113010
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY
OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
VOLUME ONE
New York
The Macmillan Co.
London
The
Cambridge University Press
Bombay, Calcutta and
Madras
Macmillau and Co., Ltd.
Toronto
The Macmillan Co, of
Canada, Ltd.
All rights reserved
THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY
OF THE
BRITISH EMPIRE
General Editors
J. HOLLAND ROSE, M.A., LITT.D.
Vere Harms zvorth Professor of Naval History
in the University of Cambridge; Fellow
of Chris? s College
A. P. NEWTON, M.A., D.LiT.
Rhodes Professor of Imperial History in
the University of London; Fellow
of Kings College ^ London
E. A. BENIANS, M.A.
Fellow and Senior Tutor ofSt John's College
Cambridge
VOLUME I
THE OLD EMPIRE
FROM THE BEGINNINGS
TO 1783
NEW YORK: THE MAGMILLAN COMPANY
CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND: AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1929
PREFACE
JN OTHING in the early existence of Britain indicated the great-
ness which she was destined to attain." So wrote Lord Macaulay in
the introduction to his most famous work; and though the seed of
England's later imperial power may be found in the unity, the law,
the institutions, and the sea instinct, of which she became possessed
in the Middle Ages, it was not until late in the fifteenth century that
her oceanic expansion began. It is therefore with the Tudor period
that this History opens. Out of the ambitions of that adventurous
age, when men dreamed great dreams for England and set out to
realise them, grew the maritime State which, shaped amid the suc-
cessive conflicts of modern history, has developed in the twentieth
century into the British Commonwealth of Nations. A long story of
colonisation and imperial policy, of the rise and growth of new
nations and the assumption of vast responsibilities, a story varied in
its scene, but finding its unity in the activities of a maritime and
commercial people, runs through the intervening centuries. The
time has not yet come when that story can be finally written. The
British Empire is still in the long process of its growth. The latest
phase of its development is still too near to us, and, in its past, rich
but neglected fields still offer a mine of wealth to the historical
student. But in the forty-five years which have elapsed since the
late Professor Sir John Seeley delivered at Cambridge his lectures on
the "Expansion of England" and shed a new light on the history of
the Empire, much has happened to increase public interest in a
subjectwhich to an unique degree challenges the attention of statesmen
and the labours of scholars. The time has passed when the research
of any one man could suffice for the varied work which a compre-
hensive history of the British Empire demands, and it has been
deemed essential in the present undertaking to follow the plan of
the Cambridge Modern History and to invite the co-operation of many
students who are specialists in different parts of the subject. That
such a method can be entirely successful with this or any other
historical theme it is too much to hope. But within the limitations
imposed on them by the difficulties of the co-operative method and
the vastness of their subject, the Editors hope that this History of the
British Empire will exhibit the present state of knowledge of the subject
and lay a foundation on which future generations of students may
build.
The work has been planned in eight volumes, of which the first
three will relate the general history of British oversea expansion and
imperial policy, volumes four and five the history of British India
(these two volumes being edited by Professor H. H. Dodwell and also
vi PREFACE
published as part of the Cambridge History of India), and the remaining
three the history of Canada and Newfoundland, Australia and New
Zealand, and South Africa. The history of the various parts of the
dependent Empire will be treated in the first three volumes in con-
nection with the general story of the Empire's growth and policy. The
volumes on the history of the Dominions arc being written for the
most part by scholars of the Dominions, and the Editors have had the
great advantage of the co-operation, as Advisers, of Professor W. P.
McC. Kennedy for the volume on Canada and Newfoundland,
Professor Ernest Scott and Professor J. Right for the volume on
Australia and New Zealand, and Professor E. A. Walker for the
volume on South Africa. They desire to express their very great
appreciation of the assistance thus given to them, since without close
touch with the historical scholarship of the Dominions these volumes
could not well have been undertaken.
The present volume covers the first phase of British expansion
when the centre of the outer Empire lay across the Atlantic and when
only the foundations of our eastern power had been laid. In planning
it the Editors have endeavoured to keep in due perspective the pro-
gress of the mainland and island communities of the west and to
treat the general growth of the Empire in its relation to the conflicts
of Europe. They have also paid considerable attention to commerce,
always the life blood of the Empire, and to die development of its
naval power and policy, so simply summarised by Halifax in his
words "Look to your moate." While they trust that they have fully
illustrated the stages and character of colonial growth, their principal
care has been to give prominence to the main course of imperial
development.
The story told in this volume describes not only a phase of
British expansion, but also the origins of one of the greatest States of
history. American scholars have worked indefatigably at their own
history, and the Editors feel fortunate in having the assistance of
Professor C. M. Andrews of Yale University in a field of colonial
policy he has made his own. The lamented death of Professor
Clarence W. Alvord, before he had completed the chapters he had
kindly undertaken on the American Revolution, deprived the volume
of the further assistance from the other side of the Atlantic for which
the Editors had hoped. Their special thanks arc due to Mr Cecil
Headlam who, besides other contributions that he has made to the
volume, also undertook these chapters in Professor Alvord's place.
Another of our contributors, who was a pioneer in the study of
British colonial history, the late Professor Egerton, did not live to
revise the proofs of his chapter, for doing which and for much other
kindly help and advice the thanks of the Editors arc due to Sir
Charles Lucas. Professor Egerton took the warmest interest in the
whole undertaking, aided it with his counsel and contributed to it
PREFACE vii
the last of his writings. We also gratefully remember here the kindness
of the late Mr G. L. Kingsford, who had promised to contribute a
chapter which, unhappily, he was never able to complete.
The Bibliography is based on material supplied by contributors
and has been arranged and edited by Miss Lillian M. Penson, Ph.D.,
Lecturer in History in Birkbeck College, University of London. The
special thanks of the Editors are due to her for her labour and care
in the matter, also to the contributors, especially Professor C. M.
Andrews, Mr. C. Headlam, Dr H. W. V. Temperley and Dr J. A.
Williamson, who have supplied the material for this part of the work.
Acknowledgment is also due to the Controller of H.M. Stationery
Office for the permission readily given to reproduce the extract from
the Eighteenth Report of the Royal Commission on Historical
Manuscripts (Cd. 8384) which appears on pp. 839-84.2. The contents
of the Bibliography are shown on p. 823, and here we need only
observe that it consists of a selected list of the most important sources,
both documentary and published, relating to the history of the Old
Empire. It is also for the most part restricted to the internal history
of the Empire. Although certain aspects of British foreign policy
which concern the growth of the Empire are necessarily treated in
our narrative, a full bibliography of that subject would lie outside
the purpose of this work. Special Bibliographies relating to the history
of Canada, Australasia and South Africa will appear in the volumes
devoted to the Dominions.
The Editors take this opportunity to express their thanks also to
Dr Temperley for valued advice on many occasions, to Dr C. W.
Previte-Orton, Editor of the English Historical Review, for assistance
kindly given, to Mr N. H. France, Naden Student of St John's
College, Cambridge, who has compiled the Index, to Mr S. C.
Roberts, Secretary to the Syndics, and the Staff of the University
Press for their ever ready co-operation, and to all their contributors,
without whose courtesy and forbearance their task would have been
even more formidable.
J.H.R.
A.P.N.
E.A.B.
8 March, 1929
CHUB I
ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS AND SOURCES
QUOTED IN THIS VOLUME
Am. H.R.
B.M.Add.MSS
B.T. Journal
B.T.
Gal. St. Pap. Col.
Cal. St. Pap. Dom.
Cal. St. Pap. For.
Chatham MSS
CJ.
C.O.
E.H.R.
J.H.R. New York
J.H.B. Va.
tj.
N.R.S.
N.Y. Col Doc.
Pat. Roll.
P.R.O.
St. Pap. Col )
St. Pap. Dom. >
St. Pap. For. )
American Historical Review.
Additional MSS in the MS Department of the British
Museum.
Journal of the Board of Trade.
Documents in the Board of Trade Archives (P.R.O.).
! Calendars of State Papers, Colonial, Domestic, Foreign, in
P.R.O., London.
MSS of Earl of Chatham and the younger Pitt in P.R.O.,
London.
Journals of the House of Commons.
Documents in the Colonial Office Archives, P, R.O., I-ondon.
English Historical Review.
Journal of House of Representatives, New York.
Journal of House of Burgesses, Virginia,
Journals of the House of Lords.
Publications of the Navy Records Society, London,
Documents... Colonial History of New York, 1*5 vols., ed.
O'Callaghan.
Patent Rolls in P.R.O., London.
H.M. Public Record Office, London.
MS Documents of State Papers, Colonial, Domestic,
Foreign, in P.R.O., London.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
By SIR CHARLES LUCAS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., late Assistant
Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, formerly Fellow
of All Souls College, Oxford page i
CHAPTER II
ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
By J. A. WILLIAMSON, M.A., D.Lit.
PAGE
Incentives to Exploration 22
The Cabot Voyages 25
Bristol Enterprises 27
The Newfoundland Fishery 29
Policy of Henry VII and Henry VIII 31
The Brazil Trade 33
The Western Adventurers 35
Economic Changes 37
The North-East Passage 39
The Muscovy Company 41
The African Trade 43
Anglo-Portuguese Negotiations 45
Oceanic War with Portugal 47
Hawkins in the Caribbean 49
The Tudor Navy 51
CHAPTER III
THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION,
1569-1618
By A. P. NEWTON, D.Lit., F.S.A., Rhodes Professor of Imperial
History in the University of London, Fellow of Bang's College,
London.
Ribault and Stukely's Schemes , ... 55
Colonising Schemes in Ireland 57
The Company of Kathai 59
Gilbert's Plan to attack the Fishing Fleets 61
The Portuguese Succession 63
The Levant Company 65
Gilbert and CarleilJ's Rival Schemes fj
x CONTENTS
PAGE
Arguments for Colonisation 69
The first Colony in Virginia 71
The African Trade 73
Sir Thomas Smythe 75
The Treaty of London 77
The Virginia Charter of 1606 . 79
The Virginia Charter of 1609 .... 81
Sir Thomas Dale in Vnginia 83
The Foundation of the Bermuda Colony 85
Colonising Attempts in Guiana 87
John Smith's Description of New England 89
Raleigh's last Expedition 91
CHAPTER IV
SEA POWER
I. THE SPIRIT OF ADVENTURE
By J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D., Vere Harmsworth Professor of Naval
History, Fellow of Christ's College, and F. R. SALTER, M.A.,
Fellow and Tutor of Magdalene College.
Sir Thomas More ^3
The Significance of Morc's Utopia 95
Shakespeare and the New Woild P7
Francis Drake 99
Drake in the Pacific ioi
Frobisher's Voyages 103
Gilbert and the Western Qpcst I0r,
The Elizabethan Sea-Dogs 107
Sir Walter Raleigh KKJ
Hostility to Spain 1 1 \
The Fall of Raleigh 113
II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND EXPANSION,
1580-1660
By J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D.
Geographical and Political Factors in the Struggle with Spain . . . 114
Superiority of the English Navy 117
The Rupture with Spain, 1585 u<j
English and Spanish Naval Strategy . .ISM
Efforts against the Spanish Flota 12g
Exhaustion of Spain Ia^
Oceanic Commerce and Anglo-Dutch Rivalry 127
Decline of Naval Efficiency lay
Colonisation and Maritime Enterprise 131
National Unity and Colonial Security 133
Cromwell's Naval Supremacy i«j3
CONTENTS xi
CHAPTER V
THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
By A. P. NEWTON, D.Lit., F.S.A.
PAGE
Comparative Paucity of Emigration under James I 136
Economic and Religious Difficulties 137
The Amazons Company 139
The Breach with Spain 141
The first Settlement of St Christopher 143
Conflicting Grants of Barbados 145
The Council of New England 147
The Tobacco Contract 149
Quarrels in the Virginia Company 151
Scottish Colonial Schemes 153
Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye, 1632 155
The Mayflower Pilgrims 157
The Massachusetts Bay Company 159
Government in Massachusetts 161
Connecticut and Rhode Island . . , 163
New Haven 165
Royal Government in Virginia 167
Proprietary Government in Maryland 169
Struggles for Barbados 171
Decline of Spanish Power in the Caribbean 173
Constitutional Position of the Colonies 175
The Commission for Plantations 177
The Colonies in the Civil War 179
Sir David Kirke in Newfoundland 181
CHAPTER VI
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD,
1450-1648
By A. PEARCE HIGGINS, C.B.E., LL.D., K.C., Whewell Professor
of International Law, Fellow of Trinity College.
The Bulls of Alexander VI 183
Discovery as a Basis of Title 185
"Lines of Amity" 187
Vague Ideas of Neutrality 189
Rights of Aborigines in newly-found Lands 191
Sovereignty of Native Races ignored 193
Extravagant Claims to Sovereignty of the Sea 195
English Claims over the adjacent Seas 197
Queen Elizabeth and the Freedom of the Seas 199
Disputes between England and Holland aoi
The "Bat tic of the Books" 203
Writers on the Law of Nations 205
xii CONTENTS
CHAPTER VII
THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY,
1649-1660
By J. A. WILLIAMSON, M.A., D.Lit. PAGE
Lack of a clear Imperial Policy before 1650 207
The Enemies of the Commonwealth 209
The Colonies in 1649 211
Mercantile Principles 213
The Navigation Act of 1650 215
The Navigation Act of 1651 217
Submission of the Colonies 219
The Dutch in the Atlantic 221
The First Dutch War 223
England and Spanish America 225
Cromwell and Mazarin 227
The War with Spain 229
Surinam 231
The Caribbee Islands 233
Emigration 235
The Slave Trade 237
CHAPTER VIII J
THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION,
1660-1713
By J. A. WILLIAMSON, M.A., D.Lit.
Causes contributing to National Divergence 239
The Caribbee Islands 241
Barbados 243
Jamaica . . . 245
The Bermuda Company ... 247
Colonial Migration 249
New England and New Netherland 2rj j
New York and New Jersey 2*53
Pennsylvania 2^5
Virginia and Maryland 257
Infraction of the Laws of Trade 2^9
The Revolution in New York ajjx
The Revolutionary Settlement 263
The Darien Scheme 265
Colonial Population 267
CHAPTER IX /
THE ACTS OF TRADE
By CHARLES M. ANDREWS, L.H.D., Farnam Professor of
American History in Yale University.
Formulation of a definite Commercial and Colonial Programme . . 268
Early Councils of Trade afjq
The Navigation Act of 1660 ! 271
CONTENTS xiii
PAGE
Enumerated Commodities 273
The Staple Act of 1663 275
The Plantation Duty 277
Ireland and the Navigation Acts 279
Protests from the Colonies 281
Acts loosely enforced 283
The Navigation Act of 1696 285
Instructions to Governors 289
The Naval Officer 291
Customs Officials 293
Vice-Admiralty Courts 295
Jurisdiction of Vice-Admiralty Courts 297
Changes in 1 764 and 1768 299
CHAPTER X *
RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
By W. F. REDDAWAY, M.A., Fellow of King's College and
University Lecturer in History.
The Rise of Britain as a World Power 300
Europe in the Age of Louis XIV * . .301
The Missionary Motive in Colonisation 303
Commerce in the Age of Louis XIV 305
Colbert and French Colonial Policy * 307
Colbert's Commercial Policy 309
French, Dutch and English Colonisation 311
Rivalry of French, Dutch and English 313
Growth of Danger from France 315
Anti-Dutch Designs 317
French Aggression and Wars on Land 319
Struggle between France and Europe 321
The Partition Treaties 323
The War of the Spanish Succession 325
The Spanish Succession and the Colonies 327
The Peace of Utrecht 329
CHAPTER XI
THE WEST INDIES AND THE SPANISH-AMERICAN
TRADE, 1713-1748
By LILLIAN M. PENSON, Ph.D., Lecturer in History in
Birkbeck College, University of London.
Importance of the West Indies * 330
West Indian Trade 33*
Spanish Colonial Trade 333
Negotiations of 1711-13 335
xlv CONTENTS
PAGE
The South Sea Company 337
The "Annual Ship" 339
Prevalence of Illicit Trade 34 1
The War of Jenkins's Ear 343
Surrender of the Asiento 345
CHAPTER XII
RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
By W. F. REDDAWAY, M.A.
Sir Robert Walpole and William Pitt 346
British Liberties 347
The Stuart Menace 349
Great Britain and Hanover 351
European Complexities and Dangers 353
International Position of Great Britain 355
The Triple Alliance (1717) 357
Great Britain and Europe after Utrecht 359
Great Britain and the Northern Settlement 361
Walpole and his Ministry 363
The Return of Bolingbroke 365
Fleury, Walpole and George II 367
Decline of the Entente 369
The Spanish and Austrian Wars 371
Austrian Recovery: Treaty of Worms 373
"The 'Forty-five": Louisbourg and Peace 375
CHAPTER XIII
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES UNDKK
THE FIRST GEORGES, 1714-1755
By CECIL HEADLAM, M.A., Editor of the Calendar of
State Papers, Colonial Series.
Representative Institutions in the Colonies 377
The West Indies 379
Absentee Landlords $l\
Revolt of the Maroons 383
The American Colonies 385
Governors' Salaries and Revenue 387
Colonial Separatism , 389
Schemes for Defence jj^i
Nova Scotia, Virginia »g«j
Carolina and Georgia 3^,
Shipbuilding and Currency j^jy
Post, Education and Newspapers 399
Population and Immigration . . . . , . . . „ 401
Religious Denominations
CONTENTS xv
CHAPTER XIV •
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
By CHARLES M. ANDREWS, L.H.D.
PAGE
Variety of Governmental Forms 405
Early Experiments 407
Normal Type of Colonial Government 409
Royal Officials in the Colonies 411
The Board of Trade 413
Treasury and Admiralty 415
Colonial Governors 417
Governors' Instructions 419
Provincial Council 421
Position of the Assembly 423
Controversy over Privileges 425
Powers of the Assembly 427
Assembly Procedure 429
The Speaker 431
Control of the Finances 433
Other Forms of Encroachment 435
CHAPTER XV
THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND THE
AFRICAN SETTLEMENTS
By EVELINE C. MARTIN, M.A., Ph.D., Lecturer in History in
Westfield College, University of London.
The Slave Trade as the Foundation of West Indian Prosperity . . 437
Sir Nicholas Crisp's Guinea Company 439
French, Dutch and English on the Gold Coast 441
Methods of the Slave Trade 443
The Royal African Company's Monopoly 447
The English Ports and the Slave Trade 449
The Company of Merchants trading to Africa 451
Defective Knowledge of the Interior 453
The Government of Senegambia 455
War with the French and Dutch 457
Change in British Relations with Africa 459
CHAPTER XVI
THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
By W. F. REDDAWAY, M.A.
The Decade after the Peace of Ahc-la-Chapelle 460
Franco-British Antagonism 46*
The Problem of Alliances 463
French and British in America 465
Washington at Fort Necessity 4^7
xvi CONTENTS
PAGE
Growing Tension between France and Great Britain 469
The Convention of Westminster 47 l
The Advent of William Pitt 473
Anglo-Prussian Go-operation 475
Pitt and Frederick the Great 477
British Victories in 1758 479
Pitt and the French Invasion 4&1
Victories of 1759 4^3
CHAPTER XVII
THE PEACE OF PARIS
By H. W. V. TEMPERLEY, O.B.E., Litt.D., F.B.A., Reader in
Modern History, Fellow of Peterhouse.
A Year of Triumph 485
Policy of Charles III 487
Bute as the Dispenser of Royal Favours 489
Proposals of Choiseul 491
Pitt's last Council 493
Bute's Conduct towards Frederick the Great 495
Bute and the Cabinet 497
Fall of Bute jgcj
The Value of the Peace f>oi
Pitt and the City 503
Shelburne's Defence of the Peace 505
CHAPTER XVIII
SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
By J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D.
Recovery of England's Naval Strength under Cromwell .... 507
The New Era of National Policy and Expansion 509
The Struggle for North America 5x1
Operations in the West Indies 513
Perilous Situation of the Colonies 515
Treaty of Ryswick; Dampier 517
A Typical West India Expedition 519
Gibraltar and Imperial Defence f,u i
The Peace of Utrecht 5^3
The First Capture of Louisbourg . 525
Origins of the Seven Years' War . . , 527
The Navy in the East Indies 529
ChoiseuTs Plan of Invasion 531
British Naval Successes in 1759-60 533
Increase of British Commerce 535
Captain James Cook 536
Results of British Naval Supremacy 537
CONTENTS xvii
CHAPTER XIX
THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. MARI-
TIME RIGHTS AND COLONIAL TITLES, 1648-1763
By A. PEARGE HIGGINS, C.B.E., LL.D., K.C.
PAGE
The Development of Maritime Law 538
English Pretensions to the Sovereignty of the Seas 539
The Three Mile Limit 541
Fishing Rights 543
Status of Indian Tribes 545
Pacific Blockade 547
"Free Ships, Free Goods" 549
The "Rule of the War of 1756" 551
Neutrality as a Doctrine of International Law 553
Contraband 555
Blockade and the Right of Search 557
Letters of Marque 559
CHAPTER XX
MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
By J. F. REES, M.A., M.Com., Professor of Commerce
in the University of Birmingham.
Mercantilism as the Economic Expression of militant Nationalism . . 561
The Balance of Trade 563
Importance of a large Population 565
Economic Subjection of Colonies 567
Consolidation of the Colonial System 569
Mercantilist Evaluation of the Colonies 571
Opposition to Colonial Manufactures 573
Production of Naval Stores encouraged 575
The Bounty Policy 577
Colonial Provision Trade 579
West Indian Sugar — British and Foreign 581
Competitive Weakness of British Sugar 583
Significance of the Molasses Act 585
Restrictions on Colonial Iron Manufacture 587
Growing Importance of the Continental Colonies 589
Guadeloupe versus Canada 591
Effects of Commercial Regulations 593
The R61e of Credit 595
Currency Difficulties 597
Indebtedness of the Colonists 599
Weak Points of Trade with the Colonies 601
xviii CONTENTS
CHAPTER XXI
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE—
FROM BACON TO BLACKSTONE
By J. EWING, M.A., Professor of History in Rhodes University
College, Grahamstown, South Africa.
PAGE
The Continuity of Constitutional Evolution 603
Bacon and the Plantations 605
Property and Political Power 607
"Fundamental Constitutions" of Carolina 609
Influence of Harrington in Amciica 611
Organisation of the English Colonial System 613
Application of English Law to the Colonies 615
John Locke 617
Charles Davenant *H9
William Paterson *>2 1
Dean Swift on Colonisation 6*23
The Craftsman on Colonial Appointments 625
Berkeley's Bermuda Project t>27
Hume on the Influence of Climate 629
The American Question f>3 1
Influence of Blackstonc ^'133
CHAPTER XXII
I. IMPERIAL' RECONSTRUCTION, 17(53 17(15
By CECIL HEADLAM, M.A.
Necessity of remodelling the Administrative Machinery of the Colonies . 634
Plans for Defence ^35
The Conspiracy of Pontiac ^37
Need of a Standing Army 639
The Proclamation of 1763 <>.ji
Protection of Indians (J.J3
The Stamp Act t>43
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE WITH TUB
AMERICAN COLONIES, 1765-1776
By CECIL HEADLAM, M.A.
Evolution of the Americans f»,j7
Otis and Henry (>4<j
Colonial Separatism <>;>i
Effects of Grcnville's Measures 6-,;j
Resistance to the Stamp Act 655
The Theory of the Revolution (15,7
Repeal of the Stamp Act f>f,9
The Declaratory Act 6(5 1
Townshend's Import Duties (Jfrj
Dickinson's Letters from a Farmer (>l>,
Hillsborough, Colonial Secretary 6(37
CONTENTS xix
PAGE
Repeal of the Revenue Act 669
The Gaspee Affair 671
The Whateley Letters . 673
The Boston Tea-party
Suppression of Loyalists
The Continental Congress
Lexington and Bunker's Hill
675
677
679
681
Paine's Common Sense 683
CHAPTER XXIII
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE
COLONIAL SPHERE, 1763-1783
By CECIL HEADLAM, M.A.
Britain's Gains at the Peace of Paris 685
Policy of Choiseul 687
La France tquinoxiale 689
The French West Indies 691
The Manila Ransom 693
Spain and the South Seas 695
France and Corsica 697
The Falkland Isknds 699
Fall of Choiseul 703
Beaumarchais' Mission 705
Beaumarchais and Deane 707
The Quebec Act 709
Franco- American Treaty, 1778 711
British Successes Overseas 713
War with Spain and Holland 715
CHAPTER XXIV
THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
1775-1782
By G. T. ATKINSON, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer in
Modern History, Exeter College, Oxford.
British Difficulties in North America 717
"Bunker's Hill" 7*9
Boston evacuated 721
Howe captures New York 723
Arnold delays Carleton's Advance 725
Howe's Change of Plan 7«7
Howe's Move against Philadelphia 729
Burgoyne in Difficulties 731
Howe's Success at the Brandywine 733
The Effects of Saratoga 735
The Instructions to Clinton 737
xx CONTENTS
PAGE
Lord Howe thwarts D'Estaing 739
KeppePs Action off Ushant 74 1
The Capture and Defence of Savannah 743
The Allied Fleet in the Channel 745
The Campaign in the Southern Colonies 747
Rodney's Action against de Guichen 749
Cornwallis's Operations in the South 751
Cornwallis's Move to Virginia 753
The Chesapeake and Yorktown 755
Minorca and St Christopher 757
The Relief of Gibraltar 759
CHAPTER XXV
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND
BRITISH POLITICS, i776--i7«3
By CECIL HEADLAM, M.A.
A Majority in Great Britain in favour of Coercion 761
The American Revolution — A Civil War 763
North's Conciliatory Bills 763
Death of Chatham 767
Rockingham's Cabinet 769
Negotiations for Peace 771
Fox and Shelburne 773
Shelburne succeeds Rockingham 775
The North-West Angle 777
Demands of France and Spain 779
Preliminaries signed at Versailles 781
Imperial Example of the United States 7*1$
CHAPTER XXVI
THE LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE
OF THE OLD EMPIRE
By the late H. E. EGERTON, M.A., sometime Beit Professor of Colonial
History in the University of Oxford and Fellow of All Souls College.
Three Types of Colony 784
Virginia as an Aristocratic Society 785
The Church in Virginia 787
Intellectual Life 789
Causes of Alienation from Great Britain 791
Social Life in the Garolinas 793
Social Organisation in New England 795
Religious Repression 797
Cotton Mather 799
Boston in 1721 , Hoi
CONTENTS xxi
PAGE
Samuel Edwards 803
Evil Effects of a lax Land System 805
Benjamin Franklin 807
Pennsylvania 809
Burnaby's Travels through North America 811
The West Indies 813
Jamaica 815
Neglect of the Island Garrisons 817
Condition of the Slaves 819
Social Conditions in Barbados 821
BlBUOGRAPHY 823
INDEX 889
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
JtlfNGLAND, on account of the natural fertility of the soil, of the
great extent of the seacoast in proportion to that of the whole country,
and of the many navigable rivers which run through it, and afford the
conveniency of water carriage to some of the most inland parts of it,
is perhaps as well^ fitted by nature as any large country in Europe to
be the seat of foreign commerce, of manufactures for distant sale, and
of all the improvements which these can occasion."1 This was Adam
Smith's guarded estimate of the natural advantages of England for
foreign trade, published in the Wealth of Nations at the time when the
old British Empire was coming to an end.
Through the centuries the world had known a variety of empires,
but empires and colonisation had no necessary concern with each
other. No element of colonisation, other than the forcible deportation
of peoples, entered into the empires of Egypt, Assyria and Babylon.
Colonisation and colonies, in the ordinary sense, began, not with em-
pires, or with nations, which were as yet unformed, but with the city
states of the Mediterranean world, with the Phoenicians and Greeks
who crossed the water to establish trading stations or to found new
homes. By water far more than by land colonisation went forward,
and unbridged distance from the original metropolis or mother city
was substituted for the more or less continuous widening out from a
dominating centre which characterised the land empires of the earliest
times. A further stage was reached when, centrally placed on the
North African coast, the Phoenician colony of Carthage subjected
the neighbouring cities and countryside, established by sea distant
trading stations on the coast of North-West Africa, and went far to-
wards creating a land empire in Spain. Carthage fell before Rome,
which beginning as a city, ended as a world — the Mediterranean
world. Rome made an empire of more or less well-governed de-
pendencies, and with Roman rule was coupled Roman colonisation
carried out alike by land and sea.
In the Mediterranean world the peninsulas led the islands. There
was for a time one marked exception. The magnificent geographical
position of Sicily attracted incomers, whose cities and their rulers
rose one after another to wealth and temporary leadership; but that
island, never unified under either Greek or Carthaginian, wholly
failed to become the centre of a Mediterranean empire. Among the
ancients the land dominated the sea; sea-fighting was hardly more
1 Smith, Adam, Wealth of Nations; bk ni, chap. iv»
CHBE I *
2 INTRODUCTION
than land-fighting on water; and an island-born empire, based on
the sea alone, was beyond the mental horizon of the ancient world.
In the Middle Ages colonies and trading stations were still the work
of city states, especially of the maritime republics of Genoa and
Venice in the central peninsula of the Mediterranean. They traded
chiefly within the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, but from
them came Columbus and Cabot, who brought to light the western
world. The westernmost peninsula of the Mediterranean, which
abutted also on the outer sea and was shared between Portugal and
Spain, became, as was natural, the birthplace of oceanic discovery
and of the modern history which flowed from it.
In the Middle Ages also had arisen a species of colonies on
sufferance, the offspring of trade, and a notable clement in European
overseas history. They originated in extra-territorial rights granted
at Constantinople by the Emperors of the East to bodies of traders
from western Europe. These traders were permitted to form within
limits small self-governing communities in the capital eity of the East.
Such rights were acquired by citizens of the trading-city republics of
Italy, the Venetians obtaining the privileges early in the eleventh
century, the Genoese towards its close. The pri\ Urges were continued
after Constantinople had been taken by the Turks; they became in
fact more pronounced as they were more needed, when the sove-
reign power from which they emanated was Muslim, and exhibited
vital differences of religion, Jaw and custom. Thus the Capitulations,
of which so much has been heard, came into being and began to make
history. Among the western nations the French were the first to
obtain from the Porte in 1536 extra-territorial privileges, and in 1583
the English, through the medium of the Levant Company, secured
similar rights and immunities. Thenceforward, within the Ottoman
dominions these privileges were constantly maintained and extended,
and in the nineteenth century came a successful demand for the grant
of similar rights further cast, notably in China.
Long before the first Capitulation was obtained by the English,
colonies on sufferance had been in evidence much nearer home. They
were the product of a time before the western nations had been
crystallised, when amid fluid conditions alien merchants sought
security and convenience for their persons and their trade by being
allowed to live to a large extent on an extra-territorial basis in the; city
or land in which they were residents. Such was the position of the
Hanse merchants in London and of the Merchant Adventurers of
England at Bruges, Antwerp or Hamburg who earned the title of
"the English nation beyond the sea". Bringing wealth to the cities
where they sojourned, special privileges were gladly accorded to the
Merchant Adventurers by the lords of those cities, and in normal
times they were allowed to manage their own affairs and settle thdr
own causes in their own way, while by royal charter their own English
INTRODUCTION 3
king gave them self-governing rights. Companies of this kind were
nurseries for the coming time. They developed the trading capacity
of the Englishman and enlarged his outlook; they strengthened his
instinct to be licensed but not fettered by the State; they taught him
the machinery which would suit his purpose — the chartered company;
they trained him in the art of self-government; and the early trading
grants under which the merchants exercised their rights became, in
the infancy of the overseas empire, first drafts for colonial charters of
much wider scope.
With Henry VII and his dynasty we come to the immediate prelude
to the Empire, and it will be well to notice what developments in the
Tudor Age were essential preliminaries to the particular kind of
empire which came into being. For the founding of an empire it was
necessary that England should turn her back upon the continent
and eschew attempts at continental dominion. These attempts had
signally failed and it was inevitable that any repetition of them would
fail even more disastrously, in proportion as the several nations of
western Europe gathered unity and strength. English expansion
was to be looked and worked for, not across the narrow sea, not on
the adjoining mainland, not primarily by force of arms, assuredly
not by land campaigns on continental soil, but beyond the ocean.
A kindly destiny led our people to concentrate on developing
their island nationhood and building up their sea power — tasks
which were achieved under the Tudor sovereigns. Then, too, the
Reformation greatly strengthened nationhood, cancelling any claims
to spiritual overlordship from outside with the statutory declaration,
"This realm of England is an Empire," and adding religious fervour
to insular patriotism. Even the one reactionary Tudor queen, by
losing Calais, cut England still further adrift from the mainland and
to that extent strengthened the insularity of her people.
The hundred years' prelude to the Empire belonged in this island
to England alone. Northern Britain took no hand in the preliminary
spadework. England completed her own unification, but there was as
yet no unifying of the whole island. Before the first permanent English
settlement was made overseas, England and Scotland had come under
one king, but they were two separate peoples still, with no love for
each other, and the first century of the Empire in actual making, the
seventeenth century, passed away before Scotland came into partner-
ship. With other nations unity at home nearly always preceded ex-
pansion abroad, but the British Empire had gone on its way for a
hundred years, frgm 1608 to 1707, before the mother island was
united. From this cause it has followed, first, that neither Great
Britain nor the enlargement of it which we call the British Empire
has ever lost its elements of diversity, and secondly that it is chiefly
from England that the methods used in making our Empire have been
derived. Slow and gradual are our English processes, not parting
1-2
4 INTRODUCTION
with what has gone before in order to build on wholly new foun-
dations, but adapting the past to present needs, not sketching out
ground plans for the future, but working day by day for what the day
may bring forth. In the history of England there was no single wave of
discovery and conquest combined such as carried the Spanish Empire
almost to its fullest territorial extension within the first half of the
sixteenth century. There was instead an age of exploration and knight
errantry prior to and quite distinct from the age of settlement. Of
the knights errant of the sixteenth century Drake annexed the Gali-
fornian coast for Queen Elizabeth, Gilbert declared English sove-
reignty over Newfoundland, and Raleigh's attempts at colonisation
gave birth to the name Virginia. But permanent settlement beyond
the Atlantic had to wait for a more prosaic time, when the combined
resources of many individuals might be directed to a .single object by
means of a chartered company. At the very end of the century of
beginnings, 31 December 1600, the greatest of all English Companies,
the East India Company, was incorporated by Queen Elizabeth, and
England entered consistently on the course of empire-building in
which since then she has never faltered,
"The settlement of our colonies was never pursued upon any regular
plan; but they were formed, grew, and flourished as accidents, the
nature of the climate, or the dispositions of private men, happened to
operate."1 From the first the main feature of the British Empire was
diversity. Nevertheless there was a certain amount of uniformity in
the method of colonising, for the licensed company was the favourite
English agency for colonisation as well as for trade. This was natural,
for from the beginning, with the notable exception of the Puritan
colonies, outward expansion was initiated and promoted chiefly with
a view to returns in the form of trade. In India the trade motive was
entirely dominant, and along the African coast only a few scattered
forts and factories were set up to carry on the slave trade. The real
course of empire for Englishmen in the seventeenth century (lowed
westward. Beyond the western ocean were the colonies, the new
homes, New England and — in name though not in fact New Scot-
land— Nova Scotia. Nor were the new homes to he found only on the
mainland of North America or in Newfoundland- The tropical heat
of the West Indian islands did not prevent them from incoming
abiding places for the British race, real plantations of Britons, as
witness the thousands of resident white citizens of Barbados in the
middle of the seventeenth century. Even in the eighteenth century,
down to the time when the old thirteen colonies parted company with
the motherland, for fully 170 years of its existence the British Empire
was to an overwhelming extent a western empire, rooted and grounded
in North America and the West Indies.
1 [Burke, Edmund], An Account of Hie Euwptw .S>//fonm/t in Amrtitn (Lon<\nu<
Pt vii, chap. xx.
INTRODUCTION 5
It was a most one-sided empire — a distinct source of weakness.
Moreover it was an empire in which almost from the first centrifugal
forces were exceptionally strong. It is true that the initial emigration
to Virginia was sped on its way with acclamation and goodwill, and
that relief of distress and the desire for trade were in the background
of the venture, not political or religious dissent of any kind. But the
century was not far advanced before discord began to make itself felt.
Into the making of the Empire there entered a strain of antagonism
to political and religious authority as exercised at home, and into the
minds of quiet men a longing to flee away, to be rid of the strife, the
bitterness and confusion. The motive to be quit of the government of
England rather than any desire to widen her territory or expand her
power became for many years the driving force of English colonisa-
tion. New England was planted with this feeling of aloofness, and
Barbados, where the King's men found refuge, reproduced in inverted
fashion the Civil War of the mother island. From the accession of
Charles I until the Revolution of 1688 there were incessant cross-
currents in the British Isles unsettling men's minds or bringing them
to ruin so that they were ready to flee across the ocean to better them-
selves. Every change of government brought its own crop of exiles.
The fierce fighting of the Civil War in England, the savage sequel to
Monmouth's rising, the endless hostilities and punitive expeditions in
Scotland and Ireland — all sent fugitives overseas. The youth of the
Empire was cradled in change and revolution, and constant uncer-
tainty as to what authority should be obeyed had the inevitable result
that any authority exercised from home was more or less suspect.
While systematic control would probably under no circumstances
have been either established or tolerated by the colonists, under the
conditions of the seventeenth century it was out of the question.
To the right appreciation of the Empire a clear understanding of
its first century is essential. An island people had after many genera-
tions been brought to recognise by costly experience that expansion
for them, if they meant to expand at all, was not to be on the neigh-
bouring continent. Instinctively and by force of circumstances they
developed their island nationhood and their sea power. They did it
gradually and therefore did it well. They went far afield on the waters,
and on the waters they secured their existence and found their profit,
withstanding, as they have withstood ever since, any Power which for
the time being threatened to dominate the world. Their wars, their
trading ventures and piracies, profitable all, familiarised them with
distance as a necessary ingredient in English expansion. If they were
to have oversea possessions at all, other than Ireland, these must be
at a distance from the mother country, not closely linked to her or
under her immediate eye. To this physical difficulty the seventeenth
century added moral difficulties arising out of a veritable kaleidoscope
of political and religious changes, which when transferred from the
6 INTRODUCTION
centre to the circumference produced confusion and impatience of
control. The seventeenth century shaped and coloured the old Em-
pire. By the encouragement which it had given to, or rather by the
necessity which its dissensions had created for, the self-dependence of
the parts, by its preference for diversity over uniformity, it was ulti-
mately responsible for bringing the old Empire to its grave. But from
that grave emerged a new and greater commonwealth still instinct
with the diversity which was the hall-mark of the seventeenth century.
That century was a great time for human plantation, a time when
the English race was reproduced in the New World. But plantation
did not exhaust English activities overseas. Trade must not be ignored
in reckoning up the account of the seventeenth century, and when at
length, in 1696, an agency with some element of permanence for
advising on colonial matters was created in the Board of Trade and
Plantations, trade came in front of Plantations. In the sixteenth
century the chief foreign menace to England had come from Spain.
In the eighteenth century it came from France. Throughout a
large part of the seventeenth century the main source of danger was
Holland. England and the Netherlands were built on the same lines.
Both of them drew their sustenance from foreign trade and lived by
the sea. "The republic was sea-born and sea-sustained", writes
Motley of the United Netherlands, and sea-born and sea-sustained
were the strength and life of England. At the close of their long and
successful fight with Spain the Netherlander had risen to an abnormal
height of power and prosperity, and had almost monopolised the
carrying trade of the world. Against them was directed in 1651
the first general Navigation Act, which was upheld in war and the
provisions of which were greatly extended immediately after the
Restoration. The primary object of the Navigation Laws was the main-
tenance and development of British sea power and, as vital to British
sea power, the breaking down of the Dutch monopoly of the carrying
trade. But, starting with this object, these laws embodied the one
attempt at a policy which aimed at treating the whole Empire as a
single unit. They created the "mercantile system'* and through them
more than in any other way home control was continuously, though
most imperfectly, exercised over the colonies. Tims trade led the
Plantations. In the East, where there were no Plantations in the
wider sense, trade surely though very slowly carried the English on
to empire, and before the century ended the East India Company
began to contemplate the necessity of a limited territorial expansion*
In this age, whether in trade or Plantations, whether in East or West,
it was almost always private citizens or groups of private citizens that
worked out British expansion, English companies were at once weaker
and stronger than Dutch. The Dutch concentrated on the Nether-
lands East India and the Netherlands West India Companies, which
could hardly be distinguished from Government agencies. While the
INTRODUCTION 7
strength of the Dutch nation was unimpaired these two companies
were immensely strong; but, whereas no such wholehearted support
by their Government was given to English companies, their fortunes
were not to the same extent as the fortunes of their Dutch competitors
bound up with those of the State. This was a great asset in a century
when English Governments seemed but a series of dissolving views.
It was no doubt impossible for companies, whose directors were
leading Englishmen domiciled in England, to be kept outside politics,
but in so fax as they were associations of private citizens for trading or
colonising purposes, licensed but as a rule not subsidised by or in any
way dependent on the State, they did not rise or fall with this Govern-
ment or that but in their particular calling carried on continuously
beyond the seas the work of an undivided England. Charles II's reign
was fruitful of companies. In 1670 was chartered the Hudson's Bay
Company, which next to the East India Company has filled the
largest space in our history. Shaflesbury and his partners were
responsible for the planting of the Carolinas. The Duke of York, after-
wards King James II, was a leading member of the African com-
panies formed to prosecute the slave trade, which with the rest of the
carrying trade had been previously in the hands of the Dutch. It
was always the same story. The Crown gave patents to individual
proprietors or to syndicates of private citizens, and derived its benefit
indirectly from the increased flow of imports and exports if the ven-
tures succeeded.
In all the three full centuries of the life of the British Empire the
'eighties have been most crucial decades. The Revolution of 1688
made the Netherlands an ally and made France, the friend of the
exiled Stuarts, an enemy. From this date onward for many genera-
tions France and Great Britain competed for leadership beyond the
seas. As far as the British colonies were concerned, the Revolution
had another and most far-reaching effect. The monarchy was placed
once for all on a constitutional basis and the powers of Parliament
were recognised beyond question. The liberties of the home country
were thereby safeguarded, but the change involved parliamentary
interference with the liberties of the colonies.
The seventeenth century made way for the eighteenth with the
opening of the first great war that was almost as important in the
colonial as in the European sphere. Marlborough's victories brought,
under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, great gains to the English
in America. But, over the seas, co-operation with the North American
colonists had been most ineffective. Little was done under their eyes
which was calculated to impress them in any way with the might of
England.
Though, while Walpole was in power, Great Britain enjoyed a
markedly long interval of peace, or rather of abstention from formal
war, the eighteenth century stands out in the history of the Empire as
8 INTRODUCTION
first and foremost a century of great wars and, as the result of great
wars, of gains and losses on a large scale. The elements which the
preceding century contributed to the childhood of the Empire were
all or nearly all growing in potency. Trade, Plantations, immense
preponderance of the West, distance, diversity, self-dependence and
self-assertion of the diverse constituent parts, all were formative
factors of prime importance. To them were now added force and
direct action by the State to an extent unknown in the previous
hundred years, and the result of the interaction of all these influences
was the dissolution of the existing Empire. In the 'eighties, after the
collapse, there was a new beginning of peaceful expansion and then
the century ended, as it had begun, in war. Its first years had been
years of present success and of much promise for the future. They had
seen Marlborough's triumphs in the War of the Spanish Succession
and a British footing in the Mediterranean gained by the taking of
Gibraltar and Minorca; parliamentary union with Scotland, in-
dispensable for the Empire, had been achieved; and British progress
in India had been assured by amalgamation of the two rival East
India Companies. The outlook was fair when the Treaty of Utrecht
was signed in 1713. What were the main features of the next seventy
years until the Treaty of Versailles in 1 783 put its seal on the downfall
of the old Empire?
France was the foreign Power which Great Britain had most to fear.
The Dutch dropped out of the front rank of competitors, and, at all
points beyond the seas, Franco-British competition made history.
But in the list of nations whose courses intersected that of Great
Britain, Spain, far behind France as a direct source of real danger,
was in some respects in front of her as a perpetual source of irritation
and collision. The Spanish oversea dominions were immense, still
more immense were Spanish claims. In great wars, down to 1 783,
Spain, for the most part following the lead of France, was almost
invariably ranged against Great Britain; and outside great wars there
was continuous friction between the citizens of the two nations and
constant fighting even when there was no recognised war. The con-
struction of the terms of the Asiento or contract for supplying slaves
to the Spanish Indies, transferred from France to Great Britain by
the Treaty of Utrecht, was a fruitful source of trouble; the wood-
cutters and squatters in what is now British Honduras occasioned a
dispute which lasted through the whole century; the Falkland Islands
brought the two Powers to the verge of war; as did also in 1790
Nootka Sound in Vancouver Island. If the British North American
colonies on their northern and western sides were solely concerned
with France, in the south they were very much concerned witli Spain.
Here the youngest of them, Oglethorpe's colony of Georgia, was not
solely a philanthropic venture but also an important British outpost
against the Spaniards in Florida. In the Mediterranean there were
INTRODUCTION 9
acute irritants to Spain in the British tenure of Gibraltar and Minorca,
uninterrupted in the case of Gibraltar, intermittent in the case
of Minorca. In the relations between Spain and Great Britain
the eighteenth century resembled the sixteenth rather than the
seventeenth, but a stronger Britain was pitted against a weaker Spain.
Against both Spain and France the mid-century foreign war, the
Seven Years' War, was for Great Britain triumphantly successful. The
old Empire rose to its topmost height immediately before it was broken
in pieces by civil and foreign war combined. What brought it to its
height was sea power. At the end of the War of the Spanish Succession
Great Britain was easily first on the sea, and the first place thence-
forward she never lost except in the years 1778-81, when the tem-
porary loss of command produced decisive effects on the struggle in
America. But Rodney's victory saved her when the old Empire
crumbled and fell, and great were the sailors whose names crowd the
first chapter of the new Empire, for the new Empire, like the old, was
born of the sea.
There was no longer any question of a Dutch monopoly of the
carrying trade, and British shipping had outgrown the need for the
forcing process of the Navigation Acts. The sole object of these Acts
was now to ensure to the market of the mother country a monopoly
of the Empire's trade. From the point of view of statesmen, merchants
and manufacturers in Great Britain in the eighteenth century not
only did trade go in front of Plantations, but Plantations were in-
terpreted in terms of trade. This was not the view of the Plantations
themselves. To them the Navigation Laws became in a growing
degree a practical nuisance, only to be tolerated in so far as they could
be evaded, and, as the Plantations themselves grew, these laws ap-
peared to be, in Adam Smith's words, " impertinent badges of slavery ".
It may well be contended that the mercantile system was beneficial
in the childhood of the Empire; and at a later date it did litde harm
to those oversea provinces whose products did not compete with the
home-grown products of Great Britain. But where, as in New England,
climate and soil promised, in the absence of artificial restrictions,
competition with the Old Country, and where the human stock had
been from the first nurtured on extreme ideas of freedom, there it was
inevitable that trade, as the mother country construed trade, and
Plantations, as they construed themselves, would sooner or later
collide, and that Plantations, having nature on their side, would
prevail.
For at any rate three-quarters of the eighteenth century trade
dictated the policy of the British Empire, yet the century was not
marked by any large growth of new trading companies. The South
Sea Company was a child of the century, but otherwise the companies
which helped to make the history of these years were in the main en-
larged versions of the old companies. With the East India Company,
io INTRODUCTION
trade led on to territorial dominion, territorial dominion to manifold
abuses, and territorial dominion and manifold abuses conduced to
constantly growing State supervision. The rise of the East was a
leading feature of the century, especially after the preponderance of
the West had disappeared with the loss of the United States. In the
East was illustrated the strength and the danger of the company
system as an agency for making an empire. In the West Indies were
illustrated both the strength and the danger of a moneyed interest,
and the tyranny that can be exercised by a much-prized commodity
when its production is a strongly entrenched monopoly. The eighteenth
century saw the reign of sugar; the reign of cotton was yet to
come.
Though, as the century grew older, the riches which flowed from
India into Britain grew rapidly in volume, yet almost to the end the
West Indies bulked larger as a source of wealth and of the political
and social influence which is derived from wealth. The West Indies
fitted admirably into the mercantile system. Here were no competing
colonies and products to arouse the apprehension of home growers
and merchants. Sugar demanded slavery and the slave trade, and
the powerful cities and classes concerned with this carrying trade
were solidly behind the West Indian planters and merchants. The
richest planters spent much of their time in England with ample
means to pull the strings of State. Rarely has any interest gathered to
itself so much power linked to so much that was odious and in-
defensible. It seems strange that such an enormity as the slave trade
should have survived the century. Towards its close, after the old
Empire had gone by the board, the voice of humanity became in-
sistent, and even in the earlier years the call of the spirit was not un-
known, as witness the story of the founding of Georgia; but in the
main, as long as the old Empire lasted, the eighteenth century, though
it was John Wesley's century, was a material age. Before 1 783 t he
capacity for rule, which is among the Englishman's best qualities, hud
not been developed, and the sense of trusteeship for coloured races
had hardly been aroused, save in the minds and consciences of
exceptional men.
Much history was crowded into the 'eighties of the eighteenth
century. With the recognition of the independence of the United
States, the West, though still prominent in what remained of the
Empire, was once for all dethroned from its inordinately high estate and
men turned from a narrow commercial view of imperial policy to a
wider outlook. No prospect of material gain guided the steps of the
United Empire Loyalists into Upper Canada and the Maritime
Provinces. The settlement at Sierra Leone testified to growing British
feeling in favour of freedom for the negro, and no force entered into the
acquisition of the territory. It was peaceably acquired by purchase
from its native owner. Peaceably acquired, too, leased in perpetuity
INTRODUCTION 11
by its native sultan to the East India Company, was the island of
Penang, a nucleus of what was to be in the twentieth century a noble
province of the Empire. Peaceably acquired, once more, was Aus-
tralia, where the first white settlement was planted on the shores of
Sydney Harbour, not typical of the eighteenth century in being peace-
ably acquired, but typical of it in being directly acquired by the State.
Meanwhile, as against the fatal collapse in the West, in India, at the
darkest time, Warren Hastings ceded not a foot of ground to Britain's
enemies. Yet before these memorable ten years were ended the
saviour of India and the friend of the Indian peasantry had been
brought to trial in Westminster Hall; and the fact of the trial, how-
ever much the proceedings should be condemned, testified, as did the
founding of Sierra Leone, that a new spirit of humanity was abroad
in the land. The old Empire ended its days in 1 783. Before 1 790 it was
clear that on the old foundations or what was left of them a new
Empire was about to rise, more widely spread and therefore better
balanced than the Empire of the past, on the way to part with the
evil inheritance of slavery, and more responsive to the call of religion
and philanthropy than had been the powerful but ill-assorted aggre-
gate of peoples and interests which constituted the old Empire.
The passing of the Act of 1791, whereby representative institutions
were granted to Canada, proved that regard for political freedom did
not leave the Empire when the old North American colonies left it;
but the excesses of the French Revolution which speedily followed did
not incline British minds to extension of democracy. Then came year
after year of war with France, British possessions increased in number,
diversities were multiplied. On the other hand, the outcome of over
twenty years of almost continuous war was for the time being an
empire organised and administered as though war were its normal
condition; every colony was garrisoned, every colonial governor was
a soldier. Yet in the midst of war the new age was on its way. The
slave trade was abolished, the end of slavery came in sight, and the
end too of the unhealthy domination of the sugar interest, further
threatened as it was by the development of the beet sugar industry
on the continent of Europe. The last years of the eighteenth century
handed on to the nineteenth a great awakening of Protestant mis-
sionary enterprise, which went hand in hand with the crusade against
slavery, and henceforward the missionary was a potent factor in the
Empire, more especially in Africa and the Pacific, Side by side with
the new spiritual forces scientific discovery was recasting the world.
James Watt lived until 1819, at which date George Stephenson was
verging on forty; and the 112 years from Watt's birth in 1736 to
Stephenson's death in 1848 covered the time when steam and tele-
graphy triumphed, when new machinery for spinning and weaving
made cotton rise as sugar declined, when Great Britain became
a land of cities and factories, and when progressive diminution of
12 INTRODUCTION
distance made the problems of the Empire fluid to an extent unknown
in former times.
In estimating what distance has meant to the Empire, whether it
has been a difficulty and impediment, or, as in Adam Smith's
opinion and in his words, an alleviation of the effect of dependence,
the case of Ireland gives food for thought. The union with Great
Britain was carried, as the union with Scotland had been carried
nearly a hundred years before, in the midst of war with France, but
carried by doubtful means and not followed by Catholic Emancipa-
tion for many years. However the story may be told and accounted
for, there is the plain fact to mark and digest that Ireland had been
for centuries a dependency of England, an overseas dependency near
at hand; but that proximity in no way tended to better relations be-
tween the two countries. On the contrary, it may well be contended
that distance would have been in this as in-other cases an alleviation
of dependence, and that in later and more liberal times the principal
outcome of proximity was mischievous vacillation between treating
Ireland as a separate unit and treating it as an integral part of the
United Kingdom,
India, like Ireland, holds a special place in the study of the Empire,
and in connection with the years which followed Waterloo its in-
fluence may be traced very specially in two respects. While peace
at length returned to Europe, some part or other of India remained
constantly at war. Here, therefore, the sword was never allowed to
rust. Here were highly trained armies ready to take the fic%Id and
frequently in action. Here military experience was to be gained, and
danger bred responsible leaders of armed men. Even more important
has India been as a school for administrators. Perpetually widening
areas, with endless diversities of race, custom and creed, were brought
under British control; the trading Company which ruled India was
gradually divorced from trade and confined to administration; and
in the work of administration it was more and more closely super-
vised by the Government. Conscious of such supervision, adequately
paid and no longer eking out small salaries by illicit pickings, ap-
praised and promoted or the reverse on their work as administrators,
tested by the well-being of those committed to their charge, the mem-
bers of the Indian Civil Service found an unrivalled field for the
exercise of the worthiest British qualities, initiative, capacity for
making the best of the means to hand, uprightness, sense of justice
and love of fair play. A very noble record has been that of the Civil
Service in India, and from India the training and the tradition lias
gone forth into all the dependent provinces of the Empire*
The modern history of the British Empire may be taken to begin
from Waterloo. The age of Franco-British wars then came to an
end, happily for the two neighbour nations, and happily too there
has been ever since unbroken peace with the United States. The
INTRODUCTION 13
expansion of the Empire in the nineteenth century was phenomenal,
but there is space to refer only to some of the main features. Much
misery followed the return of peace. Apart from the inevitable atter-
math of prolonged war, the substitution of machinery and factories
for handwork and homework caused for the time bitter distress,
which led to rioting and repression, while emigration began on a
fcarge scale. But it was not in reality a reactionary time. Canning
stood for progress and enlightenment, Huskisson guided the country
far on the road to free trade, the Duke of Wellington's Government
carried Catholic Emancipation. In truth Great Britain has had little
cause to complain of the succession of eras in her modern history.
If wars can ever be other than an evil to the peoples involved in them,
the long war in which Great Britain stood sturdily out against
Napoleon, and in which "crowning mercies" attended her arms on
sea and land, was assuredly of immense value as a set-off against the
American catastrophe which had seemed at the time to mark the
decline and fall of the British Empire. Great Britain was thereby
reinstated both morally and materially in the forefront of the world.
If, again, such a fundamental change as the Reform Bill had been
attempted shortly after Waterloo, before time had been given for the
return of comparatively normal conditions, it might weU have done
more harm than good. Coming in due time it was completely suc-
cessful and became the fruitful parent of other reforms, including im-
mediately the abolition of slavery. Then two or three years later came
another most opportune era. Just at the time when the newly en-
franchised middle classes of Great Britain had drunk deep of reform,
when little cause had been given for attachment to or reverence for
the Crown, the succession devolved on a young girl of spotless home
life, who, if only by contrast to much that had gone before, attached
to the throne the chivalry of her people, and whose mind was from the
first attuned to the political aspirations of the new age. During more
than sixty years Queen Victoria reigned, and, as the years went on,
the sovereign became more and more to the peoples of the Empire
which had grown up under her rule, the personal embodiment of
imperial unity.
In a reign of many wars it was not to war, but strongly to peace,
that the temper of the time inclined; and the interests of Great Britain,
the interests of the trading middle classes, called for peace. By the
Reform Act the middle classes achieved political freedom and entered
on the path of political dominance. Adam Smith noted that com-
merce and manufactures had, when he wrote, been advancing more
rapidly in England than agriculture, but he still placed England in
the category of landed nations as opposed to purely mercantile states.
But now commerce was becoming all in all. The trader is at best a
calculating patriot. The British trader's mother country is an island,
in Qjieen Victoria's reign secure and fully conscious of security, in the
i4 INTRODUCTION
charge of admittedly the strongest fleet in the world. That strength,
it was forgotten, had been built up by the Navigation Acts, now being
finally swept away. The mineral resources of the island, through
modern inventiveness and research, were for the first time being fully
developed and applied. Geographical position, climate— for cotton
the moist Lancashire climate — the various natural advantages of the
island, were now enjoyed in a time in which all those ad vantages would
be multiplied a hundred-fold if only nature were not hindered by
man. Peace was demanded from the Government and the removal
of artificial restrictions. It was a demand based on consciousness of
strength. In all directions the tide set in favour of unlimited freedom,
of antagonism to Government interference, of curtailment of Govern-
ment expenditure. There was to be economic as well as political free-
dom; humanity combined with interest to abolish the Corn Laws; it
became an axiom that there should be no customs duties except for
revenue purposes, and a sinister meaning was attached to the word
"protection". Self-governing institutions and fiscal freedom were
granted to the colonies, which were called upon to provide for their
own land defence, and advanced thinkers or politicians of the free-
trade school, regarding colonies as expensive encumbrances and as no
better customers of the mother country than if they were foreign
countries, looked with equanimity to the probability of their severance
from Great Britain. This was the revised version of "trade and Plan-
tations". Never, in the palmiest days of the mercantile system, was
the trade outlook on the colonies more predominant in Great Britain
than when the Manchester school was at the height of its power.
Trade did not so much lead Plantations as threaten to elbow Plan-
tations out altogether. They had caused much expense, they would
inevitably cause more expense; for trade purposes they would be as
valuable outside the Empire as inside; if occasion offered let them go.
So argued the Manchester school.
But the Manchester school had not the whole field to itself. Lord
Durham and his group, as democratically minded as their con-
temporaries of the Anti-Corn Law League, had their eyes on Plan-
tations rather than trade, and they saw in the grant of free institutions
to the colonies not a first step towards getting rid of them, but the one
and only means of keeping them within the Empire. The first full
recognition of responsible government for the colonies in the test case
of Canada exactly coincided with the repeal of the last Navigation
Laws by an Act of 1 849 ; the colonies obtained or were obtaining what
they wanted, the mother country had what she or the classes who
claimed to speak for her wanted, the ground seemed to be cleared for
amicable parting, but the parting has not come, and the result has
been the development of a commonwealth of nations miscalled an
empire, the most illogical human structure that the world has seen
and very nearly the strongest.
INTRODUCTION 15
Before they received full freedom, the colonies, like the colonies
of the old Empire, were by no means wanting in self-assertion. Trans-
portation was discontinued owing to the opposition offered in Aus-
tralia and at the Gape of Good Hope. In Canada, before the so-called
"Rebellion" of 1837 which called forth Lord Durham's mission,
colonial resistance, intensified by the race feeling of French Canadians,
had produced a complete impasse in the Lower Province. After self-
government had been conceded to the colonies and the right to frame
their own tariffs and pass their own laws, it was somewhat discon-
certing to free traders to find that they favoured protection rather
than free trade, and protection even against the mother country her-
self. Assuredly they were minded to go their own way, but on the
whole they were not minded to travel outside the Empire; instead they
remained within and reacted on the mother country and the Empire.
Reference to parliamentary papers and debates in the 'fifties and
'sixties of the nineteenth century will show how slow and gradual was
the process of clearly distinguishing between colonies and depen-
dencies. In a parliamentary return of 1859, Canada and the West
Indies are grouped with Ceylon and the West Coast of Africa under
the heading "Plantations and Settlements". What seems to us an
obvious difference was not so obvious sixty or seventy years ago, and
the reason was that as a matter of fact the difference did not exist in
the same degree. The problem of the Empire was a fluid problem.
There was more at work than normal increase in the area of culti-
vation and normal multiplying of numbers. The forces of science were
beginning to join great territories to one another, to make small units
into large, the future nations of the Empire. By the mere grant of self-
government colonies did not cease to be dependencies so long as they
were small. The two linked Canadian provinces ran their self-
governing career and proudly claimed to settle their own tariffs in
their own interest, without regard to the interest of the mother
country; but at the same time the mother country was left mainly
responsible for the defence bill of Canada. There was a world of
difference between the disconnected self-governing communities on
Canadian soil prior to the British North America Act of 1867, and the
State created by that Act when in 1885 the Canadian Pacific Rail-
way had been completed. The Dominion of Canada was not made
by an ordinary process of expanding and magnifying; it was a new
creation, which had surmounted natural barriers and conquered
mountains and deserts, a creation of the railway engineer. In
course of time other similar new creations were brought to birth and
became the Dominions of to-day.
The territories of the Hudson's Bay Company were bought in 1869
by what was still only the nucleus of the Dominion of Canada, though
for purposes of trade the Company still flourishes to-day. The East
India Company, on the other hand, passed out of existence when,
i6 INTRODUCTION
after the Mutiny, the Government of India was taken over by the
Crown. It seemed that, as a British agency for making an empire,
the chartered company had had its day, seeing that, according to the
doctrines of the Manchester school, with which the inclinations of the
British Government were for many years in accord, further imperial
expansion was to be deprecated. But by the year 1 880 the Manchester
school had spent its force and a counter-current was setting in, to
which the self-governing colonies contributed. They resented the
apparent indifference of the governing classes in the mother country
as to whether their fellow-citizens overseas remained fellow-citizens
or not, and they rejected the cold-blooded economic doctrines which
had taken root in Great Britain. With the 'eighties of the nineteenth
century came a new phase in the evolution of the Empire, expansion
on an immense scale was forced upon reluctant British Governments,
and once more there was a revised version of " trade and Plantations".
It has been seen that Africa was one of the main fields into which
the stream of evangelical missionary enthusiasm poured in the latest
years of the eighteenth and in the nineteenth century. One of these
missionaries, a Scotsman, David Livingstone, was first and foremost
in the final opening up of Africa* So soon as the main geographical
features of the continent had been determined, the "scramble for
Africa" followed, and the results of the exploitation by European
peoples of the vast areas which had been brought to light were on
their worse as on their better side reminiscent of what had followed
the discovery of America. For good and evil a new chapter was begun
in the history of the world ; down to the Great War that history largely
centred in Africa, and to the remoter causes of the war Africa sub-
stantially contributed. From 1880 onward for more than a generation
Africa markedly dominated the history of the British Empire- Egypt
and the Sudan, South Africa, West, East, Central Africa, all crowded
into the story; old features and forces reappeared in somewhat different
setting and combined with new features and new forces to produce
a new and greatly enlarged edition of the Empire. The trader and the
missionary side by side led a forward movement. Traders, appre-
hensive of being excluded by rival Powers wholly innocent of free-
trade leanings and intent on backing their own citizens, betook them-
selves to their old weapon, the chartered company. Missionaries,
apprehensive for the future of mission work in debatable territories,
such as Nyassaland and Uganda, pressed for and eventually secured
their inclusion in the Empire. Plantations followed where trade and
missions led the way. Already in South Africa Empire statesmen
were, as they still are, faced with the supremely difficult problem of
European colonisation in the midst of outnumbering native races*
Rhodesia has presented the same problem, and in Rhodesia, as in
Kenya, there is the further problem as to how far for the purposes of
permanent European settlement altitude can countervail the effects
INTRODUCTION 17
of tropical heat. The trader and the trading company, the missionary,
the coloniser and colonist were all to the fore. The railway engineer
was active everywhere, linking up territories and creating larger
units, in South Africa, in East Africa, in Nigeria.
The older settlements were increasingly important, especially
Australia. Between 1880 and 1885 Australians protested in no mea-
sured terms against the failure of the Home Government to forestall
German annexation in the Pacific and almost at the very same time
they sent, as a free-will offering, a contingent to serve on the Red Sea
coast of the Sudan after the fall of Khartum. Not only were they de-
termined not to leave the Empire, they were as resolved to claim and
earn the right to have a voice in directing it, and time was on their
side, bringing with it increase in population and larger units. Their
great distance from the mother country had especially influenced the
colonies of the Pacific. It had made them self-dependent and inde-
pendent in a high degree; on the other hand, inasmuch as they were
all-British peoples, it had added strength to the instinct of race and
clearness to the call of the Old Country. The year 1887 saw the
beginning of Empire gatherings to discuss common problems and
needs. The meetings developed gradually in British fashion, especially
after the South African Wax had given occasion for the employment
on a considerable scale of oversea contingents side by side with the
regular forces of the Crown. Active participation in an Empire war
by the self-governing units of the Empire meant active partnership
in the Empire, together with growing recognition of that partnership
and of the nationhood and the individuality of the separate parts.
By the side of the self-governing Dominions, in the dependent pro-
vinces of the tropics, experience and modern reasoning had long been
suggesting the wisdom and humanity of indirect as compared with
direct control, of governing or guiding through the human machinery
indigenous to the soil, adapted and progressively improved, in pre-
ference to supplanting native laws, customs and methods by alien
British institutions. It is very largely on these lines that Great Britain
has been carrying out her part as trustee of native races. In India
direct and indirect control have been conjointly in operation; but in
British India, which has been the scene of direct British control, self-
government, which is the negation of control from without, has now
been definitely declared to be the goal. This was an outcome of the
Great War, the full results of which are still in the future. The war
provided a wonderful demonstration of the strength and endurance
of the Empire, of its unity amid and in consequence of its many
diversities. On the other hand, it applied a hothouse process to move-
ments and tendencies which were working out their own salvation
in the slow and sure characteristically British way, and this must be
counted a possible source of danger, for not by haste will the common-
wealth stand.
CUBE Z
18 INTRODUCTION
What is the conclusion of the whole matter? What is the thread, if
any, running through a story which has contradicted all logic and
perpetually falsified reasoned and reasonable expectation? To the
present writer the answer seems to be that the Empire or common-
wealth has not been made, it has grown; that it is the product of an
island in which there has never been complete fusion; that it is the
product of distance; and finally the product of evolution on family
lines.
The study of what might have been is sometimes attractive, though
rarely of any practical usefulness. If the British Empire is the outcome
of natural growth, the question of what would have happened to
Great Britain and its people or peoples if there had been no Empire is
answered at once ; the case would have been that of a child not allowed
to grow up, of life abnormally stunted. But, it may be asked, can this
general statement be supplemented? Is it possible to indicate in what
specific ways, if any, and to what extent the Empire has reacted on the
mother island? In answer it would perhaps be true to say that the
Empire has reacted on Great Britain and its inhabitants more by in-
creasing its size than by changing its character, which after all is no
more than a restatement of the cardinal fact that the Empire has been a
growth. Without the Empire the island, too large and well-populated to
be conquered, would doubtless have retained its independence, would
have developed a strong navy, would have exploited its mineral wealth
and built great cities. The attitude of Great Britain towards free trade
does not seem to have been affected one way or the other by conscious-
ness of possessing an Empire which might in the coming time be self-
sufficing. The strongest free-traders were the most antagonistic to the
Empire, and obviously without the Empire free trade would have been
very much more necessary to the islanders than it has been with it,
Apart from this matter of free trade, what the island bred and taught
the Empire went on breeding and teaching on a constantly widening
scale. What Great Britain was before the Empire carno to pass, it
was more so afterwards; but with the growth of the Empire the
difference in degree became almost exalted into difference in kind.
Insularity, independence, aloofness, whatever best describes the
British type of character, went over the water with tin: pioneers of the
Empire, with the first settlers in Virginia, New England or Barbados,
Unlike those of the Latin stock who crossed the seas, our forefathers
in the lands to which they went did not mix appreciably with other
breeds, whether white or coloured. With little alloy, the type brought
out from home gained strength in newsurroundings with ample elbow-
room, in unlimited freedom except for trade restrictions imperfectly
enforced* As the generations went on, in spite of distance, the colonists
made themselves felt in the mother country, and the climax was
reached in the American Revolution with its lasting effect upon
political life and thought in Great Britain,
INTRODUCTION 19
Living in an island, which, as Adam Smith pointed out in the
passage already quoted, has a great extent of sea coast in proportion
to its total area and many fine estuaries and rivers, Britons could not
but be in large numbers sea-goers and sea-traders; they could not but
develop sea power, empire or no empire. But it seems reasonable to
conclude that it was the existence of an infant empire which gave
occasion for or, at the least, reinforced the arguments for the Navi-
gation Laws; that those laws nursed English shipping and English
carrying trade in their struggling years; and that after they had,
under changed conditions, become worse than useless and positively
harmful, it was still the existence of the Empire, the fact of owning
colonial and Indian possessions, that made tie strongest possible sea
power for Great Britain at once vitally necessary for the protection
of those possessions, and, in view of the naval bases, the refitting
stations, and the nurseries of seamen provided by the Empire overseas,
not extremely difficult of accomplishment.
If one outcome of the Navigation Laws was the strengthening of
British sea power, another was the creation or furtherance of vested
interests and monopolies which, as has been seen above, in the
eighteenth century especially, very greatly affected political and
social life in Great Britain. Such were the West African slave trade
interest, the kindred West India sugar interest, and the interest of the
East Indian nabobs. It is true that there was no need of an empire in
order to create trade monopolies, that without any British colonies
there might have been a large British carrying trade in slaves and
sugar, and without any British possessions in India there might have
been, as there actually was, relatively speaking, in the early days of the
East India Company, a flourishing commerce between Great Britain
and India. But is it conceivable that without the permanent oversea
bases, the colonies, the settlements, and the factories held on freehold
tenure, British trade could ever have attained to the dimensions to
which it did attain or would have been so sure in foundation and
growth as it actually was, or, as a consequence, that the monopolies
in Great Britain would have been as powerful as they were?
The money which flowed into the mother island from the colonies
and India may perhaps have been a greater curse than a blessing to
British national life and character, but on the other hand the colonies
and India supplied and still supply outlets for British men and
women and British capital. Here again it will be said that there
would have been ample use for both men and money overseas without
the need of any British ownership of soil. This argument, so often used
in the middle of the last century in one form of words or another)
really derived whatever force or substratum of truth it had from the
existence of the United States, which after all were once part of the
British Empire and peopled by our own stock; and moreover those
who contemplated a future for Great Britain without an empire did
2-2
20 INTRODUCTION
not take into consideration how that future could be safeguarded if other
competing European nations possessed empires while we had none.
In any case without an empire Great Britain would have been very
much poorer in one important respect. An unsurpassed opportunity
for calling out and developing the best British qualities would have been
wanting. It may be said again that, without the Empire, British
engineers, the makers of railways, telegraphs, irrigation works and
the like, would all the world over have been able to put forth their
initiative and resourcefulness, their capacity for turning existing
conditions to the best advantage for the work in hand, that, if they
were found to be the fittest instruments for given purposes, they would
have been employed. But the world never has been an open market,
and it will not seriously be contended that the prospects of openings
in foreign lands are as a whole to be compared in the case of British
citizens with those which their own Empire presents. In one direction
there would be no openings at all — there would be in effect, though a
few special instances to the contrary might be quoted, no field for
administrators. As a school for administration the British Empire
stands alone. Outside the self-governing dominions, in India and the
Far East, in tropical Africa including the Sudan, and to a lesser de-
gree in other parts of the world, British genius for management and
control has been developed in a wonderful way, and the Empire has
reacted on the homeland by sending back a succession of highly
trained men, before their time of active usefulness is past, to leaven
public and private life in Great Britain. It would be interesting and
instructive to have a record of the part which has been taken in home
life by retired Anglo-Indian officials, and it is impossible to contend
that the Empire has not given a broader outlook to the dwellers in
Great Britain, by bringing among them a strain of men who have
handled and taken responsibility for all sorts and conditions of race,
custom and creed throughout the wide world.
If anything absolutely new can be traced to the possession of our
Empire, it must be traced to the most original feature in it, the
progressive development of dependencies into independent partner
nations which have nevertheless remained by the mother country's
side and under the same sovereign. In the report of the Inter-Im-
perial Relations Committee of the Imperial Conference of 19*6 the
members of "the group of self-governing communities composed of
Great Britain and the Dominions'* arc defined as "autonomous com-
munities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way sub-
ordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external
affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and
freely associated as members of the British commonwealth of nations >f .
To this there is no parallel in history, and perhaps it would be fair to
say that, whereas the present partner nations overseas were once, but
have ceased to be, dependencies of Great Britain, the life of Great
INTRODUCTION 21
Britain as a nation is now, as it was not formerly, conditioned
by its partnership with these other nations. One result is that those
citizens of Great Britain who think at all on political and consti-
tutional questions, are compelled now to think not only imperially,
as Joseph Chamberlain counselled, but internationally— in anewsense
as opposed to a continent-of-Europe sense. Under the old order, as
late as Palmerston's regime or even later, colonies marched infinitely
far behind foreign Powers in the consideration of British statesmen.
It is not so now. In our outlook on the future the British Common-
wealth of Nations takes the first place.
CHAPTER H
ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
IN the long perspective of history the accession of the House of
Tudor is an event of cardinal importance. Contemporaries may
hardly have understood it; to them the victory of Bos worth appeared
as but the latest incident in the dreary succession of plots and revolu-
tions which had filled the English record for a century past. But their
posterity can discern that the event does mark a definite stage in the
growth of the English nation. After Bosworth certain fibres of the
corporate life were dead, or withered and doomed to die, whilst others
found scope for more vigorous development, for ramification and
penetration of new areas of activity. The feudal baronage had dis-
appeared, slain by its own degeneracy and loss of public spirit.
Serfdom also was virtually gone; the English were now free men, with
so few exceptions that publicists could generally ignore them and
after another century it could become a legal maxim that there were
no bondmen in the realm. The Church, in its medieval capacity of
a state within the State, owning much of the property and exercising
a great part of the administration and legal jurisdiction of the country,
was in decline. It had grown unpopular with men of material motives,
and Lollardism, its spiritual enemy, was yet alive and lurking to
attack it; its downfall awaited only the revival of the power of the
Crown. That revival is one of the most apparent results of the revo-
lution of 1485. It carried with it a growth of patriotic feeling, an in-
crease of security and consequently of trade and wealth, and an
ambition for maritime power as the most effective means of national
defence. So was England equipped to take advantage of the accidents
of her situation, of the mental awakening and material expansion
which were now offering their benefits to all European peoples alike.
Nothing is more probable than that, but for the turn in English
politics, the Renaissance would have left us not stronger but weaker,
as it left Italy and Germany, and that the favourable juncture for
our growth into a great Power would have been lost. The success of
the Tudor monarchy offered a practical field to the dreamer, action
to discipline imagination, a material reward for the labours of the
scholar and the projector. In no sphere is this so apparent as in that
of the maritime adventurer.
At Henry VIPs accession the foreign commerce of England dis-
played the same general features as in the reign of Edward HI. The
greater, or at least the richer, part of it was in the hands of foreigners
—of the German Hansa and the Flemings to the eastward, and of the
Italians and Spaniards towards the west and south. Of English
merchants there were two classes, the incorporated traders of the
INCENTIVES TO EXPLORATION 23
Staple and the Merchant Adventurers working across the Straits of
Dover and the North Sea, and the independent merchants trading
with Ireland, Aquitaine, the Peninsula, and occasionally perhaps
with the Atlantic islands, and at rare intervals pushing into the Medi-
terranean and the Levant. Some of these western or ocean men hailed
from Bristol, the Devon towns and Southampton, but many belonged
to London, which was common ground to both types of enterprise,
a fact which had an influence upon the rapid commercial advance of
the capital during the Tudor period. It may be said in general that
the North Sea trades, handicapped though they were by foreign
competition, were yet the most frequented, and produced the greater
part of the country's commercial wealth; whilst the western trades •
were scantier and less lucrative, but were to be offered, with the ad-
vance of ocean discovery, an opportunity of greater expansion. The
realisation of this potentiality was, however, delayed by political
factors: the Anglo-Spanish amity of the first half of the Tudor period
acted as a brake upon enterprise, and it was not until the progress of
the Reformation had made England the enemy of the Peninsular
powers that the more dazzling possibilities of the ocean revealed them-
selves. Then at last was seen the true contribution of the western ad-
venturers to the national development. For they were the originators
of almost all the oceanic undertakings of the Tudor period, and they
were the fathers of the generation that founded the old colonial Em-
pire. The present chapter has thus to relate a twofold story — the
achievement of commercial autonomy in European waters, and the
turning of English energies to more distant regions.
Early in the Tudor period England became involved in that move-
ment towards geographical discovery which had already absorbed
the energies of Portugal, but before tracing the record of her activities
oversea, we may enquire why a country with so ancient a maritime
tradition as ours was so backward, compared with Portugal and Spain,
in pursuingit. For fifteenth-century Portugal, Africa was theland across
the narrow seas, just as France was for England. Either country found
an outlet for its surplus energies in oversea conquests, but whereas those
of Portugal led to something further, those of England did not: the
Hundred Years' War and the ensuing civil commotions provide a
reason for the lack of English enterprise upon the ocean. ^ Portugal,
in addition, combined with the ordinary adventurous spirit a strong
religious impulse. In the Peninsula and the Mediterranean the
crusading idea was yet alive. By the fifteenth century the Muslim
had long been cleared from Portugal itself, and in Spain he was on
the decline; but in the Mediterranean his power was advancing. The
virile and brutal Turk had succeeded the cultured Saracen. He had
established himself on the soil of Europe, and in the course of the
century had taken Constantinople and made himself a sea power, and
was now reducing Venice to a state of dependence and threatening
24 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
to close the old Levant routes to the East. None could foretell
where the Turkish advance would stop. Men whose ancestors had
fought the infidel for generations were quick to take up the new
challenge, and the Portuguese exploration of the African coast was
largely inspired by the hope of converting the negroes to the faith and
of finding a road to the Christian people vaguely known to exist in
eastern Africa. Yet further lay (or was thought to lie) a similar in-
ducement. Christian travellers in the thirteenth century had reported
the Mongol princes of Asia as very complaisant towards their faith;
and the hope had never entirely died of bringing Central Asia upon
the backs of the Muslims of the Nearer East. This was remote enough
from the immediate prospects of Portugal, yet in the general con-
fusion of thought and lack of geographical knowledge it may have
strengthened the will of the Portuguese to seek in African discovery
a counterpoise to the Turkish power. Upon England, remote from
the Turk, these considerations had but a faint effect.
Geographical position illuminates the question in yet another way.
The geographical knowledge possessed by Greece and Rome had
perished in western Europe amid the confusion of the Dark Ages.
In the Eastern Empire it had survived and had been passed on to the
Saracens who conquered Egypt and Syria. They, in the early Middle
Ages, were far more highly instructed in all the sciences than were
their European contemporaries. The Crusades brought Europeans of
all countries into contact with the Saracens, but it was the friars and
merchants of Italy rather than the fighting men of the north who
reaped the intellectual benefit; and it is established that Italy sup-
plied to Portugal the rudimentary knowledge of world geography
which gave an edge to her crusading fervour. Italian cosmographers
corresponded with Henry the Navigator, and Italian pilots bore their
part in the early expeditions to the Atlantic islands and the African
coast. Above all, Italy was the creator of the portolano, the handy
pilot's chart by means of which a man could really profit by the dis-
coveries of others and could record his own. Portolani were in common
use among the Mediterranean seamen of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries; but Chaucer's shipmaster could not have read one had he
seen it. There was an immense difference between the potentialities
of scientific navigation, however crude its instruments, and those of
blundering by a sort of animal instinct along familiar sea tracks and
coastlines. Here again, Portugal had the advantage of new methods
from which the northern seamen were far remote.
Not only was England in the fifteenth century very poorly equipped
with such world knowledge as existed, and not only had her overseas
expansion taken a direction in which success would have been more
injurious thanfailure, but in another matter also she was handicapped.
The men of the Mediterranean, with Italians again as the pioneers,
had evolved a commercial technique superior to that of the English,
THE CABOT VOYAGES 25
although not perhaps to that of the Flemings and Germans. England
was wealthy in a way, but the wealth was not in mobile form. The
merchant who wanted to withdraw his gains from adventure invested
them in land, for banking facilities were unknown to him. Even late
in the sixteenth century it proved difficult to raise capital for new
undertakings; men reputed to be worth many thousands would sub-
scribe no more than £50 or £100 to a project in which they had good
faith; and it was not until the joint-stock company made its appear-
ance in 1553 that a means existed whereby a large number of in-
vestors could combine their very small investments.
Nevertheless England did react, although feebly, to a historical law
which has operated with fair constancy. Whenever a people has
emerged from a successful war of liberation or consolidation — has
become a nation in fact — it has tended to divert its energy to outward
expansion. Ferdinand and Isabella united Spain and expelled the
Moorish power; and at once they listened to Columbus. Henry VII
replaced feudal anarchy by a strong government, and then he and
his merchants glanced for a brief moment across the ocean.
John Cabot or Cabotto, a Genoese by birth and a naturalised
Venetian, was living at Bristol early in 1496. It was not a town in
which Italians ordinarily did much business; but it was already
visited by Portuguese ships direct from Madeira and possibly from the
Azores, and this may have helped to stimulate in its inhabitants that
interest in ocean discovery which they undoubtedly felt.1 There is a
record of Bristol ships having made fruitless voyages into the Atlantic
before Cabot's time. Perhaps they were trying to find their way to
the Azores, perhaps they were looking for something further; at least
there was a stimulus of some kind. Cabot was there to preach a
doctrine long familiar to speculative geographers — that the eastern
shores of Asia must extend sufficiently far round the globe to be
accessible to ships sailing westwards from Europe. The voyage,
according to these thinkers, was practicable, and the inducement to
attempt it was the spice trade, which Venice was losing by Turkish
intolerance, and which Portugal had not yet gained by the success of
Vasco da Gama. Reports of the earlier discoveries of Columbus had
now come to hand, but it was obvious to commercial men that, how-
ever strongly he might assert that he had been in the islands of Asia,
he had certainly not yet found the true spice islands or the civilised
peoples of China and Japan. In March 1496 Cabot obtained from
Henry VII a patent empowering him to search in the east, north or
west for lands hitherto unvisited by Christians, and to enjoy a mono-
poly of any new trades so discovered. The Crown was to receive one-
fifth of the profits, but was to contribute nothing towards the expenses.
1 Ship from Madeira, P.R.O., Exchequer, E. 122, 20/5, Sept. 19 (customs ledger),
1485/6; for the Azores probability, the undoubted residence of Azoreans in Bristol (md*
infra).
26 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
In the spring of 1497 John Cabot sailed from Bristol with a single
small vessel, and at the beginning of August he was back in England
with a report of the discovery of a new coast to the westward. No
journal or map of the voyage has been preserved, and there are no
details of latitude or longitude, so that it remains uncertain whether
the land was Nova Scotia, Newfoundland or southern Labrador; but
it must have been one of them, for it had a temperate summer climate,
was not in an Arctic latitude, and was near enough to Europe for
the whole voyage to be accomplished in three months. Cabot him-
self was convinced that he had reached the mainland of Asia in its
northerly extension, and that with a better equipped expedition he
could follow its coast westwards and southwards and so reach the
profitable countries of China and Japan. The King and the merchants
accepted his contention, and showed much enthusiasm for the com-
pletion of the discovery. Henry conferred upon Cabot a gratuity of
£10 and an annual pension of £20. He paid also, according to a con-
temporary, the expense of fitting out one ship, although a second
patent, issued in February 1498, makes no promise of pecuniary aid
but merely permits Cabot to pursue his exploration with the assistance
of the King's subjects.
On his second voyage Cabot sailed from Bristol in May 1498 with
four or five ships freighted by merchants of London and Bristol, a
few of whom had received loans from the Crown for that purpose.
His expressed intention was to found a trading factory on the coast
of Asia, and neither he nor anyone else had the least suspicion that
the land already visited belonged to a continent distinct from Asia.
In other words, there can be no possibility that he went to seek a north-
west passage, which would pre-suppose an America to circumnavi-
gate. This question is important, because there is no contemporary-
record of what actually happened on this voyage, and the rest of
John Cabot's story is a matter of inference. All that is established is
that he sailed and had not returned as late as October, but that
probably, although not certainly, he came home at a subsequent
date. It is, however, possible to say that the voyage was a disappoint-
ment—in contemporary eyes, a failure— for he found nothing of what
he went to seek. The farther shores contained no Chinese cities, no
wealthy Japanese with gold-roofed houses, no spice trade. If John
Cabot made an extensive coastal voyage and came again to England,
it was with the knowledge that the continent beyond the ocean was
not the Asia described in gorgeous detail by Marco Polo two cen-
turies before.
The above account of John Cabot's expeditions is based on good
evidence, some of it the unimpeachable testimony of administrative
documents, and the remainder contained in news letters written by
observers in London at the time; and if the story appears meagre,
the reason is that it has been rigorously divested of the cloud of
BRISTOL ENTERPRISES 27
surmises with which so many commentators have been tempted to
surround it.
A number of independent historians, writing in the sixteenth
century, give accounts of a voyage of discovery by Sebastian Cabot,
the son of John. They obtained their facts, at first, second, or even
third hand, from the utterances of the explorer himself. They are
vague and mutually discrepant about the date, save that it was in the
reign of Henry VII; but they do agree that Sebastian took two ships
and sailed north-westwards into the Arctic ice in search of a route to
Cathay, and that, having failed to find it, he turned southwards,
coasted a great part of the American continent, and returned to
England. They state, further, that he claimed to have discovered the
Newfoundland cod fishery; but the credit of that, on much better
evidence, is due to John Cabot in 14.97. Of Sebastian Cabot's voyage
it may be remarked that its commander (if he spoke the truth, and
if he was correctly reported) was aware of the true nature of the
opposite continent, and was looking for the North-West Passage.
A fair inference is, therefore, that the undertaking was of later date
than the second voyage of John Cabot.
There is no trace of any other voyages by the Cabots under Henry
VII, although it has recently been discovered that Sebastian was still
living at Bristol in 1505, when he was granted an annuity of £10 for
good service.1 Before that date other hands had taken up the work.
In March 1501 the King issued a patent to three Bristol merchants
named Richard Ward, Thomas Ashehurst and John Thomas, and
three natives (described as squires) of the Azores, Joao and Francisco
Fernandes and Joao Gonsalves. The document conferred elaborate
rights of discovery, colonisation and monopoly of trade, and ap-
parently contemplated the establishment of a commercial factory
somewhere in the north-west. The three Bristol men are all traceable
in the customs records as doing regular business with Spain and
Portugal, and as early as 1493 there is an entry showing a "Johannes
ffornandus" exporting goods from Bristol to Lisbon.2 By other
evidence it is known that Joao Fernandes had obtained a grant from
the King of Portugal in 1499 to make discoveries in the north-west.
There arc scanty but conclusive indications that the Bristol syndicate
sent out expeditions in 1501 and 1502, and that in the latter year
three captured Eskimos were brought to England. Then, in December
1502 the King cancelled the existing patent and issued a new one to
three of the former syndicate, Thomas Ashehurst, Joao Gonsalves
and Francisco Fernandes, and to one new member, Hugh Elyot.
More voyages followed in 1503, 1504 and 1505, after which the
enterprise drops completely out of view. The only clue to the nature
of the expeditions is that they went to "the new found lands", and
1 Newton, A. P., "An Early Grant to Sebastian Cabot", EJIJl. xxxvn, 564-5.
* Exchequer (Customs), E. zaa, 20/9,
28 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
that one of them was organised, if not accompanied, by Hugh Elyot
and Robert Thorne the elder, a man who was in other matters an
ally of Elyot's, although his name does not appear in the patent. The
enterprise was at one time promising, as is shown by royal gratuities
to some of the voyagers and by the grant of £10 pensions to Gonsalves
and Francisco Fernandes. The probable motives were fishing and
fur-trading and the search for the North-West Passage. But the end
was failure, and the last joint trace of the parties occurs in a Chancery
suit wherein "Fraunces Fernandus Esquier" complains that he is
imprisoned by Hugh Elyot for a debt of ^loo.1 Henry VII, although
favourably inclined, had not spent £300 from first to last upon the
whole of the exploring projects of his reign. A comparison of this
petty sum with the cost of a court function or a single campaign in
contemporary warfare reveals the value which the King set upon
western discovery.
Under Henry VIII there were sporadic attempts, in which the
King showed more marked initiative than his father had done, to
pursue the north-western discovery, and there was also a serious
promotion of trade with Guinea and Brazil by merchants of Ply-
mouth, Southampton and London, those western men whose signi-
ficance has already been noted. The first project of discovery belongs
to the years 1516-17, when Sebastian Cabot and an English captain
named Thomas Spert are said to have failed in a voyage intended
for Newfoundland. This rests on the authority of Richard Eden, who
wrote some forty years later. Apart from his statement, there is no
evidence that either Spert or Cabot was engaged in the venture, but
a document recently discovered shows that there was a voyage set
forth in 1517 by John Rastell and others, whose ships got no farther
west than Waterford.2 In 1521 Henry himself evolved a plan
for the north-west, but he relied upon the merchants to provide most
of the capital required. Those of Bristol professed willingness, but the
Livery Companies of London virtually refused, alleging want of faith
in Sebastian Cabot, the commander designated by the King. It does
not appear that any ships actually sailed. Four years later an Italian
captain, Paolo Centurioni, came to London to discuss an expedition,
but died there before anything had been done. In 1527 there was an
indubitable voyage, seemingly at the King's expense. John Rut, a
shipmaster of the Royal Navy, sailed in May of that year with two
ships. He pushed up the Labrador coast to 53° N. where one of the
vessels was lost in a storm. With the other, Rut went south to New-
foundland, whence he sent a letter home by a fishing boat, and then
he coasted North America until he came down to the West Indies.
He touched at Porto Rico and San Domingo, and thence sailed home
to England. This is the first recorded intrusion of an English ship in
1 Early Chancery Ptoc., Bundle 135, no. 76 (no date).
2 See Reed, A. W., in Mariner's Mirror, ix, 137-47.
THE NEWFOUNDLAND FISHERY 29
the Caribbean. In the same year Robert Thorne the younger, son of
the Thorne already mentioned, wrote an address to the King on the
subject of a northern passage to Asia. Thorne was a merchant doing
business with Spain and Portugal, and he was eloquent upon the
profits the discovery would yield. His idea was that a passage would
be practicable over the Pole itself, and that the icebound area would
be found negligibly small. His writing has been generally considered
as the inspiration of Rut's voyage, but it is to be remarked that Rut
did not follow the course Thorne recommended. Two more items
close the list of exploring projects under Henry VIII. In 1536 one
Hore led an expedition to Cape Breton. Although he lost many men
by hunger he discovered nothing new, and did not penetrate beyond
the waters known to the fishermen. Lastly, in 1541, the Privy Council
was said to be planning northern discoveries, but no action is known
to have followed its deliberations.
The abundance of cod upon the banks of Newfoundland had been
reported by John Cabot in 1497, and the fishery was being actively
exploited shortly afterwards. The Bristol syndicates of 1501-5 may
have sent out fishing vessels, but apart from this there is no evidence
of Englishmen regularly frequenting Newfoundland until the latter
part of Henry VIITs reign. The Portuguese, on the other hand, were
at work in the early years of the sixteenth century, and the French
were not long behind them. Rut found Normans, Bretons and Portu-
guese fishing in 1527, but the first clear reference to an English par-
ticipation occurs in an Act of Parliament of 1541. This, however,
makes it probable that the industry was well established by that date.
Such, in outline, was the English contribution to the oceanic dis-
coveries of the great age. It was not a very brilliant effort, and, had it
stood alone, might have made no great difference to the course of
the country's development. But England, in common with the rest
of Europe, experienced the reactions set up by the overseas enterprise
of Spain and Portugal, and some appraisement of their efforts is
necessary. To the imagination of mankind the impulse was very
powerful, and it came at a time when mental energy was being
generated by the advance of other branches of knowledge. The
peoples of Europe were losing sight of the ideal of Christendom as a
single entity and were beginning instead to respond to the urgings^of
national self-consciousness. When, therefore, the first discoveries
were made, not only did they become subjects of eager speculation
wherever men of wide outlook congregated, but also they promoted
the growing tendency towards national development. Vast areas
presented themselves in the early sixteenth century for exploitation
by the ambitious, and almost as a matter of course it was decided that
the exploitation must be on strictly national lines. It should not be
forgotten, however, that another solution of the problem was imagin-
able, and that in the era of the Crusades the Powers of Christendom
30 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
would probably have made some attempt to approach the unknown
by an effort of general European organisation. However, the age of
discovery coming when it did, the channel into which the quickened
imagination of the time directed the energy of Europeans was that of
national expansion into other continents. The discoveries did not
beget nationalism, but they did accelerate its growth, intensifying
national animosities, and stifling, down to our own time, any hope
of a European unity like that of the Roman Empire or the medieval
Church.
As the era of oceanic competition set in, it confirmed another pro-
cess which was independently beginning, the decline of the Mediter-
ranean as the focus of Christendom. Italian prosperity was already
threatened by the advance of the Turk, which interrupted the ancient
lines of communication between Europe and the civilised East. Inter-
course with the East was by this time a necessity of life to Europe, and
had there been no alternative route there must have been a mighty
effort to roll back the tide of Muslim conquest — a new Crusade,
economic as well as religious in its motives, resulting, if successful,
in the preservation of Italian supremacy in the arts of life and in the
reconstruction of some form of pan-European authority. But the
alternative presented itself, the heroism and will-power of Europe
sought the oceans, and the Mediterranean and its culture declined.
A concrete illustration of the process finds expression in an English
Act of Parliament,1 attributing the decay of Southampton to the fact
that "the King of Portugal took the trade of spices from the Venetians
at Calicut," since when, "few or no carracks, galleys nor other ships
have repaired unto our said town, nor be like to repair hereafter";
for Southampton's function in the old economy was to be an out-
post of the Mediterranean, a distributing-point for the Asiatic goods
obtained by the Italians in the Levant.
The Portuguese handled the wealth of Africa and the East in a
different fashion. They made Antwerp the staple for distribution over
northern Europe, and the city, already prospering by reason of its
geographical position, enjoyed its most splendid period in the sixty
years preceding the revolt of the Netherlands against Alva and
Philip II. Thereafter London and Amsterdam shared its spoils and
those of its Portuguese feeders, but the commercial headship of
Europe had left Venice and Genoa and their neighbours for ever.
Spanish treasure from the West in like fashion stimulated the enter-
prise of the Netherlands and Germany rather than that of Italy.
Charles V was Holy Roman Emperor as well as King of Spain, and
the effect of the connection in piling up the fortunes of German
financial houses was remarkable. The Fuggers and the Welsers of
Augsburg, the outstanding examples, had founded their position
under the conditions of medieval trade. But they were able to
1 as Hen. VIII, c.2o.
POLICY OF HENRY VII AND HENRY VIII 31
change with the times. They had sufficient capital to finance the
Emperor's wars and so to secure from him concessions whereby they
accumulated a great deal more. They exploited mining and other
property all over Europe and Spanish America, skimmed the cream
from the treasure fleets, and vitalised business enterprises hitherto
untouched. But the men who followed in their footsteps, at first
feebly and doubtingly enough, were not the worn-out merchant-
nobles of Venice, but the western men of England, France and the
Dutch Netherlands. English mining, for example, began to be
scientific in the reign of Elizabeth, and drew its instruction from the
Fuggers' men from Germany and its capital from London merchants
who were profiting by the African and Caribbean trades. Mobile
capital was foreshadowing its power.
It was in a world in which these new forces were stirring that
Henry VIII succeeded to the English throne. The maritime develop-
ment of the country owes as much to him as to his father, although
the debt is of a different kind. He took a more active interest in dis-
covery, but his efforts yielded virtually no result. He took a rather
less active interest in trade, and so Henry VII's good work was not
vigorously followed up; yet the damage was not considerable, for
English trade was now healthy enough to stand by itself. But in
another direction Henry VIII accomplished what Henry VII had
only contemplated — he built a first-class fighting Navy and devised
a naval administration which had no equal in Europe for a century
to come. That, in the purely maritime sphere, is his contribution to
the advance of England, and its success was in great measure due to his
pursuit of a foreign policy far less cautious than that of his father.
The naval side of the French wars also affected relations with the
Hanseatic League. No sooner had the king's ships become a promi-
nent factor in the national defence than the question of naval stores
became vital. The Baltic was then the producing area of the hemp,
pitch and spars so essential for wooden warships. The Hansa was in
a position to cut off supplies, and therefore, although there were
disagreements in time of peace, the approach of war modified Henry's
attitude towards the League, with which at the end of his^ reign he
was on cordial terms- In 1544-5 it sold him several warships of the
largest size, including the famous Jesus qfLubeck. Thus the politics of
the reign entailed a postponement of the inevitable day when England
should shake herself free from the heaviest shackle upon her com-
mercial autonomy.
Henry VII had seen that the predominance of the Hanseatic
League was an obstacle to the growth of English commerce. By
well-timed interference in the Wars of the Roses it had secured from
the English Grown a privileged position as against all other foreign
merchants, and it even paid lower customs duties than Englishmen
themselves. These privileges were embodied in a treaty signed at
32 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
Utrecht in 1474. Bound by this pact, Henry VII, with all the resources
of his diplomacy, was unable to shake the League's position in his
realm. In other directions, however, he had advanced English trade.
He had made favourable treaties with Spain and the Netherlands,
had protected his subjects from Venetian jealousy in the Mediter-
ranean, and had passed Navigation Acts (1485 and 1488) to restrict
the import of wine from Gascony to English shipping.
Under Henry VIII the North Sea trades made no great advance.
English merchants in the Baltic and Germany remained subordinate to
the Hansa which also competed keenly with them in the Netherlands.
The western trades show a much more interesting record. There
may not have been much growth in their volume, but the English
share certainly increased. The misfortunes of Venice caused the
great Flanders galleys, formerly the vehicles of the spice trade, to
become irregular in their sailings and to cease them altogether after
1532. Private Venetian ships still came to England, and a Venetian
community long remained in London, but a great deal of the trade
with Italy and the Levant fell into the hands of English merchants.
The Levant voyage commonly took twelve months and demanded
the use of a large and well-armed ship. The King occasionally ven-
tured a warship in the trade. It supplied moreover an incentive to
build merchantmen of a more advanced type than was common on
the short North Sea routes. Business training also benefited, for the
records show that the risk of a Levant voyage was usually shared
by a considerable number of merchants, Englishmen being often
associated with Italians.1 Here is to be seen one of the origins, not
only of the regular joint-stock company for foreign trade, but also of
those very flexible syndicates which carried on the Elizabethan war-
fare against Spain and accomplished much pioneering work in the
colonial Empire of the seventeenth century. The need for experience
in such matters is apparent when it is remembered that they involved
complex questions of law between the parties. The High Court of
Admiralty, reorganised by Henry VIII, adapted its procedure to the
new needs of the time, and from 1536 onwards preserved in its records
an immense body of learning and precedent. The westward traders
strengthened their connection with the French ports, and undoubtedly
obtained there a stock of information about Africa, Brazil and the
West Indies, where French intruders were busy throughout the reign
of Francis L In spite of the wars with France, there is little evidence
of rancour between the French and English seamen; on the contrary,
they seem to have joined in hatred of the Flemings and Germans
and afterwards of the Portuguese and Spaniards, so that when
the Reformation supervened, the seeds were already laid of that
* Exchequer (Customs), E. 122, 143/1 j, 1539 July 1 9— a great ship from Southampton
for Levant, laded by more than twenty merchants, English and foreign: E. 122, 143/13,
1542, Dec. 21— a similar undertaking.
THE BRAZIL TRADE 33
alliance between English Protestants and French Huguenots, which
made the Channel and the Bay of Biscay a freebooters' paradise and
severed the best line of communication between the Habsburg
dominions.
The English share of trade with the Peninsula grew in volume
as the result of changing conditions. Bristol, Plymouth and South-
ampton tapped the traffic from Portugal to Antwerp, and South-
ampton gradually regained some of the business lost by the decline
of Venice. The seaports of Andalusia were no longer a terminus only,
but began to serve as half-way points on the Levant route. In 1530
Henry VIII issued a charter conferring the organisation of a regulated
company upon the merchants in Spain; and so valuable was the
traffic that it survived all the troubles of the Reformation until the
beginning of war in 1585. In the later years of Henry VIII there is
clear evidence of English ships frequenting the Spanish Canaries and
the Portuguese Azores, bringing wines and sugar from the former and
woad from the latter.1 Portugal, however, prohibited access to
Madeira and the African coast. As the sixteenth century advanced,
the difficulties besetting the English merchants in Spain became
serious enough to destroy any but a well-rooted trade. Privateering
and piracy grew rampant; the Spanish secular laws were oppressive
— English residents, for example, were not allowed to keep their
private accounts in their own language;2 and the cruelties of the
Inquisition, as Admiralty records show, were not such fables of
Protestant polemic as has sometimes been alleged.
The most striking oceanic advance of the reign was the opening
of a regular trade with Guinea and Brazil in spite of Portuguese ob-
jections. The details of the story are lost, but from the scanty evidence
which remains it appears that William Hawkins of Plymouth was the
pioneer. He made three voyages in person to Brazil in 1530-2,
touching the Guinea coast on the outward passage. In subsequent
years he sent out ships on the same errand, one of which in 1540
brought home a valuable lading of ivory and Brazil wood, which may
be taken as typical of the results of the trade.8 At the same date the
Southampton men were active, and one of them built a fort near
Bahia in 1542. In 1540 a London ship went to northern Brazil
(which may possibly mean Guiana) and thence to the Caribbean,
where her crew committed piracies on the Spaniards.4 Hawkins and
the Southampton men were all merchants doing business with Spain
and Portugal, and it is from those countries that they may have
1 H.C.A. Examinations, nos. 3 and 4, passim, 1538-42; H.GA. 7/1, Exemplifications,
nos. 206-8, 1538.
* CaL St. Pap, Foreign, 1561-2, no. 412.
« &£?%&. fo^'xxiv, 96, Marsden, R. G., "The Voyage of the Barbara of London".
Further detail* not given by Marsden occur in a Spanish report of 17 August 1540,
printed inj. F. Parhcco's Colecciondedocmentosimditos. . .de las posesiones espaftotas, Madrid,
1864-84, i, 573.
CHBEI
34 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
obtained their charts and pilots for the ocean voyages. But a more
probable source is to be found in Normandy. The seamen of Rouen,
Havre, Honfleur and Dieppe had visited the tropics from the be-
ginning of the century and had made a regular trade thither since isso.1
Rouen, in particular, harboured a number of Spanish and Portu-
guese renegades, some of whom had become naturalised Frenchmen
and were doubtless ready to sell their countries' secrets. The English
Brazil trade died out during the French war of 1544-6. Portugal was
at length taking the colonisation of the country in hand, and was
sending out warships to stop intruders. In addition, the war made
freebooting in home waters more profitable than distant trading, and
the Admiralty records show that many a cargo of sugar, ivory and
dyestuffs was brought into English ports by adventurers who went
no farther than Finisterre in search of it. The French, on the other
hand, made no break in their tropical expeditions. Francis I and
Henry II connived at them, and at a later date Admiral Coligny
became a frequent investor. His position as head of the Huguenot
party was thus utilised to transform the earlier interloping under
royal patronage into a Protestant crusade which carried fire and
sword into the colonial waters of the Peninsular Powers.
Henry VIIFs services in strengthening the Royal Navy, establishing
the Navy Board and fortifying several ports were vitally necessary.
Already in 1538-9 Englishmen were being roughly used in Spain for
refusing to deny their King's claim to the title of Supreme Head of the
Church.2 In 1540 a new English Navigation Act introduced the
principle of discriminating duties between users and non-users of
English shipping; but so loud were Flemish and Spanish complaints
that Henry was obliged to give way and exempt the Emperor's subjects
from its operation. Then, in 1542-4, there was a reconciliation with
Charles V9 and in the latter year he and Henry jointly declared war
on Francis. They made one campaign in unison, and Henry captured
Boulogne, but in the autumn Charles suddenly concluded a separate
peace at Crespy, leaving England alone to cope with France and
Scotland. Scotland was already powerless for offence, thanks to a
joint naval and military expedition in 1544, which had taken Edin-
burgh, burned Leith, and cleared the Forth of shipping; but France
had a strong professional army and a navy capable of contesting
the Channel. The danger year was 1545, when the French fleet
came over and blockaded the English in Portsmouth. There was a
half-hearted fight off the mouth of the harbour, and afterwards the
French withdrew, defeated more by their own maladministration than
by the English guns. Henry's Navy won no victory; yet its existence
l Brdard, C. and P., Documents relatifs d la marine normande (Rouen, 1880), pp. 201-2.
For this very important period of French expansion see, in general, Charles cfcla Konciere,
Hist, de la marinefratifaise, m.
• Letters and Papers, xiv, pt i, nos. 466, 487; xv, nos. 38, 481.
THE WESTERN ADVENTURERS 35
had saved the country from invasion, for that was the purpose with
which the French had set out.
The Emperor's Peace of Crespy was a serious blow to the old
alliance of England with Spain and the Low Countries. There were
circumstances which tended to justify him, but by all good English-
men his act was regarded as one of the blackest treachery. Accordingly
his subjects became fair game for adventurers who professed to be
privateering against France, but who resisted few temptations to rob
beyond the scope of their commissions. By 1^45 the privateers had
already cleared the seas of French merchantmen, and now they began
to take Spaniards and Flemings and even Portuguese on the charge
of carrying French goods. Some did not trouble to make the excuse.
One of them took a treasure ship from the West Indies with a cargo
worth 30,000 ducats,1 patently not of French ownership, and many
others did similar feats. The Anglo-Spanish hatred of Elizabethan
days was no new thing. It began in the dungeons of the Inquisition
and on the waters of the Bay and the Channel before Henry VIII was
dead; and it confirmed the Protestantism of the western adventurers
and urged them to make common cause with the more experienced
Huguenot freebooters from the ports of France.
So important was the western element in the subsequent generation
that it is relevant to consider individually some of the men who were
its pioneers. In London the Gonson family were prominent. William
Gonson under Henry VIII traded with Spain and also despatched
many ships to the Levant. Great nobles like the Dukes of Suffolk
and Norfolk participated in the trade, in association with the Gon-
sons and other merchants. Benjamin Gonson, the son of William,
succeeded to a similar career. His western ventures included the
financing of voyages to Guinea under Mary and Elizabeth and of
John Hawkins's expeditions to the West Indies. He was Treasurer of
the Navy and Cecil's right-hand man in its-administration; and John
Hawkins married his daughter and succeeded to his office. Sir
William Lock and his son Michael were also Levant traders, and
Michael Lock was in after days the chief promoter of the Company
of Kathai and of Frobisher's search for the North-West Passage. The
Castlyn family were originally prominent in the Spanish and Portu-
guese trade under Henry VIII, William Castlyn as a merchant, and
his brother James as a sea captain. From the Peninsula they ex-
tended their operations to the Canaries and the Azores, to which
group James Castlyn made one of the first recorded English voy-
ages. Edward Castlyn, of the next generation, in partnership with
Anthony Hickman, maintained resident factors in the Canary Islands
in the reign of Mary, and both of them were prominent investors in
the pioneer voyages to Barbary and Guinea. Of the other London
adventurers in oceanic undertakings, Sir George Barnes and Sir
1 Letters and Papers, xx, pt i, no. 459, and several subsequent references.
36 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
Andrew Judd were Spanish traders, as also were Sir William Gerrard
and Sir Lionel Ducket. In general it may be said of this London
group — of which the above list is not exhaustive — that they made
their fortunes in the old regulated trades across the North Sea and
then ventured their surplus in the more risky speculations on the
ocean; the majority of them are known to have belonged to the
Merchant Adventurers as well as to the Spanish Company.
Southampton numbered among her townsmen some men of the
same stamp. Henry Huttoft was a Levant trader with extensive
Italian connections under Henry VIII. He served the State as col-
lector of customs and as a contractor for naval construction at Ports-
mouth, where he built the second Great Harry and other ships in 1536
and the following years. He acted also as agent to Thomas Cromwell,
who was himself an investor and shipowner in the Spanish and
Levant traffic. Robert Reneger, Thomas Borey and John Pudsey were
Southampton merchants who engaged in the early Brazil trade.
Reneger in the last French war was a noted privateer and the captor
of the first West Indian treasure ship to fall into English hands.
The Brazil ventures of William Hawkins of Plymouth have already
been considered. He helped Cromwell in the Dissolution, engaged
largely in privateering,, and afterwards acted as a contractor for
victualing the Navy and fortiiying Plymouth Sound. He represented
Plymouth in three Parliaments and twice served as mayor, an office
which was important as an outpost of the central authority. His sons
William and John continued the same tradition, engaging in pioneer-
ing ventures and bearing a part in national and local administration*1
At Bristol the Thornes filled a similar position. Their main business
was trade with Spain and the Mediterranean, and by it they were
inspired to promote oceanic expansion. Robert Thorne the elder
and his son of the same name have already been mentioned for their
share in American discovery. The younger Robert and his brother
Nicholas traded with the Canaries and even maintained a factor in
1526 in the West Indies, although their trade thither is fairly certain
to have been carried in Spanish bottoms.
The significance of all these men, and of many others, in the national
development was considerable. By voyages to the Peninsula, the
Levant and the Atlantic islands they acquired ideas and knowledge
of highly organised business methods, of shipbuilding and navigation,
and of the new world-conditions which were to dominate the future.
They accumulated capital in the old trades and were fearless in using
it in the new. They were necessarily individualists, breaking with the
old tradition of incorporation, and as active in challenging vested
interests afloat as on shore. Some of them mingled trade with
privateering, which was legitimate warfare, and with indiscriminate
roving against neutrals, which was not; thus they grew accustomed
1 SeeWiUiamson,J. A., Sir John Hawkins, passim.
ECONOMIC CHANGES 37
to unlicensed hostility against the Catholic Powers, and reprisals
were pursued with far more hatred against Spaniards and Portu-
guese than Against the lawful enemy, France. Finally, they filled
administrative posts whilst carrying on their private activities; they
did much hack-work for the nobles of the Privy Council, made them-
selves indispensable, admitted their superiors to good investments,
and so acquired influence over national policy. They share with the
men who urged forward the Protestant Reformation the responsi-
bility for the breach of the Habsburg alliance and for the setting forth
of England upon the path of oceanic expansion.
The closing years of Henry VIII witnessed the beginning of a social
upheaval as important as the new departures in maritime enterprise,
and destined to combine with them in moulding the country's future.
The spoliation of the Church and the rise of a new class of land-
owners— purchasers or grantees of monastic property— accelerated
changes in the exploitation of the soil. Reduced to its elements, the
position, was that the standard of life in Europe was rising, and that
there was consequently a greater demand for cloth and for the wools
which went to make it. In some parts of England, therefore, the new
landowners converted arable land into sheep pasture and evicted that
part of the rural population whose labour was no longer required.
At the same time there was a movement by other landowners to
challenge the traditional rights of the peasants upon their manors,
to break up the co-operative, open-field system of cultivation, and to
re-lease the land in enclosed farms for higher rents. This enclosure
movement was confined to certain districts and was not so widespread
as that of the eighteenth century, but, taken with the spread of sheep-
farming, it did dislodge an appreciable section of the peasantry from
their inherited means of livelihood. Coincidently there occurred a
fall in the value of money, in consequence of the inflow of gold and
silver from America, a phenomenon which was made the excuse for
much of the enclosing of land. The general result was a period of
social misery and political unrest, of rapid fortune-building for the
progressive and of insecurity for those of conservative temperament, of
greater extremes of wealth and poverty, and of the break-down of many
of the social relationships which had been adequate to a more stable
condition of affairs. Between 1540 and 1560 there took place, in effect,
a rehearsal in miniature of the Industrial Revolution. The French
wars, the heavy Government debts, and the debasement of the coinage,
all contributed to the evils of the time, causing a general complaint of
the decay of the old trades upon which England's wealth was founded.
Meanwhile the population was increasing, a fact which is explained
by the disappearance of the static social conditions hitherto acting as
a restraint upon marriage. At the opening of the Tudor period the
population of England and Wales was about three millions, having
remained almost stationary since the Black Death; at its close the
38 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
numbers had reached four millions, and most of this increase had
taken place since the dissolution of the monasteries. Consequently it
appeared to contemporary thinkers that England needed not only a
social reconstruction and development of internal resources, but also
the discovery of new paths of commercial expansion. The former
process was postponed until the reign of Elizabeth, but the latter
began shortly after the death of Henry VIII, by means which have
now to be considered.
The friendship between Henry VIII and the Hanseatic League had
caused much resentment among the Merchant Adventurers, who
had never yet succeeded in their aim of monopolising the North Sea
cloth trade. But Henry considered himself justified in rating naval
efficiency higher than the advantage of the merchants; and the
Hansa, besides selling him ships, delivered a great quantity of cordage
and other stores at the opening of the wax of 1544. l The discontent of
the Merchant Adventurers grew more intense in the next year, when
the Emperor proclaimed an arrest of their trade in the Low Countries
in retaliation for the injuries he suffered from the privateers. The
Englishmen had to look idly on whilst their German rivals engrossed
the trade in English cloth for the Antwerp market. But the death of
Henry changed the prospects of the contending parties. Somerset and
Northumberland, who ruled successively in the name of Edward VI,
were men to place immediate advantage before ulterior considera-
tions. They were hampered by enormous debts, and they looked to
the wealthy Merchant Adventurers to ease the State of its burdens.
The Adventurers, led by Thomas Gresham, found the money and
demanded a return, nothing less than the revocation of the Hanse
charters and the abolition of the privileges conferred by the treaty of
1474. They presented a long list of charges against the Germans; but
the real offence was undoubtedly that of competing in the Low
Countries trade. In February 1552 Northumberland revoked the
Hanse privileges, and reduced the German traders to the same position
as that held by other aliens. Queen Mary on her accession restored
the privileges for a time; but ere long the Merchant Adventurers were
renewing their complaints, and Gresham's financial genius was
making itself as indispensable to the new Government as to the old.
Once more the price had to be paid, and in 1555 Mary suspended the
privileges, substituting certain temporary rights of trade pending a
meeting to negotiate a settlement. The Hansa refused to attend and
clamoured for full restitution, the temporary concessions expired, and
by the summer of 1557 England and the League were in a state of war.
Thedosingof the Baltic cutoff grain supplies during a timeof dearth in
England and, more serious still, it cut off the supply of naval stores.
Of all Mary's Navy, well-nigh as strong on paper as that of her father,
there was not even a small squadron fit for the sea when Guise
1 Hist. MSS Commission, Cecil M&S, i, 44.
THE NORTH-EAST PASSAGE 39
beleaguered Calais. The cause may have been mere incompetence,
but is more likely to have been an unavoidable shortage of neces-
saries; for fifty-five English merchantmen had that season been
denied cargoes in the Baltic ports.1 In 1560 Elizabeth, on Cecil's
advice, made peace with the Hansa on terms which excluded its
members from the Antwerp cloth trade and abolished the absurd
customs exemptions by which they had paid less than native English
merchants. But still the Germans retained an advantage over other
foreigners until 1579, when a new dispute caused the withdrawal of
this last privilege. Finally, in 1598, the English Government seized
the Steelyard, their London home, and expelled its tenants in retalia-
tion for the Emperor's expulsion of English merchants from Germany.
The critical event of this series was the treaty of 1560. By it the
Merchant Adventurers secured the monopoly of sending cloth to
the Netherlands and western Germany, and the way was prepared
for Elizabeth's revival of the Eastland Company, which at length
gained for the English a position of equality in the Baltic. The struggle
with the Hansa was an indispensable preliminary to the attainment
of commercial autonomy.
Before accomplishing the defeat of the Hansa, the London mer-
chants had embarked upon what was to them a novel scheme for
finding new markets for English manufactures; they had formed a
joint-stock company for the discovery of the North-East Passage to
Asia. The inspiring brain seems to have been that of Sebastian Cabot.
He had left England in 1512 and had taken service with Spain, where
he rose to the rank of Pilot-Major of the realm. His knowledge of
navigation and geography was great, and his own estimation of that
knowledge greater still, so that when he returned to England in 1548,
having rather outstayed his welcome in Spain, he was hailed as one
who would restore the prosperity endangered by the economic
changes of the time. Yet he was slow to evolve an acceptable scheme,
and nothing came to the stage of action until the early part of 1553.
By that date a Company had been formed to work on a joint stock
of £6000 divided into £25 shares, and to equip an expedition to open
a direct trade with Asia by the north-east. Sebastian Cabot, as the
man of knowledge, was appointed governor, although actually he
could have known no more than anyone else about the region to be
traversed, his own early failure having been in the north-west. The
Company, whose members included noblemen, politicians, courtiers
and merchants, prepared three well-found ships, and entrusted the
command to Sir Hugh Willoughby, a soldier, with Richard Chancellor,
an experienced seaman, as his second and adviser.
In May 1553, as Edward VI lay dying at Greenwich, the expedition
passed down the Thames and steered for the Norwegian coast. In
case of separation the fishing port of Vardo, near the North Cape, the
1 Brit. Mus., Lansdowne MSS, 170, ff. 250 seqq.
40 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
farthest north-easterly point known to the men of western Europe, had
been named as the rendezvous. The separation unfortunately took
place, Chancellor with one ship losing sight of Willoughby with the
other two in heavy weather not very long after leaving English waters.
Chancellor made for Vardo and awaited his chief, but Willoughby
overshot the port and sailed on eastwards, intent upon discovering
the passage while the summer endured. He reached the desolate
shore of Novaia Zemlia and was then forced by a leaky ship and the
break-up of the weather to seek a haven in which to winter. He re-
traced his course westwards until he came to the inlet of Arzina on
the Murman coast of Russian Lapland, and there he decided to lay
up the ships and resume the voyage to Asia in the following spring.
But for Willoughby and his men there was to be no spring; every one
of them perished in the Arctic winter, and their vessels were after-
wards found with the bodies on board.
Meanwhile, Chancellor had resumed the voyage with his single
ship. Keeping a more southerly course than Willoughby, he had
found the entrance of the White Sea, which, as a possible passage to
Cathay, it was his duty to investigate. He sailed to its southern end,
where he overhauled a boatful of fishermen; and from them he under-
stood, much to his surprise, that he was in the dominions of the Czar
of Muscovy. At that date Russia was known to western Europe only
by vague report. The Hansa had long maintained factories in the
country, but their merchants had been jealous in excluding strangers
and preventing any leakage of information. Their line of entry had
been from the Baltic coast, to which Russia did not yet extend, in-
wards to Novgorod and Moscow, and by Chancellor's discovery their
monopoly was now completely outflanked. For Chancellor realised
the possibilities of his find. He laid up his ship at the fishing port of
Archangel, a Russian outpost then of recent foundation, and travelled
overland to Moscow. There he saw the czar, Ivan the Terrible,
assumed the position of England's accredited envoy, and negotiated
a grant of trading privileges to be exercised by the White Sea route.
Ivan was glad to open up a new route to the western Powers and to
free himself from the economic tyranny which the Hanse monopoly
had entailed. In the summer of 1554 Chancellor returned to Arch-
angel and thence sailed to England, where his news gave great satis-
faction. He had heard nothing of Willoughby's fate, and it was at
first hoped that that officer had pushed on to the yet happier
discovery of the Asiatic passage.
For the present the Company had to exploit the Russian trade, and
it did so by despatching Chancellor with a new expedition in 1555.
It was then that Willoughby's end was learned from Russian fisher-
men, and his log and other papers recovered. In the same year the
Company received a charter of incorporation from Philip and Mary,
with the monopoly of the new trades it was opening up. Its official
THE MUSCOVY COMPANY 41
title was that of "The Merchants Adventurers of England for the
discovery of lands, territories, etc., unknown", but from force of
circumstance it was soon popularly called the Muscovy Company.
It carried on a thriving business in Russia in its early years, obtaining
certain products for which England had been hitherto dependent
upon the Hansa, and marketing English cloth and other manu-
factures. But this active trade was set off by heavy losses of shipping
in the wild northern seas — Chancellor was himself drowned on his
second return from Archangel — and by the difficulty of controlling
employees in a distant land.
The Company regarded Russia as a stepping-stone to Asia, and
in 1557 Anthony Jenkinson, its most brilliant servant after Chan-
cellor's death, set out to achieve the discovery by land. He went down
the Volga to the Caspian Sea, and thence eastward to Bokhara. He
was on an ancient trade route to China, but conditions had deterior-
ated since Marco Polo had followed it three centuries before. There
was now no great Mongol emperor enforcing peace throughout Asia,
and the anarchy was so serious an obstacle that Jenkinson had to
return. His discoveries did, however, result in the establishment of a
trade with Persia. But it was abandoned in 1580, when a Turkish
invasion threw Persia into confusion.
The Muscovy Company was not only the first joint-stock corpora-
tion chartered by an English Government, and so a means of gaining
experience in new methods of exploitation, but also the first English
Company to gain direct contact with any part of Asia beyond the
coasts of the Levant. It represented an attempt at peaceful expansion
without challenge to Spain or Portugal, and its objects were approved
by so jealous a critic as Philip II. The north-west voyages and the
Levant Company of Elizabeth were the fruit of the same inspiration;
but success was to come only from the bellicose efforts of the East
India Company.
The search for new markets has hitherto been traced in its eastward
manifestations, and they have been found true to type in that they
assumed the form of a strictly governed company. It is now necessary
to consider the simultaneous moves to the southward and westward,
wherein the individualist tradition was to show of what successes it
was capable.
The Guinea and Brazil voyages of the early series had ceased at the
outbreak of the last French war of Henry VIII. Several of the persons
concerned in them must have been living ten years later; yet a new
oceanic trade sprang up under Edward VI in such a way as to suggest
an independent origin, for it began with voyages to the Atlantic coast
of Morocco, and then extended to the Gold Coast and the Bight of
Benin. There are, however, connecting links in the persons of
James Alday, who claimed to have originated the Barbary trade,
and of Thomas Wyndham, both of whom had certainly been
42 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
Channel privateers, cruising off the Devon coast in association with
Hawkins and the Plymouth men, in I545-6.1 According to Alday's
account, it was he who revealed the necessary information about
Barbary to Sir John Lutterell and other London merchants, who
appointed him to command an expedition in 1551. But an outbreak
of the sweat killed off the principal adventurers of the voyage. Alday
himself was taken ill, and Thomas Wyndham sailed in command of
the ship. He reached the port of Santa Cruz in Morocco, traded with
success, and came safely home. In 1552 three ships went, again under
Wyndham's command, at the adventure of Sir William Gerrard, Sir
John Yorke, Francis Lambert and others. They also did good busi-
ness, obtaining sugar, molasses and dates in exchange for English
manufactures. Thenceforward the Barbary trade was well established,
and became the especial business of a particular set of London mer-
chants.2 They maintained resident factors in the country, and were
on excellent terms with the Sultan of Morocco. Sugar was at first
the principal commodity obtained, but as time went on gum, which
was useful for cloth finishing, began to rival it in importance. Too
much weight should not be attached to Alda/s claim to have
"invented" the trade.8 He appears frequently in the records of the
Admiralty court, generally as a defendant, and was in fact being
proceeded against for piracy at the very time when he alleged that
the sweat prevented his sailing to Barbary. Other evidence suggests
that the trade first came to the notice of Englishmen resident at
Seville and Cadiz, and that it was originally worked from the latter
port as a base,4 probably long before 1551. Whatever its origin, it
became very important in the early years of Elizabeth, and by 1574
was reckoned by the merchants to be more lucrative than the trade
with Portugal itself.6 Portugal protested and claimed a prior interest
in the country, but she could hardly describe it as her possession, for
the sultan was manifestly an independent prince. Therefore, without
raising any general principle, Portuguese ambassadors made accusa-
tions of detail against the English merchants, such, for example, as
that of supplying Hebrew bibles to the Jews of Morocco.6
In 1553> Just as Willoughby and Chancellor were sailing for the
north-east, the Barbary merchants extended their enterprise to
Guinea. The syndicate consisted of Sir George Barnes, Sir John
Yorke, Sir William Gerrard, Thomas Wyndham and Francis
Lambert.7 According to a contemporary account by Richard Eden,
1 H.CA. Examinations, no. 5, 1546, Oct. 8; 1546/7* Jan. 18, Feb. 5; 1548, Apr. 23,
Mays.
1 See especially H.C.A. Examinations, no. 12, 1559, Nov. 12, 20 and 30; no. 16, 1568,
May 29, Nov. 1 1 ; and th^ceforward many references to end of volume.
Commercial Relations of England and
P- 143- • Brit. Mus., Lansdowne MSS, 171, f. 154 b.
A t? inations, no. 9, 1554/5, Feb. 6, 12.
THE AFRICAN TRADE 43
the inspiration came direct from Portugal by means of a renegade
named Antonio Anes Pinteado, but it is significant that Gerrard sent
to Rouen to enlist a French surgeon experienced in the diseases of
the coast.1 The voyage which ensued differed in plan from those
of William Hawkins. He had pushed no further east than the
Grain Coast, but the expedition now to be described went to
the Gold Coast and thence into the Bight of Benin, a much more
risky undertaking because the prevailing winds and currents
made it difficult for sailing ships to get away again into the open
Atlantic.
Three ships, the Lion, the Primrose and the Moon pinnace, the last
two hired from the Royal Navy, sailed from Portsmouth in August
1553 > with Wyndham and Pinteado in command and crews numbering
140 men. They bought some wines at Madeira, and then touched
at the Grain Coast and sailed on to the Gold Coast. There they traded
on either side of Elmina, the Portuguese headquarters, and obtained
150 Ib. of gold from the negro chiefs. This gold would have been
worth ^10,000-^12,000 and must alone have yielded a large profit
on the voyage; there is no record of the working expenses, but a
similar expedition at a later date cost about £7,000 to equip. From
the Gold Coast they went on to the mouth of a river in Benin —
possibly a channel of the Niger delta — where Pinteado knew of a
pepper-growing region in the interior. Here Wyndham and many
others perished of fever, and Pinteado died on the voyage home.
Less than one-third of the whole company reached England. But
the tragic end of this pioneer undertaking was forgotten in die glamour
of the profits foreshadowed by the voyage, and the Guinea trade at
once became fashionable with the westward adventurers of London.
A new syndicate prepared a voyage with three ships and two pinnaces
in 1554- Its members were Sir George Barnes, Sir John Yorke, Thomas
Lock, Anthony Hickman and Edward Castlyn, of whom the last two
were already trading regularly in the Canary Islands. They entrusted
the command to John Lock. These Locks seem to have been brothers
of the more famous Michael Lock; it is interesting to notice also that
Martin Frobisher served in this expedition, having already accom-
panied and survived the previous one.2 The voyage was a great
success, yielding Guinea grains, ivory, and 400 Ib. of gold. Others
followed; three of them, led by William Towerson, are recorded in
detail by Hakluyt, whilst of several more there are hints sufficient to
show that they really took place; and a lucrative trade gave a great
stimulus to the individualist form of oceanic enterprise. The import-
ance of this latter point should not be lightly estimated, for the in-
corporated form might easily have been adopted, as the history of the
1 Gosselin, E., Documents pour servir d Fhistoire de la marine normande (Rouen, 1876),
pp. 146-7.
2 Cal. St. Pap* Foreign, 1562, no. joa; Lansdowne MSS, 171, f. 148.
44 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
Dutch West India Company was to prove. For England these
voyages of Mar/s reign formed the tradition and determined subse-
quent development.
The chief reason preventing incorporation was the clandestine
nature of the trade. Already, before Lock had returned, Portugal
was protesting her right to the monopoly of Guinea and demanding
that the voyages should be stopped. The merchants argued that they
were not interloping, since they avoided the Portuguese stations and
traded with independent negro chiefs— whom they exalted into
sovereign kings. They had some show of reason on their side, for
Portuguese occupation of West Africa was not, in the present sense
of the word, effective. Queen Mary was inclined to support her
merchants, but her husband, Philip of Spain, seeing the importance
of the principle involved, insisted upon the prohibition of the trade.
The Privy Council accordingly forbade the merchants to proceed
(December 1555), and on later occasions took sporadic measures to
stop the business. Nevertheless it went on throughout the reign;
the merchants outwitted their rulers; and there is no doubt, from the
continued use of naval vessels and from other indications, that men
in high places were conniving at the trade and even investing
in it.
Under Elizabeth there was no disguise. Voyage after voyage went
forth to the African coast, managed by Gerrard, Sir Lionel Ducket, Sir
William Chester, Castlyn, Hickman, William and George Wynter
(both Navy officials), and many more, and supported by nobles like
Leicester, Pembroke and Clinton, the Lord Admiral. Richard
Hakluyfs Principal Navigations records some of these voyages and is
invaluable for details of a kind which do not appear in official docu-
ments. But Hakluyt has been, quite innocently, the cause of some
perversion of historical truth. Although he nowhere claims to give a
complete register of the expeditions, modern historians have been
tempted to assume that he does and to base their conclusions upon
his accounts alone, with the result that the importance of the
whole business has been minimised and it has been viewed solely
through the eyes of the English adventurers whose accounts Hakluyt
reproduced. In actual fact it may be gathered from a variety of
sources that the number of Guinea voyages was at least four or five
times as great as has been commonly supposed, and that the Portu-
guese had some grounds for complaint even if the English had more.
From a close reading of the original evidence the view emerges that
the Guinea traffic of this period is one of the fundamental transactions
of British expansion, that it produced an oceanic war with Portugal,
the first English war of its kind, and that it occasioned the formulation
of a British doctrine which was never afterwards abandoned, the
doctrine that prescriptive rights to colonial territory are of no avail
unless backed by effective occupation.
ANGLO-PORTUGUESE NEGOTIATIONS 45
From the outset Elizabeth took up a definite attitude. She openly
approved of the Guinea trade, added a share of its profits to the
revenue of the Grown, and recognised that it provided an opportunity
for the commercial expansion of which England was in urgent need
for reasons which have already been discussed. Charter-parties and
other documents passing between the Queen and the adventurers
indicate the terms upon which royal warships were hired for some
of the voyages. The Crown provided the vessels, rigged and armed
them, furnished victuals to the amount of one-tenth the value of the
cargoes exported, and bore the risk of total loss, although not that of
incidental wear and tear. On their side the adventurers paid the
wages of the crews, laded cargo of a specified value, and agreed to
pay the Crown one-third of the clear profits of the undertaking be-
sides making good any damage to the ships.1 The Crown's share was
paid over to the Treasurer of the Navy and so presumably was re-
garded as public revenue, a circumstance which tends to rebut the
charge sometimes brought against the Queen of irresponsibly in-
volving the country in dangers for the benefit of her private purse.
Another misconception may also be corrected at this point. Sir
William Cecil is sometimes regarded as a man of peace who frowned
upon all tropical adventures likely to cause difficulties with foreign
Powers. However true this may have been at a later period, when
Drake at sea and the ultra-Protestants at court were steadily forcing
on war with Spain, it was not true of the Portuguese dispute. Cecil
evidently saw no reason, up to 1569, to fear Portugal, and he took an
active part in the administration of the Guinea trade and in the for-
mulation of English policy towards it; and there is no evidence that
he did so against his better judgment.
As in Queen Mary's reign, Portuguese ambassadors were sent to
demand the cessation of the English expeditions, but their reception
by Elizabeth was very different from that by Mary and her husband.
In 1561, 1562 and 1564, three successive envoys appeared in England,
and since the transactions between them and the Queen's Govern-
ment were on each occasion very similar, a single account of the
negotiations will suffice. The ambassador opened with a general com-
plaint of the intrusion of English traders into Portuguese possessions
of long standing, and with a request for prohibition and punishment.
To this the English replied that the Qjieen was not certainly in-
formed what places and peoples were subject to the King of Portugal,
and suggested that the best solution would be for either Power to
grant full rights of trade in all its dominions to the subjects of the
other. The Portuguese then made a more extended statement. The
objection covers, it asserts, the entire coast of Guinea (evidently
meaning all West Africa south of Barbary). The Kings of Portugal
1 Brit.Mus.,LansdowneMSS, n
no. 61.
46 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
have conquered these regions, expending much blood and treasure,
and have been careful to distribute their produce freely over Europe,
so that it is obtainable by the English as by other nations. Moreover,
the King of Portugal restricts the trade even among his own^subjects,
who need a special licence to engage in it. Only a disciplined and
limited trade has any chance of prospering, and the profits have
already been ruined by the numbers of interlopers resorting to the
coast. As for the contention that some of the places in question are
not subject to the King, it is not true. They all acknowledge "more or
less " his authority, although he admits that he imposes a lighter hand
in some places than in others, for the purpose of spreading true
religion by kindly treatment. In this matter he makes a distinction
between places conquered by force and those which have voluntarily
submitted. With regard to mutual toleration, the Queen, it is true,
permits foreigners' trade in the conquered kingdom of Ireland, but
so does the King in his conquestsof the Algarve and the Azores, and this ,
is a sufficient exchange. He must again press for total prohibition of
the Guinea trade.
The ground taken by the Portuguese in this argument is very note-
worthy. There is no appeal to the Bulls of Alexander VI, which appear
scarcely to be mentioned in any of the surviving documents; and the
claim to monopoly is based, by Portugal herself, upon effective occu-
pation and the right administration of a trust in which the interest of
other nations is admitted. It has all a much more modern tone than
is usually credited to the sixteenth century. The vital question thus
became that of defining effective occupation, and on this point the
negotiations broke down.
In the English reply, the Queen protests that any restriction is un-
neighbourly and provocative, but that nevertheless she will for the
sake of peace forbid her subjects to resort to any place in Africa under
the actual dominion of the King of Portugal. But she contends that
the greater part of the regions in question do not acknowledge that
dominion. Here a witness is called in the person of Martin Frobisher,
who had been captured by negroes in the voyage of 1554-5 anc^ by
them handed over to the commander of Elmina. He declared that
between Gape Verde and Benin there were only two Portuguese
forts, one at Cape Tres Puntas and the other at Elmina, that only
the people under gunshot of the forts obeyed the Portuguese, that
Englishmen and Frenchmen were accustomed to trade where the
Portuguese dared not, and that of missionary work there was none
beyond an occasional mass celebrated at Elmina and poorly attended
by the natives. Such being the position, the Queen's answer con-
tinues, she will not agree to the prohibition of the trade with any
places not garrisoned by the Portuguese, more especially as the
French are, and have long been, in the habit of exercising those very
rights from which it is sought to exclude her subjects. An ironic
OCEANIC WAR WITH PORTUGAL 47
thrust concludes the argument, pricking the bubble of the Portuguese
contention. If, remarks Elizabeth, the regions in question are really
under the King's authority, he can settle the matter himself by for-
bidding their inhabitants to trade with Englishmen.
With this answer all three ambassadors had to depart unsatisfied.
The Queen was as good as her word, so far as it went, for there are
documents showing that bonds were exacted of Guinea adventurers
not to go to places occupied by the Portuguese. But the latter were
left with an undoubted grievance. They had a strong sense of pre-
scriptive right, and in addition they knew that English witnesses like
Frobisher had overstated their case. For it is certain that, although
there may have been no more garrisons than Frobisher alleged, there
were Portuguese factors and officers resident in several negro settle-
ments.1 In the main, however, it is true that occupation was not
effective, and that the majority of the places claimed by the Portu-
guese were merely visited by them from time to time for purposes of
trade. Failing to secure satisfaction in England, Portugal sent out
warships to the Guinea coast. There was wild work there, more,
probably, than has been recorded, capture of Englishmen, de-
structive reprisals by their friends, and an extension of hostilities to
the Atlantic islands and the seas of Europe. In 1565-6, for instance,
the Wynters sent out a ship which was surprised and sunk by a
Portuguese armada in the River of Sestos. Although she was only of
seventy tons, they claimed that the loss suffered was £7600 and
secured letters of marque from the Admiralty court empowering them
to take Portuguese property in home waters to that amount. It is
typical of the confusion which this irregular warfare produced that
one of their first captures was a ship insured in London.2
Out of the gold trade with Guinea sprang the slave trade in-
augurated by John Hawkins and linking Guinea with the Caribbean.
Old William Hawkins died in the winter of 1553-4, when his younger
son John was about twenty-two years of age. John Hawkins made
several voyages in his family's ships to the Canary Islands, where he
gleaned information about trade conditions in the West Indies and
made friends with local merchants who could be useful to him. He is
also known to have had business in northern France,3 whose Huguenot
adventurers had long been a plague to the Spaniards in the Caribbean.
He had thus an inherited and acquired interest in Atlantic enterprise.
In 1560-1 he came to London and married the daughter of Benjamin
Gonson, Treasurer of the Navy and a partner in the Guinea syndi-
cates. With the backing of Gonson, Sir William Wynter, Sir Thomas
Lodge and Sir Lionel Ducket, he made his first slaving expedition in
x There are several references to such persons in Cotton MSS, Otho E. viii, ff. 17-41 b,
an account of John Hawkins's voyage of 1567-9.
1 H.G.A. Examinations, no. 1 7, 1570, Apr. 6; Libels, 3/42, no. 106; St. Pap. Dom., Ehz.
XLXX, nos. 26, 27.
8 Cat. St. Pap. Foreign, i553~6> ao. 566.
48 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
1562-3. He went first to the Canaries, where he picked up a Spanish
pilot for the Caribbean. Then he made for the Guinea coast, where
his own account, printed by Hakluyt, states merely that he captured
some negroes. A version compiled by the Portuguese and submitted
by yet a fourth ambassador in 1568 puts a different complexion on
the proceeding, alleging that between Cape Verde and Sierra Leone
he took six of their ships with well over 900 negroes and much other
merchandise.1 This was his first appearance on the African coast, so
that he had no personal wrongs to avenge; yet, if the Portuguese are
to be trusted, he acted as a belligerent from the outset. Having thus
secured his cargoes of slaves, he went over to the Caribbean to sell
them to the Spanish colonists. In so doing he was infringing another
Portuguese monopoly, that of the sale of negroes in Spanish America.
Spain, having no Guinea stations of her own, leased this right to
Portuguese capitalists, by whom the price was enhanced to the detri-
ment of the Spanish planter. Some of the ships taken by Hawkins
belonged to the owners of the concession, and one of their witnesses
testified to an incident which shows how the English appreciated the
situation: Dixit ipse testis se if so audiente Anglos alia voce iactasse eo
Tractationem nee ad Lusitaniae regem nee adeo Tractatores pertinere, sed
ad imperium Anglicum et ad Joanem Decanes [Hawkins] spectare.* The
tractatio evidently means the slaving concession. In Hispaniola
Hawkins sold his negroes at a good profit. The colonial officials made
no opposition, and he acted as though he expected none, for he left
property behind him in the island and shipped some part of his
return cargoes to Spain. When, however, the §panish Government
learned of the enterprise, it confiscated the goods and forbade the
colonial officials to allow any more trade by Englishmen.
There was here no question of the effectiveness of occupation, as in
Guinea, for the nature of the slave trade compelled dealings in es-
tablished colonies. But Hawkins could claim legality for his traffic by
the terms of treaties made with Spain and the Netherlands in the time
of Henry VII. In those instruments Philip's ancestors on both sides
of his family had bound themselves and their successors to allow
English trade in all their dominiojcis without any limitation of the
colonies, which, in the nature of things, could not have been antici-
pated by the negotiators. It has been generally assumed that this was
the English contention; yet there seems to be no direct evidence that
either Hawkins or the English Government appealed to the treaties
at the time of the voyages. However, just as Henry VII himself had
sometimes quoted statutes as overriding treaties, so now Philip II
brushed aside the English contention, if it was made, without a
moment's consideration. Foreigners' trade was positively not to be
allowed in the West.
* St. Pap. Foreign, Eliz. xcix, a book of Portuguese complaints, of 97 pages.
4 St. Pap. Foreign, Eliz. xcv, ff. 242-67, a similar book.
HAWKINS IN THE CARIBBEAN 49
The Queen backed Hawkins, and Cecil did not disapprove, and
the syndicate accordingly prepared a second expedition. Hawkins
sailed again in 1564 with four vessels, of which one, the Jesus of
Lubeck, was a ship belonging to the Queen's Navy. This time he sold
his negroes in the ports of the Spanish Main, from Borburata along to
Rio de la Hacha. The governors, acting on instructions, prohibited
the trade, but they did so in a perfunctory manner, and yielded to a
show offeree by the Englishman. They even gave him certificates of
good behaviour at his departure. Once again the voyage was a great
success. It excited a vigorous protest from Don Guzman de Silva, the
Spanish ambassador in England, and Elizabeth, whether sincerely or
not, forbade Hawkins to sail again when his squadron was ready in
the autumn of 1566. He remained at home, but three ships laden by
him sailed from Plymouth, ostensibly for Guinea, on 9 November.1
They were away nearly a year, committed depredations about Cape
Verde, and sold negroes on the Spanish Main.2 de Silva, hearing that
they had been to the West Indies, asked the Queen to punish the
leaders, but nothing more was heard of the affair. Hawkins sailed in
person once more in the autumn of 1567 with the Jesus and the
Minion, of the Navy, and four smaller vessels. He concealed his in-
tended destination from de Silva, although not from Cecil and the
Queen, who knew at the last moment that he meant to go slaving
again. The syndicate consisted of the original members with the
addition of Sir William Gerrard, and they had invested a greater sum
than before. Hawkins, having taken or destroyed more Portuguese
property than ever in Guinea, again forced a trade on the Main,
although with more difficulty, and at Cartagena met with a positive
refusal. Then he sailed homewards by the Gulf of Mexico, suffered
damage in a storm, and put in at San Juan de Ulua, the port of
New Spain, for repairs. Shortly afterwards the outward-bound Plate
fleet arrived, bearing the new viceroy as a passenger. He exchanged
hostages with Hawkins in pledge of friendly behaviour, but suddenly
fell upon the dismantled English ships. After a severe battle all were
taken or burnt except the Minion and the Judith, in which Hawkins
and Francis Drake respectively made their escape. With their
arrival in England in January 1569 the era of western trade was at
an end, and that of private warfare and reprisals had begun, the
typically Elizabethan era, to which all the irregular proceedings of
the past thirty years had formed the prelude.
The disaster to Hawkins was almost contemporaneous with two
other events which, coupled with it, had a considerable effect upon
English relations with the oceanic Powers. These were the replace-
ment of Guzman de Silva by Guerau de Spes as Spanish ambassador
1 P.R.O., Plymouth Port Books, 1010/18-
1 H.G.A. Libels, 3/39, nos. 22, 101; the Portuguese complaint last cited; and Cotton
MSS, Otho E. viii, £ 32.
CUBE I
50 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
in England, and the seizure by the English Government of a consign-
ment of treasure despatched up the Channel by Philip II for the
support of his army in the Netherlands. The money was shipped in a
number of small craft which were waylaid by French privateers and
forced to take refuge in English harbours. Elizabeth and her ministers
could not keep their hands off this wealth, and after promising to pass
it safely on to its destination they found a technically good excuse for
retaining it. Guerau de Spes, the new Spanish ambassador, a head-
strong and foolish man, put Spain in the wrong by his handling of the
matter; whereas it is quite possible that de Silva, a diplomatist of tact
and personal charm, would have been equal to saving the treasure
and avoiding any breach of good relations. As it wag, Philip arrested
all English property in his dominions and Elizabeth retaliated in the
same manner, getting considerably the better of the exchange. The
quarrel continued, with suspension of trade, until a compromise was
patched up in 1573. These and other circumstances combined to put
an end to the unofficial war with Portugal. Gold-trading in Guinea
was being overdone, profits were diminishing, and Portuguese armed
squadrons were growing stronger, whilst slaves were no longer a
lucrative cargo for the West. Drake and a new school of privateers
were feeling the attraction of the Caribbean as a cruising ground, and
this also relaxed some of the pressure upon Guinea. Finally, the
embargo upon English commerce in Spain put a premium upon good
relations with Portugal, for it was feasible to trade indirectly with
Seville through Lisbon. Accordingly in 1569 England became more
friendly towards Portugal and began to prohibit Guinea expeditions,
which thenceforward became less common for several years. Negotia-
tions for peace with Portugal began in 1571, but Elizabeth, although
not anxious to press the matter, would never formally yield on the
question of effective occupation; and in the end nothing was diplo-
matically achieved but a treaty of mutual abstention from hostilities
in 1576. The Guinea question was thus partly suspended, but not
settled.
As the reign of Elizabeth advanced, England was steering into
very troubled waters, and the question of naval efficiency became
vital. A list of the king's ships made a year after the death of Henry VIII
shows that there were then fifty-three vessels in the fleet, twenty-five
of which were of more than 200 tons. Under Edward VI the Navy
was well cared for, but under Mary there was a decline in efficiency,
although no great falling-off in paper strength. The total number of
ships indeed decreased, but those which dropped out were for the
most part of small size; and at the close of Mary's reign a considerable
programme of new building was in process of being carried out.
The guardians of Edward VI continued the reforms in the administra-
tion which Henry VIII had inaugurated. They laid the foundations
of the building and repairing yard at Chatham, and they took steps
THE TUDOR NAVY 51
to place the victualling on a more satisfactory fooling under a perma-
nent surveyor, instead of relying, as previously, upon emergency
contracts made as occasion arose. During the campaigns against
France and Scotland, the fleet did what was required of it, and it is
worth noting that in the winter of 1550-1 a Channel guard of twelve
ships was in commission, a practice which Henry VIII had made the
rule in war time.1 But there was another side to the question.
Until quite modern times dishonesty and shirking of duty have
been the constant bane of the civil services of England and most
other nations. Honest and efficient administration has been the
exception rather than the rule. There are indications that this canker
was at work in the Admiralty of Edward VI, and there is proof
that it was in that of his successor. In 1555, fiye ships of the Navy,
aggregating 1570 tons, were sold for a total of £88, one of them
being the Grand Mistress of 450 tons, built in 1545, and now, when
ten years old, fetching £35. Here is either incompetence or rascality,
and probably a combination of the two. The possible effect of the
quarrel with the Hansa, a dispute which reached the stage of non-
intercourse in the summer of 1557, has already been mentioned;
and in the winter of 1557-8 no Channel guard was afloat in the
narrow seas, and the Earl of Rutland, trying to save Calais with re-
inforcements conveyed in fishing boats, was easily beaten off by the
French covering squadron.
One result of the Calais disaster was an outburst of naval con-
struction, which in 1558-9 added several good warships to the fleet.
But with the conclusion of peace at Cateau-Cambr&is the effort died
down, and for the first ten years of her reign Elizabeth barely main-
tained the Navy at the strength at which she had found it. There
is, however, some evidence of better administration and of an in-
creased interest in naval problems. The Qiieen claimed that she alone
of European princes made an effort to hunt down pirates. She was
not very successful in so doing, but she did maintain a Channel police
force fairly continuously on duty. Cecil kept an eye on the Navy, and
was partially successful in checking the worst abuses. But in 1569 the
Navy was not by any means fit for the tasks which it was to perform
twenty years later. An immense work of organisation had yet to be
undertaken, and a presage of that work may be seen in the arrival
in Plymouth Sound of the two battered ships escaped from the carnage
of San Juan de Ulua. For it was that day of treachery and murder
which gave to the Navy a peerless fighting admiral in Francis Drake,
and a first-class administrator in John Hawkins.
Looking back over the maritime record from 1485 to 1569, it is
possible to frame some generalisations. During that period England
worked for and secured the chief control of the old trade routes from
1 See Oppenheim, M., Hist, qfthe Administration qfthe Royal Navy9 and Corbett, J. S.,
Drake and the Tudor Navy, vol. i.
4-3
52 ENGLAND AND THE OPENING OF THE ATLANTIC
her own ports to those of other European nations. But no sooner had
she done so than, from world causes, the old trades began to decline
in relative value. At the same time she had been opening up new
trades with new methods— joint-stock organisation and small indi-
vidualist syndicates. The individualist form was congenial to the
western men, and it was also inevitable in the oceanic trades because
some of these trades were more or less illegitimate and could not be
formally sanctioned; individualism certainly developed character and
enterprise on lines differing from those of the incorporated trades.
When this stimulus began to operate, it was assisted by the new
financial conditions which were permitting the accumulation on a
small scale of the mobile capital essential for long-distance under-
takings. The Reformation bore its part by producing in England a
social upheaval and a sense of over-population, a prime incentive to
colonisation in the next period; and in Europe a re-grouping of the
Powers in accordance with religious interests, a re-grouping which the
new oceanic ambitions hardened by material considerations. Amidst
these changes the Tudors saw the need of a regular Navy. Henry VII
laid plans which Henry VIII did much more than realise. Mary held
less firmly to the ideal. Elizabeth in her early years gave it only
moderate attention, preoccupied as she was with the task of bringing
domestic order out of the revolutionary chaos of the preceding genera-
tion; but at least she was so far successful as to see the conspiracy
of 1571 breakdown owing to the impossibility of a Spanish invasion.
England, it is true, had only a mediocre Navy, but Spain had
virtually none at all available for service in northern Europe.
In the Mediterranean she had the galleys of Lepanto, and on the
ocean a small semi-private squadron of sailing galleons; but the first
of these forces was fully engaged by the Turk, and to the second
was allocated the duty of guarding the treasure fleets against the
privateers. The period of Anglo-Spanish hostility inaugurated in
1568-9 was one in which both countries increased their naval pre-
parations. But England, thanks to the good work of the Tudor
sovereigns in the past, was fully able to maintain her superiority.
CHAPTER m
THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION,
1569-1618
AT all periods the development of England's colonising activity has
been largely influenced by the course of her foreign relations, and
this not less in the days of its beginnings than in the great eras of
expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Every practic-
able way to trade beyond the limits of Europe was blocked by the
pretensions of Spain and Portugal to monopoly. Opportunities for
the expansion of commerce could be found only at the expense of
their exaggerated claims, and in the attack upon them the new
maritime nations were led first to seek advanced bases across the
ocean and then to establish permanent colonies for trade and
plantation. In the previous chapter we saw that Portuguese interests
on the African coast were the first to suffer, but later the main object
of effort became that trade with the East Indies which for half a
century had been pouring riches into the hands of Emmanuel the
Fortunate and his successors, and had made Lisbon one of the richest
cities in Europe. Portugal held the prize, but Spain was the chief
enemy by reason of her championship of the Counter-Reformation,
and the earliest colonial attempts were made when some of Eliza-
beth's councillors saw a way to aid defence in Europe by diversions
across the ocean. Their attempts are bound up with the changes in
policy that led to the outbreak of the Elizabethan war. During
the war years there was a cessation of practical effort, but theoretical
interest in colonisation as a means of remedying social evils and
strengthening the State was growing and it played an important part
in the promotion of the first permanent colonies, when peace came
under James I. The period to be treated in this chapter falls therefore
into three parts, the years of change that preceded the outbreak of
the war with Spain, the time of open war from 1585 to 1604, and the
ensuing interval of peace that came to an end when the Thirty
Years' War began in 1618.
The story of the first of these periods is not one of connected pro-
gress or even of gradual development in the colonial field. It is that
of a number of unsuccessful experiments whose most lasting results
are to be found in their cumulative influence on the national temper
and outlook. A spirit of daring adventure was aroused that set the
stay-at-home Englishmen of an earlier age on the road that has made
them the most widely scattered of all the European peoples. Such
spiritual movements are emphasised in other chapters, and here our
54 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
attention will be directed to the more prosaic background of the
story, to the connection between the various colonial ventures and
their relation to foreign and economic policy. Alongside them we
must note something of the development of English mercantile enter-
prise whereby the foundations of oversea dominion were at last
securely laid by the East India and other chartered companies
during the later years of our period.
The typical Elizabethan era, the time of private war and reprisals,
began in 1569. Englishmen had long been closely associated with
the Huguenot party in France in their attacks upon Spanish and
Portuguese commerce, and they derived the inspiration for their
first systematic efforts across the Atlantic from the great Admiral of
France, Gaspard de Coligny. Both French and English merchants
had from time to time attempted to establish small posts on the coast
of Brazil from which to carry on trade with the natives,1 but the
Portuguese had easily disposed of them. Coligny strongly advo-
cated the advantage of attacking Spain in the Indies in order to
weaken her in Europe, and during the war under Henry II he had
persistently pressed this policy on the Crown. But with the outbreak
of the Wars of Religion France was split into warring factions, and
Colignys maritime policy ceased to be national and was regarded
as merely a party interest.
The despatch of an army to France to assist the Huguenots in their
campaign in Normandy brought English officers into closer associa-
tion with Frenchmen than they had been for many years, and to
that association we may date the genesis of constructive schemes for
English colonisation beyond the seas, for serving together in the camp
at Le Havre in 1562 were Richard Eden, Thomas Stukely and
Humphrey Gilbert, the first promoters of colonial ideas in England.
Spain was the supporter of Coligny's rivals, the Guises, and in order
to weaken her he was determined to continue an aggressive policy at
sea. His thoughts were turned to the establishment of colonies on the
American coast to serve as outposts for his privateers, and his first
colonial enterprise was in Brazil, the scene of French activity almost
since the liftie of its discovery. He gave his patronage and help to the
colony of Nicolas de Villegaignon at Fort Coligny in the Bay of
Ganabara, where the city of Rio de Janeiro now stands. The colony
received a party of emigrants with their pastors who were sent out
from Geneva to plant the reformed faith in the New World. But the
adventure ended disastrously, for after bitter religious disputes among
its leaders the colony was wiped out by the Portuguese in 1560 and
the remnant of the colonists massacred or dispersed among the
cannibals. In the summer of 1561 when Coligny was governor of the
fortress of Le Havre, he summoned a meeting of his partisans and
announced to them his intention of despatching an expedition for the
1 Vide supra, p. 33.
RIBAULT AND STUKELY'S SCHEMES 55
exploration of Terra Florida preparatory to the establishment of a
colony there to be called "New France". He had completed his
preparations by the beginning of 1562, and the expedition set sail in
February under the command of Jean Ribault, a Huguenot captain
of proved worth who was well known to the English Government.
Queen Elizabeth was at this time lending support to the party of the
reformed religion and was certainly not displeased to learn of the
admiral's plans against Spain in the New World. Sailing out across
the Atlantic by an unfrequented direct route to avoid Spanish vessels,
Ribault established a garrison on the River of May in what is now
South Carolina. He called his little fort "Charlesfort" in honour of
King Charles IX, and returned to France for reinforcements in July
1562. But the times could hardly have been less propitious, for the
first War of Religion had begun, and though an English force had
been sent to the assistance of die Huguenots, the struggle was already
going against them. Ribault was compelled to flee to England after
the surrender of Dieppe to the Catholics in October 1562, and
there he wrote for the first time a full account of his Florida enter-
prise, which was published in English in London in I563.1
Ribault's tract found the English public ready for stories of Ameri-
can adventure, for Richard Eden, who was a personal acquaintance
of Sebastian Cabot, had already published a translation of Sebastian
Munster's Cosmographia in 1553 under the title of A Treatise of the new
India with other newfound Lands and Islands. His next book, which ap-
peared in 1 555 as The Decades of the New World or West India, contained
selections from the Spanish historians of the conquest and had a
considerable circulation.
The Queen's attention was drawn to the story of Ribault's expedi-
tion by Thomas Stukely, one of the most reckless and unprincipled
of the Devonshire soldiers of fortune. The idea of forestalling the
French attracted her fancy, for since Ponce de Leon's first discovery
of Florida that land had always been reputed to contain rich stores
of gold and silver, and Ribault claimed to know where to find the
treasure. But Elizabeth made an unfortunate mistake in selecting
Stukely to command the expedition that Ribault was engaged to
pilot. He betrayed the whole plan to the Spaniards and promised to
deliver over the ships to Philip's service.2 When he sailed in June
1563 he gave himself up to a course of indiscriminate robbery of
Spanish, Portuguese and French ships upon the high seas. In all
probability he never went near the Indies, but his pretence of a
colonising design is of interest in the history of expansion oversea,
because it was the first suggestion of American colonisation by English-
men, and was a link between the projects of Villegaignon and Ribault
and those of the later Elizabethans, Further the alleged connivance
1 For the original text see Biggar, H. P., in Eng. Hist. Rev. xxxn ( 1 91 7), ,253-70.
a Cal. St. Pap. Span. 1558-67, no. 328, de Silva to Philip II, 22 Oct. 1565.
56 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
of the English Queen in Stukely's piracy antedated her ^approval of
Drake's designs, and gave colour to the Spanish suspicion of every
professed English colonist as a potential pirate.
Cecil knew from the first that Stukely was not to be trusted, and
early in 1564 he decided to entrust the Florida design instead to the
experienced hands of his partners, the Hawkinses, of Plymouth. John
Hawkins, who was ordered to call and report on the prospects of the
colony on his return from his second voyage, found that the second
batch of French colonists, who had been sent out under Rend de
Laudonni&re in April 1564, were starving, and he offered them a
passage to Europe. This they refused and on his return to England
Hawkins reported that there was little prospect of finding treasure in
Florida, and the English plans for ousting the French were dropped.
The colony came to a tragic and long-remembered end. Ribault's
relief ships were cast away in a terrible storm and their shipwrecked
crews fell defenceless into the hands of Pero Men6ndez de Avil£s; no
mercy was afforded them; everyone captured was put to death, and
only Laudonni&re and a handful of followers saw France again.
The massacre horrified Englishmen and fanned the growing con-
viction of Spanish brutality and ill-faith. Coligny's schemes of
colonisation had failed, but they were not forgotten, for though
France stood aside from the struggle for forty years, a whole genera-
tion of Englishmen took up the fight and bracketed the Florida
massacre with the slaughter of Hawkins's men at San Juan de Ulua
as justifying the merciless reprisals of their privateering war. From the
time of Drake to that of the buccaneers the legend of Spanish treachery
was never forgotten. The prejudices and passions that were deliber-
ately fostered by the Queen and her ministers not only keyed up the
national spirit, but created the temper in which every English colony
from Raleigh's Virginia to Cromwell's Jamaica was planted. If we
judge only by the rival propagandists, it would seem that most
Englishmen were as incapable of rendering justice to Spain's claim
to colonial empire as Spaniards were to admit that every English
seaman was not a Lutheran savage. The truth is less highly coloured.
The main impetus to English colonisation in the Elizabethan age was
the search for economic advantage, and not solely the high-flown
desire for revenge and glory that legend has painted it, but we must
not neglect the importance of the psychological forces fostered by
anti-Spanish propaganda.
Though the English Government made no systematic efforts, like
those of Spain and Portugal, to foster colonisation across the ocean, yet
in one sense it was engaged in colonising efforts on a very large scale.
Colonisation was undertaken in Ireland under direct governmental
control for political ends and with public money. The drain in men
and treasure was such that, while the Crown was endeavouring to
solve the perennial Irish difficulty by planting colonies of English-
COLONISING SCHEMES IN IRELAND 57
men, there was nothing to spare for more distant and less pressing
enterprises. The influence of Irish experience in English colonial
history deserves study, but only a passing reference can here be made
to it. The names of the Elizabethan advocates of western planting are
sufficient to indicate the community of ideas in regard to Ireland and
America which made men turn in search of profit from Munster to
Virginia, from Newfoundland to Kerry, and back again, without any
radical change of thought. Even the phrases used in Ireland under
the Tudors have a familiar ring in the ears of students of later colonial
history. Terms like "native53, "colony", "plantation", and "plant-
ing" were employed in connection with Ireland fifty years before any
English settlement in America was thought of. Throughout Eliza-
beth's reign and down to the last and greatest plantation of Ulster
under James I there were repeated schemes to attract English emi-
grants, and recruiting agents became expert in setting forth the
alluring prospects for those who would settle on the Irish lands of the
speculators who employed them. Many of these speculators in the
early years of Elizabeth came from the ranks of the lesser gentry of the
English west country or of unemployed officers who had seen service
in the Irish wars. Thomas Stukely had dabbled in such speculations
before he proposed his plantation in Florida, and it was in Ireland
that his fellow-Devonian Humphrey Gilbert made his first colonising
attempts.
As was stated above, Gilbert was serving in the English army at
Le Havre in 1562 and there became interested in the schemes for the
expansion of French influence and commerce beyond the ocean
which were being discussed among Coligny's followers. After his
return to England he took shares in the Muscovy Company and tried
to persuade its governors to resume their original purpose and pursue
the discovery of a passage to Cathay by the north-east.
Anthony Jenkinson,1 finding that his new trade to the East through
Persia was very precarious, was about the same time taking up the
idea of a sea passage. In May 1565 he presented a memorial to the
Crown urging a fresh promotion of the discovery,2 and gave reasons
derived from his own intercourse with men from Cathay to prove its
practicability. A reorganisation of the Muscovy Company was then
proceeding and no answer was returned to the memorial or to later
joint representations by Gilbert and Jenkinson. Gilbert then pro-
ceeded alone with the project, but turned his attention from the
north-east to the north-west, influenced probably by French stories
of a water passage beyond the cod fisheries. He prayed for the grant
of a licence for an enterprise to discover a passage to Cathay and
all other rich parts of the world hitherto not found, together with
the government of all territories discovered by him or by his advice
1 Vide supra, p. 41.
a St. Pap. Dom., Eliz. xxx, no. 60.
58 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
towards any part of the north and west. Such a grant would in-
fringe the exclusive privileges of the Muscovy Company which had
just been confirmed by Act of Parliament1 and Gilbert's prayer was
rejected. He turned instead to attempting a plantation in Ireland
and under governmental patronage tried to found a settlement of
west-countrymen on the shores of Lough Foyle in Ulster. But the
attempt failed, and for the next few years Gilbert devoted himself to
soldiering and planting in Munster. His continued interest in dis-
covery is only evidenced during these years by the writing of a
visionary tract that was circulated in manuscript among his friends
and those whom he sought to engage in his schemes.
Between 1568 and 1574 the relations between England and Spain
were very much disturbed. Embargoes and counter-embargoes put
a stop to the usual flow of commerce, and seizures and reprisals on
both sides were incessant. Anti-Spanish projects had a favourable
hearing from the Government, but there was a sharp division of
opinion in the Privy Council, and the Queen's decisions were in-
calculable. Burghley desired to pursue a temporising course, for
he wished to maintain amicable relations as long as possible with
Philip II, the ruler of our best market in the Netherlands. The Earl
of Leicester and his ally, Walsingham, favoured a bolder policy and
planned to weaken Spain, as France had done in the late war, by
attacks upon her communications with the Indies. Their policy was
in the ascendant in the early part of 1574, and the second serious
proposition for the foundation of an English colony across the Atlantic
dates from March in that year. Petitions were presented to the Queen
and to Lord Admiral Lincoln by Richard Grenville and certain
gentlemen of the west parts who were interested in privateering
ventures.2 They prayed for a commission to embark at their own
charges on a voyage for the settlement of "certain rich lands fatally
and it seemeth by God's providence reserved for England and the
honour of her Majesty". Special orders were sought "for establishing
of her Majesty's dominion and amity in such place as they shall arrive
unto" and for exclusive privileges of trade. The exact direction of the
proposed voyage was not revealed in the petitions, but it was known
to those associated with the projectors to lie towards the River Plate
beyond the area effectively occupied by the Spaniards.3 There a
colony was to be established as an advanced post whence expeditions
might be sent out to penetrate by Magellan's Straits to the un-
discovered lands of the great southern continent that was firmly
believed to exist. The interest of the proposal lies in the direct
1 8 Eliz. c. 23. Not printed in Statutes of the Realm. See Page, W. $., The Russia Co. from
1553 to 1660.
* Col. St. Pap. Col., EJ., 1513-1616, no. 20; Col. St. Pap. Col., Am. and W.I. Addenda,
157^-1674, nos. i and a; Gorbctt, J. S., Drake and the Tudor Navy, x, 199, 203.
3 Depositions of John Butler and John Oxenham at Lima, ao Feb. 1579. Neu> Mgh* on
Drake (Hakluyt Soc., 1914), pp. 7, 9. See also Williamson, J. A., Sir John Hawkins, p. 386.
THE COMPANY OF KATHAI 59
association of Walsingham with it through his stepson Christopher
Carleill. This is the first indication of his policy for furthering anti-
Spanish colonising schemes that was of such importance a little later,
butithad now to be dropped by reason of a change in the international
situation. A new turn in French affairs brought Elizabeth and
Philip II into more friendly relations. The Queen demanded from the
projectors a security of £30,000 to £40,000 that they would not touch
lands belonging to King Philip, and for a time she would consent to
nothing that would be regarded by Spain as an unfriendly'act. In
August 1574 all outstanding claims between the two Powers were
settled by the Convention of Bristol, and Walsingham had to put aside
his patronage of the corsairs. GrenviQe and Drake returned to schemes
in Ireland, and Carleill went back to his soldiering in the Netherlands.
In 1553 Spanish pressure had diverted English activities for a time
from Guinea to the northern seas, and in a similar way in 1574
Burghley furthered the revival of designs for the discovery of an
English route to the East Indies by the north, to avoid danger to the
old-established trade to Andalusia. The new attempt was financed
and led by men who had been connected with the Guinea trade,
among whom Martin Frobisher was prominent. He was a nephew of
Sir John Yorke, one of the first promoters of the Guinea voyages under
Edward VI, and found his first employment in ships trading there.
He was for a time a prisoner at Elmina in 1 554-5, * and in 1566 he
planned a piratical attack on the Portuguese there and was brought
before the Privy Council and warned to desist.2 He then turned
his attention to finding a way to the Spiceries by the north, but the
prior rights of the Muscovy Company blocked his plans and he was
unable to get any effective support. At length in 1574, with the aid
of Gilbert's as yet unpublished tract A Discourse of a Discovery for a new
Passage to Cataia* he succeeded in interesting Ambrose Dudley, Earl
of Warwick, with whose powerful patronage he could approach the
London financiers for funds. Michael Lock and others of his old
masters among the Adventurers to Africa took up the scheme,
the " Companye of Kathai" was launched as a joint stock, and public
subscriptions were invited. The story of Frobisher's voyages to the
Arctic and their disastrous results is told later, and we need only
note here that the failure and the collapse of the boom in Kathai
shares gave a severe blow to public confidence in projects of discovery
and colonisation.
A new field for the investment of English capital, especially from
the west country, was about this time becoming of increasing im-
portance. Englishmen from the western ports were sailing every*
season to the Newfoundland fisheries, and the trade not only proved
a profitable investment, but became tide nursery of skilful seamen and
1 Vide supra, p. 46. * Eliot, K. M., in Eng. Hist. Rev. xxxn, 89-92.
1 See Hakluyt, vn, 158-90.
60 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
bold navigators that for centuries made it one of the most valued
sources of recruits for the Royal Navy. It was not until the early years
of Elizabeth's reign that English barks joined the annual fishing
fleets in any considerable numbers. The older fishing trade to Iceland
from the east coast ports decayed, and the fisheries of the North Sea
were almost wholly monopolised by the Hollanders, who were
building up great national prosperity on the produce of their fishing.
In the Iceland trade, since Englishmen had to suffer the fierce
competition of the Scots and the men of the Hansa, and to win
their cargoes almost literally at the sword's point, our fishing vessels
were customarily larger and better armed than the French and
Portuguese boats, which were small and ill-found. Again, as the
English climate is unsuited to the making of salt from sea- water, our
fishermen had to purchase their salt at considerable cost in the south
of Europe. They had therefore developed a process of curing their
fish by drying it instead of heavily salting it. To carry on this process
they preferred to fish from shallops near their drying stages on shore,
while the French and Portuguese fished out on the banks direct from
the barks in which they had crossed the ocean. They loaded their
catch wet into their holds and barrelled it with salt, so that they came
into harbour only rarely.1 In these circumstances the English "were
commonly lords of the harbours from which they fished all summer,
and used all strangers' help if need required. . .in respect of their
protection of them against rovers or other violent intruders who did
often put them from good harbours".2 The chief gathering place was
in the harbour of St John's, where during the height of the season some
hundreds of barks might assemble. The fishing in the Grand Bay, i.e.
the estuary of the St Lawrence, was little visited by Englishmen; its
fisheries were almost entirely in the hands of the men from Brest and
St Malo, who made their headquarters at Gape Breton.
The encouragement of the English fishing industry was an im-
portant part of Burghley's policy of gathering all sources of national
wealth into English hands. His ordinances to compel the eating of
fish in Lent and on fast days afforded matter for facetious comment
by the Court wits, but they were parts of a carefully designed plan to
encourage English shipping and to provide a nursery for seamen.
The lands beyond the fisheries might afford the masts, pitch and
other naval stores that England had to import at great cost from the
Baltic, and thus be of much importance. Plans for securing control
of the fisheries and following up English predominance in the har-
bours by colonising the inland territory became frequent from 1578
'onwards. There is a continuous thread of ideas between Parkhurst's
suggestions "that we shall be lords of the whole fishing" and the
1 See a letter from Anthony Parkhurst of Bristol to Richard Hakluyt the elder, of the
Middle Temple, Nov. 1578, Hakluyt, vra, 9-16.
2 Ibid, vra, 13.
GILBERT'S PLAN TO ATTACK THE FISHING FLEETS 61
actual colonisation of the neighbouring shores of New England fifty
years later, and always we find emphasis laid upon the joint ad-
vantages of fisheries and the provision of naval stores from sources
under English control. To Burghley's concern at the prospect of war
in 1579 and the need for supplying the Navy we may attribute his
furtherance of the reorganisation of the old regulated company of the
Eastland merchants and the grant to them of a new and exclusive
charter for the Baltic trade. >
In the extraordinary complexities of European politics little at-
tention could be spared by the Queen's ministers to affairs beyond the
ocean, and Elizabeth herself never appears to have taken much interest
in them. But Walsingham, one of the shrewdest and subtlest states-
men of his time, kept them in the forefront of his schemes and to him
belongs the proud position of forerunner in English world policy.
He held that a struggle with Spain could not be avoided and pointed
to the Indies as offering the most vulnerable point for English attack
when the time should come. Even the jealous vigilance of Philip IPs
spies could find no piratical designs in Frobisher's voyages for the
Company of Kathai, and they were admitted to be legitimate ven-
tures. But while public attention was focussed upon them, Walsing-
ham and his friends were secretly preparing schemes that were
incompatible with peace. In the autumn of 1577 the lull in Anglo-
Spanish relations came to an end, and the whole country was in a
fever of war. In November, with the connivance of certain members
of the Privy Council, Drake slipped away from Plymouth to begin
his great enterprise against the Spaniards in the South Sea, un-
noticed by most Englishmen and unsuspected by his enemies,1 and
in the same month Humphrey Gilbert presented to the Qjieen a
Discourse proposing to fit out a powerful force which, under a pretence
of colonising on the St Lawrence, should attack the Spanish, Portu-
guese and French fishing fleets in the harbours of Newfoundland, and,
enriched by their spoils, should raid the Spanish colonies in the
Caribbean. There seems to have been no real colonising intention as
there had been in Grenville's propositions of 1574. "The diminishing
of their forces by sea is to be done ... by giving of licence under letters
patents to discover and inhabit some strange place with special proviso for
their safeties whom policy requireth to have most annoyed, by which
means the doing of the contrary shall be imputed to the executors'
fault: your highness* letters patents being a manifest show that it was
not your Majesty's pleasure so to have it."2
Though the desired licence to sail was not sealed until June 1578,
Walsingham assured Gilbert earlier in the year of the acceptance of
1 One of Drake's ships returned from Magellan's Straits in June 1578, but his exploits
in the South Sea were unknown in Europe till late in 1579.
* A Discourse how Her Majesty may annoy the King of Spain, in Gosling, W. G., Life of Sir
H. Gilbert, pp. 133-9.
62 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
his plan, and he proceeded to equip his fleet. His backers included
some minor courtiers who favoured war, but his funds were
mainly provided by his own friends and relatives among the west-
country gentry. The subscribers included Gilbert's own brothers John
and Adrian, his half-brothers Carew and Walter Raleigh, and his old
friend Sir George Peckham. The fleet was a stronger and better
furnished one than had ever yet left England on an ocean voyage, and
the armament was so heavy that the Spanish ambassador Mendoza
had good reason to warn his master of Gilbert's hostile intentions.1
The expedition left Dartmouth in September, but dissensions among
the leaders ruined its chances from the start. It was too late in
the season to attack the fishermen and before the end of November
the only ships that sailed were compelled by storms to return
to harbour and to report utter failure. Though the ostensible
colonising purpose of the scheme was a sham, Gilbert's patent had
some subsequent importance as the basis for his later ventures.
When Drake and Gilbert presented their plans it could not be fore-
seen that one of them would meet with resounding success and the
other with failure. Drake sailed away in November 1577 with a
greater design than a mere plundering raid into the South Sea.
His instructions, if he ever had any, have not survived, but from
other contemporary evidence we can discern that his main purpose
was the discovery of new lands and new trades and their annexation
to the Crown of England.2 His proceedings on the voyage amply
verify this, and though the later course of events obscured this side
of his work, its importance appears when we recall that his plans
were drafted in concert with Walsingham. The story of his voyage and
his annexation of the western shores of America as Nova Albion is told
later,8 and here we need only notice his proceedings when he reached
the Spiceries which very probably were his goal from the beginning.
He found there such detestation of the Portuguese that his offer to the
Sultan of Ternate of a treaty of alliance and protection was cordially
welcomed. Whether any formal treaty was concluded has been a
matter of dispute, though it is immaterial; such a treaty could never
have been implemented. But when Drake returned to England his
negotiations in the Moluccas were regarded by the Queen and the
Council as one of the greatest results of his voyage and as offering the
most permanent benefits.
There is no doubt that in Drake we should see one of the earliest
and greatest of our imperial pioneers. His ideas were in advance of
the narrow European outlook of his Queen and her generation* Not
till she had passed away and peace had come, did Englishmen in
! SP-P' P&- S^an' J568-79» Mendoza to Philip, 1 6 May, 3 June, 1578, nos. 496, 503, etc.
2 Declaration of Capt. John Winter, 1579 in New Light on Drake, p. 386. See also ibid.
pp. 318-19 and xxxiu-xxxviii.
8 Vide infra, p. 101.
THE PORTUGUESE SUCCESSION 63
general begin to grasp his great conception and try to realise his
vision of a new England in the West and dream of a vast empire
in the East. In after years it was always recalled that the circumnavi-
gator had staked out claims in advance of any but the Portuguese,
and for more than a century the results of his work were the sheet
anchor of our diplomacy in the East.
After 1569 England's relations with Portugal became less strained
than they had been for many years, and in 1576 a treaty for mutual
abstention from hostilities was signed by the two Governments. But
the respite was only a short one. When Philip II became King of
Portugal in 1580, he seemed to have added the empire of the old
Indies irresistibly to the "New India" in America of which he was
already sole possessor. But in reality the annexation brought hi™
little new strength; it afforded new opportunities for his enemies to
enrich themselves at his subjects9 expense. Portuguese commerce with
the Indies had long been the prey of piratical attacks by the outlaws
of the sea. These were now succeeded by quasi-legal privateering, at
times on a formidable scale, as reprisals for wrongs done by the
Spaniards. French and English corsairs seized greedily on the oppor-
tunity, and the "Sea Beggars", who were nominally Philip's own
subjects, were not behindhand. The pretext for the assistance afforded
more or less guardedly to the corsairs by their Governments was found
in the pretensions of Don Antonio, grandson of Emmanuel the Fortu-
nate in an illegitimate line, a weakling who was but a pawn in the
tangled game of high politics. Catharine de' Medici staked her
chances in the game on the desperate enterprise of her cousin Philip
Strozzi against the Azores, where some Portuguese nationalists were
holding out for Don Antonio. But the tragic destruction of Strozzi's
fleet by Admiral Santa Cruz (26 July 1582), and the massacre of his
crews, put France out of the oceanic struggle for a generation. It
became clear to some men of the northern nations, and to Drake and
Walsingham above all, that while it was hopeless to destroy the
Spanish hegemony on the battlefields of Europe, its strength could be
sapped upon the ocean and in the lands beyond. The first stage in the new
era was begun; oceanic expansion was no longer merely an affair for
merchants and projectors, it reckoned as a prime factor in high policy.
For some time Dutch and English merchants had been planning
to win a share in the gains to be derived from oceanic commerce in a
different direction and to profit by the spoils of Antwerp which was
rapidly sinking from its place as the centre of banking and world trade.
Bills on Antwerp had been the common commercial currency of the
world; and to finance any enterprise of the first magnitude recourse
had been made to its international money market. But repudiation
and war were proving fatal to its supremacy and the town that could
afford the greatest security was likely to obtain a favoured place in
international commerce. No French town, not even Rouen which
64 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
once seemed to have a chance, could hope to compete in the struggle,
for civil war is fatal to mercantile enterprise. The old commercial
cities of the Hansa, Hamburg and Bremen, lay too far to the east to
be good distributing centres, and only London and Amsterdam re-
mained. Each of them was as favourably situated as Antwerp, and
each was better protected from the dangers of war. Each had a
nucleus of commercial experience, some stock of fluid capital, gained
mainly in the trade of northern Europe, and enterprising merchants
anxious to benefit by the break-up of the Antwerp system. But the
Dutch had a long start, for they had the privileges of denizens in the
Spanish dominions. When in November 1576, during four days,
Antwerp was a prey to the sack and fury of the unpaid and mutinous
Spanish soldiery, it was to Amsterdam that the fleeing merchants be-
took themselves. They could bring with them little from the wreck
but their immense commercial skill and experience in world trade,
the most important of all assets to the rising city. When a little later
the United Provinces solemnly abjured their allegiance to the King
of Spain and Philip retaliated by forbidding trade with them, English
and Dutch were placed upon an equal footing as competitors for
world commerce and its necessary accompaniment, the opportunity
to gain colonial power. For thirty years their paths lay parallel. The
two Protestant Powers only diverged into rivalry when their prime
object had been achieved, and the Iberian monopoly was broken.
England, and especially London, had experienced a fairly steady
rise in commercial prosperity from the founding of the Muscovy
Company down to the Flanders embargoes of 1569, and she had
considerably increased her stores of fluid capital.1 But the five years
from 1569 to 1574 were a time of serious depression overcome only
by the combined efforts of the Government and the great merchants.
These efforts were successful, and the eleven succeeding years were
a period of great prosperity that gave the country for the first time
sufficient available capital for oceanic trade on the great scale.
The main national effort was directed to the pursuit of commerce and
to privateering, but the period of prosperity was also marked by the
most important colonising attempts of Elizabeth's reign.
By 1581 the great organisations of aliens who had taken the lion's
share of English commerce under the early Tudors had been wholly
thrust out. English merchants were at last masters in their own
house, and both Burghley and Walsingham were anxious for them to
compete for any profitable field of world trade. The policy of the two
statesmen was directed to a common purpose, the increase of England's
treasure, but they differed as to the best means of securing their aim
and they drew their support from different sources — Walsingham
from the privateering merchants and the courtiers of the war party,
Burghley from the more conservative London merchants of the old
1 Sec Scott, W. R., Joint Stock Companies to 1720, vol. I, chap. ii.
THE LEVANT COMPANY 65
regulated companies and the lawyers. The reorganisation in 1578-9
of the Eastland Company under the lord treasurer's patronage has
already been mentioned. He furthered next the foundation of a
company to revive the English trade with the Levant that had begun
under Henry VIII. The profitable but short-lived trade of the Mus-
covy Company in the products of the East by way of Persia and the
White Sea or Baltic had been blocked by the attacks of the Tartars,
but there were high hopes of a profitable trade in the wines and
currants of Turkey and of access to the markets of India through
Damascus and Baghdad and by way of Egypt and the Red Sea.
Walsingham, on the other hand, favoured an attempt to extend
English trade to the East by the long sea route where no dues would
have to be paid to the Turks of Egypt or Constantinople. Immediately
after Drake's return in 1580 he proposed to the Queen to send him
to Calicut to enter into relations with the Portuguese there who ad-
hered to Don Antonio, or to the Moluccas to obtain spices direct
from Ternate and to carry forward his treaty.1 He prepared and
submitted a plan for the erection under Drake's governorship of
a company for eastern trade and its management on the exclusive
Spanish pattern through a casa de contratacidn. At the same time
another plan was considered for sending Drake with a strong fleet to
assist Don Antonio's partisans in the Azores and establish an ad-
vanced base there for English privateers on the track of the treasure
fleets.2 This was the plan that Strozzi ventured upon a little later, and
his fate proves that Elizabeth was right in her rejection of both plans
as too perilous.3 Instead, she sent Walsingham to Paris to disentangle
her tortuous marriage negotiations and to work for a firm alliance
against Spain* He had thus to drop his oceanic schemes which fell
into the hands of others of less judgment. The project for the Levant
Company proceeded and by the middle of 1581 a capital of over
£80,000 had been subscribed by the great London merchants and
the Queen, who invested £42,000 out of her share of Drake's plunder.
The Company was launched upon a profitable course that we need
not here discuss ; but its activities were the main root of the later
enterprise of the East India Company.
While Walsingham was absent, the Earl of Leicester pushed on the
schemes for seizing the Portuguese trade, but they became involved
in personal intrigues that boded ill for their success. The Queen would
not accept the Azores design though it had already cost a good deal
of money, and a scheme was proposed instead for seizing Sao Jorge
da Mina, the Portuguese headquarters on the African coast. Frobisher
knew the place for he had been a prisoner there in 1554-5; and he
was concerned in a scheme for its capture in 1566; as he was put
forward by the promoters for the command, the idea probably
1 St. Pap. Doxn», Eliz. CXLIV, no. 144, printed in New Light on Drake, p. 430.
1 Read, C., Walsingham, m, 399-4Q* • 8 Corbett, op. cit. r, 3*5-3'-
CHBEI
66 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
originated with 'him.1 But the plans were changed again and
Frobisher retired. As the Muscovy Company provided most of the
capital, it claimed a voice in selecting the leaders and drafting
their instructions. It would not accept Christopher Carleill, who
was nominated by Walsingham, but chose instead Captain Edward
Fenton who had been Frobisher's second in command in the Kathai
voyages. It was an unfortunate appointment from the first. Fenton's
instructions were prepared in accordance with the best advice in the
City, and he was ordered to proceed by way of the Cape of Good
Hope to the Moluccas and there to open up trade in pursuance of
Drake's treaty. But when he sailed in May 1582, he flatly disregarded
these instructions. After touching at Sierra Leone he steered to the
coast of Brazil on his way to the Straits of Magellan. There he was
attacked by the Spanish fleet waiting for him, and, broken and dis-
organised, his ships had to return to England in June 1583 and almost
the whole invested capital was lost. The Cape route was still to remain
untouched for ten years more.
Sir Humphrey Gilbert rightly regarded the merchants belonging
to the Muscovy Company, who had opposed the grant of his patent in
1578, as his most jealous and dangerous rivals. When it seemed likely
that he would be forestalled by Fenton, he turned to the common
device of grantees at the time, and tried to find adventurers who would
finance expeditions on their own account under assignments of his
rights. He found his first assignee in Dr John Dee, the celebrated
physician and astrologer, who had long been interested in projects
of discovery and frequently entertained at his house in London a
small circle of influential friends for the discussion of problems of
geography and navigation.2 As early as 1570 Dee had urged that
Englishmen, owing to the situation of their country, might make
surpassing discoveries of rich countries if they would only bestir
themselves,8 and in September 1580 he purchased from Gilbert the
right of discovery under the patent of all lands to the north of the
50th parallel. Dee made no use of his licence, however, and Gilbert
sought for other purchasers of his assignments.
Sir George Peckham, one of his old friends and companions-in-
arms, though not himself a Roman Catholic, was closely associated
with many recusants. To him and Sir Thomas Gerrard, a well-known
recusant, Sir Humphrey in August 1582 made a lease under his
patent of the right to explore and colonise 1,500,000 acres upon the
coast of North America between Cape Breton and the south of
Florida.4 The proposal was to people these lands with English Roman
Catholics who would find there a refuge from the disabilities under
which they suffered at home. Walsingham knew of the scheme and
1 Brit. Mus., Lansdowne MSS, 31, f. 81.
I giay/1>r?ohnl>" (Camden Soc. 1842^. » In his Preface to &tf&
• SeeM$rnman, R. B., Amor. Hist. Rev. (Apr. 1908), xra, 493-500
GILBERT AND CARLEILL'S RIVAL SCHEMES 67
favoured it from the beginning. The Spaniards also learned of it at
an early stage, and compared it to Coligny's projects for colonising
Florida with Huguenots.1 According to Mendoza, the Spanish am-
bassador, the Secretary was the originator of the scheme, for he saw
in it an opportunity to use some of the Queen's disaffected subjects in
founding an outpost of English power at the gateway of the Spanish
Indies. It was true that Walsingham did much to further the project,
and that he was the forerunner of those who saw in the New World
an outlet for men who could not accept the religion of the State. But
the recusants would not join and the scheme was dropped.
The next of Gilbert's assignees were much lesser fry, but more pro-
ductive of subscriptions. The ancient port of Southampton had lost
much of the commercial prosperity that had enriched it in the four-
teenth century and Gilbert's promise that their town should be made
the sole port of entry for English ships coming from the projected
colonies in America appealed to some of its citizens as an opportunity
of reviving their decayed fortunes. They raised a modest capital to-
wards which Walsingham contributed, and again lavish grants of
lands and privileges were assigned by the patentee. Richard Hakluyt
desired to further the plan as he did all schemes of colonisation, and
he was sent by Walsingham to secure aid and subscriptions from the
citizens of Bristol.2 But a rival scheme was in hand. Christopher
Carleill with the support of the Muscovy Company was appealing to
the Crown for the issue of a new patent in its favour, and ultimately
the Bristol merchants seem to have preferred this scheme for their
subscriptions rather than that of their Southampton rivals. Letters
were sent to the fishing ports of Devon and the west of England urging
them to support Carleiirs scheme for the colonisation of Newfound-
land as a means of furthering their fishing industry.
Faced with this competition, Gilbert realised that, unless he was to
be forestalled, he must set out upon his expedition without more
delay, and through his half-brother Walter Raleigh, who was rapidly
rising in the Queen's favour, he secured her permission to make an
immediate start. He set sail from Plymouth in June 1583 purposing
to touch first at Newfoundland and then proceed southward to found
his colony upon the American coast in warmer latitudes. The
heroism and tragic fate of the leader of the expedition are discussed
in the next chapter and here we need only remark that Gilbert's
real work in the field of colonisation is to be found not in his
practical achievements, which were few, but in his unwearied
preaching of England's imperial destiny. He was the first of those
many advocates of colonisation as a cure for the ills of State, of whom
Richard Hakluyt is the outstanding figure. Hakluyt's Discourse of Western
Planting was written in 1584 to further Raleigh's Virginia enterprise,
1 Cal St. Pap. Span. 1580-6, no. 275, Mendoza to Philip II, 11 July 1582.
8 Hakluyt, vm, 132.
5-2
68 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
but it was circulated only in manuscript and had to await publication
until our own days.1 It was contemporary with two other tracts
directed to the promotion of the colonising schemes we have
been describing, Sir George Peckham's True Report of the late Dis-
coveries and possession . . .of the Newfoundlands by. . .Sir Humphry Gilbert,
Knight? and Christopher CarleilTs Discourse* prepared for the
Muscovy Company in 1583. In these three writings, of which
Hakluyt's is much the most substantial, the colonising theory of
the time is set forth in largely identical arguments which were
repeatedly employed during the next sixty years. The ^tracts
explain clearly the grounds upon which schemes of colonisation
were put forward for the national benefit during this period. If we
disentangle the main lines of reasoning from the appeals to patriotic
sentiment and to claims to dominion by right of prior discovery, we
find that they are based upon the economic and social advantages to
be achieved by the increase of commerce, the promotion of mari-
time enterprise and relieving England of its surplus population.4
Commercial considerations occupy the foremost place. According
to the mercantile theory of the time the State should do all it could
to limit the importation of goods from foreign sources while en-
couraging the export of English manufactures. The difference or
"balance of trade" would then necessarily be paid in bullion and so
the store of national treasure would be increased. But there were
many necessary commodities that could not, owing to natural con-
ditions, be produced in England. If wine, silk, sub-tropical fruits,
sugar, salt and the like could be procured from English colonies, the
demand for foreign produce would be greatly lessened and the
balance of trade in our favour increased. All the reports concerning
the American coast to the southward laid emphasis on the suitability
of the land for yielding such produce. "What commodities soever
Spain, France, Italy or the East parts do yield unto us, in wines of all
sorts, in oils, in flax, in resins, pitch, frankincense, currants, sugars, and
such like, these parts do abound with the growth of them all."5
Hakluyt himself wrote that "this western voyage will yield unto us
all the commodities of Europe, Africa and Asia, as far as we were wont
to travel, and supply the wants of all our decayed trades".6 The
northern parts would give us the hemp and cordage, timber, masts,
pitch, tar and soap-ashes that had to be procured from the Baltic and
paid the heavy Sound dues to the King of Denmark. Peckham and
Hakluyt went further and maintained that Englishmen might find in
the New World rich mines of gold, silver and precious stones such as
1 Hakluyt, A Discourse of Western Planting, first printed in the publications of the
Maine Hist. Society, 1877.
8 Hakluyt, vnr, 89-131 . • Ibid, vni, 134-47-
« See Beer, G. L., On&ns ofihe British Colonial System, 1578-1660, chaps, iii and iv.
5 Hakluyt, Prim. JVaz?. vra, 319, Ralph Lane to HaJduyt, from Virginia, 3 Sept. 1585.
6 Hakluyt, A Discourse of Western Planting, p. 19.
ARGUMENTS FOR COLONISATION 69
those which yielded her treasure to Spain. Such supplies of bullion
would directly increase the English stock of treasure, and this argu-
ment was especially attractive to those who held to the older views of
economic theory, but Garleill was more sceptical about the possi-
bilities of profits from mining, for his patrons in the Muscovy
Company must have had vivid memories of the fiasco of Frobisher's
enterprise.
To some extent all three writers believed in the possibility of
lucrative trade with the American aborigines, for their small numbers
and primitive life were not realised in England till a generation later.
All agreed however that, to raise the commodities required, English
colonists must be transported across the ocean. When they were
settled in their new homes, they would need English manufactured
goods, whereby a fresh outlet for export trade and thus a new source
of profit to the State would be forthcoming. Considerable emphasis
was laid upon this argument as foreshadowing a hope of improvement
for the decayed trade of English artisans. The transport of goods in
either direction would afford increased opportunities for shipping and
the employment of mariners, and thus there would be an increase in
our reserves of seafarers from whom the Navy might be recruited in
time of war. To this advantage the fuller development of the valuable
fisheries off the American coast would also contribute largely. By the
prosecution of fishing England might redeem herself from her de-
pendence upon the Dutch who held an unchallengeable position in
the fisheries nearer home. The vessels needed for the North American
fisheries must be larger than those little barks employed in coast
fishing, and since they must be armed for protection, they would add
considerably to our naval strength.
The third line of argument related to the social benefits that would
accrue. In the Elizabethan Age most men held that England was
over-populated, and pointed to the great increase of the able-bodied
and disorderly poor and the ever-growing army of vagrants. Hakluyt,
Peckham and Carleill all urged that colonies in the New World would
afford an invaluable outlet for the surplus of unemployed "living
altogether unprofitable and often-times to the disquiet of the better
sort".1 The needy and dependent might be transported from the
crowded courts and alleys of London and other English cities, thus
freeing their parishes from the burden of their support and emptying
the hotbeds of plague and disease. The gaols might be cleared of their
swarming crowds of petty thieves and vagabonds who "might be
condemned for certain years in those western parts especially in
Newfoundland ",2 and more serious criminals might be reprieved from
the gallows and transported across the sea to aid in building up the
new colonies. It is instructive to find thus fully set forth in tracts
written in 1583-4 at the very beginning of English colonial enterprise
1 CarleilTs Discourse, in Hakluyt, Princ. Nao. vra, 143. 2 Hakluyt, Discourse, p. 37.
70 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
the root ideas of our old colonial system. They were little modified
in their essentials for a couple of centuries, and if we were to attempt
to summarise in a single phrase the work of establishing the old
English Empire we might say with reasonable accuracy that it was
accomplished in a long series of experiments designed to carry into
practice the ideas of Hakluyt, Peckham and Carleill.
Returning now to Gilbert's colonising schemes, we may note that
they were practically applied in two directions. On the one hand his
brothers organised the voyages of John Davis in search of the North-
West Passage (1584, etc.) and were supported by Walsingham; on the
other, Raleigh, the most favoured of all the family, secured the
renewal of his colonising patent on its expiry and attempted, as
we shall see, to establish a colony in Terra Florida and to find a way
through the northern continent to the sea.
Another of the projects which Gilbert had set forth in his memorial
of I5771 was also revived by Walsingham, and Raleigh with the
Council's approval was entrusted with its organisation. Large
numbers of Spanish and Portuguese fishermen sailed every year to
the Grand Banks, and in June 1585 three ships were sent under
the command of Sir Bernard Drake to seize their barks in the New-
foundland harbours or intercept them on their voyage homeward.
Orders were given that the vessels captured were to be brought into
the western ports without disturbing their cargoes. The crews were
to be imprisoned in reprisal for Philip IPs seizure in May 1585 of the
English ships and mariners in his ports. The enterprise was entirely
successful. More than 600 Spanish and Portuguese mariners were
seized with their ships and cargoes just when their fishing wa.s com-
pleted, and the fish was sold forthwith in England and abroad.2 For
some years the Spanish and Portuguese fisheries off Newfoundland
were badly crippled, and the English and the French (including the
Bretons, Normans and Gascons) were left as the only serious com-
petitors in the annual voyages.
Elizabeth had now at last been persuaded to sanction active steps
against the Spanish Indies and Drake was charged with the fitting
out of a powerful fleet with Frobisher and Carleill as his chief
lieutenants. But the orders for its departure were delayed for many
months by the Qjieen's irresolution, and the war party determined
to demonstrate to her the defencelessness of the Antilles. For this
reconnoitring they were already provided with the old cloak of a
colonising scheme. Walsingham, Drake and Sidney all aided Raleigh
in financing the expedition, and in April 1585 it sailed from Plymouth
under the command of Sir Richard Grenville and Ralph Lane with
orders to discover the state of defence of the Spanish islands and to
1 Vide supra, p. 61.
1 Privy Council to Sir John Gilbert, 10 Oct. 1585, St. Pap. Dora., Eliz. CLXXXHI.
no. 13.
THE FIRST COLONY IN VIRGINIA 71
report home on their arrival in Virginia. Accordingly they landed
and fortified themselves for a short time in Porto Rico and again in
Hispaniola. Their report was sent off a few days after the vessels
touched on the coast of Terra Florida, and the information of the
Spaniards9 comparative defencelessness at last persuaded the Qjueen
to give Drake licence to depart. With a fleet of thirty vessels he sailed
out hurriedly from Plymouth on 14 September 1585 before the
countermand that he expected could arrive. Drake's fleet was
furnished and equipped mainly by the London merchants who had
financed the earlier exploring voyages, and it was in similar priva-
teering ventures that they employed most of their fluid capital for the
next fifteen years.
The course of events seriously prejudiced the chances of the Vir-
ginia scheme. Public interest was diverted to what seemed more
important happenings, and the colonising plan shrank to a private
venture. The colonists were unable to accomplish any of their de-
signs and the surviving remnant took passage home with Drake when
he returned from his Caribbean raid in 1586.
While the Virginia colony appeared likely to interest the Queen,
Raleigh had made much of it with ideas borrowed from Gilbert's
schemes, but now that it seemed to offer no chance of prestige or
profit, he took little further interest. But he still held the rights of his
patent, and he was ready to make what he could of them. Some of
his associates were more persistent of purpose, and in 1587 John
White and twelve others purchased from him a licence of incorpora-
tion as "The Governor and Assistants of the City of Raleigh" with
power to plant a colony on the shores of Virginia. The assignees
of the licence bound themselves to pay certain royalties to the
patentee, but he undertook no corresponding responsibility for the
adventure, which was wholly the affair of White and his associates.
It was even less successful than Lane's attempt. A settlement of some
150 colonists, including a few women, was established at Roanoke
during the summer of 1587, and at the desire of his followers White
returned to England to secure further help. The times were un-
propitious, for England was in the grip of war. A small relief
force was got together with difficulty, and when White sailed
back in April 1588 his sailors mutinied and carried him off on
a piratical cruise among the islands. It was not until three. years
later that he could try again to succour his deserted followers, and
when at last he reached Virginia, scarcely a trace of the colonists
could be found. All had perished or had disappeared among the
savages. Though Hakluyt had done his best to urge upon Raleigh
the great future awaiting him if he would but continue his search for
the South Sea through Virginia,1 the great courtier had had enough.
1 Hakluyt, "Epistle Dedicatory" to his translation of a French account of Florida
(1587), Princ. Nav. vm, 439-45.
7* THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
The Qjieen was no longer interested, and his finances were too over-
burdened with his other schemes to spare money for Virginia. At
last, in March 1589, he determined to cut his losses and made an
assignment of practically the whole of his rights under the patent to
certain of his creditors with results that we shall consider later.1
The year 1586 marks the close of the first period of English colon-
ising efforts and the beginning of an interval of some eighteen years
during which, though there was considerable theoretical interest in
colonisation as a means of remedying social evils, little was actually
attempted. None of the colonising attempts that were made during
the period of private war and reprisals was successful, but they play
an important part in the story, in paving the way to success after the
peace. The experience they gained confirmed Englishmen in that
habit of reliance upon private effort in enterprise beyond the seas
wherein our colonial history has differed from that of other Powers.
Individual enterprise and independence of governmental help were
as characteristic of the Elizabethan naval war as of the planting of
colonies and the search for profitable foreign commerce. The three
forms of activity went hand in hand; they were carried on by the same
set of men and financed from the same sources of private capital. The
Queen was often a partner in the enterprises, but only in the same way
as any other capitalist. A proper return of profit was expected
whether in a privateering adventure to the West Indies, a speculation
in eastern trade or an enterprise of western planting. If a project did
not return a reasonable profit, it was difficult to attract investors to
further ventures on similar lines. All the colonising expeditions of
Elizabeth's reign largely failed from lack of reliefs with fresh supplies.
The promoters could not send these reliefs because they had not
sufficient capital to fit them out, and they could not attract that
capital because their schemes did not hold out any prospect of im-
mediate profit. Those who had ready money to invest could put it
to more profitable use in other ways. The time had not yet come when
men could see in the planting of colonies beyond the ocean national
profit other than by monetary gain.
Now that the war for which they had so long been planning had
begun, the most earnest supporters of the idea of colonisation,
Walsingham and Drake, were too deeply occupied to spare any thought
for it. The merchants who alone could finance oversea ventures found
too profitable employment for their ships and capital in privateering
voyages, and men of war like Grenville and Garleill had too many
opportunities of advancement to continue to further the type of
enterprise they had joined in between 1576 and 1586. When letters
of marque or reprisal against the Spaniards could be obtained almost
for the asking, as was the case during the war years, no ship or
mariner need lack for employment, and the source from which the
1 Vide ittfra, p. 75.
THE AFRICAN TRADE 73
crews of the exploring voyages had been recruited was closed so long
as the rover's trade would return a satisfactory rate of profit.1 The
levies for the Queen's service, too, were frequent and oppressive. On
the other hand, an outlet for able-bodied vagrants into the armies
in the Low Countries and Ireland was opened through the hands
of the recruiting agents, and for a time complaints of over-
population in England were less frequent. It was not until the
inevitable exhaustion of prolonged war made its effects patent in
increasing commercial depression and unemployment towards the
end of Elizabeth's reign, that advocacy of emigration and colonisa-
tion as the most potent cure for social ills became once more
insistent.
A few scattered ventures during the war years show that the search
for opportunities of peaceful oceanic trade was still being prosecuted
by individual adventurers. The easiest of those opportunities lay in
the numberless creeks and havens of the West African coast between
the Senegal and the Bight of Benin. It is probable that Englishmen
never entirely neglected the African trade from at least the middle of
the century, but there were few organised ventures, and our informa-
tion is therefore very scanty. In 1588 a group of west-country mer-
chants from Exeter and Barnstaple with Antony Dassell and another
London merchant petitioned the Crown for exclusive privileges of
trade along the African coast from the River Senegal southwards to
the Gambia. The desired patent was granted2 and thus the first
organised English Company for African trade was established, but
we have little or no information as to its history. HaHuyt has pre-
served for us accounts of two trading voyages to the Benin coast in
1588* and 1590.* The London merchants who set forward the voyages
seem to have made a satisfactory profit, and doubtless other private
ventures of a similar kind were undertaken from time to time. There
is no doubt that from the beginning the English African trade was an
open one unrestricted by monopoly, and this fact is of importance in
its bearing upon subsequent history.
When Anthony Parkhurst in 1578 described the fitness of New-
foundland for English colonisation he expressed the hope that profit
might be found in a search of the River of Canada, for Frenchmen
and "Portugals" were in that river and about Cape Breton.5
Nothing was done at that time, but in 1 591 Burghley was informed that
Bretons from St Malo had found a new and valuable source of train
oil, hides and ivory by the hunting of the morse or walrus on the
shores of an island that they called Ramea,6 and he was urged to
further English competition for this promising source of profit. The
heirs of the explorer Jacques Carrier were also endeavouring to obtain
1 Vide infra, chapter rv; also Cheyncy, E. P., Hist. ofJEjigland, i, 463-76.
8 Hakluyt, vx, 443-50. 3 Ibid, vx, 45O-S. * Ibid, vi, 461-7.
6 Ibid, vra, 15. * Now Isle Madeleine, ibid, vm, 155.
74 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
from the King of France monopoly rights to pursue his discoveries
in the River of Canada,1 and the time therefore seemed fitting for an
extension of English enterprise in that direction. The first English
voyage was set forth by fishing merchants of Redruth and Apsham
in I593,2 and another expedition explored the river as far as the Isle
of Assumption or Anticosti in the following year in search for the
whale fishery that was being exploited by Biscayans from St Jean de
Luz; but Breton and Basque fishermen were visiting the fisheries
within the Grand Bay between Cape Breton and Newfoundland every
year in such rapidly increasing numbers and with such well-armed
ships that there was little hope for successful English competition. The
Spaniards and Portuguese had mostly been driven out from the fisheries
by the war and they never returned in any considerable numbers.
In 1597 Charles Leigh and Abraham van Herwick, merchants of
London, made a fresh attempt upon Ramea and the St Lawrence
fisheries which is of interest in connection with a project for a colony
of those who were dissatisfied with the religious policy of the English
Government. A petition was presented to the Lords of the Council
by certain Brownists for permission to establish a colony and exercise
their own form of worship.8 The petition was granted, and certain
members of the sect departed with Leigh for Ramea, but the project
came to nothing owing to the hostility of the French fishermen.4
This was the last attempt of Englishmen to get a footing in the
St Lawrence estuary for many years, and its waters remained a close
preserve of the French until at length Samuel de Champlain con-
solidated their power by the founding of his colony at Quebec in
1608. Our efforts were directed further south, and before the close
of the sixteenth century the rival colonising powers in North America
had laid down the general lines of their expansion as they were to be
maintained for the next century and a half.
After the failure of his Virginia schemes Raleigh devoted little
attention to ideas of colonisation oversea and turned his interest
wholly to English affairs and the plantation of his Irish estates. But
when in 1592 he forfeited the Qjieen's favour, and was driven into
retirement, his fertile imagination again turned towards America as
the treasure-house of Spain. The adventurous story of his Guiana
expeditions (1594-7) is dealt with in the following chapter. Some
writers have ranked the Guiana enterprise high among Elizabethan
efforts at expansion. In reality it hardly deserves this credit, for it
was but a reversion to the least profitable methods of the Spanish
gold-seekers which, save in the case of Pizarro, had never met with
success. Its story sounds like a faint echo of the great days of the
conquistadores that had passed away sixty years before. Raleigh's first
1 See Biggar, H. P., The Voyages of Jacques Carter (Publicns. of the Archives of Canada,
noft- "), pp. 359, 3*3-14- a Hakluyt, vm, 157-62.
9 Col. St. Pap.9 Col. Add, 1574-1674, no. 47. * Hakluyt, vm, i6a-8o.
SIR THOMAS SMYTHE 75
attempt in Guiana marks the end of the typically Elizabethan colonial
ventures, although his voyage under James I revived that type of
expedition once again twenty years later. The interval between his
return in 1597 and the foundation of the Virginia Company in 1606
covers a change of epoch, and it is in those years that we must seek
the beginnings of the first permanent English colony.
The true line of development is to be traced in the later story of the
Virginia patent that Raleigh had passed over to his creditors. As was
stated above, his financial difficulties as early as 1589 had led him, in
order to satisfy his creditors, to mortgage the privileges that had been
bestowed upon him by the Queen. Among the least valuable of those
privileges was the patent for exploration and colonisation in Virginia.
A legal assignment was made transferring the powers of the patent to
a group including John White and Ananias Dare representing the
"City of Raleigh" colonists who were prepared to go to any colony
that might be founded, Richard Hakluyt and others who favoured
colonisation on theoretical grounds, and above all Sir Thomas
Smythe, the typical merchant venturer.
Smythe occupies an unique position among the founders of the
Empire, for he was not only a link between the older and the newer
forms of commercial enterprise, but was connected with almost every
effort to extend English trade overseas for more than thirty years. His
father was the celebrated Customer Smythe who farmed and organised
the collection of the Queen's customs for many years and amassed a
large fortune; his mother was a daughter of the great merchant Sir
Andrew Judd who had been engaged in every sort of mercantile
venture under Henry VIII. Sir Thomas therefore began with con-
siderable ready capital, and this he invested in the cloth trade of the
Merchant Adventurers. He was one of the original members of the
Levant Company in 1581 l and was also a large investor in the enter-
prises of the Muscovy Company. He took part in profitable con-
tracts for the victualling of the Navy, but he seems to have avoided
investment in privateering enterprises. He supported the views of
the mercantile party that the national interest could best be served
in the fostering of peaceful trade and he took full advantage of the
change in the international situation in 1598-9.
France made peace with Spain by the Treaty of Vervins in May
1598, and Burghley did his best to bring about a general peace that
should include the Dutch and secure freedom of maritime trade. But
these efforts failed, and later in the same year Elizabeth and the
States-General agreed to further joint naval efforts against the oversea
possessions of the common enemy. The main result of this agreement
was a favourable attitude on the part of the Government towards the
organisation in 1599 of an East India Company on a large scale for
the exploitation of the Cape route to the Spiceries. The prime movers
1 Hakluyt, v, 193.
76 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
came from the Levant Company, and Sir Thomas Smythe, the
organiser of the enterprise, filled the position of governor in both bodies.
When Essex left the court in 1599 to serve as lord deputy in Ireland,
the ascendancy in the Council passed to the peace party and definite
negotiations with Spain were opened at Boulogne.1 The envoys were
instructed to demand freedom of trade to the Indies on the same
terms as the old trade to Spain and Portugal, and in return to promise
a concession as to colonies. "We are contented to prohibit all repair
of our subjects to any places where [the Spaniards and Portuguese]
are planted, but only to seek their traffic by their own discoveries in
other places, whereof there are so infinite dimensions of vast and great
territories as themselves have no kind of interest in." 2 This was a clear
statement of the doctrine that only effective occupation could be
recognised as giving a valid title to new lands, but the Spaniards were
not prepared to agree to this doctrine whether put forward by Eng-
land or by France, and the negotiations of 1600 in consequence
proved abortive. The state of war continued until, on Elizabeth's
death in March 1603, James I succeeded to the throne. In May
1604 fr68^ negotiations for a definite settlement were opened in
London, and again the English representatives strove hard to secure
an acceptance of their doctrine that, subject to customary commercial
restrictions, trade to the Indies both East and West should be as free
as to the European possessions of the King of Spain. They also sought
for an acknowledgment that our men might legitimately colonise in
unoccupied lands discovered by them, but no acceptance of these
propositions could be obtained, either formal or informal. Ultimately
all reference to the lands beyond the ocean was omitted from the
treaty save indirectly in an article that was studiously left ambiguous.
It was merely stipulated that there should be free commerce both by
land and sea between the subjects of the two parties "in all and
singular their kingdoms, dominions [etc.] where commerce existed
before the war, agreeably and according to the use and observance
of the ancient alliances and treaties before the war".8 Herein lay the
ambiguity, for whereas the English traders had always maintained
that no treaty or agreement had ever prevented them from sailing to
the Indies as freely as they could to Seville or Lisbon, the Spaniards
denied such free commerce on the authority of their own domestic
regulations. The result was that the matter was left by the Treaty of
London to be hammered out in practice until some workable com-
promise could be reached.4
The lines of the compromise appeared early, for each party insisted
on one of their claims and rather neglected the other. The Spaniards
were immovable in their refusal of freedom of trade to America,
1 Treaty of Westminster, Aug. 1598, in Davenport, F. G., Treaties bearing on Hist, of
U.S. to 1648, p. 241. • Ibid. p. 247 n. » Ibid. p. 356.
• See Stock, L. F., Proceedings and Debates of British Parliaments respecting N. America, i,
12, 17-
THE TREATY OF LONDON 77
though disputes and long-drawn wrangles on this subject were to
endure until the very eve of the independence of the colonies in the
nineteenth century. On the other hand, Spain found herself unable
to guard every part of the regions that she claimed, and she had to
concentrate her efforts. With very few exceptions her effective occu-
pation had reached its maximum extension before 1604. From St
Augustine at the mouth of the Florida Channel in the north to Buenos
Aires in the south fairly effective Spanish or Portuguese control had
been established along the whole of the American mainland coast
save in Guiana. The greater islands of the Antilles were firmly
occupied except the western part of Hispaniola, but the lesser were
neglected, and North America above the latitude of St Augustine was
untouched by the Spanish power. It was, therefore, to these three
easily accessible but neglected regions, North America, Guiana and
the Lesser Antilles, that the colonising activities of the other nations
were mainly directed. The Dutch conquest of a part of Brazil is the
only important example of another nation occupying an Iberian
colony and that occupation was only temporary. Jamaica never had
more than a handful of Spanish colonists. It was not until the con-
quest of Florida in the eighteenth century that the limits of actual
Spanish occupation were effectively reduced. The Treaty of London
is therefore an important landmark in the history of European
expansion as the close of one epoch and the opening of another.
The conclusion of the war and the attitude that the Government
had taken up during the peace negotiations obviously made the time
propitious for a revival of activity by the advocates of colonisation.
Suggestions were soon made to the Council that private purses were
inadequate to bear the heavy expense of the founding of such colonies
as the country needed for the disposal of its surplus population, and
that a public stock should be raised by commissioners appointed by
the Crown "for the peopling and discovering of such countries as
may be found most convenient for the supply of those defects which
the realm of England most requireth " .* The King's honour should be
pledged to assist and protect the project, for foreign nations would then
be less likely to threaten the colonies, and contributions would be
more readily obtained for their support. We have only fragmentary
indications as to the deliberations of the Privy Council on such
matters, but everything tends to show that the Earl of Salisbury and
his colleagues were closely interested in the fostering of oversea trade
as the best means of expanding the customs revenue2 and that they
looked to colonisation as one method of assuring this. The way was
thus prepared for governmental sanction and some measure of
support for any schemes put forward by responsible persons.
,
a Newton, A. P., "The Great Farm of the English Customs" in Trans. R. Hist. Soc.
4th ser. i, 129-55.
78 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
There were two active groups who were interested in such pro-
jects. Sir Thomas Smythe and other London merchants who led the
East India, the Levant and the Muscovy Companies had been the
holders of such rights as remained under Raleigh's patent of 1584,
and desired to find sources of raw materials that might be kept under
English control and reduce our dependence on Spanish supplies.
On the other hand, many of the fishing merchants in Bristol and the
west of England were anxious to discover new fisheries and to profit
by title fur trade with the savages on the coast of Norumbega that had
already been exploited to some extent by the French. Various private
voyages had been made to that coast between 1602 and 1605, and the
mistic accounts of the excellence of the fishing. There were associated
with this west-country group certain of Sir Humphrey Gilbert's family
and Devonshire friends who had a traditional interest in colonising
schemes, and two public men of importance in the west country
who advocated emigration as a relief for the growth of crime and
pauperism. Sir John Popham, a Somerset lawyer who had risen to be
Chief Justice, and Sir Ferdinando Gorges, a well-known soldier who
held the governorship of Plymouth. Popham and Gorges were the
link between the Government and the western group, and the latter's
activities in the colonising field were for many years surpassed only
by those of Smythe, the mouthpiece of the London associates.
Hakluyt by his writings and by personal contact influenced both
groups, and certain noblemen like the Earl of Southampton were
associated with the scheme from the beginning, though the part they
played at first was not so important as it became a few years later.
From the first, therefore, the colonisation of Virginia excited national
interest to a unique degree, and this had no doubt a considerable
influence on the fortunes of the colony.
The Government did not accede to any suggestions for direct
assistance, and left the two groups of promoters to raise their own
capital by subscriptions in the regular way of a commercial company.
But in place of a grant of two charters for separate schemes, a single
patent was issued establishing a system of management in which the
Crown played an essential part and which was quite unprecedented.
This was important as involving the national honour in the protection
of the project, and the King of Spain was thus deterred from action
against the colonists such as was urged upon him by certain of his
advisers.1 A Royal Council for Virginia of thirteen or fourteen mem-
bers nominated by the Crown was created to sit in London and to
have general administrative control over the whole area included in
the grant, i.e. between the 34th and 45th parallels of latitude.2 The
1 Sec, c.g. Brown, Genesis of U.S. i, 100 and various letters of Zufiiga, there printed.
* Ibid, i, 53.
THE VIRGINIA CHARTER OF 1606 79
colonies were to be governed in accordance with "Instructions"
issued by the Grown, and the first set of these Instructions prescribed
the entire judicial, administrative and commercial system to be
established. The exact area within which each colony was to be
planted was indicated in the patent, but the land was not handed over
to the patentees in such a way that they could give valid tides to the
settlers. It was provided that such grants could be made only by the
Grown,1 which therefore stood in the same legal position towards
the land in the colonies as it did in England. In each colony a
council of thirteen members was to be set up with power to choose a
president and fill vacancies as they occurred, and grants of land by
the Crown were to be made upon the petition of these local councils.
The duties to be performed by the councils were naturally in the main
of an economic character, but the councils were also empowered to
make local regulations in the nature of laws so long as they were not
repugnant to the laws of England. Thus from die beginning the
colonists carried with them overseas into land of the Crown not only
their allegiance, but also — a matter of the greatest importance— their
English law and their indefeasible rights as Englishmen. The colony
was not a swarming-off such as all the ancient Greek colonies had
been, but the passing of an organised group of English subjects into
an oudying portion of the king's territories, expanding his Empire as
they passed. The system of government outlined in the Virginia
charter was dual in character, royal in matters of government, pro-
prietary in matters of economic organisation — thus leaving a great
deal to private initiative and admitting of diversity of detail within a
strong and flexible framework of unity.
The provisions of the charter and the "Articles and Instructions5'2
that were handed to the first governor of the colony to guide him in
its management represent the best thought of the time on colonisa-
tion. They were very carefully drawn up in consultation with Hak-
luyt and other theorists and with the legal advisers of the Crown and
the Company, and that many of them proved unworkable is no
reflection on their authors. The whole adventure was an experi-
ment in a yet untrodden field, and we should rather remark the
soundness and liberality of the principles than criticise the im-
practicability of many of the details. The Instructions show that
their authors realised something of the fact that the foundation of a
successful colony was dependent upon material considerations, but
it took generations of experience and the sufferings and death of a
multitude of pioneers before it was discovered how best to contend
with the difficulties of the untamed wilderness.
The early days of the "First" or "London Colony" in South
Virginia were a time of almost unrelieved tragedy of famine and the
1 Clauses 18 and ro of the Charter.
8 Hening, W, W., Stats, tf Virginia, i, 67-75; Brown, Genesis of US. i, 65-75.
8o THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
ravages of disease, but we can only refer to them very briefly. The
first expedition1 left England on 20 December 1606 in three ships,
the Susan Constant, Godspeed and Discovery, hired from the Muscovy
Company. They were commanded by Sir Christopher Newport, a
seaman who had won high reputation during the war and who was
later to do good service for the Empire in the East Indies. It was
determined to establish the colony further to the north than the
scene of earlier attempts and the land round the estuary of the Chesa-
peake was fixed upon as being further removed from any possible
trouble with the Spaniards. Sailing out by the well-known route by
the Canaries and the West Indies, they reached Virginia in May 1607,
and the first settlement was made at James Fort or James Town on a
low island or peninsula not far removed from the entrance to the
river. The site was unfortunately chosen, for the neighbouring swamps
bred malaria and the native Indian tribes were none too friendly.
Newport left about a hundred settlers to man the fort and begin the
clearing of the forest and sailed back to England for fresh supplies.
When he returned six months later, more than half the little company,
including the first governor, Bartholomew Gosnold, had perished,
and the remainder were bitterly quarrelling and on the verge of
starvation. Before he left again, fire had consumed the first dwellings
and store-houses and only fifty-three men remained to continue the
struggle.2 Luckily there was among them a born leader, Captain
John Smith, and to him more than to anyone else their ultimate
success was due.
Meanwhile the "Second" or "Plymouth Colony" was founded in
August 1607 in North Virginia on a rocky peninsula at the mouth of
the Sagadahoc or Kennebec River, and was called Fort St George.
Its management was most inefficient, and after a very short time die
majority of the colonists returned to England complaining bitterly
of their hardships and of the severity of the climate. The resources of
the Plymouth Company were inadequate for the despatch of regular
supplies, and after the final abandonment of Fort St George in 1608
the interest of the members was diverted from colonisation to the
exploitation of the fisheries off the North Virginia coast. Some profit
was also obtained from the fur trade with the Indians, and the coast
was so fully explored as far as the entrance to the Grand Bay that by
1610 the Government was furnished with a fairly accurate map of the
whole region.8
The London colony at James Town was now being slowly es-
tablished upon a firm footing, and, profiting by earlier experience,
the efforts of the colonists were directed to clearing some ground and
1 Brown, Genesis of U.S. i, 152.
* Brown, A., Fmt Republic in America, pp. 55 seqq.
T/ ^cS?dSccdJ^ Brown, Genesis of U.S. i, 456, and the northern portion in Burrage,
H. 5., The Founding of Colonial Maine.
THE VIRGINIA CHARTER OF 1609 81
planting crops for subsistence; the cultivation of maize was learned
from the Indians and certain men were charged with the regular duty
of supplying the settlement with fish and game. It was long before
the colony became self-supporting, but the attention paid to securing
its own subsistence did more than all else to carry it through the early
difficulties wherein so many previous attempts had failed. The new
leader, Captain John Smith, who came into power by an extra-
ordinary series of accidents, was a man of exceptional personality and
fertility of resource. In his writings and speech he tended to paint his
adventures in such glowing colours that he has sometimes been re-
garded as a braggart and his stories as self-glorifying romances. But
it cannot be denied that he rendered first-rate service to the building
of the empire, and that he deserves a more favourable verdict than
some writers have accorded him. After an adventurous career as a
soldier of fortune in the Turkish wars, Smith was named as a member
of the first resident council in Virginia, and, becoming "cape-
merchant", he was responsible for the obtaining of supplies from the
Indian tribes. The council system soon broke down, and he ruled the
colony for a time as undisputed master. He held to the principle that
he who would not work should not eat, and by his energy cured the
evils of insubordination and laziness and carried the settlers through
the critical winter of 1608-9.
The popular interest in Virginia that had been excited in 1606
soon died away as it became clear that there were no rapid fortunes
to be made, and that the establishment of the colony would be a
toilsome and expensive process. The Royal Council ceased to func-
tion, and the control of the enterprise passed almost wholly into the
hands of Sir Thomas Smythe and a few of his merchant associates.
They found the proprietary provisions of the 1606 charter ineffective,
for there was no authority charged with the double task of recruiting
and supplying the colony and moved by the incentive of possible
profits. In 1 609 the merchants took the lead in petitioning the Crown
for a new charter modelled on those of the trading companies, with
the working of which they were familiar. Their petition was acceded
to, and the London Company was incorporated as the proprietor
under the Crown of the province of Virginia with the title of "The
Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City of
London for the First Colony in Virginia". Sir Thomas Smythe was
appointed treasurer, and thenceforward for eight years he was the
undisputed leader of the enterprise. This was a matter of great im-
portance, for along with experience and skill in mercantile organisa-
tion he possessed determination, persistence and a command of
capital that was essential to overcome the difficulties of a very costly
experiment. Too much attention has been directed in the past to the
men of high position whose names are mentioned in the charter as in
most similar documents of the time, and the part played by the London
CHBEI
82 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
merchants has been somewhat neglected. In reality the nobles and
courtiers were for long merely ornamental additions whose names
looked well on what we should now call a " prospectus"; the real
work was carried on by Smythe and his associates.
The Second Charter of 1609 was amplified by a Third Charter in
1612 and their provisions may be jointly considered.1 The general
government of the Company was placed in the hands of the whole
body of the shareholders assembled in the General Court, which was
to elect a council in London to carry on the executive functions, and
a treasurer, the supreme executive officer. The membership of the
Company could be increased by the issue to "adventurers" of shares
of 5^12. los. apiece in the common stock, while those who emigrated
to the colony were termed "planters" who invested as their contri-
bution their labour and that of their families and servants. The appeal
of the enterprise was well and systematically advertised, and sub-
scriptions were invited from all classes in the community. These
invitations met with such success that practically all the Livery
Companies in the City of London and many persons of influence in
governing circles became subscribers. The subscribers to the Ply-
mouth Company were invited to turn their interest to the new venture
and many took shares. The restrictions on the area of the Company's
planting activities were removed and, between the extreme parallels
bounding their grant, a hundred miles north and south of Point Com-
fort on the Atlantic coast, the rights of the Company ran indefinitely
west and north-west to the sea beyond the American continent. It is
probable that those who drafted this provision had some vague
knowledge of the great lakes in the north-west and mistook them for
the farther ocean. The immense distance separating the two shores
of the continent was as yet quite unrealised, but the provision was
to have considerable influence on the enterprise of English-speaking
people in later years. The business of the Company under the new
charter was cleverly organised and efficiently carried on, and of
ill-informed interference from England with their measures the
colonists in Virginia had little to complain.
Smythe as treasurer was responsible for the appointment of a sole
and absolute governor for the colony with functions similar to those of
the commander of a fortress, and in the spring of 1609 Sir Thomas
Gates, a soldier of high reputation who had seen consicbsrable service
in the Netherlands, was despatched with 500 colonists to recruit the
meagre number of sixty men to which the 300 earlier settlers had
shrunk. The ravages of hardships and disease had proved terribly
costly, and the Indians when Smith's control was removed had
become very hostile and had made several damaging attacks upon
the settlement. ^ Gates was provided with a carefully drawn set of
instructions laying down the broad lines of policy which in concur-
1 Second Charter, Brown, Genesis of UJS. i, 208-37; Third Charter, ibid, n, 540-53.
SIR THOMAS DALE IN VIRGINIA 83
rence with an advisory council in the colony he was to adopt. These
instructions were similar in many respects to the later Instructions
issued to colonial governors on their appointment to amplify and
explain the more formal instruments by which they were appointed.
Gates 's expedition of 1609 was very unfortunate, for, encountering
a violent storm, its vessels were wrecked upon the islands discovered
by Juan Bermudez, which had proved so disastrous to the Spaniards
that they were known as the "Isles of Storms". There Gates and his
second in command, Sir George Somers, an old companion in arms
of Raleigh, lost their ships with the larger part of the ships* companies.
The survivors contrived to save themselves from starvation by catching
turtles and hunting the wild pigs which abounded in the islands. They
succeeded in building from the wreckage of their ships a pinnace in
which they completed the voyage to Virginia, but they reached it
only to find on their arrival that the few remaining colonists were on
the verge of starvation. Men were therefore sent back to the Bermu-
das to replenish their stores. The famine was relieved and the islands
now figured as a most desirable place for permanent settlement.
When the Company at home learned of Gates's and Somers's
disaster, Smythe decided to send out to Virginia a strong expedition
with many farmers and artisans, and the command of it was entrusted
to a man of high rank, who, it was supposed, would be able to claim
a larger measure of obedience. Thomas West, Lord de la Warr, who
had won considerable repute for his leadership of English soldiers in
the Dutch service, was chosen for the appointment and was granted
by his commission full martial and executive powers over everyone
in the colony. He arrived in Virginia in 1610 just in time to save the
colony from abandonment, and soon changed the condition of affairs;
the colony was put into a proper state of defence, and by severe
discipline all were compelled to work for the common benefit and
were maintained from the common store. A stringent code of written
laws was drawn up, modelled in part upon the military code prevailing
among the armies in the Netherlands. Lord de la Warr died in 1611,
and the enforcement of these laws was mainly left to his successor. Sir
Thomas Dale, a rigorous soldier who had seen much service. The code
remained in operation for a period of nine years, and though its
provisions for enforcing discipline and regular work seem incredibly
severe, even they failed to enforce satisfactorily the communistic
system of labour and maintenance that had been adopted on the direct
orders of the Company. In Virginia under Dale's code the system
received its fullest trial at the hands of capable and energetic ad-
ministrators, but though it always recommended itself to theoretical
colonisers, yet, as in every other case where it has been tried, it gradu-
ally broke down and had to be replaced by a regulated individualism.
By 1 6 1 6 when the transition was well under way, the Virginia
settlers consisted of three classes. The " officers " cared for the military
6-2
84 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
protection of the colony, looked after the distribution of the Company's
communal stores that were sent out from England, and saw to their
replenishment by trade with the Indians; the "labourers" included
the agricultural servants who had been sent out at the Company's
expense under the indentures, and most of the artisans. They had to
work for the greater part of the year for the benefit of the colony, the
profits of their labours going into the general store, but they were
allowed to do a certain amount of work for themselves and could
gradually acquire sufficient property to redeem their indentures, and
thus join the third class of "free-farmers ". These had come out to the
colony with their families at their own cost, and were granted twelve
acres apiece to be cultivated free of rent for the first year under an
ordinary system of tenant right. In these farmers or planters the
colony had a firm nucleus for future growth, and it gradually began
to extend from James Town in scattered clearings along the bajaks
of the creeks and rivers that formed the only avenues of transport
through the primeval wilderness.
Dale left the colony in 1617 to take service under the East India
Company. With the definite appointment of his successor, Sir George
Yeardley, the colony was established on a sound basis and to the
growth of its future prosperity the discovery of a profitable staple
product for export made a valuable contribution. Originally the
new colony of Virginia had been expected to supply naval stores to-
gether with potash and the silk, wines and drugs which were im-
ported in large quantities from southern Europe. The hopes of
finding supplies of the precious metals were very early disappointed,
and none of the other commodities could be produced upon a profit-
able scale owing to lack of labour and of the skill necessary to start
industries under the primitive conditions prevailing in the colony.
Tobacco, despite the prohibitive duties at first imposed upon it as
an illicit drug had, since the beginning of the century, been imported
into England from the Spanish Indies in rapidly increasing quan-
tities. It was soon found that it could be raised to great advantage
with comparatively little labour in Virginia. The high prices that
prevailed in the home market gave the colonists a large return on the
parcels they sent to England and enabled them to pay for the manu-
factured articles which they had to import and which otherwise must
be supplied at the cost of the shareholders of the Company. As early
as 1616, therefore, tobacco became the principal article of export of
the colony, and though the Government did all it could to divert the
energies of the colonists to the production of other commodities, the
effort was in vain, and the Company found it advantageous to en-
courage the growth of tobacco and to make this the standard of
barter for all the articles it disposed of from its magazines. But such
action necessarily soon led to over-production, a decline in price,
and economic difficulties both in Virginia and the Bermudas.
THE FOUNDATION OF THE BERMUDA COLONY 85
The glowing reports of the fertility of those islands brought to
England after Somers's shipwreck in 1610 induced the Virginia
Company to secure such an extension of its charter as would in-
clude them in its field of plantation, and this was effected by the
new letters patent or Third Charter procured in 1612. As usual, the
Company needed to attract fresh capital if it were to undertake fresh
responsibilities or even to discharge properly those with which it was
already burdened. But the time was very unpropitious. During the
three years since the granting of the Second Charter the Government
had embarked upon a very large and costly plantation of Englishmen
and Scotsmen upon the confiscated Irish lands in Ulster. This
absorbed all the spare capital and energies of those who might have
been expected to subscribe new capital to the Virginia Company,
and the burden of planting the Bermudas was left to be undertaken
by those who were personally interested in the Company and its
fortunes. Nothing was done, however, to occupy the islands until
certain of the more active members of the Virginia Company in 1615
took over its rights and founded a new Company known as "The
Company of the Plantation of the Somers Islands". The organisation
of this new enterprise was closely similar to that founded under the
Virginia Charter of 1609, and Sir Thomas Smythe became the first
governor. The islands were systematically surveyed and mapped out
into "tribes" and hundreds called after the principal members of
the Company. Each of the large subscribers had an area of land
allotted to him and sent out at his own cost a number of indentured
servants to work and cultivate it. The development of the colony
was closely bound up with that of Virginia, and parallel with it both
economically and politically. Its well-preserved early records1 are
therefore of interest, since Bermuda is the colony that has owed the
longest uninterrupted allegiance to the British Crown. But it was
always small and it did not exercise much influence on the general
course of imperial development. It came into public notice princi-
pally because of the difficulties that were caused with the Spanish
Government by the piratical tendencies of the colonists, and the
Bermuda Company was thus involved in the acutely debated con-
troversies that raged round the unpopular foreign policy of the
King.
Though the Spaniards were unable to take effective steps to expel
the English colonists from their new colonies, they made repeated
protests through diplomatic channels against what they claimed to
be an intrusion on their territory. Secret agents were employed to
report what was going on in Virginia, and Philip III was kept almost
as fully informed as the English Government of the progress of the
colony.2 But in reality Spain had ceased to be an effective
1 Printed in Lefroy, J. H., Memorials of the Bermudas.
8 See Brown, Genesis of U.S.9 passim.
86 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
competitor in the territory north of St Augustine, and a new inter-
national rivalry for colonial power was beginning in which the French
and the Dutch competed with England for control of the North
American coast and its far trade and fisheries. Dutch expeditions and
notably that commanded by the Englishman, Henry Hudson, were
busily exploring the coast to the north of the Virginia colony; they
laid claim to all the land between Cape Cod and the Delaware with
indefinite limits towards the interior, but they did not undertake any
permanent occupation until 1621. The English feared more their
French rivals who had established settlements to the north, and in
1612 the Virginia Company determined on a serious effort to expel
them.1 Captain Samuel Argall was ordered to clear the territory as
far as the English claims extended, and in the summer of 1613 he
proceeded to break up the French settlements that had been recently
established. He took as captives to James Town several of the
Jesuit missionaries who had begun a mission to the Indian tribes at
Mount Desert, and burned Port Royal, the French colony on the
Acadian peninsula. Thus began the long struggle between England
and France for the possession of North America.2
The maritime nations were entering into competition not only on the
American coast to the north of the limits of effective Spanish occu-
pation, but English, French and Dutch were also trying to build up a
trade with the Indian tribes in the ill-explored region known as
Guiana between the easternmost Spanish settlements at the mouth
of the Orinoco and the delta of the Amazon beyond which lay the
Portuguese colonies in Brazil.
One of the principal articles of trade was tobacco, and it seems to
have been in Guiana that Englishmen first attempted to cultivate
the plant instead of purchasing it from the Spaniards.3 The first
settlement there was planned in 1602 by the Captain Charles Leigh
who had made the attempt at Ramea in the Gulf of St Lawrence in
1597. Leigh was financed by his brother Sir Oliph Leigh, and from
1604 to J6o6 he tried tobacco planting on a small scale on the banks
of the River Wiapoco4 in eastern Guiana. Friendly relations were
established with the Indian tribes on the coast, but the colony was
troubled with dissensions from the first. The promoters in England
sent out supplies and reinforcements in 1605 by a vessel called the
Olive Branch^ but the powerful currents along the Guiana shore
carried them past the entrance to the river and they found it im-
possible to return. Only a remnant of the colonists survived the un-
healthy climate, and they could not afford to purchase from the
Dutch slavers the negroes required for their plantations. The
1 Brown, Genesis of U.S. n, 709-23.
8 See Purchas, S., Pilgrims, XDC, 214-16; Biggar, H. P., Traaing Companies of New France,
* See Williamson, T. A,, The English in Guiana, 1604-68.
4 Now called the Oyapock in the colony of French Guiana.
COLONISING ATTEMPTS IN GUIANA 87
Wiapoco was therefore abandoned after Leigh's death in 1606, and
a French expedition that tried to settle there in the following year
met with like disaster.
The mishap to the reinforcements sent out by Sir Oliph Leigh led
to the first attempt to found an English settlement in the Antilles.
When the Olive Branch found it impossible to reach the Wiapoco, the
intending settlers under Nicholas St John proceeded before the wind
to St Lucia in the Windward Islands, and arranged to remain there
on land purchased from the native Garibs. The crew carried off the
ship, and some sixty-seven Englishmen were left behind. In a short
while the Garibs became hostile, and attacked and destroyed the
settlement. Only a few survivors escaped to the Spanish plantations
on the mainland.1 Garbled accounts of this unfortunate attempt
which made the colonists land in Barbados on their way to St Lucia
have given rise to the legend that the English annexation of that island
took place twenty years before its real date, and the error has been
repeated by most historians of the British West Indies.2
The second English attempt to settle in the Lesser Antilles was
made in 1 609 when certain merchants sent out some 200 miscellaneous
emigrants from the City of London to establish a colony in the island
of Grenada. But like the unfortunate settlers of St Lucia they were
attacked by the Caribs who had been stirred up against them by the
Spanish governor of Trinidad.3 Leigh's colony in Guiana was planned
on a very small scale without influential patronage, and lasted only
a short time, but the next attempt was more ambitious, and though it
was ultimately unsuccessful, it had so direct a connection with later
events as to be of greater importance. Robert Harcourt was probably
first interested in Guiana through Sir Walter Raleigh, and he was
successful in securing the patronage of Prince Henry for a colonising
project there in f 609. He took out to the Wiapoco, in addition to a
small force of men who intended to settle and commence planting,
a cargo of merchandise to trade with thq* Indians for cotton, dye-
stuffs and tobacco. He sent out exploring parties into the interior,
and formally annexed the whole of Guiana between the Amazon and
the Orinoco in the name of King James. His plan was to follow the
example of the Dutch and establish a system of trading posts among
the Indian tribes based upon a firmly established settlement on the
Wiapoco estuary,4 but his resources were insufficient to send out the
constant reinforcements necessary for so ambitious a project. He
succeeded in obtaining from the Grown a patent granting pro-
prietary rights over all that part of South America between the
Amazon and the Essequibo. It was closely modelled on the Virginia
1 Nicholl, J., An Houre Glasse qf Indian News (London, 1607).
8 See Williamson, J. A., Caribbee Islands under the Proprietary Patents, pp. 15-18.
3 Ibid. pp. 18-19.
* Williamson, Guiana, p. 46. See also Edmundson, G., in EJH.R. xvi, 640-75, xvra,
642-63, XDC, 1-45.
88 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
charter of 1612 and Guy's Newfoundland patent of 1610 and con-
ferred similar privileges.1 But he could not attract subscribers to a
joint-stock company to work the patent, and after 1618 his activities
in Guiana ceased for several years.
It is impossible to speak of other minor enterprises in Guiana. The
evidence is fragmentary in the extreme, and what we have is difficult
of interpretation owing to the intermingling of English and Dutch
in the ventures. It is clear, however, that what was going on in
Guiana closely resembled what was happening simultaneously along
the coast of Norumbega. History has concerned itself almost wholly
with the activities of die organised chartered companies in Virginia,
the Somers Islands and the East Indies, not only because they suc-
ceeded in their task, but also because they have left written records
of their doings that are easily accessible. The contemporary efforts of
private individuals or small groups to found Plantations or to find
profitable and unrestricted trade have been passed over because of
the obscurity of each particular venture. In the aggregate, however,
they were of importance in furthering expansion and adding
to the national stock of capital. Moreover it was in these minor
ventures of James Fs reign that the individualist character of
English colonisation was fully displayed. The time was one of tran-
sition in maritime adventure as in many other things. In the reign
of Henry VIII small ship-owning firms found their profits in rank
piracy; under Elizabeth they became privateers, and by legalised
attacks on Spanish and Portuguese shipping procured cargoes of the
tropical products that were being demanded in Europe in ever-
increasing quantities. But under James I opportunities for priva-
teering under the English flag ceased, and piracy became a very
risky pursuit. Merchants and men had to find new employment: the
smuggling trade with the Spanish colonies would yield the coveted
commodities, especially tobacco, but it might involve those who
engaged in it in serious trouble with the Government and was subject
to cut-throat competition by the Dutch. The fisheries and fur trade
of the North American coast were less profitable, and all the greater
oversea trades were closely restricted to the regulated companies.
Hence arose on the one hand the long battles for "free trade" that
filled the reign, and on the other the search by obscure experimenters
for opportunities to make a profit in unoccupied tropical regions.
Between the abandonment of Sagadahoc in 1609 and the arrival
of the Mayflower Pilgrims in 1620 there was no attempt to found a
colony on the shores of North Virginia, but public interest in the
region steadily increased. Sir Ferdinando Gorges and others sent
out frequent expeditions to trade for furs and sassafras and to exploit
the newly discovered fisheries off the coast. The time was one of
rapid improvement in commercial and industrial processes, and this
1 Pat. Roll, n Jac. p. 9.
JOHN SMITH'S DESCRIPTION OF NEW ENGLAND 89
provided markets for new imports. The Dutch had begun to use train
oil for the manufacture of soap in place of tallow, and the process was
imitated by English soap-boilers. There arose a brisk demand, and
the whaling grounds that John Davis had been unable to exploit in
the 'nineties now began to -attract interest. The Muscovy Company
still held the monopoly of the northern seas and under the leadership
of Sir Francis Cherry it tried to develop a profitable trade of walrus
hunting and whaling from Cherry Island in Davis Straits. In 1612
it made very considerable gains, which induced other competitors to
try for whales elsewhere.
In 1614 Captain John Smith, who had remained in England since
his return from James Town, was employed by two London mer-
chants to hunt for whales off the American coast. Smith was still
keenly interested in colonisation and he determined to make use of
the opportunity to search for a likely place for a settlement. His
whaling was unsuccessful; but he secured a valuable cargo of fish
near the harbour of Monhegan where he found many west-country
fishermen practising the ordinary English method of dry-curing.
He also did some valuable exploring work which he used after his
return for the preparation of a map showing the whole of the coast
of North Virginia. This, the first map accessible to the general public,
he published in 1 6 1 6 to illustrate his book1 setting forth the advantages
of the coast for English colonisation. He called the region "New
England", and his book excited so much interest and was so widely
circulated, especially among those engaged in the fishing industry
in the west of England, that the name almost at once displaced the
earlier names of Norumbega and North Virginia and came into
universal use. Smith painted the country in glowing colours. "Of
all the four parts of the world that I have yet seen not inhabited,
could I have means to transport a colony, I would rather live [there]
than anywhere.. . .New England is great enough to make many
kingdoms and countries, were it all inhabited."2 His book greatly
encouraged the growth of the new fishery and aroused the moribund
Plymouth Company to new activity. It employed him to under-
take a new voyage under the resounding tide of "Admiral of New
England", and he tried three times to return. A series of unfortunate
chances intervened, and Smith never visited New England again,
but his work was well done, and it had important results.
The most elaborate attempt at colonisation with the exception of
the Virginia and Somers Islands Companies took place in New-
foundland. From Parkhurst's time onwards some of the fishing
merchants were always attracted by the idea of permanently occu-
pying the island and excluding fishermen of other nations from its
harbours. But the majority were opposed to this and preferred to
1 Smith, J., A Description of New England (1616). See Smith, J., Works (ed. Arber, E.),
n, 937. 2 Ibid, i, cxxxiv.
go THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
continue the old system of annual voyages so as to retain the detailed
management of the trade in the English ports. Thus began a long
conflict of policy that was not fully settled until well on in the nine-
teenth century. It was the desire of the Government to encourage the
Newfoundland fishery, for the 9000 or more fishermen who were en-
gaged in it provided two-thirds of the crews required to man the^ ships
of the Royal Navy, but there was a recurrent vacillation of opinion as
to the best means of securing the desired end. The restoration of
peace in 1604 opened the valuable Spanish markets to English fish,
and full advantage could be taken of the opportunity, for the long
war, heavy taxation and the constant impressment of fishermen to
man the Indies fleets had almost destroyed the fishing industry of
Spain and Portugal.1 Hence there was only a short interval between
the Treaty of London and the first serious attempt at a Newfoundland
colony.
The most active of the promoters came from Bristol and were led
by John Guy, and some who had been associated with Hakluyt in
promoting Carleill's scheme in 1583. Sir Francis Bacon was the
principal sponsor of the project in official circles, and he was more
closely associated with it than with any other colonial enterprise.
The scheme was first propounded in 1607 by certain western mer-
chants who had been interested in Peckham's schemes, and at length
in 1610 the new Company received a charter of incorporation as "The
Treasurer and company of Adventurers and Planters of the city of
London and Bristol for the colony or plantation of Newfoundland".
Complete authority was given for the government of the colony, but
with the important reservation that complete liberty was guaranteed
to those resorting to the island for fishing.2 The arrangements for the
government of the Company and colony were carefully drawn and
offer interesting points of comparison with the Virginia charter of 1 609,
but it was in this reservation that the seeds of future happenings lay.
The Government is said to have provided a considerable pro-
portion of the capital of the Company,8 but this is improbable. Guy
himself went out to Newfoundland as the first governor, and built
his settlement in a well-chosen situation at Cupid's or Cuper's Cove
on the Bay of Conception, but from the first he met with undisguised
hostility from the bulk of the fishing merchants. They refused to
recognise his authority or that of his successor, Captain John Mason,
a^ naval officer who was appointed for his experience with fishery
disputes in Scotland. Faced by constant difficulties the Company
proceeded to the usual course of larming out some of its grant to
1 See Brown, V. L., "Spanish Claims in the Newfoundland Fisheries," foportofih* Cana-
dian Historical Association (1925) ,T>. 67.
• Carr,C.T.,&ferfCftflrferjq? Trading Companies (Selden Soc. Publications), xxvm, 51-62.
a Prowse asserts this, Hist, of Neitfotmdkmd, p. 93. Guy stated in the House of Com-
mons in 162 1 " that the plantation of the Newfoundland never had penny help, but from
the adventurers' purses'1. C.J. i, 654.
RALEIGH'S LAST EXPEDITION 91
other venturers, and its first assignee, Sir William Vaughan, took
out a party of Welsh emigrants in 1617. But they proved hopelessly
incompetent, and later Vaughan in his turn disposed of portions of
his grant to Lord Falkland and to Sir George Calvert. The Company,
however, still persevered with its enterprise. In 1618 the western
fishing merchants presented bitter complaints of the settlers' pro-
ceedings as damaging the fishery, and when Parliament met again
in 1620 after six years' intermission they carried their grievances into
the House of Commons with consequences that will be considered
in a subsequent chapter.1
The fourteen years between the Treaty of London in 1604 and the
outbreak of the war in Germany in 1618 were for England an inter-
lude of comparative calm in international affairs. Some general
interest in the establishment of the new English colonies oversea was
aroused from time to time, but they were in the main the concern of
particular groups and aroused no controversy on a national scale.
The minds of Englishmen were engrossed with their domestic dis-
putes and comparatively little attention was bestowed on external
events. The quarrel with Spain that had occupied men's thoughts
for fifty years slept for a time, and the new struggle with France and
the Dutch had not yet begun. But in 1617 there came a belated
epilogue to the Elizabethan war which also heralded the opening of a
new chapter wherein colonial affairs became a matter of national
concern. Guiana saw both the events that closed the old epoch and
those that began the new. Sir Walter Raleigh during his prime had
been one of the foremost among the anti-Spanish party, and his
release in 1616 from a close confinement that had lasted since 1604
was generally regarded as a sign that the policy of association with
Spain was weakening. Even while he was in prison he had done his best
to urge his friends to continue attempts against the Indies. The Earl
of Southampton had joined him in 1609-10 in financing Sir Thomas
Roe for a voyage to the Amazon with the intention of founding an
English colony there.2 Roe himself stayed nearly a year in Guiana
and sent out two other expeditions between 1611 and 1614 to the
Amazon delta where his colonists were associated with Dutch ad-
venturers. Some of his men were still there in 1617 and sending home
cargoes of tobacco.8 During the momentary ascendancy of the anti-
Spanish party in the Privy Council Raleigh was able to organise an
expedition to explore the Orinoco in search for a rich gold mine of
which he had heard during his previous visit. No obstacles were put
in his way by the Government, which tacitly accepted his plea that
he was aiming only at territory not in effective Spanish occupation.
On the face of it this was a proper adherence to the principle
1 Vide infra, p. 148.
* Garcw to Roe, Apr3 1617, St. Pap. Dom.,Jas. I/xcv, no. aa.
* Williamson, J. A.', 148 English inGvitma, p. 53 n., quoting Tanner MSS, 168, f. a.
~- ~* """ Jas. I, r
92 THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
maintained by the English negotiators of the Treaty of London. Butit is
disputable whether either Raleigh or the anti-Spanish party that was
for the moment dominant at court was sincere. His fleet was too
large and too strongly armed for a mere exploring or colonising
venture, and it seems as though the whole scheme were once again a
reversion to earlier precedents— this time to the policy of Walsing-
ham's day and an attempt to precipitate a Spanish war. Instead of
the promised gold mine very effective Spanish forces were found, and
Raleigh was driven off. His ignominious return to England and his
trial are noticed later. The preliminaries of English colonisation were
over. A new era was opening when colonial affairs were to play a
vital part in English politics as a matter of permanent national
interest.
CHAPTER IV
SEA POWER
I. THE SPIRIT OF AD\^NTURE
VV ITH the dawn of the sixteenth century was born anew the spirit
of adventure, the child of fruitful movements in the spheres both of
thought and action. First, the Renaissance, opening up the learning
of Ancient Greece, freed the mind of man from medieval trammels
and revealed vistas of power and progress attainable by independent
thought and resolute enquiry. Then, when the human spirit began to
chafe against the narrow bounds of its European home, there burst
upon it the spectacle of a New World. Thus the mental awakening
due to the revived study of Greek in the West was completed by the
great navigators who, near the end of the fifteenth century, discovered
the routes to the Indies. The results of these double discoveries were
bewilderingly great. Neither thinkers nor seamen could realise their
significance, still less how the mental and material factors were des-
tined to react one upon the other; and after the lapse of centuries
we can but dimly imagine the thrills of that springtide, when
scholars revealed to man the glory of his faculties, and seamen dis-
closed the wonders of his home. Armed with firm resolve and in-
satiable curiosity, he now fared forth to try his powers and explore
the universe. As his mental and physical horizons expanded, he
ventured on new and startling quests in philosophy, art, literature,
natural science, navigation and colonisation. The modern world is
the outcome; and those peoples have forged ahead most who have
best combined the mental alertness with the physical daring of that
age. Succeeding centuries have but garnered the harvests of the seeds
sown in the latter half of the fifteenth century.
First among the thinkers who discerned the wider opportunities
opened up by the discovery of the New World stands Sir Thomas
More. While the successors of Columbus prepared to exploit the
(presumedly) East Indies; while Vasco da Gama and the Portuguese
voyaged by the Cape to those Indies; and while Sebastian Cabot
urged on north-westerly ventures to that same goal, the eager brain
of More discerned in the New World a new heaven wherein might
dwell righteousness. His vivid imagination first brought together in
fruitful union the world of Plato and the world of Columbus and
Cabot. With quick intuition he saw that the ideal Republic of the
Greek sage might be founded in the fertile wastes possessing the two
essentials hitherto always denied to mankind— space and security.
All down the dark vistas of the past, land hunger had been the parent
of war, war of cruelty, cruelty of countless vices undermining the
94 SEA POWER
social order. Discontent with that order produced More's protest,
the Utopia (ov TOTTOS = Nowhere), published in Latin in 1516. The
introduction reveals a soul in revolt against the grim actualities of
his age. He sees the European States in a condition of veiled or
actual hostility; rulers waging wars of aggrandisement; wars breeding
other wars and leaving behind a loathsome progeny of hatred and
hardships; savage laws making more thieves ("what other thing do
you than make thieves and then punish them? ") ; and thieves be-
coming murderers. Crime, too, springs from the craze for turning
tillage into pasturage; for wool pays better than corn, wherefore
sheep "devour whole fields, houses and cities", and the peasants
thus expelled must beg or steal and be hanged. Such is the old
order, the aftermath of the long civil strifes — & weary waste of selfish-
ness, extravagance, injustice and misery.
Over against the hopeless welter of the Old World he throws up
in sharp relief an ideal commonwealth spaciously framed in the
lands discovered by Amerigo Vespucci. There, in die islands of the
West (for no American continent was as yet surmised), he discerns a
home where mankind may start afresh. He pictures Utopia as a
larger England, remote and safe from invaders, having fifty-four
cities at least twenty-four miles apart. Each city holds twenty square
miles of ground, which is tilled in common by husbandmen appointed
yearly in rotation. Urban and rural life are interchangeable, and
every tenth year houses are changed by lot. Nevertheless they are
three storeys high, builded "after a gorgeous and gallant sort", along
streets twenty feet wide. As for government, philosophers either rule
or counsel tie ruler, who holds office for life unless deposed for
tyranny; weighty matters are brought before the council of the whole
island, lesser affairs before magistrates chosen yearly. For the rest,
social well-being is assured by peace and security, prosperity by
thorough tillage of the soil, and culture by a six hours' day which
leaves scope for the "free libertye of the minde and garnishing of the
same". Guiding their lives by reason, the Utopians despise gold,
silver, and jewels as the source of pride or folly, and they store them
up only against the contingency of war. They hate warfare " as a thing
very beastly", but enter upon it to defend themselves or their friends,
or even to compel others to till land which, contrary to the law of
Nature, is held up void and vacant. To lessen the risk of war they
make no alliance. Similarly, they have few laws, and those as simple
as may be; for they have all things in common. Their chief aim is
reasonable pleasure, both of mind and body.
Such, on its political and social sides, is die transoceanic life de-
picted in Utopia. More contrasts it sharply with the greed, injustice
and misery rampant in Europe. Though deriving his inspiration from
Plato and the New Testament, he may also have been influenced by the
stories of the kindly natives who ministered to the needs of Columbus
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MORE'S UTOPIA 95
and were oppressed or slaughtered by his followers. For already the
ills wrought by the lust for gold were clamant; and his sketch was
doubtless intended partly as a warning against the prostitution of
Nature's bounties offered in the New World. "Shun the precious
metals, till the land, let all share alike, and so build up a new com-
munity founded on peace, goodwill and equity/* This is the moral
of More's message. It sets forth the two forces which were to draw
myriads oversea — the lure of a new life and discontent with the old
life. Above all More bids mankind rely, not on the precious metals,
but on tillage of the soil. Herein he sounded a Cassandra note; for
during a century gold and silver were to be the curse of the New World,
enticing men from tillage to pillage, from colonisation to buccaneering.
Published first at Louvain, then at Paris, Utopia was not englished
until 1551, and by that time its gracious author had fallen a victim
to regal tjranny and to his later reverence for the Papacy. Perhaps
the inconsistency of the earlier and later halves of his life (social seer
and divot) lessened the influence of this, his greatest work, which was
regarded as a whimsical play on life rather than a call to a new life.
In the England of Henry VIII his seed fell on stony soil; and many
convulsions had to occur before even the meagre firstfruits appeared.
Some admirers have seen in Henry's cessation from French wars his
respect for More's teaching.1 The suggestion is improbable. Henry
ever went his own way, and cramped and insulated England during
half a century. *
According to Henry's biographer, Lord Herbert of Cherbury,
some of his councillors in 151 1 urged maritime expansion rather than
a continental policy:
Let us in God's name leave off our attempts against the terra firma. The natural
situation of islands seems not to consort with conquests in that kind. England
alone is a just Empire. Or, when we would enlarge ourselves, let it be that way we
can, and to which it seems the eternal Providence hath destined us, which is by the
sea. The Indies are discovered and vast treasure brought from thence every day.
Let us therefore bend our endeavours thitherward; and if the Spaniards and
Portugals suffer us not to join with them, there will be yet region enough for all to
enjoy.*
In this eloquent appeal Herbert projected the thought of
Charles Fs reign back into that of Henry VIII, when no thinker,
save More, pictured a New England overseas. This is not surprising.
The home-loving practical English then felt no need for expansion;
the prevalent westerly gales of the North Atlantic discouraged enter-
prise; Robert Thome was almost alone in urging Henry to undertake
the discovery of the North-East or North-West Passage to the Indies ;
for "I judge there is no land unhabitable nor sea innavigable".
All was in vain. Henry and his nobles took little interest in maritime
ventures, a fact deplored by Frobisher's biographer, Best, inasmuch
1 Kautsky, K., Thomas MM and his Utopia (Eng. transl. p. 141).
* Lord Herbert of Gherbury, Tht Reign qf Henry VIII (edit, of 1649, p. 18).
96 SEA POWER
as "our chiefest strength consisteth by sea".1 This dictum is of Eliza-
bethan, not of early Tudor times. Much had to happen before it
commanded wide assent. The breach with Rome, the loosening of
continental ties in Mary's reign; next, the dawn of a fresh national
consciousness linked with a growing hatred of Spain and a growing
resolve to rifle her oversea treasuries ; lastly, a confident belief that
sea prowess there gave us the mastery — all conspired to endow the
Elizabethans with unique freshness and force. "The world's mine
oyster, which I with sword will open" exclaims Ancient Pistol in the
Merry Wives of Windsor} and the braggart does but blurt out the
roystering vitality of the Shakespearean age.
Much ink has been spilt in the effort to discover how the poet, bred
by the Avon, could, as if to the manner born, dole out travellers'
tales and the jargon of the fo'c'sle. Indeed, the thesis has been
plausibly maintained that only a gentleman-adventurer, like Raleigh,
could have written the Tempest and parts of other plays.2 But the
land vibrated with an adventurous spirit conducive to mental daring
and inquisitiveness. Only the dull clods stayed at home. Even
men of slender reputation
Put forth their sons to seek preferment out,
Some to the wars to try their fortune there.
Some to discover islands far away.
Plymouth, Bristol, Southampton, London hummed with excitement
at the return of every successful venture to the Indies. Would not the
master mind of the age soon absorb the master spirit of the age? And
to a Warwickshire lad were not the treacherous calms and awesome
storms a spur to a new realm of thought and expression? What
wonder that he "milked" the seamen of Wapping; and that, thanks
to his soaring spirit, English thought and expression underwent
a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.
Visions of the ocean light up the talk. In As You Like It Rosalind,
eager to hear of Orlando, bursts out with "One inch of delay more is
a South Sea of discovery". Pistol, when urging Falstaff in pursuit
of Mistress Page, becomes for the nonce a sea-captain:
Clap on more sails; pursue; up with your fights;
Give fire: she is my prize; or ocean whelm them all.
The map in the new edition of Hakluyt's prose epic is pressed into
service by nimble-witted Maria, who, in Twelfth Night, thus hits off
Malvolio's smirks — "he does smile his face into more lines than are in
the new map with the augmentation of the Indies". Now, as the
Elizabethan playwrights wrote for the many, not for the few, it is
dear that topical allusions such as these would not be too obscure even
1 Frobishcfs Three Voyages (Hakluyt Soc., 1867, ed. Gollinson), p. 22.
8 Pemberton, H. (Junr.), Shakspeare and Sir W. Ralegh, chaps, iv-xiv.
SHAKESPEARE AND THE NEW WORLD 97
for the groundlings. They would doubtless be puzzled by Gonzalo's
quizzical sketch of a New World Utopia:
no kind of traffic
Would I admit, no name of magistrate,
Letters should not be known, riches, poverty,
And use of service, none; contract, succession,
Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none:
• ••••• •
All things in common Nature should produce
Without sweat or endeavour.
And only merchants and gallants would see in it a skit on the fiasco
of the first Virginia settlement.
But then there soon comes in the arresting figure of Caliban, with
whose ultimate fate the audience would be in full sympathy. Im-
aginative in regard to pictorial details, Shakespeare was a realist
respecting the social destinies of the New World. But his plays un-
questionably quickened the Wanderlust of the average healthy young
Englishman.
In the new centrifugal phase of national life west-countrymen took
the lead. Now that the New World offered a golden lure, trade with
the Easterlings seemed commonplace. For years the men of Devon
and Cornwall had sallied forth to help Huguenots and Dutch "Sea
Beggars" hajry the Spanish convoys which lumbered up Channel to-
wards Dunkirk; and this profitable privateering emboldened the men
of Plymouth and Fowey to take wider flight. Years before, a Cornish-
man, Sir Richard GrenvUle, had sung:
Who seeks the way to win renown
Or flies with wings to high desire;
Who seeks to wear the laurel crown
Or hath the mind that would aspire —
Let him his native land eschew
Let him go range and seek a new.
His father had gone down in the Mary Rose off Spithead in 1545; and
in 1591 his grandson was to win immortal fame in the Revenge. Other
Cornish seamen were the Carews, Tremaynes and Killigrews; while
from across the Tamar Devon sent forth Wilford, the two Hawkins,
Drake, Davis, Gilbert and Raleigh. Of most of these leaders we know
comparatively little; for, with the exception of the two last, they
wrote little. Speaking generally, the love of adventure, which has
counted for so much in the spread of our race, has left few records
like those of the methodical much-writing merchant class. Therefore
the romantic side of British expansion now bulks small by comparison
with the commercial which left behind masses of documents. Never-
theless, the Empire was made largely by restless spirits who felt the
call of the sea or the wild, by landless younger sons or yeomen ejected
by the enclosures, by discharged sailors and soldiers — in short by Esaus
CHBE I
98 SEA POWER
and Adullamites of all kinds. Usually they failed, as Esaus do, but
sometimes they pointed the way for the Jacobs^ ^
Primogeniture has played no small part in driving our people over-
seas ; and it would be curious to speculate how far the independent
colonial spirit sprang from the discontent felt by landless younger
sons. A dispossessed Orlando goes forth from home embittered
against a bullying Oliver, who bids him beg his way. Nay, it appears
that before the time of colonies Orlandos often took up piracy, "the
profession of the sea"; for the Venetian ambassador at London re-
ported on 10 August 1620 (one month before the sailing of the
Mayflower from Plymouth), that "the younger sons here, as opposed
to the first born, being deprived of property by the laws of the realm
have taken to the profession [of piracy] from necessity and an evil
disposition". As they slew or drowned all whom they met, including
Englishmen, the Royal Navy was to show them no mercy.1 By
degrees the colonies opened out a new sphere for all such; and who
can measure the gain to civilisation when by degrees they took up
war against the wilderness in place of war against man? On the
other hand, their adventurous and often aggrieved spirit greatly in-
creased the difficulties of the early settlements, besides implanting the
seeds of dissidence.
But the British Empire was not the outcome of a vague swarming
impulse: it was the work of born leaders of men, who were resolved
that England's overseas domain should rival that of Spain; and their
rugged personality and daring deeds were potently to influence our
future. Foremost stands Francis Drake. Born and bred near Tavis-
tock in Devon, he grew up at a time when the privateering spirit was
sending forth many a vessel from Plymouth or Bideford to prey upon
the Spanish transports and traders. His early experiences toughened
a firm thick-set frame and sharpened a mind naturally keen and
masterful. Chased with his family from their home by a local
Catholic rising in 1549, the boy early imbibed hatred of that faith,
and, when settled near Chatham, took to the sea. During hard
experiences in the Channel he learned the seaman's craft, and the
seaman's virtues, obedience, fidelity and utmost hardihood. Destiny
soon called him to wider scenes. Probably his detestation of Spain
quite as much as his relation to the Hawkinses of Plymouth turned
him from the North-Eastern quests then foremost, and inclined him
towards America. Before 1567 Drake seems to have sailed to the
West Indies with one Captain Lovell, and with him to have suffered
from Spanish treachery at Rio de la Hacha.2 Sailing with Hawkins
to the West Indies in 1567-8, he experienced the perfidious assault
at San Juan de Ulua, which increased his desire for revenge; but this
feeling was never glutted by the plunder which he amassed in his next
1 Col. St. Pap. Venetian, 1619-21, p. 357.
1 Corbctt, Drake and the TvdarNcay, i, 94.
FRANCIS DRAKE 99
three raids (1570-2) on Spanish domains. Rather did it incite him to
larger and yet larger designs. Thus, in 1572 he relied partly on escaped
negroes and "maroons" to effect the capture of the Spanish treasure
city, Nombre de Dios. He failed only because a wound laid him low
at the crisis of the fight. It is a sign of the affection which he inspired
that his men bore him to the boats, preferring to save him rather than
master the wealth of the Indies. Undaunted, he withdrew with his
company to a fertile island for rest and recovery, and while there
swore "to reap some of the Spaniard's harvest which they got out of
the earth and sent to Spain to trouble all the earth". Soon he came
to terms with the "maroons" and planned to plunder the convoy of
treasure-laden mules on the mountain track between Panama and
Nombre de Dios. With marvellous control over his brown allies he
threaded his way across the isthmus, and at the summit ascended a
lofty tree whence he beheld far below the glittering expanse of the
South Sea. The spectacle, never yet seen by an Englishman, marked
another stage in his mental development. From private plunder he
had risen to the design of ham-stringing the Spanish giant; and now
he caught a vision of an English Empire. To his comrade, John
Oxenham, he signified his earnest desire that some day he might sail
on that sea. Compared with that vow the final plunder of the Spanish
mule-train near Nombre de Dios is mere buccaneering, significant
only because the booty swept in there and afterwards at sea rendered
possible his dream of a voyage into the Pacific. Soli Deo gloria ends
the narrative of the Nombre de Dios venture. The phrase is not mere
cant, but the expression of thanks of hard-pressed Protestants that
they had found a means of sapping the world supremacy of
Spain.
The discoverer of the new policy was well fitted to be its executant.
"A man of about thirty-five years" (thus a Spanish captive described
Drake), "short, with a ruddy beard, one of the greatest of mariners,
alike from his skill and his power of command." Knowing well his
craft, and aware of the careless ease of the Spaniards in the Pacific,
he trusted to overpower their scattered settlements by means of that
most potent of all tactics, surprise. It was long before his friends at
court could persuade Elizabeth to abandon her policy of cautious
balance and loose him against the Spanish preserves ; but in the spring
of 1577 that champion of a forward policy, Secretary Walsingham,
procured him an interview with her in which he broached his Pacific
plan. The Qjieen, then smarting under Philip's affronts, liked well
the design, but is said to have warned Drake to keep it secret, above
all from the cautious Cecil, Lord Burghley. She promised to subscribe
1000 crowns for this joint-stock venture, the prize at stake being
Spain's New World tribute of over £3,000,000. For her, so long as
Drake kept silence, the risks were small, the profits enormous: as for
Drake, he risked his neck and his all in the venture ; but he merged his
7-2
zoo SEA POWER
desires for profit, strong as they were, in the resolve to tap the sources
* Dwer.
At last, in November 1 577, he put forth from Plymouth in the Pelican
of over 100 tons, carrying eighteen guns. With her sailed the smaller
Elizabeth, and the tiny Marigold and Swan, the crews in all numbering
150 men and a few boys. Serving with Drake were about ten gentle-
men adventurers, whom on occasion he consulted, the chief among
them being Sir Christopher Hatton and his friend Thomas Doughty.
Difficulties soon arose with the last named and came to a head as they
neared St Julian's Bay in Patagonia. Headstrong, ambitious and
masterful, Drake accused Doughty of mutiny— and therefore of high
treason; and in the trial the accused admitted betraying the secret of
the venture to Cecil, then an opponent of all such enterprises. This
and his other acts sufficed to procure Doughty's condemnation, and
Drake executed him in that bay. Then, as if to wipe out the past be-
fore they neared the dreaded Straits of Magellan, Drake changed the
name of his ship to the Golden Hind, the family crest of Hatton.
Further, in order to regain unity both in spirit and in action he made
an urgent appeal for an ending to all class distinction: "My masters
I must have it left. For I must have the gentleman to haul and draw
with the mariner and the mariner with the gentleman. What! let
us show ourselves all to be of one company and let us not give occasion
to the enemy to rejoice at our decay and overthrow. I would know
him that would refuse to set his hand to a rope, but I know there is
not any such here". The appeal struck home; for it breathed the true
sea spirit, which minimises class distinctions and unites all true sons
of the sea in a freemasonry of adventure. The Nelson of that age
clinched these homely words (his testament to the Royal Navy) by
reminding officers and men that they served not him but the Qjieen,
whose glory they must advance. Then, entering the dreaded narrows,
he halted at one of the larger islands, which he annexed, calling it
"Elizabeth Island".
After seventeen days of difficulty and danger Drake saw the South
Sea open before him, only to be driven to and fro by terrific storms,
in one of which the little Marigold foundered. Finally a series of north-
westers drove him back to the neighbourhood of Cape Horn. Near
that promontory he found shelter, and, on putting out, claimed to
have found signs of the existence of open sea to tie southward, in
feet, of the great Southern Ocean (October 1578). Such is the gist of
the narratives of this voyage. Though marred by vagueness and
several discrepancies, they bear the signs of an almost childlike
simplicity and their general purport is convincing.1 Therefore we
may conclude that Drake discovered the southernmost of that group
of islands, which he named "Elizabethides". His chaplain, Fletcher,
termed them collectively Terra australis nunc bene cognita. Drake in fact
1 But see Wagner, H. R., Drake* s voyage round the World (1926), pp. 88-96.
DRAKE IN THE PACIFIC 101
surmised that the Terra ausfrdis of sailors9 talk was non-existent, and
that a group of islands bordered the Straits of Magellan. Only by
creeping through those dreaded straits had the Spaniards first reached
the Pacific — a route which they had abandoned as too dangerous, in
favour of the overland route via Panama. It was long before Drake's
discovery of an open sea route to the Pacific was utilised, doubtless
because of the prevalence of terrible storms which he reported; but
ultimately his discovery and that of Dutch voyagers opened the
Pacific to all the world.
During these long bufferings the Elizabeth parted company, and
her captain, Wynter, very tamely made for home. Nevertheless,
Drake determined to push on northwards with the Golden Hind in the
belief that swift action and surprise would gain him success every-
where among the scattered Spanish settlements. His confidence was
justified. Seventy years of security had bred laxity and sloth. Their
unarmed posts and ships offered no resistance, At Lima Drake ran
in his little craft by night and anchored amidst seventeen ships, and
departed unscathed. Everywhere he met with the inertia of sheer
bewilderment; and his men lightened ships and carriers of their
burdens with a humorous good nature that half excuses the piracy, as
when Fletcher describes the robbery by a watering party of thirteen
bars of silver from a Spaniard who lay asleep— " and so left him to take
out the other part of his sleep in more security". Drake filled the hold
with precious metals, and seems throughout the voyage not to have
slain a single Spaniard.1 With one exception his Spanish prisoners
stated that he treated them humanely, even with courtesy.2
The Golden Hind being richly freighted, Drake held on northwards
"along the back side of America" towards "the Californias. . .1400
leagues in all". Fletcher describes him now as bent on "the dis-
covery of what passage there was to be found about the northern
parts of America from the South Sea into our own ocean", so as to
benefit England by finding a short northern passage to the Indies.
He also informed his Spanish prisoners that he came in the service of
his Qjieen, and for a greater purpose than plunder; that he meant to
return home by a strait in latitude 66°, and if he could not find it he
would return by China ; for she had sent him to encompass the world.8
As to his run far northward, his bufferings by bitterly cold winds
from about latitude 48°, and his return landwards to the bay which
is now named Drake's Bay, it is well to reserve judgment. Fletcher's
insistence on the continued bitter cold and gloom at midsummer in
lat. 38° excites question. The trees (it seems) had no leaves and
the birds dared not leave their nests "after the first egg laid". The
* The World encompassed, cd. Temple (1926), pp. xUv-Ii, 42.
8 NuttaU, Z., New Light on Drake (Hakluyt Soc. 1914), pp. xriv, 139, 151, 166, 196-
210,420-3.
8 Aid. pp. 317-20.
102 SEA POWER
Indians in their furs came huddling together for warmth; and finally
they began to worship the white men as gods until "we fell to prayers
and singing of psalms whereby they were allured to forget their
fidly".
All this whining was perhaps designed to warn off other voyagers
from attempting to find the North-West Passage from -that side.
Drake must have known that Frobisher and others were seeking that
passage from the Atlantic; and, unable now to go on with his quest,
he may have wished Fletcher to scare intruders away from the North-
East Pacific. Yet he now annexed this forbidding land, naming it
New Albion because of the cliffs and fixing a plate of brass to a post,
with the likeness and arms of the Queen "in a piece of sixpence
current English money".1 Probably he hoped thereby to establish
a prior claim to land which he believed to command the passage to
the Atlantic. If so, he designed England to be the sea-warden of both
entrances to the Pacific. Whatever be the truth as to his ultimate aims,
there can be no doubt as to the dogged daring with which he pursued
them. His fame as circumnavigator is well established. The Spanish
poet Lope de Vega with chivalrous exaggeration praises him as the
only man who in a single voyage sighted both poles.2 With sober
truth, however, we may claim for him that he was the greatest
pioneer of the Empire. And when on his triumphant return
home, Elizabeth, after the usual coy calculations, knighted him on
board the Golden Hind at Deptford (4 April 1581) Queen and people
seemed to be of one mind in challenging the might of Spain.8 As will
appear later that issue was long deferred; but, when it came, Drake's
confidence in swift offensive bore fruit both in his attack on Cadiz
(1587) and in the tactics adopted against the Armada.
Another pioneer of empire was Martin Frobisher ( 1 535-94) . Stern,
silent and coldly selfish, he is not an engaging figure. Yet his hardi-
hood and persistence amidst prolonged dangers mark him out as one
of the great Elizabethan mariners. Beginning, like Drake, as an
ordinary seaman, he early learned to overcome difficulties and achieve
much with feeble means. After voyaging with the Lock (or Lok)
brothers to the Guinea coast, he took up, in connection with Gilbert
and the Earl of Warwick, the search for the North-West Passage to
the Indies. Owing to the opposition of the Muscovy Company, he
could procure only two small coasting vessels and a tiny pinnace. Yet
in them he was to battle against the stormiest seas in the world and
to brave the dangers of ice, cold, and lack of food. In the tropics
food rarely failed the voyager: within the Arctic Circle its exhaustion
was his chief dread. For in Frobisher's small craft there could be no
reserves, or much shelter from the elements. Even in a moderate
wind, the sea frequently broke over the low bulwarks of the waist or
1 The World encompassed, pp. 48-62; but see Wagner, H. R., chap. vii.
a Lope de Vega, Dragontea, p. 40. • Col. St. Pap. Spanish, 15^0-6, no. 78.
FROBISHER'S VOYAGES 103
middle part of the ship, so that even in his largest craft, the Gabriel,
they had to be "laced fore and aft with ropes a breast high" to pre-
vent the waves washing the crew overboard; yet, even so, one man
was carried away over the ropes. Let one more incident testify to
the Gabriel's lowness amidships. Frobisher, desiring to bring back
proof of his having touched habitable land, enticed an Eskimo to her
side, and then, laying hold of his hand, dragged him and his coracle
on board.
In fact, the whole expedition was a triumph of man's indomitable
spirit over contemptible materials. It cost, in all, with wages and
charges of the voyage included, £1613. 19*. ^d.1 For this sum,
Frobisher, with thirty-four men and boys, was to venture into un-
charted seas in order to find a short cut to the unimagined riches
of Cathay. Well might Queen Elizabeth, then at Greenwich Palace,
send to him, as he dropped down from Blackwall, a farewell message
that she had "good liking to their doings" (7 June 1576). In a
storm off Greenland the pinnace foundered with all hands, and
the Michael, "mistrusting the matter", made for home. Yet Frobisher
toughly persisted, "knowing that the sea at length must needs
have an ending"; and on 20 July discovered in Baffin Land a
great gut which he believed to be the passage between Asia and
America leading to the Pacific. Into it he ventured, hoping to reach
"some open sea on the back side"; but, intercourse with tricky and
thievish Eskimos leading to the loss of five men and his only boat, he
was fain to return, bringing with him the native captured by guile,
also a lump of black pyrites, which was stated by an Italian assayer
to contain gold.
At once the news dwarfed all interest in geographical discovery.
Elizabeth lent the Aid (200 tons and 100 men) which, with the Michael
and Gabriel, set out to find stores of the precious metal and annex the
lands containing it. Reaching Frobisher's Bay, the crews landed on
the south side, "the supposed continent of America", and, with
ensign displayed and trumpet sounding, annexed the land "for the
advancement of our commonwealth" (23 July 1577). Thus Frobisher
and his men had the honour of making the first transoceanic addition
to the British Empire. He anticipated D/ake's Antarctic annexation
by fifteen months, and that of Newfoundland by six years. He now
sought hard to find his men seized by the natives the year before; but,
failing to find more than relics of their clothing, he strove to discover
the passage to the South Sea. But Elizabeth, in hex longing for gold,
which would enable her to defy Philip, placed mining first. Therefore
Frobisher, "considering the greedy desire our countrey hath to a
present savour and return of gayne, bent his whole endeavour only to
find a mine, to fraight his ships and to leave the rest (by God's help)
hereafter to be well accomplished". Finding a mine of the supposed
* ProKshir's Tkne Voyages^ pp. 74, «6> 153-
104 SEA POWER
ore on the north cape, he laded the ships witk "almost 200 tons of it",
and on 23 August set sail homewards, reaching Milford Haven a
month later.1
The results of assaying, though doubtful, were promising enough
to incite Queen, courtiers and merchants to send forth the Aid and
fourteen smaller vessels under command of Frobisher. He was to sail
" to the land now called Meta incognita and there lade 800 toones " of the
ore, also to discover new lands. Setting sail from Harwich on 31 May
1578, the squadron sighted land which he annexed as "West Eng-
land" (20 June 1578). He then bore northwards to his strait, which
he found cumbered with ice and beset with fogs and extreme cold.
Thereafter they were sore perplexed as to their whereabouts. What
with schisms within and storms and ice without, Frobisher at one
time resolved "to burne and bury himself and all togither with Hir
Majesty's ships". The set of the ice drove the fleet up a "mistaken
strait", probably Hudson Strait; but Frobisher made his bay at last,
and then, after lading a large stock of ore, set sail for home.2 At the
end of it all the ore proved worthless, and he fell into disfavour,
giving up north-west discoveries for West India ventures of more
promise. Ill-fortune seems to have embittered him; and Thomas
Fuller thus sums him up : "He was very valiant but withal harsh and
violent (faults which may be dispensed with in one of his profession)".
But only sterling qualities and an indomitable will could have con-
ducted three Arctic expeditions with very little loss of life and no
mutiny. His fame rests on sure foundations, as a pioneer who over-
came incredible hardships with the scantiest of means, and raised
English seamanship to a height which easily baffled the Spanish
Armada. At that crisis Frobisher commanded the Triumph (noo
tons) and rendered doughty service in the Channel and off Grave-
lines. He died at Plymouth of a wound received near Brest in 1594.
Thus the embryonic beginnings of the British Empire were due to
the resolve of Frobisher, Drake and their patrons to occupy important
positions on the Arctic and Antarctic routes to the South Sea. The
fabled wealth of the Indies emboldened them to undertake fool-
hardy quests in pigmy craft if so be they might circumvent Spain and
cut off her world-conquering wealth at its source. Now that the
North-Eastern Passage was generally discredited, there were three
ways of dealing her a heavy blow, either by the North-West Passage,
or the Elizabethides, or over the Isthmus of Panama. The fortunes
of Drake and Frobisher showed which was the more formidable, the
opposition of Spaniards or of nature; and it is clear that all the
vigorous elements in England longed to beard the Dons in their own
preserves. But now, during some four years, Elizabethan statecraft
intervened to forbid further inroads into the Spanish preserves;8 and
1 Frobisher*s Three Voyages, pp. 135, 152, 157. a Xbid. pp. 2*1-80.
» Read, a, WMatfam <M$* folly oJE&foih, vol. n, chap. viii. *P 3 9
GILBERT AND THE WESTERN QJLJEST 105
in the meantime her sea dogs, long straining at the leash, again trailed
off with glad recklessness upon the northern quest, and this time with
tangible results.
Again the leader was a man of Devon. Sir Humphrey Gilbert
(i539?-83) came of a good family of Compton, near Dartmouth,
Devon. Educated at Eton and Oxford, he was one of the gentlemen
adventurers whom Drake had severely to admonish; and his educa-
tion seems not to have softened a relentless nature, which, later, took
on a sharper edge from his military experiences in the savage warfare
in Ireland and Flanders. Nevertheless he early pondered the problem
of the North-West Passage, and helped to turn the energies of his
countrymen towards it and away from the north-eastern quest.
In his Discourse of a Discovery for a new Passage to Cataia (published in
1576), he showed with much learning and ingenuity that America
must be an island, that England with her invincible Navy was best
able to gain and profit by the new trade with Cathay and the Indies;
"for it is the long voyages thatincrease and maintain great shipping".1
His daring and unscrupulous spirit probably inspired the "discourse"
of certain west-countrymen to Elizabeth to send warships, under
pretence of discovery, to destroy Spanish shipping off Newfoundland
and then conquer the West Indies. "I will do it if you will allow me,
only you must resolve and not delay or dally; the wings of man's life
are plumed with the feathers of death."2 Some influence at court
availed to clip this plumage; and on n June 1578 Elizabeth gave
Gilbert a charter empowering him to discover and hold such " heathen
and barbarous lands . . . not actually possessed of any Christian prince
or people" ; also to rule in them over those who might be sent thither
from England or Ireland, provided always that he never robbed by
sea or land the subjects of the Queen or of friendly rulers.8 This, the
first charter for the founding of a British colony, is drawn up in terms
which imply a desire for peaceful and law-abiding expansion, far
different from the methods recommended in the "discourse".
After a long pecuniary struggle and one unsuccessful venture by sea
Gilbert set sail from Plymouth Sound on 1 1 June 1583 in the Delight
(120 tons), with four other craft, the crews numbering some 260 men.
Though deserted by his largest unit, the Bark Rdeigh, Gilbert pushed
on in the teeth of the prevalent westerly winds, beating against them
deviously as far south as 41° and as far north as 51°. At last, after
passing over the Bank, they made the Great Bay of Newfoundland on
30 July; then, running south, they entered St John's Bay, where they
found thirty-six fishing vessels, English, French and Portuguese, all
under the governance of a weekly ruler termed Admiral. These, on
seeing the Queen's commission, allowed entrance, offered hospitality
and approved the act of annexation which Gilbert prepared to effect.
1 HaJduyt, v, 1 15. (Everyman Edition.) » Col. St. Pap. Dom. 6 Nov. 1577.
8 Halduyt, v, 349-54; also vide supra, pp. 61-2.
io6 SEA POWER
The land pleased him greatly; for it abounded in wild fruits and
flowers, game and fish being also plentiful.
Accordingly on Monday, 5 August 1583, Gilbert landed with great
state, summoned the merchants and master-fishermen of all nations
there present, to whom he read and interpreted the Queen's com-
mission. By virtue of it he annexed the district and 200 leagues every
way, accepting a rod and a turf in sign of possession: he also declared
that laws would be ordained "agreeable so neere as conveniently
might be unto the laws of England, under which all people coining
thither hereafter, either to inhabit or by way of traffique, should be
subjected and governed". As a commencement he declared that the
religion should be that of the Church of England, and that attempts
against the Queen's authority should count as acts of high treason,
those who were guilty of disrespect to her losing their ears and suffering
confiscation of ship and goods. To these enactments the multitude
promised obedience and was then dismissed. Next, the arms of
England were engraved in lead and set up on a wooden pillar; where-
upon Gilbert "granted in fee simple divers parcels of land lying by
the water side " to such as desired to dry their fish, in order to prevent
the seizure of lands, as heretofore, by the first-comers. The lessees
were now to pay certain rents and services to Gilbert.1
Such was the act of annexation, savouring of the time of absolute
monarchy and patriarchal ideas of ownership. Whether its purport
was understood by the foreign fishermen may be doubted ; but English
law was now imposed in place of the sea customs hitherto in force;
and thus began the acute struggle between governors and fishermen
which long fills the dull and acrid story of England's oldest colony.
At once difficulties crowded upon Gilbert. Iron and silver ore
being found, he was urged to stop, lade his ships and so return home.
This he refused in order to push on his explorations southwards; but
he promised to return in due course. To depart or to stay was alike
hazardous; for many of his men were mutinous and maltreated the
fishermen, while others fled to the woods. Thus it was with scanty and
discontented crews that Gilbert weighed anchor on 20 August after
a stay of only three weeks, he himself sailing in the pinnace Squirrel
often tons for the inshore survey work. Trials now came thick and fast.
On 29 August in hazy weather his largest craft the Delight ran on a
ree£ probably off Cape Breton Isle, and was lost with nearly 100 men,
the others narrowly escaping the like disaster. The loss of all the re-
serve provisions and clothing now led nearly all the survivors to urge
a return home, which Gilbert conceded, promising however a fresh
attempt next spring. Ceasing then to battle westwards, they turned
and sped before the gale. Brooding over the loss of his papers
(probably about the silver mine) Gilbert waxed irritable, but stoutly
refused to go aboard the larger ship and desert the little company on
1 Hakluyt, vi, 17-19.
THE ELIZABETHAN SEA-DOGS 107
the Squirrel. At last, on 9 September, when near the Azores, a great
storm raised "terrible seas, breaking short and high pyramid-wise".
Midst these the little pinnace laboured exceedingly, but at the last
view from the Golden Hind, Gilbert was seen waving joyfully with a
book in his hand and crying out "We are as neere to heaven by sea
as by land". At midnight the Squirrel's lights were quenched, and
with her went down as stout an adventurer as ever sailed. What was
the book which consoled him in his last hours? Surely it was More's
Utopia, in which he read these words — "The way to heaven out of all
places is of like length and distance".
For in spite of their hardness and occasional cruelty these Eliza-
bethans had in them a strain of religious idealism which carried them
through incredible hardships and difficulties. They feared God and
nothing else. Nerved by that belief, they sailed in mere cockle-shells
to brave Arctic ice, the heat and disease of the tropics, and the thumb-
screws of the Inquisition, in order that they might dry up the wealth
of Spain at its source. With this patriotic purpose were often mixed less
worthy motives; but their hardihood and determination set to the
nation a standard of achievement of priceless worth. Long battling
with stormy seas and ice produced stout ships and stout hearts.
A contemporary, William Harrison, reckons two well-found English
ships a match for three or four foreigners; and he adds that "for
strength, assurance, nimbleness and swiftness of sailing, there are no
vessels in the world to be compared with ours". The crews were
generally worthy of their leaders, Hawkins, Drake and Frobisher,
who in the crisis of 1588 became great captains. Mocenigo, Venetian
ambassador at Paris, feared that the English would triumph over the
Armada; for they "never yield, and though driven back and thrown
into confusion they always return to the fight".1 A people having in
reserve these stores of spirit, skill and strength, was invincible; and the
confidence with which it burst into a new oceanic career called forth
exhilarating energies destined to influence every side of the national
life. England now lived as she never lived before or since. In turn the
Vikings, the Spaniards, Portuguese, English, Dutch and French had
their heyday when they felt the throbs of new and fruitful world-
contacts: but that of the islanders was at once the most glorious and
the most lasting of all; for, from a sure island base, their adventurers
opened the way for traders, and these for settlers, in lands where new
Englands could be founded.
Nevertheless, this expansive impulse worked in English fashion by
fits and starts. Elizabeth's warlike efforts were as short-lived as her
whims. After the Armada no effective blow was struck at Philip II.
The Azores, his vital link with the Indies, were never seriously
attacked; and excessive individualism marred the work of our great
explorers. Nothing tangible came of the annexations of Frobisher
1 Col. St. Pap. Venetian, 1581-91, no. 706; also ibid. 1617-19, nos. 2254, 91"-
io8 SEA POWER
and Drake, while that of Gilbert long remained valueless except to
our west-country fishermen. Next, the unmanly fads of James I half
stifled loyalty and enthusiasm. He took no interest in colonisation.
"He seems" (wrote Lando, the Venetian ambassador) "to aspire to
nothing beyond the limits which the sea has set him."1 Yet the
Elizabethan spirit survived, manifesting itself in the north-western
quests of Hudson, Baffin, and others unknown to fame. They were
beaten by the stern facts of geography. Yet they had not striven in
vain. They had secured for England the first claim to the lands north
of Labrador and around Hudson Bay. Above all they had learned to
press on despite endless rebuffs; and the hardening of the national
fibre is an asset of priceless worth. No soft people, stumbling on
empire, ever kept it
After the explorer comes the adventurer, after the adventurer the
settler. Gold is the link between them, and few men loved gold as
Sir Walter Raleigh did or sought it more assiduously. But he was
much more than an avaricious and speculative adventurer. He
possessed to an unusual degree that admixture of good and evil
which makes the Elizabethan Age at once so interesting and so
baffling. Transitional periods produce naturally these combinations
of good and bad, but the impetuous individualism, which is also their
outcome, found a valuable opening in overseas activities. If the rank
and file of the early buccaneers and settlers helped in some small
measure to relieve the vagrancy problem at home, their leaders also
were better employed than if they had stayed behind to evict copy-
holders or to fall into the usurious clutches of a Spinola or a Para-
vicini. Religious zeal, too, found a healthier outlet in converting the
native Virginians than in harrying unfortunate sectaries, and the
soundest cure for an "Euphues" or an "Inglese Italianato" was a
voyage to Guiana or a raid on Cadiz.
Raleigh, "the man who had more genius than all the Council put
together", represents therefore better than any other, save perhaps
Sidney, the many-sidedness of the period. Less famous than Drake as
a navigator, less adventurous than Davis as an explorer, inferior to
Spenser as a poet and to Essex as a courtier, the idol of the West
Country at one time and at another the most hated man in England,
he is at once one of the most bewitching and one of the most exasper-
ating figures of English history. Aubrey sums him up briefly and well :
"he was a tall, handsome and bold man, but his naeve2 was, that he
was damnable proud". Of his handsomeness, the portraits leave no
doubt. If his boldness aided him to envisage an overseas empire as
no man before had imagined it, his pride forced him ever to be at
variance with superior and subordinate alike. Independence and
1 Col. St. Pap. Venetian, 1621-3, no. 603.
* Fault.
SIR WALTER RALEIGH 109
subservience, tenderness and arrogance, hardiness and love of display,
these contradictory characteristics appear over and over again, in his
letters, in his more consecutive writings and, indeed, in all his words
and actions. His achievements in literature are of high worth. If,
rather reluctantly, Aubre/s verdict is accepted that "he was some-
times a poet but not often" it can be claimed at least that he was an
unsurpassed master of vigorous and enchanting prose, and that half
a page of the Report1 or the Discovery of Guiana is enough to conjure
up the immortal exploits of Sir Richard Grenville or the exquisite
thrills of pioneering on the Orinoco, with its riot of colour, its wealth
of foliage and its infinite variety of fowl, fish and fruit.
His interest in colonisation started early. After the death of his
half-brother, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, in 1583, he took over his schemes
and got his very comprehensive charter renewed in his own name.
A series of experimental settlements followed, interesting as being
among the first systematic attempts at colonisation made by English-
men, but doomed to failure partly through inadequate resources and
partly through the unwise choice of a site. "If these two captains"
(Amadas and Barlow, sent out by Raleigh in 1584) "had first dropped
anchor in the Chesapeake instead of in the modern Albemarle
Sound, the successful colonisation of Virginia would probably have
been anticipated by a quarter of a century. "2 Then came White's
voyage of 1587 and the tragic failure to find any trace of the
colonists left behind at Roanoke. After this, Raleigh leased his
patent to a company of merchants who did very little, and the real
story of Virginia is not resumed till the granting of tie charter in
April 1606. But Raleigh's influence had been both direct and abiding;
he had marked out once and for all the lines of future development.
Virginia was to be a colony of white settlers, a home for Englishmen,
not a mere trading depdt or the stronghold of a garrison. It was in
anticipation of a great future that the charter of 1584 had guaranteed
that the colonists should "enjoy all the privileges of free denizens of
England". Moreover the economic incentive had not been over-
looked by Raleigh, "the least that he hath granted being 500 acres".3
Legal security and economic independence were to go together. Nor
was Raleigh ever disillusioned or discouraged; "I shall yet live to see
it an English nation", he was bold enough to prophesy in tie dark
days just Before his fall. This unquenchable faith was not the least
valuable of his services to the Empire.
In the meantime his interests had been diverted to Guiana, which
meant then all the hinterland of the Orinoco, and far more than is
suggested by the name to-day. He came back from his adventurous
voyage of 1594 convinced of two things, the great potential value of
the land and the importance of its being opened up and developed
1 In Hakluyt, v, 1-14. * Bruce, Economic History of Virgima, I, 5.
1 Hariot, Briefe and true report of Vkgima, London, 1588 (ed. of 1900, p. 69).
i io SEA POWER
in a more or less official way. "If it be left", he said in his Epistle
Dedicatory,1 "to the spoil and sackage of common persons; if the loss
and service of so many nations be despised, so great riches and so
mighty an empire refused, I hope Her Majesty will yet take my humble
desire and my labour therein in gracious part." Subsequent ex-
plorers have confirmed many of his statements, such as the almost
incredible rapidity with which the water rises in even the little inland
creeks, and from the geographical point of view his narrative appears
generally accurate. Unfortunately he was obsessed with the stories
of El Dorado, and convinced that gold also was to be found in
workable quantities in the white quartz which lay about abundantly.
At any rate, little more is heard of Guiana until the fatal voyage of
1617, and meanwhile interest swings back again to Virginia.
If Raleigh thought of plantations in terms of gold and empire,
thus combining the ideas of the past and of the future, other men were
impelled by other motives. The missionary aspect is to be noticed,
and is, indeed, the only one mentioned in the preamble to the Letters
Patent for Virginia (io April 1606). "The Kingdom of God will be
enlarged" says the author of Nova Britannia (1609) "and the tidings
of His truth will be proclaimed among so many millions of savage men
and women who now live in darkness in those regions." Robert Gray,
writing his Godspeed to Virginia in the same year, is equally emphatic:
"far be it from the hearts of the English that they should give any
cause to the world to say that they sought the wealth of that country-
above or before the glory of God and the propagation of His King-
dom." Similarly Captain John Smith, in the preface to his General
History of Virginia, stresses the point that "the gaining provinces
addeth to the King's Crown, but the reducing heathen people to
civility and true religion bringeth honour to the King of Heaven".
The ingenious Hariot, Raleigh's mathematical expert, is also careful
to point out that the astonishment produced in the natives by the
sight of his clocks and compasses "caused many of them to give credit
to what we spake concerning our God. In all places where I came,
I did my best to make His immortal Glory known." As against this,
we have the complaint of George Thorpe, some years later, that "all
the past ill success was owing to the not seeking of God's glory in con-
verting the natives". Thorpe himself was not to blame for this, as he
had taken a direct personal interest, on the spot, in the scheme for
founding a Missionary College, but his statement shows that in
practice the religious aspect of colonisation tended to fade into the
background.
Among worldly motives, hostility to Spain took a prominent place.
"That country", Sir Thomas Dale said of Virginia on his return to
England in 1616, "being inhabited by His Majesty's subjects will
put such a bit into our ancient enemy's mouth as will curb his
1 To the Discovery of Guiana.
HOSTILITY TO SPAIN in
haughtiness of Monarchy." Of Guiana, Raleigh had already written
"whatsoever prince shall possess it shall be greatest, and if the King
of Spain enjoy it he will become unresistible". "Are three molehills
so much for us and so many Empires so little to him?" asked Captain
Smith. It is only in their rarer moments of caution that men re-
member that James, with his constant inclination towards the
Spaniards, must be humoured and persuaded that no real injustice
is being done to them. It was not tactful to compare Alexander's
famous Bull with the forged decretals, asserting contemptuously "the
first donation is an ancient fable and the other is a joke and a ridi-
culous invention". Captain Smith, in a more conciliatory spirit,
urged that "pur most royal King James I hath place and opportunity
to enlarge his ancient dominions without wronging any, which is a
condition most agreeable to his just and pious resolution". Usually,
however, the anti-Spanish feeling is expressed with the greatest
frankness. Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador, found in 1609 that
"they are in a great state of excitement about that place [Virginia]
and very much afraid lest your majesty should drive them out of it",
and two years earlier the council in Virginia had written home for
speedy assistance "lest that devouring Spaniard lay his ravenous
hands upon these gold-shewing mountains". Raleigh is on occasion
bitterest of all "against the ambitious and bloody pretences of the
Spaniards who, seeking to devour all nations, shall be themselves
devoured". But it was a race for time and the moment was assuredly
propitious for a forward move. "The Spanish Empire hath been
greatly shaken and hath begun of late years to decline. . . .But if the
King of Spain can obtain peace upon any condition reasonable . . .
he will soon grow to his former greatness and pride." This policy did
not necessarily mean an immediate outbreak of hostilities, but merely
the weakening of the Spanish power by a vigorous development of
permanent settlements in those parts of the New World where the
enemy had not yet shown himself. Gondomar himself quite realised
this point; "they preserve these places very carefully", he wrote home
to Philip, "as it appears to them that they will be very useful to
England if there should be war with Spain". This attitude of Raleigh
may appear curious when it is remembered that he had been, at any
rate in 1586, a pensioner of Spain. But that this practice did not
imply treason to England appears from the similar behaviour of such
men as the Earl of Salisbury (Robert Cecil), the Earl of Dorset
(Thomas Sackville) and Sir William Monson.
Yet another motive for colonisation was to rid England of some of
the surplus population from which many folk then believed her to be
suffering. Naturally those thus forcibly emigrated were not of the
best type (sent out, often enough, to "escape ill destinies" at home1),
and this was even claimed as a virtue in discussions with the
1 Smith, John, Generall Historie of Virginia (1907 ed.)> i, 189.
ii2 SEA POWER
Spanish envoys, who to allay their apprehensions were told that
expeditions were being despatched not against them but, in Sir John
Popham's words, "in order to drive from here thieves and traitors
to be drowned in the sea".1 The Spaniards affected to accept this
explanation and Don Alonso de Velasco confirmed it when he wrote
to Philip, "their principal reason for colonisation is to give an outlet
to so many idle and wretched people as they have in England".2
Gondomar is in the same vein when he tells a story of "some who have
preferred hanging to going to Virginia ". "A few days ago, when they
were about to hang some thieves, three of them, the soundest and
strongest, were chosen to go to Virginia. Two of them accepted, but
the third would not, and seeing the two returning to gaol he said,
Let them go there and they will remember me! Then he urged the
hangman to shorten his work, as if he were thus relieved of a greater
evil, and thus it was done." It was in this somewhat complicated
guise, therefore, that the question of the Plantations then presented
itself.
The pioneer must always be an adventurer, full of initiative and
resource. At every hour of the day, at every step of the path, the
qualities of leadership are essential to success. In the early stages of
colonisation critical situations would often arise when the timorous
commander would return to his base, or even to England, while
the more adventurous would decide to press on. Later, when
relations with native tribes were entered on, personal qualities,
especially those of wariness and tact, would once more be all-important.
Similarly, inside the growing settlement, it was only the born leader
who could make the colonists work hard at preparing defence works
and at food production, and, furthermore, restrain them from the
tempting alternative of bartering away their weapons to the natives
for corn. And there was room for neither democracy nor divided
leadership in these young Plantations. Only a strong man could bind
the divergent interests together and, above all, put down the factions
and even plots which vexed the early communities. The council for
Virginia had from the beginning insisted that "chiefly, the way to
prosper and achieve good success is to make yourselves all of one
mind for the good of your country and your own", but Wingfield,
RatclifFe, Martin, Yeardley, and many another could testify sadly
to a contrary experience; while only a few, such as Sir Thomas Dale
and perhaps Captain Smith, were able to overcome these obstacles
"by wisdom, industry and valour", as Sandys said of Dale, "accom-
panied with exceeding pains and patience". Unfortunatdy men of
this character were less often to be met with than either the self-
seeking mischiefinakers or the well-meaning nonentities.
Raleigh himself was fearless, knew what he wanted and was quick
at. making decisions, but had few opportunities of command. In
i Brown, A., Genesis qf US. i, 46. » Ibid, i, 476.
THE FALL OF RALEIGH
Ireland and at Cadiz he was definitely in a subordinate position, and
felt it keenly. When he was in command, his difficulties were generally
great and his resources inadequate. In his first Guiana expedition
he had to come back prematurely because of the tropical rains and
the approach of winter. On his final voyage his crew, "some forty
gentlemen excepted, were the very scum of the world" ; in the end,
his son was killed, his second in command committed suicide and his
sailors mutinied. But his chief hindrance (before 1603) was his
popularity with the Queen, who could seldom be induced to let
her favourite leave her, even for a short period. Consequently his
personal share in the discoveries was small and in the consequent
settlement still less. It was his contribution to be an entrepreneur, to
organise the adventures of others, and to stimulate the imagination
of his fellow-countrymen by suggesting to them that they should
establish no mere trading depdts but permanent colonies where
generations of Englishmen yet unborn could spread and multiply.
But his schemes were vitiated in part by haste and lack of forethought
and in part by his over-emphasis on gold, and when, as in Virginia,
gold was not in the end forthcoming, there was, unfortunately, a
general tendency to consider the colony a failure.
On this vainglorious and petted Elizabethan fell the blight of
Jacobean inconstancy. The result is well known — the accusation of
treason and the travesty of a trial, followed by thirteen years of im-
gisonment in the Tower; "no man but my father", said Prince
enry, "would keep such a bird in a cage". But Raleigh used his
enforced leisure to exercise his unrivalled mastery over the English
language, producing many attractive "Discourses" as well as his
magnum opus, the First Part of the History of the World. Then came the
final phase, fourteen months of quiet freedom, leading up to the ill-
starred second voyage to Guiana, the return, the immediate arrest
and the almost immediate execution, based on the verdict of guilt
given fifteen years before.
But in an age of unfettered individualism, attention should not be
confined to any one person, however brilliant. Of other leaders the
most interesting is the self-confident Captain John Smith,, whose life,
however, belongs rather to the history of the Virginia Company.
Beside him stand John Pory, himself no mean explorer and, for four
years, secretary in Virginia; Captain John Martin, "the only man to
protest against the abandonment of Virginia on the memorable
morning of June 7, I6IO";1 Thomas Hariot, Raleigh's mathematical
and engineering adviser; John Rolfe, who married Pocahontas and
brought her over to England; Elfiith, "the man who carried the first
rats to the Bermudas and the first negroes to Virginia" ;a Sir Edwin
Sandys, the promoter of the Free Trade Bills of 1604; Nicholas
Ferrar, of Little Gidding fame; Samuel Argall, who discovered the
1 Brown, A,, Genesis tfU£. IT, 944. • Ibid, n, 886.
GHBEI 8
SEA POWER
direct route to Virginia as against the earlier way via the Canaries
or the Azores; and noblest amongst them Richard Hakluyt. To few
men does the Empire owe more than to the stay-at-home clergyman
who, by his enthusiastic and industrious editing of the voyages of
others, did so much to inflame interest and point out the way of the
future. "The time approacheth, and now is, that we of England may
share and part stakes (if we will ourselves) both with the Spaniard
and the Portingale in part of America and other regions as yet un-
discovered." Nor was his a narrow influence. He saw clearly that
"the advancing of navigation, the very walls of this our island" was
no less important than colonisation itself, and he pressed for the
establishment of a Readership in the art of Seamanship to be set up
either at London or Bristol; furthermore he advocated investigation
into the causes and cure of tropical diseases, and was himself a share-
holder in the Company of Merchants which took over Raleigh's
Virginia patent in 1588, and in many other companies. The first
volume of his Principal Navigations appeared in the following year,
while so early as 1584 he had, at Raleigh's suggestion, written and
? resented to the Queen his stimulating Discourse of Western Planting.
t is hard for us to realise the extent of his labours, but "the ardent
love of my country devoured all difficulties"; and, as his fame grew,
not a sailor or explorer left these shores but reported to him on his
return anything of interest that had occurred, Raleigh being, as
Hakluyt acknowledges in his Preface, a particularly valuable source
of information. When he died (in 1616) England's colonial empire
was still nascent, but it was Hakluyt's patient labours and glowing pen
which had kept alive the interest and curiosity of his fellow-country-
men during a difficult period of discouragement and failure. It was
the atmosphere created rather than the results achieved which was
of importance, and the warrant of ultimate success, as has been pointed
out, lay in "those long and dull lists of unknown names of merchant
promoters, gentlemen adventurers, intending colonists and ships'
companies which give so business-like an air to Hakluyt's pages".1
II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND EXPANSION, 1580-1660
For their new oceanic career the English people possessed great
natural advantages. In the sea-hemisphere their position was central,
as contrasted with that of Spain, whose fleets were partly in the
Mediterranean, partly in the Atlantic, besides having often to convey
troops and money by sea to the rebellious Netherlands. Over against
these scattered possessions and diverse interests stood England,
compact, self-sufficing and strategically dominant so long as the Dutch
successftdly resisted Spanish rule. The two Protestant peoples soon
perceived their strength. First the Dutch, then the English, preyed on
1 Raleigh, W., English Voyages (1910), p. 193.
GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS 115
Spanish succours as they straggled along the English Channel. The
Dutch revolt revealed the inherent weakness of Spain, which, as will
duly appear, received its crowning illustration in the campaign of
the Armada. And while the two maritime peoples harried her in the
Narrow Seas, they also raided her overseas empire. Never were there
greater temptations to privateering, the Spaniards being unable to
observe the main ports whence our seamen stole forth to the Indies.
England's strategic advantages over France were less marked, until,
for political reasons, Richelieu stationed part of the French Navy at
Toulon, where it was isolated from the main body in the Atlantic
ports. On the other hand, the English Navy could quickly concen-
trate to command the Narrow Seas. Facing die Dutch and Germans,
the British Isles stretch like a gigantic barrier reef barring the way
to the ocean — a fact which goes far to explain the results of naval wars
with those peoples from 1652 to 1918.
Such were the geographical facts largely determining the course of
the world-struggle which became certain in the year 1580. Two events
then occurred which sharpened the tension between England and
Spain. In September Drake's sole surviving ship, the Golden Hind,
cast anchor in Plymouth Harbour, ballasted with the gold and silver
of Spain's vast and hitherto intact Pacific preserve. At the close of
the year Philip II of Spain followed Alva's conquering troops to
Eisbon, and assumed control over Portugal and her vast overseas
empire, extending from Brazil to Macao. The one event emboldened
Englishmen to challenge the might of Spain; the other empowered
her to take up their impudent challenge. To continental statesmen
the attitude of the English sea-dogs, and finally of Elizabeth, seemed
mere folly. They deemed her the illegitimate queen of "half an
island",1 in danger from hostile or suspicious Scots and openly
rebellious Irish. The four millions of English were but a handful be-
side the great peoples ruled by Philip II of Spain in his Iberian,
Italian, Burgundian, Netherland and overseas domains. Her revenue
was a precarious half-million sterling: his was bounded only by the
power of the officials of New Spain to extort and of English "pirates"
to intercept. His shipbuilding resources in Europe far exceeded hers,
vessels being also obtainable in the Spanish Indies, where wood and
iron abounded;2 and in 1580 his fleet, with the Portuguese and Italian
contingents, was deemed far more powerful than hers, which com-
prised only twenty-five capital ships.8 Accordingly, when Drake
boasted that, with his own few ships, he could impeach the whole
Spanish fleet, Arundel roundly rebuked him, adding that Philip alone
could war against all the world united.4 In truth, Spain was the only
1 Col. St. Pap. Venetian, 1581-91, no. 642.
a Ibid. no. 940.
8 Corbett, Drake and the Tudor Naay> i, 352.
* Col. St. Pap. Spanish, 1580-6, p. 307.
8-2
n6 SEA POWER
World Power; and the prospect of the distracted French, the schism-
rent English or the exhausted Dutch rebels, ever seriously challenging
her across the oceans seemed the wildest of fancies.
Yet Drake's boast was far from empty. The forthcoming struggle
between England and Spain must be decided almost entirely at sea;
and on that element the English had begun to assert their superiority.
Since the time of Henry VII the English Royal Navy had been an
efficient force, long under eclipse, but now, in the third decade of
Elizabeth, rapidly recovering its former efficiency. The people were
more and more taking to the sea. Since the year 1550, when the fore-
and-aft sail came into general use, our seamen had steadily improved
their craft, gradually adapting them to oceanic voyages. The increase
of the Levantine trade alone would demand thoroughly sea-going
ships. But in and after 1576 the voyages of Frobisher and Davis for
"the discovering of a passage by the north to go to Gataia [Cathay] "
showed the need for stoutly built ships and dauntless seamanship.
Even before Drake's return shipbuilding was brisk: "They are
daily building more (wrote Mendoza to Philip II on 20 February
1580) ; but the moment the Spanish trade fails them and they are not
allowed to ship goods to Spain, they will stop building, as they have
no other trade so profitable".1 Never was there a worse forecast.
After Drake's return, the wealth of both the Indies acted as an irre-
sistible lure. When the adventurers, including Elizabeth, receiveH
£47 dividend on every £i invested, ordinary trade profits seemed
humdrum.2 Shipbuilding became a veritable craze. Mendoza urged
Philip to issue orders "that no foreign ship should be spared in either
the Spanish or Portuguese Indies, but that every one should be sent
to the bottom. . . .This will be the only way to prevent the English
and French from going to those parts to plunder; for at present there
is hardly an Englishman who is not talking of undertaking the voyage,
so encouraged are they by Drake's return".3 The policy of spurlos
versenken was in vain. Joint-stock companies of a privateering turn
satisfied both the patriotic feelings and the sporting instincts of the
race, so that dull honest enterprises, such as the founding of colonies,
suffered; the expenses of planting each colonist being reckoned at
£40, prospects paled beside those of privateering, where profits had
touched 4700 per cent.4
Therefore the privateerthg boom continued unabated. Whereas
in 1578 there were computed to be in England only 135 vessels of
more than 100 tons,6 the official survey (exclusive of Northumberland)
ordered in 15812 by the Lord High Admiral, showed a total of 223
ships of more than 80 tons;6 and in 1588 there were 363. Of seamen
1 Col. St. Pap. Spanish, 1580-6, p. 8. * Gorbctt, i, 410.
8 Col. St. Pap. Spanish, 1580-6, p. 55.
4 Scott, \V. R., Joint Stock Companies, i, 86-S, 446.
* Charnock, J., Marine Architecture, vol. n, chap. iii.
• Jfaval Tracts of Sir W. Monson (Navy Record* Society), m, 187-92.
SUPERIORITY OF THE ENGLISH NAVY 117
there were at the earlier date 16,306. This growth, coining after the
experience gained in Atlantic voyages, was in fast, sound, weatherly
ships, which provided an invaluable reserve in days when a merchant-
man could readily become a "ship of force", and a merchant seaman
a man-of-war's man.
Still more marked was the superiority of the English Navy. It was
indeed the only force which possessed long experience of the heavily-
gunned sailing ship. During the Religious Wars the French Navy
greatly declined. As for Spain and the Italian States, they still trusted
mainly to the galley, their victory of Lepanto over the Turk (1571)
having confirmed their faith in a swarm of light, oar-propelled craft,
whose offensive strength lay in bow-fire and ramming. Italian sea-
men, it is true, had invented the sea-going galleon; but they and the
Spaniards used it little for war, preferring the galleasse, a large but
lightly built galleon which could be propelled by sweeps. All their
craft were poor sea boats, pitching and rolling heavily in a seaway.
As regards tactics the Spaniards were still in the galley stage, trusting
less to cannonade than to boarding, for which their towering fore and
aft castles were well adapted.
On the other hand, English shipwrights, under the tutelage of Sir
Richard Hawkins, had evolved a sea-going warship, independent of
oars, carrying three masts and fore and aft castles of only moderate
height, able therefore to sail near to the wind and to choose their
position for the broadside fire in which lay their chief strength. In
short, while the Spanish ship was a castellated structure adapted for
boarding, the typical English ship was a swiftly moving engine, able
to elude the enemy's boarding tactics and crush him by gunnery.
It is true that Hawkins in 1593 pronounced in favour of the high-
pooped ship, as mounting more guns and "overtopping and sub-
jecting the enemy". But Raleigh's experiments in shipbuilding led
him to endorse the Spanish proverb Grande Naoio grande fatiga; and
he recommended a handy, strong-built, fast ship, able to work her
guns in all weathers.1 This became the English type, embodied in
the Revenge (40).
An undated report by a Spanish captain, Luis Gabreta (probably
of 1586 or 1587), warns Philip not to trust in his galleys — "they may
be of some little use, perhaps, in the Mediterranean but they are of
small importance elsewhere". He then advises the building of "12 or
15 ships of the newly invented vessels" (probably of the English
type), whereupon "Your Majesty will be the indisputable lord of the
sea at all times", though now, through lack of ships, seamen and
gunners, the Spanish coasts are liable to insult.2 Subsequent events
sounded the death-knell of the galley, at least in the open, Captain
1 Raleigh, Sir W., Observation!, on the Naxy and Sea-Service (Lond. 1650), pp. 2-4; Oppen-
heim, M., Administration of Royal Navy, pp. 126-34.
1 Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 28,430.
n8 SEA POWER
Thomas Fenner declaring in May 1587 that twelve English warships
could dispose of all the 150 galleys of Spain.1 The superiority of
English guns and gunnery was also very marked.2
A vital factor in sea power is sea-endurance, that is, ability of ships
to ride out gales, and of crews to retain health and efficiency. Herein,
according to Admiral Sir William Monson, Elizabeth's Navy marvel-
lously excelled ; for, though very rarely in harbour and operating con-
tinually on the Spanish coasts or in the Indies, "abiding and enduring
the fury of all winds and weather", yet in eighteen years of war, it lost
only one ship, the Revenge, and that one thrown away only by the
obstinacy of Sir Richard Grenville.3 This excellence Monson ascribed
less to the ships than to the shipmen, trained as they were by constant
battling with our stormy seas, whereas of the Spaniards only the
"Biscainers" underwent the like salutary rigours in their annual
fishing voyages to Newfoundland.4
From the reign of King John the kings of England claimed the
sovereignty of the adjacent seas and in sign of it required alien ships
to lower their topsails and often to submit to search. Elizabeth, how-
ever, claimed no exclusive right over these seas or ownership of the
fisheries, such as the early Stuarts were to advance. In fact, she dis-
allowed the idea of possession of the seas and oceans; for "the use of
the sea and air is common to all; neither can any title to the ocean
belong to any people or private man ". On these grounds, while main-
taining the national policy in home waters, she encouraged her sub-
jects to break down the oceanic monopoly of Spain,6 which barred
the way to enterprise and colonisation in habitable regions. To do so
was the necessary preliminary to the founding of the Empire.
Success at sea requires not only good crews and good ships, but a
sound naval policy. This arises naturally from islanders9 experience
of their advantages, needs and dangers. The quintessence of English
policy is found in this central thought of the little poem The Libel of
English Policy (1430) —
Kepe then the sea that is the wall of England:
And than is England kept by Goddes handc;
The obverse of that truth was set forth about 1570 by John Mont-
gomery in a pamphlet which described the sea as a highway for
England's enemies unless she held it firmly; but if she did, it was the
best of frontiers. As for our warships, he praises them as the best in
the world, and urges the need of forty of them, with as many large
merchantmen. Disclaiming the notion of completely commanding
the sea, he declares that such a fleet would prevent invasion, and to
x Monson's Tracts, i, 144-6; The Spanish War, 1585-7 (Navy Records Society, 1898),
. St. Pap. Foreign, ana, pt i, pp. 58, 518.
8 Monson's Tracts, n, 263. * Ibid, n, 66-9.
5 Sec chapter vn: also Fulton, T. W., The Sovereignty of the Sea, chaps, i-iii.
THE RUPTURE WITH SPAIN, 1585 119
this end advises the stationing of it in three parts, off Scotland, in the
Channel and off Ireland.1 This parcelling out of the fleet in three
parts, each acting on the defensive, of course sins against the elements
of naval strategy. Luckily, by the testing time of 1588, Drake had
come to sounder conclusions. His raids on the Spanish Indies in 1571,
1574 and 1585 had proved the sovereign worth of surprise in warfare,
and surprise involved a sudden offensive. Monson blamed him for
evacuating his chief conquest, Cartagena, in 1585; but to hold it
would commit England to a defensive campaign in the West Indies;
and this Drake wished to avoid. To drain away Spain's overseas
wealth by a succession of sudden blows, while not oneself offering any
colonial hostages to fortune, was surely sound sense until the great
issue with her was fought out in home waters. Not until then could
England safely venture upon a colonial empire. The radical difference
between her and her rivals — Spaniards and Portuguese — was that they
attempted too much overseas too early in their maritime development ;
she adapted her colonial policy to the existing naval means.
Elizabeth and Philip drifted into hostilities, perhaps unwillingly,
for both made pacific proposals, and neither ever issued a declaration
of war. Nevertheless, war came as the result of the intrusion of English-
men into Philip's preserves and his reprisals, also of his help to
Elizabeth's Catholic malcontents, especially in Ireland from 1579
onwards, and her support of his Dutch rebels. This last step was
strongly recommended by her ablest statesman, Walsingham, who
discerned the weakness of Spain in the division of her forces2 and urged
the traditional English policy of opposing the subjection of the Dutch
and Flemish coasts by any great conquering Power. By a sure instinct
the islanders have always looked closely to the protection of their east
coast, so easily invaded from the harbours of Flanders. This instinct,
arising out of imperious naval considerations, has prompted English
action at all grave crises from the Battle of Sluys (1340) to that of
Jutland (1916), and it probably induced Elizabeth and Walsingham
to challenge Philip at his most vulnerable point. For them to allow
Spain, swollen with the spoils of the Indies, to remain master of the
coasts opposite the mouths of the Thames and Humber, would be to
consign England for ever to insignificance. Equally impossible was
it for Philip to allow English seamen always to threaten, and often to
seize, his reinforcements proceeding by sea to the Netherlands.
Thus the crucial step in England's development was reached in
March 1585, when Walsingham induced the oft-wavering Qjieen to
accord open support to the Dutch. Resolving to drive a hard bargain
with "rebels", she required as pledges the ports of Flushing and Brill
in return for the despatch of 4000 troops. During the haggling over
these terms Antwerp fell to Parma's veteran army— a disaster that
proved lastingly prejudicial to English naval interests. The bargain,
1 Corbett, I, 344-3* * Col. St. Pap. Foreign, xxi, pt i, p. 286.
120 SEA POWER
however, was struck, and Elizabeth secured "the cautionary towns95,
Flushing and Brill, which gave some measure of control over the
North Sea.1 Speedily Philip retorted by seizing all English and
French merchantmen in his Biscay ports, selecting their crews to fill
out the imposing but hollow fabric of his Armada.2 Thenceforth,
despite sundry pacific shifts and turns, in which Elizabeth excelled
him, he prepared for open war.
He might well expect to overbear the little Power which contested
his claim to world-empire. He counted on active help from the almost
triumphant Catholic League in France and expected- that all the Irish,
most Scots, and from one-third to one-half of the English would join
him after a landing.3 On the other hand Elizabeth's aid to the Dutch,
albeit tardy, embarrassed the Spaniards in that quarter; for the nimble
Dutch squadrons, supported from England, often intercepted the
succours from Spain. Another weak spot in Spain's armour was
Lisbon, where the people were ready to rise for Don Antonio, the
Portuguese claimant, whenever Elizabeth could send a squadron with
him on board. She also assisted Henry of Navarre and the Huguenots
against the Catholic League; and, by stirring up the Turks to prepare
a great fleet of galleys, threatened Philip's rear in the Mediterranean.
Such was her success that the Pope privately confessed his preference
for the heretic over the saint. Moreover, while England was nearly
self-sufficing, Philip's unwieldy empire depended on the gold and
silver of the Indies. As the Venetian ambassador at Madrid re-
marked: "Should iheflota (from the Indies) fall into Drake's hands,
that would mean the ruin of half Spain, as indeed will happen if die
fleet does not arrive this year; for they say that a mere delay will
cause the failure of many merchants in Seville".4
Englishmen, however, had to face grave economic difficulties. The
sudden cessation of trade with Spain, as also with Germany, owing to
her occupation of towns on the Lower Rhine, brought many mer-
chants to the verge of ruin. Accordingly, in November 1586 Mendoza
recommended Philip to station a force of galleys in the Straits of
Gibraltar for the interception of English trade with the Levant and
the Barbary States, whereupon "they will be driven into a corner
without any commerce or navigation". Nothing, apparently, came
of this plan of commercial strangulation, which recalls that of Philippe
le Bel in 11297 and foreshadows the continental system of Napoleon.
The enemies of England have adopted the scheme only as a last resort,
when direct attack has failed; and in 1586 Philip was confident of
conquest.
Even in this first encounter Spain and England pursued diverse
1 Read, G.? Wdsvn&ham and the Policy of Elizabeth, vol. m, chap, xiii; Edmundson, G.,
Anglo-Dutch Rioafa, 1600-50, chap, i; Fvgger News Letters (and series), nos. ioo, 105, 106.
r Col. St. Pap. Venetian, 1581-01, no. 275.
* Laughton, J. K., Defeat of toe Spanish Armada (N.R.S.), n, 19.
4 Col. St. Pap. Venetian, 1581-31, no. 524.
ENGLISH AND SPANISH NAVAL STRATEGY 121
war policies destined profoundly to influence their overseas develop-
ment. While Philip prepared systematically and slowly to crush
Elizabeth by sheer mass, her seamen retorted by a swift rapier thrust.
In April 1587, with twenty-five sail, mostly small, Drake dashed into
Cadiz, routed the Spanish galleys, destroyed two great ships and thirty-
one small ones, and brought off four provision ships, thus spreading
panic1 and paralysing the Armadafor thatyear. Next, discerning safety
for England only by acting vigorously on the enemy's coast, he occupied
Sagres Castle, near Cape St Vincent, so as to separate the south
Spanish fleets from those of Lisbon and the Biscay ports. But Eliza-
beth, always prone to half measures, ordered him home. Her sailors,
however, still clung to the offensive, even the cautious Lord High
Admiral, Howard of Effingham, pointing out in mid-June that at no
point in home seas could a fleet guard these islands, and that we must
meet and defeat the enemy in his own waters.2 This statement marks
the official acceptance of that offensive strategy which has assured the
safety of England and her Empire at many crises. If Howard and
Drake had not been driven back by a sou'wester, the decisive battle
of the war would have been fought off the north-west of Spain early
in July 1588.
On the other hand Philip and his commander, the Duke of Medina
Sidonia, had not grasped the sine qud non of a successful invasion, viz.
thoroughly to beat the defending navy. Philip ordered the Duke to
make straight for the English Channel so as to join off " CapeMargate "
Parma's transports conveying the Dunkirk army from the Flemish
ports to the mouth of the Thames. If the English fleet approached,
he might assail it; but, preferably, he should keep his force intact
in order to guard the transports. This entirely military view of the
problem governed the details of the expedition, the soldiers always
flouting and dictating to the seamen, or even turning them out of their
quarters and leaving them shelterless.8
Acting in this spirit, Medina Sidonia with about 120 ships let slip
the golden opportunity of defeating the smaller English force as it
struggled painfully out of Plymouth to gain the western or windward
position (20 July). Now, as always, his preoccupation, to get in
touch with Parma at Dunkirk, condemned him to defensive tactics
which played into the hands of Howard and Drake. Speedily the
when the wind swung to the north, off Portland, the Spaniards failed
to attack, and the nimbler defenders, once more gaining the weather
gauge, resumed the offensive with such effect that at nightfall the
1 Col. St. Pap. Foreign, xxr, pt i, pp. 335, 493.
* Laughtou, J. K., Defeat of the Spamsh Armada* i, 196, 200.
8 Duro, F., La Armada Irwndbile, n, 469. 4 HaMuyt, n, 386.
122 SEA POWER
enemy "gathered their whole fleet into a roundell", and bore away
eastwards, Howard now divided his array (finally numbering some
130 units) into four squadrons under himself, Drake, Hawkins and
Frobisher; but the tactical arrangements on both sides were tentative
and elementary. Certain it is that the brunt of the fight fell on the
twenty-three large royal ships which daily plucked Sidonia's tail
feathers, until it was a morally beaten force which cast anchor off
Gravelines. Meanwhile Parma's light craft (little better than river
boats) could not beat out of Dunkirk and Nieuport against the
prevalent westerly winds,1 which for the time rendered needless the
presence of English and Dutch blockaders. Thus, after sacrificing a
good chance of victory off Plymouthin order to gain touch with Parma,
Medina Sidonia never caught sight of that windbound and unseaworthy
flotilla. Beaten off Gravelmes, he ran for the northern exit of the North
Sea. Less than half of the Armada reached Spain ; and the disaster sent
through Catholic Europe a thrill of horror rivalling in intensity that of
exultation which pulsated through England and Holland. Patriots
vaunted the size and terror of the Spanish, Italian and Portuguese
galleons now overcome by the smaller island craft, forgetting that the
latter were better armed, better manned, and better worked, besides at
the start gaining the weather gauge. But joy at the deliverance from
a great fear stopped not to reason why. Enough that the Spaniards
"with all their so great and terrible an ostentation did not in all their
sailing about England so much as sink or take one ship, bark, pinnace
or cockboat of ours, or ever burnt so much as one sheepcote of this
land". Well might the Londoners, at the solemn thanksgiving of
29 November, hail Elizabeth as, under God, the preserver of the
realm. Forgotten were her shifts, turns and petty economies, even
her maritime strategy, as ultra-feminine as her whims and wiles. Now
at last men understood her thirty years of dalliance and delay, which
deferred the conflict until her patient tact had made of England a
united nation, able to give stiff backing to the sea-dogs whom she had
coyly reared.
The connection between Philip's invasion plan and the overseas
activities of the two peoples remains to be noted. His attack on
England had compelled her to recall her raiding squadrons for the
defence of the realm. Consequently the Peruvian treasure-fleet,
escaping all danger off the Azores, now arrived safely at San Lucar.
Clearly another attack on England was the best protection of the
Indies and their bulwark, the Azores. "If" (wrote Lippomano,
Venetian ambassador at Madrid) "the Azores were captured, that
would be the end of the Indies; for all ships have to touch there."2
Pride and prudence, therefore, counselled another offensive, which
seemed the easier owing to the failure of Drake's and Norris's attempt
• 1587-1603, pp. 245, 355, 371.
* Col. St. Pap. Venetian, 1581-91, nos. 770, 775, 788.
EFFORTS AGAINST THE SPANISH FLOTA 123
on Corunna and Lisbon (1589). Drake's ships arrived in the Tagus
"with not enough men [i.e. soldiers] fit to attack a boat", and Drake
had to withdraw to the open, there consoling the shareholders of this
joint-stock venture by capturing "eighty Hansa hulks". Elizabeth
vented her spleen on Drake by slighting him and leaving him un-
employed during five years. Such was the year 1589— a drop from
the sublime to the stock-jobbing.
Philip's great preoccupation now became the defence of the Azores,
to which focal point his new Catholic Armada of forty great and twenty
small ships finally sailed.1 For him the issue of the war turned on the
arrival of the annual treasure-fleet bringing what Mun terms " the very
sinews of his strength". After it arrived in November 1589 there was
great activity in the shipyards, eleven galleons on the English model
and nine on the Portuguese model being constructed in the Biscay
ports.2 Again in September 1590 the flagship of the East India fleet
arrived bearing great riches. Thereafter the West India flota from
Havana arrived safely with a vast sum (March 1591). The total
amount brought by the treasure fleets to Spain in this war is not
known; but the well-informed Venetian ambassador at Madrid
estimated that between August 1587 and November 1600 they had
imported a sum equal to 108,240,000 millions of gold (i.e. ducats), or
about £p9,766,ooo.8
As Philip did not strike directly at England, our privateers resumed
their activities, but with small results. The Earl of Cumberland with
four ships in 1589-90 seized some valuable ships, but not the fleet
which he sought. Frobisher with four of the Queen's ships fared little
better; for he brought back safely to port only two out of several
prizes; these two were worth £15,000, but the expedition had cost
Elizabeth £i 1,320* — a sad falling off from the golden days. Our
privateers did not spare the Germans and Dutch, so that in 1590 we
were branded as the enemies of the world.5 In 1591 the Queen
speculated on the luck of a new man, Sir Thomas Howard, cousin of
the Lord High Admiral, who was to sail to the Azores on the "Grand
Quest". But Philip, hearing of the design, sent out a great fleet to
surprise Howard. Off Flores the Spaniards nearly caught him, and
his second in command. Sir Richard Grenville in the Revenge, refiising
to flee, fought that epic fight against fifteen warships in succession,
which left him and his ship stricken to a glorious death. Not Howard
but the elements conspired to avenge Grenville. On the battered
and worm-eaten Spanish ships, many of which had been detained a
year in the West Indies, there burst a tempest fatal to most of them—
a loss to Philip almost as great perhaps as that of the Armada of
1 Ibid. nos. 836, 863, 873, 968.
* Ibid. nos. 894, 898, 899.
8 Monson's Tracts, n, 339-40 n. * find, i, 239.
* Fugger News Letters (and series), p. 208; also pp. 219-121, 235-43.
SEA POWER
1588. By good fortune Howard escaped the storm; but thenceforth
Elizabeth lost her taste for these western ventures, which were risky
now that Spain protected the Indies by fleets and forts.
As for Englishmen, they were still attracted by privateering more
than by colonisation, which indeed was unsafe whole the Spaniards,
with greatly improved ships, contested the mastery at sea1 and gained
ground in northern and western France. The danger to our coasts was
obvious in 1595 when from Blavet in Brittany an enterprising Spanish
captain, Amerola, with four galleys, raided and burnt Mousehole,
Newlyn and Penzance. Elizabeth's retort, hesitatingly adopted in
August, of loosing Drake and Hawkins on the Indies, was a failure.
The Spaniards were on the alert : the two old sea-dogs first quarrelled,
then sickened, and in quick succession died near die scenes of their
early glories. Near home things went even worse. Despite English
help to Henry IV of France he lost ground to Parma's army and the
still malcontent Leaguers. Finally Calais was in danger. At this
threat England was deeply moved. With Antwerp, Nieuport and
Dunkirk in the power of Spain, and Ostend and Calais in peril, an
invasion of Kent by a fleet of galleys seemed an affair of weeks. At
Henry IV's request Elizabeth prepared to redouble her succours to
France, but only on condition of holding Calais in pledge. During
these hagglings, the Spaniards took the place by storm (9 April 1596).
The land power seemed now on the brink of success; for Philip's
persistence and Parma's genius again menaced England with invasion
and pinned her to the defensive. How should she recover the initia-
tive, which in war compels success? Fortunately the memory of Drake's
exploit at Cadiz inspired in Essex and Raleigh his indomitable resolve
to forestall, not to await, attack. Wayward and inconstant in their
enterprises, these two favourites of the Queen possessed the priceless
gift of warlike imagination; and to the lunge of the Spaniard at Kent
they dealt the riposte at Cadiz. The secret of their design was well
kept. Under the Lord High Admiral, Howard, served Essex, Lord
Thomas Howard and Raleigh. The expeditionary force comprised
forty-seven warships and transports carrying over 6000 troops. By
mid-June it was ranging the coast of Spain, carrying with it a rising
surge of terror. "The Spaniards" (wrote Nani, Venetian ambassador
at Madrid) "would not believe that after the death of Drake and the
scattering of his squadron, coupled with the loss of Calais, the English
would think of moving to any great distance to harass their neigh-
bours. "2 Would the fleet seize the Bayona Isles, enter the Tagus, or
make for the Azores and the treasure-fleet? It made straight for
Cadiz.
On 20 June Howard struck swift and hard. The city fell to Vere's
veterans from the Dutch wars, and was held for a fortnight, while
1 Monson's Tracts, iv, 66-78.
* Col. St. Pap. Venetian, 1592-1603, no. 431.
EXHAUSTION OF SPAIN 125
Xeres, San Lucar and Seville trembled in expectation of the like fate.1
At Madrid, the drum was beaten "to raise troops for the imminent
peril of this kingdom". Not more than 2000 harquebuses and muskets
could be found, despite search in private houses; and the terrible
truth was laid bare that, while Philip conquered in France and
exploited the New World, he was almost defenceless at home. Essex
urged the retention of Cadiz, with himself as governor. He was over-
ruled, perhaps from jealousy, or because the men were sickening with
the heat, wine and fruit. Elizabeth (always timid in naval affairs)
seems never to have contemplated holding the place, though that
step, albeit expensive, would have paralysed Spain at sea and given
England the mastery of the New World. On 4 July Howard sailed
away, carrying off eighteen Spanish vessels full of spoils, besides those
seized by the troops. Idiaquez, Philip's secretary, supplied the caustic
comment — "The English know how to conquer but not how to
hold".2
Philip's pious persistence was proof even against this last disaster.
Still bent on revenge, he appropriated the treasure brought in safely
by the Havana fleet, repudiated the State debts, and laid hands on
all ships in Spanish harbours. Thus, the third and last Catholic
Armada rapidly took form; and in October he bade it sail, probably
to help the rebel earls in Ireland. In vain did the officers beg him
not to send forth this commandeered force into the autumn gales.
In reply came a more imperious order to depart. They obeyed, where-
upon off Finisterre a storm caught them, destroying some thirty vessels,
with more than 2000 troops on board, and scattering the rest along
the coast. From the ships which made Ferrol, all but 2500 seamen de-
serted by the new year.3 Therefore the hapless force never left Spain;
and Parma's further victories in Picardy were fruitless. In fact, Spain
never recovered from the blows dealt by the English at Cadiz and by
nature off Finisterre. In May 1 598 Philip made peace with Henry IV,
ceding his conquests in France, including Calais. Four months later
he died, and bigoted pertinacity gave place to voluptuous frivolity
in the person of Philip III.
It has been necessary to review briefly these events because the
persistence of Spanish efforts down to the year 1597 helps to explain
why Englishmen had not before then succeeded in founding colonies.
The fact was that Philip's vast resources, his possession of Flemish and
French ports and his dogged resolve to strike at Elizabeth through
them or through Scotland or Ireland, placed England on the de-
fensive and aroused constant alarm. One by one his expedients failed.
The French Catholics, the Irish, the Scots, his fleet— all in turn dis-
appointed him. But not until the year 1597 was England safe from
1 Monson's Tracts* i, 344-54^ Corbett, Successors of Drake, chaps, iii, iv; Fugger News
Letters, p. 280.
• Col. St. Pap. Venetian, 1592-1603, no. 470. 8 Ibid. nos. 506, 507, 519.
i26 SEA POWER
invasion. Therefore until that year privateering and not colonisation
absorbed the energies of her sons. The last venture of Drake and
Hawkins, also the attacks of Dudley on Trinidad, of Somers, Shirley
and Parker on the West Indies, and of Raleigh and Popham on the
Orinoco were little more than raids, serviceable only as exhausting
Spain and advancing English seacraft. The one serious attempt at
conquest, that of Porto Rico by the Earl of Cumberland with eighteen
vessels, failed through lack of man-power (I597).1
Yet the Age of Elizabeth, though not formally decisive in war,
spurred on Englishmen to deeds which made for supremacy at sea.
Her challenging personality roused England to enterprises hitherto
unimagined; and war, commerce and literature felt the ocean's tang.
It adds spice to the prose epics of Hakluyt and Purchas, and inspires
Drayton's panegyric of England and her Qjieen —
who sent her navies hence
Unto the either Inde and to that shore so green,
Virginia, which we call of her, a virgin queen.8
Samuel Daniel in his Musophilus (1599) projects his vision into the
future —
And who (in time) knows whither we may vent
The treasure of our tongue? To what strange shores
This gain of our best glory shall be sent
T'ennch unknowing nations with our stores?
"What worlds in the yet unformed Occident
May come refin'd with th' accents that are ours?
And Bacon thus distils the essence of policy — "He that commands
the sea is at great liberty and may take as much and as little of the
warre as he will ". So swift and yet so vital in this age was the inter-
action between bold deeds tdid inspiriting thoughts. Together they
raised our people to heights never known before and implanted in the
national consciousness an abiding memory and ambition.
Hitherto the war-spirit, manifested in privateering, had told against
both commerce and colonisation. So far as is known, only eighty-one
merchantmen of more than 200 tons were launched during Elizabeth's
reign,8 the demand being great for swift privateers. Raleigh com-
plained that the Dutch built far better cargo vessels, which were en-
grossing our carrying trade and poaching upon our valuable fisheries.4
But this was not all. With the seventeenth century dawned a new
age destined to be one, not so much of romantic exploit, as of com-
mercial exploitation. In developments in the Orient, though James
Lancaster had pointed the way, the lead lay with the Dutch, who had
*& J 593-4 formed companies for the furtherance of their East India
1 Hakluyt, vn, 164-224, 272-356; Col. St. Pap. Venetian, 1592-1603, nos. 566, 750.
* Dnqton, PolyoUnon (Song 17). • Monson's Tracts, m, 431 n.
4 Raleigh,. . . Trade and Commerce (f England with the Dutch. . .(1603); so too Mun, chap.
xix; and Gentleman, T., England's way to win Wealth (1614), PP* ?-*<>•
OCEANIC COMMERCE 127
trade. The opportunity was great and the profits sometimes reached
400 per cent.1; for the discontent of the Portuguese under Spanish rule
yielded an easy victory to Dutch organisation and persistence. In
1598 England and the United Provinces made a treaty of mutual
support, which helped on Anglo-Dutch incursions into both the
Indies ; and in the sequel mercantile efforts reached a higher plane of
organisation, as appeared in the English East India Company (1600)
and the concentration of the Dutch on the joint-stock Universal East
India Company (1602).
By this effective union of capital and maritime enterprise both
Companies were able to build far larger and better armed ships,
suitable for the long and dangerous voyage to the East.2 From the
time of the Phoenicians the greatest maritime progress has been
achieved by the peoples who persistently attempted the longest and
most gainful voyages. As Mun wrote (chap, iv), "remote trades are
most gainful to the Commonwealth". The East now became the most
coveted goal; and the development of naval construction, first of
merchantmen and then of protecting warships, has in the main
corresponded to the vital needs of oriental trade. First, the Portu-
guese with their great carracks; then their conquerors, the Dutch, for
a time led the way in great weatherly ships; while, later, the English
forged ahead, gradually discarding the fore and aft castles, building
ships of wider beam and deeper draught, the climax being reached in
1610 in the East Indiaman, Trade's Increase, of noo tons.8 The chief
disadvantage in the eastern voyages was the high death rate, eight
sailors dying out often.4
Thus, in the years 1590-1610 the Dutch and English passed from
the pelagic to the oceanic phase — a change flk™ to that which re-
placed privateering by commerce, the mother of empire. As might
be expected from their limited land base, small population and
oligarchic town government, Dutch efforts were narrowly commercial ;
and Motley exaggerates when he hails in the Dutch "the first free
nation to put a girdle of empire around the earth".6 Only in Great
Britain were found the political and social conditions favouring the
further development from what may be called the factory to the
family stage; and, the beginnings of her Empire having been firmly
laid in successful seamanship and national unity (consummated in
1603 by the union of the English and Scottish Crowns), the growth
of the fabric was henceforth both rapid and sustained— a develop-
ment far other than that of Spain and Portugal, whose portentous
bulk soon bore the signs of premature decline.
Nevertheless, the personal and political fads of the early Stuarts
1 Fugger News Letters, pp. 259, 317.
8 Monson's Tracts, iv, 180-2; Comb. Mod. Hist, TV, 728-34.
1 Anderson, Origins of Commerce, n, 2241; Oppenheim, op. cit. pp. 185-7.
4 Col. St. Pap. Venetian, xvn, no. 603.
* Motley, J. L., The United Netherlands, chap. Hi.
i28 SEA POWER
now enfeebled England and therefore the Navy. After the heroic
figure of Elizabeth came the timid pedant, James ; and after him, the
conscientious bigot, Charles, both of them stumbling-blocks in the
way of English expansion. At once James offended his subjects by
declaring his desire for peace with Spain, and by calling in all
privateers. Much, however, could be said for such a course.1 The
war had burnt itself out; English trade suffered more by virtual ex-
clusion from Spanish lands than it gained by privateering. Above all,
the new age needed organisation, and organisation implies peace and
the desire for peace. Yet, as usual, James spoilt a good case by his
garrulity, which led Philip III to raise his terms. In vain did Cecil,
Earl of Salisbury, roundly assure the Spanish ambassador that
England had proved she had the longer reach, and all the world
knew it.2 James ever compromised the English negotiators. Finally,
by the Treaty of London, signed in August 1604, he secured freedom
of trade with Spain and the Netherlands, the retention of Flushing
and Brill ("the keys of England"), and the abolition of the 30 per
cent, duty on English imports into Spain. Letters of marque and
reprisals were forbidden on both sides.
The Spanish negotiators, however, succeeded in obfuscating the
clause concerning trade with the Indies so that the ambassador in
Londonforthwith denied that right. " e Whatfor no? ' "—said the King.
"c Because (I replied) the clause is read in that sense.' 'They make
a great error who hold this view (said His Majesty), the meaning is
quite clear*."8 Disputes and private hostilities at once began on this
question. By way of retort James allowed his subjects to enlist in the
Dutch service, and made little difficulty when a Dutch fleet chased
Spanish reinforcements into Dover, taking or sinking most of their
ships and blockading the survivors (1605).* After Heemskerk's
brilliant victory over a superior Spanish fleet in Gibraltar Bay (1607)
Philip III opened negotiations with the Dutch States; and, as a sop
to Spanish pride, the peace of 1609 was termed a truce for twelve
years, during which time Philip promised not to hinder Dutch trade
wherever carried 0131. As the Dutch Navy ever waxed from commerce
and the Spanish Navy waned for lack of it, the truce spelt ruin for
Spain and primacy for the Dutch. During forty years of struggle they
had worn down the Spanish power, and now made bold bids for
empire in the East and West Indies, in South America and at the
mouth of the Hudson River. In truth, the years 1600-1650 may be
termed the Dutch half-century.
The commercial system of the Dutch being no less exclusive than
that of Spain, friction between England and Holland lay in the nature
of things, all the more so because the British Navy now underwent
511, and vide supra, p. 76.
DECLINE OF NAVAL EFFICIENCY 129
a rapid decline. The Venetian ambassador, Molin, after leaving
England in 1607 reported it as comprising only thirty-seven ships,
many of them old and rotten, but capable of being reinforced by
nearly 200 well-manned merchantmen. He adds:
If England remains long at peace and does not make up her mind to keep up a
larger navy and to stop the sale of ships and guns, which is already going on, she
wifl soon be reduced to a worse condition. For the King does not keep more than
three vessels armed, and that not as they used to be, and private individuals have
no need to keep theirs armed, for the Grown is at peace, privateering forbidden,
the Indian trade half stopped; and people do not know what to do with their ships,
and so take to selling them, and their crews take to other business.1
Technically, this was a time of improvement in dockyard con-
struction, due mainly to Phineas Pett, formerly of Emmanuel College,
Cambridge, who, profiting by mathematical training and the best
examples of foreign shipping, produced in 1610 a ship, the Prince
Royal, of 1200 tons which was deemed the paragon of warships. His,
too, was the design of the first English three-decker, the Sovereign of
the Seas (1637), which did good service up to 1696 and forms a link
with the eighteenth-century three-decker.2
But sea power depends on a united national spirit as well as on ships ;
and the time of the early Stuarts is therefore a time of decline, witness
James's failure to put down piracy in home waters and his permission
to the Dutch to chase and destroy pirates in Irish harbours. Very
characteristic was his extension of the former claim to sovereignty of
the Narrow Seas into one of possession together with its corollary,
collection of fishery tolls from alien fishermen.8 This last he utterly
failed to enforce on the Dutch. James's toadying to Spain in the
matter of Raleigh's execution aroused disgust at home and contempt
abroad. In 1616 he surrendered to the Dutch for a sum of money
"the cautionary towns" Brill and Flushing.4
A leading cause of naval decline was the pluralist proclivities of the
now senile Howard, Lord High Admiral, which opened the sluices
of corruption at the dockyards and throughout the whole service.
At last, in 1618, the scandals in high places, the rottenness of the
ships, and the hardships of the seamen ("a ragged regiment of com-
mon rogues") led to a royal commission of enquiry, which disclosed
a veritable sink of iniquity. Howard, now Earl of Nottingham, though
guilty only of negligence, thereupon resigned. The Surveyor and
Controller of the Navy were both discharged; and their duties were
assigned to a Board of Commissioners.5 James's favourite, the Marquis
of Buckingham, was appointed Lord High Admiral in 1619, and in-
fused some energy into the service.6 But the old defects of favouritism,
Col. St. Pap. Venetian, 1603-7, no. 739. So too Oppenheim, pp. 18^9.
Corbctt, ticcessors of Drake, pp. 418-30; Autobiograpfo of P. P«tf faJELS.), PP- .163^218.
Vide infra, p. 200. 4 Edmundson, G., Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, chap. u.
Hannay, D., Hist, of the Royal Wavy, i, I5]H>!- ,
14ft and Works of Sir H. Mainwaring (N.R.S.), vol. i, chap. vu.
CHBEI
I3o SEA POWER
corruption in the dockyards and neglect of the seamen continued,1
the results being seen in the cowardly conduct of Mansell and his
crews in the abortive attempt against the pirates of Algiers (1620).
Several pamphleteers lament the decline of English energy and
prestige. Thus, Tobias Gentleman bursts out — "O slothful England,
look on the plump Hollanders; behold their diligence in fishing and
our own carelesse negligence".2 So too Mun bemoans that we "besot
ourselves with pint and pot", while the Dutch have "taken up our
wonted valour" and gain incredible wealth from fishing in the English
seas. Let us develop our fisheries and our immensely profitable East
India trade; for foreign trade is "the nursery of our mariners, the
walls of the kingdom and the means of our treasure, the sinews of our
wars, the terror of our enemies". Also in his Discourse of Trade to the
East Indies he states that for that trade alone seven or eight ships
yearly are built at Deptford and Blackwall, employing at least
2500 seamen— a great source of power. Monson, though a hater of
the Dutch, contrasts their enterprise with our slackness, which leaves
us with not ten merchantmen in the Thames fit to help in national
defence.8 England's dependence on shipping, and therefore on the
fisheries and on colonial and foreign trade, is already a commonplace.
Vaughan states that fishing "multiplieth shipping and mariners, the
principal props of this Kingdom";4 and Sir William Alexander
rejoices that some fifty ships sail yearly to the New England fisheries.6
The resolve to strengthen the merchant service as a nmrsery for the
Navy explains in part the early restriction of colonial trade to English
vessels, and the attempt to tax Dutch fishermen in the English seas. The
North American colonies were also valued chiefly as supplying timber
and naval stores which would render us independent of the Baltic
lauds. The pre-eminence of the naval factor appears in King James's
Instruction (xn) to the Commission of Enquiry (1622) into the causes
of the decline of trade: "Above all other things seriously and care-
fully consider by what good means our Navy and the shipping of this
Kingdom may be best maintained and enlarged, and mariners bred
up and increased." The enquiry was to deal with the reservation to
Britons of "the herring fishery upon the seas and coasts appertaining
to our own realms";6 the exclusion of foreign imports while our
shipping wanted employment; the regulation of the trade in corn and
flax with the Eastland countries; and the method whereby tie East
India trade, "which is specious in show, may really be made profit-
1 Hollond, J., His First Discourse of the Wavy (ed. J. R. Tanner, N.R.S.), pp. 4-7,
35^44> 79-SK
Gentleman, T., England's way to win Wealth (1614).
Monson's Tracts, m, 238, 431.
Vaughan, W., The Golden Fleece (1626), p. 14.
Alexander, W., Encouragement to Colonies (1624), p. 31.
Anderson, Origins of Commerce, n, 295. So too Beer* G. L.,
System, chaps, iii, viii, ix; Col St. Pap. Dm. 1649-50, p. 317.
COLONISATION AND MARITIME ENTERPRISE 131
able to the public". The close connection of industries and economics
with the welfare of the Navy and the safety of the nation is here ex-
pressed in typically practical fashion. Englishmen were feeling their
way towards a commercial policy which would assure supremacy at
sea.
Thus, even when the Government declined in energy, the nation
showed signs of spirit and vigour as appeared in the contests of our
East Indiamen with the Portuguese. Further it was in these years
that the important settlements at Plymouth (1620), St Christopher
(1623), and Barbados (1624-5) took place. The coincidence of these
developments with a time of decline of the Navy might be urged as
proof that there is no connection between sea power and expansion.
Such reasoning would be superficial. For, as will again appear, the
influence of sea power is often gradual and indirect, not immediate
and obvious. Sixteen years had elapsed since the cumulative efforts
of the English Navy had compelled Spain at least to cloak her former
monstrous claim of exclusive possession of the New World. In the
interval English and Dutch seamen had cancelled that claim in the
East and exposed its hollowness in the West. But only by long years
of struggle had that result been made possible. It was the Elizabethan
seamen who were the prime founders of these Jacobean settlements.
Nor must the services of mathematicians, cartographers and ship-
wrights be overlooked. In 1594 John Davis published his work The
Seaman's Secrets, containing practical hints for navigation* Mercator's
Atlas, first published in Flanders in 1595, provided a good risumi of
the work of geographers and explorers. In 1599 Edward Wright, of
Gonville and Gaius College, Cambridge, advanced the science of
navigation by his work Certain Errors in Navigation detected and corrected,
and in 1600 gave to the world a greatly improved atlas. Napier's
logarithms (1614) were applied to navigation by Gunter in 1 620 ; and,
as Raleigh had noted, great improvements had latterly been made
in shipping, notably in the addition of top-sails, top-gallant sails,
studding-sails, and sprit-sails ; also the striking of the top-mast, the
weighing of anchor by the "capstone", and die lengthening of the
cable ("the life of the ship in all extremities") greatly added to the
safety of ships.1
Compared with this vital development the decline of English
prestige in Europe and the East is a passing symptom. Dutch rivals
might murder twelve Englishmen in Amboyna and expel the rest
(1623) ; but their resulting monopoly of the spice trade was of slight
significance by the side of the settlements in Virginia and New
England. English sea power, however weak, could generally shelter
these young communities; for, by great good fortune the time of
ever growing discord between the Stuart dynasty and the nation,
1 Raleigh, Sir W., A Discourse of the Invention of Strips, etc., p. 16; but see Oppenheim,
p. 127. See too Cal, St. Pap. Venetian, xm, p. 41.
9-2
i32 SEA POWER
coincided with that crescendo of Europe's agony, the Thirty Years9
War, which paralysed her at the time of England's first feeble efforts
at colonisation.
The gulf between King and nation widened under Charles I, the
results being apparent after he blundered into war, first with Spain,
then with France. Speedily the fiascos at Cadiz and La Rochelle re-
vealed the decline both in national energy and in naval organisation.
Equally significant were events overseas. In 1629 &c Spaniards de-
vastated St Christopher and no reparation was forthcoming at the
peace. Nay, Charles himself reversed Captain Kirke's exploit of
capturing the French settlements in Acadia and Canada, by finally
bartering them away for 400,000 crowns.1 The most far-reaching out-
come of war with France was the resolve of her statesman, Richelieu,
to revivify the long decadent French Navy. Accordingly he formed a
great dockyard at Toulon, whence, in 1643, twenty-four warships and
several galleys put out to coerce Spain. France now began to surpass
Spain as the leading Mediterranean Power. In fact the Spaniards,
already weakened by the revolt of the Portuguese and the loss of their
harbours and eastern treasure, now underwent a rapid decline, which,
twelve years later, was to invite the attack of Cromwell on their
West Indies.
Thanks to the endless turmoil in Europe, the maritime weakness
of England (only partially repaired by the tactless device of ship-
money) was cloaked except to the keen eyes of the Dutch. They de-
rided the hollow claim of Charles to the dominion of the Narrow Seas
and his demand of fishery tolls in the North Sea. In 1639 t^Y defied
him in territorial waters; "for Van Tromp chased a large Spanish
force into the Downs near Deal, and finally, after receiving rein-
forcements, nearly annihilated it in the presence of a squadron
of twelve sail under Pennington, who did next to nothing to main-
tain English neutrality. Charles was furious, but mainly, it would
seem, because he had bargained with the Spanish ambassador for
£150,000 as the price of protecting the Spanish fleet; and, the bargain
not being complete when Van Tromp finally attacked, Pennington
had no orders to protect the Spaniards by force* — a striking instance of
Stuart methods, which disgraced England and enfeebled her fighting
services. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the fleet went over to
the Parliament, thus aiding greatly in the defeat of the King's cause
in the Civil War.8
The work of the Navy in assuring the downfall of Charles is better
known than its later activities in restoring national and imperial unity
after his execution. Yet they were vital, for after that event the
Papers, n, 71 ; Edmundson, pp. 121-9; Penn, G. D., Navy under the early
1 275-85.
's article in Manner's Mirror, Oct. 1926.
NATIONAL UNITY AND COLONIAL SECURITY 133
English Republic was banned by all States; and a European coalition
against England seemed not improbable. She was also opposed by
the Scots and Irish, defied by many of the colonies, and hard pressed
by an informal maritime war with France. Yet she met all perils with
undaunted front. On the "Generals at Sea", Blake, Deane and
Popham, who in February 1649 took over the duties of the Lord
High Admiral, now fell the heavy burden of preventing invasion,
supporting Cromwell's communications and flank during the
Drogheda and Dunbar campaigns, and finally driving from the seas
the revolted ships with which Prince Rupert preyed on English
commerce. Never were heavy burdens more manfully and success-
fully shouldered. Blake and his colleagues were assisted by the
Admiralty Committee of the Council of State.1 These officials, along
with Commissioners appointed in 1652, exacted good work from the
dockyards,2 and promoted seamen of proved skill and hardihood.
The results were phenomenal. In three years forty-one new men-of-war
were added to the Navy, and good pay and a stern sense of duty made
the crews the Ironsides of the sea. The annihilation of the enemy was
also inculcated in the new and stringent Articles of War (December
1652), which sternly enforced discipline and helped to restore to the
Navy the trenchant power lacking in it since the death of Drake.
Blake was his reincarnation. Taking up his first naval command at
the age of fifty, he infused so high a spirit into his squadron blockading
Prince Rupert's force in Kinsale Harbour that the prince could do
nothing to harry Cromwell during his Irish campaign. Thereafter
Blake watched Rupert in the Tagus3 and later followed him into the
Mediterranean, chasing his ships into Cartagena and sinking or firing
all but three. This, the first great success of an English fleet in that sea,
made an immense impression, which was clinched by the mainten-
ance, for the first time, of an English Mediterranean squadron.8 But
this was not all. Rupert, escaping from Cartagena, sought, finally
with only two ships, to aid the Royalists in the West Indies. But he
was too late ; for the Admiralty had despatched thither a light squadron
under Admiral Sir George Ayscue, who overcame the resistance of
Lord Willoughby and the tough Royalists of Barbados. Thereupon
the Leeward Isles, as also the settlements in Virginia, acknowledged
the Commonwealth, which now maintained a West India squadron.4
The drastic action at sea, after five decades of Stuart slackness,
illustrated the vital connection between national unity and colonial
security. So long as England, Scotland and Ireland were at feud, the
defence of the colonies was impossible. National unity being re-
stored, the new spirit and discipline of the Navy swept Rupert from
1 Col. St. Pap. Venetian, xxvm, nos. 383, 457, 498, 506, 587, 667.
8 Hollond, op. cit. Introduction, pp. Ivi-Ex.
* Col. St. Pap. Venetian, xxvm, nos. 671, 700.
4 Oppenheim, pp. 302-4.
i34 SEA POWER
the seas, re-established commerce and thereafter crushed or cowed
the recalcitrant elements in the New World. Such was the essential
sequence, destined to recur after the accession of William III.
The tame acquiescence of the Stuarts in the Amboyna massacre
deferred to the time of Cromwell the day of reckoning with Dutch
arrogance overseas. Other considerations, notably the long chase of
Rupert, the informal maritime war with France, and the acute
friction with the royalist colonies, emphasised the need of strengthen-
ing England's sea power; and, as is shown in Chapter vi, the Navi-
gation Acts of 1650 and 1651 were designed as a stimulus to English
shipping and a blow to the Dutch carrying trade. These Acts summed
up the experience of the last seventy years, that, while a professional
Navy was essential to the safety of England, yet, in spite of the dif-
ferentiation of warships and merchantmen, the latter formed the chief
nursery of seamen. In this respect and this only the Dutch had an
advantage over us; and the Commonwealth sought by these Acts to
equalise matters. The final cause of the first Dutch War was the
Commonwealth's stiff claim to the sovereignty of the Narrow Seas, and
the consequent right of search. On this question neither side would
give way, especially after a collision between the two fleets off Dover.
On both sides moderate and devout men and all the merchant class
disliked the war. Yet memories of Amboyna and other annoyances,
together with the ever-mounting tale of reprisals and the equality of
the combatants in skill, bravery, and naval resources, imparted to
this war, and all the Dutch Wars, an unparalleled fierceness and
obstinacy. Van Tromp and de Ruyter were worthy rivals of Blake,
Monck and Ayscue. Numbers also were in favour of the Dutch, who
in July 1652 mustered 102 warships with many in reserve. Yet from
near the start they were often reduced to the defensive by the need of
protecting their fishing fleets and their convoys passing along the
Channel or round the north of Scotland. Indeed, the chief strategic
interest of these campaigns is the enormous advantage conferred by
England's dominant position and her comparative independence, at
that time, of sea-borne trade. In matfriel she benefited by possessing
deep-keeled, better armed and more heavily timbered warships, able
both to inflict and to endure longer punishment than the usually
lighter and shallower built Dutchmen, and also to overpower the large
armed merchantmen on which the enemy partly relied.1 Further,
the Dutch fleets, being controlled by five Boards of Admiralty of the
five marine provinces, lacked the homogeneity which marked the
Commonwealth's Navy. Tactically considered, the war is remarkable
for the tendencies towards the adoption (especially on the English
side) of the line ahead formation for battle, which may perhaps have
clinched Monck's final success off Camperdown (30 July 1653).
Already, after the defeat of 2 June, de Witt had warned the States-
1 Cd. St. Pap. Vmttian, xxvra, nos. 624, 631, 633.
CROMWELL'S NAVAL SUPREMACY 135
General that "the English are masters both of us and of the seas".
Still more decisive was the economic pressure on the enemy, who had
lost some 1500 merchantmen, and now kept his trading craft shut up
in port — a policy followed still more systematically in the second and
third Dutch Wars.
Meanwhile Cromwell, now Lord Protector, sought to end the
strife between the two Protestant Powers. Peace was accordingly
signed on 5 April 1654, the Dutch agreeing to lower the flag in the
Narrow Seas, pay a sum for the right to fish on the English coasts,
award compensation for the Amboyna outrage, and limit the number
of their warships. The question of search was left unsettled.1 That
both neutral Powers and rivals regarded England as victor appeared
in their eagerness to frame alliances with her — Sweden, Denmark and
Portugal granting valuable trading concessions. These treaties, though
less thorough than Cromwell desired, had far-reaching effects. Those
with Sweden and Denmark opened the Baltic trade to English ships
on terms which assured the passage of corn and naval stores. By the
treaty with Portugal we gained access to her possessions in the East
Indies, thereby furthering exploration and commerce in that quarter,
and inaugurating close relations with our oldest and "most faithful"
ally. Cromwell rarely if ever thought logically; but a logical sequel
to the opening of the East Indies was the opening of the West Indies.
Here Spain barred the way. It was therefore only natural that he
should resolve to exact reparation for the wrongs she had committed at
St Christopher; and in August 1654 he resolved to send an expedition
to add weight to demands which would otherwise be scorned. By
degrees he passed to open hostility, and therefore to an understanding
with her enemy, France. The results (described later) were such as to
impair the Spanish monopoly in the centre of the New World and
plant the flag of St George in Jamaica.
In his outlook on foreign affairs Cromwell is the last of the great
Elizabethans. After the dull backwater of the early Stuarts England
again pressed on with a favouring stream; for in Blake her seamen
found a leader able to humble the Bey of Tunis and sink or burn
sixteen Spanish ships under the protection of the batteries of Santa Cruz.
The contrast with the humiliations of Algiers in 1620 aiid La Rochelle
in 1626 reveals the supreme importance of national spirit and of great
personalities. Apart from the influence of Elizabeth, Cromwell, and
their admirals and statesmen, the sea might have been an easy
avenue for would-be invaders of these islands. Thanks to those leaders
it provided countless avenues for adventure and settlement overseas;
and at Cromwell's death it was scarcely doubtful that France alone
could seriously contest with the victorious islanders the empire of the
sea and of the New World.
* Baffliausen, R. G., Der mU Englische-HoUdn&sche Sukrieg, p. 688.
CHAPTER V
THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
WHILE Europe was involved in the struggles of the Thirty Years'
War .English colonial expansion was proceeding at an unprecedented
rate. This coincidence was not accidental, for though England was
not directly involved, the war had a powerful influence upon her
foreign policy and produced important results in the colonial field.
Moreover its economic effects promoted the flow of settlers across the
Atlantic in such numbers that the period has been appropriately
called "The Great Emigration". The time was crowded with
colonial developments, and the English possessions beyond the seas,
which in 1618 consisted of only two weak and unprosperous settlements,
had grown thirty years later to more than a dozen thriving com-
munities. To deal with the many diverse movements that were taking
place almost simultaneously, we must survey different aspects of the
period in turn, tracing first the results of the change in English
foreign policy which was the predominant factor between 1618 and
1629, an(^ considering later the settlement of New England, wherein
the effect of European events was only indirect and English domestic
troubles exercised the chief influence.
During the reign of James I the comparative paucity of emigration
proved that the plea of the early advocates for colonisation as a means
of relieving England's over-population had little validity; but under
Charles I circumstances changed for the worse, and a stream of
emigration began from these shores that was without parallel. It has
been customary to attribute the movement almost wholly to the
influence of religious motives and to speak of the migration as
Puritan, but this is to neglect other factors that were at work.
The causes urging men to cross the sea in this period were at least
as much economic and political, but they were individual in their
action and there was no organised means of giving them effect or
calling attention to them. On the other hand, the distinctively
Puritan emigrants were well organised and led by men who gloried
in placing their religious motives on record, and though economic
and political causes were acting on their followers as on many
thousands of others, they were unavowed and perhaps not even
realised.
The years between 1618 and the outbreak of the Civil War were
very hard for the mass of Englishmen and especially so for the wage-
earners and the lesser gentry. The agrarian changes and the altera-
tion in the value of money bore with particular hardship on those
who lived by the land, and the long and devastating war in Central
ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTIES 137
Europe deprived England of markets for the sale of her cloth, upon
the manufacture of which so large a proportion both of her town and
couiitry population depended. In every direction men felt prevented
from helping themselves by irritating restrictive regulations and
privileges that survived from an earlier time and were too strait a
jacket for a growing nation. The older sources of revenue were in-
sufficient to support the expenses of the Crown and Government,
partly because of inefficient collection but mainly owing to the fall
in the value of money. The representatives of the nation in Parliament
were not yet prepared to supply the ordinary needs of Government
by regular taxation, and the King and his ministers were therefore
compelled to supply the need by a drastic exaction of the tradi-
tional royal dues. The device usually adopted for their collection was
to place them in farm at a competitive rent. Syndicates were formed
among the richer London merchants who had command of fluid
resources of capital to take up the farms, and it was their interest to
manage the collection efficiently. The Government benefited because
the rents demanded and offered at the periodical tenderings were
calculated upon the average produce of the farms during the preceding
term. The subjects, who were hard pressed in the economic struggle,
found intolerable grievances in the extortionate demands of the
speculative syndicates who had had to bid high for their grants and
were determined to make profits. Men naturally associated these
financial grievances with other causes of complaint against "the
Government, and economic difficulties thus merged with political
struggles against established authority. The contest between the rights
of the subject on the one hand and privilege and prerogative on the
other had a profoundly disturbing psychological effect. Men's minds
were prepared for adventures that in quieter times they would never
have contemplated, and the one perennial motive for emigration, the
desire to make a better living, found an unusually favourable field in
which to work.
Along with this economic and political unrest there was wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the government of the Church, and this,
especially in London and the eastern and southern counties, was of
compelling force. The bulk of the laity and lesser clergy had come to
accept the Elizabethan settlement of religion as a matter of course.
Within its definite prescriptions in matters of Church government and
ceremonial they found much doctrinal liberty, and, down to the later
years of James I, the system worked with comparative smoothness.
But just at the period when economic distress became most acute
and governmental insistence on traditional prerogatives most irri-
tating, the supreme influence in the Church passed to a group of the
higher clergy who were not prepared to accept as sufficient a mere
outward show of conformity but were determined to curb departures
from their standard whether in doctrine or in practice. So in Church
i38 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
matters as in civil there was an irritating and narrow control and an
exaction of compliance with rigid regulations that did much to add to
the prevailing unrest, to diminish respect for established authority
and to loosen traditional ties.
In the settlement of Virginia and the Bermudas, which was
accomplished without Spanish interference, we see no direct influence
of foreign policy on colonial development. In fact until 1618 the
more actively Protestant party in the Privy Council had little oppor-
tunity to influence foreign affairs, but James was inconstant and
touchy, and from time to time when he was offended with Spain, they
were encouraged to move. Anti-Spanish feeling was much stronger
in the country than at court or among the leading merchants, and
there came about an association between those who favoured a return
to the aggressive policy of Elizabeth's reign and the lesser merchants
and interlopers who were attacking the privileges and monopolies
of the great chartered companies. Foreign policy lay outside the
province of Parliament, but the general dislike of the King's partiality
for Spain found its outlet in debates on trade wherein the affairs of
the colonies were frequently concerned. The voicing of colonial
grievances thus often fell to the spokesmen of those who were opposed
to the policy of the court in other matters, and they have sometimes
been unduly credited with an exclusive interest in colonial expansion.
When Spain's intervention in Germany was making it increasingly
difficult for James to maintain his old policy of an Anglo-Spanish
alliance, the opportunity of the anti-Spanish party arrived, and they
began to further openly designs such as they had previously concealed.
The first moves were in Guiana, and since the foundation of English
colonies in the Caribbean arose from those efforts it is to them that
we must turn our attention. It was the temporary ascendancy of the
anti-Spanish party after the fall of the Howards that set Raleigh free
to organise has last expedition, and his backers included two of its
most powerful members, the Earl of Southampton and Sir Robert
Rich, afterwards Earl of Warwick, who between them typify the
transition between two eras. Southampton was the most prominent
surviving member of the war party of Elizabeth's days, while Rich
lived to advise Cromwell on the preparation of his "Western Design".
The^ former had often been in disfavour for his persistent enmity to
Spain and was frequently associated with privateering enterprises
under foreign flags. Rich's father, the second Lord Rich, had long
been suspected of using his great wealth in semi-piratical ventures,
and the public career of the foremost patron of colonisation for thirty
years began with a privateering expedition that he set forth under the
flag of the Duke of Savoy.1 A sign of the King's momentary change of
policy in 1618 was the elevation of Lord Rich to the Earldom of
Warwick, to which Sir Robertsucceeded ayear later. Thenceforward his
1 Col. St. Pop. Venetian, 1615-17, no. 631.
THE AMAZONS COMPANY 139
name was associated with almost every colonial scheme of importance
until the Interregnum. He had been one of the founders of the
Bermuda Company, and some of his clients went out to Virginia
under the regime of Sir Thomas Smythe. About 1617 he began to take
an active part in the affairs of the Virginia Company, and in 1618
he gave his patronage to Sir William St John in the promotion of a
new Company for African trade. This "Company of Adventurers
trading to Gynney and Bynney" built the first English fort on the
River Gambia and made attempts to follow the new enterprises of
the Dutch and begin a trade in negro slaves.1 The first negroes sold
in Virginia came in one of Warwick's ships, but the venture proved
unprofitable, and St John's Company turned instead to privateering.
Among the officers of Raleigh's last disastrous expedition was
Roger North, brother of Lord North, a member of the anti-Spanish
faction at court, who was so much impressed with the opportunities
of profitable colonisation in South America that he warmly pushed
it among his friends after his return. He succeeded in enlisting
Warwick's support, and with his influence, in April, 1619 he obtained
the consent of the Privy Council to the incorporation of a company
styled "The Governor and Company of Noblemen and Gentlemen
of the City of London Adventurers in and about the River of the
Amazons", with title to explore and colonise a territory between the
mouth of the Wiapoco and the delta of the Amazon, stretching right
across the continent from sea to sea after the fashion of the Virginia
patent of 1609. This grant was not, like that of Harcourt of 1613, con-
fined to the "Wild Coast" which had never been in Spanish occupa-
tion, but boldly laid claim to a slice of territory extending to the
South Sea, although it was known to contain many Spanish posts. The
Spaniards at once demanded the cancellation of the patent as a wilful
challenge to their rights, and the state of public feeling was such that
the question was regarded as a tussle between the anti-Spanish party
and the powerful ambassador, the Count of Gondomar, for influence
with the King. It excited attention far beyond the circle of those who
were usually interested in colonial enterprises. In the meantime North
slipped away with the connivance of certain officials and settled a
post of a hundred men in the Amazon delta to begin planting tobacco
and to trade with the Indians. Without risk of a complete breach it
was impossible to maintain the Guiana patent in face of the evidence
of effective Spanish occupation that Gondomar laid before the
Council, and a royal proclamation was therefore issued denouncing
North's attempt against a friendly Power. Warwick was ordered to
bring up the patent for cancellation, and in May 1620 he had to make
his humble submission.
Meanwhile Warwick had become actively interested in Virginia
as a possible base for attacks against the Spanish Indies if the breach
1 Vide infra, p. 438.
140 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
for which he and Southampton hoped could be brought about. Such
designs, dating as far back as the French colony in Florida in 1563,
had never been forgotten by some members of the Company, and
though to advertise them was impolitic, in 1614 Richard Martin, the
counsel for the Company, incautiously referred to "such matters of
high moment" before the House of Commons and spoke of Virginia
as "a bridle for the Neapolitan courser if our youth of England are
able to sit him, for which they will give him golden spurs "-1 Probably
his censure by the House was attributed as much to this reference to
foreign relations as to the general tone of his speech which was the
nominal cause of complaint. Southampton and other Opposition
peers were present when the speech was made, and Martin's apologists
were those members of the Commons, like Sir Edwin Sandys, who
were notorious for their anti-Spanish feelings. Sir Thomas Smythe,
treasurer of the Virginia Company and governor of the Somers
Islands Company, was on the other hand prominently interested in
the regulated Company for Spanish trade and averse from any policy
that would endanger its commerce. He was also leader of the mer-
chants who had control in the great exclusive companies, so that he
was regarded by the interloping merchants as their chief opponent.
In 1618 Rich and Southampton lent their aid to the faction in the
Virginia Company that was antagonistic to Smythe, and they com-
pelled him to decline re-election to the treasurership. He was suc-
ceeded by Sandys, who had been the spokesman in the House of
Commons of the "free traders", and whose election marked the be-
ginning of an acute schism in the Company that became a public
scandal. It also affected the Somers Islands Company, for the rival
factions wererepresented in its Courts. They were opposed on a variety
of grounds, and the dispute bristled with personal accusations on both
sides. The great nobles and the politicians who were concerned made
use of the opportunity to consolidate a party of opposition to the
King's Spanish policy and thus made colonial affairs an issue in
national politics. The disputes lasted for more than six years and will
demand our attention later.
The momentous changes that were taking place in the international
situation aided the designs of Warwick and the war party. The twelve
years' truce between Spain and the United Provinces came to an end
in 1621, and the war reopened with increased bitterness. There was
at first little hope of winning decisive victories on the land front, but
sea war and attacks upon the Spanish colonies had proved so profit-
able that the Dutch resumed them with zest. They at once took up
the threat that had extorted peace from Spain in 1609, and con-
centrated their efforts against the American colonies in tike hands of
a single great West India Company organised to follow the same
methods as their East India Company was employing against the
1 Common? Journals, i, 487.
THE BREACH WITH SPAIN i4I
Portuguese. Efforts were made to secure the assistance of other Powers
by the promise of high profits, but neither England nor France could
be persuaded to take action. The States did not relinquish their plan
and awaited a more propitious moment that was not long delayed.
In October 1623 Prince Charles and Buckingham returned from
their Madrid adventure determined on wax with Spain and they
soon forced the King to abandon his old policy. Buckingham placed
himself at the head of the war party, and the country welcomed the
change with enthusiasm. When Parliament was summoned in
February 1624 to tear a formal account of the breaking-off of the
Spanish marriage treaties, it at once appeared that the policy of
Elizabeth's time had not been forgotten. During the years of peace
the supporters of colonising schemes at the expense of Spain had been
frowned upon and checked, but now their advocates like Warwick
were in the ascendant, and at Buckingham's instigation theirs was
the policy commended to the Commons by Sir Benjamin Rudyerd,
the spokesman for the Government. Plans for the recovery of the
Palatinate by war in Germany were put in the background, and it
was determined to use land forces only on a limited scale for the
assistance of the Dutch in Flanders and Brabant. According to
Elizabethan precedent the war was to be one of limited liability, and
effort was to be directed to the stimulation of privateering attacks
upon Spanish commerce and against the islands and towns of the
Indies.1 The King should be petitioned, said Rudyerd, "whensoever
he intends to make wax for the Palatinate, to make it by way of
diversion to save charges, whither every younger brother that had
but £20 in his purse may go stocked for a profession and course of
life; and where the Low Countries, no doubt, will be willing and
ready to assist us for their own interest ",2 The Commons were already
convinced that this was the right policy to pursue, and it was in
the assurance of its adoption by the Government that they voted
subsidies with unwonted readiness.
The Dutch saw their opportunity and tried once more to get
English assistance for their West India Company, but they could
secure nothing more than an agreement for a defensive alliance.
In these negotiations the idea of permanent annexations in the West
Indies in place of mere raids was brought for the first time within the
range of practical politics, for the Dutch offered the inducement to
England that all conquests that were made jointly should be left in
English occupation. Early in the session of 1624 the Commons con-
sidered a project for the formation of a West India Association regu-
lated and established by Act of Parliament, and thenceforward for
twenty years it was repeatedly advanced as the best means of bringing
about the downfall of Spanish power and adding to English wealth.
i See Gardiner, S. R., Hist, of England, v, 190.
* St. Pap. Dom., Jas. I, cue, no. 8.
r42 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
Rudyerd spoke strongly in its favour and claimed that it was the best
way "to cut the King of Spain at the root and seek to impeach or
supplant him in the West IndieS This will be a means not only
to save but to fill his Majesty's coffers, . . .for the sea-war will chiefly
be made at the charge of the subject".1 The idea of a joint association
had few attractions, however, for the dissensions between the rival
Dutch and English East India Companies were notorious; the Dutch
seemed to get the better of every bargain, and the news of their evil
usage of their English competitors in the "massacre" of Amboyna in
February 1623 kac* lately arrived in England, where it was long to
be remembered. However, in September 1625 an offensive and de-
fensive alliance was concluded "for the purpose of attacking the
King of Spain in open war in all his realms . . .in all places, on this
side and beyond the line, by land and sea". Trade with the Spanish
dominions was forbidden, and detailed provisions were laid down
concerning contraband and the taking of prizes.2 French, English and
Dutch privateers were once more let loose against the commerce and
oversea possessions of Spain and her Portuguese dependency, with
small effects on European politics, it is true, but with lasting results
in the West Indies. The opportunities for profitable war on the
Elizabethan scale were over, for the Spaniards had learned how to
defend their occupied territories on the mainland and in the larger
islands against any attacks not on a large scale. Even the Dutch with
their powerful organised Company could get no permanent footing
in Brazil where they made their greatest efforts, and the English
Government had its hands too full elsewhere to undertake any
operations in the Caribbean. The war therefore dwindled into an
affair of sporadic privateering, and the "gentlemen of fortune" of
Drake's day were succeeded by rough "buccaneers"8 who led a
precarious, roving life and were a terror to- honest mariners of all
nations alike.
Though privateering was no longer profitable, a new era of tropical
exploitation began with the Guiana attempts. North and the other
founders of the Amazons Company in 1619 emphasised the planting
of crops as their main purpose, and not the search for gold mines or
the conquest of rich kingdoms. Practical men who knew the Indies
realised that, if they were to make profits, they must raise marketable
products by their own exertions. Since Indian labour in any of the
unoccupied regions was unreliable and difficult to obtain, the planting
must be carried on by imported labourers. The most easily raised crop
was tobacco, as the Virginians had found ; the planters on the Amazon
and in Guiana, both Dutch and English, had worked hard at it for
1 A Speech concerning a West India Association by Sir B. Rudyerd (Lend. 1641). Extracts in
Stock, L. F., Proc. and Debs, in Parliament, i, 61-3.
2 Davenport, pp. 290-9.
8 7.0. those who prepared bo wan, the dried meat of wild cattle.
THE FIRST SETTLEMENT OF ST CHRISTOPHER 143
some ten or twelve years before the war, and with the change of
circumstances they sought fresh opportunities. The suppression of the
Amazons Company in 1620 did not bring the enterprise of its ob-
scurer promoters to an end; they continued their efforts clandestinely
and concealed them, so far as they could, both from the English
officials and from the spies of the Spanish ambassador.1 The number
of English, Irish and Dutch Plantations in the delta had become so
large in 1623 that the Spanish Government gave urgent orders for
their suppression. None of the settlements was strong enough to offer
much resistance, and the planters were either scattered or killed or
carried off to Pard as prisoners.2 The survivors determined to try
elsewhere, more out of the way of their enemy's arms, and among
them was Thomas Warner, the first pioneer of English colonisation
in the West Indian islands. Before we consider his work, we must
refer briefly to Roger North's later attempts in Guiana.
The plans to seize Spanish territory that had been prohibited under
James I appeared under his son as commendable efforts against the
enemy. Robert Harcourt and Roger North joined forces for a new
venture, and in 1627 they were granted a new patent of incorporation
for a "Company for the Plantation of Guiana" under the governor-
ship of the Duke of Buckingham himself. But the merchants for the
most part stood aside, and from the beginning the Company suffered
from a lack of funds. The planters in the delta had to face repeated
attacks from the Portuguese, while the colonists on the Wiapoco fell
victims to the unhealthy climate. After 1631 English activities
in Guiana came to an end, though the Company apparently still
lingered on in 1638.*
These unsuccessful Guiana adventures are worthy of remembrance
mainly because they led to the beginnings of the first English colonies
in the Caribbees. Thomas Warner, a Suffolk man, had gone out to
Guiana with North's colonists in 1620 to begin planting, but found
the conditions so disturbed and precarious that he stayed only for
two seasons. On his way back to England he explored the possi-
bilities of some of the islands of the Lesser Antilles and fixed upon the
island of St Christopher among the Leeward Islands as best suited
for his purpose. It had never been occupied by the Spaniards and was
not easily approachable from the centres of their power in the Carib-
bean owing to the steady trade wind from the north-east. Warner
managed to obtain financial backing from certain London merchants
of the lesser sort, and returned to St Christopher to settle in 1623.
The island proved well suited for the raising of tobacco, and natural
foodstuffs were so abundant that the settlers were not much troubled
with the initial difficulties of the first settlers in Virginia. Shortly after
1 Col. St. Pap. Venetian* 1622-3, p. 425.
8 See Williamson, J. A., The English in Guiana, pp. 99-106.
3 Ibid, chaps, v and vi.
144 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
Warner's expulsion of the natives a party of French privateers under
D'Esnambuc arrived, and the parties joined forces for safety against
an expected Garib raid. After some difficulties the island was parcelled
out between the English and the French, and their respective leaders
returned home for farther support1
Meanwhile another pioneer, Sir William Courteen, was taking
action in the West Indian field. As a partner in the great Anglo-
Dutch trading firm of Gourteen Brothers of Middelburg and London
he had taken a share in Dutch mercantile and planting ventures in
South America. Immediately after the accession of Charles I he made
application for a grant of all the undiscovered "lands in the south
parts of the world called Terra australis incognita extending eastwards
and westwards from the Straits of Le Maire", the passage to the
south of Tierra del Fuego discovered by the Dutch a few years be-
fore.2 But Courteen did not proceed with this application, for he
found a more promising field of operations. One of his captains,
John Powell, returning from a trading voyage to Brazil in 1624 ^a(i
touched at a beautiful island lying to the east of the general chain of
the Windward Islands which he found unoccupied and very suitable
for planting. Barbados, as we now call it, was comparatively little
known and was sometimes confused by geographers with the islands
of the Windward Group or with legendary islands of the Atlantic that
had no real existence.8 Powell landed and took formal possession of
the island in the name of "James, King of England and this Island".
On his way home he called at St Christopher, and there his sailors
incautiously spoke of their find to Warner's colonists. The sequel
was a dispute that caused trouble for many years. Courteen at once
took up the idea of planting Barbados in earnest, and provided the
funds by a small syndicate. Before the close of 1628 some sixteen
hundred colonists had been sent out and about £10,000 had been
expended. Houses and a fort were built and planting began in such
systematic fashion that large cargoes of tobacco were sent home.
Others were at work in a different way. Warner returned to
England from St Christopher in the late summer of 1625 in order to
obtain official recognition of what he had done in an island that the
Spaniards certainly considered as belonging to them. When he first
settled there he held no commission, and he and his colonists were
legally pirates. He wanted to safeguard himself, but he probably had
also some notion of forestalling Courteen in Barbados* He and his
merchant backers therefore tried to get the patronage at court that
was necessary if anything was to be done, and they obtained it from the
Kong's favourite courtier, James Hay, Earl of Carlisle. In September
1 625 a commission was granted to Warner taking his Plantation under
1 See Williamson, J. A., The Caribbee Islands under the Proprietary Patents.
* St. Pap. Dom., Ghas. I, xiv, no. 33.
8 Newton, A. P., The Colonising Actonties of the English Puritans, pp. 132-4.
CONFLICTING GRANTS OF BARBADOS 145
the royal protection and naming him governor for the King in the
four islands of St Christopher, Nevis, "Barbados" and Montserrat.
No proprietary rights were granted, but the position of the colonists
was properly established upon a legal basis. There was later much
dispute as to whether the terms of this original grant referred to the
island of Barbuda near St Christopher in the Leeward Islands or to
the real Barbados, but when Courteen's settlers had shown the worth
of the latter island, there was no hesitation on Carlisle's part in
backing Warner's contention that they were trespassers without
rights.
The Lord Proprietor took little personal part in the schemes that
were carried on in his name, but looked upon them merely as an
additional means of finding money. The real movers were the London
financiers who were familiar with the method of working under the
shadow of some person with court influence, for it was constantly
employed in dealing with profitable royal grants. The proprietary
system of colonisation in the West Indies in fact derived its motive-
power from the merchant class that was so potent in the foundation
of Virginia and Bermuda. Carlisle was the patron of two syndicates,
the one operating in St Christopher and the Leeward Islands and the
other in Barbados.
Acting on Warner's information, the Carlisle syndicates obtained
from the Crown in July 1627 a grant of letters patent making the earl
proprietor of all the islands commonly called "Caribees Islands"
lying between 10 degrees and 20 degrees north latitude.1 The
principal of them, beginning with St Christopher, were enumerated
in rough order from Grenada northwards to Sombrero, and they
included both "Barbidas" and "Barbado". Courteen -was also
taking steps to procure a court patron for his enterprise, and in
February 1628 on the consideration that he had expended money
in transporting men to the islands, there was issued to Philip, Earl of
Montgomery, afterwards Earl of Pembroke, a grant of Trinidad,
Tobago, Barbados and "Fonseca alias St Bernard" lying between
8 and 13 degrees of north latitude to be called "Provincia Mont-
gomeria".2 The two grants overlapped and Barbados was granted in
both, but as soon as Carlisle and his backers learned of the issue of
the Montgomery patent, they hastened to press the King for its can-
cellation as far as Barbados was concerned. Their efforts succeeded,
and on 7 April 1628 a fresh patent8 was issued to the earl reciting his
previous grant and bestowing the Caribbee Islands on him in such a
detailed way as to preclude all doubt. Barbados was mentioned with
four aliases and Barbuda with three, so that the claims of Courteen
and Montgomery were unmistakably set aside, and Carlisle was fully
recognised as Lord Proprietor. As the steps he took to establish his
i Pat. Roll, 3 Gar. I, p. 31, no. 15. • Pat. Roll, 3 Gar. I, p. 30, no. i.
* Pat. Roll, 4 Gar. I, p. 6, no. 4.
10
GHBEI
146 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
control belong to the second part of our period, they will be considered
later.
In 1629 a Spanish fleet cleared out the colonists from Nevis and
St Christopher, but they returned as soon as it sailed. The war lingered
on indecisively from 1626 to 1629, ^ut Spain was exhausted and had
long been anxious to make peace. Negotiations were attempted as early
as 1627 without success owing to Charles's unacceptable demands; by
1629 he was ready to agree to any terms he could get, even though
they involved a disgracefiil alliance against the Dutch with whom we
hadbeenassociatedforseventy years. The public treaty was concluded
at Madrid on 5/15 November 1630^ and the secret anti-Dutch alliance
on 12 January 1 63 1,2 but the negotiations had been so involved and so
mixed with verbal assurances and reservations on both sides, that
the words of the agreed articles really meant very little. The pro-
visions of the Treaty of Madrid did little more than revive those of the
Treaty of London of 1 604, the Spaniards merely restoring the freedom
of English commerce with their dominions as stipulated in that
treaty.8 But the Spanish commissioners avowed that they did not
intend to question the English navigation to the East Indies, and
promised that if Charles would agree not to trade in certain specified
harbours possessed by the Portuguese, they would "capitulate a free
navigation not only into those seas but to the coast of America also,
particularly allowing the plantations of Virginia and others".4 Their
design was to induce the English to act against the Dutch colony
of New Netherland, but Charles was too weak for that or any
other warlike enterprise. The English negotiators abandoned their
old contention that there was "no peace beyond the line", and for
the first time they agreed to an article extending the peace to the
regions beyond the "lines of amity" after an interval of nine months
to permit of the proclamation of the treaty.5 In 1629-30 the long
struggle for oceanic power seemed in fact to have petered out.
England and Spain, once the principal combatants, were too com-
pletely exhausted to fight any longer. Only France and the Dutch
were the gainers, for the one was rapidly acceding to Spain's former
position of pre-eminence among the Powers, while the other had won
the carrying trade of the world and a seemingly unchallengeable
mastery of colonial markets.
English colonial enterprise in North America was not, as in the
West Indies, directly affected by the war with Spain, but it was pro-
foundly influenced by the increasingly bitter disputes and struggles
of the last years of James I. We saw in an earlier chapter that Guy's
Newfoundland Company met with devastating opposition from the
fishermen and that in 1618 petitions were presented to the Privy
THE COUNCIL OF NEW ENGLAND 147
Council complaining of it as a grievance. Sir Francis Bacon, who had
long been particularly interested in the fisheries, was now the leading
member in the Government. Captain John Smith's book in praise
of New England and its fisheries1 disposed him to consider favourably
suggestions for the consolidation oif an English monopoly in those
regions such as Guy and his associates had failed to secure in the
international fishing grounds off Newfoundland. The initiative was
taken by Sir Ferdinando Gorges who proposed to revive the moribund
North Virginia Company. Smith had been trying hard for some time
to get subscriptions for a colonising company for New England, but
he complained that "one might as well try to hew rocks with oyster
shells" as to induce merchants to furnish funds for such an under-
taking. The Virginia Company had never paid a dividend, the
Newfoundland Company had lost all its capital, and Gorges pointed
out with truth that " men could not be drawn to adventure in actions
of that kind where they were assured of loss and small hopes of gain".2
English colonisation was still in the early experimental stage, and it
was quite uncertain what form of organisation would best accomplish
the desired purpose. As the reorganisation of the London Company
in 1609 on the lines of a trading company seemed to some extent to
have been responsible for its troubles, the Privy Council decided
instead to revive something like the organisation of the 1606 charter.
In November 1620 a patent was issued granting the territory in
North America between 40 and 48 degrees north to a body designed to
promote colonising efforts. The Lord High Admiral, Buckingham, was
appointed President of "The Council established at Plymouth in the
County of Devon for the Planting, Ruling, Ordering and Governing
of New England in America ", \fchich was composed of forty persons of
honour or gentlemen of blood and a few merchants, all nominated by
the Crown.8 Exclusive monopoly of trade and fishery was granted
in their territory and the seas adjoining, together with the right to
collect fees for licences and to expel intruders. Both Southampton and
Warwick were among " the patentees and counsellors for the managing
of the business by whose favours the royal charter was granted",
but the moving spirit was Gorges, who at once set to work to compel
the western fishing merchants to take up licences for their voyages to
the profitable new fishing grounds and with the funds so derived to
send out colonists to the mainland.
The issue of the patent at once aroused an outcry from the fisher-
men as an infringement of the rights of free fishing that had been
guaranteed to them ever since the reign of Edward VI. * Sir Edwin
Sandys, the new treasurer of the Virginia Company, voiced the
1 Smith, John, Description of New England (1616); Neva England's Trials (1620).
1 Gorges, F., Brief Narration (Gollns. of Maine Hist. Soc.), n, 35.
1 Printed in Hazard, Hist. Collections, i, 103.
* By Act of Parl., a Ed. VI, c. 6.
10-2
i48 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
opposition in Parliament on the ground that the exclusive grant was
harmful to the interests of the colony that was already established.
In April 1 62 1 he introduced a bill for the free liberty of fishing voyages
to the sea-coasts of Newfoundland, Virginia and other coasts of
America, and opened a debate of great interest.1 In its course not
only was the "great patent" for New England attacked, but also the
pretensions of Whitbourne and Mason to make their colonies in New-
foundland centres from which to preserve order among the fishermen
of all nations by virtue of their commissions of vice-admiralty. John
Guy, now member for Bristol, strongly opposed the bill as preventing
any possibility of colonisation either in New England or Newfound-
land. But the sense of the House was as much opposed to him as it
was to Secretary Galvert, the spokesman for the Government. He
raised an important constitutional point, for he maintained that as
the bill concerned America, it was beyond the competence of the
House.2 When the members continued the discussion in spite of his
protest, the Secretary strongly supported a proviso brought forward
by Guy to safeguard the rights of planters. Matters stood over during
the prorogation, but the agitation did not subside. Gorges went on
with his demands for fees from the fishermen, and in June 1621 the
first land grant for a plantation in New England was made to the
representative of the Mayflower Pilgrims who had gone out in the
previous year, and whose story we consider later. When the session
was resumed, the Commons summoned Gorges to appear before
them and bring up the obnoxious patent. He refused to produce the
document as a matter beyond his power, but he gave evidence that
the council's main purpose was the furtherance of plantation and
that they were open to compromise regarding the fisheries. Galvert
pointedly warned the House that, unless the interests of the planters
were properly safeguarded, the bill would not receive the royal
assent, but the fishing interest was too strong, and Guy's proviso was
decisively rejected. This speech of the Secretary of State is suggestive
as indicating a direct interest of the Privy Council in balancing the
claims of contending parties. The traditional version has blamed the
King for decisions with which he had little to do, and has attributed
to him a narrow desire to oppress his subjects for his own benefit.
In reality, in this as in the other difficult colonial questions with which
they were trying to cope at the same time, the ministers had a sounder
appreciation of the national interest than most of their critics. Their
grasp of the problems was imperfect, and they were forced to ex-
periment in an unknown field, but even thus early we can see dimly
some attempt to search for a sound imperial policy. The members
from the west of England resolutely protested that any and every
colony in Newfoundland and New England alike was harmful to the
interests of the English fisheries and should be prevented, and they
1 Stock, L. F., Debates, i, 39. » Common* Journals, i, 6a6.
THE TOBACCO CONTRACT 149
persuaded the House of Commons to pass the bill for free fishing in
its most uncompromising form, although it was defeated in the Lords
where the advocates of colonisation were stronger. The matter was
regarded by the Commons as in the forefront of the grievances that
precipitated the quarrel with the King over free speech and led to
the abrupt dissolution of Parliament in 1621.
Parties were differently aligned on the other acute colonial question
of the time, the importation of tobacco, for here the private interests
of Sandys and his friends favoured the setting up of a strict and
exclusive monopoly. The Privy Council began to give close attention
to the tobacco question in 1619, and thenceforward for a quarter of a
century discussions and negotiations between the various interests
concerned were both incessant and intricate. The controversy1 was
really at the centre of a prolonged series of experiments in economic
statecraft. The colonies were newcomers in the body politic, and
Englishmen had to find gradually by a process of trial and error the
way to construct a new economic system to include them. The King's
subjects, whether at home or overseas, had a like right to look to him
and his Government for measures to foster their prosperity. They
were all parts of the realm that he had sworn to govern well. In 1 62 1
the Crown consented to prohibit the growing of tobacco in England
and Ireland, but required in return that the colonists should bring
all their tobacco to England for sale. The importation of Spanish
tobacco was greatly restricted or forbidden in order to leave the
market clear. Thus English consumers had to pay high prices for an
inferior article to foster the interests of the planters, but Virginia was
never satisfied. When the new English colonies were settled in the
West Indies repeated petition was made that all tobacco-growing
should be prohibited there, though without success until sugar came
to replace it after 1640.
The troubles over the tobacco contract in 1621-2 added fuel to the
fires of faction that were raging in the Virginia and Bermuda Com-
panies, and Sandys and his friends were unmeasured in the accusa-
tions of corrupt practices that they heaped upon their rivals and
government officials alike.2 They showed no scruples in suppressing
complaints from Virginia that would be damaging to their manage-
ment and in editing the official records of proceedings to favour their
arguments.
The results of the Southampton-Sandys regime were of great im-
portance in the political field, as will be seen later, but this could not
be realised at the time. In the economic field they fell so lamentably
short of the promises that had been held out that the Privy Council
was obliged at last to take action, in much the same way as in the case
1 See Beer, Origins, chap. iv. .
* See Scott, W. R., Joint Stock Companies, n, 271 seqq.; Osgood, H. L., American Colomes
in the Seventeenth, Century, m, 41-53.
I5o THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
of later chartered companies. It was moved by the news of the
most serious calamity that Virginia had suffered. The colonists had
generally lived in peace with the Indians whose hunting grounds lay
upon the borders of their scattered settlements, but on Good Friday,
22 March 1622, wax parties of the tribes suddenly descended on the
plantations with fire and slaughter. Scores of the outlying houses
were burned, great numbers of cattle were destroyed, and 347 persons
were killed with all the atrocities of Indian warfare.1 As this was about
a quarter of all the white inhabitants in Virginia the blow was
crushing. The survivors were left in grievous straits, but the ruling
faction in the Company did little to relieve them or to give informa-
tion to the public of what had happened. Nathaniel Butler, late
Governor of Bermuda, shocked the authorities with a highly coloured
account of the conditions he had found prevailing in Virginia, and
Warwick and Smythe appealed to the Grown for a commission of
enquiry. It was declared that of the 10,000 persons who had been
shipped to the colony less than a fifth part survived in a desperate
condition, so that there was danger that "other nations would term
Virginia a slaughter house both odious to ourselves and contemptible
to all the world".2
Things had come to such a pass that an enquiry was obviously in
the public interest, and in April 1623 a strong commission was ap-
pointed including various respected men of affairs who had had
experience of plantations in Ireland. At the same time a special
committee of the Privy Council was appointed to consider the reform
of the government of Virginia, and the appointment of the three lords
(Grandison, Chichester and Garew) who had had most experience
in governing Ireland indicates the direction in which precedents were
sought for fiiture action. The report of the commission of enquiry
showed that the affairs of the Company had been badly mismanaged
by the Southampton-Sandys administration and that the colony was
suffering severely. In 1618, when Smythe resigned the treasurership,
there were more than 1000 persons in Virginia and 4000 emigrants
had since been sent, but in 1623 onty about 1200 remained, the rest
having perished. On such a showing alone it was clear that something
must be done, and the Privy Council proceeded to demand the sur-
render of the charter with a view to the assumption by the Crown of
more direct responsibility for the government and probably the con-
fining of the Company to private functions. Many of the members
were in favour of compliance, but Sandys and his allies were entirely
recalcitrant, and, being in possession, they denied to the mass of the
shareholders any opportunity of voting. The Council therefore in
November 1623 entered upon the regular legal course of a suit of
1 Neill, E. D., Virginia Company, pp. 307-2 1 ; narrative in Smith John, Works, pp. 573-94.
» Butter,N., The Unmasked Face of our Colon? in Virginia as it was in fa Winter of fayear
1623, printed in Records of Vd. Co. n, 374-6.
Q1LJARRELS IN THE VIRGINIA COMPANY 151
quo warranto for the annulment of the charter and it ended in favour
of the Crown's contention.
When Parliament met in February 1624 Sandys attempted to carry
the Virginia case directly into the political arena. In April 1624,
Nicholas Ferrar, his principal lieutenant, presented a petition to the
House of Commons setting forth their case. Ferrar practically in-
vited the members to take their side against the Crown in the dispute,
as they had done in the controversy over free fishing with the New
England Council. But the sense of the House was distinctly against
any such interference, and the petition was referred for examination
to a committee including members of both factions.1 The Govern-
ment was not prepared to have the acrimonious dispute fought over
again, and the House welcomed with a sense of relieP a message from
the King stating that he was taking steps for the better government
of Virginia and desiring the Commons not to proceed.3 The course
taken was certainly the best to fit the immediate circumstances,
but incidentally it marked again the view of constitutional propriety
expressed by Secretary Calvert in 1621 that the affairs of the King's
dominions in America lay beyond the province of the English Parlia-
ment.
The revocation of the charter only terminated the Company's
governmental functions, and it was allowed to continue as a trading
corporation. It tried to carry on till about 1632, but the whole of the
capital of more than £200,000 that had been subscribed since 1606
was irremediably lost, the Company was bankrupt, and it finally
disappeared. The commission of enquiry into the affairs of the Somers
Islands Company reported more favourably, and it was allowed to
continue its administration. Many of the Bermuda colonists left the
islands after 1625 to pass to new colonies in the West Indies,4 and
those who remained settled down to an obscure and uneventfiil life.
The existence of the chartered Company continued<*until 1684 when
upon its own motion it was allowed to surrender its functions to the
Crown,5
The change of government made no alteration in the legal position
of the colonists in Virginia, but rather afforded them security against
excessive interference. The transfer, in feet, aided in the gradual
growth of confidence, and the prosperity of Virginia began to in-
crease steadily. Immediately after the massacre of 1622 the popu-
lation numbered only 894 persons,6 but by 1636 it had risen to over
6000. The excessive rate of mortality was checked, and Virginia
1 Stock, Proc. and Debates, 1,63-8.
» Col. St. Pap. Col., Am. and W. I. 1574-1660, p. 61. Chamberlain to Carleton, 30 April
1624-
8 St. Pap. Dom., Jas. I, CLxm, no. 71.
4 See Newton, A. P., Colonising Activities of the English Puritans, chap.
5 Lefroy, J. H., Memorials of the Bermudas, n, 527-41-
• Brown, A., First Republic in America, p. 464.
i52 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
received her full share of new settlers from the great flow of emigra-
tion that marked the years of Charles Fs personal government.
Meanwhile after Smythe's displacement, clear signs appeared that
the despotic commercial management of the colony, under which the
settlers were treated like labourers on a detached English estate, must
give place to one in which they would at least share in framing
decisions on their local concerns. The new administration had a free
hand, and to remove the grievances of monopolist government it
turned to the parliamentary methods in which it trusted. It
desired to elicit the full co-operation of the colonists in carrying out
its policy, and one of its first decisions was to summon a General
Assembly in Virginia to consist of the council of state and two bur-
gesses chosen by the planters or freeholders from each town, hundred
or other particular plantation. An instruction to this effect was sent
out by the new governor, Sir George Yeardley, and the first Assembly
was convoked in the church at James Town in July I6I9-1 The
union of the separate districts as parts of one colony government was
thus assured and the first offspring of the ancient Mother of Parlia-
ments came into being. It was followed by the summoning of a
similar Assembly in 1620. The Somers Islands Company also directed
its governor to call the colonists into council at the same date,2
and the Bermuda Assembly thus convoked has an uninterrupted
connection with the island legislature of to-day.
The acts of the Virginia Assembly were sent to England to be
considered by the Company in 1620, but the result has not been
recorded; the second Assembly sat in 1621 and the third in 1624 just
before the Company's charter was resumed. The first list of acts that
has been preserved comes from this third Assembly and the acts mostly
relate to the organisation of local government and to economic
matters. One important echo of current political controversies in
England appears: The sole taxing power of the General Assembly was
affirmed, and it was declared that no taxes should be laid in the
province except by its authority or expended except as it should
direct.8 When Sir Francis Wyat was sent out as the first royal governor
of Virginia in 1624, he received instructions to continue the Assembly
in the same form as in Yeardley's time, and the burgesses were given
free power to consult and conclude on matters concerning the public
weal of the province and to enact general laws for its government.
Thus the assumption by the Crown of direct control involved no re-
striction of the political liberties of the colonists, but rather placed
them on a more secure and permanent footing.
While the troubles over Virginia were at their height Sir Ferdi-
nando Gorges was pushing on his northern schemes. Theoretically
the grant to the Council of New England covered the whole coast
1 Osgood, i, 912. 2 Lefroy, Mems. of Bermudas, i.
8 Hening, Statutes qf Virginia, i, 121 ; Osgood, i, 96.
SCOTTISH COLONIAL SCHEMES 153
between Newfoundland and Virginia, but the Dutch set a southern
limit by the foundation of their colony of New Amsterdam at the
mouth of the Hudson River in 1621. The grant of the site of New
Plymouth to John Pierce in June 1621 on behalf of the Mayflower
Pilgrims1 was the first assignment of lands by the new council, and the
next was to one of the King's old followers, Sir William Alexander, who
was projecting a colony of Scotsmen. His interest in colonising schemes
was aroused by Captain Mason who had been governor of Guy's
colony in Newfoundland and wrote thence in 1617 to a friend in
Edinburgh to commend it as a place of settlement for the Scotsmen
who were then flocking over to the new plantations in Ulster.2
Alexander's grant of September 1621 covered the whole northern
part of the territory assigned to the New England Council, which he
called "New Scotland" and divided with his friend Sir Robert
Gordon of Lochinvar who proposed to found a colony of "New
Galloway" in Cape Breton Island. Small expeditions with a few
emigrants were sent out by Alexander at his own expense in 1622-3,
but they had no success.
Scattered parties of settlers went out from time to time to various
places on the New England coast and met with uniform failure, and
the only real colony before 1629 was *bat at Plymouth. There has
been a tendency among historians of the period to belittle the efforts
of Gorges and his coadjutors and to attribute their failure to the in-
competence of the court party, possibly with the unconscious aim
of showing the success of the Puritans in sharper relief. They class
the formation of the New England Council among measures of Stuart
"tyranny", whereas, if we look beyond the boundaries of a single
area and consider what was happening elsewhere at the time,
it appears rather as an experiment in the unexplored art of managing
distant dependencies. The failure of the early attempts both in Maine
and in Newfoundland was really attributable to the trouble over the
fisheries and to lack of consistent financial support. The association of
the names of well-known courtiers with the New England Council
does not warrant us in attributing its failure to a court party any-
more than the success of St Christopher and Barbados can be attri-
buted to the Earl of Carlisle, the most prominent courtier of his time.
In reality, the most active noblemen associated with the work of the
Council, like Lords Warwick, Brooke and Saye, were identified in the
political struggle with the party of opposition. Most of the other men
of rank who lent their names, like Hamilton, Lindsey and Goring,
did so in pursuit of a passing fashion.
The projectors and patrons of most of the colonising schemes of the
time were neither persistent enough nor, which is more important, able
to furnish the regular supplies of capital that were necessary. The only
1 See "Records of the Council of New England", Proc. of Arm. Antiq. Soc. April 1866,
PP- 91-93- * Published in 1620 as A Brief Discourse of the New-found-land.
154 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
persons with ready money at command were the merchants who, as
a rule, cared little for ideas such as attracted the projectors. In the
early days of Virginia and Bermuda Smythe was willing for the sake
of his ideas to wait long for his profits, but he was unique both in the
amplitude of his resources and the breadth of his views. The mer-
chants at the back of the West Indian ventures were willing to con-
tinue providing capital because they could look for profits on the sale
of tobacco and by supplying goods to the planters. In the same way
the men who kept Virginia and Bermuda going were not those who
wrangled in the courts of the companies, but those who supplied the
magazines and took the planters' produce in payment. In New
England and Newfoundland the interests of the merchants concerned
were directed not towards colonisation, but to the fishing andfur trades
to which a resident population was inimical. The great majority of
the fishing merchants were determined, if they could, to carry on their
business in the traditional way and to keep the shores as drying grounds
during the summer season. The disputes over free fishing were fatal
to the schemes of the colonisers. Merchants gave little credit to their
promises of profit, and could find better use for their money elsewhere.
The better class of emigrants would not readily go to places where
it was notorious that they would be faced with the hostility of large
numbers of unruly fishermen, and New England had therefore to
await a new and more potent colonising motive than that of profit.
Alexander's expeditions to Nova Scotia were regarded by France
as an infringement of her right of prior occupation, and in 1624 she
protested to James I against the trespass of his subjects in the penin-
sula.1 But the protest was disregarded, and the King tried to aid
Alexander by following a precedent employed in the plantation of
Ulster. To further the enterprise an order of "Knights Baronets of
Nova Scotia" was founded for those who would send out settlers and
pay heavy subscriptions to the funds. The outbreak of war with
France set on foot other enterprises to seize the fur trade and to
profit by attacking Champlain's little colony on the St Lawrence.
The story of this first English conquest of Canada will be told in a
later volume,2 and we can here say only that on 29 August 1629
Ghamplain was forced to surrender the fortress of Quebec to an
expedition organised by David Kirke, a privateering merchant of
mixed English and French descent;8 a few weeks previously Scottish
colonists had landed in Gape Breton Island and Alexander's men had
occupied the settlement of Port Royal. The whole of the territory in
French occupation in North America had therefore fallen into
British hands. But meanwhile affairs at home had taken a turn that
was fatal to Kirke's ambitions.
1 See Insh, G. P., Scottish Colonial Schemes, 1620-88, pp. 212-13.
2 See vol. vi.
8 See Kirke, H., The First Efiglisk Conquest of Canada.
TREATY OF ST GERMAIN-EN-LAYE 155
The French war had been marked by a series of disgraceful failures
and Charles was utterly without means to fight further. The nation
had lost interest even in the war with Spain and men's thoughts were
more and more concentrated on the domestic quarrels in Church and
Parliament. Richelieu, anxious to free his hands for the struggle with
Spain over the Mantuan inheritance, was ready to make peace on
easy terms. On 14/24 April 1629, therefore, a treaty between the
two Powers was signed at Susa. Almost all debatable questions were
postponed for further discussion, but it was agreed that while prizes
made before the peace should be retained, those taken after an interval
of two months from its conclusion should be restored.1
Richelieu was paying especial attention at this time to commercial
and colonial affairs and he would not acquiesce in the retention of
Canada and Acadia by Great Britain. Kirke's and Alexander's
occupation had undoubtedly begun after the lapse of the period of
two months9 grace stipulated in the Treaty of Susa and though
the words of the article ostensibly referred only to ships captured
as prizes, they could also be read to include establishments on
shore. The Scottish colonists in Cape Breton Island had been
defeated and brought captive to France very soon after their landing,
but Kirke was firmly in possession at Quebec and Sir William
Alexander's Scots at Port Royal. On the other hand the French had
not yet paid over the whole of the dowry of Qjieen Henrietta Maria,
and they retained two rich English prizes which had been captured
and brought to Dieppe while carrying negro slaves for Sir Nicholas
Crisp from Guinea to the American plantations. The negotiations for
an accommodation were long drawn out, but ultimately the French
succeeded in their demands and by the Treaty of St Germain-en-
Laye (19/29 March i632)2 mutual restitution was agreed upon.
Quebec and Port Royal were handed over to the French com-
manders, and the first English occupation of Canada was at an end.
Little interest was taken in the transaction by the general public, but
Kirke and his associates were loud in their outcry against the in-
justice that they claimed had been done and before long they tried
again in Newfoundland.8
In reality it would have been impossible for England to have re-
tained the conquests without the danger of a fresh breach with
France, which Charles was in no position to contemplate. An ill-
conceived and ill-directed foreign policy had placed England in an
inferior position wherever she had to face the competition of other
colonising Powers. Luckily the progress of the Empire was not de-
pendent upon governmental support; at the very moment when
English prestige in Europe had sunk to its lowest point, in the field
of colonisation individual enterprise became more active than ever
1 Art. 7 of Treaty of Susa: Davenport, p. 364. • Davenport, pp. 31^23.
. 181.
156 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
before. New motives were at work that owed little to high policy but
sprang wholly from domestic conditions. They brought about the
settlement of colonies of a new sort with results of profound import-
ance for England and the world.
Upon the details of the founding of New England it is not necessary
to dwell at length. For our purpose it is of more importance to
emphasise certain aspects of it that were of lasting consequence.
Though the great majority of Englishmen conformed to the settle-
ment of the Church as established by the Act of Uniformity, there
were small groups scattered here and there who desired to go much
further in the direction of reform and would not acquiesce in even the
mildest episcopal control. We showed earlier how such a group of
Brownists proposed to sail to America with Captain Charles Leigh in
1596 and how the design ended in failure. Many other little parties
of separatists left England under Elizabeth and James I to escape the
reach of authority, and they mostly fled to the Netherlands. In 1607
such an independent congregation from Scrooby in Nottinghamshire,
without licence from the authorities,1 were led oversea by their
pastor, the Rev. John Robinson, and William Brewster. They es-
tablished themselves first in Amsterdam and later in Leyden, and
there for ten years they strove to keep themselves apart, much as they
had done in England. But they found the conditions round them
irksome, their religious feelings were troubled by their neighbours,
they had a hard struggle to make a living, and feared that their
children were forgetting that they were English.2 In 1617 the leaders
determined to carry their congregation to a fresh home in the New
World far from corrupting influences. But they were without suf-
ficient means to provide for transportation and to stock a colony.
They first contemplated a settlement in Guiana where they might live
by planting, but this plan was soon abandoned, and they approached
the Virginia Company for a licence to settle within the limits of its
grant but far removed from the colony round James Town. An
invitation from the Dutch to settle in their newly projected colony
at the mouth of the Hudson River was rejected as inconsistent with
their desire to remain English, and through Sir Edwin Sandys they
obtained the Virginia licence they desired. Application was made
to the Crown for governmental sanction of their project, and this was
granted without trouble, but they failed to obtain the patent they
sought to protect their separatist form of Church organisation. No
Government in that age could be expected to establish such a prece-
dent of religious toleration, but the petitioners were informally
promised that they would not be interfered with so long as they bore
themselves peaceably. So far from persecuting them, the authorities
1 For impartial surveys of the story sec Adams, J. T., Founding of New England, pp. 90-
103; Charming, E., I£st.ofU.S. i, 293-315.
* Bradford, W., Hist, of Plymouth, Plarto&on, pp. 22-4.
THE MATFLOWER PILGRIMS 157
regarded their plans benevolently, but it was difficult to obtain
financial help to carry them into effect. As was shown earlier, so
much money had been lost in colonial schemes that financiers
generally declined to help them. Luckily for the pilgrims, some of the
London fishing merchants were beginning to be interested in the New
England fur trade and fisheries and saw opportunities of profit in the
establishment of a permanent base there. A terminable joint stock was
formed to which the merchants subscribed money or stores and the
emigrants their labour, and it was agreed that after seven years the
accumulated property of the venture should be distributed pro rata
among the shareholders.
Incessant difficulties arose to delay the enterprise, and it was not
until 6 September 1620 that the first of the emigrants managed to
get away from the port of Plymouth in the Mayflower. Their pastor
Robinson was unable to go with them and John Carver was elected
governor, being succeeded on his death a few months later by
William Bradford, the historian of the colony. After a voyage of two
months and a half they came at length to the sandy shores behind
Cape Cod and landed there in the middle of November. The region
clearly lay beyond the limits of the Virginia Company whose licence
they held, but they decided to remain, and after some weeks' search
they settled on a site for the colony which they called Plymouth.
There building began on 21 December 1620. As already mentioned,
a grant of land for the settlement was obtained by John Pierce from
the Council of New England in whose jurisdiction it lay, but this was
rather for the security of the merchants who had financed the voyage
than for the benefit of the colonists, and ultimately they had to buy
Pierce out. The foundation of the Plymouth colony attracted little
notice in England, and almost the only public reference to it was in
the debate in the House of Commons on free fishing when the issue
of a patent to the settlers by the Council for New England was
quoted as one of the grievances of the fishermen.1
For ten years until the foundation of the Massachusetts Bay colony
in 1629 Plymouth with its two or three hundred settlers was by far
the largest centre of population in New England, but there were
many other attempts along the coast from Maine southwards. None
of them succeeded in establishing organised or self-supporting com-
munities because profits were lacking. In the plantation colonies
where profitable investment was possible, the planters became to a
considerable extent merely cultivators for English absentee owners,
but in Plymouth the London merchant-venturers had sold out to the
settlers and cut their losses by 1627, and from that time onward the
colony was economically self-contained. The settlers could live their
own lives, and all their efforts contributed to their own benefit. A great
sickness had recently killed off almost the entire aboriginal population
1 Vide supra, p. 148.
158 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
about Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay, so that the little settlement
was fortunately able to survive its early years without Indian attack.
Constitutionally the colony was in an entirely anomalous position,
for it could never procure a grant from the Crown giving rights of
jurisdiction. The Company derived directly from the earlier trading
enterprises with a terminable joint stock. When such attempts had
been made with the shiftless or broken men who were the usual
emigrants of the time, they had resulted in failure, but the infusion
of the religious motive provided a nucleus of settlers of determination
and self-control who could carry the colony over its initial difficulties,
and this was the new and vital factor in the experiment. The men of
strong religious conviction were, it is true, but a nucleus; among the
original 102 passengers in the Mayflower only thirty-five had belonged to
the Leyden congregation and the remainder were a very mixed company
from London who gave signs of indiscipline from the start. But the
leaders found means to control their followers even before they landed
in America, and thenceforward they never lost command. The first
permanent colony in New England owed almost everything to a
narrow group of men who could work together as a team. To quote
the words of one of them: "In these hard and difficult beginnings
they found some discontents and murmurings arise amongst some,
and mutinous speeches and carriage in others; but they were soon
quelled and overcome by the wisdom, patience and just and equal
carriage of things by the governor and better part which clave faith-
fully together in the main. "*
The steps they took were of constitutional significance, for they
gave a radically democratic basis to the colony from the start. Some
of the rougher emigrants from the London slums, sent out by the
merchants as indentured servants, knew that they were no longer
under authority when it was decided to settle beyond the boundaries
of the Virginia Company's grant, and boasted that they did not in-
tend to be ruled by anyone, but would use their own liberty. To
cope with this menace the leading colonists assembled together on
1 1 November r 620 and drew up a short written instrument modelled
on the form of a separatist Church covenant. By this "Mayflower
Compact",2 as it has been called, they agreed to combine themselves
into a civil body politic for their own preservation and to assume such
power under the King as was necessary for the framing of just laws and
equal ordinances and the appointment of competent officers. Forty-
one men signed the document and thus established a basis for the
legal authority of their government in the absence of an express com-
mission from the King. The signatories became in fact the first free-
men of a new political community, preserving their allegiance to the
English Crown and laws unimpaired, but compelled by reason of
1 Bradford, pp. 192, a.
* Facsimile from Bradford's ERstoy in Adams, J. T., op. cit. p. 93.
THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY COMPANY 159
distance to govern themselves separately* Such plantation covenants
were used in the next twenty years in the founding of many other
settlements in New England, and they provided a written fundamental
instrument of authority wherever there was no royal grant con-
ferring jurisdiction on a lord proprietor or a chartered company.
Throughout the whole of its separate existence the Plymouth colony
was a poor and struggling community, but the religious motives that
had inspired it found a wider outlet in the larger and more important
settlement that was founded ten years later on the shores of Massa-
chusetts Bay. Such a stream of emigration was attracted as England
had never seen before, and the new commonwealth rapidly became a
factor of immense importance in the development of the Empire. The
germ of the enterprise is to be found in one of the small fishing
ventures, common along the New England coast at the time, which
was started at Cape Ann in 1623 by certain merchants of the town of
Dorchester, and by 1626 seemed to have come to the usual unprofit-
able end. But the Rev. John White, the Puritan incumbent of the
parish of Holy Trinity, Dorchester, saw in the venture an opportunity
to further a project of wider import. Conditions in England were
rapidly growing unbearable to men of a certain temper, for the rift
between Crown and Parliament was daily widening and religious
dissensions becoming more acute. Puritanism and English liberty
alike seemed swamped by tyranny and ungodliness, and White
conceived no less a plan than to found a refuge for the righteous be-
yond the Atlantic and there "to raise a bulwark against the kingdom
of Antichrist which the Jesuits labour to rear up in all quarters of the
world". The Protestants of the Palatinate and La Rochdle were
already "overwhelmed and enslaved" and he urged his countrymen
"to avoid the plague while it is foreseen, and not to tarry as they did
till it overtook them".1 White exercised great influence among the
straitest sect of Puritans under the leadership of the Earl of Lincoln,
who were closely bound together by ties of friendship and inter-
marriage, and they warmly took up his plan. The Dorchester fishing
company was revived; a grant of land was obtained from the New
England Council with the assistance of the Earl of Warwick, and one
of White's parishioners, John Endicott, was sent out in September
1628 to prepare the way for those who would follow later. The number
of the supporters of the scheme grew rapidly, and on 4 March 1629
they obtained from the Crown a charter establishing "the Governor
and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England". Its pro-
visions were modelled on those of preceding chartered companies for
colonisation, with a Governor, a Court of Assistants and rules for the
holding of quarterly General Courts of all the freemen.2 According
to the Virginia and Bermuda precedents a local governor and council
1 General Considerations for Planting New England (1629).
2 Massachusetts Records (ed. Shurfleff), pp. i-ao.
160 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
were appointed by the Company to manage affairs in New England;
they established their first settlement at Salem and by the end of the
summer of 1629 the colony numbered about 300 persons.
A momentous departure from precedent was made by the Company
in England during the same summer. On 26 August 1629, *&£* much
secret debate, it was determined by the ruling members of the Com-
pany that they would transfer themselves and their families with their
belongings to Massachusetts. They resolved that "the whole Govern-
ment, together with the patent for the said Plantation, be by an order
of court legally transferred and established to remain with us and
others which shall inhabit upon the said Plantation".1 That this
resolution could be legally carried out was due to the fact that,
whether by design or otherwise, the patent departed from earlier
colonising grants since it contained no provision to secure that the
government of the Company should be carried on in England. It is
possible that the petitioners for the patent knew how the Plymouth
colonists a couple of years before had bought out their London
partners and so made themselves independent of outside interference;
there may or may not have been a positive design to secure a
like autonomy, but whatever the case, the step was of far-reaching
consequences.
John Winthrop, the newly elected governor of the Company, in
the summer of 1630 took out with him nearly a thousand emigrants
who had paid their own costs of transportation and were bound by
no financial obligations to promoters remaining behind in England.
Thenceforward with hardly a break until his death in 1 649 Winthrop
took a leading share in the government of Massachusetts, and to him
is attributable in no small degree the success of the colony. Though
the form of government that he did so much to found was one of the
main roots from which sprang the troubles of the American Revolu-
tion, Winthrop undeniably deserves to be ranked very high among
the builders of the Empire.
By the transfer of the form of government of an autonomous
trading company, and its almost insensible adaptation to the pur-
poses of civil government, the Massachusetts colony was provided with
a polity based not upon traditional and flexible English precedents
but upon a written instrument to be interpreted according to strict
legality. The promoters had no intention of founding a democracy,
though that was to be the most striking result of the colony's de-
velopment. They believed in strong government by those qualified to
exercise it, and they felt themselves divinely called to establish God's
kingdom. Hence the narrowness and aggressiveness of the ruling
clique of magistrates and clergy which from the beginning dis-
tinguished Massachusetts from other colonies. The management of
the Company's affairs and therefore the whole governing power in
1 Winthrop, R. C., Lift ofj. WMrop, i, 345.
GOVERNMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS 161
the colony was legally vested by the charter in the subscribing free-
men, but of the 2000 inhabitants in 1631 not more than twelve
possessed this qualification. A demand for a share of political rights
could not be refused to some of the leading colonists outside the
governing circle without the danger of an exodus to the unoccupied
lands of Gorges and Mason to the north. Again, some of the outlying
settlers raised objections to the payment of taxes about which they
had not been consulted, and the governing clique gave way a little
and agreed to admit a number of new freemen to the General Court,
not like subscribers to the original commercial Company, but as
citizens admitted to the franchise. Many of them in outlying settle-
ments could not attend meetings in Boston and elected deputies to
represent their particular communities. Before 1635, therefore, a
full system of parliamentary government had been evolved from
what had at first been the ordinary machinery of a joint-stock
company.1 But through all the changes the complete control of
the ruling few was never weakened, and the essential character
of the government remained that of a theocratic oligarchy.
For local purposes the settlers organised themselves by Church
covenant into a closely-knit and self-perpetuating body from which
all but the most rigid Puritans were excluded. As the colony grew,
this device for Church government was adopted in each new settle-
ment, and it produced momentous results. It derived not from English
but from continental precedents inspired by John Calvin, and it
meant that Massachusetts from the first diverged from England in
matters of religion, for worship according to the form of the English
Church was stringently forbidden, and those who practised it were
driven out. In civil matters, too, the organised congregation became
the body in which the local affairs of the community were managed.
Political rights were thus restricted to the narrow circle of Church
members, an undeniable narrowing of the usual English freehold
franchise. But the form of local government was strong and efficient
under the lead of the minister, a better educated man than the rest;
it ensured the extension of the colony not by unorganised individuals
in haphazard fashion, but by a number of community groups each
carrying with it a ready-made organisation. Englishmen emigrating
to Massachusetts became subject to a government which differed
radically from anything they had known before. Between 1629 and
1640 its population rose from less than 300 to more than 14,000, but
not more than one in every five adult males possessed full Church
membership or political rights. Religious freedom was non-existent,
for the government was infinitely more rigorous in its demands for
orthodoxy according to its own interpretation and as unsparing
in its pursuit of the unorthodox by the civil power as any English
government had been.
i Osgood, H. L., American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, vol. i, pt n, chap. i.
GHBEI
II
THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
What then attracted men to New England in such large numbers?
The answer is to be sought in its economic conditions and the oppor-
tunities it afforded to the common man. The England of the seyen-
teenth century was an agricultural country; most Englishmen lived
under rural conditions and were filled like all countrymen with land
hunger. In New England land could be had almost for the asking,
and it could be profitably cultivated in much the same way as at
home. If a man went to Virginia or the West Indies, he had to serve
a long apprenticeship under unfamiliar conditions, and even when
he had earned his freedom, he could only get land for himself by the
payment of rent. The area of the West Indian islands was so small
that all the cultivable land was rapidly taken up and newcomers were
doomed to the position of landless labourers who were dependent
upon imports even for their food. The New England township on the
other hand was almost self-sufficing, and though a newcomer had to
live hard and work hard, he was independent from the start, and
could look forward with some assurance to a modest prosperity. The
artisan could find ample room to ply his craft under vastly more
healthy conditions than medieval slums and medieval trade restric-
tions afforded. It was free land and freedom of labour that drew
men to New England, The process of migration was to some extent
selective, for the poorer and more shiftless emigrants could not pay
the expenses of their transportation and so were compelled to accept
service with the recruiting agents for the plantation colonies. Those
who were better off could pay their own passage and go where they
would. The selective process was continued when they arrived in the
colony; the more hardy and adventurous pressed out to the edge of
the settlements in search of the best land available, leaving their
weaker brethren to settle more closely in the older parts and help in
forming a well-knit society. Thus the New England pioneers had
advanced bases in America from which to carry on their conquest of
the wilderness and they were no longer dependent for supplies on the
distant home country. So there began that influence of the American
frontier in the life of the Empire which has been of profound and
lasting importance.1
The close control of the Massachusetts magistrates was irksome
even to many who shared their religious views, and it awoke in them
a desire to move further afield. The first step on the long westward
trail that was ultimately to lead to the shores of the Pacific was taken
when settlers moved inland from the coast plain towards the fertile
lands along the Connecticut River. The Dutch from Manhattan had
established trading posts there as early as 1626, and they were followed
in 1633 by certain fur-traders from Plymouth. The Massachusetts
1 See Turner, F. J., "The Significance of the Frontier in American History"; Proceedings
qf Wisconsin State Hist. Soc. 1894, pp. 79-112; "Social Forces in American History", Mag.
of Hist, xm, 117; The Frontier in American History, passim.
CONNECTICUT AND RHODE ISLAND 163
authorities declined to grant permission to join in this Indian trade,
but in 1635-6 organised congregations of newcomers from England
and older colonists trekked across the hills in search of fertile land
and formed settlements round Hartford on the middle course of the
riven The leading spirit in the movement was the Rev. Thomas
Hooker, a man of great spiritual force who had found it impossible to
agree with his ministerial brethren either in England or in Massa-
chusetts. The men of the River Towns, as the settlements were called,
had no commission either from the English Government or from the
authorities in Boston, and their only title to their lands was obtained
by nominal purchases from the neighbouring Indians.
Massachusetts strove to retain control though the new towns lay
outside the limits of her charter, but Hooker was determined to be
independent. In 1639 under his leadership the settlers organised
a formal government1 on a purely democratic basis without any re-
ligious requirements attached to the franchise, though possibly there
were practical restrictions. Hooker maintained that the foundation
of authority lies in the free consent of the people, and they alone
have the power to appoint officers and magistrates and to set bounds
and limitations to their authority. The constitution or "Fundamental
Orders" drawn up by the elected representatives of the settlers con-
tained no recognition of any superior authority in England and implied
a claim to complete independence. The document remained un-
known or unregarded by the English Government which had its hands
full elsewhere. It was the first written constitution in the English-
speaking world on an ostensibly democratic basis and is of importance
as illustrating what was rapidly to become the feature that most
clearly differentiated the New England colonies from the home
country. The Fundamental Orders remained the sole instrument of
government in the colony until Governor John Winthrop junior
procured a formal charter from Charles II after the Restoration.
Hooker and the Connecticut colonists left Massachusetts against
the will of the magistrates and only obtained their reluctant per-
mission to depart after much pressure. Roger Williams, however,
the founder of the settlements around Narragansett Bay, which after-
wards became the colony of Rhode Island, was expelled for his attacks
upon the government of the oligarchy. An able writer and preacher
of great personal charm he came to Boston in 1631 and was called to
be minister of the church at Salem but soon got into trouble with the
authorities for proclaiming that the civil power had no authority to
punish religious offences. He passed for a time to Plymouth, but in
1634 he returned to Salem and preached the doctrines of the separa-
tion of Church and State and of religious toleration more persistently
than before. He also maintained that the Massachusetts charter had
no legal basis and that the King had no right to grant the lands on
1 Osgood, i, 304.
1 1-2
164 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
which the colony was founded since they belonged only to the Indian
tribes. Such dangerous theories could not be tolerated by the civil
authorities or the ruling ministers, and Williams was brought to trial
and condemned to banishment from the colony as a disturber of the
peace. Preparations were made to ship him back to England, but in
January 1636 he escaped and fled to the Indians near Narragansett
Bay.
Williams had only a comparatively small following, but the churches
of Massachusetts were split from top to bottom by another contro-
versy that arose at the same period. This centred in the teaching of
Mrs Ann Hutchinson, a woman of great religious fervour who had
come from England to Boston with her family in 1634. The trouble
began over religious matters, but it soon merged into a political
attack upon the ruling oligarchy and became dangerous when the
new governor. Sir Henry Vane the younger, espoused Mrs Hutchin-
son's cause. Winthrop took up the leadership of the opposite side and
a bitter struggle for power filled the years 1637 and 1638 until Vane
returned to England in disgust and Mrs Hutchinson was excom-
municated and thrust out.
The result of the controversy was to rivet the control of the narrow
and intolerant ruling clique on Massachusetts and to excite the
serious alarm of the English Government with results that will be
considered later. While it was raging, various fugitives from Massa-
chusetts gathered in three small independent settlements at Provi-
dence, Portsmouth and Newport on Narragansett Bay on lands
obtained by Williams from the neighbouring Indians, and thither
Mrs Hutchinson fled with many of her followers. The settlers were
united in their opposition to Massachusetts, but they had little definite
organisation or leadership. The only form of government in each
town was a town fellowship for local purposes, a loose democracy of
the simplest sort based upon agreements signed by the heads of
families, and it was not until 1644, ^^ *& t'ae face °f *& imminent
Indian attack they were united as the colony of Providence Plan-
tations under a charter obtained by Williams from the Earl ofWarwick
and the Parliamentary Commissioners for the Plantations.1 This was
the earliest attempt to incorporate previously diverse governments
into a colony, but the movement towards union was so feeble that it
was not until three years later that the charter was accepted and the
towns bound themselves together by an engagement or social com-
pact into a democracy, "that is to say, a Government held by the free
and voluntary consent of all, or the greater part of the free in-
habitants".2 The colonies of Rhode Island and Connecticut largely
owed their inception to revolt against the theocratic tyranny in
Massachusetts, but the next settlement, New Haven, went further
in the direction of theocracy. The leader in its foundation was the
1 Osgood, i, 354. . a Ibid, i, 357.
NEW HAVEN 165
Rev. John Davenport of London, a Puritan clergyman of the straitest
doctrine; he arrived in New England late in 1637 with many of his
comparatively wealthy parishioners, who had determined to establish
a mercantile rather than an agricultural community, to be ruled as a
Bible commonwealth. In 1639 a form of government was agreed to
by an assembly of all the "planters" which entirely ignored all
external authority, and even abandoned the English common law,
declaring the "word of God" to be the only rule in the Plantation.
A stringent religious test was established, and the freemen placed the
whole power of government in the hands of a body of twelve which
was to be self-perpetuating. New Haven was thus ruled by the
narrowest of oligarchies, but its example had little influence upon the
prevailing trend of New England towards democracy. It was sur-
rounded by many small settlements of seceders from Massachusetts
that differed so acutely on doctrinal matters that they found it almost
impossible to agree in civil affairs. Ultimately they were all absorbed
into the colony of Connecticut, and shared in its democratic consti-
tution. The process of double selection which weeded out the most
determined nonconformists from many English parishes, and then
sifted them again by religious contention into separate settlements,
in a very few years produced a divergence in temper between New
and Old England that has been of lasting significance.
Attention to the minor differences between the various colonies
settled in New England in the decade 1630-40 must not obscure their
general homogeneity. They were situated in one natural geographical
area within which intercommunication was easy, but which was
isolated from other regions by almost impenetrable forest barriers.
There was no waterway tempting men far into the interior, for the
Hudson River was a Dutch preserve, and the colonists had no access
to the St Lawrence or the Great Lakes. The landlocked harbours and
shallow bays along the coast, however, fostered shipping, and from
the beginning the New Englanders were both a trading and seafaring
as well as an agricultural people. It has already been stated that the
first settlements were spared from Indian attack by the depopulation
of the coast region by a great plague that just anteceded the coming
of the white men. For some years the colonists lived in peaceful re-
lations with the few remnants of scattered tribes, but when the migra-
tion into the Connecticut valley began, the Indians who came down
from the western forests became dangerous, and the long struggle
of frontier raids and punitive expeditions began. The Connecticut
settlers had invaded the hunting grounds of the tribe of Pequots, who
were the first to feel the white man's vengeance for their raids upon
outlying farms. In 1637 remorseless war upon them was waged until
almost the whole tribe was exterminated; only a few women and
boys were spared to be enslaved and sold to the Bermudas in order
to recoup some of the expenses. Roger Williams, whose personal
166 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
influence had not only saved other tribes from joining with the
Pequots against the settlers, but also persuaded them to aid in the
war, pleaded hard against the slaughter of the last defenceless
stragglers. But the Boston preachers would hear nothing of mercy ; they
loudly declaimed savage texts from the Old Testament as evidence
of a divinely ordained sanction of extirpation as the only Indian
policy. Thus began the first advance of the bloodstained western
frontier that was to provide the hardest colonial problems of the
next two centuries.
While the New England settlements were being shaped, a disastrous
experiment had been made in the Caribbean which showed that the
secret of their success did not lie wholly in their Puritanism. In the
same months that subscriptions were being invited among the inner
circles of the Puritans to the Massachusetts Bay Company, the Earl of
Warwick and certain of his supporters in the Bermuda Company were
preparing to seize two islands in the heart of the Caribbean and to
establish there a Puritan colony. A charter for the Providence Com-
pany was obtained from the Crown and many of the most prominent
Puritan leaders in England subscribed to its funds. Lords Warwick,
Brooke, Saye and Sele, Sir Benjamin Rudyerd and Sir Nathaniel
Rich were all actively interested, while John Pym, who was coining to
have great influence, was the treasurer and prime mover. At one
time it seemed likely that John Winthrop would join in the Providence
rather than the Massachusetts scheme, and it is certain that Oliver
Cromwell seriously considered emigrating under its auspices.1 The
promoters had the same purpose as John White, "to plant the true
and sincere Religion and worship of God", but they associated it
with the incompatible Elizabethan project of attacking Spain in the
centre of her power in the Indies. The first colonists came under the
leadership of Governor Philip Bell from Bermuda where the profits
of the tobacco plantations would not provide a living. At the expense
of the English promoters they were transported to the small islands
of Old Providence and Henrietta off the coast of Nicaragua, and later
colonists were also settled in the island of Association or Tortuga off
the north coast of Hayti. There they started planting under the usual
West Indian conditions, but the venture was unsuccessful from the
start. The islands lay in the jaws of the Spanish power, and the
settlers had to direct their main attention to defence and not to the
production of foodstuffs and marketable commodities. Providence
and Tortuga became nothing but buccaneering strongholds from
which EngHsh and Dutch rovers preyed upon Spanish commerce,
and ultimately the scandal became so serious that strong forces were
sent to clear tie islands and destroy their fortifications. Tortuga was
cleared of Englishmen in 1635, but it was reoccupied by French
rovers soon afterwards. It was the first place in which Englishmen
1 See Newton, A. P., Colonising Activities of English Puritans, passim.
ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN VIRGINIA 167
began the industry of logwood cutting that was to be so important
later in the century. Providence was captured by the Spaniards after
severe fighting in 1641, but it left memories that were recalled when
Cromwell was planning his "Western Design'* in 1654-5. The only
permanent results of the venture lay in the relations that were opened
up with theMoskito Indians on the mainland. These gave England her
first direct interest in Central America, and began a connection that
continued until 1850. The Providence Company was an interesting
hybrid; sprung directly from the old Warwick-Smythe party in the
Virginia Company it manifested Elizabethan ideas of colonisation;
it was also the last of the chartered companies of the early Stuarts;
infused with the Puritan theocracy of New England, it was also a
forerunner of the aggressive Protestant imperialism of the Inter-
regnum. It carries us back appropriately to the point at which we
left Virginia, immediately after the revocation of the Company's
charter.1
The Privy Council was faced in 1624 wfth an unprecedented diffi-
culty, that of directly governing a dependency at least two months
removed from the metropolis yet accustomed for years to look for
detailed instructions and support from English sources. The authori-
ties were at first resolved to make their control as close as that over
Ireland, and on 13 May 1625 Charles I proclaimed his policy "that
there may be one uniform Course of Government in and through all
Our whole Monarchy".2 It was clear that the Privy Council could
not pay attention to all the details of management, and a special
Commission was appointed to regulate Virginian affairs. The pro-
clamation promised that the Crown would maintain "those public
Officers and Ministers, and that Strength of Men, Munition and
Fortification that shall be fit and necessary for the Defence of the
Plantation". The colonists took this promise at its face value, and
applied for the despatch of a royal force of trained soldiers and military
engineers to assist them in a campaign against the Indian tribes, as
the English army had been employed in the Irish wars.8 But no such
help was forthcoming, for the war with Spain was just beginning,
and there was not a man or a penny to spare. Within a short time
the Royal Commission for Virginia ceased to function, the stream of
detailed instructions dwindled, and the direction of policy in Virginia
became mostly an affair for the governor and his local council with
only occasional interference from England. After long delay the
Crown provided £1000 a year to pay the governor's salary out of the
Virginia customs, but otherwise little or no assistance was given.
In one respect the policy outlined in the proclamation of May 1625
was thenceforward generally adhered to. The government of the
colonies was immediately to depend upon the Crown <c and not to be
committed to any Company or Corporation, to whom it may be
i Vide supra, p. 152. * Rymer, Foedtra, xvra, 72-73- ' Osgood, ra, 77.
r68 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
proper to trust Matters of Trade and Commerce but cannot be fit
or safe to communicate the ordering of State Affairs, be they of never
so mean Consequence". After 1625 save ^ t^ie exceptional cases of
the Guiana, Massachusetts Bay and Providence Companies no further
charters to colonising corporations were issued by Charles I, but a new
form was employed. Henceforward, except in New England, colonies
established on a grant made to an individual lord proprietor became
the general rule. This type of patent was first employed in the grant
to Sir George Calvert of a part of Newfoundland, and its application
to colonisation may very probably be attributed to his invention.
In a previous chapter it was stated that when Guy's Company
found itself unable to exploit its lands it disposed of its rights
over certain tracts to various projectors of colonising schemes.1
Among them was Sir George Calvert, who, as one of the Secretaries
of State, had been concerned with colonial policy and held similar
views to those of Bacon as to the strategic importance to the kingdom
of establishing a colony in Newfoundland. His first practical attempt
was in the plantation of confiscated Irish lands round Baltimore in
Munster, and in 1621-2 he began to send out colonists at his own
expense to settle the area in Newfoundland that he had purchased.
In 1623 ke procured from the Crown a charter granting him full
proprietary rights over a region to be named the Province of Avalon
with palatine jurisdiction similar to that in the Bishopric of Durham,
a provision that anticipated by four years any other proprietary
patent. Calvert was unable to do very much to carry out his schemes
until after his resignation of the secretaryship, but in 1627 he paid a
short visit to the island and in 1628 took out Ms wife and family with
several colonists, intending to reside there permanently. Like other
attempts the project was thwarted by the hostility of the fishermen
and the severity of the climate, and aiier one season Calvert deter-
mined to abandon Newfoundland and begin again further south.
Meanwhile the system of proprietary grants was being employed
to provide for the government of the new English colonies in the
West Indies whose genesis we considered earlier.2 The 1623 patent
for the Province of Avalon apparently provided the model for the
various patents issued in 1627 to the Earl of Carlisle as Lord Pro-
prietor of the Caribbee Islands and to the Earl of Montgomery for
his Provincia Montgomeria. When Virginia became a royal pro-
vince in 1624, t^ unoccupied lands within the original grant legally
passed back into the hands of the Crown and were available to be
granted afresh. But the colonists contested this view, and maintained
that the corporate right to the whole area stretching 200 miles
north and south of Point Comfort and an indefinite distance
inland was vested in the resident community in Virginia and not in
the dispossessed London Company. In their contention unsettled
1 F*fr **«fc P- 90- a Vide supra, pp. 143-5.
PROPRIETARY GOVERNMENT IN MARYLAND 169
lands throughout the whole area could be granted only through the
colonial government and the province which later became known as
the "Old Dominion" was one and indivisible. But these claims were
disregarded, and in October 1629 ^ Grown acceded to a petition
from Sir Robert Heath, the Attorney-General, for the grant of rights
to establish colonies at his own expense in portions of the lands
originally assigned under the Virginia charter of 1609. The area
granted to Heath lay to the south of the settlements along the James
River, and he projected a colony there to be called "Carolana", but
nothing was done to carry his project into effect, and ultimately he
disposed of his rights to certain London merchants. It was not until
after the Restoration that any effective settlement took place in the
region and then it was under fresh proprietary grants.
Calvert, who was created Lord Baltimore in 1625, had petitioned
for a grant of unoccupied lands in Virginia while he was still in
Newfoundland and visited James Town about the time when Heath
received his patent. He was naturally regarded with hostility by the
Virginians, and they got rid of him by tendering the oath of supremacy
which as a recent convert to Roman Catholicism he refused to take.
For three years they succeeded in preventing any grant to him and
meanwhile the governor and council furthered the settlement of
William Claiborne, one of their number, in the region for which
Baltimore had applied. It was not until after his death in April 1632
that his suit was successful and a patent was issued to his son Gecilius
Calvert, second Lord Baltimore, for the colonisation of Maryland
including the lands on the north of the Virginia settlements up to the
4Oth parallel, the southern boundary of the territory granted to the
Council of New England. The claims of Virginia were formally re-
jected in 1633, but a long contest began between Claiborne and
Baltimore's colonists that embittered the relations of Virginia and
Maryland for many years.
The proprietary patents that began with Calvert's Avalon grant in
4623 and continued down to 1629, when the province of Maine was
grafted to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, were generally similar in their
provisions, and they may be most appropriately studied in Baltimore's
Maryland patent of 1632 since that alone remained in effect until the
eighteenth century.1 The colonies established by chartered companies
were in a sense proprietary, but they derived from the precedents of
trading corporations and the relations between the grantees and their
colonists were only industrial and political. The essential features of
the true proprietary colonies were on the other hand feudal. The
rights of the grantees were expressly stated in the patents to be
modelled on those of the Bishops of Durham in their county palatine.
All land was to be held directly or indirectly of the lord proprietor as
the feudal superior and he was endowed with full seignorial rights.
1 See Osgood, vol. nr, chaps, ir-iv.
170 THE GREAT JEMIGRATION, 1618-1648
The detailed arrangements that were developed in each proprietor-
ship naturally varied according to circumstances, and in no instance
were they an exact reproduction of their English original. Their type
was fundamentally the same, but each province, owing to diverse
social and political forces, filled in the outline in its own way, and the
development of government in the Garibbee Islands produced a
result differing at least as widely from Maryland as that colony differed
from its neighbour, Virginia. The lord proprietor was a tenant-in-
chief and held his province of the King like a private feudal estate.
It was subject to the King's sovereign control and all the inhabitants
owed allegiance to him, but titles to land were derived, not from the
Crown as elsewhere, but from the proprietor. He was empowered to
establish courts and appoint all officers necessary for the execution of
the laws, and was authorised to legislate for the province through an
assembly of freemen, to issue ordinances of government under his
seal, to execute justice and to grant pardon. In fact in almost every
respect the lord proprietor was a petty sovereign within his province
which was imperium in imperio; his estate was heritable like any other
fief, and since his powers were derived, not from the province or its
inhabitants but from the overlord, it was theoretically impossible for
him to be called to account by the settlers within his domain. This
system was infinitely removed from the democracy of the New Eng-
land commonwealths, but in practice its institutions rapidly developed
in a democratic direction. The pioneer conditions of the New World
were unfavourable to the exercise of aristocratic or autocratic power,
and the lords proprietors both in Maryland and the Garibbees were
more anxious to develop the material prosperity of their colonies and
to attract settlers than to insist on legal forms. Thus from the first,
as elsewhere in the outer Empire, the power of the elected Assemblies
increased while that of the proprietor diminished. But while the
rule of a chartered company could be terminated by a single act, the
rights of a proprietor could not be extinguished without expropria-
tion or revolution.
In one respect Maryland was unique among the colonies, for it was
the only region in the Empire governed by a Roman Catholic pro-
prietor and in which Roman Catholics were in the full exercise of
political power. Toleration in Rhode Island had come as a matter of
principle from the theological teaching of Roger Williams, but in
Maryland it was adopted by Cecilius Galvert for practical convenience
to assist the material progress of his colony by including any suitable
emigrant whatever his religious beliefs. In the early years there
was a Roman Catholic majority in the Assembly, but gradually
the Protestants came to preponderate without any alteration of
religious policy. At one time certain Jesuit zealots attempted to
press restrictive measures upon the proprietor, but he refused point-
blank to allow religious aims to interfere in civil affairs, and it was
STRUGGLES FOR BARBADOS 171
not until the Interregnum that invading Puritan zealots from New
England were able to destroy the practice of toleration for a time and
to exclude all Catholics and Anglicans from political power. With the
Restoration the Independent bigots were expelled and the colony
regained its original comprehensiveness.
We now return to Barbados and the Leeward Islands to consider
the steps taken to establish the proprietary governments under the
Earl of Carlisle's patent of 7 April 1628 procured in the circum-
stances mentioned earlier.1 The new grant largely increased the lord
proprietor's opportunities of personal profit both at the expense of
his rival Sir William Courteen and of the planters. His purpose of
excluding other competitors achieved, he took no further active
part but at once handed over to his merchant associates complete
authority to manage the business, of which they availed themselves to
the full. Captain Charles Wolverston, who had been one of the early
planters in the Bermudas, was commissioned as Governor of Barbados
and sent out with some eighty colonists. Since he professed entirely
friendly intentions, Courteen's settlers made no objection to his
landing, but when a couple of months later he had established him-
self securely, he suddenly produced his commission as governor for
the Earl of Carlisle, nominated a council and demanded submission
to his authority. After some show of force the original settlers sur-
rendered,2 and trusting in the promise of the Carlisle party that they
"should continue in their former freedom without being a colony",
they agreed to pay the heavy dues upon their produce that were
assigned to the lord proprietor under his new patent. As soon as the
news of these proceedings reached England, Montgomery and Cour-
teen resolved to despatch a new force to protect their rights. The
command was entrusted to Henry Powell, the brother of the first
commander in Barbados, and at the end of February 1629 ke landed
there, seized Wolverston and some of his officers and re-established his
nephew, John Powell the younger, as governor. He confiscated the
tobacco and stores of Carlisle's colonists and sailed back to England,
taking with him Wolverston and others as prisoners in irons.
Whole this was happening in the colony, the rival cla.ima.nts in
England carried their dispute to the King. Since it was concerned with
the interpretation of conflicting grants issued under the great seal,
it ought properly to have been tried in the courts of law, but Charles
arbitrarily exerted his authority in the interest of his favourite, and
merely referred the matter for an informal hearing before the Lord
Keeper Coventry. His report8 pronounced generally in favour of
Carlisle's claims, but it bore indications that the decision was given
under pressure and against the Lord Keeper's better judgment.
Royal orders were at once despatched to Carlisle's representatives in
Barbados to secure obedience, and the managers of the syndicate
1 Vide supra, p. 145. a September 1628. » 38 April 1629.
172 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
sent out Captain Henry Hawley to recapture the island. Though the
Gourteen party refused to allow him to land, Hawley treacherously
persuaded Powell to come aboard his ship for a conference and then
seized and confined him. With the governor in his hands Hawley had
no difficulty in bringing the planters to obedience, and in August
1629 tbe whole island passed finally under Carlisle's rule and the
expropriation of Sir William Courteen was complete. For many
years he and his heirs attempted to secure redress in the English
courts and from Parliament, but they could get no more satisfaction
than did many of the merchants who had incautiously expended
money on behalf of the spendthrift earl.1
Things had at first gone more smoothly in the Leeward Islands,
where Thomas Warner held the governorship for the lord proprietor.
By 1629 there were about 3000 settlers in St Christopher and
large cargoes of tobacco were sent home. The English occupied
the middle of the island with the French at either end, while one
Anthony Hilton had begun planting in the neighbouring island of
Nevis. Some of the planters held leases from the Earl of Carlisle for
which they paid rents in tobacco, but the best plantations were
owned by absentee landlords who were wealthy London merchants
like Maurice Thompson and Sir Samuel Saltonstall, who also had
interests in Virginia and New England. The estates were cultivated
by white indentured servants sent out and maintained at the mer-
chants3 expense, and by far the greater part of the profits on the
magazines exported for sale to the planters and the cargoes sent home
went into the pockets of English capitalists. There was thus from the
beginning a radical difference between the islands and the self-
contained northern colonies who had no profits on their labours
to pay to outside capitalists.
In the latter part of 1629 Warner received the reward of his
services to the Crown and the lord proprietor by royal appointment
as Governor of St Christopher for life with full power over the colony
subject to ratification by the Earl of Carlisle. Many of the provisions
of the grant seem to be modelled on those commonly included in the
commission of the governor of a fortress, and this appears reasonable
enough when we realise that such an outpost as St Christopher was
regarded by the Spaniards as a patent menace to their Caribbean
preserves. If Spain had had the power, there is- no doubt that she
would have used it earlier to clear out the English intruders, but her
resources were so exhausted that it was not until six years after the
first settlement that Philip III was able to give orders for the attack.
France and England were at war, but in the West Indies their interests
as intruders in territory claimed by Spain were identical, and repeated
treaties were made between the French and English governors in
St Christopher to preserve peace between their settlers. The long-
1 Sec WiUiamson, Caribbet Islands, pp. 62-3 seqq.
DECLINE OF SPANISH POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN 173
expected blow fell in September 1629 while Warner was away in
England. The heavily armed outward bound Mexican fleet under
Don Fadrique de Toledo first appeared off Nevis and compelled its
surrender. The crops were destroyed and the settlement burned, and
the attack was then directed against St Christopher. The English and
French joined forces to defend themselves, but they were out-
numbered and could make only an ineffectual resistance. Some of the
settlers fled to the hills, but many hundreds of prisoners were taken
and both the English and French settlements and plantations were
devastated. However the Spanish victory was barren of lasting re-
sults, for as soon as Toledo's fleet had departed, the fugitives came
out of their hidingplaces and at once began to restore their ravaged
plantations. Circumstances had entirely changed since Menendes's
vindication of Spain's colonial monopoly in 1569, and now English,
French and Dutch settlers streamed into every unguarded island and
could not be dammed out. It was as though trickles were pouring in
through a score of leaks between the opened seams of some outworn
vessel, and though the Spaniards were able to stop here one leak and
there another, they could not close them all, and as soon as they had
finished anywhere and passed on, the intruders streamed back as
fast as ever. Any effective defence required strong and well-armed
squadrons cruising almost continuously, and these Spain could neither
provide nor maintain. The period of Spanish monopoly in the islands
was clearly over, and the West Indies became the cockpit of a struggle
between the maritime Powers that was to last until the time of Nelson.
Warner returned from England in 1630 to find St Christopher
devastated, and he at once entered upon his difficult task of restoring
the colony to prosperity. From thence onward until his death in
1649 he remained undisturbed in his governorship. To him is un-
doubtedly due the chief credit for establishing the English possession
of the Leeward Islands on a firm basis. The French had suffered
much more than the English in the Spanish raid, and for some years
thieir quarters in St Christopher were only sparsely occupied, but
Warner apparently thought it advisable not to attempt to dispossess
them, and the island remained divided between the settlers of the two
nations with only minor troubles. For many years Wamer Per"
sistentiy followed the policy of planting unoccupied islands with
English settlers, and St Christopher and Nevis thus became in a very
real sense a seed-bed for colonising enterprises in the West Indies.1
Antigua was firmly planted between 1634 and 1636, and Montserrat
about the same time, but those colonies remained very weak for
more than twenty years. In other islands, notably Santa Cruz and
St Bartholomew, Englishmen were competing with French and
Dutch settlers for possession, but no permanent plantations were
effected.
1 See Williamson, op. cit. pp. 94-5, 150-3.
174 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
The influx of immigrants into the various islands, especially
Barbados and St Christopher, between 1630 and 1640 was enormous
in comparison with their limited area, and every scrap of cultivable
ground was occupied. Despite the excessive mortality that resulted
from ignorance of the means of living under tropical conditions, by
1639 there were probably more than 1000 proprietors in Barbados
and a total population that is said to have amounted to 30,000
persons.1 In St Christopher and Nevis there may have been as many
as 20,000 by 1640 and all the evidence proves that the islands were
very densely populated and that the struggle for existence was severe.
There was therefore constant unrest among landless men and
readiness to re-emigrate in search of better conditions.
The first Lord Proprietor of the Caribbees died in 1636 after con-
veying almost the whole of his property to trustees to protect it from
his many creditors. During the period of his rule there had been
practically no interference by the Privy Council with the affairs of
the islands, and Carlisle, or rather the syndicates who sheltered
themselves behind him, was left unhindered to make the utmost
profit out of the planters. From 1635 to 1642, however, there were
incessant quarrels between rival claimants to the proprietorship, and
the colonists took advantage of them to secure what freedom they
could. In 1639 the Earl of Warwick tried to find profit in these dis-
sensions. He had bought up the Earl of Pembroke's derelict rights
and with the aid of men from Bermuda and Providence was attempt-
ing to establish settlements in Tobago and Trinidad; he endeavoured
to get possession of Barbados through the governor, Captain Hawley,
and to persuade many of the planters there to move to his new plan-
tations. Hawley was dismissed from the governorship of Barbados by
the trustees of the late lord proprietor, but acting, as he claimed,
under Warwick's orders he seized the government again and refused
to allow the new governor to enter. In order to secure the support of
the settlers he summoned a representative Assembly for the first
time, "chose burgesses and settled a parliament or in a parliamentary
manner as he termed it".2 Thus at a time when no Parliament had
sat in England for ten years, Warwick, the leader of the party that
was striving for its revival, furthered popular election among the
colonists after the fashion of the continental colonies in order to
secure their support.
During his governorship Hawley had been tyrannical and ex-
tortionate, and the burgesses of the Assembly found as great causes of
complaint against him as against the holders of the proprietorship.
But the calling of a representative body practically marks the end of
proprietary authority in Barbados, and when Philip Bell, a client of
1 Sec Harlow, V. T., Hist, of Barbados, 1625-85, Appendix B, for discussion of these
figures.
* G.O.i/io,no.72,HuncbtoGarlisle,iiJuly 1639. Cited by Williamson, op. cit. p. 144.
CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE COLONIES 175
Warwick's, came to the island as governor from Providence after its
capture by the Spaniards in 1641, affairs were run in much the same
way as in Virginia, viz. in accordance with the views of the richer
planters, whose first considerations were always for their material
prosperity and who desired autonomy because they found it cheaper.
As already remarked, the Home Government troubled very little
with the affairs of the proprietary colonies, but the great outflow
of emigrants from England after 1630 to New England and the
West Indies became a matter of grave concern to the Lords of the
Council both on economic and political grounds and led to the first
serious attempts to provide an organisation for a general imperial
control over the colonies. The economic side of the question being
considered in a later chapter, our attention can be confined to
political matters.
In the incessant constitutional controversy that filled the reigns of
the first two Stuarts colonial affairs were at first made a battleground
of the English political struggle. The Parliamentarians under the
lead of Sir Edwin Sandys attempted to bring Virginian affairs before
the House of Commons on the implied ground that the grievances of
the colonists differed in nothing from those of subjects within the realm,
and like them must properly be presented to the King in Parliament.
But the Crown refused to accept this view and both in 1621 and 1624
definitely denied the competence of Parliament to consider colonial
grievances. When Virginia became a royal province, the colonists
preferred to consider their grievances in their own Assembly and
present them by direct petition to the Crown rather than involve
them in the welter of English disputes. There was no conscious adop-
tion of a policy, but. distance had already produced its inevitable
effect in a separation of interests. The policy of the rulers of Massa-
chusetts was, on the other hand, from the beginning, a conscious one
of separation. After the violent dissolution of Parliament in 1629
it seemed as though the old constitutional rights of Englishmen had
gone like those of France and Spain, and many of those who passed
across the Atlantic were minded to save what they could of their
ancient liberties from the peril of royal tyranny. The first ten critical
years of the founding of the new colonies coincided with such an
intermission of Parliament as England had never known before, and
only beyond the ocean could men meet in constitutional assembly to
debate their affairs. The effect was one of profound importance.
The struggle for control that arose seemed to be one between free
commonwealths wherein the ancient liberties had been preserved and
an autocratic monarch ruling with irresponsible prerogative. English-
men of the Opposition like Oliver Cromwell saw New England as a
land of freedom, and some like Sir Henry Vane fled thither with high
political hopes. The course of events differed widely from what was
foreshadowed in 1629, ^ut t*16 ten y^3-18 of personal government did
176 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
their work, and thenceforward the conception of America as the land
of refuge against kingly tyranny was permanently rooted in the
national consciousness.
The practical consequence of the intermission of Parliament was
that the only organ of government to consider colonial affairs was the
executive, i.e. the King with his personal ministers of the Privy
Council who suggested or worked out his policy. It has been the
tradition of colonial historians to attribute every governmental
mistake in the colonial field to the incompetence or tyranny of
James I or Charles I. In reality it seems certain that colonial
affairs interested either very little save when they interfered with
questions of high policy, as when North's Guiana enterprise ob-
structed James's designs for the Spanish match or the General Courts
of the Virginia Company became a forum for the parliamentary
opposition. Charles Ts personal intervention in directly colonial
affairs was usually confined to securing some profit for one of his
courtiers like Carlisle. Some of his ministers, however, paid con-
siderable attention to such matters, and more than once we can
vaguely trace efforts to work out a policy, though nothing of the sort
persisted until the next period when Warwick and others infused
Cromwell with some of their colonial enthusiasm. The affairs of the
rapidly growing outer Empire, in fact, secured little attention from
English statesmen in their preoccupation with foreign policy and the
absorbing constitutional struggle.
From time to time we find indications that small committees of the
Privy Council were entrusted with special tasks in regard to the
Plantations as they were for trade, and usually the committees for
both matters had much the same personnel. But this was the customary
way in which the Privy Council dealt with its executive tasks, and no
committee had a continuing or separately organised existence. It
was not until the menace to the policy of the Government of the
nonconformity and separatism of Massachusetts became apparent that
a special body was commissioned to supervise general colonial affairs.
The impetus came from Sir Ferdinando Gorges who was stirred into
action by the success of rival settlements in a region which he had
vainly tried for years to colonise. In 1632, in conjunction with certain
persons expelled by the Massachusetts magistrates, Gorges petitioned
the Government for redress against the colonists, whom he and his
proteges accused of having separated themselves from the lawful
authority of Church and State and of intending to rebel against the
King. The indictment was far too serious to be dismissed without
careful enquiry by the Privy Council, and a committee was instructed
to hear the evidence of the petitioners and to examine witnesses who
could speak for the colonists. After a careful enquiry Gorges's petition
was dismissed, but when in the following year Laud with his passion for
legality and determination to enforce ecclesiastical discipline through-
THE COMMISSION FOR PLANTATIONS 177
out the realm became Archbishop of Canterbury, the matter grew
more serious. His repressive measures at once accelerated the flow of
Puritan emigration and he began to see in New England a dangerous
centre of disaffection whither the malcontents in Church and State
were fleeing to plot treason and heresy. A fresh enquiry into the pro-
visions of the Massachusetts charter was begun, certain ships laden
with emigrants were arrested for a time, and in April 1634 a perma-
nent board of "Lords Commissioners for Plantations in General9'
was erected by patent,1 with wider executive, legislative and judicial
powers than had been entrusted to any body since the time of Henry VIII.
Actually the membership was confined to Lords of the Privy Council
of which the commission was nothing but a standing committee
entrusted with the powers of the Council in a particular field.2
A body of sub-commissioners composed of men of lesser rank but of
special experience was appointed later by the commission to prepare
matters for its decision or that of the Privy Council.8
The opponents of the Government saw in the commission a
dangerous instrument of the prerogative and a new threat to their
ancient liberties, and many men of high position and influence like
Warwick began seriously to make plans to abandon England for
good. The revolutionary temper was clearly rising, though eight years
more were to elapse before the outburst. But Massachusetts, which
saw in the commission an instrument directed against itself, had no
reluctance to proceed upon a course that was one of rebellion in all
but name. To the demands of the commission to produce the Com-
pany's charter for examination the governor and Assembly returned
only evasive answers, and it became evident that they did not intend
to obey. A suit of quo warranto was therefore begun in the King's
Bench. But the whole machinery of the Company having been re-
moved to New England where there was no means of enforcing
judgment, judicial proceedings were futile. Only executive action
could be of effect and the rapidly increasing domestic troubles made
any such effort impossible.
Meanwhile other steps were being taken by the Archbishop and
the Privy Council which indicated tie policy they intended to adopt
if they could find the means. The Council for New England had
been moribund for some years, and in 1634 it was resolved on
the suggestion of Gorges and Captain John Mason to surrender its
charter and to divide the territories allotted to it between the sur-
viving members in the hope that some of them would enforce
their shadowy rights at their own expense. The terms of the
surrender pointed to the proceedings of the Massachusetts colonists
as the cause of the failure of the Council's schemes and prac-
tically accused them of rebellion. "They made themselves a free
1 Rymer, Foedira, xx, 8-10. a Beer, Origins, pp. 313-14.
8 See Andrews, C. M., British Comrmttus, $tc.> qf Trade and Plantations, 1632-75, pp. 18-20.
GHBEI 13
178 THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
People. . .and framed unto themselves new conceits of Religion and
forms of ecclesiastical and temporal Orders and Government,
punishing divers that would not approve thereof. . .by banishing
and the like."1 The King announced his intention of appointing Sir
Ferdinando Gorges as Governor-General of New England and giving
him full proprietary rights over one of its provinces for his support,
while John Mason was appointed Vice-Admiral of New England
with full martial authority in those seas and also beyond into the
South Sea "where lie California and Nova Albion", an interesting
reminder that Drake's annexations had not been forgotten.2 Mason
died, however, before he could take up his commission and no suc-
cessor was appointed. Gorges began to organise an armed expedi-
tion to establish his government, and if he could have secured proper
support from the Grown, such as would have been forthcoming in
normal times, there is little doubt that the American revolutionary
war would have been anticipated by a hundred and forty years.
That anyone of influence in Massachusetts intended to claim com-
plete political independence from England is unlikely, for that would
have meant laying the colony open to attack by other European
Powers. The implications of the course of policy they were pursuing
had not been fully realised, and it was possible for their apologists
to deny sincerely that "under the colour of planting a Colony they
intended to raise and erect a seminary of faction and separation"8,
while others were writing thence that " they aimed at sovereignty and
it was accounted perjury and treason in their general court to speak
of appeals to the king'9.4 It was neither the first nor the last time that
revolutionaries in intent have tried to make the best of both worlds.
However, the colony was determined to resist any attempt to sup-
press its charter by force of arms, and the years 1635 and 1636 were
filled with preparations for defence. Forts and blockhouses were
erected and the train bands armed and drilled, but the looked-for
expedition never arrived, for Gorges could get no help, and his own re-
sources were too depletedfor him to do anything effective. The English
Government had its hands full with the beginning of the troubles with
the Scots and could spare no help to suppress colonial rebels beyond
the Atlantic. Distance from the centre of the Empire was clearly the
colonists' best defence, and only a stronger and more highly organised
power than the distracted Government of Charles I could have done
anything to curb the rapidly hardening separatist spirit in America.
With the outbreak of the Scottish war the power of the English
Government to pay any attention to colonial affairs practically came
to an end and England became wholly absorbed in the domestic
1 Recs. of Council for New England in Proceedings ofAmer. Antiq. Soc. (1867), p. 124.
8 Dean and Tutde, Life of John Mason, p. 347.
8 The Planters9 Plea (Force's Tracts), pp. 14, 44.
4 Hutchinson, T., Hist, of Mass, i, 87.
THE COLONIES IN THE CIVIL WAR 179
struggles of her Puritan Revolution. In the history of the outer Em-
pire the Civil War was as important a factor as it was in English
history, but its action was wholly negative. For ten years or more
each colony was practically isolated from outside interference and
each continued its development in its own way. The only unifying
influence was removed, and the factors working for differentiation
had full play. Hence it is impossible to trace any connected story and
we must confine ourselves to a few brief references to events that were
contemporary but unrelated.
The flow of English emigration continued with little check
down to 1641, but with the beginning of civil war in 1642 it rapidly
dried up owing to the impossibility of finding transport. The great
exodus that had carried at least 80,000 Englishmen across the Atlantic
was over, and no efflux of such magnitude in comparison with the
population was to be seen again until the nineteenth century. When
the Long Parliament seized executive power, it directed some
attention to colonial projects, but its plans were of a kind that was
out-of-date, being concerned mainly with the design of establishing
a West India Association on the lines of the Dutch West India Com-
pany to organise attacks upon the Spanish colonies.1 Pym and others
of the Providence Company were appointed to a parliamentary com-
mittee to examine the project, but they never reported. The interest
of the incident lies in the link it affords with the Western Design of
1655.* Neither King nor Commons could spare much thought for
colonial affairs, but since the Parliamentarians held London, which
did by far the greater part of the colonial trade, they had a certain
control over the customs on imports and exports. Hence any action
they took was mainly concerned with economic matters.8
In 1643 tita ^arl of Warwick was appointed Governor-in-Chief and
Lord High Admiral of all the English colonies in America with
a standing council endowed with considerable powers.4 But these
powers were merely nominal, for it was impossible to enforce any
orders of the council. Massachusetts flatly denied the legislative
power of Parliament in the colony, for they maintained that "the
laws of the parliament of England reach no further, nor do the king's
writs under the great seal go any further. Our allegiance binds us not
to the laws of England any longer than while we live in England".6
In the other colonies the English struggle between Royalists and
Parliamentarians was duplicated, though the points at issue were
concerned more with local disputes than with any broader questions.
Centrifugal forces were, in fact, in fall play and everyone sought his
own immediate interests.
In New England during this period of autonomy the most im-
portant event was the establishment of a confederation of the colonies
1 Stock, Debs, i, 122-3. 2 ?** ufta» P- a*5- 8 ^?9 Prigins, pp. 343-6 seqq.
4 Ordinance of 2 November 1643. 8 Winthrop, n, 352.
12-2
i8o THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
for defence against the Indians, the Dutch and the French. By 1640
the population of New England had grown to about 18,000, of whom
nearly 14,000 were in Massachusetts, and while the flow of immigra-
tion continued the prosperity of the colonies seemed to increase by
leaps and bounds. But with the cessation of the stream the boom
collapsed, business came to a standstill and men found it so hard to
make a living that emigration to the West Indies began and soon
assumed proportions that were alarming to the authorities. Each
of the colonies during the boom had been expanding into the in-
terior as fast as it could, but with the crash the dangers with which
they were faced from their neighbours looked more menacing than
the advantages to be derived from any increase of territory. Massa-
chusetts had made repeated attempts to bring the smaller colonies
under her control, but they had always withstood her, and when in
1643 she expressed her readiness to recognise their independence and
to agree to Articles of a Confederation for common defence, in the
council of which each colony was granted equal representation, they
were willing to accept. "A firm and perpetual league of friendship
and amity for offence and defence, mutual advice and succour" was
established,1 and a board of commissioners was set up to consider
matters of mutual interest and to determine all military questions,
each colony supplying the forces required from it. The existence of
any authority in England was completely ignored, and the "United
Colonies of New England" arranged the confederation entirely
between themselves by diplomatic negotiations like independent
states.
In Virginia the general tendency during the Civil War was to
favour the royalist cause, but no effort was made to give active
support to the King's forces. Advantage was taken of the downfall of
external authority to free the colony from restrictive commercial
regulations and to enter into active trading relations with the Dutch,
who were beginning to supply negro slaves in considerable numbers.
This remedied the scarcity of white indentured servants and had an
important effect upon the plantation economy of the colony.2 The
troubles in England drove abroad numbers of those who disliked the
Puritan rigmt) and Virginia welcomed many emigrants of a much
better social position than those who had come to her shores as in-
dentured servants. But on the other hand the royalist government
of the colony drove many Puritans away, and in the year 1649 more
than a thousand persons left Virginia to settle in Maryland. The
colony was, however, so firmly established that it could support these
defections. The contrast between its condition during the Civil War
and its earlier years is marked by the way in which it met a second
Indian massacre. The disaster of 1622 had nearly proved fatal, but
1 Newton, A. P., Federal and Unified Constitutions, pp. 50-6.
a Bruce, P. A., Economic Hist, of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century.
SIR DAVID KIRKE IN NEWFOUNDLAND 181
in 1644 when the Indians rose again and slaughtered more than 300
persons in the frontier settlements, no serious check to Virginia's
general prosperity resulted. The Indians were driven entirely out of
5ie lower part of the colony, and thenceforward its development was
unhampered by troubles with the savages except upon the frontier.
In Maryland the troubles between the Puritans and the Roman
Catholic proprietors led to two years of civil war in 1645 and 1646,
but the struggle exercised little influence on affairs outside the
colony.
In Newfoundland the period was marked by the final disappear-
ance of all those who in earlier years had attempted to establish
colonies of permanent residents, by the increase of French interests in
the island and its fisheries, and by the beginnings of a permanent
settlement of Englishmen. We showed earlier how Lord Baltimore
established himself at Ferryland in the Province of Avalon in 1628-9,
but abandoned the island after a season's stay. In all probability a
few isolated settlers remained behind, but they were quite unorganised,
and it was not until ten years later that another attempt at systematic
colonisation was undertaken. Sir David Kirke, it will be remembered,1
had been deprived of his conquest of Canada after the Treaty of St
Germain-en-Laye in 1632. In 1638 James, Marquis of Hamilton,
and others secured from the Grown a patent granting to them the
whole island of Newfoundland, including the Province of Avalon, as
*c Lords Proprietors and Adventurers.** This syndicate was organised
by Kirke and he went out to the island with a company of settlers
mostly from the west country to assume the government. He occupied
Baltimore's deserted buildings and thence began to enforce order and
exact licence dues from all fishermen landing on the coast. By 1640
Sir David had fallen out with the Lords Proprietors and they attempted
to replace him as Governor, but he refused to budge, and for ten
years he ruled the island as he thought fit, entirely disregarding any
authority other than his own. Protests were made against his pro-
ceedings by the fishing merchants, but it was not until 1651 that any
effective action could be taken, when Kirke was compelled to return
to England to answer for his arbitrary actions before the Council of
State. However, his settlers remained and it is certain that the
residence of an English community in Newfoundland can be traced
continuously from 1638 onwards and is to be associated with the
work of the Kirke family.
During the time when the sequence of regular fishing voyages from
the English ports was interrupted bythe Civil War, ships and merchants
began to find bases for their operations in the New England ports and
an active commerce sprang up. Ships from Boston or Rhode Island
began to carry flour and meat to St John's to sell to the Newfoundland
fishermen and there to freight their vessels with fish and train oil
1 Vide supra, p. 155.
x8a THE GREAT EMIGRATION, 1618-1648
for sale in the ports of southern Europe. The circumstances of the
trade are obscure, but there is no doubt that during the Civil War
that association began between the commerce of Newfoundland and
New England which was to be of such rapidly increasing importance
after the Restoration.
In the Caribbean colonies the interval between the outbreak of the
Civil War and the execution of the King was a mere prologue to the
events of the Protectorate and was most remarkable for the begin-
nings of a complete change in the economic interests of the colonists.
The introduction of the sugar industry set the West Indian colonies
on the path to a prosperity that made the "Sugar Islands55 the
greatest prize in the wars of the following century, but the considera-
tion of the changes that ensued belongs to a later period of their
history.
CHAPTER VI
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD,
1450-1648
JL HE fifteenth century marks the culminating period in the age of
discovery which had commenced three centuries previously, and
which with the year 1492, when Columbus discovered America, en-
tered upon its most important stage. The previous centuries had been
of little, if any, interest to England in this respect, though Spain and
Portugal were adding vast areas to their respective Crowns. Gradu-
ally and by slow stages the coast of Africa had been discovered, and
in 1486 Bartolomeu Diaz, the Portuguese navigator, had rounded the
Cape of Good Hope, the "Tempestuous Cape". Six years after the
voyage of Columbus to America, Vasco da Gama reached India, and
anchored off Calicut on 20 May 1498. Spain and Portugal had thus
been steadily expanding their possessions, and they had obtained a
title or recognition of their tide to their new dominions by papal
grants or bulls. Popes had claimed in the time of the Crusades to
dispose of lands inhabited by infidels, though this claim was not
conceded by all writers. However, in 1344 Clement VI granted the
Canary Islands to Luis de la Cerda on condition that they were con-
verted to Christianity; in I4541 and I4552 Portugal received from
Nicholas V the exclusive right as against Spain to trade and acquire
territory south of Capes Bojador and Nfto (Nam or Naon) through
and beyond Guinea, with power to conquer all barbarous nations,
and all the faithful of Christ, secular or lay, no matter what their con-
dition or nation, were prohibited from trading there or entering those
seas. Alexander VI by the famous bull Inter caetera of 4 May 1493
granted to Spain all islands and mainlands not possessed by Christian
princes to the west and south of a line drawn from the North to the
South Poles at 100 leagues towards the south and west of the Azores
and Cape Verde.8 Between 1455 and the issue of the bull Inter caetera
there were serious controversies between Spain and Portugal, the
former claiming Guinea, notwithstanding the papal decree; a com-
promise was effected whereby Guinea, the Azores and Cape Verde
Islands were recognised 35 Portuguese, while Portugal acknowledged
1 The bull Romanus pontifex: text in Davenport, F. G., European treaties bearing on the
tester? of the United States to 1648, p. o.
2 The bull Inter caetera (Cafixtus III), Davenport, p. 27.
See on these bulls Bollan, W., Coloma Anglican* Illustrate and the bibliography given by
F. G. Davenport under the headings of each bull in the collection. For the history of the
line of demarcation see also Bourne, E. G., Essays in historical criticism, p. 193; Harnsse, H.,
Diplomatic history of America.
» See Davenport, p. 79, and Linden. H. Vander, "Alexander VI and the Demarcation
of the Maritime and Colonial Domains of Spain and Portugal," Amer. Hist. Rev. (Oct.
1916), xxn, i-ao.
1 84 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD
Spain's right to the Canaries, and this compromise was confirmed by
Sixtus IV in 1481. The line drawn by the bull Inter caetera was modi-
fied in favour of Spain by another bull of the same year, 25 September
1493, and subsequently a new line was agreed to by the two monarchs
by the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, when Portugal obtained from
Spain the concession that the line, instead of being 100 leagues west
of the Gape Verde Islands, should be 370 leagues1 west and provisions,
which were never executed, were made for determining the position
of this line. Julius II confirmed this treaty by a bull of 24 January
1506.* These lines become of importance later on as part of the
"lines of amity" beyond which treaties with Spain and Portugal lost
their force. Thus to Spain by papal decree and treaty was assigned the
western hemisphere with the exception of Newfoundland and Brazil.
It
theologians such as. Victoria and. tte^eat"5Sssionary Las ~Ca§as re-
fused^to admit the papal, claim to dispose^ of lauds belonging to bar-
barians. Certainly, the King of England raised no protest, and on a
Portuguese embassy coming to Edward IV in 1481, the object of which
was the confirmation of the " ancientleagues " of Portugal with England
and the recognition, by Edward, of Portugal's title under the papal
bull to her West African possessions, the English King acceded to the
King of Portugal's requests and in 1482 concluded a treaty. But
opposition to the claims of the Iberian Powers based on papal grants
was soon forthcoming. Henry VII, though busy consolidating his
kingdom, was at first averse from oversea adventures, yet in 1496 he
granted a petition preferred by John Cabot, a Venetian citizen, and
his three sons, praying the Crown to sanction a voyage in search of
unknown countries beyond the ocean in northern latitudes, and a
charter granted at the same time authorised the grantees "to navigate
in any seas to the east, north or west, and to occupy and possess any
new found lands hitherto unvisited by Christians".8 Whether there
was an intentional disregard of the papal division of the newly found
lands between Spain and Portugal is not clear; the omission of any
reference to the southern seas, the only ones so far entered by Colum-
bus, suggests that the King had no desire to raise the question.
By the middle of the next century not only English, but French and
Dutch, navigators were found disputing the claims of the Iberian
Powers under the papal bulls, and Protestant monarchs and writers
such as Grotius denied that the Pope had any authority to divide
newly found lands, or to give away countries which did not belong
to him. We shall see, therefore, that the papal grantees soon fell back
upon other grounds for the validity of their tide, the chief of which
was that of prior discovery. Thus Mendoza, Philip II's ambassador,
1 Davenport, p. 84. » Ibid. p. 107.
8 Williamson, J. A., Maritim* Enterprise, I4&5-I558, p. 53.
DISCOVERY AS A BASIS OF TITLE 185
when complaining of Drake's expedition, based his claim on dis-
covery. Elizabeth's reply denied the title of the donation by the
Bishop of Rome as well as that based on mere discovery, contending
that the latter title needed completion by some definite act of settle-
ment. " For that their [the Spaniards'] having touched only here and
there upon a coast, and given names to a few rivers or capes, were
such insignificant things as could in no ways entitle them to a pro-
priety further than in the parts where they actually settled and con-
tinued to inhabit.9'1 James I continued the policy of Elizabeth. He,
moreover, enjoyed the advantages of the newly born literature of
international law in the Protestant interpretation of the law of Nature
and nations. Thus in granting the first charter of Virginia in 1606
he empowered the grantees to "make habitation, plantation and to
deduce a colony" on lands and islands which are "either apper-
taining to us, or which are not now actually possessed by any Chris-
tian prince or people".2 So too in the charter of the New England
Council of 1620 the grant is made of lands where there are "no other
the subjects of any Christian king or state by any authority from their
sovereigns, lords or princes actually in possession of any of the said
lands", and thanks are given to God "for his great favour in laying
open and revealing the same unto us, before any other Christian
prince or state".8 The concern of the monarch was only with the
possession of the territory by any Christian king or State. The fact of
the territories in question being inhabited by others than such sub-
jects is immaterial to the title. The charters assume the absence of
settlers of Christian princes and do not assist in the solution of the
question whether discovery could be relied on as a basis of title. There
was in fact no international law to which appeal could be made;
Roman law was certainly not conclusive on the point, even if it can
be said to be applicable at all. Res nulliits could be acquired by occu-
pation, but could a country inhabited by people organised into a
political society be compared to a chattel? As between the members
of the Catholic Church yielding allegiance to the Pope, it may well
be that papal grants should suffice as a root of title, but with Pro-
testants it was otherwise, and even for the Catholic Powers, some
other basis was sought, and out of the dispute, based often on abstract
and contradictory principles, arose the doctrine which later found its
way into international law under the name of occupation involving
the planting of settlements. Discovery was held to confer at most an
inchoate title "to be completed by occupation within a reasonable
time".4
No definite rule appears to have developed by the middle of the
1 Gamden's Annals, year 1580. Cited by Twiss, Sir Travers, The Oregon Question, p. 161.
* Macdonald, W., Select Charters, p. a.
8 Ibid. p. 25.
* WestJake, J., Collected Papers, p. 161. For bibliography see Fauchille, P., Droit wifcr-
nationd public, 1. 1, a* partie, § 534.
r86 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD
seventeenth century as to what constituted sufficient occupation after
discovery. Spanish operations usually consisted in a formal act and
declaration of occupation made before civil and religious authorities,
but there was no publication to the world. In fact secrecy was the
rule, not publicity. The discoverer wished to keep the newly found
lands to himself; there appears, therefore, to have been no need felt
for a definite assertion of sovereignty with a publication of the fact.
So long as agents of the State remained on the territory no difficulty
would arise, for where they were, there would be the national flag,
the symbol of the State's sovereignty. It is probably the truth to say
that down to the time of Vattel (1758) there was no necessity re-
cognised for effective possession in order to give a title by occupation.
But in this matter, as in many others, States laid the emphasis some-
times on discovery, sometimes on occupation, as best suited the
exigencies of the moment; nor, as Westlake points out, is there any
State "which has maintained a perfectly uniform attitude on the
questions of detail into which the general question resolves itself".1
It was natural that Spain and Portugal should emphasise discovery
as a root of title, and that England, France and Holland should
require not only discovery but effective occupation by settlement.
The case of St Lucia which occurred at the end of the period under
consideration raises interesting questions regarding the settlement of
newly discovered lands, and the abandonment of the same. In 1639
an English colony settled in the island of St Lucia, but was extermi-
nated by the Garibs in the following year. Ten years elapsed and then a
French colony was founded by royal charter, die English in the mean-
while having done nothing to re-establish themselves in the island.
In 1664 the settlers were attacked by Lord Willoughby and driven to
the mountains where they remained until he withdrew after .three
years, when they reoccupied their lands. At the Treaty of Utrecht the
island was viewed as a neutral island in possession of the Garibs, so
that probably this settlement had either died down or shared the fate
of its English predecessors. During the negotiations for the Treaty
of Paris, 1763, the French laid claim to the island and urged that
the English had abandoned it and that it was therefore vacant in
1650 when their colonists took possession. The island was by this
treaty assigned to France. It is generally agreed that the French
contention was sound, that the inactivity of England for ten years was
sufficient to justify the assumption of the abandonment of the island.2
During the negotiations for the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis of
3 April 1559 between France and Spain a question which was later
to prove of the greatest importance to England was discussed. The
French claimed the right to go to the Spanish Indies, the Spaniards
1 Wcsdake,p. 161.
a phiUimore, Intonaiwnal Law, vol. i, § 341 ; Hall, W. E., International Law, § 34; Oppen-
ham, L., International Law, vol. i, § 347.
"LINES OF AMITY" 187
resisted and based their claims to a monopoly on the grants of Alex-
ander VI (Inter caetera], 1493 to Spain and of Julius II (Ea quae), 1506
to Portugal, and also on the ground of discovery.1 In the end the
matter was excluded from the treaty and an oral agreement was
arrived at limiting the operation of the treaty to the east of the prime
meridian and the north of the tropic of Cancer. These were to be the
" lines of amity ", beyond them "might should make right and violence
done by either party to the other should not be regarded as a contra-
vention of treaties*5.2 The French and Spaniards subsequently dis-
agreed as to the situation of the prime meridian; the latter recognised
what corresponded roughly to that set forth in the Portuguese demarca-
tion line of the bull of 1454 and the Spanish line of the bull of 1493.
When James I came to the throne he was anxious to make peace with
Philip III of Spain and the Treaty of London was concluded between
the two monarchs in June 1604. The question of the exclusion of
Englishmen from the New World was raised, as it had been with the
French, and again the treaty failed to settle the question. The Spanish
contention was that, as the "Indies were a new world", the doctrines
applying to the Old World did not apply; this accorded with the prin-
ciple that treaties did not apply beyond the "lines of amity". In
practice, James and his successors adopted the principles which had
been contained in the instructions to the English negotiators four
years previously, that only places which were actually planted by
the Spaniards in the New World should be immune from settlement.
As has been already seen, the charter of Virginia and the other early
charters to the New England colonies granted the colonists rights
over portions "not actually possessed by any Christian prince or
people". Against this charter Spain protested in i6og.8 Since 1559
the French and Spaniards had fought beyond the "line", without
any violation of the treaty of that year, and Henry IV, speaking of
the treaty of 1604, hoped that the English would continue to do as
his subjects had done.
In the end an ambiguous phrase was used in the article which pro-
vided for general intercourse between the subjects of the two con-
tracting Powers,4 that there should be free commerce between them
"both by land, by sea andfresh water in all and singular their kingdoms,
dominions, islands, other lands, cities, towns, ports and straits of the
said kingdoms and dominions, where commerce existed before the war,
agreeably and according to the use and observance of the ancient alliances and
treaties before the war'9. The form of words is generally similar to that
of older treaties which refer to the terms contained in the Inter-
cursus Magnus of I4g6,5 under which freedom of intercourse is pro-
vided for the subjects of the English and Burgundian rulers. Henry VII
1 Antunez de Portugal, Tractates de Donatiombus, n, 53; Nys, E., Le droit international et
le droit pohtique, la ligne de demarcation d'Alexandre VI, 1. 1, p. 193.
2 Davenport, p. 220. 8 Ibid. p. 260. 4 Ibid. p. 256.
5 Rymer, T., Foedera, xn, 583.
1 88 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD
in granting the charter to the Cabots may well have interpreted the
phrase as only limiting his grantees to occupy places not actually in
the possession of the King of Spain, but otherwise allowing for freedom
of intercourse, and in the Elizabethan period of expansion a like
freedom of intercourse was claimed under this and similar treaties.
The Spanish view throughout the period was clearly that the treaties
of mutual intercourse were operative only within the "lines of amity "
and that the proceedings of the English seamen in the New World
were attempts to obtain by force what English statesmen contended
was theirs by right. The Spanish kings were not prepared for many
years to admit that any other States had rights of occupation or trade
within the territories they claimed under papal bulls and discovery;
at the same time neither they nor the English and French were
desirous of treating as acts of war the forcible proceedings of the
northern seamen in attacking and capturing the riches of Spain in
the western hemisphere.1
There were many acts offeree committed by the subjects of States
at this and earlier times which were entirely indistinguishable from
acts of war, but which were not regarded as creating a state of war
between the States themselves. The line between peace and war was
not so clearly defined as in modern times. Originally and in theory
such acts remained forcible means taken against the subjects of
another State or against their goods to constrain the foreign Power
to do justice upon the questions in dispute. Under the name of
"reprisals " they are provided for by treaties so far back as the middle
of the thirteenth century. At first they appear to have been carried
out by private persons without any public authority, when there was
little if anything to distinguish them from piracy, but later, authorisa-
tion of the prince was recognised as necessary and became the rule.
These were known as "special reprisals59 to distinguish them from
similar acts of a general character against all the persons or property
of a foreign State, authorised by the Government, to which the name
of " general reprisals " was given. A statute of Henry V only allowed
reprisals after lettres de requite had been sent to the Privy Council,
which if granted enabled the injured party to obtain letters of marque
under the great seal.2 Treaties from the fifteenth century provided
that no reprisals should be authorised until the prince of the subject
despoiled had applied for redress to the prince of the alleged wrong-
doer.8 The grant of letters of reprisals and of marque continued to be
an important feature during the period of the Anglo-Spanish rivalry
of the sixteenth century and during the Anglo-Dutch conflicts of the
seventeenth century. During the latter conflicts "general reprisals"
1 For other references to the history of the line of demarcation see Payne, E. G., in
Camb.Mod. Hist. , vol. i, chap, i; Bourne, E, G., Essays in historical criticism, p. 175; Hanisse,
r AV __ -^ ^f f jt
1 4 Hen. V, c. 7.
3 Dumont, Corps wnverssl diplomatique, vol. rv, pt n, p. 12.
VAGUE IDEAS OF NEUTRALITY 189
were introduced and letters of marque were freely given irrespectively
of whether the grantees had received injury or not. By the end of the
seventeenth century "special reprisals" were dying out.
The writers of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century
generally conceived of war as a dispute by force, or dealt with the
status or condition of the belligerents. They failed to envisage the
existence of the legal condition which arises from war and to dis-
tinguish it from the use of forcible means of obtaining redress, such
as reprisals, where a state of war is not in existence. There was not,
in fact, the same necessity for the modern conception of war as there is
to-day, since the modern notion of neutrality with the rights and duties
of neutrals which it involves was non-existent. The belligerents had
but little concern or theoretical respect for third parties, their rights
and obligations, and the latter had no modern sense of their duties
and rights in relation to the belligerents. The quarrel might be and
possibly ought to be the concern of their neighbours, a state of things
in keeping with the cosmopolitanism of the times and the absence of
the sentiment of nationality. But this is not to say that the condition of
neutrality was unknown. The neutrality of particular territory in the
sense of its immunity from acts of hostility was recognised in the
sixteenth century. The Act given by Francis I in 1536 for the pro-
tection of the territories of the Duke of Lorraine recognised the lands
as "neutres "-1 The subjects of States not engaged in war were termed
non hostes or medii in bello. The conception of neutral duties appears,
indeed, alifen to the thought of the period, and especially is this true
during the wars of religion, when the assistance of belligerents of his
own communion was felt to be the duty of a Christian prince. The
Dutch and French Protestants both received aid from bodies of
English and Scottish soldiers even where there was no state of war
between the English and Spanish monarchs. Henry IV allowed
regiments of French soldiers to enter the service of the United Pro-
vinces, and when, in 1631, the Marquis of Hamilton took 6000 men
to the assistance of Gustavus Adolphus, with the consent of Charles I,
the expedition was exceptional only in its size.2 If States wished to be
neutral, they entered into treaties for this purpose, and even such
treaties were not necessarily violated where limited aid was given to
a State under pre-existing conditions. So, too, treaties not infre-
quently gave States a right to raise forces in countries which were not
parties to the war. The meagre condition of the law may be seen from
the fact that Grotius in 1625 has but one short chapter in his Dejure
belli ac pads on "De his qui in bello medii sunt", in which he lays it
down that "it is the duty of those who stand apart from a war to do
nothing which may strengthen the side whose cause is unjust, or
1 Walker, T. A., Hist, of Int. Law, p. 105; see also "Neutrality and neutralisation in the
sixteenth century— Lifcge", by Knight, W. S. M., Jovm. of Comp. Legislation, 3rd ser. n
(1920), 48-98. * HaB7§ 208.
igo INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD
which may hinder the movements of him who is carrying on a just
war; and in a doubtful case, to act alike to both sides in permitting
transit, in supplying provisions to the respective armies, and in not
assisting persons besieged".1
As regards the rights of the non-belligerents there seems to have
been a curious conflict in practice between the claim for inviolability
of neutral territory and the complaints when it was enforced. Perhaps
herein is to be seen the well-known change in the point of view which
has invariably characterised the attitude of States according as they
are belligerent or neutral. In the sixteenth century respect for neutral
territory appears to have been slight, and Elizabeth's action in 1588
in instructing her ambassador to complain to Henry III of the con-
duct of French officials in preventing the capture by her ships of
Spanish property in French waters was scarcely in accord with the
opinion of Gentilis.2 The theory of neutral right became more pro-
nounced at the end of the sixteenth and in the early part of the
seventeenth century. James I in 1604 issued a proclamation for-
bidding belligerent acts within any places in his dominions "or so
near to any of our said ports and havens as may be reasonably con-
strued to be within that title, limit or precinct". He further defined
the lines of neutrality at sea as "a straight line drawn from one point
to another within the realm of England". The areas so enclosed were
called "The King's Chambers". But even in the next year the Dutch
and Spanish fleets fought in Dover harbour, and innumerable in-
stances occurred during the next half century showing that the
doctrine was more honoured in the breach than the observance.8
It was not until the eighteenth century that neutral rights were better
respected. The principle of contraband, involving the capture of
neutral goods destined for the enemy, was coming into being and
Elizabeth defended Drake's capture in 1589 of Hanseatic vessels in
the Tagus which were laden with stores for a new Armada. She laid
down the proposition: "The right of neutrality is in such sort to be
used, that while we help the one, we hurt not the other".4
The practice of warfare in the period under consideration was cruel
and savage, though it must be borne in mind that the general customs
of the age were such as would in many respects revolt modern
ideas.
It is not easy to define the position of many of the great seamen of
the Elizabethan age in their attacks on Spanish trade in the New
World. That there was lawlessness, there is no doubt, cruelty also in
many cases. But Englishmen would not be denied commerce in the
New World, and trade merged into war. These proceedings, if not
always authorised, were connived at by the Queen and her advisers;
1 Dejure belli aefacis, lib. m, cap. xvii.
* "Aiienum temtorium sccuritatcrn praestat", De jure belli, lib. n, cap. 327.
For examples see Hall, § 309. « Walker, p. 200.
RIGHTS OF ABORIGINES IN NEWLY FOUND LANDS 191
if the adventurers were successful, they shared in the spoils; if not,
the ^ adventure failed; but in both events the peace between the
nations remained unbroken. Religion was doubtless a strong com-
pelling force, but economic forces were also at work with equal
power. The New World was the main source of the gold supply of
Spain, and this was being used to overwhelm the Protestant move-
ment in Europe, and French Protestants joined with English in en-
deavouring by way of reprisals to cut off Spanish supplies at their
source and to found colonies in those parts of the world which Spain
claimed as her own. To attempt to pass judgment on the actions of
the pioneers of naval expansion in the light of such international law
as could be said to exist at the period appears to be a vain task.
Treaties there were, but the interpretation of the terms relating to
the intercourse of the subjects of the contracting States was dis-
puted. Beyond the "lines" might was right.
To return to the Spanish claims; the most important event oc-
curred in the making of the Treaty of Madrid, 1630, between England
and Spain. The principles underlying the treaty are similar to those
of the treaty of 1604, freedom of commerce being allowed "where
there was commerce between the said kingdoms before the war be-
tween Philip II, King of Spain, and Elizabeth, Queen of England,
according as it was settled in the treaty of peace of the year 1604". x
There is no specific mention of what these places were; the matter
was left as equivocal as before. In one respect, however, the treaty
registers a change. The view that treaties lost their force in places
"beyond the lines of peace" was abandoned as regards prizes, for it
was agreed that those taken "beyond the line" should be restored.
At length, in the Treaty of Miinster, 1648, Spain formally acknow-
ledged that the Netherlands had the right of navigation and com-
merce both in the West and East Indies (Art. s).2 The long struggle
for freedom of navigation and settlement in the New World was
ending, and treaties were now operating "beyond the line".
Something more should be said of the rights of the original in-
habitants in the newly discovered lands, as strongly opposed points
of view manifested themselves on this subject. Later opinion tended
to deny to pagan inhabitants the possibility of sovereign rights over
their territories; but writers of the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries generally inclined either to the opinion that such peoples
had complete rights as against all others, or that they had conditional
or restricted rights. The contrary opinion followed from the principles
advocated by Wycliffe; this was condemned by the Council of
Constance (1414-18) and by Richard Fitzralph, Archbishop of
Armagh, in regard to Poles and Lithuanians.8 But this con-
demnation did not prevent the view from reappearing and being
1 Davenport, p. 313. 2 Ibid. p. 363.
9 Nys, E., Le droit des gttns et les ancUns jurisconsults espagnols, p. 65.
192 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD
strongly held in the sixteenth century, especially in England and
other countries which rejected the scholastic views of which St
Thomas Aquinas was the chief author. It seems clear that the great
Spanish authorities of the sixteenth century held the view that the
newly discovered lands in America were not t&rritoria nullius. This
doctrine was emphatically enunciated by Franciscus £ Victoria and
Dominic Soto, the latter declaring that there was no difference be-
tween Christians and pagans, for the law of nations is equal to all
nations. Las Gasas and Ayala, Gentilis and Grotius followed in the
same line of thought, maintaining that the discovery of unknown
lands already occupied did not give the discoverers the right to
deprive the inhabitants of their territory.1
The reasons which led both Spanish and Portuguese navigators to
undertake their hazardous adventures were complex, though emphasis
is laid in the papal bulls on the spread of Christianity, and the con-
version of the heathen. Ferdinand and Isabella and their successors
were actuated by a desire to extend the power and influence
of the Church and their personal pre-eminence as its bulwarks,
and they found in the papal claims to overlordship of the infidel
world valuable assistance to their own aims. The writings of the
theological jurists of Spain gave them an immense moral support,
and their insistence on the claims of humanity, emphasised in the
bulls themselves, strengthened the claims of the Portuguese and
Spanish monarchs. Unfortunately, the teachings of these writers
were not observed in practice. The secular advantage accruing from
discovery of lands with illimitable' potentialities for wealth led to an
easy disregard for the doctrine of the sovereignty of the local chiefs
and leaders. The expeditions were invariably accompanied by
ecclesiastics and notaries who not only assisted in, but controlled, the
process of occupation and the preparation of treaties with the Indian
chiefs. These treaties gave practical advantages as against rivals of
the western world, and almost invariably led to acquisition of sove-
reignty either by the unconscious and indefinite development of events
or by the breach which afforded a just cause for the desired war of
conquest. Such a casus belli, according to many of these theological
jurists, was necessary before a just war could be undertaken, while,
according to others, the passive or obstinate resistance by the abori-
gines to the preaching of the Gospel was itself a casus belli giving rise
to njustum bellum.*
But, while these methods were being followed in the East and West
by the Spanish and Portuguese, England remained indifferent. The
bulls were not accepted either here or in France3 as excluding the
1 Nys, op. cit. chap, vii; Lindley, M., The Acquisition and Government of Backward Terri-
tory* p* 12.
1 Of. the circumstances of the Spanish occupation of Luzon in 1570, Blair and Robertson,
Papers relating to the Ptifypin* Islands, n, 169.
* Margry, P., Navigations frarqaises, p. aai.
SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE RAGES IGNORED 193
search of other nations for new lands and islands. The charter to the
Cabots enunciated a principle not dissimilar from that of the papal
bulls, that lands hitherto unknown to Christians were open to occu-
pation by the adventurer. But the Cabots were sailing under the flag
of England, and the lands they discovered were to come under
the sovereignty of the English king. Before long, the cruelties of the
Spaniards in America raised a righteous indignation in England and
urged her seamen to desperate vengeance, but this was mainly due
to the religious struggles of the period and the danger to England of
the Spanish power. The great Spanish theologians and missionaries
protested in vain against the excesses of their countrymen, who were
ignoring their humanitarian claims. Elizabeth in her instructions to
Fenton on his expedition to the East Indies and China warns him not
only against despoiling Christians but also to deal with the pagans
as a good and honest merchant, but there is no pretence at discovery
for the purpose of conversion. Still it must be remembered that in the
earliest charters of the colonies in the New World, one of the reasons
given for the grant is "the propagating of Christian religion to such
people as yet live in darkness and miserable ignorance of the true
knowledge and worship of God 'V and " the conversion of such savages
as remain wandering in desolation and distress to civil society and
Christian religion".2 The law of Nature and nations had acquired in
England a new meaning. A new interpretation was placed upon it
in accordance with Protestant thought and English interests. The
sovereignty of the native races was ignored, a decided, though un-
conscious tribute to the genius of Wycliffe. Discovery followed by
settlement, thus leading to occupation, or, more rarely, the simple
right of conquest, was relied on as a title. There was no real agreement
as to the legal basis on which claims should rest at this time, and
modern authorities are similarly in disagreement. States were feeling
their way towards a juridical basis for their acts, so that they might
defend them against others and against the aborigines.
Later writers have enunciated the principles on which they deemed
the discoverer or conquerors might base their tide. Thus Blackstone
says, "Plantations or colonies, in distant countries, are either such
where the lands are claimed by right of occupancy only by finding
them desert and uncultivated, and peopling them from the mother
country; or where, when they are already cultivated, they have been
either gained by conquest or ceded to us by treaties. And both these
rights are founded upon the law of nature, or at least upon that of
nations". He further adds that our American Plantations were ob-
tained "either by right of conquest and driving put the natives (with
what natural justice I shall not at present enquire) or by treaties ".*
1 Aft. 3 of the first charter of Virginia, 1606.
1 Patent of Council for New England, 1620; cf. also the first charter of Massachusetts,
1629. 8 Commentaries, i, 107, 108
CHBEI X3
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD
From this view Story, the distinguished American jurist, dissents,
but he does not take account of the fact that Blackstone is considering
the question as between England and the native races only, and not as
between England and other States. From the latter point of view
both he, Kent and Chief Justice Marshall lay stress on the priority
of discovery. The last-named authority, after pointing out that the
European nations, in their eagerness to acquire new territories, found
no difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample com-
pensation to the inhabitants of the New World by bestowing on them
civilisation and Christianity in exchange for unlimited independence,
says,
It was necessary in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war
with each other to establish a principle which all should acknowledge as the law
by which the right of acquisition to which they aU assented should be regulated as
between themselves. The principle was that the discovery gave title to the Govern-
ment by whose subjects or by whose authority it was made, against all other
European Governments, which title might be consummated by possession.
He then adds a summary in which he shows that the history of
America from its discovery to the present time proves the recogni-
tion of these principles.
Spain did not rest her title solely on the grant of the Pope. Her discussions
respecting boundary, with France, with Great Britain, and with the United States,
all show that she placed it on the rights given by discovery. Portugal sustained her
claim to the Brazils by the same title. France, also, founded her title to the vast
territories she claimed in America on discovery The States of Holland also
made acquisitions in America and sustained their right on the common principle
adopted by all Europe The claim of the Dutch was always contested by the
English; not because they questioned the title given by discovery, but because they
insisted on being themselves the rightful claimants under that title. Their pre-
tensions were finally decided by the sword.1
It is obvious that during the period under review England could
not have made the firm beginnings of overseas expansion had she not
been a maritime Power. As such she was faced with international
problems, and to the solution of them she ultimately contributed
much. On her east coast were great sea fisheries, perhaps the most
important in Europe, which were at the same time a source of food
supply and of wealth not only for her own people but for those of a
large part of Che continent. The use or control of these fisheries, the
spirit of adventure and of trade which developed in the sixteenth
century, produced competition and conflicts, which led to an exami-
nation of international rights and elaboration of doctrines relating
to them.
The chief questions connected with the sea which call for examina-
tion during this period are those of the sovereignty of the sea, claims
* Johnson and Graham's lesseev. Mclntosh (1833) 8 Wheat. 543; see also Story's Commentaries,
§ 152; Ktfitv Commentaries, ra, 384; Moore, J. B., Digest tf International Law, I, § 80; Snow,
A. H., The Question of Aborigines in the Law and Practice of Nations, chaps, iii and vi;
Lmdley, p. 23. v » r-
EXTRAVAGANT CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY OF SEA 195
to appropriate or to exercise dominion over vast areas of the ocean
and the restriction of commerce and navigation therein, the right to
sea fisheries,, inshore as well as deep sea, and the limits of the terri-
torial seas.1 All of these questions are largely involved in the funda-
mental one of national occupation, property or jurisdiction over the
sea, and as regards England herself some of the most important
matters during the period were those connected with fishery rights.
It has become an uncontested principle of modern international
law, that the sea as a general rule cannot be subjected to appropria-
tion,2 but at the beginning of the seventeenth century there was
probably no part of the seas surrounding Europe free from the claims
of proprietary rights by some Powers, nor were there any over which
such rights were not exercised in varying degrees.3 The Italian
Republics of Venice and Genoa afford striking examples; the former
before the end of the thirteenth century claimed the sovereignty of
the Adriatic, the latter that of the Ligurian Sea. The claims of Venice,
though she was not in possession of both the shores, were acknow-
ledged by the Popes and by other Powers, and, even after her decline,
these rights were admitted generally as barriers to the Turks. In the
north Denmark and Sweden claimed the Baltic, and Norway and,
later, Denmark claimed the northern seas between Norway, Iceland
and Greenland, on the principle that possession of the opposite shores
carried the sovereignty of the intervening seas. The Spanish and
Portuguese claims, based on the papal bulls and the Treaty of Tor-
desillas, as we have seen, were still greater. The "line" was drawn
dividing their dominions, and westward of it in the Atlantic, the
Caribbean Seas and the Pacific, Spain claimed the exclusive right
of navigation, while eastward of it in the Atlantic and in the Indian
Ocean Portugal advanced similar claims. With the English claims
we shall deal later.
Meanwhile it is well to ascertain the reasons which underlay claims
which to-day appear extravagant. Doubtless the principle of self-
preservation, the need for the protection of their coasts and of their
commerce and the maintenance of a monopoly of trade were im-
portant reasons for the assertion of the right of supremacy over ad-
jacent seas. But the enforcement of the right of control, carrying with
it often the right to levy tolls and other charges for a protection to
passing ships which was often more nominal than real, was tolerated
so far as it enabled the foreign sailor to obtain assistance and ^pro-
tection from the pirate, the plague of the seafarer in the Middle
Ages. In the Baltic, the North Sea, the Channel, the Medi-
terranean, everywhere, traders were exposed to the attacks of these
1 This last subject is dealt with in chapter xix, infra.
a Hall, W. £., International Law, § 40. '
8 Fulton, 7~
Hist, of Int.
Droit international 1
13-2
ig6 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD
sea robbers. The merchants of various nations soon found that the
protection of their trade must be undertaken by themselves, and they
armed their fleets, which sailed in consort under an elected chief
called an admiral.1 Articles of agreement were drawn up regulating
the voyage, providing for mutual defence and a fair division of any
captures they might make from the pirates ; the admiral was not only
their leader but to him was left the duty of adjudicating in matters of
prize. Princes found it to their advantage to enlist die services of
these associations, and in so doing they deemed it best to leave them
to obey their accustomed rules, and thus their rules grew into maritime
international law, the customary law of the sea. The Admiral's Court
became a Court of Prize which operated not only in case of captures
from pirates, in prizes taken by way of reprisals, but also of prizes
taken in war. Fighting navies maintained by the State only came
into existence about the fifteenth century; princes engaged the ser-
vices of the associations of merchants and mariners as well to protect
the seas from pirates as for purposes of war. The conception of the
sovereignty of the seas residing in the monarch had, therefore, in the
Middle Ages and later a real and beneficent cause. That such claims
should first appear in the Mediterranean was only natural, for the
trading cities of Italy were the chief sufferers from the depredations
of Saracens and Greeks in those waters. The extension of jurisdiction
involving claims to sovereign rights over adjacent waters was a
means of giving such claims the appearance of a legal basis as being
appurtenant to ownership, and the principles laid down for the
Mediterranean extended to other seas.2
The English daim was probably at first based on the ground of
protecting commerce, but in its early stages there appears to have
been little interference with shipping in the seas adjacent to these
islands. The later Plantagenets and the Stuarts claimed this sove-
reignty, but the extent of the claims and their attempted enforcement
appear to differ very considerably.8 On the claims of the Plantagenet
kings there is a difference of opinion, but the better view appears to
be that they originated in the need for the protection of shipping.
A much-cited ordinance of Bang John in ipoi required all vessels,
foreign and English, "to strike or veil their Bonnets at the com-
mandment of the lieutenant of the King, or of the Admiral of the
King or his lieutenant". There are doubts as to the authenticity of
this ordinance, but the weight of authority is in its favour. Both
shores of the Channel were under the sovereignty of the English king,
and this according to current ideas gave him special rights. Probably
1 Twiss, Sir Trayers, Law qf Nations, War, §§ 74, 76.
* Nys, E., Les origincs du droit international, chap. xvi.
» See Sir Tohn Boroughs, Sovereignty of the British SMS (1633), with introduction by T. C.
Wade (1920); Wade, T. C., "The Roll De Superioritate mans Anglia", Brit. Tear Book of
Intornat. Law, 1921-22, p. 99; Fulton, T. W., The Sovereignty of the Sea, Introduction and
chap, i; Twiss, Sir Travers, The Black Book of the Admiralty, Introduction.
ENGLISH CLAIMS OVER THE ADJACENT SEAS 197
the lowering of the topsail was to enable the vessel to be stopped to
ascertain whether she was a pirate or engaged in lawful trade. It was
not till the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the "right of the
flag'9 was enforced to signify an acknowledgment of claims of sove-
reignty of the sea far in excess of those of the Plantagenets. Edward III
by a commission of 1336 to Geoffrey de Say as admiral made the
definite assertion that die kings of England had in times past been
lords of the English seas on every side and defenders of the same
against the incursions of their enemies. Edward III in the earlier
part of his reign well deserved the title of " Lord of the Sea", andin 1 340
after his victory over the French .in the battle of Sluys he coined the
famous gold noble of which the obverse bears the effigy of the King,
crowned, standing in a ship with a sword in one hand and a shield
in the other. This was taken to represent "king, shype, and swerde
and pouer of the sea" by the author of The Libel of English Polity
who, seventy years later, was bewailing the condition of tie English
fleet. By the end of the reign of Edward III the fleet was starved and
defeated by the Spaniards, and in the reign of Henry VI the naval
power of England was reduced to a very low ebb.1 The words used
to designate the nature of the claims were superwritas or dtwdnium, but
it does not appear that the monarchs considered the seas over which
they made these claims as part of their domains or that foreigners
were prevented from passing through them or taking the produce,
nor was tribute levied as was done by Denmark at the Sound or by
Venice in the Adriatic. "The Plantagenets strove for little more than
a high sounding title, and were willing for the prestige which it con-
ferred to undertake the burdens and duties which it involved."2
During the fifteenth century the sea power of England was at its
lowest, and until the claim was revived in an exaggerated form by
the Stuarts there is little trace of attempts to assert maritime juris-
diction during the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth
century. The attitude of Qjieen Elizabeth to such questions is con-
sidered below. The demand for the observance of the lowering of
the topsail and the ceremonial striking of the flag was made from time
to time and enforced. In the reigns of Henry VIII and 'Edward VI
we have examples, and this demand began to be made from foreign
ships of war in the Channel. In 1554 the Spanish admiral's ship
carrying Philip of Spain to marry the Qiieen was fired on by Lord
William Howard and compelled to lower her colours in the presence
of the English fleet. It was not, however, till the next century that
the ceremony became of international importance.
The subject of fisheries in the North Sea and the waters surrounding
England is one of great importance in this period, but from the reign
of Edward III there was considerable liberty of action for all foreign
fishermen, with occasional assertions of ceremonial acknowledgments.
1 Fulton, p. 37. * Wade, in Brit. Tear Book of Internal. Low, 1921-33, p. 107.
i98 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD
To the end of the sixteenth century many of the treaties concluded
for mutual commerce and navigation included permission to fish in
English waters. The Dutch were the greatest fishermen of the period,
and the industry became of supreme national importance to them.
The most important treaty on this matter was that made in 1496
between Henry VII and Philip, Archduke of Austria and Duke of
Burgundy, known as Intercursus Magnus (The Great Intercourse,
9t Groot Commercie-Tractaat), which has been called the "sheet-anchor
of Dutch policy in relation to England in the seventeenth century "-1
This treaty endured for about 150 years, and under it the fishermen
of both nations — English and Dutch — were to be at liberty to go in
security to fish anywhere on the sea, without requiring any licence or
safe-conduct, and to have free use of one another's ports when com-
pelled thereto by stress of misfortune, weather or enemies, paying the
ordinary dues (solvendo in locis ubi applicdbunt quin et theolonia praedicta)
and being free to leave with their ships and cargoes without hind-
rance.2 Throughout the Tudor period English policy towards foreign
fishermen was liberal and conceded the right to fish in English waters.
The policy of Scotland was more restrictive, the Scottish fisheries were
of even greater value than those of England, and with the accession
ofjames I, whose upbringing had been in a very different atmosphere
from the liberal policy of England, the "bloody quarrels" — as
Welwood terms them — of the Scottish and Dutch fishers extended to
England. After the Reformation a rapid decay of the English sea
fisheries had set in, and the revival of the industry became an im-
portant object of the domestic politics of the country. To this end
there arose a desire to prohibit all foreigners, and especially the Dutch,
from using the fisheries, and this led to a movement for the assertion of
England's sovereignty of her seas. The literary pioneer of England's
claims was Dr John Dee, better known as "magician" and astrologer,
but also a scientist and political thinker. He published in 1 577 a book
entitled General and Rare Memorials pertaining to the Perfect Arte of Navi-
gation, known also as The Brytisk Monarchie. While admitting that the
British seas were common to all for navigation, he put forward the
view that the fisheries within the royal limits and jurisdiction wherein
the English Grown had its sovereignty, pertained to the Grown and
should be free only to such foreigners as were licensed and paid
tribute. Of Dee it has been said that he "was not only the first
English writer who claimed the sovereignty of the sea and the fisheries
for England; but he was also the first who attempted to define their
boundaries in detail".8 The limits were based largely on the writings
of Italian jurists such as Bartolus and Baldus,4 but such claims, even
with the support of Plowden, who had previously in arguing a case
1 Fulton, p. 72. a Rymer, T., Foedera, xn, 583; Dumont, m, ii, 338.
8 Fulton, p. i ox.
4 Fcnn, P. T-, jr., The Origin of the Right of Fishery in Territorial Wafers, chap, vi.
QJUEEN ELIZABETH AND FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 199
submitted similar limits, were not accepted by those in authority.
Plowden denied the Queen's rights of property in the sea, or that she
could prohibit anyone from fishing in it.
Elizabeth, who is sometimes wrongly accused of inconsistency in
this matter,1 long before Grotius wrote his Mare Liberum in 1609,
put forward no such claims over the seas adjacent to her realm. Her
protest to Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, is mentioned below,
and in her dispute with the King of Denmark arising out of the
Danish monopoly of the Iceland fisheries, her instructions to the
English ambassadors (in 1602) contained a remarkable argument
in favour of the free sea. She claimed that the law of -nations
allowed fishing in the sea everywhere. There could be no property
in the sea even though both sides belonged to the same monarch, the
most that she was prepared to allow was some oversight and juris-
diction for a small distance from the coast. Elizabeth was not thinking
alone of the English seas, she had already combated the claims of
Spain and Portugal whose demands extended to the complete ex-
clusion of other nations from the waters allotted them under the papal
bulls and treaty. Her dispute with Portugal began early in her reign,2
but it was with Spain that the most serious trouble was occasioned.
Elizabeth's policy was to secure freedom to trade and to fish for all
her subjects, and Drake, Frobisher and Hawkins in the West and
Cavendish and Lancaster in the East provided the practical answer to
these pretensions of the Iberian Powers. The foundations of the British
Empire were being laid beyond the seas, and this great undertaking
was only legally possible on the assumption that the seas were free to
the navigation of all and that no newly discovered territory, not
effectively occupied by any other Christian Power, was closed to the
English adventurers and their ambitions. The Spanish pretensions
received careful consideration by Elizabeth and her advisers. To
Mendoza's complaints in 1580 of Drake's depredations the Spanish
ambassador was told by the Queen that his master was violating the
law of nations in forbidding English commerce in the West Indies,
and that her subjects would continue to navigate those seas since
"the use of the sea and air is common to all'*.8
With the accession of James I the claim of England to the sove-
reignty of the seas entered upon a new stage. In the first year of his
reign he decided that charts should be prepared marking out the
"King's Chambers", the areas between the headlands round the
coast of England within which all hostile acts of belligerents were
prohibited. This step was for the fuller ascertainment of the juris-
diction of the king and is noteworthy also as an assertion of neutral
protection. But very soon a further step was taken with a view to
1 Hall, W. E., International Law, § 40.
8 Selden, J., Mare Clausian, i, c. xvii.
8 Gamden, W., Armals, p. 225 (ed. 1635). See Fulton, p. 107.
200 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD
protecting fisheries along the coasts of Britain and Ireland. The Scots
had always been jealous of foreign fishermen, and during the reign
of Elizabeth the Dutch had vastly increased their encroachments on
English waters. The political situation was now changed. Elizabeth
had stood as the protector and ally of the Protestant Dutch in their
revolt against the Spaniards. The United Provinces were rapidly
becoming the chief maritime competitors of England. James Fs
attitude to Spain was quite different from that of Elizabeth. Spain
at the beginning of the seventeenth century, though still a great
Power, was not the danger she had been in the middle of the sixteenth
century. James early concluded peace with Spain,1 and turned his
attention to the Dutch who throughout the seventeenth century were
to be the great rivals of England and amongst whose chief commercial
assets were the fisheries in the North Sea. So James proceeded in
1609 to claim all the fisheries along the coasts of Great Britain and
Ireland and to prohibit foreigners from fishing there without licences.
From this time the English claim to the sovereignty of the sea was
asserted in a far more extensive manner than had ever been sug-
gested before, and this assertion met with the approval of the people
of England, jealous of their rivals not only in the fisheries but in their
commercial enterprises in other parts of the world, and actuated
by the feeling that in their dealings with the Dutch, the latter were
by no means open and fair. The Plantagenet claims were based
on the necessity of keeping the seas clear of pirates, the Stuart
claim embodied "the national jealousy of the success of active
and industrious competitors". In support of his claim the King re-
ferred the matter to the Privy Council to examine the question whether
he was fettered in his action by treaties, and especially by the Inter-
cursus Magnus. The report of tie Committee was favourable to the
King.2 The Dutch were not unprepared, as the tenor of the report of
the Privy Council was known several months before the proclamation
was issued, and almost immediately it was followed by the publication
by Grotius, at the request of the Dutch Government, of his Mare
Liberum — the classic argument against the principle of the sovereignty
of the sea. This was followed, before the issue of King James's procla-
mations by the Truce of Antwerp (1609) whereby the long struggle
between Spain and the United Provinces was brought to a standstill
for twelve years. The States-General at once protested. The operation
of the proclamation was suspended, but not withdrawn, and James
ordered the State archives to be searched to ascertain what arguments
could be found to support his pretension to maritime sovereignty and
exclusive fishing in the waters in question. Special embassies passed
between England and Holland, the position being complicated by a
Dutch protest against England's activities in the Far East, where the
English claims for freedom of navigation and commerce were being
1 Vldg stfra, p. 77. * Pulton, p. 147.
DISPUTES BETWEEN ENGLAND AND HOLLAND 201
asserted. It is clear that considerations of interest, rather than of
principle, were the motive power of both parties. Meantime
James was punctiliously reasserting the right of the flag in the
Channel.
Charles "I carried his father's claims still further. James had laid
emphasis on fishing rights and the inviolability of the "King's
Chambers"; Charles claimed the lordship over all the surrounding
seas, the Channel and the North Sea. There was some excuse for
this in the lawless warfare which for years was carried on between
the Dutch and the Dunkirkers, who were little better than pirates.
Flagrant violations of English territory occurred. Twice in 1634
fights occurred in the harbours of Yarmouth and Scarborough be-
tween these belligerents — in the latter case the fight was actually con-
cluded on shore; this notwithstanding a proclamation of Charles in
^SS, reasserting his sovereignty over the whole of the four seas of
Great Britain. Unfortunately, the Navy of England was very weak
and unable to exercise its primary duty of preserving peace in the
Channel which was rendered more difficult by the incursions of
Mediterranean pirates. There was, therefore, in the opinion of the
English political leaders of the day, some reason for an active naval
policy, even for a "Ship-money" fleet, built under circumstances of
grave constitutional danger. For a time the question of the salute of
the flag raised but few difficulties on the part of the Dutch, and it was
not Richelieu's policy to engage France in war on such an issue.
Charles's attempts to assert his claims were, on the whole, a pitiable
failure, but at his instigation search was again made for precedents
to support them and Selden devoted his massive learning to this end.
The Long Parliament made the efficiency of the fleet one of its first
cares, and under it and the Commonwealth the Stuart claims were
not only asserted, but enforced, and the refusal of VanTromp to lower
his flag to Blake in the Straits of Dover was the proximate cause of
the first Dutch War.
This subject cannot be left without further reference to the great
juridical controversies on the freedom of the sea which filled the first
half of the seventeenth century, and whose results were only mani-
fested towards its end, when doubts began to be cast on the genuine-
ness of the historical precedents on which English claims were based
and also on the wisdom of their enforcement.1 The controversy has
been well called "the battle of the books", and it produced a series
of works on both sides characterised by an amazing amount of
erudition and dialectical skill. The protagonists on their respective
sides were the Dutch Grotius and the English Selden, both men of
immense learning and ardent patriotism. Grotius, as subsequent
events showed, was on the winning side, and it is quite as much —
if not more— to his Mare Liberum, as to his better known Dejure belli
1 Meadows, Sir Philip, Observations concerning the dommon and sovereignty qf the seas (1689).
202 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD
ac pacts, published in 1625, &** ^ daim to be the founder of inter-
national law is due.
The general position as regards the claims made by Venice, Genoa
and Denmark has already been noted. These claims were small
and unimportant when compared with the extravagant pretensions
of Spain and Portugal to the monopoly of trade and navigation in the
New World and the East, which involved the exclusion of all other
nations from all the waters of the world except those washing the
shores of Europe and North Africa. The English were by no means
the only nation to suffer by these claims; French and Dutch were
likewise excluded, and this interference with the Dutch traders in
the East Indies was the prime reason for Grotius writing his Mare
Liberum. By a curious irony of fate, not unlike that from which Milton
suffered in relation to his plea for the freedom of the press, Grotius
soon afterwards was arguing for the exclusion of the English from a
share in the trade in the East Indies which the Dutch had been able
to wrest from the Portuguese.1 The Mare Liberum was the twelfth
chapter of a work called Dejurepraedae in defence of the Dutch trade,
and the only part of it which was published during the writer's life-
time. The manuscript of this work remained unknown till 1864, and
was not given to the world till 1868. Grotius had been preceded in
his arguments for the freedom of navigation and commerce by two
Spanish writers, Francis Alfonso de Castro2 and Ferdinand Vasquicas
or Vasquez,3 who, like so many other Spanish jurists of the period,
showed an astonishingly independent attitude towards the legal
controversies of the time.
It is doubtful whether any country can show such a remarkable
body of jurists as those of Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries whose views were based on the broadest outlook of humanity
and without whose inspiration it is doubtful whether Grotius would
have written, or, if he had written, would have achieved the success
which his works attained.4 Both de Castro and Vasquez held that
the sea was common to all and that the claims of both die Portuguese
and the Spaniards to prohibit other nations from navigation in the
East and West Indies were untenable. Grotius not only adopted these
arguments, but also assailed the papal grants. He took the position
that every nation is free to travel to, and to trade with, any other nation,
a position which even to-day is not fully accepted in practice. As
regards the sea and navigation he argues that the sea is incapable of
occupation by any one State and is common to the use of all. He is
speaking here of the outer sea or ocean, not that adjacent to the
shores of a State and within sight of the shore. Further, since the
1 For an account of the origin of the Mare Libsntm and its connection with the Dejiere
praeda* see Knight, W. S. M., The Life and Works of Hugo Grotius (1925), chap, v; also
Fulton, chap, ix; Fenn, chap. viii.
* De Potostob lens penalis, 8 Controvcrsiac fllustns.
4 See Nys, E., le aroitdesgeru ft Us anciens jurisconsults cspagnols.
THE "BATTLE OF THE BOOKS" 203
sea is free to all, so is fishing in it, and this ought everywhere to be
exempt from tolls. Grotius repeated in more concise form these
principles in his Dejwre belli acpacis, with some modifications especi-
ally relating to what afterwards became known as "territorial waters ",
anticipating the position which Bynkershoek, another Dutchman, one
hundred years later assumed in his limitation of the waters adjacent
to the shores of a State to so much as was capable of being controlled
from the land. The Dutch obtained what they sought from the Portu-
guese by a treaty signed a month after the Mare Liberum was published.
But this work seems to have passed almost unnoticed on the continent
for some years. A reply was prepared by Seraphim de Freitas, a
Portuguese monk, in 1625, Dejusto imperio, and at the same time there
also appeared works in defence of the claims of Venice,1 though they
do not appear to have been replies to Grotius. But in England the
Mare Liberum received much more attention, the King was angry, and
the English ambassador at the Hague held up the author to oppro-
brium.2 The first reply from England came from the pen of William
Welwood, a Scotch Professor, who published in 1613 a new edition
of his treatise on the sea laws of Scotland which contained a chapter
on "The community and property of the sea", and two years later
he published a formal work in Latin on the same subject, De Dominio
Mans. Welwood asserted the right of the inhabitants of a country to
the fishery in the seas adjoining their shores, both for the maintenance
of the inhabitants and also to prevent the exhaustion of the fishery.
Welwood was the only antagonist to whom Grotius replied, though
the reply wajs not published but was found in manuscript with that
of the De jure praedae in 1868.
The classic reply to Grotius was made by John Selden in his Mare
Clausum published in 1635. Between the publication of the Mare
Liberum and Selden's reply other works dealing with the subject had
been published in England, and of these reference must be made
to the Hispanicae Advocationis of Albericus Gentilis, published in
1613. This was a reproduction of his arguments as representative
of Spain in the English Prize Courts, in which he contended that
the English seas extended on the west as far as America, and
that territorial jurisdiction extended round the coast to a distance
of 100 miles, an argument which was based on the doctrines
of the Italian school represented by Bartolus and Baldus, but not
accepted by the English courts. Sir John Boroughs, the Keeper of
the Records, was also engaged at this time, by command of Charles I,
in preparing a defence of the Stuart claims, using as one of his
chief arguments the De Superiontate roll to which reference has
already been made.3 Boroughs's work on Sovereignty of the British Seas,
written in Latin and dated 1633, was not published till 1651, but
it was available to Selden.
i See Fenn, chap. ix. • Fulton, p. 351. 8 Vide supa, p. 196.
204 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD
Sdden appears to have finished his first draft in 1618, but this was
greatly enlarged and revised and finally published in December 1635.
He met the claim that the sea is common to the use of all and in-
capable of appropriation by evidence of numerous cases to the con-
trary. He agreed that Spain and Portugal could not support their
claims because they had no sufficient naval forces to maintain them.
He admits that innocent navigation should not be prohibited, but
that it cannot always be claimed as a right. When he comes to the
claims of Charles I he endeavours to prove by citation from the
records that English kings had always preserved the right to forbid
navigation and to levy tolls for fishing. Much of this part of the
argument appears to be far-fetched and many of the examples given
could have been paralleled from the records of other maritime States
adjacent to the North Sea. Without entering further into the details
of his arguments it may be said that it surpassed the work of Grotius
in learning and was not less able in its arguments. "Apart from its
extreme doctrines as to the sovereignty of England in the seas, it more
correctly represented what are now the admitted principles as to the
appropriation of the adjacent seas than did most of the works written
on the other sides not excepting even those of Grotius."1
A reply to Selden was prepared in Holland by Dirck Graswinckel,
a kinsman of Grotius, but was not published. In 1637, however,
Pontanus, another Dutchman, in the service of the King of Denmark,
and therefore fettered to a great degree by the Danish claims to the
navigation of the Sound and the lordship of the seas round Iceland,
published a refutation of Selden in which he very severely criticised
the English claims to sovereignty of the northern seas. The "battle
of the books" continued throughout the remainder of the seventeenth
century, an accompaniment to the din of war which raged during its
greater part over the question of the freedom of the seas.
In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made not only to corre-
late England and English policy with the outer world, but in so doing
to show that the rules governing international relations, rules which
were afterwards to form part of the body of international law, were
vague, indefinite and only in process of formation. So long as there
was a claim for supremacy over the European nations by Emperor and
Pope, and the modern State system of Europe had not come into
being, there could be no realisation of the society of States which
needed for its fuller development and growth a system of laws to
govern the mutual relations of the members. When the society of
States appeared, then appeared the law — ubi societas, ibi ius. Un-
doubtedly there were the beginnings of rules in various departments
of State intercourse, but it was not until the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries that the idea of a State community began to force its way
into prominence. The law of Nature and of nations — the jus naturde
1 Fulton, p. 376.
WRITERS ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 205
and the jus gentium— were not treated as equivalent expressions by the
writers of the Renaissance; a distinction came to be drawn between
the rules for which the necessity could be seen and those for which the
necessity could not be seen.1
^ Ferdinand Vasquez Menchaea (1512-69), who has already been
cited in the "battle of the books", made a great step forward when
he conceived of the free nations of the earth grouped together as a
society with their rights regulated by the Jus Naturde et Gentium*
Vasquez was a writer of strong independence, the enemy of absolutism,
the advocate of freedom of navigation. While predicating a. jus inter
principes vel populos liberos he did not conceive of both the existence
of an international society and the independence and interdepend-
ence of its members so plainly as another of his countrymen, Francis
Suarez (1548-161 7).* Suarez taught that though the human race
was divided into peoples and kingdoms, each of which might in itself
be a complete community, yet each was a member of the universal
unity. "For these communities are never singly so self-sufficing but
that they stand in need of some mutual aid society and communion.
. . .For that reason they are in need of some law by which they may
be directed and rightly ordered in that kind of communion and
society."
Two important works on the laws of war were published at the
end of the sixteenth century, and a third, more important still, ap-
peared in 1625, which dealt not only with war but with peace also.
They were attempts to ascertain what principle underlay this im-
portant and prominent fact in international relations, to distinguish
acts of force in war from those between private persons, and to as-
certain how, if at all, the brutal desires of men could be curbed by
appeals to justice and right. The first of these is from the pen of
Balthazar Ayala (1548-84), Judge Advocate of the Spanish army in
the Netherlands, and was published in 1581. It is a treatise entitled
Dejure et qfficiis bellicis et disdplina militari;* the second is the Dejure
belli libri fres* by Albericus Gentilis (1552-1608), to whom reference
was made above. Gentilis was an Italian jurist who left Italy, as he
had embraced the reformed doctrines, and settled in Oxford where
he was made Regius Professor of the Civil Law. His work is of the
greatest importance and was much used by Grotius.
It is, however, to the work of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) that the
greatest importance must be attached in the evolution of a system of
international law. It is not possible to do more than briefly indicate
1 Westlake, Collected Papers, p. 26.
* IllustriwnContmversiarwn
* Tractates de legibtts acDeo legislature (1612); Walker, i, 155.
* Edited by John Westlake with a translation into English by John Pawley Bate, 1912;
see also Knight, W. S. M., "Balthazar Ayala and his work", Journ. ofComp. Legislation,
3rd ser. ra (1921), 220; Walker, i, 247.
5 Edited in 1877 by Sir T. E. Holland; see also his Studies in International Law, pp. 1-39,
and Oppenheim, L, International Law, i, § 52, for bibliography.
206 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OUTER WORLD
some of the reasons which made the publication of his Dejure belli ac
pads in 1625 an epoch in the history of the law governing the mutual
relations of States.1 Writing at a time when Europe was in the throes
of the Thirty Years' War, when passions were unrestrained, and wild
lawlessness and barbarity were everywhere rampant, he appeared as
the teacher of the rulers of men that they were members one of another
and that natural law is as binding on the members of the community
of States as on individual citizens of any one of them. He admits the
existence of rules of thej&r gentium as the practice of States, and that
many of them are in violation of the rule of reason or Nature, and
hence he pleaded for numerous ameliorations (temperamenta) in the
rules of war. The effect of his teaching was not immediate — many of its
precepts still remain unfulfilled— but its appeal to the learned classes
was great, and soon statesmen and warriors like Gustavus Adolphus,
who is said to have carried a copy with him on his campaigns, be-
came students of his work. It has been well said that "the secret of
his success lies in his conservative use of approved ingredients'*.2
He brought to the task of constructing a system of law suitable to a
new era a knowledge of the philosophic principles which had received
the approval of the best minds of the preceding generations. His
appeal to the law of Nature, to the Roman and canon law, was an
appeal to principles known and accepted. In the international con-
troversies of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance men argued in
the realms of private law arid remained within its domain, 'Grotius
earned them outside this realm into a higher sphere, that of a society
composed of States, His influence can be appreciated when the
leading principles of the Peace of Westphalia (1648) are compared
with those which were current in the sphere of international relations
before the works of Grotius and his predecessors appeared.
"The extended knowledge of the world in the era of discovery and
the growth of commerce raised numerous questions which called for
solution. The long wars of religion caused a new international sense
to arise among the members of conflicting confessions. The imperial
power was vanquished, and in the Peace of Westphalia, Catholic and
Protestant Powers met on terms ofequality, and a real society of States
emerged whose interests were the interests of all. Following this peace
came the general establishment of permanent embassies whose duties
were concerned with these common interests of the State society, and
'the rules governing the intercourse of such States were henceforth
sought in the principles which Grotius had enunciated in the law of
Nature or reason (as some writers prefer to call it8), and the law of
nations as evidenced by their customary modes of procedure.
1 See Higgins, A. Pearce, Studits in International Law and Relations.
* Laurence, T. J., International Law, § 23.
8 E.g, Westlake.
CHAPTER VH
THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY,
1649-1660
ATTEMPTS to deal with British policy are usually open to the
criticism that at most periods and in most departments of State
activity it is difficult to prove that a policy was ever consciously
formulated and acted upon. This is particularly true of some phases
of imperial affairs in the mid-seventeenth century. There is a mass
of ascertained facts bearing upon oceanic history, and there is also
a great volume of essays and pamphlet literature by irresponsible
writers, urging various courses upon successive Governments; but
there is a remarkable deficiency of State papers by which it might be
rigorously proved that English statesmen worked upon a great im-
perial policy, or did more than make opportunist moves as need arose.
We look in vain among the State papers of the Interregnum for any
programme from the hand of a man who had power to execute his
thoughts, like that which Colbert penned to Mazarin in 1653: "We
must re-establish or create all industries, even those of luxury;
establish a protective system in the customs; organise the producers
and traders in corporations; ease the fiscal bonds which are harmful
to the people; restore to France the marine transport of her pro-
ductions; develop the colonies and attach them commercially to
France; suppress all the intermediaries between France and India;
develop the navy to protect the mercantile marine ". l Colbert thought
out these plans and others in minute detail, and then took office and
put them into practice; and Golbertism is a demonstrated policy
which can be treated almost with the precision appertaining to a
physical science.
The English way was different. English statesmen were not
original or even logical thinkers. They did not construct a system and
subordinate all means to its perfecting. Subjectively and consciously,
they may have had no permanent policy for the advancement of the
State, but only a number of expedients, temporary and shifting: yet,
objectively and in practical effect, a policy is there. The drift of
English opinion was powerful and unmistakable, and opportunists
were more sensitive to it than abstract thinkers would have been. The
views of an army of pamphleteers and memorialists, from the fifteenth
century onward, are on record. Their cumulative effect is traceable,
without any straining of the truth, in the actions of statesmen from
Henry VII to the Restoration. And the Puritans of the Interregnum;
1 Weber, H., La Gompagmefran$dse des Indes, p. 100.
208 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
freed by circumstance from many shackles of the past, brought them
more fully to the stage of action than the Stuart longs had been able
to do. To that extent the Puritans may be credited with working out
a policy for the old colonial Empire, although they often acted upon
principles they might themselves have been puzzled to formulate.
The past had a great influence upon these conservative revolu-
tionaries, who in the political sphere conceived themselves as fighting,
not to overturn their world, but to rescue the ancient liberties of
England endangered by a usurping tyranny. They were as well versed
in their country's history as in her laws. Their minds were steeped in
the glories of the Elizabethan Age when, as it seemed to them, Pro-
testant England was free and united and her name had rung through
the world. Their present task of destruction was hateful to them; they
shuddered at the things their duty called them to do. Nine men in
every ten of them were horrified at the execution of the King. " I have
sought the Lord that He would rather slay me59, said Cromwell in
1653 as he expelled the Parliament, "than put me upon the doing
of this work. " l It was with relief that they turned to the external task
of building an empire of the sea in fulfilment of the Elizabethan
promise. The gospel of that empire was ready framed. Hakluyt and
Peckham, Gilbert and Raleigh, Malynes and Mun and many another
had laid it down in phrases which they knew by heart. The doctrine
was so much the fabric of all their minds that they had little need to
write each other minutes upon it. Recent influences, too, bore weight
with them, things they had seen in their own time. The shameful
story of Amboyna and other harsh proceedings in the East had en-
gendered in many a resolve to settle accounts with the Dutch. This
was a cross-current giving rise to confusion of purpose, yet strong
enough to leave its permanent trace upon policy. It conflicted with,
and momentarily overcame, the mightier impulse to do battle with
Antichrist in the shape of the Catholic Powers, to create a Protestant
alliance in which England's part should be to wrest tropical America
from the hands of Spain and to divert its wealth to the service of the
godly people of the world. The Commonwealth, fighting for its life,
was patriotically materialist and anti-Dutch. The Protectorate,
having achieved a breathing-space, could afford to be idealistic,
although it could not keep its idealism untainted by sordid motives.
The economic view, therefore, will not alone illuminate the policy of
the Puritans. Patriotism and religious fervour must enter into the
calculations of those who would seek to appreciate their work for
the Empire and to understand wherein and why they succeeded and
failed.
When, a few weeks after the death of Charles I, the Rump enacted
"that the People of England and of all the dominions and territories
thereunto belonging are. . .a Commonwealth and Free State", it
1 Carlyle, T., CromoeWs Letters and Speeches, m, 195 ; Firth, G. H., Cromwell, p, 323.
THE ENEMIES OF THE COMMONWEALTH 209
was apparent that a struggle would be needed to make good the
words. The monarchs, whether of Spain and Portugal in the west, or
of Denmark and Russia in the east, were aghast at the tragedy of
Whitehall; France patronised the royalist exiles and began an un-
official maritime war against English commerce; the United Pro-
vinces with their stadholder, a son-in-law of the dead King, sheltered
his heir and recognised his right to the English throne; and, backed
by the approval of all these Powers, Prince Rupert commanded a
revolted squadron of the Commonwealth's fleet and set forth to con-
tinue the Civil War upon the sea. If the continent had been at peace,
a coalition might have enthroned Charles II within a year. But,
fortunately, France and Spain were engaged in a war which neither
had any immediate prospect of winning; Spain also had not yet con-
sented to recognise the independence of Portugal under the House of
Braganza, and the stadholder, William II, had still to consolidate his
position against the republican party in Holland, the wealthiest pro-
vince of the Dutch Netherlands. The foreign enemies of the Common-
wealth were thus at odds among themselves, and bold statesmanship
might render ineffective their hostility to England. Meanwhile,
within the British Isles, Scotland had dissociated herself from English
courses and had proclaimed Charles II king, whilst Ireland remained
in a welter of anarchy of ten years3 duration, with the Royalists
standing forth as the most considerable among her many factions.
The parliamentary party had always derived its main support from
London, and London lived by carrying on three-quarters of the
foreign trade of the country. Rupert and the royalist and French
privateers were therefore foes of the first magnitude, whose suppres-
sion would be likely to tax the maritime resources of the Common-
wealth. But before any steps had been taken to deal with them, news
began to come in which showed that in default of yet more naval
activity an entire lucrative branch of London's commerce would be
cut off at its source. The western colonies, with the exception of New
England, were, or were likely to be, in revolt. Of these colonies the
most important in contemporary eyes were Barbados and the Lee-
ward Islands— St Christopher, Nevis, Montserrat and Antigua. All
of them had been, as we have seen, included in a proprietary pro-
vince granted by Charles I to the Earls of Carlisle, and all had been
left very much to their own devices since the second earFs power to
control them had collapsed at the beginning of the Civil War. These
island colonies had been founded as tobacco plantations, and in this
business they had been so successful as seriously to endanger the
prosperity of Bermuda and Virginia, the pioneer producers of tobacco.
By 1636 tobacco had become a drug in the market and it had been
advisable to look for a new staple. Cotton had for a time promised
well, but was soon found to command only a limited market owing
to technical difficulties in its spinning and weaving.
GHBEI
210 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
Then, just as the Civil War broke out, the Lesser Antilles found
their vocation in sugar-planting, introduced by Dutchmen whose
sugar industry in Brazil was being destroyed by the Portuguese re-
conquest of that colony. Sugar rapidly transformed the social aspect
first of Barbados and then of the Leeward Islands. Its cultivation was
best practised on large estates needing considerable capital for their
equipment. The tobacco planters had been for the most part small
twenty- or thirty-acre men, relying upon the labour of their own
hands and of a few indentured white servants. The sugar estate
was commonly of 500 acres, with labour organised in large gangs,
with wagons and draught cattle, roller crushing machines worked by
windmills or horse power, stillhouses containing great copper tanks
and boilers, a personnel of overseers, clerks, engineers and coopers, and
a dominating mansion for the wealthy owner of the whole.1 The in-
dispensable basis was soon found to be the negro slave, although a
transition period of some twenty years elapsed before he had ousted
the white servant as the standard unit of labour. For the fortunate
few who moved with the times an era of dazzling profits set in, and,
had the Empire been at peace, the manufacturers, merchants and
slave traders of the mother country would have shared the gains with
the planters. In fact, a small band of London merchants did par-
ticipate in the sugar boom, but rather because they had been wise
enough to buy sugar estates and instal agents to work them than be-
cause the new trade as a whole flowed through the London custom
house. For the Civil War had relaxed imperial control and had re-
duced to a dead letter the regulations of Charles I which had sought
to confine the colonial traffic to English ports. In the main it was the
Dutch who engrossed the new trade of the Caribbean. The capitalists
of Amsterdam were bigger men than their London competitors. They
gave long credit, equipping the planters with the new machinery
and with slaves from the West African stations which they were
wresting from the Portuguese. The London interest in the transformed
colonies was therefore inferior to that of Amsterdam, and the most
promising of all the imperial undertakings was rapidly falling within
the economic sphere of the United Provinces.
Politically also, the English connection was almost dissolved. The
Earl of Carlisle was a royalist, and the parliamentary statesmen had
suspended his proprietary rights, although they had as yet hesitated
to make a final decision by annulling them. The planters had no
love for the earl, and cheerfully pocketed the dues which they owed
him; but they had no mind to submit to the control of Parliament
without compulsion, for they knew very well that the established
colonial doctrine would require in some form or other the restriction
of their trade to English channels, and they had now come to regard
an open trade as necessary to their prosperity. They assumed,
1 See Ligon, R., True and Exact History of Barbados, London, 1657.
THE COLONIES IN 1649 211
therefore, an attitude of detachment and intimated that the factions
in the mother country must compose their differences before they,
the colonists, could think of recognising either King or Parliament;
meanwhile, they would govern themselves.1 Barbados in this matter
voiced the feelings of the rest. It was a galling impertinence for the
victors of Naseby to receive from a unit no larger than the Isle of
Wight, but it had this justification, that Parliament had then no
fleet to spare for the Caribbean.
The continental Plantations, Virginia and Maryland, were of less
importance in the imperial scheme. Virginia in 1649 had only half
the population of Barbados, and Maryland bore much the same
relation to St Christopher; moreover, there had been in them no
economic revolution like that which brought sudden wealth to the
Caribbees. In Virginia the tobacco economy had been perforce
adhered to, and, partly by reason of favourable customs rates, partly
owing to the absence of proprietary tyranny like that of the Earls of
Carlisle, the Virginian planters had attained a condition of modest
prosperity. Local legislation had favoured the growth of a class
of substantial planters. Royalist sentiment predominated, largely
through the influence of Sir William Berkeley, a popular Cavalier
appointed governor by the king in 1640: but it was a royalism which
had no enthusiasm for close imperial control, for Virginia had always
had a hankering after trade with the Dutch, and could indulge it
without restraint when the wars began at home.2 Maryland suffered
from religious dissensions leading to revolt by the Puritan party
against the representatives of Lord Baltimore, the Catholic pro-
prietor. For some time the rebels were in the ascendant, but by 1649
the proprietor's interest had regained strength with the result that
the colony declined to recognise the authority of Parliament. The
step represented the local triumph of a faction and was taken against
the wish of Baltimore who, from his standpoint in England, saw
clearly that an ephemeral success would be dearly bought in the out-
come. The tobacco colony of Bermuda suffered from like dissensions,
but from a different cause. It was the property of a chartered com-
pany, most of whose members were on the parliamentary side. Dis-
like of the Company's rule thus encouraged royalism among the
colonists, for the victory of the King might offer a chance of the
dissolution of the Company.
The above considerations clear the ground for an estimation of the
colonial revolt which broke out in 1 649-50 against the newly declared
Commonwealth. Although royalist sentiment played a certain part
in it, the stronger motive was impatience of any imperial control.
1 Governor and Council of Barbados to the Parliamentary Commission for Plantations,
October 1646, Lords' Journals, EX, 51.
8 Act of Virginia l^islature, 1643, legalising Dutch trade. Beer, G. L., Origins qfBrit.
Colonial System, p. 350.
14-2
212 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
Since 1642 the colonists had enjoyed political autonomy and an open
trade with all the world j and so long as King and Parliament were at
war that liberty was unassailable. But now that the Roundheads had
won, their backers among the London merchants would be certain to
demand a reimposition of restrictions; and the planters revolted, not
against the Commonwealth as such, but against the overlordship of
the English mercantile interest. Since, however, rebellion needs the
spur of moral enthusiasm as well as of material advantage, the
royalist standard floated over the movement. But had the King been
victorious, it might well have fallen to him to despatch an expedition
to reduce colonists resisting him in the name of the Bible and liberty.
Virginia, Maryland and Bermuda all repudiated the Common-
wealth in 1649. I*1 *be Caribbee Islands the revolt was limited to
Barbados and Antigua and was delayed until the following year.
In Barbados it was more determined than anywhere else, partly by
reason of the density of population and the defensibility of the coast,
partly because a really fanatical royalism actuated the leaders and
lent moral strength to the economic calculations of the rest. The island
had become the chosen home of royalist refugees from England. Its
own preference hitherto had been for the neutral attitude it had
formerly expressed, although it was quite ready to resist any attempt
from home to curtail its liberty. But in the spring of 1650 the royalist
faction overruled Philip Bell, the governor, and banished the known
Puritans of the community, fining and confiscating to a merciless
extent. In the midst of these proceedings there arrived Francis, Lord
Willoughby of Parham, with a commission from Charles II and a
lease of the Caribbean proprietorship from its nominal owner, the
Earl of Carlisle. Willoughby took command and proclaimed the
King, and afterwards went on to secure the Leeward Islands. He was
successful at Antigua, which had been developed largely by Bar-
badians, but failed at St Christopher, Nevis and Montserrat. St
Christopher, since the death of its founder Sir Thomas Warner in
1649, had been governed by Major Rowland Redge, who determined
to maintain neutrality; Nevis and Montserrat, connected with it by
personal ties, followed its example. Willoughby returned to Barbados
to organise an active defence, by which he hoped at least to bring the
Commonwealth to a compromise. Thus, with Prince Rupert still at
large, the Civil War had entered upon an oceanic phase in which it
was by no means certain that the Commonwealth would be able to
bring its crushing military force to bear upon its opponents.
During these events New England maintained essentially the same
attitude, modified only in externals, as that of her southern fellow-
colonies. The New Englanders were Puritans by religion and cer-
tainly not Royalists, and so lacked any ostensible cause of quarrel with
the Puritans of England. But they had achieved as complete an
autonomy as had the royalist planters of the south, and they had no
MERCANTILE PRINCIPLES 913
more intention of surrendering it to their friends at home than had
those ^ royalist rebels to their enemies. Massachusetts had instantly
perceived the implication of the Parliament's claim to be the para-
mount authority in the Empire. As early as 1642 she had declined an
offer of favourable legislation by the Puritans at Westminster "lest
in after times . . . hostile forces might be in control, and meantime a
precedent would have been established". The New Englanders had
felt quite competent to deal with a distant King, whose prerogative
could be little more than a name in colonies which appointed all their
own officers of state, but to be subject to the English House of Com-
mons might mean the ultimate relinquishment of colonial rights of
legislation. New England was therefore verbally cordial to the
Commonwealth, whilst letting it be understood that she would sub-
mit to no interference with her liberties; and since she had no very
valuable trade with Europe there was the less incentive for English
statesmen to molest her.
Such were the problems confronting the new Commonwealth —
European disapproval, Scottish and Irish hostility, maritime war with
Rupert and the privateers, and finally, the colonial revolt— and we
have now to turn to the principles and methods of its statesmen in
dealing with them.
The principles, as has been said, were of no recent growth. On the
economic side, they were directed to the increase of the national
wealth and can be grouped under the designation of the mercantile
system. But mercantilism, as the term is commonly employed, had
a wider scope than the mere acquisition of wealth. Wealth needed
defence, and thus the defensive power of the nation must also come
within the purview of the economist. Foreign trade could never be
secure without the shield of a powerful navy, but at the same time it
seemed possible to arrange by suitable legislation that trade itself
should produce some of the elements of which naval power was com-
posed. In earlier times the warship had been simply a merchantman
adapted for the purpose, and the idea still held force that the pos-
session of large merchant ships was a national asset; for the dockyards
which could build them could also build warships. There was thus
an incentive for mercantilists to promote those trades which em-
ployed large ships — that is, the long-distance colonial trades. Still
more strongly did this motive work with respect to the men. The man
who could sail a merchantman could sail a warship, and gunnery was
a craft whose rudiments were easily acquired. The State needed
thousands of seamen in time of war, but could not afford to pay them
in time of peace. Therefore it was essential to promote the employ-
ment of seamen in commerce, and the commerce of long voyages was
the best for the purpose, since it occupied more men than that of
short voyages for the transportation of a given quantity of stuff. In
another aspect considerations of defence required that the country
THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
should be self-sufficing and not dependent upon foreigners for certain
indispensable wares. Naval stores — masts, pitch, cables and cordage
— were in Europe, as has been stated in earlier chapters, the mono-
poly of the Powers controlling the Baltic coasts, and so mercantilist
statesmen were never weary of planning the acquisition of colonies
wherein these goods should be produced under the national flag.
So also dependence upon foreigners for any other class of goods which
the national colonies could be made to supply was held to be an
avoidable weakness.1
The interpretation of an agreed body of doctrine is influenced by
the special desires of those who stand at the statesman's elbow. After
1649 the predominant voice in Government councils was that of the
City interest — not only of the investors who had constituted the great
chartered companies, but also of the individualist merchants in un-
incorporated or interloping trades, a class which had never before
been so numerous and influential. Under James I and Charles I
there had been a strong court interest in commercial and colonial
affairs— the owners of proprietary grants and trading monopolies,
the farmers of the customs, and the stockholders in certain chartered
companies, such as that for the Amazon and .Guiana, but this was
now entirely eclipsed, and the Commonwealth leaders had ears only
for the views of the City. Hence a body of opinion found expression
which was hostile to colonial proprietorships and even to the chartered
companies, such as the East Indian and African, although these had
derived much of their support from the City. Particular monopolies
of all sorts were attacked in the name of fair play for all, and the
individuals who during the Civil War had infringed them with im-
punity hoped to continue to do so. But the tendency was only to seek
freedom of enterprise as between Englishmen, and the monopolist
spirit demanded all the more strongly that restrictions should be
placed upon the enterprise of foreigners within the English sphere of
control. Stuart rule, in short, had favoured particular monopolies;
Commonwealth rule was to favour national monopolies.
Before considering the extent to which these ideas were put into
practice, it is necessary to pause for a moment to observe the adminis-
trative mechanism employed. Until the outbreak of the Civil War,
oceanic trade and colonisation had been matters under the royal
prerogative, and Parliament had never clearly established its right to
interveneinthem. In 1643 Parliamenthad appointed a strong Commis-
sion, under the presidency of the Earl of Warwick, to take charge of the
colonies and their trade, but circumstances had prevented its power
frombeingeffective. Warwick's Commission ceased to function afterthe
execution of the King, when the Council of State became the executive
authority for all branches of the administration, the colonies being
expressly placed under its care by an Act of 13 February 1649. The
1 Sec Beer, passim.
THE NAVIGATION ACT OF 1650 215
Council of State acted through committees of its own members,
sometimes assisted by outside experts in the various branches of busi-
ness. At first the colonial committees were indiscriminately manned,
but in December 1651 the Council appointed a standing committee
for trade and foreign affairs, whose members included Cromwell,
Vane and Haslerig, old members of Warwick's Commission. This
body transacted most of the colonial business until the fall of the
Long Parliament in April 1653. Another committee which also had
dealings with oceanic matters was the Committee of the Admiralty,
the successor to the duties of the Lord High Admiral of the old ad-
ministrative system. In addition to these authorities, Parliament made
in August 1650 an attempt to create a permanent department by
appointing a Council of Trade (and, in practice, of Plantations) under
the presidency of Sir Henry Vane. This body had in theory complete
powers over all branches of trade, fisheries and colonies, and also over
the customs, excise and exchanges. For a year it was very active, and
then it gradually resigned its functions to those committees of the
Council of State which it had never entirely superseded. Thus it may
be seen that, although there was multiplicity and overlapping of
authorities, there was as well a full opportunity for questions of policy
to be aired and developed; and the fact that active individuals served
on more than one body simultaneously may have lessened the in-
evitable confusion. Among the outsiders called in to assist may be
noted the names of Martin Noell and William Pennoyer, merchants
doing large business with the western colonies, and of Maurice
Thompson, whose interests extended to the East Indies as well as to
the Caribbean. With the establishment of the Protectorate in 1653,
the Protector's Council superseded the Council of State, and die
colonial administration was carried on with very little change.1
The outcome of the attention devoted to maritime affairs may be
seen in the Navigation Acts of 1650 and 1651. The former has not
until recent times received the consideration its importance demands,
chiefly because its true intention is not apparent on a cursory reading.
On 3 October 1650, some two months after it was known that
Barbados had defied the Commonwealth, Parliament passed an Act
to meet the situation. The preamble is worth quoting, for it states an
imperial doctrine: whereas, it runs, there are in divers places in
America2 colonies "which were planted at the cost and settled by the
people, and by authority of this nation, which are and ought to be
subordinate to and dependent upon England; and hath ever since
the planting thereof been, and ought to be, subject to such laws,
orders and regulations as are or shall be made by the Parliament of
i Sec Andrews, G. M., British Committees, etc., tf Trade and Plantations, 1623-75,
pp. 23-35.
1 By contemporary usage, "America" included the West Indies.
216 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
England, . . .be it enacted", etc. The enacting clauses may be sum-
marised as follows: (i) prohibition of all trade, by foreigners and
others, with the rebels in Barbados, Bermuda, Virginia and Antigua;
(2) prohibition to the ships of any foreign nation to trade without
licence with any of the English Plantations in America, the object
being "to hinder the carrying over of any such persons as are enemies
to this Commonwealth"; (3) power to the Council of State to settle
governors and make other political arrangements in the Plantations,
"any letters patents, or other authority formerly granted or given to
the contrary notwithstanding".1 Seldom has so much revolutionary
matter been compacted into a document so small and of so innocent
an appearance. Ostensibly, the Act is an ephemeral measure of
emergency against a set of rebels; and as such it was accepted at the
time of passing, for it seems to have drawn no protest except from the
rebels in question. Yet it embodies an affirmation of three separate
doctrines or policies, all novel or hitherto unaccepted, and it contains
no provision that its validity shall come to an end with the rebellion
which has evoked it. The three principles are: the doctrine, countered
eight years before by Massachusetts, that Parliament has supreme
legislative power over the colonies;8 the absolute prohibition to
foreign shipping to trade, not merely in the rebellious, but in all the
colonies; and the nullification of all proprietary or chartered com-
pany rights at the discretion of the Council of State. All this is hung
upon the peg of a rebellion in four colonies, and the artifice of im-
plying one thing whilst saying another is the better appreciated on a
study of the text, in which the clauses of permanent effect are ex-
pressed in a few words and placed in subordinate positions* Surely there
was never a thinner excuse for permanently closing the colonial trade
of a substantial empire than that it was done to hinder the transit of
disaffected persons. This Act remained in force until the Restoration.
Encouraged, no doubt, by the absence of any protest from the
foreigners affected (for the first seizures of ships contravening the Act
seem not to have been made until the dose of 1651), the Common-
wealth statesmen proceeded after a year to a further measure, the
Navigation Act of 1651. The preamble is short, but again is worth
quoting, for some waste of ink would have been avoided had all
commentators weighed it. It says simply: "For the increase of the
shipping and encouragement of the navigation of this nation, which
under the good providence and protection of God, is so great a means
of the welfare and safety of this Commonwealth, be it enacted", etc.
The provisions are: no goods from Asia, Africa or America to be
brought into England, Ireland or the Plantations, save in English
(including Irish and colonial) ships, the majority of the members of
each crew being English; no goods from Europe to be brought into
1 Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, ed. Firth and Rait, n, 495-9.
1 Vide supra, p. 179.
THE NAVIGATION ACT OF 1651 217
England, Ireland or the Plantations save in English ships or foreign
ships of that country "of which the said goods are the growth, pro-
duction or manufacture"; foreign goods brought in by English ships
to be brought only from the place of origin, as above defined; salt
fish, fish oil and whalebone to be brought in solely in English ships;
the above fish, etc., to be exported from English territory solely in
English ships; and the trade from one port to another "of this Com-
monwealth" to be reserved solely to English ships. Exceptions are
allowed as follows : English ships to be permitted to bring from coun-
tries in the East Indies and the Levant goods which have not been
produced in those countries; English ships to be permitted to bring
from Spain and Portugal goods produced in the colonies of those
countries ; and lastly, English ships may bring silks of Italian origin
from the ports of the Dutch and Spanish Netherlands.1 The pre-
possessions of nineteenth-century economics have vitiated modern
criticism of this measure. Modern economists have almost with one
accord2 declared that it must have been harmful to the trade of
England or, at best, that there is no evidence that it benefited English
trade. On this it may be proper to remark that there is also no evi-
dence that the framers of the Act intended it to benefit English trade,
or that they cared greatly if the result should be some diminution of
it. For their measure was what they named it, an Act of Navigation,
an Act for promoting the employment of English ships and English
seamen; and that might well be consistent with some restriction of
English trade in general, taken in a wide sense. Restriction lies in
every clause, restriction mainly of the operations of foreigners, but
also of many which could be carried on by English merchants.
Realisation of this fact renders it useless to probe for the "interest"
which might be supposed to have inspired the Act. The interest was
that of the national safety and not that of any particular clique; and
contemporary statements to the contrary emanate from jealous Dutch
sources. Charles I had made many trading regulations for increasing
the flow of colonial cargoes into English ports irrespective of the
nationality of the shipping which carried them; under Charles II
there was to be passed a Navigation Act combining that motive with
the encouragement of the national shipping; but the Act of 1651
belongs solely to the economics of defence, and to judge it from any
other standpoint is to misjudge it. How far it was successful in creating
ships and seamen cannot now be determined, for the evidence has
been swamped. First came the Dutch War with a flood of prizes,
double the number of the pre-existent mercantile marine of England ;*
then came the Spanish War with very serious losses at the hands of
enemy privateers; and much of the increase in the numbers of seamen
1 Acts and Ordinances, n, 559-62.
* The American, G. L. Beer, is an exception to this statement.
8 Oppenheim, M., AdanmstHOfon of the Royal Navy, p. 307.
218 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
must have been due to the requirements of the Navy. There was no
chance for the Puritan Navigation Acts to show their value before
they were superseded by other measures at the Restoration.
If the above view is correct, the Navigation Act of 1651 must be
taken out of the category of commercial measures and placed amongst
the efforts made by the Commonwealth to equip the country with a
sea power adequate to its security. That work went on without inter-
mission from the beginning of 1649. It seems to have been inspired
by the necessity of hunting down Prince Rupert and of coping with
the French and royalist privateers, and to have been furthered by
the realisation that an ocean-going navy would be indispensable
if England meant to regain her ascendancy over her colonies
and their trade. The deficiency of sea power at the outset is attested
by the fact that the colonial revolt endured for more than two
years before it was suppressed. But the Council of State was
aware of the weakness, and its Admiralty Committee worked un-
ceasingly. In two years it doubled the material strength of the fleet
and infused a new tone into the combatant ranks and the dockyard
staffs, with the result that in a remarkably short time England re-
gained the naval fitness and spirit she had lost during half-a-century
of Stuart rule.
Concurrently with the reorganisation, an active campaign went
forward against the maritime foes of the Commonwealth. As was
stated earlier, 1 Blake drove Prince Rupert's royalist squadron from
European waters; and it could not reach the West Indies until the
revolt there had collapsed.
By the opening of 1652 the maritime civil war was virtually over,
and the Commonwealth's energetic promotion of sea power had
justified itself. In the autumn of 1650, whilst passing the Act pro-
hibiting trade with the revolted colonies, Parliament took steps to
organise an expedition to visit and subdue each of them in turn. The
command was entrusted to Sir George Ayscue, who was also named
one of a board of three commissioners for negotiation and political
resettlement. Lack of shipping delayed the undertaking for nearly
a year. Not until August 1651 did Ayscue sail for the West, and not
until October did he reach Barbados, his first point of attack.
Meanwhile, the Act of 1650 had evoked a colonial rejoinder which
anticipated the constitutional arguments of the Americans under
George III. In February 1651 Lord Willoughby, the royalist
governor of Barbados, passed with the concurrence of his council and
Assembly a declaration to the effect that the recent Act was pre-
judicial to the freedom and safety of the colonists, who had themselves
made no innovations, but were bent merely upon maintaining their
established form of government; and that the colonists would not con-
sider binding the enactments of a Parliament in which they were not
SUBMISSION OF THE COLONIES 219
represented. The Act of 1650, with its assertion of the sovereignty of
Parliament, and Willoughby's declaration, based on the established
constitutional rights of Englishmen, illustrate the dilemma of the old
colonial Empire. But it is characteristic of the political methods of
the race that this dilemma, although never escaped, never became
troublesome except when complicated with a dispute over material
interests. That dispute, in the present instance, related to trade, and
the Barbadians concluded their manifesto by placing on record their
gratitude to the Dutch for commercial benefits received at Dutch
hands.1 Without this, it is doubtful whether Willoughby would have
obtained much support; for the royalist faction, although energetic,
was small, and there was among the planters hardly one genuine
adherent of the proprietary claims which he represented.
^ Ayscue, on arriving at Barbados, found its military strength con-
siderable. The coastline offered few landing places, and Willoughby
had under arms seven or eight times as many men as the admiral
could hope to disembark. A pause of three months ensued, during
which the pressure of blockade did its work. At the outset Ayscue
seized a number of Dutch merchantmen whom he found trading in
contravention of the Act of 1650. As time went on, the planters saw
themselves faced with ruin, and the moderates among them, with
motives rather economic than political, at length compelled Wil-
loughby to yield. The articles of surrender, signed on 1 1 January
1652, provided that the island should receive a governor appointed
from home, but that there should be no taxation save that imposed
by the Assembly, and that trade with friendly nations should be free.
The sense of the latter phrase was left undefined, and was in practice
interpreted as subject to the Acts of 1650 and 1651. Free trade with
foreigners, therefore, meant trade conducted solely in English ships.
The colonists afterwards protested, but there can be little doubt that
they had understood the condition; it had been vital to them to get
rid of the existing blockade, even at the expense of agreeing to a future
restriction which might not be seriously enforced. Willoughby and
other extremists were banished, the proprietary rights were annulled,
and Barbados was left under the governorship of Daniel Searle, one
of Ayscue's fellow-commissioners.
Bermuda had abandoned the revolt on hearing that the expedition
was at sea, and Antigua's submission quickly followed that of Bar-
bados. A small squadron with a separate body of commissioners
entered Chesapeake Bay in March 1652. Berkeley and the ultra-
Royalists of Virginia made a show of resistance, but the public
opinion of the colony was against them, and articles were signed with-
out hostilities. They included the same clauses on freedom of trade
and taxation as the Barbados agreement, and Richard Bennett, one of
i See Schomburgk, Sir R., History of Barbados; Davis, N. D., Cavaliers and Roundheads in
Barbados; and Harlow, V. T., Hist, of Barbados, 1625-85, chap. iL
220 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
the parliamentary commissioners, became governor. But the Inter-
regnum statesmen showed little interest in the internal affairs of
Virginia when once she had acknowledged their authority, and
Bennett's successors until the Restoration were elected by the
Assembly. No objection was raised even to Berkeley's residence in the
colony, and he remained as a private individual until he resumed
office under Charles II. A single warship ensured the submission
of Maryland, which also was left thereafter very much to its own
devices. The Chesapeake Plantations, penetrated in all directions
by navigable creeks, offered conditions the exact opposite to those
presented by the convex coastline of Barbados. A few cruisers could
paralyse resistance, and there was no point in imposing harsh terms
upon colonists who admitted its futility.
The subjugation of the colonies provided the first example since
their foundation of the employment of the Navy as a link of empire.
It may be regarded as an important branch of the new imperial
policy which was taking shape and which was to be developed after
the Restoration. On the other policies laid down in the Act of 1650,
it may be said that, having established in theory the principle of
parliamentary supremacy, the Commonwealth made little attempt —
none, indeed, outside Bermuda and the Caribbean islands — to inter-
fere in practice with local autonomy; that it did partially annul the
chartered rights conferred by the Stuart prerogative, abolishing com-
pletely those of Carlisle and Willoughby, suspending those of Lord
Baltimore, and reconstructing the Bermuda Company, but leaving
untouched the privileges of Massachusetts; and that it made serious
but incomplete attempts to put in practice those clauses of the Navi-
gation Acts that affected colonial trade. The efficacy of those attempts
is a debated question which is probably incapable of settlement. All
that can be said is that there was some enforcement and some evasion
of the monopoly granted to English shipping.1
The chief imperial interest of the Commonwealth is in the framing
of a domestic policy for the Empire; the interest of the Protectorate
lies in the relations of the Empire towards foreign Powers. Here
also some principles emerge which can be traced as of more or less
continuous application, helping to elucidate some of the transactions
of the eighteenth century. Between the domestic and foreign policies,
Anglo-Dutch relations form a connecting link, since the Dutch,
although foreigners, had entrenched themselves so deeply within the
boundaries of the Empire as almost to share the interests of its subjects.
The Dutch have often been thought of as one of the great colonising
nations of the world, but the truth is that they were not pre-eminent
as colonists, nor even as rulers of native dependencies, save for one
purpose, that of trade. Trade was the means and the end of Dutch
greatness, and Dutchmen overseas lacked both the religious fervour
1 Beer, pp. 391-9.
THE DUTCH IN THE ATLANTIC 221
which palliated the gold lust of the Spanish pioneers, and the capacity
for establishing new polities of the parent type which rooted the
English at so many points in the West in the space of a single genera-
tion. As against these deficiencies, the Dutch had an unsurpassed
faculty for recognising and seizing the strategic positions of world
trade, for exploiting the services of native races, and for developing
those business methods which enabled them to enter into the fruits
of the colonial enterprise of others. The history of the Atlantic area
in the seventeenth century justifies these remarks. The Dutch colonies
in it were few and feeble: the progress of New Amsterdam, with its
7000 inhabitants after fifty years of effort, cannot compare with that
of New England; in the West Indies the Dutch produced no such
lusty communities as Barbados and St Christopher; and in Brazil
they failed to establish a colony by conquest, although sea power and
initial success gave them every advantage. But they did succeed in
planting an excellent system of trading posts. In that capacity New
Amsterdam was a success, attracting to itself the produce of its
populous English neighbours; so also were St Martin and St
Eustatius, adjoining the English and French Antilles, and Curagoa,
giving facilities for an illicit trade on the Spanish Main. In the
mouths of several Guiana rivers the Dutch built fortified factories
where they collected valuable wares from the natives. And in West
Africa they ousted both Portuguese and English from the best
slaving stations, capturing Elmina in 1637 after Portugal had held
it for close on two centuries. The Dutch West India Company,
founded in 1621, presided over these activities. Like most chartered
companies it failed as a patron of colonies, but it did succeed in its
maritime operations against Spain and Portugal and went far towards
realising the policy of monopolising the trade of the Atlantic whilst
leaving others to colonise its shores.
Enough has already been said to show that the Commonwealth's
determination to be master of its own colonies and of their trade con-
tained the seeds of a quarrel with the Dutch; and on more general
grounds there was the certainty of rivalry if the maritime advance
of England should fulfil the promise of its promoters. The mercantilist
habit of mind, which regarded commerce as a kind of warfare, was
bound to accentuate this tendency. Politics moved in the same
direction, The stadholder, William II, succeeding to his office just
as the treaties of 1647-8 brought the Thirty Years' War, and with
it the Dutch-Spanish contest, to a close, was known to be dissatisfied
with the peace. He wished to join France in still further humiliating
Spain ; both he and the French court had personal reasons for seeking
to avenge Charles I; and France was already virtually at war with
England upon the sea. These circumstances, coupled with the Portu-
guese patronage of Prince Rupert in the early part of 1650, seemed
to indicate a coalition of three Powers against England and Spain,
222 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
in which the Dutch might hope to restore the Stuart monarchy and
draw their profit from the spoils of the Atlantic. To one element in
the Commonwealth such a contest seemed inevitable and not un-
welcome. But on both sides there was another element. The rich
province of Holland was republican in feeling and not eager to
further the ambitions of the stadholder, and some of the magnates of
Amsterdam worked quietly to avert war; they were profiting well
by the existing state of affairs in which they were free to trade with
the English colonies, and they did not realise how soon the Common-
wealth meant to curtail their opportunities. In England also there
was an influence for peace. To the ardent Puritans of the army, men
who had no personal interest in overseas trade, war with the most
Protestant nation of the continent was abhorrent. They wished rather
to promote a great anti-Catholic league. To these idealists, Crom-
well among them, it seemed feasible to effect a close alliance with the
Dutch and to settle the oceanic differences by some delimitation of
spheres of influence. The sudden death of William II in October 1650
clarified the situation. The Dutch Netherlands became fully re-
publican and ceased to be bellicose, and the English peace party were
able to despatch a mission to the Hague to negotiate an alliance.
The mission was from the outset a failure. Its leaders, Oliver St
John and Walter Strickland, were annoyed by the insults of exiled
Royalists who mobbed them at the Hague, and they soon made up
their minds that they could effect no usefiil treaty with the Dutch.
The English demands were in the first place for a defensive military
alliance and the expulsion of the Royalists. If they could obtain these,
the ambassadors were further charged to propose some form of
political union between the two republics. The latter project never
came under discussion, for the Dutch rejected the former as one-
sided: England, with the Battle of Worcester yet unfought, would
claim the immediate assistance of an ally, whilst the Netherlands were
in no danger of attack from any quarter. Moreover, there were no
disaffected Dutchmen to be turned out of England in recompense for
the expulsion of the English Royalists from Holland. The Dutch there-
fore countered with proposals of their own for the regulation in their
favour of fishing rights in the North Sea, of the maritime law of
contraband, and of colonial trade. On the latter subject, in particular,
their suggestions were as inadmissible as those of the English, for they
proposed a mutual freedom of trade in the American and West Indian
settlements. With their own poor colonies but huge mercantile marine,
they stood to gain all and give nothing in trade with the rich colonies
of England and in competition with her much less advanced mer-
cantile organisation. By midsummer of 1651 the negotiations had
reached a deadlock.1
In England, suddenly awakened to the mercantile possibilities
1 For the negotiations in detail, see Gardiner, i, 322-9.
THE FIRST DUTCH WAR 223
of the East and the West, there were only two courses that could be
pursued towards the Dutch: alliance and a division of the mercantile
arenas, or war for supremacy in all of them. The religious interest
had prompted the policy of alliance, now discredited; the mundane
interest was thus free to force a contest. The Navigation Act of October
1651, passed a month after the pacification of the British Isles by the
victory of Worcester, marks the predominance of the new attitude.
It is to be regarded, however, less as a declaration of war than as a
measure for strengthening the Navy for a contest considered on other
grounds to be inevitable. The Dutch certainly did not take it as a
cause of mortal quarrel. They had coolly infringed many an English
trading regulation in the past and counted on doing so again, and
they held, in common with most modern economists, that to English
trade the Act would be rather damaging than the reverse.1 They were
at this time curiously blind to the naval menace which had so sud-
denly arisen on the western side of the North Sea, and they felt few
qualms about the security of their world-wide commerce; for them
English sea power was the sea power of the Stuarts, well-nigh as con-
temptible as that of Spain or Portugal. Thus they moved without fore-
sight into a war whose immediate causes were disputes capable of
settlement by negotiation— the law of contraband, and the English
claim to the salute by foreign ships in the narrow seas. The contra-
band question arose out of Anglo-French hostilities. English cruisers
were retaliating for the depredations of the French privateers; French
merchants were shipping their goods for safety in Dutch bottoms ; and
the English courts were condemning such cargoes as lawful prize.
Goodwill, which could have adjusted the matter, was smothered by
mutual contempt and aggressiveness, and when, in May 1652, a
commerce-protecting squadron under Van Tromp encountered a
squadron under Blake, the salute was refused, blood was shed, and
the Dutch War began.
Certain outstanding circumstances of the war can alone be noticed
here. The Dutch statesmen had neglected their fleet, and still more
its administration, so that their capable admirals were hampered by
lack of means. English trade was small compared with Dutch, and
the English warships could devote most of their energy to commerce
destruction, taking about 1500 prizes in the course of the two years'
struggle. These injuries were proportionately the more damaging to
the Dutch, since foreign trade was a necessity of their national life,
whilst for England it was a source of wealth, but not yet of bare liveli-
hood. But in one respect the great Dutch trade proved a fighting
asset, for it ensured a plentiful supply of seamen, whilst the English
fleets were often undermanned. This fact made a lasting impression
on English statesmen and confirmed them in the policy of the Navi-
gation Acts. Geographical conditions, as has often been pointed out,
1 See Clark, G. N., in History, vn, 283-6.
THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
were permanently in favour of England, which lay athwart the tracks
of Dutch commerce. But to this there was an exception in the Baltic
trade. There the Dutch secured the advantage and in January 1653
signed a treaty with Denmark whereby the latter Power undertook
to exclude the English from the Sound and from the supplies of naval
stores to which it formed the only access. This difficulty caused the
Commonwealth not only to seek friendship with Sweden but also to
stimulate the production of naval stores in New England and other
suitable colonies, a policy which led to a system of bounties and other
special aids enduring into the nineteenth century. These measures
never completely solved the problem, and until wood gave place to
iron, and sail to steam, the Baltic remained a prime anxiety with
English foreign ministers.
During the war Cromwell expelled the Long Parliament and with
the aid of the army leaders established himself as Protector, At once
the alternative policy, from which Puritan thought had momentarily
swung away, came again to the fore; and the Protector determined to
end the Dutch War as soon as possible on the ground that it consti-
tuted a betrayal of religion. Haggling over terms delayed the end for
a year (until April 1654), for the English knew quite well that their
enemies needed peace, and were determined to make them pay for it.
At length a treaty was signed providing for a defensive alliance, the
continuance of the salute in British waters, the exclusion of the Stuarts
from the United Provinces, the maintenance of the Navigation Acts,
and moderate compensation for past injuries suffered by the London
East India Company. The peace reflected the fact that the Dutch had
been beaten but not routed, and it was disappointing to Cromwell in
that it contained no promise of the aggressive Protestant coalition
which appealed so strongly to his imagination. Its most valuable
concomitant was an agreement with Denmark (September 1654)
abolishing the privileged Dutch position in the Baltic and providing
that English shipping should pay no higher dues in the Sound than
the shipping of any other non-Baltic nation. The Dutch War had em-
barrassed the finances of the English Government, but had inflicted
less economic loss upon the country than might have been expected
from the severity of the fighting. It had not wholly decided the ques-
tion of ultimate maritime supremacy, for Cromwell desired to utilise
Dutch sea power rather than to extirpate it. A proposal drawn up
with his approval during the negotiations reveals his own ideal of
an oceanic policy. It embodies the scheme of the Protestant League
against the Catholic Powers, a league to be supported by the joint
fleets of England and the Netherlands, monopolising the colonies and
oceanic trade of the world. The Dutch were to buy out the English
East India Company and to enjoy the whole commerce of the Indian
Ocean. The two Powers were to conquer all the shores of America and
West Africa, the slaving posts of the latter being divided, and all
ENGLAND AND SPANISH AMERICA 225
America except Brazil falling to England. So might Antichrist be
chained with golden fetters of his own forging, in the manner dreamed
of by the Elizabethans. The plan was idealistic, but it rested on brute
force, and the force would inevitably have been diverted to baser
ends; for Cromwell was too old and too much hampered to have re-
mained long enough in control. Perhaps he was himself conscious
that it was all a dream, for he did not persist, and the war ended in
the prosaic manner already described.1
If an Anglo-Dutch partition of oceanic wealth was impracticable,
Cromwell was nevertheless determined to advance the Protestant
interest in Europe and to use for that purpose the land and sea power
which had fallen into his hands. This gives a unity to his foreign
and imperial policies, and causes the latter to assume some elements
of a permanent nature. It has been held that Cromwell carved
his way to power on domestic issues and then mishandled in-
ternational questions of whose bearings he was ignorant. In the
oceanic sphere this is unjust. His mind was steeped in the Eliza-
bethan tradition, and he had a long practical acquaintance with
colonial affairs. In European politics, it may be admitted, his views
were out of date, for he still thought in terms of the religious conflict
which had really ceased to be the mainspring of men's actions, and
failed to realise that the Counter-Reformation had spent its force
whilst the nationalist ambitions of France were to dominate the
future. In reality the oceanic factor redeemed his policy from futility,
for here he was in accord with a permanent English instinct, rooted
in the past and reaching forward into the times to come. An enumera-
tion of a succession of British adventures will illustrate the continuity.
The Elizabethan raids in the Caribbean; the establishment, in the
period 1604-42, of colonies in that area and near its entrance and its
exit, of Guiana posts, of half-a-dozen island settlements, of Virginia
and Bermuda; the discussion in the same period of plans for an
English West India Company; Cromwell's "Western Design"; the
Darien Scheme; the South Sea Company and its Asiento concession;
the War of Jenkins's Ear— these are all links in a chain, successive
aspects of an abiding ambition to divert to British coffers the wealth
of Spanish America. Cromwell could not know the future, but he
knew the past and based his actions on that knowledge. He had been
a close associate of Pym and the Earl of Warwick and other Puritan
leaders, who had formed the Providence Company in 1630, and in
colonising that island had thrust an English wedge deep into the
Spanish monopoly of the western Caribbean. Again, under Warwick
he had been a member of the parliamentary commission for Plan-
tations formed in 1643. Warwick had tried hard to hold the English
Caribbean islands to their allegiance, had patronised privateers who
preyed upon the Spanish colonial trade, and had sent out pioneers to
1 For the Dutch and Danish negotiations see Gardiner, vol. n, chaps, xxx, xxxL
GHBEI *5
M6 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
colonise Tobago and Trinidad in 1638-47. Warwick and William
Jessop, the secretary of tiie defunct Providence Company, had borne
a leading part in organising the expedition which recovered Barbados
in 1651-2, whilst Cromwell had been a member of the Committee of
Trade and Plantations sitting at that time. And now, at the be-
ginning of the Protectorate, Warwick, still the friend of the Protector,
was resigning the lead into his hands. These were the bases of the
"Western Design".1 The whole policy of the Protectorate was to
weaken Spain, the Catholic Power, and to divert her colonial
wealth to Protestant uses. On the European side it was but slaying
the slain, but on the oceanic, if for Catholic we read Bourbon,
and for Protestant, British, the doctrine was that preached by the
elder Pitt in 1739.
Cromwell saw the goal when he became Protector, but he had to
do more than close the Dutch War in order to clear the way. His re-
lations with Spain were complicated by those with France, for the two
Powers were still engaged in the struggle which for the rest of Europe
had ended in 1648. At the beginning of the Commonwealth, France
had shown violent hostility towards the Puritans, whilst Spain, hating
them fully as much, had yet offered them the hand of friendship. The
stadholder's ambitions were directed as much against Spain as against
England, and France and Portugal were obvious allies ready to co-
operate with him. Spain therefore recognised the Commonwealth
in 1650 and facilitated Blake's blockade of Lisbon by allowing him to
base his fleet on Spanish ports; at the same time her anti-Puritan
feeling showed itself in the shielding of the royalist murderers of
Ascham, the Commonwealth envoy at Madrid. The death of the
stadholder in the autumn of 1650 relieved Spanish anxieties for a
time^ yet it left the alliance of England still worth courting, for
England could intervene with decisive effect in the Franco-Spanish
struggle in Flanders. Many Puritans were on religious grounds more
bitter against France than against Spain, for the former was thought
to be persecuting her Huguenots whilst the latter had now no Pro-
testant subjects to oppress. As the French depredations upon English
commerce continued, it was an open question in the first two years
of the Protectorate whether the anti-Catholic onslaught of England
should be directed against Spain or France. Cromwell kept them
both in uncertainty. Perhaps if Spain would have granted liberty
of worship to Englishmen and free navigation in the West — "the two
eyes" of Philip IV— the Protector would have forborne to revive the
Elizabethan policy to which his own mind leaned. Meanwhile both
Spaniards and French had been given cause to ponder the uses of
England's sea power, for in September 1652 Blake had destroyed a
1 See Newton, A. P., Colonising Activities qf the English Puritans, especially the final
chapter. This seems to modify some of the views expressed in F. Strong's * Causes of
Cromwell's West Indian Expedition", American Hist. £ouw9 iv, 228-45.
CROMWELL AND MAZARIN 227
French squadron bearing aid to Dunkirk, and so had enabled a
Spanish army to capture that fortress.
With the Dutch War concluded, the Protector had to make up his
mind. For him, with his military record and his sense of a mission,
there could be no standing still. Holding himself accountable for the
use of the power which had been placed in his hands, he conceived
that he must employ it for the advancement of England and of the
Protestant interest, which in his eyes were identical. The only doubt
was of the direction in which to strike. War against either France or
Spain could be made to yield a Flemish conquest upon which to base
an intervention in the affairs of Europe at large. War with France
had also the attraction of enabling him to assist the Huguenots. But
his secret agents soon convinced him that there was little basis for
such an aim. The Fronde was not, as he had been tempted to believe,
a war of religion, and there was hardly anything in common between
English Puritanism and the opponents of Cardinal Mazarin. On the
other hand, the actions of Spain in the West, viewed through English
eyes, called out for vengeance. The conquest in time of peace of
Tortuga (1635) and of the Puritan colony of Providence (1641)
seemed unprovoked aggressions to one who honestly could not compre-
hend that Spain had regarded their establishment as an aggression.
Several minor transactions had a similar bearing; and Philip IV
would not hear of liberty of worship for Englishmen in his ports.
So, after some months of negotiation with either Power, Cromwell
decided in the autumn of 1654, not for regular war with Spain, but
for a great reprisal raid in the Caribbean, the seizure of some im-
portant colony which, if the thing promised well, might grow into a
conquest of Spanish America. The opening stage, he calculated, need
not commit him to war in Europe, where he might still for some time
postpone his choice of a foe. Mazarin had already swallowed the
intervention at Dunkirk which had lost him that stronghold, and
when in October 1654 news came that an English force had captured
the French forts in Acadia, Cromwell declined to restore them and
incurred no declaration of war from the cardinal. It seemed reason-
able, therefore, that he should expect Spain to put up with similar
treatment; but in that, as the event was to show, he miscalculated.
Thus the "Western Design" went forward, a feint in the major
game of European diplomacy, but one planned to yield in itself solid
results across the ocean. The plans were faulty, for Cromwell listened
to advisers who were too optimistic, and he badly under-estimated
the difficulty of the task. He was probably influenced by the state-
ments of Thomas Gage, the author of The English American, a book
which had a great vogue at the time.1 In it the writer described, from
personal observation, the feebleness and moral corruption of the
1 See Gage, T., The English American or a New Surv& of the Wrt Indies, cd.A~*. Newton,
Introduction.
I5-*
228 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
Spanish colonial population, the rottenness of their defences, and the
discontent of the natives under their sway. Gage was right so far as
he went, but he did not tell the whole truth. For experience had
already shown that the true defence of the Spanish colonies against
English aggression lay not in men and guns, but in climate and
pestilence. Of Cromwell's error it may be said that, believing the
Spanish Empire to be a sham, "a Colossus stuffed with clouts",
he sent out a sham expedition to conquer it.
He had no desire to lose in the West Indies the men who supported
his authority at home. He planned therefore that the troops sent from
England should number only 3000, and that their force should be
doubled by recruits picked up in Barbados and the Leeward Islands.
Actually the English part of the force did not exceed 2500 men, and
those of poor quality. Few were trained soldiers, and the majority were
civilians hastilyimpressed. This so-called army was hurriedly embarked
at the close of 1654 without having once mustered in its entirety. As
Gardiner has remarked, "It had not been by gathering a mob and
styling it an army that Oliver had beaten down his enemies at Marston
Moor and Naseby ". The explanation lies in his under-estimate of the
difficulty of the service and in the prevailing theory of emigration,
which held that it was unwise to settle good men out of England. For
in Cromwell's mind the conquest was to be merely incidental to the
exploitation of the territories acquired, and the troops were to settle
down in them as the first colonists. The warships were much better
manned, and it was their seamen who did most of the real work that
was accomplished. By the end of March 1655 the expedition had
visited Barbados and the Leeward Islands and had enlisted about
3000 colonists, men who were even more dissolute and ineffective
than those who had come from England.
The Protector's orders to Robert Venables and William Penn,
respectively the land and sea commanders, were vague. They might
begin by taking Porto Rico or Hispaniola and thence extend the
movement to the other Spanish islands, or they might disembark
on the Spanish Main and capture Cartagena and the adjoining coasts,
or they might occupy an island and then try for Cartagena. He left
it all to them and their fellow-commissioners to decide on the spot:
"The design in general is to gain an interest in that part of the West
Indies in the possession of the Spaniard, for the effecting whereof we
shall not tie you up to a method by any particular instructions".1
The orders were such as Cromwell himself would have preferred to
receive, but they threw too much upon the shoulders of Venables,
whose character was rather that of a subordinate than of a leader.
It is unnecessary to enter into the details of what followed. The
story of the landing in Hispaniola and the disgrace at San Domingo
is well known. By the beginning of May all was over in that quarter.
1 Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 1 1410, f. 41, printed in full in Watts, A. P., Histoire des colonies
angldses aux Antilles, 1649-1660, pp. 466-9.
THE WAR WITH SPAIN 229
The expedition then seized Jamaica, which could muster no more
than 500 fighting men. All the English force was now needed for the
work of colonisation: and since it was more demoralised than ever,
there could be no thought of any further undertaking. Perm and
Venables, notwithstanding their duty to remain and develop their
conquest, returned to England, and Cromwell sent them to the
Tower for deserting their posts.1
The " Western Design" had not yielded a tithe of its expected
fruits. In Europe it produced results upon which the Protector had
not calculated. He seems to have been convinced that as France and
Spain were at war with each other they would both put up with any
amount of hard usage rather than quarrel with him. While, there-
fore, Venables was on his way to the West, Blake was sent with a
fleet into the Mediterranean to strengthen English interests there, to
retaliate upon French commerce for past injuries, and to show in
general that English sea power was as formidable there as in home
waters.2 Blake fulfilled his mission in such a way as to frustrate a
French design for the conquest of Naples, and then with great im-
partiality sailed out of the Straits of Gibraltar to cruise for the home-
ward-bound Spanish Plate fleet. Meanwhile Mazarin, as devoid of
temper as he was full of craft, persistently turned the cheek to the
smiter and offered alliance; but Cromwell held off for a long time
rather than subscribe to any agreement which would bind him to
connive at the oppression of the Huguenots. Spain acted with more
dignity but less worldly wisdom. Philip IV, on receiving in the late
summer the news of the attack on Hispaniola, held that that in itself
constituted a declaration of war. After a brief delay he recalled his
ambassador and detained English merchants and property in Spain;
and the Protector was left to make the best of a situation of his own
producing. There can be no doubt that Mazarin had made the better
choice, humiliating as it was, for England really was the holder of the
balance, as the events of the next four years were to show.
In October 1655 England and France signed a treaty ending the
maritime hostilities which had been waged since 1649. Next year
they made an alliance for the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. The
new combination achieved little in 1 657, but in 1 658 carried all before
it, routing Spaniards and Royalists at the battle of the Dunes, capturing
Dunkirk, and then making a triumphant invasion of the Spanish
provinces which was stayed only by the vanquished suing for peace.
At the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659), England secured Dunkirk, and
France part of the Netherlands, and the age of Louis XIV, the age
of Spanish debility and French ascendancy, began. Meanwhile ^ at
sea Blake had destroyed a treasure-fleet at Santa Cruz, but English
commerce had suffered severely from the Ostend and Dunkirk
1 Sec Gardiner, vol. ra, chap, xiv; Watts, op. «/., Appendices; Firth, G. H., Narrative
of Gen. Venables (Gamden Soc.).
* See Corbett, J. S., England in the Mediterranean, vol. i, chap. xvi.
230 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
privateers, so that the Spanish War proved far more costly in the
end than the Anglo-Dutch contest.
To complete the review of the external policy of the Puritans it is
necessary to say something of Portugal. In an earlier chapter of this
volume1 reference was made to Anglo-Portuguese hostilities arising
out of the English claim to trade in West Africa in the early part of
Elizabeth's reign. Since 1576 there had been considerable English
trade on the Guinea coast with the sanction of successive Govern-
ments, a complete disregard of the Portuguese monopoly in the East
Indies, and a regular English traffic with the parts of Brazil occupied
by Portugal. These matters were unregulated by any treaty until
1642, when John IV, leading the Portuguese revolt against Spanish
domination, had been glad to seek the friendship of Charles I. The
Anglo-Portuguese agreement of that year recognised English rights
in West Africa, allowed a limited English trade in the Portuguese
stations in India, and provided for a meeting of commissioners to
define the extent of the English Brazil trade. A further clause permitted
Portuguese merchants to hire English shipping for their own African
commerce.2
John IV's alliance with the Stuarts impelled him to afford shelter
to Prince Rupert in 1650, and led to a substantive maritime war in
that year between Portugal and the Commonwealth. Blake soon
convinced the Portuguese of the unwisdom of their attitude, and
negotiations for friendship with England began in 1 652 . They were still
incomplete when the Protectorate succeeded the Commonwealth,
and it was left for Cromwell to bring them to an issue in 1654. By the
treaty of that year Portugal made great concessions. Compensation
was to be paid for the losses of English merchants in 1650; English-
men in Portugal were to be free from the jurisdiction of the Inquisi-
tion, not only on board their ships, but in their houses on shore;
customs duties were limited to agreed rates, not to be augmented;
with Brazil under certain restrictions; and Portuguese merchants
might hire English ships but not those of any other nation.3 In effect
the treaty constituted England the heir to the dying Portuguese
Empire and dealt to the ambitions of the Dutch a blow which they
were then in no condition to resent. English merchants and ship-
owners acquired the same footing in the Portuguese colonial trade
as the Dutch had acquired in that of England during the Civil
War; and, unlike their rivals, the English were never ousted from their
gains. The ease with which Cromwell secured this predominance
undoubtedly inspired him to make similar demands on Spain.
1 Vide supra, chapter u, pp. 41-7.
* The text is in Rymer, T., Foeaera, orig. edn. xx, 523-7.
s Shillington and Chapman, The Commercial Relations oj England and Portugal, pp. 199-
204; for the text of the treaty see Dumont, Corps umver&l diplomatique, vi, 82-5.
SURINAM 23I
The imperial policy of the Protectorate with regard to foreign
Powers has necessarily taken precedence of its policy towards the
English colonies themselves, but that branch of the subject has now
to be considered. Three new colonies were temporarily or per-
manently acquired during the Interregnum, and of these the first
was Surinam. In 1651 Lord Willoughby, then the royalist governor
and part-proprietor of Barbados, sent a small expedition to
Guiana, the scene of so many English attempts during the early
Stuart period. His emissaries reported well of the prospects on
the Surinam River, and Willoughby then despatched about a
hundred Barbadians to begin a plantation, with an eye to the de-
velopment of a new proprietorship for himself. The colony took root
and prospered. Willoughby himself paid it a visit on his eviction
from Barbados in 1652, and then sailed for England to obtain the
recognition of his rights. The Commonwealth, however, objecting
both to royalism and to proprietorships, had no ear for his petition,
and appointed a certain Captain Richard Holdip to govern Surinam.
Holdip went to the colony, but is recorded some time afterwards as
having deserted it. He cannot have stayed longer than the summer
of 1654, for he sailed with Venables's expedition at the close of that
year. At the beginning of the Protectorate, Willoughby sought a
grant of the proprietorship from Cromwell, but after some negotia-
tions the plan broke down; although in 1657 the Protector offered to
let him go to Surinam to enjoy his private property there. Willoughby
was not content with this, and preferred to remain at home and en-
gage in royalist conspiracies. So, in and out of the Tower, but never
very harshly treated, he continued until the Restoration. Meanwhile
Cromwell appointed no governor and did nothing positive to regulate
the affairs of the colony, which pursued an autonomous career until
1660. Its planters were chiefly Royalists from Barbados, together with
a number of Jews driven successively from Brazil by the Portuguese
and from Cayenne by the French. Surinam developed a thriving
sugar industry, and since it avoided giving scandal by its royalism and
was moreover a settlement of great potential value, the Protector was
quite content to let it alone. It evolved a constitution of its own, the
planters annually electing an Assembly, and that body a governor, the
latter having also the assistance of a council of his own nomination.
The second of the new acquisitions was the fruit of the informal war
with France. Early in 1654 Major Robert Sedgwick had been sent
to New England to organise an attack upon the Dutch colony of New
Amsterdam. The Dutch peace nipped this scheme in the bud, and
Sedgwick turned his energies in another direction. His commission
empowered him to make reprisals on the French for their attacks upon
English shipping, and with assistance from New England he captured
the fortified posts controlling the French colony of Acadia. Cromwell,
despite his later alliance with Mazarin, did not restore the conquest,
232 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
which remained in English hands until the reign of Charles II. No
steps, however, were taken to supplant the French settlers, the motive
of the New Englanders being simply to control the fisheries and timber
trade of the coastline.
Jamaica occupied a larger share of the Protector's attention. He
was convinced of its intrinsic value and still dreamed of making it
a base for further conquests among the Spanish colonies. But he had
learned that the "Western Design" would be of slow accomplishment
and that Jamaica must be firmly occupied before anything more
could be attempted. To Jamaica were sent accordingly a rein-
forcement of troops and a number of civilian colonists. Owing to the
ill-will of many of the officers in the island, and to the ignorance and
mismanagement of the administration both there and at home, a
frightful mortality occurred and little progress was made. Jamaica
was the first of our colonies to be planted and developed by the
State, and the State had to learn by trial and error the business in
which private enterprise was now fairly expert, but in which it had
bought painful experience in the early days of Virginia. When the
course of the undertaking is compared with the contemporaneous
story of Surinam, a surprising contrast is apparent. On the Surinam
plantation there was no public expenditure, and the inhabitants,
with some assistance from Lord Willoughby, quickly became self-
supporting; neither is there any record of serious disasters during the
formative period. In Jamaica, on the other hand, despondency and
apathy overhung the colony like a cloud. The difference may to some
extent be that between good and ill luck, but it lay also in the type
of colonist employed and the conditions of work imposed upon
him. The pioneers of Surinam were old hands who had learned their
business in Barbados, they knew exactly how to set about their new
task, and they worked from the outset for their individual advantage.
Those of Jamaica were of a poor type, unused to tropical conditions,
relying upon pay and supplies provided by the State, and lacking any
incentive to render themselves independent of those aids. An army
on service is a communistic body — all efforts and all means are
devoted to a common end. When such a body is faced with the task
of making a colony upon virgin soil, as it was in Jamaica, it is out
of its element and its discipline is apt to break down, and without
discipline it perishes. There lies the essential difference between the
planting of Jamaica and that of the Lesser Antilles and Surinam. Not
until 1657-8, with the introduction of experienced colonists from
Nevis and Barbados, did Jamaica begin to emerge from its period of
disaster. A less resolute Government than that of die Protectorate
would have abandoned it before that date. The history of the under-
taking showed clearly that a rabble was no more fit for colonisation
than for conquest.
Of the older colonies under the Protectorate the imperial history
THE CARIBBEE ISLANDS 233
is almost a blank, although there were some transactions of local
importance. The New England group, Virginia, and Maryland
enjoyed fairly complete self-government, maintaining more or less
the policy of the Navigation Acts,1 but otherwise taking little part
in imperial affairs. Bermuda remained under the jurisdiction of
its chartered company, twice reorganised during the Interregnum.
Newfoundland, under its royalist governor, Sir David Kirke, had
been hostile to the Puritan party in the Civil War. In 1 65 1 , therefore,
the Commonwealth recalled Kirke, and thenceforward die island was
controlled by commissioners appointed by the Puritan Governments;
but there was in this period no settlement of the questions long at issue
between the colonists and the seasonal fishermen from the English
ports. St Christopher, Nevis and Montserrat remained under the
governorship of local men recognised by the Protectorate. All three
were in possession of elected Assemblies by 1660, but it is uncertain
whether those institutions were evolved before or after 1649. They
were probably of spontaneous growth, since there is no record of any
authorisation by an English Government for their establishment.
Only in Barbados is there any sign of a keen debate on imperial
questions. There the Puritan, Daniel Searle, remained governor from
1652 to the eve of the Restoration. By the terms of the capitulation
of 1 652 the colony, whilst electing an Assembly with control of taxa-
tion, received a governor of home appointment. The Barbadians
were dissatisfied with the arrangement and sought to argue that since
corporations in England elected their own chief magistrates, colonial
communities should have the same privilege. It was the old view of
the homogeneity of the rights of Englishmen irrespective of their
place of residence, but its force was weakened by the fact that its
exponents held extremely separatist ideas about their duties as
Englishmen, notably in the matter of the Navigation Acts. Before
April 1660 Barbados gained a step towards administrative inde-
pendence by securing the right to elect its council as well as its
Assembly. With the Restoration this privilege was abolished, but it
is of interest as showing the general tendency of the Interregnum.2
Under this cloak of political principle individual advantage was, in
fact, the real inspiration of the Barbadian leaders. The same may
be said of the planters of Antigua, whose squabbles with a harassed
governor, Christopher Keynell, in the same period have been rather
unwarrantably dignified with the appellation of a political conflict.
In spite of a theoretical centralisation of control, Cromwell's real
attitude towards those colonies whose condition was stable was that
of Walpole in the next century — quieta non movere. His organisation
of the colonial department of the Home Government -was therefore
designed chiefly with an eye to the affairs of Jamaica, and of the
Caribbees as they affected Jamaica.8 The attempts of the Common-
l. Beer, Origins, chap. xii. 2 Harlow, pp. 124-6. 8 See Andrews, op. cit.
234 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
wealth to form a colonial administration have already been considered.
When Cromwell became Protector in 1653 his own Council took over
the business, and managed it by means of sub-committees for specific
purposes. Then, when the "Western Design" had increased the im-
portance of the subject, he appointed a Council of Trade and
Navigation which included a fair number of merchants. This
body first met in December 1655, but came to an end in less than
eighteen months. Thenceforward, for general purposes, the Protector
reverted to the system of ad hoc committees of the Council of State.
Meanwhile, in July 1656, he had appointed a standing committee
for Jamaica and the West Indies, consisting of merchants and officers
with a knowledge of the conditions. This body, having an urgent
problem to grapple with, acted in a virile manner and gradually
became the effective colonial office of the period. Its chairman from
1657 was Thomas Povey, a West India merchant of large interests
and statesmanlike views. From the beginning of the Protectorate,
Povey and Martin Nodi and other merchants had been urging the
formation of a strong select committee, accountable only to the head
of the State and unhampered by other political connections. The
Jamaica committee partially fulfilled these conditions, but the Pro-
tector, from lack of time and from a disinclination to attend to de-
tails, was somewhat inert in forwarding its policy of strict control of
the colonies. This mercantile party is chiefly important for the fruits
which its representations bore after the Restoration. Cromwell was
rather in the habit of listening to its proposals without taking any
action upon them.
So far the colonies have been considered in relation to politics and
trade, but they present also another aspect of the utmost importance
in its bearing on the destiny of the old colonial Empire. This concerns
the peopling of the overseas possessions and the emigration policy, in
so far as one can be descried, of the English Government. Before
dealing with the facts of the Interregnum it will be useful to review
the theories of population entertained from the opening of the oceanic
period. About the middle of the sixteenth century, social and economic
changes began to produce an increase, greater than had before been
noticed, in the population of England, and at the same time an
amount of pauperism beyond the power of existing remedies. Thus
an impression became established that the country was over-popu-
lated and that the best means of relief would be the provision of more
employment at home and of an outlet for some of the surplus people
in colonies overseas. This provided the text for the Elizabethan ad-
vocates of colonisation, whose doctrines began to bear fruit in the
reign of James I. But the cost of the Atlantic passage was prohibitive
to persons in economic distress at home; such people could no more
afford to transport themselves to America than they could afford to
travel first-class to New Zealand to-day. Thus there sprang up the
EMIGRATION 235
system of indentured service, by which the wealthier settlers paid the
cost of transit and recouped themselves by commanding the services
of the poor emigrant for the term of years covered by the indenture.
At first, when the realities of colonial servitude were unknown and
when there was a prospect of land grants for those who had served
their term, the indenture system attracted a fair number of men of
respectable character and status. The pioneers of New England and
Maryland certainly included such servants, and the founders of the
settlements in Virginia, the Garibbees and Guiana found it worth
while to advertise for them in their prospectuses. But as the con-
ditions became better understood and the eligible lands near navigable
water were all taJken up, indentured service got an ill name, as of
certain slavery without hope of ultimate reward. Consequently, by
the end of the Civil War the emigrants were coming to consist pre-
dominantly of a class which had been present to some extent from
the outset— of vagrants, criminals, parish paupers and unfortunates
abducted by crimps, all in one way or another transported against
their will, and of a low average of character. The practice of the
country was thus diverging from the Elizabethan principle of volun-
tary emigration for the benefit of the emigrant.
Meanwhile that principle itself was undergoing a silent modifica-
tion- Until the end of the reign of James I the cry of publicists had
been all for mass emigration to relieve the alleged over-pressure of
the home population. Under Charles I this doctrine received less
emphasis, and by 1649 was heard no more. The resettlement of
agriculture and industry undertaken by Elizabeth's ministers was
bearing its fruit in the period of peace which followed her death, and
the England of the early Stuarts was proving itself capable of main-
taining a moderately growing population. Mercantilists, studying
more closely the interactions of trade and industry, grew more con-
fident, and even began to regard a numerous home population not as
a detrimental factor but as one favourable to the increase of wealth.
Consequently, by the mid-seventeenth century the emigration of
useful citizens had ceased to be a policy attractive to statesmen.
For the fulfilment of the mercantile programme, however, a
growing colonial trade was essential, and it could not be had without
a growing colonial population. Colonists must somehow be obtained.
Further, mercantile considerations required rather a growth of the
plantation colonies than of the settlement colonies in New England;
for the former sent rich cargoes to the mother country and received
her foodstuffs in return, whilst the latter sent home virtually nothing
and competed with the mother country's exports by supplying their
own foodstuffs to the Plantations. Agriculture, it must be remem-
bered, was still the premier occupation of England, and to maintain
it in a healthy state an outlet for its surplus products was necessary.
So the mercantilist theory demanded at all costs an increase of the
236 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
Plantation population, and would have viewed with indifference a
decrease of that of New England. These considerations led to
a practice in emigration which first stands forth in unmistakable
fashion during the Interregnum. In that period it may be question-
able to call it a policy — perhaps it was rather an unconscious reaction
to circumstances — but in the later stages of the old Empire it certainly
was a deliberate policy. It was that of filling the colonies with un-
desirables from the British Isles, with foreigners from any European
country which would supply them, and above all with negroes from
Africa. All ideals of a decent colonial society, of a better and greater
England overseas, were swamped in the pursuit of an immediate
gain, and it was only by an accident that in exiling English Quakers,
Irish Presbyterians and Catholics, and Scottish Jacobites, the rulers
of the old Empire mingled some good British strains with the hetero-
geneous mob they planted with complete indifference under their
flag. The origins of this disastrous error are to be seen, as has been
said, in the proceedings of Cromwell and the Puritans.
Those proceedings may be illustrated by the colonisation of Jamaica.
The expeditionary force of 1655 consisted chiefly of English undesir-
ables, soldiers rejected by their regiments and vagrants swept up from
the streets. It was early realised that these men would not be sufficient
to make a strong colony, and in the year of the conquest the Protector
sent an agent to New England to preach the advantages of the West
Indies and to induce the New Englanders to transfer themselves
thither in mass. They, however, in spite of tempting immunities and
land offers, refused to move. They were attached to their rugged
climate and could not enter into the feelings of English statesmen,
to whom colonists producing foodstuffs in America were valueless,
although as growers of sugar in Jamaica they would be doing good
work for the Empire. Meanwhile, the Government had been ordering
its officers in Scotland and Ireland to use pressure in recruiting emi-
grants from those countries. To the English mercantilist the popu-
lations of the sister kingdoms were not only politically dangerous but
economically competitive, and so there -could be no objection to
weakening them by emigration. Few persons seem actually to have
gone to Jamaica from Scotland, and none from Ireland, whilst from
England itself the only reinforcement from civilian ranks was a con-
signment of prostitutes collected by the Governor of the Tower. Only
then, after the peopling of Jamaica by New England farmers and
British undesirables had come to a standstill, did the Government
turn to the established colonies of the Caribbees, moving 1400 persons
from Nevis and afterwards some of the surplus inhabitants of Bar-
bados. But for the fact that this transference involved no net increase
of the West Indian population it would have been a more obvious
step to take first rather than last. The evil wrought by the policy of
exiling undesirables was twofold. It introduced a bad element into
THE SLAVE TRADE 237
the colonies, already sufficiently unruly, and it accustomed English
administrators to regard all colonists as inferiors, a stigma which
rankled until the War of Independence.
Before the end of the Protectorate it was apparent that the attempt
to emigrate large numbers of white men to the West Indies had
broken down. Jamaica remained short of men for a generation to
come. Antigua was another island whose exploitation was desirable
for strategical reasons, for it contained the best harbours in the Lesser
Antilles for careening warships. Here again English settlers did not
come forward freely, and the Government encouraged any foreigners
to go there provided they were Protestants. Actually a few Nor-
wegians took advantage of the offer.1 To some extent the deficiency
was made good by the fact that Barbados and Bermuda were be-
coming overcrowded and that their unwanted inhabitants were ready
to go pioneering in newer colonies. But the real mercantilist remedy
lay in the negro slave. Slaves crossed the ocean in increasing numbers
in the decade before 1660. After that date the movement grew into
a flood, swamping first the West Indies and then the American Plan-
tations, and providing the greatest material gain and the worst moral
deterioration in the record of the old colonial Empire.
The organisation of the slave trade, like certain other branches of
oceanic administration, was, during the Interregnum, the subject of
experiments which led to no successful results, but which neverthe-
less yielded experience whereon the Restoration was to found a
definitive policy. A basis existed in the Guinea Company incor-
porated in i63O.2 At that date the number of negroes purchased by
the English colonies had been unimportant, and the Company's trade
had been chiefly in gold, ivory and vegetable products. During the
Civil War, the Company's monopoly had been extensively infringed
by English interlopers, whilst the Dutch had grasped the principal
share in the nascent business of supplying negroes to the English
Plantations. Commonwealth policy demanded that the Dutch should
be ousted, and as a first step the Council of State interfered in the
dispute between the Guinea Company and the interlopers. As has
been explained, the latter were powerful in the Puritan ranks, and
special monopolies, particularly those of royal foundation, were un-
popular. The Commonwealth therefore sought in 1651 to impose a
compromise, by which the Company was to enjoy a monopoly of the
trade from Sierra Leone to Connantin on the Gold Coast, and all the
remainder was to be thrown open. Years of misfortune followed, and
by 1657 the Guinea Company had lost all its stations and most of its
shipping to attacks by Prince Rupert, the Dutch and the Danes. At
this juncture Cromwell, who was then reviewing the affairs of the
East India Company, decided to place the Guinea interests under its
1 C.O. i/ia, no. 68 (iii).
a See Scott, W. R., jomt Stock Companus, n, 14-17.
238 THE BEGINNINGS OF AN IMPERIAL POLICY
control for five years. In this way the Guinea Company of 1 630 came
to an end, and the temporary nature of the new expedient left it open
for a later Government to make a more solid contribution to the
problem of management.
From a review of the imperial statesmanship of the Interregnum
certain permanent results may be traced. The intrusion of the Dutch
into the economy of the Empire was checked but not completely
ended. The means for their exclusion was provided, but it was left
for the Restoration to put it into full operation. Here Cromwell's
strongly Protestant policy conflicted with the desires of the mercantile
interest, but Charles II was to be restrained by no such considera-
tions. Towards Spain the Protectorate maintained an attitude in
continuity with England's policy in the past, although a new
departure, of alliance rather than enmity, might well have been
instituted. The Dutch, with greater insight into the ambitions of France,
were preparing to make this departure; but Cromwell was drawn into
the affiance with Mazarin which produced the Peace of the Pyrenees
and the beginning of the great age of French ascendancy. Cromwell's
French alliance, however, was always tinged with suspicion. Had he
lived ten years longer he would very probably have reversed it, and it
is unjust to condemn him for the way in which others continued the
work which he laid aside at the age of fifty-nine. The treaty of 1654
with Portugal produced a permanent effect, the modern English
alliance with that country, which proved a great asset in the naval
wars and mercantile competition of the eighteenth century. It also
definitely closed a period of estrangement which had endured since
the reign of Henry VIII.
In the internal affairs of the Empire the Navigation Acts, disputable
as their effect may have been, marked a new and permanent de-
parture, clearly distinguishable from the colonial regulations of the
early Stuarts. The latter had been directed chiefly to the increase of
English revenue; but the Commonwealth Acts were primarily de-
signed for the advancement of sea power, from which the newer
mercantilist doctrine taught that an increase of wealth would follow.
Out of Cromwell's West Indian transactions sprang the emigration
policy which did so much to shape the destiny of the old Empire; and
out of the series of administrative experiments of the Commonwealth
and the Protectorate emerged the permanent commercial element in
the conduct of imperial affairs. And from the two West India ex-
peditions of the Interregnum dates the continuous employment of
the Navy as a link of empire. In general it may be said that, for good
and ill, the policy of the Interregnum confirmed the foundation of
imperial unity upon an economic basis.
CHAPTER
THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION,
1660-1713
story of the old colonial Empire can be viewed in two aspects : the
one, the development of the Empire as a unity, with administrative de-
partments, political regulations, and Acts of trade and navigation;
theother, thegrowthof thecolonies as separate organisms with peculiar
aspirations and interests, inhabited in time by communities nationally
distinct from the people of the parent State. The second of these
aspects during the half-century after the restoration of Charles II
forms the chief subject-matter of the present chapter. The bonds of
empire are described elsewhere; here we are concerned with the
centrifugal forces destined to burst them.
The greatest of these forces was the divergence of national de-
velopment. The colonists under Charles I were true Englishmen, the
great majority born in England. They were at variance with the
mother country on many matters, but they understood her, and she
understood them; thought flowed in the same channels on either side
of the Atlantic. There followed twenty years, from 1 640 to 1 660, during
which the young communities lost touch with the old. Until the
Battle of Worcester the colonies followed their own devices with
scarcely a pretence of control from home; and thereafter the Puritan
statesmen contented themselves with a formal allegiance, a somewhat
perfunctory observance of the Navigation Acts, and an almost com-
plete colonial autonomy in internal affairs. The imperial policy of the
Interregnum was more a promise than a performance, a promise
which had to await settled times for its fulfilment. Meanwhile a
colonial-born generation arose, still mingled with home-bred immi-
grants, but constituting a growing element in the population and open
to few of the contacts existing in times of peace. The Restoration re-
newed some of these contacts, but not the greatest of all, the continued
emigration in due proportion of the home population. Englishmen,
it is true, still went overseas, but the emigrants were nearly all of
peculiar classes not representative of the nation as a whole, whilst
much of the new settlement was accomplished not by them but by the
internal migrations of the colonists. There was, after the Restoration
Two causes contributed to national divergence, the introduction of
foreigners into the colonies, and the difference of the colonial environ-
ment from that of the mother country. The former was important
but must not be exaggerated, for a vigorous nationality can assimi-
late considerable foreign strains without being radically affected.
240 THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION
Environment was a much more powerful agent of change, and mani-
fested itself in many forms. Climate, diseases, food and drink dictated
novel habits of daily life; occupations unknown in England introduced
new economic problems and called for independent thinking; in
colonial society the presence of black slaves or white bondservants or
uncivilised natives, and the absence of a hereditary upper class, altered
the gradations knownathomeand opened responsible positions to men
who would have had little share in the framing of public opinion had
they lived in England; and in some communities religion moulded
citizenship, and it was religion of a type not tolerated on the English
side of the Atlantic. The list of environmental factors might be ex-
tended, but the above instances are sufficiently suggestive. In the
several colonies they varied in their proportionate effects, but in all
they exerted an influence upon the corporate character. New immi-
gration was scanty, there were hardly any of the present-day contacts
provided by easy travel, quick mail services, literature and political
speech-making, and as the generations passed the colonists were
moulded more and more by their surroundings and less by the
dimming memories of the England their fathers had left. Those
memories themselves became in time a dividing force, for the mother
country was in no static condition; she was moving rapidly along
lines of her own. The third generation of New Englanders thought of
old England as the land quitted by the Pilgrim Fathers, the land of
Shakespeare and the early Stuarts; but the reality, the England of
William III and Anne, of Addison and Swift and Defoe, of stock-
jobbing and journalism, was widely different. Environment there-
fore produced divergent characteristics. The English of the mother
country developed in one direction, their cousins overseas in many
others, and varying colonial types arose, having in common only
this difference from the parent stock. This was the problem of states-
manship which the old Empire scarcely recognised and never solved.
Charles II and his advisers found much colonial business awaiting
their attention, and they made a vigorous effort to consolidate an
Empire whose cohesion had loosened under their predecessors. Their
decisions led to important consequences in the established colonies
and to rapid expansion in new directions. To consider the different
fields in the order of importance which statesmen attached to them
it will be necessary to begin with the West Indian Plantations, whose
richest unit, Barbados, ranked as " the principal pearl in His Majesty's
crown"
In the Lesser Antilles, the Caribbee Islands granted to the Earl of
Carlisle by Charles I, an urgent problem demanded settlement. The
proprietary rights had been in abeyance since the outbreak of the
Civil War at home, with the result that the colonists had long ceased
to pay the proprietor's dues and had come to regard themselves as
freeholders. During this period the colonial society had been trans-
THE GARIBBEE ISLANDS 241
formed. Before 1640, when tobacco had been the staple crop, there
had been a large number of petty planters employing a few white
bondservants apiece. These planters had been poor and of little
political weight, and had had no elective Assembly. The introduction
of sugar planting had consolidated the small holdings into large
estates owned by a comparatively few rich men who were substituting
negro slaves for indentured servants. The majority of the dispossessed
tobacco planters fell to the status of employees or re-emigrated to try
their fortunes elsewhere; white immigration declined, and with it the
numbers of the white population; and the wealthy plantation owners,
some of whom lived in England, whilst all had business connections
there, formed a powerful oligarchy able to make their influence felt
at court and to rule the islands through the elected Assemblies which
during the Interregnum had everywhere taken root. In die first
generation the planters had been at the mercy of an absolute pro-
prietor. By 1660 they felt strong enough to resist the revival of the
proprietorship and believed that they would do better as immediate
subjects of the Crown.
The Grown nevertheless had obligations to the proprietorship, the
second Earl of Carlisle having fought as a royalist and suffered for the
cause. At the crisis of his fortunes he had leased half his rights to
Francis, Lord Willoughby of Parham, who had joined the royalist
side when it offered little prospect of advantage. In 1660 Carlisle and
Willoughby urged their claim and secured a provisional recognition,
but as Carlisle died without issue his rights passed to the Earl of
Kinnoul. The planters' spokesmen resisted strongly, and other parties
became clamorous: the creditors of Carlisle, who claimed payment
out of the proprietary revenue; the Earl of Marlborough, whose
family had been assigned a pension from the same fund; and the
descendant of Sir William Courteen, the original founder of the
Barbados colony. The planters* contention was that the proprietary
patent had been invalid from the outset, since Barbados and St
Christopher had been colonised before its issue; and that even if good
it should be forfeited for tyrannical and illegal use. The Earl of
Clarendon, to whom fell the task of effecting a settlement, believed
that this contention would be vindicated by a trial at law, but he saw
also that the other claimants had a moral right to satisfaction. After
a patient investigation he imposed a compromise in the following
terms. Kinnoul and Willoughby surrendered the patent into the
Bang's hands. His Majesty then abdicated all proprietary rights on
condition that the planters, through their Assemblies, should vote a
permanent revenue. Willoughby was to receive half this revenue and
to be governor of the islands for the remaining seven years of his lease.
The other half was to provide pensions for Kinnoul and Marlborough
and to pay off the creditors of the deceased Earl of Carlisle, the
Courteen claimant alone receiving nothing. The entire revenue
16
GHBEI
242 THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION
except the Kinnoul pension, which was perpetual, was to revert to the
Crown as the liabilities became discharged.1 The planters thus became
freeholders, and the islands royal colonies. In 1663 Willoughby went
out to complete the settlement and induced each of the island As-
semblies in turn to fulfil the bargain by voting a 4! per cent, duty on
the export of their produce.2 The step once taken was irrevocable,
for legislation needed the assent of Assembly, council, and governor,
and until the nineteenth century no governor was permitted by his
instructions to agree to the repeal of the duties.
Francis, Lord Willoughby, was an able governor with a regard for
his subjects' interests as well as his own. He supported the planters'
protest against the enumeration of sugar in the Navigation Act of
1660 and frankly told the King that whoever had advised that mea-
sure was rather a good merchant than a good subject. He had other
difficulties not of his own creation. The planters expected the bulk
of the 4^ per cent, duty to be spent upon local needs and conceived
that they had voted it for that purpose, but the Crown held that it
was a composition for the proprietary dues and ordered Willoughby
to ask the Assemblies for further grants for local defence;3 since the
proprietorship in its effective period had spent nothing upon the
islands and had drawn a large profit from them.
The war of 1665-7 bore hardly upon the Caribbean colonies.
Fighting with the Dutch began early in 1665, and in April a Dutch
fleet under de Ruyter visited Barbados. He was beaten off by the
land defences, but afterwards captured some shipping at Nevis and
Montserrat. In the following year France joined in the war as an
ally of the Dutch. The French of St Christopher conquered the
English portion of that colony after savage fighting. Willoughby
sailed from Barbados to the rescue, but was lost in a hurricane with
the flower of the island's force. Soon afterwards a French fleet raided
Antigua and Montserrat, destroyed the plantations and carried off the
slaves. Nevis alone remained intact. William Willoughby succeeded
his brother in the peerage and the governorship, and receiving naval
support recovered Antigua and Montserrat in 1667, but failed to
recapture St Christopher. Meanwhile Surinam, Willoughby*s pro-
prietary colony in Guiana, had fallen to a Dutch attack. It was a
serious loss, for Surinam had prospered as a sugar colony since the
Restoration and promised well for the future. The English in the
West Indies hated the French far more than the Dutch, and the in-
habitants of Surinam had hastily surrendered to the Dutch rather
than fall into the hands of "the merciless French", who were known
to be approaching. The treaties of Breda ended the war in 1667.
I glarmdon's jrjfe Oxford, 1759, pp. 490-6; Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial, i, 362-5.
» Hfrham, C. S. S., Leeward Islands under the Restoration, p. 13; Harlow, V. T., Hist, of
Barbados, pp. 128-46.
8 Harlow, pp. 147, 157, 160-1.
BARBADOS 243
England and France made a mutual restitution of conquests, but
England and the United Provinces agreed to retain what they had
taken at the date of the negotiation.1 Before its conclusion was known
in the West Indies Willoughby had sent an expedition which re-
covered Surinam, but by the terms of the treaty it had again to
be given up and has since been a Dutch possession. The island
colonies were restored to England. They were impoverished and
despairing. Barbados was financially almost bankrupt and had lost
many of her men. The Leeward Islands had been gutted by their
French conquerors, and the work of settlement had to be recom-
menced. Antigua was resettled by the refugees from Surinam, who
were already sufficiently West Indians to entertain no thought of
returning to the mother country.
The struggle in the West Indies bore a different aspect from that
in European waters. In the latter it was an Anglo-Dutch contest in
which France bore little part; but in the West the English and the
French were the protagonists, a foreshadowing of the conflicts of the
eighteenth century. The English and French courts were as yet merely
playing at war with one another, but the prize of the sugar trade had
forced them to be serious in the region where it was an operative
factor.
The Barbadians complained that after the war their plight received
little sympathy from home. It is evident that in spite of the absentee
estate owners living in England there was a lack of liaison. The line
of cleavage was between the planter and the merchant, and the non-
residents were chiefly men of mercantile interests. The resident planters
were aggrieved not only by the need for supplementing the 4$ per
cent, with other taxes, but also by the Navigation Acts, the slaving
monopoly of the Royal African Company, the engrossment of aU
island patronage by the King's ministers, and the quartering of a
regiment in Barbados. A strong home-rule movement therefore
manifested itself in opposition to Willoughby, and in 1668 the mal-
contents asked the King to abolish the 4j per cent, and the trading
restrictions and to grant a charter whereby the late proprietary rights
should all be vested in the inhabitants as a corporate body.2 Since
those rights covered the whole field of administration, this proposal
would have amounted to what is now called Dominion status, and it
naturally received no countenance from the Home Government at
a time when imperial policy was seeking to tighten the bonds of
empire. It is, however, interesting as showing the views entertained
at this date by an intelligent body of colonists; and along these lines
the Barbadians continued to agitate for several years.8 The inspira-
tion was purely economic; the sugar trade was depressed and offices
were being given to outsiders, and nothing else mattered. The fact is
1 Dumont, Corps unxoersel diplomatique, vol. vm, pt i, pp. 42-5.
2 Harlow, p. 196. 8 Ibid. chap, v, passim.
16-2
THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION
worthy of statement, for, here as elsewhere, the selfishness of the
colonists seems to have been the certain consequence of basing im-
perial unity upon mercantile connections; and yet it must be admitted
that there was no other system conceivable at the time, for England
was not strong enough to defend the Empire without drawing a profit
from its trade. World conditions had to be transformed before any
other kind of empire became possible.
The Leeward Islands showed the same general conditions as
Barbados and were more handicapped by the disablement of war.
On the other hand they had the good fortune to be ruled for fourteen
wan? by one of the best of the old colonial governors, Colonel William
Staplclon. Until 1671 the Leeward colonies were included with
Barbados under the successive commissions of the two Willoughbys.
The Leeward planters considered that Barbados was unduly favoured
by the arrangement, for her wealth and influence greatly outweighed
theirs. In this year the Leeward Islands received a separate governor-
m-chief, and soon afterwards Stapleton was appointed to the office.
He was strict in enforcing the Navigation Acts, but his tact and fair-
ness cased the burden, and the colonists gradually regained a modest
prosperity. They did not devote themselves exclusively to sugar
growing, and their ginger, cotton and indigo mitigated the fluctua-
tions of trade that resulted from dependence upon a single staple.1
Kor five years after the Gromwellian conquest Jamaica remained
umler military government, and little progress was made in trans-
forming the soldiers into civilian settlers. This was due partly to
Spanish demonstrations on the northern coast, which required the
maintenance of an armed force, and partly to the ill-will of the
ollkors who, in their desire to be ordered home, preferred that the
undertaking should prove a failure rather than a success. Inex-
perience led to the occupation of unhealthy tracts of land, and in-
competence to a shocking waste of Government stores and natural
resources. As an example of the latter may be mentioned the wild
cattle, which were so recklessly slaughtered at die outset that they
became too shy to be approached, and so a plentiful food supply was
lost. A terrible mortality was the penalty of these mistakes, and only
a small percentage of the early settlers survived. The little nucleus of
a colony that emerged from this confusion consisted rather of West
Indians transferred from the Lesser Antilles than of the troops sent
out from England. m
The Restoration Government, contrary to the expectations of some
observers, decided to keep Jamaica and to establish a civil constitu-
tion. In 1662 it sent out Lord Windsor as governor with orders to
that effect, and the first Assembly met in 1664. Windsor was further
instructed to promise customs exemptions, liberal grants of land, and
facilities for the people of neighbouring colonies to immigrate, all
* Higham, Leetoard Islands, pafssm-, Beer, G. L., The Old Colonial System* n, 3i~46-
JAMAICA 245
this with a view to lifting the cloud of ill repute that overhung Jamaica.
In 1664 Sir Thomas Modyford of Barbados became governor. He
took with him 800 Barbadians and proposed a further transference of
1000 men a year from that island. Lord Willoughby made a strong
protest, for he desired to send the Barbadian surplus to his proprietor-
ship of Surinam; and the movement was not carried ofct at the pro-
posed rate. The Dutch War caused a set-back, here as elsewhere, but
under Modyford Jamaica entered on a period of gradual progress.
It was perhaps justifiable to employ a planter governor in a new and
struggling settlement, and Modyford ruled successfully until 1671.
His success, it is true, was threatened by political difficulties. The
Jamaica Assembly considered it unjust that, according to instructions
from home, the island laws were valid for no more than two years
unless they received the royal assent. Owing to the nature of the
legislation this assent was often withheld, and a constitutional struggle
of some importance ensued. Modyford's successors could seldom
induce the Assembly to work in harmony with them, and in 1678 the
Earl of Carlisle was sent out with orders to apply the principle of
"Poynings's Law'5 in force in Ireland, whereby no legislative pro-
posals could be initiated without the previous consent of the Crown.
The experiment failed; the Assembly refused to pass the proffered
bills and, in spite of intimidation, made good its resistance; in 1680 the
earlier constitutional position was restored. The planters had won a
victory on a matter of principle — their claim to the enjoyment of the
rights of Englishmen, and the contest had not been complicated by
economic objections to the laws of trade, which do not seem to have
been a grievance in Jamaica. In a polity so largely governed by
precedent as the British Empire, the Jamaica struggle was of more
than local significance.1
The early development of Jamaica was affected for good and ill by
English relations with Spain. Owing to the refusal of Charles II to
restore the island a state of war continued until 1670, and out of it
arose buccaneering, the final stage of the semi-lawful warfare which
had existed from Tudor times. The buccaneers, who may be described
as the frontiersmen of the Caribbean, were originally men who
engaged in cattle-hunting and similar pursuits falling outside the
category of regular trade afcd planting. The war with Spain tempted
them to the sea as privateers, and the strategic position of Jamaica
rendered its coast an ideal base for their attacks on all the Spanish
possessions in the western Caribbean. They inflicted enormous
damage on Spanish colonies and shipping, culminating in the sack
of Panama by Henry Morgan in 1671. They brought their booty to
Jamaica for disposal, but although the influx of wealth was con-
siderable it did not accelerate the settlement of the island; for all the
most energetic and ambitious men were drawn away from planting
1 Gardner, W: J., Hist, qf Jamaica, pt n, chap, i; Beer, vol. n, chap. vii.
246 THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION
to the easier road to fortune. In 1670 England and Spain signed the
Treaty of Madrid, whereby the Spaniards acknowledged the English
right to Jamaica and other de facto possessions. England then made a
serious effort to stop buccaneering. Modyford, who had patronised
the rovers, was recalled, and Sir Thomas Lynch took his place as
governor. With the aid of the Navy he restored order to some extent
and wrote in 1672 that there were no English privateers or pirates
remaining in the West Indies, although the French were continuing
their depredations. This report was perhaps too favourable, but it is
true that in the decade ending in 1 680 the buccaneers dispersed. A few,
like Morgan, settled down as planters, others became logwood cutters
in Yucatan and Honduras, and others, continuing to rob, were
scattered far and wide over the oceans.1 Jamaica benefited by the
change.
The logwood industry proved to be permanent. Its exploiters
claimed that they were working in unoccupied territory and that
their business was therefore legitimate. Spain asserted her sovereignty
over the logwood coasts and declined to permit the intrusion. The dis-
pute dragged on unsettled into the following century, but the trade
was not stamped out. Its profits enriched the mercantile element in
Jamaica, which owned most of the ships engaged, but the agricultural
development of the island felt the competition.2
During the Restoration period the maritime nations displayed an
intense interest in the Caribbean, and the eighteenth-century view of
the paramount importance of that area then took shape. No Euro-
pean Power as yet possessed the capital and the population for the
full development of the American continent, and England at least
was already conscious that the control of large continental dominions
might prove difficult. The islands, on the other hand, produced great
and immediate wealth, negro labour supplied the lack of European
man power, and the planters, hampered by their slaves and by their
dependence on imported supplies, were in no position to seek inde-
pendence. Sea power could not maintain discipline in large, self-
sufficing areas like New England, but it had a perfect grip upon the
island Plantations to which blockade would bring collapse. Mer-
cantile statesmanship therefore made the Caribbean the focus of
international rivalry.
The little colony of Bermuda stood in a class by itself. In its
strategic relation to the mother country it resembled the Caribbean
islands. In its tobacco and shipping industries and its social circum-
stances it was more like the colonies of the American mainland,
whilst it was unique in being the only settlement governed during the
greater part of the Restoration period by a chartered company with
its headquarters in London. The continuance and ultimate extinction
of the Company's control is the outstanding feature of the colony's
1 Haring, C. H., Buccaneers in the West In£es9 csp. chaps, vi, vii. * Beer, n, 66-72.
THE BERMUDA COMPANY 347
history at this time. It illustrates the incompatibility of colonial
freedom in economic matters with profit-taJdng by the investors,
whose subscriptions had nevertheless been indispensable to the
colony's foundation. It has required the experience of three centuries
for this incompatibility to be fully admitted, and for the truth to be
realised that empire-building is an altruistic process in which men
must give without expecting to receive. A few but not all of the
financial founders of the old Empire were aware of it. Many of them
risked their savings in colonies under the impression that it was a
strictly business transaction, and they deserve sympathy in their
subsequent disillusionment; for it generally happened that in the
first years there were no profits to take, that then, if the undertaking
succeeded, there began a period of dividends, and that almost im-
mediately these rewards were cut short by die cry of the settlers
against exploitation and their demand to enjoy the full fruits of the
colony's prosperity. In Bermuda, where the second stage lasted
longer than was usual, the leading events were as follows. The Somers
Islands Company, to give the proprietary body its official name,
escaped the fate of its parent organisation, the Virginia Company,
and retained its charter for sixty years after that of Virginia had been
extinguished. The Earl of Warwick remained its patron and manager
until his death in 1658. By that date most of the original members
had also dropped out. Many of their shares had been acquired by
the inhabitants of the islands, and it was alleged that only a minority-
were still held in England. Nevertheless the Company's courts con-
tinued to sit in London, and under Charles II the colonists expressed
indignation against this minority rule. The grievance was material,
even if exaggerated, for the Company retained its monopoly of trade
between England and the colony and was accused of manipulating
prices to make an unjust profit. At length, in 1682, some of the in-
habitants instituted a quo warranto process against the charter, the
Crown took up their cause, and in 1684 the Company was dissolved.
It had not been culpably guilty, but it had outlived its imperial
function, and so, with some injustice to individuals, it had to go. The
islands became a Crown colony, paying to imperial funds the same
4j per cent, export duty as was levied in the Caribbean Plantations.1
In the American colonies the period under review is one of con-
siderable expansion, which is of a different type from that of the early
Stuart period when all the colonists had been emigrants from England.
After the Restoration the new acquisitions of the Carolinas, New
York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania were peopled more by re-emi-
gration of existing colonists than by newcomers from England, and
a foreign European element was present in all of them; for a variety
of reasons there was no renewal of the "great emigration" which
had founded New England and the tobacco Plantations. Beyond the
1 See Scott, W. R.> Joint Stock Companies, n, 293-7.
248 THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION
coastal belt, with its planting and mercantile occupations, a fringe
of pioneers was pushing into the interior, cutting loose from tide water
and communication with Europe, and seeking a hazardous living in
subsistence-farming, hunting and Indian trade. This frontier element
is for the most part silent in the seventeenth century, but nevertheless
it existed, as a few scattered hints are sufficient to prove, and it was
destined to contribute a vigorous element to the American character
and to mould the events of the future in a manner quite out of pro-
portion to the numbers of persons involved. For, to the south and
west of Quebec and Montreal, the French were also throwing forward
their adventurers, and the necessities of climate and waterways stood
ready to thrust them downwards across the path of the English
pioneers.1 The climax was in the future, but already the actors were
taking the stage, and some far-seeing men had an inkling of what was
to come. "The King of England", said a French officer on hearing
of the seizure of New York and the Hudson waterway in 1664, "doth
grasp at all America " ; and for the next twenty years the frontiersmen
of New York and New France were contending for influence in the
buffer belt of the Six Nations. These things have as great a significance
as the domestic politics of the coastline.
The unoccupied region to the southward of Virginia had long
appeared a desirable acquisition. Raleigh's colonial ventures had
been directed to its outlying islands, Sir Robert Heath had obtained
a grant of it in 1629 under the name of Garolana, and some unofficial
settlers had made fitful attempts to occupy it in the middle years
of the century. Restoration statesmanship under the guidance of
Clarendon transformed these aspirations into permanent achieve-
ment. Although Clarendon was the political patron, the designers
of the new colony were Sir John Colleton, a Barbadian magnate, and
Sir William Berkeley, governor of Virginia. With them were as-
sociated Lord Berkeley, brother of the Virginian; Lord Ashley, after-
wards Earl of Shaftesbury, an enthusiast for colonisation; Sir George
Carteret, another of the same type; Lord Craven; and George Monck,
Duke of Albemarle, the organiser of the Restoration. These eight
men received in 1663 a grant of the American coastline subsequently
defined as covering the region between 29° N. and 36^° N., with un-
limited extension into the interior. The name of their province was
altered to Carolina, and the Bahama Islands were also placed within
their jurisdiction. Colonial grants had hitherto been made to joint-
stock companies or single proprietors. A partnership of eight joint
proprietors was a novelty which gave the maximum of political weight
to the undertaking, but also caused a loss of clearness in design and
of speed in action. It was a device that was not repeated.
The Carolina proprietors no doubt hoped to make an eventual
profit, but they were experienced men who knew the colonial history
1 Parkman, F., Count Frontenac and New France, chaps, ii-ix.
COLONIAL MIGRATION 349
of their time, and had they been merely seeking a good investment
they would not have put their money into a new colony. A weightier
motive was undoubtedly that of the public service and of the credit
they would gain from its furtherance. They intended Carolina not as
a competitor with existing Plantations but as a contribution to the
imperial self-sufficiency that was the ideal of the time. It was not to
grow sugar or tobacco, but the silks, wines, fruits and oils which
England was then purchasing in foreign markets. Economic thought
was by this time unfavourable to the emigration of useful English
citizens, which it held to be a draining of the mother country's
strength. The proprietors therefore sent out few native Englishmen,
but looked rather to the older colonies, to Scotland, and to the
Huguenots of France for the peopling of their new dominion. The
plans for Carolina are thus worth a more detailed study than is here
possible.1 They outran their performance, but they are a complete
illustration of the imperial ideas of the time.
The actual expansion of the reign of Charles II was almost entirely
based upon the circumstance that all the older colonies had, for
various reasons, a surplus population ready to migrate elsewhere.
New England, particularly Massachusetts, was prolific of men. Its
soil and climate were harsh, and many found its social atmosphere
harsher still. Before the close of the century wandering New Eng-
landers, toughened by discipline but eager to escape from it, had made
their mark all over the world, in English politics, in the adventurous
West Indies, and in oceanic trade extending even round the Cape of
Good Hope to the Indian Ocean. To all the new American colonies
they brought their energy and their independent political ideas; their
religious straitness is the only quality they seem to have left behind
them. Bermuda was a tiny colony with a high birth rate. Its popu-
lation early reached the limits its soil could bear, and Bennudians
also pervaded the western Atlantic as seamen and settlers even before
the first Stuart wave of emigration had spent its force. In Barbados
and the Leeward Islands fecundity was not so evident and death rates
were high, but there the development of sugar planting displaced
much of the white population for reasons already explained. Finally,
Virginia was beginning to buy negro labour and had no more surplus
land at the water's edge to bestow upon time-expired white servants.
Her landless whites formed a class too numerous to find employment
between the planter aristocracy and the servile mass. Some became
frontiersmen in the higher grounds of the interior, but many were
ready to migrate along the coastline outside the colony's limits.
At the date of the grant of the Carolina patent some Virginians
were already prospecting in search of fertile land about Albemarle
Sound within the northern limit of the province. Sir William Berkeley,
1 See Raper, C. L., North Carolina; M'Grady, E., Hut. of South Carolina; Beer, vol. n,
chap. ix.
252 THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION
them to Europe. Thus Boston used the Dutch port as an annexe for
its own more risky operations, which could be conducted in greater
safety under a foreign jurisdiction. The situation therefore amounted
to this, that a conquest of New Netherland would gratify and
strengthen Connecticut, check the independence of Massachusetts,
and render it possible to set about the enforcement of the laws of trade
and navigation; it was in fact indispensable to the imperial policy
of the ministry. In formal justification there existed the excuse that
England had more than once denounced the Dutch occupation as a
trespass upon English rights founded on prior discovery and the Vir-
ginia charters of James I. The excuse was inconsistent, for England,
from the reign of Elizabeth onwards, had strongly asserted the counter-
doctrine that effective occupation was the only test of colonial titles;
and if the Dutch occupation was not very effective, there had been
no attempt at English occupation of any sort save in the eastern part
of the territory. There was yet another significance in the conquest of
the Hudson waterway — its strategic value in a conflict with New
France. But that was a frontiersman's interest, and there is no evi-
dence that it occurred in 1664 to English statesmen, whose eyes were
upon the coast and the ocean to the exclusion of the interior. In this
respect they were building better than they knew.
The Duke of York, brother of Charles II, undertook the prosecution
of the plan.1 In March 1664 he received letters patent creating him
proprietor of certain territory to the north of New England, of the
islands from Cape Cod to the Hudson, and of the mainland of the
Dutch possessions. He sent out Colonel Richard Nicolls with a force
not five hundred strong and orders to enlist more men in New Eng-
land. At Boston the commander met with a profession of willingness
but an actual delay which made the Massachusetts men too late to
share in the campaign. Connecticut, on the other hand, provided an
effective contingent, and at the end of August Nicolls took New
Amsterdam without firing a shot. In October a subordinate occupied
the Delaware settlements and the conquest was complete. The Dutch
Government made no effort at recovery, and the Treaty of 'Breda
by recognising actual conquests left the colony in English hands.
It was in effect exchanged for Surinam.
The exclusive object having been to perfect the system of im-
perial relationships, the duke did not care very greatly what local
institutions were established in the territory so long as that object was
attained. This is the due to his colonial policy, and it explains his
political tolerance overseas as compared with his absolutism at home.
It explains also his gift of half the conquest to Lord Berkeley and Sir
George Carteret, two of the Carolina proprietors; in his view he was
delegating a responsibility rather than parting with a source of profit.
1 See Van Renssdaer, M. G., Hist, of New York in the Seventeenth Century: Channing, £.,
Hist, qf United State, vol. n, chap. ii. ^' *' '
NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY 253
Whilst the result of the undertaking was yet unknown, he made over
to Berkeley and Garteret the land from the Hudson to the Delaware
under the name of New Jersey.
Nicolls established his master's authority with very little friction at
New York, where the Dutch ex-governor set the example of swearing
allegiance. The colony was as yet hardly fit for representative
government, much less for autonomy of the New England type, but
the arrangements actually made were wise and liberal. "The Duke's
Laws", applied in 1665 to the English of Long Island and subse-
quently to the whole province, allowed liberty of conscience and
worship and trial by jury, and personal freedom was certainly not less
extensive than in any other colony. In the next Dutch War, that of
1672-4, New York was retaken by its former owners but was restored
at the peace. Sir Edmund Andros, a man of firmness and good sense,
was governor from 1674 to 1680, and Colonel Thomas Dongan
from 1682 to 1688. Andros defined the boundaries with neigh-
bouring colonies and enforced the laws of trade. Dongan was em-
powered by the duke to introduce representative government, and
the first Assembly met in 1683, This step is in sharp contrast with the
trend of home politics at the time; and in general it may be said that
the character and policy of James, Duke of York, cannot be fairly
judged without taking his colonial proceedings into account. Dongan
also realised the military importance of the Hudson and made a
lasting alliance with the Six Nations who occupied the forest country
north of the province. There was no extensive English emigration to
New York. At the time of the conquest it contained about 7000
Dutchmen, nearly all of whom remained as English subjects. Hugue-
nots and some German settlers went there during the Restoration
period. New Englanders entered the eastern regions, and the duke,
who employed Catholics and Protestants indifferently, sent out some
Irish officials. The result, as in Carolina, was scarcely an English
colony, but neither was it typically American; it was rather cosmo-
politan and so remained for a century to come.
The New Jersey grant to Berkeley and Carteret was made in June
1664. The two proprietors agreed to interest themselves in West and
East Jersey respectively, the former meaning the south-westward
region bounded by the Delaware estuary. The Dutch population
of New Jersey was very scanty, and in the first two years it was aug-
mented by new arrivals from England and also from Connecticut and
New Haven. The vigorous New Englanders set the pace in political
matters and procured the election of the first Assembly in 1668. This
body sought at once to establish autonomy of the New England type,
and a contest with the proprietors resulted. The Dutch reconquest in
1673 left the immediate future uncertain, and before peace had en-
sured restitution Lord Berkeley sold his rights in West Jersey to two
Quakers, John Fenwick and Edward Byllyng. Hence arose the first
254 THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION
organised Quaker emigration from England, for the purchasers
intended to form a colony of refuge for their co-religionists. After the
peace of 1674 the Grown granted new letters patent for both New
York and New Jersey to the Duke of York alone, in disregard of the
Quaker purchase. Andros, who went out to govern the two provinces
for the duke, declined to recognise the Quaker rights, but his master
was more complaisant and allowed the settlement to proceed. This
kindness was partly due to statesmanship, which demanded that the
colony should be peopled, and partly to a queer friendship that
existed between the Catholic duke and the Quaker William Penn,
who had taken over Byllyng's share of the business. Penn, the ac-
knowledged leader of his sect, could command a fair amount of
capital, and in 1681-2 he simplified the Jersey problem by buying up
the Carteret rights in addition to those of Berkeley. The duke in-
structed Dongan, his representative at New York, to honour the
arrangement, and the separate existence of New Jersey was assured.
The colony was not, however, a personal proprietorship of William
Penn, but that of a syndicate of which he was the leader. The Qjiakers
were not the most numerous section of the population, and their
principles rendered them disinclined for political strife. The govern-
ment of New Jersey thus fell chiefly to the non-Quakers and, except
for its religious toleration, resembled the New England type.
Penn was not content with the New Jersey experiment ; he hankered
after a colony in which he could put his own pronounced views to a
trial unhindered by prior occupation of the field. The Quakers, in
spite of the friendship of the Duke of York, experienced bitter perse-
cution in the England of Charles II. Their unworldly stubbornness
in petty matters— wearing a distinctive costume, refusing to doff their
hats in courts of justice, "theeing" and "thouing" their judges, and
interrupting the services of the established Church — aroused more
hatred than did their fundamental principles, and both they and
their persecutors came to the conclusion that the continued residence
in England of their more intransigent members was impossible. Vir-
tuous as they were, authority regarded them as bad citizens, and there
was consequently no objection to their emigration; the State, classing
them for its purposes with paupers, felons and rebels, felt relieved at
their departure and was disposed to facilitate their going.1 This circum-
stance explains how Penn was enabled to enter the ranks of the
favoured courtiers in obtaining a proprietary grant of a large new
area of North America, to which he undertook to draw off his
unpopular followers.
The Crown had owed several thousand pounds to Perm's father,
who had died in 1670, and ten years later it still owed the money to
his son. The latter offered to accept an American grant in payment,
and in March 1681 received letters patent for a vaguely defined tract
1 Beer, i,
PENNSYLVANIA 255
whose borders were ultimately drawn as those of the present State of
Pennsylvania. At the time of granting, however, the province was
muchlarger, anditwassoonafterwards made to include the settlements
on the south side of the Delaware estuary which had hitherto belonged
to New York. The duke freely made over this territory to Perm, but
since it was already occupied, its devAopment took a different course
from that of Pennsylvania proper, and in 1702 it was separated to
form the colony and subsequent State of Delaware. Penn had
suggested "Sylvania" as the title of his province, and it was
Charles II who attached the prefix, somewhat against the will of
the grantee.1
New York had become a cosmopolitan colony by the accidents of
its history; Pennsylvania was made cosmopolitan by the policy of its
founder* The Quakers were strong in Wales and Ireland as well as in
England, and contingents from all three countries were among the
pioneers. In addition to this Penn wrote a prospectus which was
published on the continent in Dutch, French and German, and by
this means attracted a number of foreign recruits, chiefly Germans
and Swiss, from religious bodies like the Mennonites, whose principles
resembled those of die Quakers. From the outset there was complete
religious toleration, and all Christians were allowed ftdl political
rights ; the only restriction was that the sects must abstain from inter-
ference with each other's practices. The grant of representative
government was a condition embodied in the patent and was acted
upon as soon as the pioneers had settled down. Penn drew up an
elaborate and unworkable constitution known as the "Frame of
Government", but he did not attempt to put it into operation; its
council of seventy-two and Assembly of two hundred members were
obviously impossible, and it should be read as an academic statement
of principle. There was, however, some trace of its influence .in the
early political arrangement whereby the council (of eighteen mem-
bers) could alone initiate legislation, and the Assembly (of thirty-six)
could alone vote upon it. This peculiarity soon disappeared, and the
constitution became one of the normal type, giving scope, it may be
added, for the usual dissensions between proprietor and subjects.
Penn himself spent the years 1682-4 in the colony. To him may be
attributed two lasting achievements, the establishment of friendly
relations between the colonists and the Indians, whose lands were
punctually although not too generously paid for, and the laying-out
of the capital city of Philadelphia on the estuary of the Delaware.
Philadelphia was an example of deliberate planning and not of
haphazard growth, and its position guaranteed its future importance,
for it stood in the only corner of the province which impinged upon
navigable water. Pennsylvania was a spiritual as well as a material
experiment. In the former character it succeeded as well as any
1 Sec Jones, F. R., Cobmsation tf the Middle States and Maryland, pp. 363-81.
258 THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION
England. It was natural that this should be so, for a social and
political environment of a unique character was established there, the
contacts with the mother country were slight — there was very little
trade and virtually no emigration — and, above all, the New England
merchants aspired to the position of exploiters rather than subordinate
members of the Empire. The Plantation trade was their opportunity
of wealth, for they had no rich products of their own, and they were
determined to carry Plantation goods to continental Europe and
manufactures from it, whatever the Navigation Acts might say. It
followed from this that, autonomous as they desired to be, they had
no thought of secession from the Empire. Apart from the question of
defence, they would have been economically lost had they passed
outside the imperial system. The time had not yet come, as Scotland
was to find, when a minor State could independently enjoy a share
of oceanic trade.
Of the five Puritan colonies, Massachusetts was the only one which
in 1660 had any royal authority for its constitutional system; in its
case the charter granted to the Massachusetts Bay Company in 1629
was still valid. Rhode Island had obtained during the Civil War a
parliamentary charter that was now worthless. Plymouth, Con-
necticut and New Haven had never had any formal authority for
their establishment. Clarendon's policy, as already explained, was
to favour agricultural Connecticut as against Massachusetts, whose
mercantile activity was a threat to the imperial system then in course
of consolidation. Connecticut therefore received a royal charter in
1662 which recognised its constitution and allowed it to absorb New
Haven. Rhode Island received a similar grant in 1663, and Ply-
mouth could have had one on certain conditions which it preferred
to refuse. Plymouth thus continued a precarious separate existence,
liable at any moment to be cut short; but as an imperial unit the
colony was now unimportant, for its expansion was blocked by the
position of its neighbours, it had no good port, and it had already
attained the limits of development possible in its existing area.
Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island formed a group known
as the charter colonies. Each elected its own governor as well as its
Assembly and other State officials, the terms of office were short, and
the administration was therefore well under the control of the elec-
torate. Had the franchise been liberal, democracy would have
existed. But Massachusetts, and to some extent Connecticut, still
contrived to make church membership the qualification for the right
to vote, and the result was an oligarchy. Orders from England, it is
true, required the abandonment of the religious test, but they were
disregarded. Just as the Dutch War of 1664-7 was breaking out,
Clarendon sent commissioners to Massachusetts to enquire into its
political practices and enforce obedience; but the war diverted their
attention, and before its close Clarendon's rule was coining to an end.
INFRACTION OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 259
Massachusetts therefore escaped with an empty verbal submission
and a contribution of timber to the Navy.
From the foregoing it will be realised that a change of tone was
taking place in New England. Puritanism was still a vital force, but
it was no longer the dominant motive of the leaders' policy; trade
and territorial expansion were taking a more prominent place. Con-
necticut swallowed New Haven and obtained an extension of its
frontier westward at the expense of New York, although it surrendered
to the latter its pioneers in Long Island. Massachusetts was able by
virtue of its autonomy to continue its illegal trade, and it sought
persistently to extend its jurisdiction northwards in the direction of
the Bay of Fundy. Here the proprietary rights of Gorges and Mason,
two members of the former New England Council, stood in the way.
Massachusetts bought the claim to Maine in 1678 and took control
of that region. New Hampshire, on the other hand, was converted
into a royal colony in the following year. Rhode Island had, like
Plymouth, an enclosed hinterland, and devoted itself to ocean trade.
Its irregularities were as flagrant as those of Boston, but on a smaller
scale.
In the last ten years of Charles II the Imperial Government awoke
to the contempt shown by New England for the laws of trade. The
details of the infraction and the measures for the enforcement
of the laws are described later,1 but the political consequences
belong to this chapter. In 1676 the Lords of Trade sent out
Edward Randolph to investigate.2 He reported that wholesale
breaches of the law were going on. In 1678 he was appointed col-
lector of customs in Massachusetts and strove manfully to fulfil his
task. But the colonial officials were unsympathetic, juries refused to
convict the persons he denounced, and it soon appeared that the
whole community was bent on passive resistance. That resistance was
bound to be effective so long as the community governed itself, and
the remedy was to extinguish self-government. Other considerations
pointed in the same direction. Massachusetts was not the only
mercantile offender, and control would be easier if the several ad-
ministrations could be united. The frontier rivalry with the French
on the upper Hudson was growing serious, and military efforts in the
threatened war would be infinitely more efficient if New England and
New York could be consolidated under a single chief. At home in
England these years witnessed a steady attack upon popular liberty,
national and local. Autocracy was in the air, and if in England it was
a manifestation of sheer tyranny, in America it was to some extent
warranted by the unhappy results of liberty misused and by the
superior defence it promised in the event of war.
The Crown was certainly not over-hasty. Randolph complained
for eight years without evoking more than a warning to the offenders,
i Vide vrfra> chapter DC. 2 See Toppan, R. N., Edward Randolph.
26o THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION
but at last the Government struck. In 1684 Massachusetts was
charged with violating the terms of its own charter, and that instru-
ment was declared forfeit. The accession of the Duke of York to the
throne in the following year facilitated the ensuing steps. Con-
necticut lost its charter in 1686, and Rhode Island in 1687. The
Plymouth constitution, never having been sanctioned, needed no
legal process for its suppression. New Hampshire, as a royal colony,
was already bound to receive a royal governor, whilst Maine was a
possession of Massachusetts. All these units were consolidated by
James II into the Dominion of New England, and the experienced
Sir Edmund Andros was sent out to take control. Andros suppressed
the representative Assemblies, but ruled with the aid of a council
containing colonial nominees. Religious toleration was the long-
established policy of his master, and he therefore instituted Anglican
services at Boston. There was no compulsion to attend, but the
existence of surplice and prayer book in Winthrop's promised land
were in themselves an outrage to the stiff-necked Puritan oligarchy.
Yet there was no resistance, as there would have been in Winthrop's
day. Temporal motives predominated; the Empire provided defence
and trade, both impossible without its bounds; and New England
sat still and bided its time.
In 1688 Andros received commissions for New York and New
Jersey, with which his dominion reached its fullest extent. Boston
was his peace-time headquarters, as New York would have been had
his rule endured until the French war. That struggle had been long
in prospect to colonial eyes, but might yet have been long delayed
had affairs continued their course in Europe. In 1686 James II
signed a treaty with France for neutrality and the maintenance of
existing conditions in America,1 which, though it made little dif-
ference to the activities of the frontier leaders, did indicate that the
two Crowns desired to avoid hostilities. So things stood in America
when the spring of 1689 brought momentous news.
The Revolution of 1688-9 must be considered under two heads:
first, its spontaneous process in the colonies; and second, the settle-
ment subsequently imposed by William III. Rumours of the im-
pending fall of James II reached New England before the close of
1688, but definite news arrived only in March of the following year.
The popular leaders in Massachusetts at once determined to strike
at Andros, and in April he was arrested and imprisoned at Boston by
a rising as bloodless as that which had taken place at home. He had
a handful of troops and a warship in the port, but the blow was so
sudden that he was a prisoner before a shot had been fired; and the
knowledge that his royal master was an exile rendered it useless for
his adherents to attempt a rescue. Public opinion was in favour of
resuming the constitution provided by the late charter, as if that
1 Dumont, Corps vnfarsd tipkmatigue, vol. vn, pt n, pp.
THE REVOLUTION IN NEW YORK 261
instrument had been wrongfully annulled, but theleadingmen thought
it more statesmanlike to negotiate with the new King and perhaps
obtain an even better settlement. In Rhode Island and Connecticut
there was no need for revolutionary action. They had been governed
from Boston under Andros, and when he fell they quietly resumed
the direction of their own affairs.1
The events at New York are unintelligible without allowance for
the cosmopolitan nature of the population, the presence of Catholic
officials, and the menace of the French on the frontier. These things
gave rise to fears and suspicions which may have been unfounded,
and led to the formation of two factions which sought each other's
blood although both were in favour of the Revolution. When the
flight of James II to France became known, a suspicion gained ground
at New York that the acting governor, Nicholson, who had attended
Catholic services, meant to call in the French and hand over the
colony to their keeping in trust for James. There is no evidence that
there was such a plot. But New York contained many French resi-
dents, and these, with Irish Catholics, New Englanders, Dutchmen
and Germans, formed a mixture which had not yet combined into
a homogeneous community. A popular party, Protestant and re-
volutionary, took the initiative, and under the leadership of Jacob
Leisler, a German, seized the fort and proclaimed William III. An
aristocratic party under Nicholas Bayard viewed the proceeding with
dislike; they also were in favour of William and Protestantism, but
they regarded Leisler as a demagogue seeking to make capital out of
popular suspicions. Nicholson and the Catholic officials escaped to
England, leaving their opponents to fight among themselves. At the
close of 1689 a letter of recognition arrived from the Home Govern-
ment instructing the persons in power at New York to continue to
rule until further orders. Both parties claimed the letter, and Leisler
secured it and so consolidated his power for two years to come. But
his opponents, whom he branded as rogues and papists, were yet
lying in wait to ruin him.
In the remaining American colonies and in the West Indies, the
Revolution caused little disturbance. There was a period of rumour
and uncertainty amid which interested persons sought to overthrow
proprietary rights, but in general the outcome was that the colonies
looked to the Home Government for a settlement. This was because
the Revolution raised no question of principle in any quarter but the
New England Dominion. There were disputed questions, but it cut
across them, and the new monarchy was not likely to take up an
attitude radically different from the old. Even at New York the
trouble had been chiefly due to local dissensions.
It was unfortunate that the English Revolution entailed rebellions
in Ireland and Scotland and a great war with France, for these things
1 Guttridge, G. Hv Colonial Potoy qf WiUiam UI9 pp. 25-6.
262 THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION
not only delayed the imperial settlement but caused it to be piece-
meal and unsatisfactory. William III, enmeshed in party politics and
campaigning in Ireland and Flanders, had no time to apply his
statesmanship to the colonies, and he found among his ministers no
one whom he could really trust for the purpose. For two years all was
hand-to-mouth and provisional, like the recognition of Leisler, but
in 1691 the Government was able to spare some attention for the
business. At the end of that year William approved a new charter for
Massachusetts. It differed from the old in two important respects:
the governor and his deputy were appointed by the Crown, and the
Assembly was to be elected by the freeholders and not, as formerly,
by the freemen of the Massachusetts Bay Company, a large distinc-
tion which transferred the franchise from the narrow circle of church
membership to the mass of the property owners. The old oligarchy
was dissatisfied, but it is evident that a considerable section of the
population was pleased with the change; for in the seventeenth
century the word "liberty" had been capable of strange interpre-
tations. Maine was placed once more under the control of Mas-
sachusetts, and Plymouth was absorbed in that colony, after having
vainly sought to resume its self-government on the fall of Andros.
New Hampshire became a separate royal colony, whilst Rhode
Island and Connecticut had their Restoration charters restored un-
altered and therefore remained as the most completely autonomous
units in the Empire.1
Meanwhile New York had been dealt with. The Home Govern-
ment, in spite of Leisler's enthusiasm on its behalf, had behaved
coldly towards him and had accorded him no personal recognition.
In the colony his faction lost ground owing to his lack of success in
resisting French and Indian raids. When, therefore, a new governor,
Colonel Henry Sloughter, arrived in 1691 with a commission en-
tirely ignoring his predecessor's status, Leisler was in so desperate a
position that he was tempted to resist. He was overcome, tried by his
opponents, and executed for treason in May 1691. Like the greater
tragedy of Glencoe, it was a miscarriage of justice in which a faction
took their revenge under cover of the authority of a distant King
whose preoccupations compelled him to entrust his good name to
unworthy keeping. The constitutional settlement made New York
a royal government with an elected Assembly and institutions similar
to those of Virginia.
Of the proprietary colonies, Maryland was placed in an inter-
mediate position. Lord Baltimore, as a Catholic, had his rights sus-
pended but not annulled, and the Crown appointed the governor
until 1715, when a new and Protestant Lord Baltimore recovered the
proprietorship. New Jersey returned to the control of its proprietors
after its brief membership of the New England Dominion, and the
1 Guttridge, pp. 24-6.
THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT 263
Carolinas remained under the authority of their proprietary partner-
ship, an authority more nominal than real for reasons already
explained. William Perm, as a notorious friend of James II, also
temporarily lost his right of control, but recovered it earlier than did
the Galverts ; but his authority was hardly effective, and Pennsylvania
long remained in an unsatisfactory condition. In 1702 the Delaware
region spontaneously separated from it and was allowed to continue
as a distinct colony under the same nominal authority. In Virginia
and the West Indian islands the revolutionary settlement involved
no constitutional changes, and the appointment of new governors
met the needs of the situation.1
The revolutionary settlement was completed in 1696 with the
establishment of the Board of Trade and the passing of the Navigation
Act of that year — matters which are dealt with later.2 From the
colonial point of view they represent, together with the decisions
already recorded, a confirmation of the imperial system outlined at
the Restoration and an attempt to make it more effective. The
alternative, the constructive policy of 1684-8, of consolidation into
dominions and centralisation of government within their bounds, was
discarded. Could it have been pushed to success, it would have
strengthened the Empire and improved its tone. On the other hand,
the failure of the policy, of which the chances were considerable,
would probably have hastened American separation by providing a
ready-made mechanism of revolt. All really depended upon the
persons engaged in the task, and whether they would have proved
strong, wise and lucky enough to tide over the period during which
the new institutions were taking root. The advisers of William III
avoided the venture and played for safety; and we knowing, as
they could not, the history of the following century, can only regard
their proceedings as an opportunity missed.
The history of the colonies from the Revolution to the Treaty of
Utrecht is overshadowed by the French wars, whose general course
is related elsewhere.8 To statesmen in all the belligerent countries the
military interest lay in Europe, with the colonies in the background
as counters for the peace negotiations. The wars thus produced no
comprehensively planned campaigns across the ocean like those of
the elder Pitt. Instead there occurred a series of little separate wars
for limited objects, not taken seriously because all but the local men
realised that the ultimate decisions depended upon the fate of battles
in Flanders, the Channel and the Mediterranean. This ineffectiveness
of the colonial war was not inevitable, as Pitt was to prove; the ocean
was a decisive field for the negotiators and could have been made one
for the commanders. But the occasion did not find the man; the
Home Government was hampered by slow communications and the
1 Guttridge, pp. 36-^40. * See chapter K.
8 See chapters, x, xvm.
264 THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION
colonies by their individual and narrow outlook; and New France,
which could have been conquered by a united imperial effort, lost
only its fringes in I7I3-1
Certain other topics need mention to complete the survey of the
Restoration Empire. The Newfoundland colony was very small, not
attaining a permanent population of 1000 during this period, but the
fishery was important as a source of men for the Navy. The great
majority of the fishermen returned to English ports for the winter,
and their spokesmen made ceaseless complaints of the conduct of the
colonists. But for the rivalry of the French and the fear that they
would claim the whole island, it is probable that the English Govern-
ment would have compelled its own colonists to evacuate their villages
in response to the demands of the seasonal fishermen. As it was, a
French colony was planted and lived side by side with the English
until the Treaty of Utrecht settled the matter by giving England the
sovereignty of the island although with a reservation of French fishing
rights, A parallel question was that of Hudson Bay. Charles IPs
charter in 1670 gave the Company a monopoly of trade within the
watershed surrounding the coast.2 French invaders by sea and over-
land from Canada captured most of its forts during the wars of
William III, and these posts were not restored until 1713, when the
Company resumed the profitable trade it had followed before 1689.
The fortunes of the Royal African Company are described later.8
Finally, the East India Company must be noticed, although its
history is dealt with elsewhere.4 Charles II and his brother were
its patrons and defenders against the jealousy of the non-privileged
traders. After the Revolution these latter obtained the support of
Parliament and a charter of incorporation in 1698. There were thus
two East India Companies, the old or London, and the new or
English. After a bitter struggle they agreed to amalgamate in 1 702 ;
seven years later the fusion was completed and the United East India
Company began its career.6
In the course of its trading operations the East India Company had
founded a small colony in addition to its eastern factories. The voyage
round the Cape of Good Hope was so long as to necessitate a halt for
water and fresh provisions at some point in its course, for the crews
carried by the Indiamen were much more numerous in proportion
to the tonnage than those of modern sailing-ships. Under the old
conditions scurvy and starvation were constant dangers in crowded
vessels, and the East India trade caused a serious wastage of the
national strength of seamen. In the early seventeenth century the
1 See Guttridge, op. cit., and the Prefaces of Calendars of State Papers Colonial for the
period.
2 Wilson, B., The Great Company-, Scott, W. R., Joint Stock Companies, vol. i, chap, xv,
vol. n, pp. 228-37.
3 See chapter xv. * See volume TV.
5 Scott, vol. i, chap, xvi, vol. n, pp. 128-88.
THE DARIEN SCHEME 265
English and the Dutch were in the habit of calling at the Gape for
refreshment. In 1652 the Dutch took formal possession, organised a
little settlement to grow foodstuffs, and naturally excluded their com-
petitors from its advantages. The English Company therefore looked
for another site^ and in 1659, after its reorganisation by the Pro-
tectorate, occupied St Helena. The first colony had an unhappy
history of dissensions between the settlers and the authorities, and
came to an end when the Dutch captured the island early in 1673.
Later in the same year St Helena was retaken and the colony
refounded. Thenceforward it continued its career, unobtrusively
fulfilling its function in the great process of eastern trade. Modern
changes in shipping and trade routes have diminished its import-
ance.1
The East India trade excited the ambition of Scotland to share in
oceanic enterprise. By the terms of the Navigation Acts the Scots
were excluded from trade with English possessions, although their
seamen were tacitly accepted as "English" for the legal manning of
English-owned ships. In 1695 ^ Scottish Parliament passed an Act
establishing a national company to trade with Africa and the East
and West Indies. Its chief activity was an attempt to plant a colony
in Darien, and its disastrous failure had much to do with the
exasperation of Scottish feeling for which the Union of 1707 proved
the ultimate remedy.2
Whether Scotland had a real grievance about Darien is now happily
nothing but an academic question. The scheme failed by reason of
its own unsoundness, for the promoters sent their men filibustering in
time of peace, whilst at home they gambled upon the undefined
constitutional relations of a common Crown with two independent
legislatures. But behind the effort, and lending passion to untenable
arguments, was the greater question of Scotland's destiny. The Low-
land Scots, a people alrin to the English, had long carried on a trade
across the North Sea and had shared in the fisheries of the Iceland
coast. At the opening of the sixteenth century James IV had built a
fighting fleet of considerable strength, and Scottish privateers had
been active in European waters throughout the warfare of the
Reformation. Scotland had thus a maritime tradition. In the seven-
teenth century, a time of almost continuous peace, her mercantile
interest had grown strong and accumulated capital. At the same time
the more fortunate maritime States were demonstrating how great a
national power and wealth could be derived from the colonial and
Asiatic trades. It was therefore natural that patriotic Scots should
grow tired of fighting for Dutch merchants and German princes and
1 See "The History of St Helena and the Route to the Indies, 1659-1702", an un-
published thesis by W. G. Palmer in the Library of the University of London.
8 Insh, G. P., Papers rflating to the Company & Scotland; Barbour, J. S., WUKam Paterson
and the Darien Company ; Scott, n, 207-27.
266 THE COLONIES AFTER THE RESTORATION
should demand an opening to the wealth of the oceans. With the
Darien Company they tried on separatist lines and failed; there was
no room for an infant oceanic power at this late date in European
expansion. But the Act of Union made them free of the English
Empire, which from 1707 became the British Empire, with nothing
but benefit to both the partners. The English treasury indemnified
the Darien shareholders, and the English Navigation Acts were
extended to share with Scotland the huge monopoly they had built up.
To the narrow view the English maritime interest was making a
sacrifice; but it was well repaid. The United Kingdom, dreamed of
by Edward I and Henry VIII, became a fact. The liberties of both
countries were secured; the Stuart attacks of the eighteenth century
were supported only by a Scottish faction and not by the Scottish
nation, as they might otherwise have been. Across the ocean the
Plantation trades brought wealth to the merchants of Glasgow and
Edinburgh and opened a market to the manufactures of an industrial
belt which has greatly increased the population of Scotland. The
Scots on their side added strength to the Empire. Canada owes much
to them, first as factors and explorers for the Hudson's Bay Company,
and afterwards as settlers in Ontario and the prairies. The Highlands,
effectively incorporated in the kingdom after 1 745, furnished to the
American colonies settlers who were for the most part loyalists in the
War of Independence, and to the Empire at large soldiers who have
made their mark all over the world. Scottish names are prominent
in the later history of British India, in the colonisation of Australia,
New Zealand and South Africa, and in the development of all the
tropical dependencies. Scottish shipowners and seamen have borne
a great part in the predominance of the British mercantile marine.
With such wisdom did the men of 1707 turn evil into good by an
achievement greater than the Battle of Blenheim or the Treaty of
Utrecht.
The growth of colonial population was an important factor in
producing the state of sentiment towards the mother country which
developed during the period. Some illustrative figures are therefore
given below; but it should be realised that the statistics are imperfect
and often unreliable, for no systematic census was ever taken under
the old Empire. The totals are combined from estimates by various
observers who differed in ability and prejudice, and the matter is one
upon which further research may yield corrections.1 Taking 1660,
1688 and 1713 as convenient dates, it may be computed that the New
England group of colonies contained about 33,000, 79,000 and
110,000 inhabitants in those years respectively. None of die middle
colonies (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware) was
1 The figures are drawn or in some cases inferred from Dexter, F. B., "Estimates of
Population in American Colonies", in Proc. qf American Antiquarian Soc. N.S. v, 22 seqq.,
with, modifications from various other sources.
COLONIAL POPULATION 267
in English hands in 1660, but New York is stated to have had about
7000 Dutch inhabitants in 1664; in 1688 and 1713 the middle group
contained some 42,000 and 73,000 respectively. For the southern or
Plantation colonies (Maryland southwards to South Carolina) the
three totals were probably 30,000, 90,000 and 157,000, most of the
growth occurring in Maryland and Virginia. The figures for the
southern colonies include a certain number of negroes, but slavery
had not yet attained the proportions evident in the middle of the
eighteenth century. The totals for all the American colonies at the
three selected dates amount to 63,000, 200,000 and 350,000; and in
the eighteenth century there was a great increase by which the popu-
lation doubled itself roughly every twenty years. The indications are
that although immigration was appreciable, the increase was mainly
due to multiplication of the pioneer stocks in an environment which
offered cheap land, a healthy climate and good trading facilities. The
British West Indies were not thus affected. It is probable that there
were no more white men in them in 1713 than in 1660, for the im-
migration was barely sufficient to balance the excess of deaths over
births. Negroes, however, were imported in increasing numbers, and
the total population (including that of Bermuda) may be estimated at
85,000, 150,000 and 200,000 in the three chosen years. Of the last-
named figure probably three-quarters were negroes. In general it
may be said that the West Indian planters remained in a dependent
position from which they had little prospect of escaping; but that the
American settlers, although not yet confident of ability to stand by
themselves, were on the way to the multiplication of numbers that
enabled them to become an independent nation in the eighteenth
century.
CHAPTER IX
THE ACTS OF TRADE
1 HOUGH the beginnings of a colonial policy may be discovered in
England's relations with Virginia and Bermuda after 1620 and also
in die legislation of the period of the Commonwealth, it was not until
the capture of Jamaica in 1 655 that the interests of the merchants were
sufficiently enlisted to lead the Government to formulate a definite
commercial and colonial programme. The new colonial territory,
acquired by conquest and free from private control, opened a promis-
ing world to the capitalists of London and elsewhere, while the
cessation of civil warfare and the diminution in England of religious
and political animosity created a favourable milieu for the accumu-
lation and expenditure of wealth. Merchants, traders, sea captains,
and promoters were growing in influence and were ready to engage
in new enterprises, so soon as England's conditions were favourable.
For the moment, however, a heavy burden of debt lay upon the
country, which in 1659 was "more than double the largest recorded
Crown liability before 1641 ".1 In 1658 and 1659 the country was in
the throes of a financial panic which rendered imminent a serious
industrial crisis and demanded a change of government. To continue
the Protectorate was suicidal; men wanted tranquillity and a re-
duction of taxation. The restoration of Charles II was due in no
small measure to the incompetence of the Puritan administration on
the financial side.
To meet the demands of those who, for some years, had been
advocating a more efficient control of trade and foreign Plantations,
the King, on 4 July 1660, appointed a committee of the Privy Council
to consider Plantation questions; and later in the year, acting upon
the advice of Clarendon and in accord with the plans of the merchants
themselves, he created two special councils, one for trade and the other
for foreign Plantations. These councils — successors of the committees
of trade of 1650 and 1657 and forerunners of the councils of 1668,
1672, and 1696 — though destined to have short lives of but four or
five years, are of the utmost importance, in that they inaugurated a
system of commercial and colonial oversight that was to continue,
with some intermissions, for nearly a century and a quarter. In the
instructions to these various bodies, covering the years from 1660 to
1696, may be found a definition of commercial policy and a shaping
of the colonial relationship that were to remain essentially unchanged
during the continuation of the old British system.
These select councils had a chequered career. The Council of
1 Scott, W.TL,J(fa Stock Compaaus,i,afo.
EARLY COUNCILS OF TRADE 269
Trade, in abeyance after 1665 because of the distracted condition of
the kingdom, was abolished in 1668 and a new council appointed.
This council in turn, after an inactive existence of four years, was
abolished in 1672 and its functions were transferred to the select
Council for Foreign Plantations, which had been revived, 3 August
1670, under the influence of Lord Ashley (later the Earl of Shaftes-
bury), and which, as the Select Council for Trade and Foreign
Plantations, sat from 13 October 1672 to 22 December 1674. After
the fall of Shaftesbury, this council also was abolished, owing probably
in large part to the inability of the Government to meet the expense;
and its duties were transferred to the committee of the Privy Council,
which under a special commission of February 1675 performed, but
in a more authoritative manner, essentially die same work as that
of the earlier councils. This important committee, the Lords of Trade,
was composed as a rule of men high in rank, office, and influence, and
though it underwent frequent changes in personnel, notably after the
Revolution of 1689, it sat for twenty-five years. Finally, under the
pressure of influential mercantile leaders, who were dissatisfied with
existing trade conditions and with the indifference and carelessness
of an inexpert and amateur body such as the Lords of Trade were
showing themselves to be, Parliament determined to re-establish the
old system of select councils. In a vigorous resolution, which re-
produced substantially the instructions of 1672, it laid down the
terms under which such a council should carry on its work. But
Kong William, always jealous of his royal rights and deeming the
action of the House of Commons an encroachment on the powers of
the prerogative, took the matter out of the hands of Parliament and
on 15 May 1696, by warrant under the sign manual, brought into
being the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, commonly
known as the Board of Trade.
The series of instructions issued from 1660 to 1696, considered as a
whole and with regard to their development, constitute a commercial
and colonial programme that determined for more than a century
the policy of the executive towards trade and the colonies. Shaped by
the London merchants in its earliest form and elaborated by Shaftes-
bury and Locke later, this programme underwent very little change
during the whole period of its enforcement. Its fundamental pur-
poses were the supervision and regulation of domestic and foreign
trade, the encouragement of home manufactures, and the advance-
ment of fishing and shipping. The control of the Plantations consti-
tuted an integral but subservient part of this prograixime. Viewed as
a source of such raw materials and tropical products as England
needed, the Plantations became a matter of commercial rather than
colonial concern, and the various councils were enjoined to discover,
then and always, how best these colonies could be made useful and
beneficial to die mother country. To this end the councils were
270 THE ACTS OF TRADE
directed to inform themselves of the condition of the colonies, their
administration, complaints, and needs; to provide newly appointed
governors with instructions; to enquire into the course of justice; to
ascertain what laws were passed and to scrutinise their "consti-
tutionality". Furthermore, they had to determine how best to
advance the welfare, defence, and security of the Plantations; to in-
form themselves regarding the inhabitants — planters, servants, and
slaves, and to aid in their increase and proper distribution; to promote
the moral and spiritual status of servants, slaves, and Indians; to
prevent crimping and spiriting, and to devise means for improving
and increasing colonial commodities. Also they were to regulate
colonial trade in such a way as to render each colony serviceable to
the others and all serviceable to England; to watch over the execution
of whatever Acts Parliament passed for the benefit of commerce; to
procure maps, charts, and descriptions of routes and channels; to
enquire into rates and duties, the systems of other countries, and their
methods of managing their colonies; to ascertain what colonial
staples were deserving of encouragement, what trades there were that
were likely to be injurious to England, and, if any such should be
found, to make every effort to turn colonial activities into the proper
channels. But the councils were invested with no executive functions,
and had no power to dispose of any public money. Their duties were
inquisitorial and advisory; throughout their entire history they made
no attempt to formulate or recommend any fundamental principles
of colonial policy, other than those laid down in their instructions,
and at no time did they show any serious interest in adapting their
ideas regarding colonial administration to the changing conditions
of colonial life. Herein lay the weakness of the old British system.
While Charles II and his successors were appointing councils and
drafting instructions, Parliament was determining the rules that were
to govern the trade and navigation of the kingdom. The principles
underlying these rules were not new, for in one form or another,
chiefly by executive order, they had been in application since the
beginning of settlement; but they were new as a subject for effective
parliamentary legislation, because the Commonwealth Navigation
Act of 1651 had ceased to have validity after the restoration of the
monarchy. Those who now felt the necessity of supplanting the Order
in Council by an Act of Parliament had a threefold object in view.
Because of the futility of the Act of 1651, which had failed to wrest
the carrying trade from the Dutch, they wished, first of all, to restate
more emphatically than before the essential features of that Act, and
thereby to ensure the promotion of English shipping and seamanship
and to secure for England complete control of her own carrying trade.
In the second place, they wished to utilise the colonies as a source of
such commodities as England needed for her own consumption and
so to rectify, if possible, an unfavourable balance of trade with certain
THE NAVIGATION ACT OF 1660 271
parts of Europe and the East. In the third place, they wished to
protect British mercantile interests and to increase the customs re-
venues by making England the staple through which all manufactured
goods that were taken to the Plantations would have to pass. These
objects were attained in two important measures, one passed by the
Convention Parliament in 1660 and the other by the Cavalier Parlia-
ment in 1663. Certain supplemental measures of 1662, 1671, and
1673 added explanations and filled in gaps, but in no way altered the
main features. Behind these Acts were merchants and promoters
without official position, such as Martin Noell, James Drax, Maurice
Thompson, and Thomas Povey; office holders, such as Joseph
Williamson, Richard Nicolls, John Werden, Robert Southwell, and
George Downing, perhaps the most persistent and influential of them
all, and statesmen of the first rank and members of the royal family,
such as Clarendon, Arlington, Berkeley, Anthony Ashley Cooper,
Prince Rupert, and the Duke of York. Clarendon, who had great
weight with the King, was constantly urging upon him the importance
of shipping, the fisheries, and the Plantations as a means of increasing
the revenues, and calling to his attention the "infinite importance of
the improvement of trade". Royalists and Parliamentarians alike
upheld the principles upon which the Navigation Acts were founded
and party lines had little place in the support of these measures.
According to the Act of 1660, the first seventeen clauses of which
were but a confirmation and elaboration of the Act of 1651, no goods
or commodities were to be carried to or from the Plantations except
in ships owned by people of England, Ireland, Wales or Berwick-on-
Tweed, or were built in and belonged to the Plantations. Of these
ships the masters and three-fourths of the sailors must be "English".
"English" was defined in 1662 as meaning "only his Majesty's sub-
jects of England, Ireland, and the Plantations", thus excluding the
inhabitants of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and apparently
Scotland. In the case of the first two an exception was| made as re-
gards their shipping, which was construed as "English built",1 and
by common law interpretation, at that time deemed more binding
than a dictum of Parliament, Scotsmen were accounted Englishmen
within the meaning of the Act, on the ground that since 1 603 they
had been "His Majesty's subjects", because born within the King's
allegiance. Jews born abroad were excluded,2 as were all aliens and
foreigners unless they had been naturalised or made full denizens.
The requirement that three-fourths of the sailors be "English" was
more precise than the "for the most part" of the Act of 1651, and by
just so much the more was it impossible of enforcement, particularly
as the further rule was laid down that the proportion be maintained
for the whole voyage. Later the practice became common of filling
Act of 1662, § vii; House qf Lords MSS, N.S. n, 484 (Hist. MSS. Commiss.).
Gf. Cd. St. Pap. Col. 1661-8, no. 140..
272 THE ACTS OF TRADE
up vacancies, due to desertion or other causes, by taking on foreigners,
notably in the Mediterranean partly because Englishmen could not
be obtained and partly because foreigners generally served for lower
wages. In times of war, as in 1709, 1740, and 1756, die proportion
was lowered to one-half and even one-quarter, and it was further
enacted that foreigners serving for four years on English ships would
be considered natural-born subjects of England.1
According to the Act of 1660 (§ vii) English-built ships were con-
strued as those of England, Ireland, the islands of Jersey and Guernsey,
and the Plantations. The question naturally arose as to whether
foreign-built ships could be utilised and, at first, was answered in the
affirmative (§§ x, xi), in case the owner took oath that such vessel had
actually been bought by him and was duly certificated and registered.
But this privilege was soon withdrawn by an explanatory Act of 1662,
according to which noforeign-builtship could engage in the Plantation
trade after December of that year.2 This Act was itself explained by
several subsequent Acts, and in a number of cases foreign-built ships
were made "free" by Orders in Council.8 In 1716 a bill was pro-
posed by the Treasury to prevent foreign-built ships from entering
the general registry by way of Scotland, unless such vessel had been
Scottish property at the time of ratifying the treaty of Union and
registered accordingly, but this bill was never introduced into
Parliament.4 Difficulties were always likely to arise regarding
English-built ships rebuilt in a foreign country, for if such a vessel
had left in it but a single original plank, it was deemed the same ship
in law. After 1747 only prize ships, legally condemned, were rated
as English-built.5 At least one ardent mercantilist raised the question
whether *e English-built" did not mean that the vessel had to be con-
structed of English timber,6 but the scarcity and dearness of English
timber made importation unavoidable, though, throughout the
eighteenth century, Plantation material was sought for and obtained
whenever possible.
Simple as seemed to be the rule concerning the carrying trade, it
involved some difficulties in practice. Protests were entered by inhabi-
tants of the island of Jersey at the restriction of their opportunities,
and efforts were made to obtain relief. But the Privy Council would
admit of no relaxation of the law, and consequently the Channel
Islands became the scene of a good deal of smuggling in defiance
of the Navigation Acts as well as of the Acts relating to the trade with
France.7 There was nothing in the Acts preventing colonial vessels
from carrying foreign commodities directly to Europe, as, for example,
6 Anne, c. 37, § xx; 13 George II, c. 3; 28 George II, c. 16.
13-14 Charles II, c. 1 1, § vi. * Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial, i, no. 1272.
PJUX, Colonial Office, 388/15, M. 179.
20 George II, c. 45, § ix. « Petyt, Britannia Languens, p. 52.
AJ*.C.9 Colonial, i, nos. 926, 932, 957, 1068, 1072, 1182; Col. St. Pap. CoL 1675-8,
no. 840.
ENUMERATED COMMODITIES 273
French sugar to Holland, and nothing barring East India ships from
trading directly with the Plantations, until they were forbidden to do
so by an Order in Council, 2 October 1721, instructing the colonial
governors not to permit it.1 About the same time the question was
raised as to whether Spanish ships, coming from Spanish ports in
America and laden with the products of those countries, might not
sell their cargoes at a British Plantation and load again with British
produce, but the answer was in the negative.2 Again, the question
as to whether negroes were " commodities" in the sense of the Acts was
eventually decided in the affirmative.
Thus far the Act of 1660 varied but slightly from that of 1651 and
did little more than re-enact a law that had been rendered void by
the Stuart restoration. But at this point appears a regulation3 not
to be found in the Commonwealth Act, though frequently enforced
by Orders in Council before 1640 and at least implied in the in-
structions to the Council of Trade of 1650, to the effect that as the
colonies were the natural sources for the raw materials needed in
home industries, colonial commodities of this character should be
entirely monopolised by the mother country. Accordingly, certain
unworked staples of the Plantations — sugar, tobacco, cotton-wool,
indigo, ginger, and such dye-woods as fastick, logwood, and brazil-
letto were "enumerated", that is, could be brought only to England,
Ireland, Wales, and Berwick-on-Tweed. This clause was not intro-
duced until the third reading of the bill and has been attributed to
Sir George Downing. But there was nothing new in the principle
involved, though neither the Council of State, the Committee of Trade
under the Commonwealth, nor the Committee of Trade under the
Protectorate ever attempted to apply it even in a restricted sense.
The clause did not enumerate all colonial commodities, but only
certain ones which were needed in the household, the pharmacopoeia,
and the textile industries, or, as in the case of tobacco, which helped
to swell the customs revenue, and as it omitted to put on the list fish,
grain, and lumber, all of them important staples of the continental
American colonies, it affected New England and the middle colonies
scarcely at all.
As time went on this list of enumerated commodities was very con-
siderably extended, partly for the sake of the industries in England
that were benefited thereby and partly for the sake of the customs
revenue. First, cocoanuts, though at this time not strictly speaking
enumferated, were construed as coming within the meaning of the
clause.4 Then Captain Michael Cole, a trader and master of a vessel
doing business with South Carolina, stirred up the Lord High
Treasurer and the Commissioners of the Customs to obtain the
1 Journal of Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 1718-22, p. 200.
2 Ibid. pp. 138-9. " f xviii.
4 "Any of the [enumerated] commodities or cacao." Maryland Archives, xx, 204, 352.
CUBE I l8
274 THE ACTS OF TRADE
inclusion of rice in the clause of a bill of 1705 which enumerated
molasses, maintaining that the carrying of such a commodity directly
to the European continent was "to the great prejudice of the trade
of the kingdom and the lessening of the correspondence and relation
between this kingdom and the plantations". But so manifestly dis-
advantageous was this enumeration of rice and so many were the
protests raised against it, that at least as early as 1721 and finally in
1731 and 1735 the restriction was in part removed and both South
Carolina and Georgia were allowed to export rice directly to points
south of Gape Finisterre. This privilege was further extended in 1764
and 1765 to include other colonies and a wider southern area. Naval
stores, copper, beaver and all other furs followed rice and molasses,
thereby adding staples that affected the northern as well as the
southern colonies. Beaver was enumerated to keep it out of the hands
of the French, with whom Great Britain was in continuous conflict
over the monopoly offish and furs. After 1764 the list was further
extended by the addition of coffee, pimento, cocoanuts, whale fins,
raw silk, hides and skins, pot and pearl ashes, iron, and lumber from
America, and gum senega from Senegambia, a royal colony for
twenty years after 176s.1 In 1766 and 1767, when England was en-
deavouring to tighten up her whole colonial system, the rule was
laid down that even if a commodity were not enumerated it had to
be sent to England or to some country south of Gape Finisterre, thus
making complete the monopoly of the colonial market, as far as
northern Europe was concerned. This was what many mercantilists
had wanted from the beginning, for it prohibited all direct trade in
colonial products north of Spain. Mercantilism in its relation to the
colonies had now reached its peak.
The Act of 1660 covered two of the three main objects of the
Navigation Acts — shipping and the enumeration. The third — the
staple — was dealt with in 1663. The measure then passed was known
as "An Act for the Encouragement of Trade", and in two of its
clauses provided that all commodities of the growth, production, and
manufacture of Europe, destined for the Plantations, should first be
carried to England, Wales, or Berwick-on-Tweed in lawful shipping,
lawfully manned, and there put on shore before being carried to
America. This meant that with a few exceptions all the foreign im-
port trade of the Plantations had to pass through England as a staple,
and that foreign or manufactured goods had to be unladen in one or
other of her ports and there reladen as if they were English com-
modities. The same drawbacks were allowed (except in the case of
foreign ironware and cordage) on all continental goods re-exported
from England to Newfoundland and the Plantations that were allowed
under the same circumstances to foreign countries.2 TTie exceptions
1 5 George IH, c. 37; Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (The World's Classics edition),
n» »73- * Board of Trade Journal, 1714-8, p. 1 19.
THE STAPLE ACT OF 1663 275
admitted by the law were three. First, salt for the fisheries of New
England, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, much of which came from
the Isle of May (Maio) of the Gape Verde group belonging to Portugal,
the sole right of exportation having been granted to England by
Portugal in the marriage treaty of 1661. Secondly, servants, horses,
and provisions from Scotland and Ireland, and, later, linen from
the latter country. The exception ceased to apply to Scotland after
1 707,*- and in the case of Ireland led to some ingenious attempts at
evasion, as when shippers listed candles and soap as "provisions"
and when called to book offered to prove their point by eating them.2
Thirdly, wines from Madeira and the Azores, a traffic that attained
considerable dimensions in the northern colonies, in which wheat,
flour, and pipe staves were exchanged for wine. In this connection
the question arose as to whether or not wines from the Canary Islands
were similarly excepted. The matter was first brought up in 1686;
then in 1702 Randolph called attention to it and asked for a ruling.3
As might have been expected, the customs officials and the Board of
Trade replied in the negative,4 but the legal authorities had their
doubts, for they thought that the Canaries were more African than
were either Madeira or the Azores and so ought to be equally privi-
leged. A decision in a New York vice-admiralty court in 1704 was
adverse, and it was generally conceded in the colonies that Canary
wines could not be imported directly. Hence much smuggling took
place.6
The idea of the staple was old, but its application to the colonies,
with the whole realm of England as the staple, was new. The objects
of the Act were to maintain "a greater correspondence between [the
Plantations, peopled by the king's subjects] and this kingdom of
England", to keep them "in a firmer dependence upon it", to render
them "more beneficial and advantageous unto it in the farther em-
ployment and increase of English shipping, vent of English woollen
and other manufactures and commodities", to render "the naviga-
tion from the same more safe and cheap", to make "the kingdom a
staple, not only of the commodities of those Plantations but also of the
commodities of other countries and places, for the shipping of them";
and to follow "the usage of other nations" of keeping "their plan-
tation trade to themselves ".6 The colonies were increasing in number
and importance; old settlements were being strengthened and new
settlements proposed. Plans for the seizure of New Amsterdam were
under consideration, and a general advance for the benefit of trade
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1661-8, p. 526.
* Some Thoughts humbly offered toward a Union between Great Britain and Ireland (1708), p. 19;
Col. St. Pap. Col. 1677-80, no. 1304.
8 P.R.C5., G.O. 388/8, E. Q, p. 13.
* Ibid. 389/28, pp. 43-5. Representation of 15 August 1721.
5 Historical MSS Comm., Pohoarth MSS9 n, 14.
6 Repeated in 32-23 Charles II, c. 26, §§x, ad.
18-2
276 THE ACTS OF TRADE
and colonisation was already in the minds of the Duke of York and
those in his confidence, who were projecting the founding of new
colonies— the Jerseys, the Carolinas, and the Bahamas. To English-
men colonies were becoming a part of the fixed scheme of things and
the proper principles according to which their relationship with the
mother country was to be determined were already undergoing
definition. A new era was opening, and the dependence, even sub-
serviency, of the colonies upon England had to be made clear at the
outset. To allow the colonists to buy elsewhere their woollens and the
finished products of countries other than England and to carry them
from the place of purchase directly to their own ports, passing by the
merchants and manufacturers of the mother country and taking ad-
vantage of the lower French and Dutch prices, to their own advantage
and the injury of English trade — such a policy was inconceivable.
It was necessary to consider not only the loss of the customs revenue,
the injury to the balance of trade, and the political disadvantages
that might accrue, but also the possible frustration of the efforts die
Government was making to recover from the bankruptcy of the
Puritan administration and to place the kingdom once more on a
sound financial basis. Trade was becoming essential to the attainment
of solvency, and this fact was never more evident than during the
first years of the Restoration when the Navigation Acts were passed.
Immediate steps were taken to put the Acts into execution. Letters
were written to the governors of all the colonies ordering them to see
that all foreign trade with the Plantations be strictly prohibited, and
reminding them that any neglect or connivance on their part would
be followed by heavy penalties. The Act of 1660 required of them, at
the risk of being discharged from their employment if they failed, a
Solemn oath binding them to do their utmost that the Act "be
punctually and bonaf.de observed", an obligation that was repeated
and reinforced by the Order in Council of June I663.1 The governors
were also to keep accounts of all vessels trading to their particular
colonies and twice a year to send to England the names of both ships
and masters. They were to transmit copies of all bonds, such as the
Act required all masters to furnish at the port of clearance to the
effect that they would carry their cargoes to England or to some other
Plantation. They were to scrutinise all foreign-built ships coining to
the colony to see whether or not such ships were trading legally, had
the proper certificates, and had given the proper bond. The Act of
1663 required all masters to furnish the governors with complete
information regarding their ships and cargoes, and placed the
governors themselves under the additional obligation of taking oath
in England before departure and of giving security at the Exchequer
or elsewhere. According to later rulings all governors appointed by
proprietors were to have their bonds approved by the Attorney-
1 New Turk Colomd Documents, m, 45-6.
THE PLANTATION DUTY 277
general, their securities accepted at the Exchequer, and their certi-1
ficates issued out of the office of the King's Remembrancer.1 Bonds
in the case of the corporate colonies were to be given in America,
though the form of such bonds had not been drawn up even as late
as 1 722.* From time to time special trade instructions were issued to
the governors, which in the case of the proprietary colonies were sent
to the proprietors. Thus in all the colonies — royal, proprietary, and
corporate — the governors were made the sole responsible agents for
carrying out the Acts of Trade in America.3
During the period from 1660 to 1673, experience showed that an
effective administration of the Acts was going to be both difficult and
slow. One obstacle was removed by the capture of New Nether-
land from the Dutch in 1 664, but even that event was far from ending
the Dutch trade with the colonies. Trouble also arose because of the
exclusion of the Scots, while within a few years the place of Ireland in
the commercial scheme was to prove so unsatisfactory as to become
a matter of acute controversy. But for the moment the most pressing
issue was not the problem of Holland, Scotland, or Ireland, but a
defect which revealed itself in the Act of 1660 and which called for
early attention because the colonials were talcing advantage of it.
The situation was as follows. Under the Act all persons wishing to1
trade in enumerated commodities had to furnish a bond in England,
the value of which was determined by the tonnage of their ships, to
carry the staple — sugar, tobacco, etc. — either directly to England or to
one of the Plantations. This carrying of an enumerated commodity
from one Plantation to another, without customs duty at either end,
was permitted in order that a coastwise trade might be built up for
the benefit of the colonists themselves. But in operation this privilege
was abused and led to what was considered in England an evasion
of the law. When once tobacco or sugar had been shipped from one
colony to another, the shipper, who was generally a New Englander
dealing in Maryland or North Carolina tobacco, believed that the
letter of the law had been met and his security released from the
penalty of the Act, and, disregarding the manifest intent of the law
that such commodity should be set ashore for the use of the colonists,
proceeded to reship all or a part of the cargo to some European port,
Amsterdam or Hamburg.4
This practice was clearly illegal, and, as the evidence in the case
seemed ample, Parliament in 1672 took the matter in hand and passed
the supplementary or explanatory Act of 1672-3. By this Act pro-
vision was made that all vessels arriving at the Plantations and
* B.T. Journal, 1708-15, pp. 433, 437; 1715-8, pp. 100, aoo ieqa.
8 Colonial Records of Connecticut, 1717-25, p. 364; Rhode Island Colonial Records, iv, 337;
B.T. Journal, 1718-22, p. 353.
8 New York Colonial Documents, iv, 291-2; AJ*.C.9 Colonial, m, 21; B.T. Journal, 1718-22,
pp. 347-8, 353, 355- 0 , , .
hives, v, 289 and elsewhere.
278 THE ACTS OF TRADE
intending to take on a lading of enumerated commodities, the captains
of which could not show to the governor (or later to the naval officer
or the royal collector) a certificate that they had taken out bond in
England to carry their cargo directly back to the mother country,
should pay a duty at the colonial port of clearance. This payment,
which came to be known as the "plantation duty", was a penny a
pound in the case of tobacco and other amounts for other enumerated
commodities. Even if the captain paid the duty, he was still obliged
to deposit a bond with the governor, naval officer, or collector,
binding himself, in case he did not unload the goods at another colony,
to take them directly to England.
This Act of 1673 played a very important part in the commercial
relations between England and her colonies and in the relations of
the colonies with each other. Nearly all the chief ports of the main-
land did an extensive re-exporting trade, sending either to England
or to some other British continental or West Indian port enumerated
products that were of the growth of other colonies. Under the law,
this coastwise and West Indian trade, which employed almost entirely
vessels that were colonial built and colonial owned, increased very
rapidly. Tobacco was carried to the West Indies, and sugar and
molasses in return were brought to Boston, Newport, New York,
Philadelphia, Norfolk, Brunswick, and Charleston, either for local
use or for reshipment. Hence the imposition of the duty affected
many mercantile transactions and raised many questions as to its
operation. The law created in colonial ports many royal customs
officials, who were appointed by the Commissioners of the Customs
in England under authority from the Treasury, and whose business
it was to collect the duties, which were those of the English book of
rates of 1660 and which had to be paid in silver or its equivalent at
sterling values.1
The object of the Act was not revenue but the regulation of trade,
that is, its aim was to prevent evasions of the Act of 1 660, by rendering
unprofitable a direct trade in enumerated commodities with the
European continent. Even if the captain took out bond in the colony
and paid the duty, he would still have to carry the goods to England
unless he unloaded them in the colony to which he was bound. There
is reason to think that even after the Act was passed, the Boston mer-
chants, inclined at this time to follow, if they could, their own bent
in trade, believed that if they paid the duty they could still carry their
goods to Europe.2 So uncertain was the phraseology of the law that
in 1676 the Lords of Trade asked the Attorney-general, Sir William
Jones, for an opinion. The latter replied that if bonds were taken out
in England to bring the enumerated commodities thither, then no
1 12 Charles II, c. 4; Baldwin, British Customs (1770), p. 63; Beer, Old Colonial System,
°3-
2 Maryland Archaxs, v, 448; CaL St. Pap. CoL 1677-80, pp. 488-9.
IRELAND AND THE NAVIGATION ACTS 279
Plantation duty was to be paid, but if the vessel had furnished no such
bond or had come from another place than England, then the captain
must give bond in the colony and pay the duty.1 The obscurity was
not entirely cleared up until 1696, when in the Navigation Act of
that year the Attorney-general's opinion was given statutory form.
That the captain, in case he took his cargo to England, would have to
pay the duty a second time is clearly stated;2 but that he would have
to do so each time he went on from colony to colony, as in the case
of a New England captain peddling Maryland tobacco in the West
Indies, is not so evident. It is more than likely that no such instance
ever occurred. Oddly enough, an Act of 1699,* which forbade the
importation of bulk tobacco from the colonies into England, said
nothing about such importation into another colony, in consequence
of which, wrote Edward Randolph, "great quantities are yearly
carried from the tobacco plantations in bulk and from thence to
Scotland to the discouragement and damage of fair traders and to the
great diminution of her Majesty's revenue".4 Randolph never missed
an opportunity of showing his animosity towards a Scot.
The relations of Scotland and Ireland to the Navigation Acts
require a brief consideration. By the Acts of 1660 and 1662 Scotland
was construed as a foreign country, Scotsmen were barred from the
Plantation trade, Scottish shipping could not carry goods to America,
and Scottish seamen were not classed as "English" under the meaning
of the Acts. A slight concession was allowed in the Act of 1663, which
permitted the transportation of servants, horses, and provisions, and
a few licences were issued, but even these were not continued. When
their efforts to obtain a modification of the Act were unsuccessful,
Scotsmen entered upon an illicit trade that attained very considerable
proportions. They carried their own coarse cloth, linen, stockings,
and hats and Irish beef to the British Plantations and brought back
tobacco, sugar, fors and skins,5 a trade that was countenanced by the
Scottish authorities. The presence of many a Scot in the colonies,
particularly in the middle continental section about New York and
the Jerseys, aroused a good deal of suspicion that Scot was in league
with Scot for the nullification of the Acts, and this suspicion, coupled
with evidences of illegal commerce, became a conspicuous feature
of the history of the period until 1707.
The Irish situation is somewhat more complicated, for at first it
was intended that Ireland should be deemed a Plantation and in-
cluded within the privileged area to which the Acts applied, as re-
gards both ships and seamen and the carrying trade. But in 1663 the
latter privilege was revoked, and Ireland, construed as a commercial
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1675-6, nos. 798, 814.
2 Maryland Archives, v, 448, §4; Col. St. Pap. Col. 1677-80, p. 530.
8 lo-n William III, c. 21, § xxix. * G.O. 388/8, E. 9, p. 3.
5 Keith, Commercial J^la^ons of England and Scotland, 1603-1707, p. 118; abuse of Lords
MSS9 N.S. n, 462, 464.
28o THE ACTS OF TRADE
rival, was forbidden after that date to send to the Plantations any
exports, except those named, or to receive directly any of the enumer-
ated commodities. Henceforth Ireland's communication with the
colonies had to be by way of England. But the situation was rendered
legally ambiguous by the continued issuing of bonds in the form pro-
vided for by the Act of 1660. The ambiguity was removed by an Act
of 1671, which ordered the omission of the word "Ireland" from the
bonds, but as the Act expired in 1680 and was not immediately re-
newed— probably more because of the distractions of the times than
by deliberate intent — the former conditions recurred and it was again
possible legally to ship enumerated commodities directly to Ireland.
Though the commissioners of revenue in Ireland said that during the
years from 1671 to 1680 Plantation goods were imported directly into
Ireland as freely as when the trade was open, the trials of ships seized
for illegal trade with Ireland during those years number nearly
twenty-five, showing that while the Act was in force the importing of
tobacco from Maryland or Virginia to Ireland was attended with no
little risk of seizure.1 After the expiration of the Act in 1680 an
attempt was made to control the situation by the issue of an Order in
Council, 1 6 February 1681, confining shipment to England only, but
it is doubtful if the order was ever obeyed.2
In the meantime, the Act of 1673 had been passed, imposing the
Plantation duty. Consequently after 1680 the question arose as to
whether tobacco and sugar, which after the expiration of the Act of
1671 could be legally carried to Ireland, should pay the duty as if
taken to another Plantation or should be exempt from it as if trading
directly with England. This was the difficulty that underlay the
Badcock and Rousby cases in Maryland and the dispute between
Lord Baltimore and the Commissioners of the Customs in i68i,8 the
latter insisting that tobacco ships loading in Maryland for Ireland
should pay the Plantation duty, required by the Act of 1673, upon
goods shipped to another colony. Baltimore was right as to the facts
of the case, for the shippers had been evading the payment, but he
was wrong as to the law and so was penalised for his ignorance.4 The
murder of the collector, Rousby, caused considerable excitement in
England and led to the omission of the word "Ireland" from the
instructions to the collectors in 1685 and to the decision in the same
year to revive the Act of 1671. 6 This decision evoked a heated protest
from the Irish commissioners of revenue, who declared that the Act
ought not to be renewed as it brought in no revenue, while the com-
missioners in England, knowing that the Acts of 1671 and 1673 were
designed not to produce a revenue but to preserve England's mono-
poly of the Plantation trade, declared that to recognise the Irish
* Beer, Old Colonial System, i, 96. * A J>.C.9 Colonial, n, no. 26.
! &Pi&M!P?* ^28g' 293> 294> 2S6' J?*5-
« Col. St. Pap. Col. 1681-5, ao- 403; 1685-8, no. 567. • Maryland Archives, v, 448.
PROTESTS FROM THE COLONIES 281
daim would "rob this kingdom in great measure of this flourishing
trade".1 The Treasury refused to redress Ireland's grievances and
with the renewal of the Act in 1685, confirmed by further legislation
in 16965 Ireland's relations with the Plantations were defined for a
century. This incident had been of no little importance in shaping
England's commercial policy during this formative period.
Serious objections to the Acts on the part of the colonists were
mainly confined to the years immediately following their passage,
when so far-reaching an interference with the freedom of trade that
all had enjoyed during the Civil War and the Interregnum was found
to lead to strenuous protests. Barbados almost at once petitioned to
be released from the operation of the Acts, on the ground that free
trade was the life of all colonies and that such restrictive measures
would ruin them.2 It declared that "whosoever he be that ad-
vised his Majesty to restrain and tie up his colonies in point of trade
is more a merchant than a good subject", one who "would have his
Majesty's islands but nursed up to work for him and such men".3
The Home Government replied that all such petitions were contrary
to "the nation's best interests at home"; and despite further ex-
postulation, which continued for a decade, refused to make any con-
cessions, on the ground that the whole frame of trade and navigation
would be destroyed if the requests of die colony should be granted.4
Virginia and Bermuda were in a situation similar to that of Barbados,
in that they too had enjoyed freedom of trade, chiefly with the Dutch,
during the Interregnum. Their tobacco, it is true, had been enumer-
ated as early as 1621, and from that time forward they had been
enjoined to send what they produced for export only to England.
In 1641 a mandatory clause to that effect was inserted in Berkeley's
instructions.6 But there is reason to believe that this requirement
was not strictly enforced, if enforced at all, from 1642 to i66o.6
Consequently, after 1660 complaints inevitably arose, e.g. one from
John Bland,7 a local planter, who had doubtless enjoyed much trading
with the Dutch merchant vessels, and another from Governor
Berkeley, who, himself interested in tobacco planting, was not willing,
as he said, to enrich some forty English merchants to the impoverish-
ment of a whole people. The Acts, he further complained, gave a
restricted market, kept the price of tobacco low, prevented the popu-
lation from growing, and brought poverty and distress to the colony.8
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1685-8, nos. 613, 638, 670, 933; Historical MSS Comm., Ormonde MSS,
N.S. vn, 128, 242, 244; House of Lords MSS, N.S. n, 485; Beer, Old Colonial System, i,
96—109.
2 Col. St. Pap. CoL 1661-8, nos. 129, 578, p. 205; no. 1679. 8 Ibid. pp. 382-3.
« Ibid. no. 561; 1675-6, nos. 526, 707, 714 n; for the Leeward Islands, 1661-8,
no. 792.
5 Vvgarda Historical Magazine, n, 280, § 30; vn, 267; xvi, 124.
6 New York Colonial Documents, m, 43-4.
7 Virginia Historical Magazine, i, 141-51; Beer, *> 108-12.
8 "A Perfect View of Virginia", Force's Tracts, n.
282 THE ACTS OF TRADE
But there is nothing to show that either Bland or Berkeley had any
sufficient justification for their complaints, beyond the self-interest
of each as a planter. In later years complaints grew fewer in number,
and in 1721 William Byrd of Virginia could find "no inconvenience "
in an extension of the enumeration.1 Like Barbados, Virginia and
Maryland probably soon learned that there was no use in further
expostulation, and that their best policy was to improve their output
and adjust themselves to the situation.2
Jamaica occupied a different position from Barbados and Virginia,
because it began as a conquered colony in 1655 and so was late
in reaching a settled industrial condition. The planters there do
not appear to have found the Acts a grievance, partly, no doubt,
because they were less dependent on one commodity as a staple,
partly because peace with Spain had opened up a lucrative trade
with the Spanish-American continent, and partly because their com-
mercial development followed, rather than preceded, the passage of
the Navigation Acts. Governor Vaughan, in a report of 1676, said
that the colony traded only with England and that the Acts of Trade
were regularly observed.
New England, by which term is meant at this time the colony of
Massachusetts Bay, had existed as an independent Puritan common-
wealth since 1652, and its people looked upon themselves as outside
the operation of the Acts, because they had not been represented in
the Parliament that passed them. The Puritans had developed an
open and free-trade system of their own, which at many points was
in conflict with the regulations of the mother country.8 They did not
want to have anything to do with the English system and tried in
every way to avoid it. They wished to trade freely with the Dutch and
to take their surplus products where they pleased.4 They ignored the
Acts as much as they could, trading directly to Europe and encourag-
ing foreigners to trade with them, hoping to win by their persistence.6
Though England relaxed the operation of the Acts many times in
New England's favour,6 she had no intention of exempting the New
Englanders permanently, as appears from the instructions given to
the royal commissioners sent over in 1664, requiring them to see
that the Acts were "punctually observed" and that all necessary
information about ships, masters, and cargoes be duly sent to the
"farmers or officers of the customs" in London.7 The resistance of
the Puritan commonwealth was long and determined, but in the end
, . .
and Politics in Maryland, 1720-1750", Johns Hopkins University
Sta&es, 333, pp. 10 seqq.
1 J3.T. Journal, i7i8-*2, p. 328.
1 Sioussat, "Economics and Polit
ta&es, 333, pp. 10 seqq.
9 Barnes, V., Dominion of New England, chap. vii.
4 New York Colonial Documents, m, 46; Plymouth Record, xn, 198, 302.
» ^'JP; P$' °°L l66i^ nos' *8' 539> 7i i ; 1675-6, nos. 787, 840, 8
P.C., Colonial, i> no. 1068.
• AP-Gy ®>]y*!*L\ '» nos- 5°4» ^06, 730, 1047, and elsewhere.
New York Colonial Documents, nr, 51-4, § n.
THE ACTS LOOSELY ENFORCED 283
the English system won the day, though it required the overthrow
of the Massachusetts Bay charter to complete the victory.
It is not surprising that this attempt to put in force a new system of
commercial and colonial control, which required so many changes in
existing habits and practices in the Plantations, Ireland and else-
where, should have been at first largely a failure. Until 1675 the Acts
were very loosely enforced and it was frequently necessary to ease the
situation by granting licences and authorising occasional suspensions
of the Act of i860.1 But in 1665 and again in 1667 the King revoked
a previous order granting dispensations, and in 1675 the Privy
Council refused further suspensions, asserting that His Majesty was
"very tender" in all cases that encroached upon the Act.2 Breaches
were numerous during these years. Secret trade with the Dutch
prevailed widely; direct commerce with the European continent
continued, particularly with Holland and Hamburg — the chief dis-
tributing centres for the continental trade in colonial products; and
"unfree" ships or foreign-built ships illegally made "free" were em-
ployed in the service of the colonies.8 The colonial governors were I
clearly not living up to the obligations imposed by their oaths and '
their bonds, and Governor Wheler of the Leeward Islands wrote in
1672 that he believed he was the only one who was doing his duty.4
Both the commissioners and the farmers of the customs reported in
1675 th** no information had been received as to what the governors
were doing to enforce the Acts and they further stated that, with
certain exceptions, no copies of bonds had been received in England
and no lists of ships lading at colonial ports.5 It was fast becoming
evident that the laws were not obeyed, and that if the system were
not to break down at the beginning, vigorous measures must be taken
and the machinery of enforcement greatly improved. Therefore the
Lords of Trade, newly commissioned in February 1675, and vested
with additional functions and powers, decided on a more active
policy.
On 24 November 1675 a proclamation, evidently originating with
the Lords of Trade, was issued in the name of the King requiring and
commanding "all and every his subjects" that they do not for the
future presume to disobey the Acts, and enjoining the governors to
command all those under their authority to aid the collectors and
other officers of the customs in the execution of their respective
duties.6 Then a month later (20 December) the same committee
instituted an enquiry into the conduct of the governors and later
1 A.P.C., Colonial, I, no. 649; Col. St. Pap. Col 1661-8, nos. 178, 848, 1340; 1669-74,
nos. 43, 50, 51.
2 Proclamation of 23 August 1667, Brigham, Proclamations, pp. 1 14-16; for the Order in
Council of 22 March 1665, ibid. p. 1 14, note a; for the Order in Council of 24 November
1675, AJ>.C.> Colonial, i, no. 1047.
* Col. St. Pap. Col. 1685-8, no. 1221. 4 Ibid. 1669-74, p. 328.
8 Ibid. 1675-6, nos. 694, 695; cf. no. 728.
6 Brigham, Proclamations, pp. 126-8.
884 THE ACTS OF TRADE
drew up a circular letter regarding the administering of the oaths (a
more stringent form being drafted in the following May),1 the taking
out of bonds, and the strict execution of the Acts. Already orders had
been sent to the Admiralty that the Navy should seize all foreign
ships in the Plantations and that additional frigates should be des-
patched to such waters 35 the Caribbean and the Chesapeake.2 In
1 68 1 an Order in Council was issued enforcing the rules about bonds
and certificates and requiring that these rules be posted in all the
customs houses in the kingdom.3 Two years later the Commissioners
of the Customs recommended that instructions be sent to the farmers
in Ireland ordering them to transmit to England all information
possible regarding ships trading between Ireland and the Plantations,4
and letters were despatched to the Bang's ministers and consuls in
Europe to watch in European ports for enumerated commodities
illegally shipped from the colonies. During the next few years
additional instructions were prepared by the Commissioners of the
Customs, in 1684, 1685 and 1686, which constitute a veritable code
for the guidance of the royal officials in America and the West
Indies.6
But even these and other efforts, expended during the years from
1675 to 1689, did not bring satisfactory results. Complaints came in
from the Commissioners of the Customs to the Treasury of continued
evasions of the Acts and of the connivance or negligence of the gover-
nors, particularly in connection with the French and the Dutch in
the West Indies.6 Edward Randolph's reports from New England
had been largely influential in effecting the annulment of the Mas-
sachusetts Bay charter in 1684, and the Dominion of New England
that followed under Andros came to a disastrous end in 1689. The
troubles in Maryland, the ill-treatment there of the collector Badcock,
the murders of Rousby and Payne, the complaints of Blakiston, their
successor as collector, the hostility of the planters to the royal frigate
that cruised up and down the Chesapeake, and the further comments
of Randolph on the derelictions of the colonists in general, were all
causes of embarrassment to the authorities at home. The carrying of
enumerated commodities to Ireland and particularly to Scotland was
becoming far too common an occurrence; the forging of certificates
and cockets and the controversies that were arising as to the inter-
pretation of the Acts were making it difficult to enforce them; while
the efforts of the Scots to establish a colonial commerce of their own,
as seen in the Scottish Act of 1693 encouraging foreign trade and that
of 1695 creating the "Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and
the Indies," commonly known as the Darien Company, combined with
1 AJ>.C., Colonial, nos. 1080, 1171. • Col. St. Pap. Col. 1661-8, no. 1884.
8 AfJC., Colonial, n, no. 26. * Col. St. Pap. Col. 1681-5, no. 1200.
5 The circular letter for 1684 has not been found, but it is mentioned in Col. St. Pap.
Col. 1603-6, no. 553.
« Col. St. Pap. Oil 1685-8, no. 1288; 168^-92, no. 2295; 1693-6, passim.
THE NAVIGATION ACT OF 1696 285
the Scottish liking for illicit trade, aroused consternation and wrath
among English statesmen and merchants.1
The years from 1689 to 1696 mark the beginning of a new era in
the history of England's commercial and colonial systems. The whole
matter of English trade and commerce assumed a new importance
after the accession of William III and the naval battle of La Hogue,
which firmly re-established England's supremacy at sea. Serious
enquiry began to be made by Parliament into the state of the nation
and the condition of trade in general, with the special purpose of
checking the growth of illicit trade and of determining how far the
Scottish Act was likely to be prejudicial to the commerce of the
kingdom.2 Edward Randolph had already suggested many methods
of preventing the illegal trade that he was sure existed between the
tobacco plantations and Scotland, and of regulating other abuses;
and on die recommendation of the Commissioners of the Customs,
which was based on memorials sent in by Randolph, the decision was
reached to bring in a bill for a new Act of navigation and trade, the
object of which was to checkmate the Scottish movement and to
remedy "a great many things which the former Acts [were] short
in".8 The preparation of this bill was entrusted to the Commissioners
of the Customs, who on 1 6 January 1696 reported that the draft was
finished and in the hands of the Attorney-general for presentation to
Parliament. After amendment in committee, the bill passed both
Houses and on 10 April received the royal assent.4
This Navigation Act of i6g65 was a comprehensive measure of
administration, containing nothing that was new in principle, but
much, derived from the experience of the preceding twenty-five
years, that was new as to the methods of enforcement. It was sup-
plemental only to the Acts of 1660 and 1673, and to that part only of
the first Act which had to do with shipping. It did not deal directly
with either the enumeration or the staple, though in its application
it touched the enumeration very closely. Its main purpose was to
prevent "the great abuses that were daily being committed, to the
prejudice of English navigation and the loss of a great part of the
plantation trade of this kingdom, by the artifice and cunning of ill-
disposed persons [i.e. the Scots?]". Therefore it enacted as follows:
That after 28 March 1698 no goods or merchandise whatsoever
should be imported into or exported out of any colony or Plantation
of His Majesty in Asia, Africa or America, or be laden or carried from
any one port or place in the said colonies or Plantations to any other
port or place in the same [or to the kingdom of England, Dominion
1 Insh, G. P., "Darien Shipping Papers", Publications of Scottish Historical Society, N.S.
in, vol. vi, Introduction; Bingham, H., "Early History of the Scots Darien Company",
Scottish Historical Review, m, nos. 10, n, 12.
" "- - * Ibid.p. 7.
, Col. 1693-6, nos. 2187, 22243.
2 House of Lords MSS, N.S. n, § 955.
4 Ibid. pp. 17, 21, 22-3, 233-4; Cd. St. Pap. (
5 7-8 William III, c. 22.
286 THE ACTS OF TRADE
of Wales, or town of Berwick-on-Tweed] in any but English-built
ships, or the build of Ireland, or of the said colonies or Plantations
(including the build of Guernsey and Jersey (§ xvii)), and wholly
owned by the people thereof, except such ships as should be taken as
prizes and condemnation thereof made in one of the courts of Ad-
miralty in England, Ireland or the Plantations, and navigated with
masters and three-quarters of the men English or colonials. Prize
ships were to be manned in the same way.
All governors were to take oath to carry out the terms of the Acts,
which oath was to be administered by such persons as His Majesty
might commission.1 In default of such oath, the governors were
liable to be deprived of their posts and to forfeit £1000 each. As time
went on, these penalising clauses lengthened and became increasingly
severe. Early instructions, such as those to Dongan of New York,
imposed no penalty, while those of sixty and seventy-five years later-
such as the instructions to Gornwallis of Nova Scotia and Bernard of
New Jersey, for example— declare that in case of dereliction the
governor would lose his position and forfeit £1000 and in addition
"suffer such other fines, forfeitures, pains, and penalties [as are pro-
vided for in the laws] and also receive the most rigorous marks of our
highest displeasure and be prosecuted with the utmost severity of law
for your offence against us". The guilty governor would also forfeit
all right to further employment under the Grown.2 In 1701 some
doubt arose as to whether a lieutenant-governor— in this case, of
St Christopher— could be removed and fined, the Attorney-general
ruling that he could be removed but not fined.8
The powers and functions of all royal officials for collecting and
managing the King's revenue in the colonies and for inspecting the
Plantation trade were defined as those laid down for the corre-
sponding officials in England (§ vi). Inasmuch as the clauses of the
Act of 1673 relating to the Plantation duty had never been clearly
understood, the Act declared that even if the duty were paid at the
colonial port of clearance, bond must still be furnished by the captain
to carry enumerated commodities to England, in case such com-
modities were not landed for actual consumption at the first colonial
port of entry (§ viii). The colonies were to pass no laws contrary to
the spirit or letter of the Act or of any other Act that related to the
Plantations. Provision was made against false or forged certificates —
such as had frequently been used by Scotsmen and others trading to
the Plantations— by a penalty of £500 fine. These certificates were
of three varieties: of bonds given in England; of bonds given in the
1 For the commissions see House of Lords MSS9 N.S. n, 422-5. Those for New Hampshire
are not given, but see New Hampshire Province Papers, n, 312.
• »*• VJU» f S+ 9 m m **, - * M. «v*». f » ' ... V __ .
1 New rvk(MmrtD€cimmts,m9^ 151 (Hunter); New Hampshire
firoouuz lotas, n, 650 (B. Wentwortfi); G.O. 218/3, pp. 391-439 (Gornwallis); New Jersey
Arcfaoes, ist sen EL, 107 (Bernard).
3 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1701, nos, 390, 507.
THE NAVIGATION ACT OF 1696 287
colonies; and of bonds given in England for the proper freighting of
manufactured goods sent to America.1 In case of suspicion, the
governor or naval officer was to refuse to vacate or cancel the security
until he had received word from the Commissioners of the Customs
in England that the certificate was authentic.
All suits arising out of this Act or other Acts touching the King's
duties were to be tried before juries composed only of natives of
England or Ireland or of such as had been born in the Plantations,
and^all places of trust in courts of law were to be held by the same
(§ xi). This clause raised two difficult questions: first, were Scotsmen
included; and, secondly, were trials to take place before juries only.
There were many Scotsmen holding office in America and there
existed serious doubt as to whether they were doing so legally; Blair
in Virginia, Mein and Skene in Barbados, Hamilton in New Jersey,
and Livingstone in New York all came under suspicion. Though a
legal opinion was rendered after 1700 favourable to Scotsmen2 as
natural-born subjects of the King, the matter was not finally settled
until the passage of the Act of Union in lyoy.8 The second question
was much more difficult to answer. There is no doubt but that before
1696 a majority of the trials for breaches of the Navigation Acts in
the colonies had been held before juries, and it is possible that those
who drafted the bill took it for granted that such would continue to
be the case. Yet as both Governor Nicholson and Edward Randolph
had already recommended the erection of vice-admiralty courts in
the colonies, in which trial would be without jury under the civil law,
it is difficult to believe that the Commissioners of the Customs could
have been unaware of the proposed plans. The ambiguity of the
clause led to great differences of opinion, when finally vice-admiralty
courts came to be established. Penn called the clause "dark and
contradictory" — "confused and dark", "darkly and inconsistently
worded", said others — and even Robert Quary, judge of vice-
admiralty in Philadelphia, asked that Parliament should explain what
the clause meant.4 But those whose business it was to enforce the Acts
of Trade usually had no doubt in their minds as to the proper in-
terpretation— the clause might mention juries only, but it could not
take away the right of the vice-admiralty courts to try cases of this
kind. The controversy lasted for more than ten years, but in the end
the vice-admiralty courts won the day.
Bonds required by the Act of 1673 were now revised and the word
"Ireland" was finally left out. From this time forward Ireland was
placed beyond the pale of commercial privilege and her industry and
1 Many copies of such bonds may be found in connection with the Shipping Returns
among the Colonial Office and Treasury Papers in the Public Record Office,
* fial. St. Pah. Gal. 1*700. no. A&R: I7O2. o. 14.5.
CUULAVSJ-t^ bUV» X^VXXVSJUUkCM >ir4JUA*W EH1VI J. Jl V«*«H**» J .* M
2 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1700, no. 428; 1702, p.
3 5 Anne, c. 8, §§ iv, v, vi.
4 Gal. St. Pap. Col. 1702, no. 708; House of
r ,_, ,_; House of Lords MSS9 N.S. rv, 326. The clause seems to
look back to 13-14 Charles II, c. 11, § xi.
288 THE ACTS OF TRADE
trade were made subservient to the interests of the realm. To prevent
any attempt to circumvent this restriction, which at this time in-
cluded Scotland as well as Ireland, on the ground of disablement or
stress of weather, a further clause was added forbidding any ship to
put into an "unlawful" port, unless first the vessel had stopped at an
English port and paid the duties. A slight exception was made in the
case of Ireland, but not of Scotland, whereby vessels stranded or
leaking and unable to proceed on their voyage might enter an
"unlawful" harbour.
All appointments of governors by proprietors or elections of gover-
nors by corporate companies were to be approved by the Grown and
the governors themselves were to take the required oaths (§xvi).
In point of fact, however, the governors of Connecticut and Rhode
Island never received the Crown's approval, though they took the
oaths to enforce the Acts. Furthermore, no proprietor or corporate
company was to sell any of its territory to other than a natural-born
subject of England. Randolph said afterwards that this clause was
inserted to prevent the Scots from purchasing land for a settlement
or a trading centre in West Jersey or the Lower Counties (Delaware),
or one of the islands off the coast, for the purpose of establishing a
staple there and so letting "themselves into the trade of his Majest/s
Plantations".1 The Act extended to the customs officials in the
Plantations the full right of search provided for English ports by
14 Charles II, c. 1 1, and thus placed the establishment in America in
all respects on a par with that in England, of which it was in fact a
constituent part. The Act, finally, required that all ships, either in
England or the Plantations, including prize ships made "free", be
registered, first in a local registry and thence transmitted to the general
registry in London, in order to prevent evasion. This requirement
applied only to decked ocean-going and coastwise vessels (§ xvii) and
not to undecked boats doing business in the Plantations, and the
certificate of registration, once obtained, formed a very important
part of the ship's papers. Undecked boats — sloops, shallops, lighters,
moses-boats, flatboats, pettiauguas, canoes, etc., were licensed by
the naval officers in the colonies2 and plied chiefly in the inland
waters.
With the passage of the Act of 1696, the statutory regulations
governing the trade and navigation of the kingdom so far as the
Plantations were concerned were complete. In the years to come,
decisions, rulings, explanations, and supplemental measures were to
render the Acts as a whole more intelligible and more workable, for
raapy difficulties were encountered in application and frequent in-
terpretations were necessary as occasions arose.8 Five days after the
* Honse of Lords MSS, N.S. n, 488-9.
* xx, 465; CaL St. Pap. Col. 1702-3, p. 533 (Jamaica).
1700, no. 815; 1701, p. 85. Off C.O. 388/8, E. 9.
INSTRUCTIONS TO GOVERNORS 289
measure received the royal assent, a circular letter was despatched
by the Lords of Trade to the governors of all the colonies with orders
that this Act and "all other laws made for the encourairement of
navigation and the securing the plantation trade to the Jongdom'
be published and "strictly put in execution".1 In Maryland, and
perhaps elsewhere, the Act was submitted to the attorney-general of
the province, who reported on it at length, and measures were taken
at once for putting it in force. The lawyers were asked about any
colonial legislation that had been passed contrary to the Act; public
enquiry was set on foot as to whether there were any "Scotchmen"
in places of trust; the clause about the registration of ships was ordered
to be posted in every county court-house; the naval officers were in-
structed to give security; and all officials were warned to look out for
forged or counterfeit certificates. Maryland sent to the Commis-
sioners of the Customs for two dozen copies of the Act and as many
of the book of rates for the use of the several counties of the province.2
The letter of the Lords of Trade was followed the next year
(8 March 1 697) by a new and elaborate set of instructions, and at about
the same time (12 April 1697) the Commissioners of the Customs
themselves wrote transmitting copies of the Act and requesting
obedience and co-operation.8 From this time forward all newly ap-
pointed governors, sent from England, were given printed copies of
all the Acts relating to trade before they went to the colonies, together
with books of rates and blank specimens of all certificates. Regularly
thereafter they received "trade instructions", drafted by the Com-
missioners of the Customs, as a part of their usual orders from the
Crown. These instructions, relatively brief at first, became very for-
midable after 1715 and particularly after 1760. A thorough know-
ledge of the Acts was an essential part of the governor's business, for
the instructions themselves were very perfunctory and of little value
in enabling him to secure their enforcement.
The machinery in the colonies for the carrying out of the Acts was
at-first very incomplete and imperfect, and the efforts which con-
tinued to be made for many years to render it more efficient were
never very successful. The long and deeply indented coastline of the
continent and the proximity of foreign possessions in the Gulf of
St Lawrence and the West Indies made illicit trade difficult to con-
trol; the small salaries and fees, the scarcity of hard money, and the
hostility of the colonists made connivance and fraud a not uncommon
occurrence; while the inability of the Admiralty to furnish a sufficient
number of frigates and scouting boats for the arrest of offenders
in American waters rendered the risk of detection slight. In the
matter of the enumerated commodities, the system worked fairly
well; but in that of manufactured goods from England and the
1 CXX 324/5, pp. 383-3. * Maryland Arduxjes, xx, 567-70.
» House qfLor£M$S, N.S. n, 483-8, 494-5; McayUuid Archives, xxm, 349-
CHBEI
2go THE ACTS OF TRADE
European continent it was perhaps less successful. As regards the
later regulative and supplemental Act of 1733, commonly known as
the Molasses Act, the system was not successful at all. It was rigid in
theory and plan, but very elastic and adjustable in practice, and on
the whole did not seriously interfere with either the growth or the
prosperity of the colonies.
The centre and mainstay of the whole system was the governor,
who was the representative of the Grown in the royal colonies and the
chief link in the chain of connection between mother country and
colonies. Next in importance was the naval officer, who took the
place of the governor as the eyes and ears of the Grown in all that
concerned the shipping clauses of the Acts. The Act of 1663 provided
(§ viii) that no ship or vessel should lade or unlade any goods or
commodities whatsoever until the master or captain had first made
known to the governor of the Plantation, or to such person or officer
as should be by him thereunto authorised and appointed, the arrival
of the ship, with her name and the name and surname of her master
or captain, and have shown to him, by displaying a certificate of
registration, that she was English-built and "that no foreigner,
directly or indirectly, had any share or part or interest therein". The
captain was also to deliver to the governor or his "appointee" a true
and perfect inventory or invoice of the cargo. This "appointee" was
made more specific in the Act of 1696, where he is called the "naval
officer".
The earliest naval officers in the royal colonies were the governors
themselves, and where, as in Barbados and Jamaica, the term
"naval office" appears, it undoubtedly meant a clerical office under
the governor's immediate control. The first recorded appointment
of a "clerk of the naval office" or naval officer seems to have been in
1676, and in Barbados and Jamaica regular appointments were made
henceforth by the governor.1 In Virginia, where there were many
rivers and no single port of entry, six naval officers existed, generally
members of the council, collectors, and sometimes justices of the
peace, a form of pluralism common in the colonies,2 and forbidden
in Maryland and Virginia, though nowhere else, by the governor's
instructions, because, as the Board of Trade wrote, it was not proper
that incumbents of these offices should sit on the council, which had
the duty of receiving the reports and examining the accounts of the
collectors and naval officers. Maryland had five naval officers, but
less pluralism, though distances were almost as great there as in
Virginia and available men equally scarce. Massachusetts in 1682
appointed two, at Boston and Salem, named by the Assembly and
1 Cd. St. Pap. Col 1675-6, no. 960, p. 422; 1677-80, no. 482; 1681-5, nos. 732,
I2OO.
« Maryland Archives, v, 291; Col. St. Pap. Col 1696-7, p. 609; 1699, P- 3^5 1700,
pp. 310-11; 1702, p. 84; 1704-5, pp. 497, 627, 737, 742; I7H-I2, § 345.
THE NAVAL OFFICER 291
commissioned by the governor,1 but after 1 691, under the new charter,
the appointment fell into the hands of the royal governor. In Con-
necticut the office was controlled by the Assembly at first and after-
wards by the governor;2 in Rhode Island by the governor only.3
^The question of the appointment of a naval officer presented some
difficulties and led to some important variations in practice. The
controversy that arose over the King's selecting in 1676 one Abraham
Langford as clerk of the naval office in Barbados first raised the issue
as to whether, in the face of the wording of the Act of 1663, the King
could select his own nominee over the head of the governor, a matter
of some concern on account of the significance of the office. Governor
Atkins of Barbados claimed that under his commission the seal of the
province was good against the King, but he was unable to establish
his claim.4 During the last quarter of the seventeenth century so
many rumours arose of collusion between the governors and the
naval officers, of duties unperformed or badly performed, and of
extravagant fees and charges, that about 1700 the practice arose of
appointing the naval officer in England.5 This marked an ominous
extension of the royal control in America and was a direct encroach-
ment on the statutory powers of the governor. Thus there arose three
ways of appointing the naval officer: under the great seal of England
as a patent office; under the royal sign manual, whereby the office
was still retained in the king's hand; and under the seal of the pro-
vince, with security given to the Commissioners of the Customs in
England.6 The most noteworthy contest that arose was in Massachu-
setts Bay, where the governor had assigned Byfidd Lyde as his deputy,
only to have the King in 1733 override the choice by naming Ben-
jamin Pemberton in Lyde's place.7 By 1752 the governors of the
royal colonies everywhere, except in Nova Scotia, had lost control
of the office.8 Inevitably, however, they continued to exercise con-
siderable influence over the management of the office, greater indeed
than the orthodox mercantilists deemed wise in view of the need, as
they saw it, of greater centralisation of authority.9
After 1696, definite instructions were issued for the guidance of the
naval officers in the performance of their duties.10 They weie to give
bond to the governor,11 with sufficient security, that they would
1 Massachusetts Colomal Records, v, 337-3- ^
8 Cohmal Records of Connecticut, 1689-1706, pp. 374-5; Talcott Papers (Collections, Con-
necticut Historical Society, rv), i, 164, 229.
3 Rhode Island Colomal Records, m, no, 119; rv, 58, 133-5.
4 Col St. Pap. CoL 1675-6, no. 947, 1677-80, no. 4812, nr, p. 535.
5 Ibid. 1702, pp. 83-3, 84, 701 ; 1708-9, no. 39. 6 JVbrtft Carolina Records, i, 497.
7 St Pap. Dom., George II, CLVI, no. 198.
6 P.R.O. Chatham MSS, 95, "Lists of Offices"; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 22, 129.
9 Abercromby, "Examination", clauses 3 and 4.
10 House of Lords MSS, N.S. n, 475, § 1 1, 486, § 5; Maryland Archives, xxra, 254-6. For
earlier instructions see CaL St. Pap. Col. 1681-5, nos. 295, 617.
11 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1702, nos. 428, 537, 925. For a copy, Collections, Connecticut
Historical Society , xvi, 214.
19-2
THE ACTS OF TRADE
faithfully and truly execute the Acts; to keep lists of all entrances and
clearances, with detailed information regarding the kind of ship, its
build, when and where registered, master's name, owner's name,
tonnage, guns (if any), men, cargo, etc., and to deliver these lists to
the governor, who would transmit them to England; to examine aT
certificates, cockets, and navigation bonds, to see that they were
correct and authentic, to sign and seal them, and to turn them over
to the collector, who would sign them and either retain them himself
or lodge them with the governor; and finally to certify to the col-
lector that ships were properly entered and cleared. In some of the
colonies they seem to have co-operated in seizing vessels for illegal
trading, and in the tobacco and sugar colonies, particularly in times
of war, to have acted with the collector in getting "the trade in
readiness against the time the convoys should arrive". Usually they
were paid by fees but sometimes by percentages, both of which were
as a rule insufficient to attract the best men unless other employment
furnished additional income. Fees were controlled at first by the
governor, later by the Assembly, and after 1760 by the Home
Government, which endeavoured to effect a reform of the whole
system.1
There were in the colonies collectors of provincial revenues, levied
by the colonial Assemblies, and collectors of the king's casual revenues,
such as quit-rents, licences, escheats, fines, and forfeitures, and of royal
export dues, such as the two shillings a hogshead on tobacco in
Virginia and the 4^ per cent, export duty in Barbados and the
Leeward Islands. The collectors of the latter were appointed from
England and held office under the commissioners of the 4^ per cent,
there. But the only collectors in America on the English establish-
ment were those designated in the Act of 1673 to collect the Plantation
duty provided for by that Act. Appointments were made in England
of collectors for this purpose as early as 27 November 1673, but it is
quite certain that none of these early appointees ever went to the
colonies, though it appears that in some of the colonies collections
were made in 1674 and 1675 ^Y other officials and by them trans-
mitted to England.2 Gradually in one colony after another the
system was set in motion — in North Carolina in 1677, New England
in 1678, Pennsylvania in 1682, Rhode Island in 1709, Connecticut
and Nova Scotia in 1715 — until finally along the mainland and in
the West Indies a chain of officials came into being, located at forty-
seven different ports and including nearly ninety surveyors, riding
surveyors, comptrollers, collectors, searchers, preventive officers, land
waiters, and tide waiters. In addition there were watermen, boatmen,
1 Worth Carolina Records, xxv, 196-8, 225; 5 George III, c. 45, § xlvii; 10 George III,
<=• 37. § ii; 19 George III, c. 22, § v.
* Calendar of Treasury Books, 1672-5, pp. 424, 427, 460.
CUSTOMS OFFICIALS 293
and clerks.1 At first the chief officials were paid by percentage
allowances, but after 1698 by salaries, ranging from £200 (Phila-
delphia) to £30 (Roanoke) for a collector, £75 for a searcher, and
£30 and £25 for a waiter. In addition the collector had fees, and
a share in forfeitures whenever he acted as informant. Over all were
the surveyors-general, who took the place of the governors as re-
sponsible supervisors, beginning with Randolph in New England in
1678, Patrick Mein and Robert Quary later, for the whole territory
in America. After 1709 there were three surveyors-general, one for
the northern district, one for the southern including Jamaica and the
Bahamas, and one for Barbados and the Leeward Islands. Still
later, three were provided for the mainland alone. In the eighteenth
century the surveyor-general was paid £495 a year, including trans-
portation expenses.2 This arrangement continued until 1767 when,
with the creation of the American Board of Customs Commissioners
sitting at Boston, only the customs officials of the island colonies
remained on the English establishment, the others constituting a
separate establishment under the Commissioners at Boston. In 1753
Grenville estimated the returns from the Plantation duty as averaging
in seven years from £1000 to £2000 a year and the cost of collection
from £7000 to £8000, leaving a deficit to be made up from the
Exchequer of at least £5000 annually.8 So much was England
willing to pay for what she considered the proper regulation of
colonial trade.
Instructions to the American customs officials were issued as early
as 1685 an^ were repeated a number of times after 1696.* The sur-
veyors-general were to serve as supervisors at large within certain
prescribed areas. They were authorised to give such orders and
directions as they should find necessary for the service and were em-
powered to enter any ship or dwelling to search for prohibited or
uncustomed goods, to seize the same, and to put in force all laws and
orders for the better collecting of the rates and duties. Though indi-
vidual surveyors-general had sat on governors' councils from early
times, yet after r733 all were formally so privileged, ex officiis, in the
region over which they had jurisdiction. They appointed the riding
surveyor, whose business it was to watch over regions remote and
sparsely settled where smuggling was likely to be carried on, and who
was empowered, as he moved from place to place, to inspect, search,
and seize, whenever necessary, all suspicious vessels. The comptroller
served as a check on the collector, inspecting his accounts, joining
with him in examining vessels and seeing that the Navigation Acts
were enforced.
1 P.R.O. Audit Office, Declared Accounts, Bundle 757, Rolls 801, 803; Auditors of
Imprest Accounts, New York Public Library.
2 Col. Treas. Books and Papers, 1729-33, no. 167. 8 GrenmUe Papers, n, 1 13-4.
* Maryland Archives, xx, 167-71, 351-5, 505-7; xxm, 4, 358-60; v, 521; House of Lords
MSS> NJ5. n, 473-5.
THE AGTS OF TRADE
The collector was to receive the duties arising under the Act of
1673, but at times he was puzzled how to interpret it and at other
times was none too efficient in his attempt to do so.1 One of his most
troublesome tasks was the examination of certificates and cockets
in order to detect forgeries and erasures, and in cases where the ship
captains furnished bonds in the colonies to be sure that the sureties
were good and the terms of the bonds carried out. His was the duty
to sue out the bonds in the local courts. He had to give a bond him-
self for £500 and to require a similar bond of the naval officer; to
collect the duties in silver or its equivalent, and to make return to the
Commissioners of the Customs every year, properly attested by the
comptroller or the surveyor. In many of the colonies he had charge
of Mediterranean passes, though in New England that business was
looked after by the secretary of the colony. When he collected, as
was sometimes the case, the king's revenues in the colony, he was
expected to bind himself not to engage in trade, but the attempt to
prevent all customs officials from engaging in trade was found to be
impossible, though the practice was seemingly contrary to law.2
Pluralism prevailed very widely in all branches of colonial ad-
ministration, north and south and in the West Indies, owing partly
to the scarcity of good men and partly to inadequate salaries, but it
was particularly common in the customs service. Deputation and
absenteeism, patronage and the farming of offices also helped to
vitiate the personnel. It is a suggestive commentary on previous
practices that in 1 761 the accountant disbursing the salaries of customs
officers should have been required to furnish certificates that "the
several officers were living at the respective times they were paid",
and that in 1763 the Treasury should "have ordered all the officers
belonging to the Customs in America and the West Indies to be fully
instructed in their Duty to repair forthwith to the respective Stations
and constantly to reside there for the future53.8
No part of the collector's duties was more troublesome than the
seizure of vessels for illegal trading. Breaches of the Acts were to be
tried in the vice-admiralty courts in America. General admiralty
jurisdiction covered (a] felonies, such as murder and mutiny, torts, and
other offences on the high seas; (b) piracy, which was provided for
by special commissions under an Act of 11-12 William III; and
(c) spoil goods or prizes, also provided for by special legislation.4
But owing to the provisions of the Navigation Acts and to the rulings
of the lawyers in their interpretation of the Acts, this jurisdiction took
on a form unknown to the vice-admiralty courts in the seaports of
England, where cases of illegal trading, within the three-mile limit
1 Cf. North GoroUna Records^ vi, 1023.
2 According to an interpretation of ao Henry VI, c. 5.
8 PJLO. Audit Office, Declared Accounts, Bundle 818, Roll 1064; A JP.C., Colonial, rv,
4 6 Anne, c. 37, §§ ii, iii.
VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS 295
or in the waters of bays and rivers, were dealt with in the common-
law courts of the counties or boroughs or in some cases were carried
up to London for trial.
According to the Act of 1660 breaches were to be tried in any court
of record. Though opinion prevailed that an admiralty court, rightly
speaking, was a court of record, yet in view of the language used in
the Act the decision was reached that only common-law courts were
there meant.1 During the years from 1660 to 1696 many trials of this
kind were held in the colonies, but though occasionally such cases
were tried in what were called admiralty courts (chiefly in Barbados
and Jamaica, but also in Bermuda and New York2), more commonly
they were brought before either the governor, the governor and
council, the governor and assistants, the county courts, or special
courts of oyer and terminer provided for the purpose. General senti-
ment in the colonies undoubtedly favoured jury trial for all such cases,
and in Massachusetts in 1697 and in Pennsylvania in 1698 acts were
passed requiring trial by jury, but these acts were disallowed by the
Crown. It is not surprising that the common-law courts should have
claimed sole or concurrent jurisdiction, for the extension of vice-
admiralty jurisdiction to illegal trading was distinctly an innovation.
The obscure wording of the Act of 1696 did not help matters, stating
as it did that juries might be employed, provided they were properly
selected, and yet at the same time taking it for granted that vice-
admiralty courts already existed in America and might be utilised
for the purpose.
Great uncertainty prevailed as to how to handle breaches of the
acts. Governor Nicholson suggested that they be dealt with in
exchequer courts as having to do with the king's revenue, while
others, seeming to find a distinction between ordinary admiralty
business and breaches of the Acts -of Trade,8 wished the latter tried
in special courts, on the ground that the governor's commission,
authorising him to erect admiralty courts, seemed to restrict the
jurisdiction of such courts to marine matters only. The situation was
very unsatisfactory to those who were shaping the colonial system in
America, for colonial juries could not be depended on to convict, and
though some condemnations took place, many vessels escaped and
illegal trade flourished. Existing methods were too varied, decentral-
ised and ineffective. British control in other respects was tending
towards uniformity and consolidation, and if such control was not to
fail at an important point, the enforcement of the Acts must cease to
belocaland must be managed from Whitehall and Doctors* Commons.
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1702, pp. 480, 554-55 Richard West, counsellor to the Board of
"Admiralty Jurisdiction", G.O. 323/8, L. :
Trade, on "Admiralty Jurisdiction", G.O. 323/8, L. 10.
2 E.g. Col. St. Pap. Col. 1661-8, p. 238; 1689-92, nos. 2636, 2705; 1702, p. 462; Minutes
of the Common Council of New Tork^ I, 69-70.
8 Such a distinction is clearly implied in the instructions to Governor Windsor of
Barbados, 1662, Col. St. Pap. Col. 1661-8, p. 81; cf. 1702, no. 570.
298 THE ACTS OF TRADE
1702, the Attorney-general, though recognising that the clause of
the Act of 1696 relating to trials was very obscure, declared1 that as
Parliament had intended suits to be tried in vice-admiralty courts
under the seal of the Admiralty, such suits could not be drawn away
to the common-law courts, but must be tried in vice-admiralty courts
only, and as procedure in such courts was that of the civil law, juries
could not be employed.
The second question, as to the jurisdiction of the vice-admiralty
courts, was not so easily answered. At first the courts made wide
claims, not only taking to themselves control over piracy, illegal trade,
and such customary admiralty business as wages, salvage, charter-
parties, bottomry, and collision, but also, as Perm said in 1701,
breaking in upon the jurisdiction of the common law and trying
without a jury cases that were of a civil and not a maritime character.
Owing to the small number of vessels of the British Navy that were
available for guarding American waters, few seizures could be made
on the high seas, and where vessels were taken within the waters of a
colony, the common-law courts claimed authority and the higher
among these courts exercised the right to intervene.2 They discharged
convicted traders and released from prison persons who had been
sentenced by the vice-admiralty judges for not satisfying the judg-
ments of those courts. They issued writs of prohibition forbidding the
vice-admiralty courts to proceed and drawing the case over into
the courts of common law. They set aside the sentences of the vice-
admiralty courts, barred their execution, and in general stepped in
whenever these courts seemed to be exceeding their powers.8 In
regard to prohibitions the conflict was least serious in New York and
most serious in New England, partly because in 1 722 the vice-admiralty
courts were granted jurisdiction in all violations of the Naval Stores
Act, which affected New England particularly. The situation finally
became so vexatious to the vice-admiralty judges that in 1 720 and
again in 1730 they complained to England of the interruptions by
the common-law judges. But little was done and the dispute was left
to take its course. Three noteworthy cases arose: that of the Sarah in
Pennsylvania, 1 73 1 ; that of Erving and Gray in Massachusetts, 1 761 ;
and that of Henry Laurens in Charleston, 1768, each of which dis-
closed the feeling of dislike that arose in the colonies in the eighteenth
century against the authority and procedure of the vice-admiralty
courts.
In 1 764 and 1 768, as a part of the effort to strengthen the machinery
of the old British system in America, a reorganisation took place,
whereby the powers of the vice-admiralty courts were greatly
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1702, nos. 585, 596, 708.
1 Osgood, American Colonies tn the Eighteenth Century, n, 300-1; New York Colonial
Documents, xv, 924.
* West's Report, C.O. 323/8, L. 10; A J>.C.> Colonial, ra, § 205.
CHANGES IN 1764 AND 1768 299
extended.1 At first a single court was provided for, which was to sit
at Halifax and to have concurrent powers with the other vice-
admiralty courts in America, but without the right of hearing appeals.
Because of the troubles resulting from the passage of the Stamp Act
this plan was given up, and in consequence of the passage of the
Townshend Act in 1767, for the more easy and effectual recovery of
the penalties and forfeiture inflicted by the Acts of Parliament, four
courts were established, at Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia and Charles-
ton, to have jurisdiction both original and appellate within a specified
area. The older courts remained as before, but further right of appeal
to England was forbidden, the new courts serving as courts of last
resort.2 These courts were to be presided over by able Chilians from
Doctors' Commons, with salaries but no fees. Under the Act3 all
breaches of the Navigation Acts might be tried either in the vice-
admiralty courts or in those of the common law at the option of the
prosecutor. This plan was duly carried out, except that the judges
were not, as a rule, doctors of civil law. Thus, control over vice-
admiralty matters in the colonies was finally centred in America and
a new arrangement was entered into similar to that which was effected
at the same time by the establishment of the American Board of
Customs Commissioners. Both marked for the colonies on the conti-
nent a tightening of the British bonds, at a time, too, when the colonies
themselves were feeling the urge of greater liberty and freedom; and
both showed the determination of the British Government to enforce
at any cost and by every means in its power the dependence of the
colonies upon the authority of Crown and Parliament.
1 William Bollan, agent for Massachusetts, had urged such an extension in "Proposals'*
sent to the Board of Trade in 1749. C.O. 323/12, 0. 61.
2 New Tork Colonial Documents, vm, 445.
3 7 George III, c. 15, § xli.
CHAPTER X
RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
JLHE half-century between 1660 and the Peace of Utrecht witnessed
a metamorphosis in Europe, and predicted and prepared an almost
equal transformation in the world. In western Europe, its salient
feature was the rise of Britain and the relative decline of France. The
rise of Britain may be calculated from the datum of the Dutch, that
"stomachful people3'1 who, though emerging with credit from
four momentous wars, sank from equality with her to be merely a
cockboat in her wake. It was attested by the gravitation towards her
of smaller States, notably of Portugal, for whom France had earlier
seemed the only possible ally, and Savoy, always sensitive to the
magnet of superior power.2 Despite her dynastic difficulties and party
strife, moreover, Britain had improved in organisation and public
safety no less than in wealth and numbers. The society of three
kingdoms, ruled by a cabinet and inspired by Blenheim and Gibraltar,
formed a far mightier force than the timid and unstable England of
the Reformation. On three distant continents, as well as within her
own boundaries, the future of Britain seemed in 1713 full of hope.
The France of Louis XIV, on the other hand, had reached and
passed her zenith. The subjects of her King, indeed, still outnumbered
those of his northern neighbour by something like five to two. With
all its strain and privation, the great half-century of his rule (1661-
1715) had added fresh elements to their national well-being. They now
possessed widened territory, a strengthened frontier, improved com-
munications, new industries, a great military and naval apparatus,
and the memory of high achievement in the domains of both intellect
and war. Spain, their secular rival, was henceforth to be governed
by a Bourbon line, and the Habsburg ring around their frontiers was
broken. Above all, at however great a sacrifice, their national unity
had been secured. Never again would pious Catholics cross the
Atlantic to escape from Huguenot intolerance,8 while provincial dis-
loyalties had melted in the beams of le Roi Soldi. Yet the hopes of
1664 had been dimmed, if not extinguished. "A most promising
Prince he is, and all the Princes of Europe have their eyes upon him",
wrote Pepys in 1663 on the last day of the dying year. But, after
Ryswick and Utrecht, never again would foreigners extol Louis as
"fallen into the right way of making his kingdom great, as none of
his ancestors ever did before35.4 In a quarter of a century of struggle,
1 Temple, Sir W., Observation upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands, p. 129.
2 Carutti, D., Storia della diploma&a delta corte di Sauoia, rv, 3.
8 Leroy-Beaulieu, P., De la colonisation chez lespettfles modefnes, i, 148.
4 Pepys, Diay, 6 November 1668.
EUROPE IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV 301
united Europe had dissipated his dreams of making the Dauphin
Emperor and of himself dictating to the world. The wish uttered by.
Temple in 1669 had at last received fulfilment, for France "that
grasps at all33 had been "induced to leave the world some time in
quiet".1
At the same time the Dutch and English had attained the aim ex-
plained in 1707 by Marlborough to Charles XII— a true balance of
power. Thanks to their exertions, France could no longer make
"offensive war daily and alone against all Europe, insulting her
neighbours, invading their territories, and rendering the will of her
King an universal law".2 This metamorphosis in the West found its
parallel in other State systems within Europe. Thanks in large measure
to Prince Eugene, the House of Austria was steadily gaining strength,
and the Empire, which in 1664 owed salvation from the Turks to
Louis' troops, had by 1714 tamed the Ottoman power. In the north,
Brandenburg had developed into Prussia, while Sweden was about
to sink from the first order among kingdoms to the third. On the side
of Asia, the Muscovites, half-roused by Peter's relentless cudgel,
were becoming an incalculable menace to the Europeans of the
north and east.
During this half-century, however, neither the world map nor the
map of Europe had undergone any startling change. Yet the way
had been prepared for a revolution in values by which colonies and
commerce would soon sway policy as at no earlier time. At Utrecht
"we acquired . . .the commerce of the world**,8 but at the same time
no treaty between civilised States has ever embodied more challenges
to war. The half-century after 1660 witnesses the germination of that
colonial rivalry between France and Britain which dominated history
until Waterloo.
At the outset, when Louis XIV, John de Witt and Clarendon had
stepped to the forefront of the European stage, the world might seem
destined to the calm which should follow the conclusion within
thirteen years (1648-61) of six stubborn and widespread wars.
With the religious question solved by exhaustion, tie Habsburg and
Vasa ambitions foiled, stable government restored in France and the
will of the English people victorious over military rule, the time was
surely ripe for the peaceful development of the riches of the earth.
"The world is large", said the English ambassador to the Dutch in
1661, "there is trade enough for both, and if there were not, I do not
see how it would be made more or more safe by their misunder-
standing."4 For Europeans, it is true, the world was far smaller
1 Jones, D., Letters written by Sir William Temple. . .to the Earl qf Arlington and Sir John
Trevor, Secretaries qf State (1699), p. 181.
1 Besenval's report to Louis XIV; Coxe, W., Memoirs qfthe Duke qf Marlborough, n, 58.
8 Acton, Lord, Lectures on Modern History, p. 263.
4 Beresford, J., The Godjather qf Downing Street: Sir George Doming, 1623-1684.
302 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
than even that portion of it which had already been laid down upon
the map. A generation earlier, it had already become an axiom that
the princes of Europe habitually enlarged their dominions upon the
regions of the other three continents.1 Of Asia, Africa and America,
however, the great bulk was inaccessible and unknown. For two
centuries to come, islands and the coasts of the sea and of the greater
rivers were to comprise most that was reckoned of value overseas.
New England, it was said, was useful only to supply the West Indies,
and in 1763 statesmen hesitated between Canada and Guadeloupe.
Even Choiseul opined that Corsica was worth more to France than
Canada had been or could become.2 Vast as the globe might seem,
and few the Europeans, the search for new coasts and waterways had
not yet become superfluous in the days of Charles II.
Although in the western nations bold adventurers were not lacking,
exploration for the moment languished. To reach Cathay by a north-
western passage remained a dream which few attempted to realise.
It would be wiser, men urged, to start from the South Seas and sail
past the island of California towards Hudson Bay or homewards by
the shores of Tartary.8 Frenchmen from New France found the
Mississippi and followed it to the sea, while their Government urged
them to restrain their roving fancies unless they could light upon an
outlet from the Great Lakes to the Pacific.4 To Englishmen, the dis-
covery to the east of southern South America of lands with climates
demanding kerseys and heavy woollens seemed the most profitable
line of research. For more than half the period, however, the mari-
time nations were struggling for their lives, and even in the breathing-
spaces buccaneering proved more attractive than exploration.
In colonising the known world, on the other hand, greater progress
was effected. Such expansion of the European peoples has been
caused in various ways. From the days of Abraham to our own, races
have found the land too strait for them, and the human hive has
swarmed. For seventeenth-century Europe, the simple trek which
peopled Siberia or the Transvaal must be represented by a costly and
perilous journey overseas, while there was little surplus population of
normal men and women. Princes in general welcomed foreign immi-
gration, if its religious complexion were not too bad, and they would
not readily give their own subjects permission to depart. Colonisation
meant transporting fresh labour to land hitherto waste or under-
peopled, within the confines of the State. It implied the action of
Government, in contrast with spontaneous emigration.
Some bold spirits, none the less, were prepared to seek by honest
labour overseas the fortune that seemed to be unattainable at home,
1 Speed, J., A prospect of the most famous parts of the worldy p. 155.
2 Mtmxres duducde Choiseul, 1719-1785, p. 245 (Memorandum of 1770).
8 Dainpier, W., A new voyage round the world (4th edn. London, 1699), i, 273; Defoe, D.,
A new voyage round the worldy i, 136.
4 Ctement, P., Lettres, instructions et mtmoures de Colbert,
m, ii, 579.
THE MISSIONARY MOTIVE IN COLONISATION 303
and many were prompted or compelled to cross the ocean by the
divergence between their opinions and those of their rulers on matters
of morals and religion. Colonies of Catholics and Dissenters in
British North America already bore witness to these motives, and
Darien was to lend them a lurid illustration. But the French as yet
preferred to send to the galleys such elements as Cromwell had
utilised to supply the West Indies with white slaves, and the Dutch
had no men to spare. The West Indies indeed remained almost the
only regions that possessed a real attraction for the ordinary settler.
The missionary motive which had inspired much of the colonial
effort of an earlier age had for the moment declined in force. Roman
Orders, notably the Society of Jesus, still formed missions, organising
the Indians into simple communities of a few hundreds or thousands,
whose main object could still be an orthodox and unambitious life.
The knowledge and devotion of the "religious", indeed, was of vast
service to the colonial movement in general, for it gave that culture
which a nascent community must ordinarily forgo, and provided
men competent to calculate, survey and build. The heretic nations,
however, scarcely attempted propaganda, and they were the chief
by sea.
Mere pride as a cause of annexation belongs in the main to a later
age, when communications are easy, and great masses can read
journals and interpret maps. Louis XIV, indeed, was ready to
commission his subjects to acquire lands overseas for his glory, and
he understood the effect upon France of the feeling that distant races
revered and obeyed her King. But republics, Colbert said, "make no
conquests except by the bad example of their liberty",1 and in that
age the English were as unostentatious in their colonial acquisitions
as were the Dutch. The day of establishments in remote regions for
strategic purposes had likewise barely dawned. It was commerce that
in the age of Louis XIV mainly promoted colonies and determined
their governance and type. The migration of workers on the land,
like the self-expatriation of missionaries or producers, counted then
for far less than the desire of merchants to secure fixed points upon
the coasts of countries with which it was profitable to trade. The
resolve to keep all the trade to themselves and to buy cheap in the
native markets might lead on to wars and conquests, but it was profit,
not dominion, at which men primarily aimed. The factory or dep6t,
the fort, the presidency, the dominion, grew from the seed of barter,
and the flag half reluctantly followed trade. Such was the origin of
the Dutch Empire in the East Indies and of British India, and it was
in the steps of the Dutch and British that such aspirants as the Great
Elector strove to follow.2 Before Utrecht, it had become clear to men
like Davenant that by holding India England "might become as
1 Clement, Lettres de Colbert, nr, ii, 220 and 222.
* Westeisaard, W., The Damsk West Indus under Company nde, chap. iii.
304 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
Rome. . .the fountain of law and the spring of power. . .throughout
an immense Empire",1 but the translation of the idea into policy
did not follow for many years.
In 1664, moreover, it was rather the Dutch than the English who
threatened to drive every competing trader from the field, and to
appropriate to themselves all commerce. They had attained their
unique position by a mixture of skill, industry and good fortune.
Absolutely dependent upon sea power and trade, they gave to those
objects the trained minds of a rich and well-educated people.2
"Their North Pole", it was said, "is their traffic, measuring all
things only by that."8 They had learned how to build the cheapest
ships in the world, how to freight them intelligently, and how to secure
the interested co-operation of the crew. Colbert, bent on capturing
their trade with the French West Indies, laments that without extra-
ordinary strictness this is impossible, "such is their habit in carrying
on all the trade, and in this all the inhabitants favour them".4
A similar difficulty arose in persuading Orientals to sell to rivals of
the Dutch who, through want of skill and of cheap capital, would be
ruined if they paid Dutch prices. In the East Indies, however, their
trade was of a nature so peculiar as to excite tyranny and violence in
its defence. Nutmegs and cloves, cinnamon and pepper, are com-
modities of which a small quantity may command an enormous price,
while a larger output may easily outstrip the demand and make
prices fall. Hypnotised by their early successes, the Dutch clung to the
policy of small supply and rigid monopoly of production. They treated
with equal brutality the natives of the islands and the foreign mer-
chants who intruded, and they organised forts and troops and navies
to preserve their absolute domination. Their East India Company,
it was said, could equip a fleet as great as the French fleet at the
death of Mazarin,5 while its army was reported to exceed 10,000
men. "The Dutch", it was widely believed, "ever will be under-
hand dealers and destroyers of your trade and people by all the ways
and means they can invent."6 Other nations had recourse to costly
Navigation Acts and still more costly wars to prevent the Dutch from
everywhere absorbing commerce.7
In an age when three dozen horses in five days could transport a
statue little more than half a mile on the road from Nancy to Paris,8
the coasting trade and inland navigation bore a highly important
relation to the total volume of exchange. Apart from these, commerce
fell mainly into five divisions, each hampered by some artificial
1 Pollard, A. F. (ed.)9 The British Empire, p. 573.
2 Cf. Jonge, J. K. S. de, De Oorsprong van Jfeertonds Be&ttingen op de Kust van Guinea.
8 Thurloe, J. (ed. Birch, TJ, A Collection of the State Papers (London, 1742), vn, 525;
Lucas, G. P., Introduction to a Historical Geography of the British colonies, pp. 77, 81.
4 CH&nent, Lettres de Colbert,, m, ii, 491. * Ibid, n, 456, 457.
6 Sir D. Thomas, cit. Davenant, v, 218.
7 Child, Sir J., A new discourse of trade (and edn. London, 1694).
8 Gtement, Lettres de Colbert, v, qio, w, <ft8.
COMMERCE IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV 305
danger of its own. From the Baltic, "the Indies of the materials of
shipping",1 came supplies indispensable for navigation, in exchange
for oriental goods and the luxuries of western Europe. At the gate-
way of the Baltic stood the King of Denmark, resolute to profit by his
hold upon an international highway. Through him, the Dutch had
gained such power that the oaken keys of the Sound, they boasted,
lay in the docks of Amsterdam.2 Trade through the Straits of
Gibraltar and with the Levant, the so-called "India of the Pro-
vengals",3 was more ruthlessly preyed upon by the Barbary pirates.
That ^towards Latin America suffered from the iron restrictions of the
Spaniards, who forbade their colonies to foreign merchants on pain
of death. Fleets of Spanish galleons, therefore, collected European
goods at Cadiz in exchange for the precious metals, thus giving to
Iberian slowness its maximum effect. Tropical eastern America and
its islands at the same time offered a new and lucrative market for
slaves. In Barbados negroes were styled "the life-blood of this place"
and it was computed that (with God's blessing) they would earn
their cost in eighteen months.4 In Dutch eyes they were "an essen-
tial part of the fruits of the land and without which the soil is nothing
worth".6 They shared with gold dust the foremost place among the
exports of West Africa, a theatre of commercial war between the
western nations and exposed to the attacks of buccaneers. There, as
in northern America, the West Indies and Brazil, diversity of owner-
ship made for a certain freedom, but in the Pacific short of the coast
of China rigid monopoly reigned. The Spaniards restricted trade with
the Philippines to a single galleon to and from Acapulco every year,
while the Dutch strove to close the East Indian archipelago to every
rival. The traffic of the American Pacific coast was confined to a few
Spanish ships, and if a hostile force rounded Cape Horn, trade was
simply suspended until the danger passed.
There remained the great peninsula of India with its dependent
islands. Here again the Dutch, rising upon the ruins of the Portu-
guese dominion, strove for monopoly. "All the prudent men among
them", wrote Temple, "confess that they have more already in their
hands than they can manage with so small a stock of men."6 But
the Dutch in India proved no more liberal than the Spaniards in
Mexico in admitting the moral claims of other nations to what they
owned but could not enjoy. "Enemies to all Europeans but such as
are under their own government",7 they attempted by securing the
approaches to India to monopolise its trade. The Cape of Good Hope,
1 Gardiner S. R. (cd.), Letters of Sir Thomas Roe, p. a.
2 Edmundson, G., History qf Holland, p. 330.
9 Philippson, M., Das jfctalter Ludwigs des Vierzehnten, p. 83.
4 Beresford, J., Sir George Downing, p. 44.
5 Temple, Letters, p. 150. 8 Ibid. p. 193.
7 Dampier, W., A Voyage to New Holland. ..in the year 1699, Continuation (London,
i 709), P- Si-
CHBEI
306 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
established as a victualling station in 1652, developed as the century
progressed into the only true colony which the Dutch possessed, with
the possible exception of Surinam.1 In 1658, the Portuguese were
likewise driven from Ceylon. French acquisitions on the island and
in southern India could not be maintained. The English were dis-
possessed at Pulo Run (Polaroon) and were thought to be in peril in
Barbados. The policy of the Dutch, in a word, lent colour to the
charge that their natural tendency is towards extremes.2
The commerce of the world, despite every danger and prohibition,
was yet too large and various to be monopolised by a single people or
compressed into a brief formula. Even after the war of 1688-97 ^a(^
been extended from the political to the economic sphere, the French
ambassador regretted that his country bought from England enor-
mous quantities of horses, mohair, ribbons, lace, cider, beer, glass,
bottles, Spanish wine, cloth, lead and tin.3 But those parts of com-
merce which most aroused the cupidity of the western nations con-
sisted in the supply of tropical products to Europe, the supply of
negroes to America, and the acquisition by any means convenient
of the gold and silver of Mexico and of Peru.
The attraction of these prizes, in regard to which Portugal and
Spain had played so poor a part, was evident in the efforts of Den-
mark, Sweden, Scotland, Brandenburg and Hamburg to secure a
share. The only serious competitors, however, were the Dutch, who
approached monopoly wherever there was anything like free access,4
and the English, their superiors in man-power and in martial ardour,
and resolved at least to maintain what commerce and colonies they
already had. When 1664 dawned, the two nations were plainly
drifting into war. Although in the absence of a simultaneous struggle
between France, the protector of the Dutch, and Spain, their ancient
tyrant, it was hard to expect decisive success, the English were too
much incensed to calculate. "Refusing us the restitution of Pulo Run
and denying us trading in all the coast of Guinea", wrote one,5
"showing scorn to all the English . . .of Surat, . . .hanging the . . . St •
George under the Dutch flag", wrote another6 — devising all manner
of tricks to secure a monopoly everywhere, as men believed — the
Dutch "made our merchants mad" and Clarendon was over-
whelmed. In March 1665 the second war broke out, which was
destined to exhaust both nations and to suggest to a pious observer
"that the Divine Providence did always set bounds to the victors, like
as He had done long since to the seas whereon they fought: hitherto
shalt thou come and no further".7
1 Bonnassieux, P., Les grandes compagnies de commerce, p. 77.
* Grew, E. and M. S., The Court of William III.
8 Grimblot, P., Letters of WilUam IH and Louis XIV, 1687-1700, n, 227.
* Chad, Discourse, p. 194. 5 Beresford, Sir George Downing, p. 184.
^ ~. 15 February 1664.
7 Golenbrander, H. T., BesMden uit vreemde arckieven omtrent de groote nederkndsche
teeorlogen, 1652-1676, 1, 343.
COLBERT AND FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY 307
At this juncture a third Power, differing widely in character,
organisation and resources from the other two, entered the race for
commerce and for empire. With the Dutch the primum mobile was
their trade and the merchants were the State. In England, a larger
and a less homogeneous country, these elements had not so dominant
a place, but must in the long run prove decisive. But in France, more
than the double of both combined in resources and in population,
the merchant class was despised, and the fleet both discredited and
in decay. There was in the directing of France, moreover, a conflict
of tradition and of policy which might permanently confine her to
Europe. The adventurous character of her sons and her possession
of three great coastlines pointed towards the world outside. Her
acquisition of important West Indian islands and of wide regions on
the American mainland showed that she could both explore and
colonise. But their vast and fertile homeland furnished little incentive
to her people to remove, while the danger from her neighbours in the
past had set up a tradition of counter-aggression towards Flanders
and the Rhine which the present weakness of both Habsburg families
was only too likely to confirm. It was therefore of vital importance
that, while French policy hung thus unfixed, Louis XIV gave his
confidence to Colbert.
Born a poor gentleman in 1619, Colbert had grown up in the public
service and was now its soul. By sheer competence, he attracted
office after office to himself, and soon it could be said that all France
passed under his eyes in every moment.1 By serving Mazarin he had
learned to worship Richelieu, so that his advent to power became a
Richelieu restoration. "To expedients, endless calculations, Italian
tergiversations, there succeeded energetic resolutions, more than were
necessary, sometimes shooting beyond the mark. "2 Louis knew well
that the man who had planned and effected the downfall of Fouquet
had made him really King, and that the minister who behaved like
an industrious attorney could never be dangerous to the Crown.
With characteristic magnificence, he accepted and rewarded Col-
bert's devotion, committing even his irregularities to his care, and not
seldom following his advice. Colbert's unique devotion, however,
was not the outcome of adoration for his master, for which indeed he
lacked the needful imagination. While the courtiers were assuring
Louis that the rain of Marly did not wet, Colbert was writing,
"Your Majesty has so mixed up your pleasure with the war on land
that to disentangle them is not easy".8 His mainspring was a passion,
rivalling that of Napoleon, for affairs. To the question whether labour
late or early was the better, he answered, "Both"; being wont to
divert himself at his desk for some fifteen hours a day. What
constituted his strength was his zeal not for Louis, but for France.
1 Lavisse, E., ttstoire de France, vn, i, 157.
2 Ctement, Lettres ds Colbert, i, xx. 8 Ibid, n, i, p. ccxviii.
20-2
308 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
To the King he gave the loyal service that was due to the lawful head
of France, but he was too dispassionate to admire a sceptred colleague
in her service who could prefer the ideals of a Louvois to his own. The
harsh recluse who held that every man had at least nine vices to one
virtue, and who disliked many classes of Frenchmen without giving
praise to any, dreamed none the less, as the Venetian senate were
informed,' "of making the whole country superior to every other in
wealth . . .having need of nothing, but dispensing everything to other
States".1 When he had been a dozen years in power, a manual of
commerce was dedicated to him as the man who had taught France
that she could do everything and must be ashamed to enrich foreigners
by her neglect.2 Foreigners, it is true, he disliked, one and all, unless
they were prepared to become French. "All his policy", wrote a
great modern critic, "was to create in France and to destroy abroad."8
The least mistakable of men, Colbert produced no less methodi-
cally than fearlessly his great design for the world primacy of France.
She had already by far the strongest army. Her navy must become
its peer, and her revenue such as would easily suffice for both. In
every industry she must be unrivalled: internal communications must
be made perfect: and she must appropriate all commerce to herself.
All this could be effected by obedience to the King's directions as
formulated by his faithful servant in an unending shower of rescripts.
Adam Smith, indeed, belittled him as a plodding man of business who
endeavoured to regulate the industry and commerce of a great country
upon the same model as the departments of a public office.4 It is
certain, however, that his unfailing energy and his influence with the
King made his ideas on commerce of great moment to mankind. His
distended working-day gave him little leisure for abstract economics,
but, happily for his own peace of mind, he found these matters too
self-evident to demand prolonged investigation. Commerce, it was
clear, was a war for gold and silver. The numbers of mankind re-
maining stationary and their wants unchanged, commerce could not
but be fixed in volume. What proportion of this fixed volume a State
obtained should depend upon its power, the numbers of its people
and the extent of its coastline. "It is certain", he declared, "that the
maritime forces of a state are always in proportion to the com-
mercial. "6 To increase its commerce and therefore its navy, no means
was so sure as to despoil a competing power. In thinking of the Dutch
or English, he agreed with Captain Cocke that " the trade of the
world is too little for us two, therefore one must down".6 This did not
necessarily mean resort to pike or cannon: ordinances, subsidies,
bribes and the sight of superior fleets and armies might be enough.
To royal companies he once triumphantly ascribed the King's wealth
1 <%6mttt,LettresdeCo!berl,vu9p.cbn&. 2 Savary9J.9Leparfdtntgodant (Paris, 1675).
3 Lavissc, E., Histoire de France, vn, i, 229. * Wealth, of Nations, iv, ix.
* Cl&nent, Lettres de Colbert, vi, 208. 6 Pepys, Diary, 2 February 1664.
COLBERT'S COMMERCIAL POLICY 309
and the need that he had spread in neighbouring States.1 But though
not bellicose, or even highly vindictive, Colbert was restrained by
little human sympathy and by few of the finer scruples. Frenchmen
he cherished in so far as they served the State, but he would have
them reduced to four useful callings. He perverted justice to supply
the galleys with labour, and shipped off girls to the colonies with
orders to be married within a fortnight of arriving. Against foreigners
he was ready to weight the scales of justice2 and to use any means to
render them subservient to the needs of France. Of religion he had
sufficient to announce, probably without conscious hypocrisy, that
the chief object of new companies for the Indies was to carry the
light of the gospel into those distant lands.* But to the Japanese he
explained that the King's subjects were of trwo religions, and that, in
view of their preference, he would send them only those whose re-
ligion was that of the Dutch.4 He is said to lave driven his wife from
his deathbed, surprised that she, who would not have dared to in-
terrupt his work for Louis, should intrude upon his converse with the
King of kings. But the 270,000 priests, monks and nuns of France,
being neither productive nor reproductive, gave him little joy. It was
natural to him to resent clerical interference with the sale of spirits to
the Redskins, and to show himself eager to bring Galvinist craftsmen
into France. Rather a statesman than a doctrinaire, he was in spirit
a Hohenzollern, though less fundamentally tolerant than they, and
the architect of power by sea rather than by land. The ruthless
realism of policy, the patient attention to detail, the unfailing energy
of application are common to Prussia and to Colbert's France.
Early in 1664, the great adventure was begun. Before securing
the King's decision to make France a commercial nation, Colbert had
set out fairly the arguments against this coarse. It might be regarded,
he insisted, as a breach not merely -with French tradition but with the
tradition of all powerful States. Fertile France, moreover, was not
naturally industrious or prone to save. By sea she was unskilful,
needing twice the numbers of the Dutch to produce a given result.
Either the French would be undersold by the Dutch, and therefore
mined, or they would ruin and alienate a dependent republic of
which the entire disposal was in His Majesty's hands.6 Dutch be-
haviour, however, gave little countenance to this contention that
Dutch sea power was tantamount to French, and the measures now
proclaimed by Colbert were such as must inevitably bring about a
rupture. Regardless of public opinion, he announced to Marseilles
and other important towns that a million litres would be expended
yearly in promoting manufactures and navigation. River dues were
to be abolished, roads improved, shipping subsidised and merchants
1 CLSment, Lettres de Colbert, n, ii, 676. * Jbuf. m, ii, 484.
s Ibid, n, i, p. dxi. * Cit. Lavissc, Histoire de France, vn, i, 236.
8 Cltaent, Lettres de Colbert, n, i, p. cclxvi.
3io RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
protected diplomatically in foreign lands. While studiously allowing
the French States-General to decay, the King proclaimed his wish to
receive merchants at his court and to render conference with them
easy.1
At the same time the expenditure that Mazarin had thought
necessary for the navy was multiplied fivefold, and no pains were
spared to transplant to France the naval science of the Dutch and
English. The most immediately arresting of all Colbert's measures,
however, was the formation, with lavish assistance from the State,
of privileged companies for the Indies, both West and East. To the
reconstructed West India Company Colbert assigned a monopoly of
trade with all the islands, as well as at Cayenne and on the mainland
from the Amazon to the Orinoco, with French North America and
with Africa from Cape Verde to the Gape of Good Hope. The French
West Indies, though acquired by private gentlemen, were transferred
to the Company, and vigorous orders were issued to appropriate for
Frenchmen their existing commerce with the Dutch.2
The East India Company, with a capital of 15,000,000 limes,
was an even more grandiose creation. Its monopoly, granted for
fifty years, began at the Cape of Good Hope and embraced all the
eastern and southern seas. Its conquests, with all their minerals and
the right of making slaves, were to remain its own for ever, on con-
dition that it maintained Christian worship and the French judicial
system. Besides subscribing one-fifth of the initial capital and ex-
tracting much more by influence, the Crown promised liberal
bounties on all French goods carried abroad, and on all colonial
goods imported by the Company into France.8 Efforts were made to
stem the tide of Dutch conquest by securing the relics of the Portu-
guese dominion in India.4 Two million pounds of salt were offered
to Denmark as a loan in kind if she would sell the unprofitable post
which she held upon the coast of Malabar.5 But the Dutch East
India Company, created and maintained by the energy of a whole
people, strengthened by long experience and possessing assets esti-
mated at 800,000,000 livres, was not easily to be undersold, intimi-
dated or dispossessed. French success in the East Indies postulated
the prior subjugation of the Dutch in Europe.
At the same time Colbert spared no pains to develop the French
colonies in North America. Wishing his children in Canada, as the
minister explained, to feel the sweetness and happiness of his reign
like those in the heart of France, Louis exhorted them to work, to
trade, and to manufacture.6 The great obstacle to progress lay in the
reluctance of almost all Frenchmen to go to Canada or to settle
quietly when they arrived there. The fact that French colonies were
in a very real sense Catholic missions closed them to Huguenot emi-
Ctement, Lettres de Colbert, n, ii, 426. 2 Ibid, m, ii, 484, etc. » Ibid, n, i, p. dxiv.
Ibid, n, ii, 456. * Ibid, vi, 332. « Ibid, m, ii, 394.
FRENCH, DUTCH AND ENGLISH COLONISATION 311
gration. Short of compulsory expatriation, to which the King would
not resort, however, every lawful method of augmenting the popu-
lation was tried. Copious rescripts, the exhortations of the Church,
the despatch of troops with orders to marry, the export of young
women and of livestock, the preparation of houses and holdings by
the forces of the Crown — all were freely employed, yet the reluctant
growth of the Canadian people almost drove Colbert to despair.
Breaking with the Jesuit policy of Indian segregation, he insisted that
the numbers should be raised by the incorporation of the natives.
Every possible freedom of activity was granted to the colonists.
Intercourse with Boston was encouraged, and when die trade in furs
declined, the representatives of the Crown were encouraged with the
argument that this would turn the settlers5 minds towards more solid
occupations. Despite all his tenacity and resource, indeed, progress
proved of the slowest, but in the 'sixties this could hardly be foreseen.
What first appeared (1664-7) was that France had made a bold push
for colonies and commerce when she enjoyed the advantage of peace
with Spain and when the Dutch and English were at each other's
throats. For in February 1664 the Royal African Company, presided
over by James, Duke of York, had seized part of the coast of Guinea,
and further English aggressions against the Dutch included the cap-
ture of New Amsterdam (September 1664). Early in March 1665
England formally declared war.
By the challenge of Colbert and the outbreak of war between
England and the Dutch, the relations between the three active
colonial peoples became almost inextricably intertwined. Their
history, their forms of government, their religion, and their interest
seemed each to point in directions mutually opposed. As rebels
against the House of Habsburg, the Dutch must be the natural allies
of France, and France claimed that to her they owed their inde-
pendence. Recent years had shown the French, however, that grati-
tude could not be counted on to save their influence in Constantinople
and northern Africa from Dutch attack, while Dutch statesmen saw
clearly that to safeguard Amsterdam the French must be kept far
from Antwerp, their natural goal. In the days of the Armada, Dutch
and English had protected each other against Spain, and Britons had
continued to form the kernel of the army which Dugald Dalgetty's
"mean, amphibious, twenty-breeched boors" hired for their own
defence.1 Yet the Stuarts and Cromwell alike recognised in Dutch
power a deadly menace to England, and strove both by laws and
arms to ward it off. Against the republic Charles II cherished the
grievance that his nephew of Orange was improperly debarred from
power. Of France and England it could be said that despite the
mutual hatred of their peoples they had generally lived in peace
and alliance for more than a century, apart from the little war of
1 Edmundson, G., Anglo-Dutch rivalry during the first hdfofihs seventeenth century, p. 82,
312 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
La Rochelle (1627-9). France and England were enthusiastic mon-
archies; Holland, an impenitent republic. The Dutch, none the less,
shared with the English a passion for civil rights to which the French
were strangers. Many now regard the churches of France and Eng-
land as always Catholic, while the Dutch were heretics from the first.
In 1664, however, there was no greater bond of sympathy between
the Dutch and English peoples than their common antagonism to
Rome. The day of religious wars did not then seem to have ended.
Fifteen years later, Shaftesbury could denounce "a secret universal
Catholic league, carried on by the clergy for the utter extirpation of
the Protestant religion".1 If France ruled Europe, Burnet in all
sincerity assured Queen Anne, "in less than three years' time she
would be murdered and the fires would be again raised in Smith-
field".2
But, disregarding forms and fears and bygones, what relations be-
tween the three Powers did their respective interests in 1664 dictate?
It is perhaps impossible to find a formula of policy which could
reconcile the legitimate demands of each for security and progress.
Each nation, it is true, owed something to the others in pros-
perity as well as in freedom. "If the Dutch", argues a Dutchman,
"almost completely expelled the Portuguese and Spaniards from the
Indies, the overthrow of these nations contributed not a little to the
aggrandisement of the English in America and to the bloom of their
commerce in Europe. "8 The Dutch, Colbert reasoned in 1665, could
not break with France, since without her their commerce could not
exist. Imports to the annual value of more than 20,000,000 livres,
employing 3000 of their ships and more than 50,000 of their subjects,
pledged them to her alliance.4 French and English, again, co-
operated whole-heartedly in some parts of North America and the
West Indies, while political and commercial jealousy failed to sup-
press their mutual trade in Europe.
In spite of Colbert and of the companies, the nations might one day
realise that they traded with each other for their own advantage, that
the world was wide enough for all, and that forts and armies and
prohibitions usually cost more than they brought in. The age, how-
ever, had decided for the ideas of the Navigation Acts and there only
remained the vital question of security. What the Dutch had in great
part accomplished in the commercial field, Louis threatened in the
political. Two decades of his rule were needed to display to Europe
all that was in his mind and to league the remaining nations against
France. A king who holds and practises the belief that, since God
has made him stronger than other kings, He must intend him to
1 Christie, W. D., AUfeef.. .Anthony Ashly Cooper, First Earl of Shqftesbtny, p. 282.
* Burnet, History of my own tone, p. 874.
8 Adfoerts,J. (publisher), Les hewreuses suites de I'alliance . . .de. . . Guillaume III et M arie II
. . .azw. . .ley SJS. Etats-Gtnhaux des Provinces-Units (La Have, 1689).
« Ctenent, Lsttos de Colbert, vi, 243.
RIVALRY OF FRENCH, DUTCH AND ENGLISH 313
dictate to them, is apt to excite alarm before his full design appears,
and such was the case with Louis. Popular instinct was aroused in
Holland and England long before the Revolution, and neither nation
can be blamed for obstructing the commercial career of France.
"If England", asked a pamphleteer, "by means of the woollen
manufactures and by vent of her tin, lead and sea-coal has amassed
such riches, what might one not have believed France would have
gained, which, besides her manufactures of wool, silk, linen, hats,
paper and many other things which are eagerly sought after by all
the world, supplies other countries with wines, brandies, wheat, salt,
oil, and fruits of all sorts for immense sums? This . . . made my Lord
Bellasis say, That if God should one day make the Turks know what
they could do at sea and the French how far they might extend their
commerce, all Europe would soon fall a conquest to those Powers."1
It is difficult, indeed, to assign any bounds to the dominion to which
seventeenth-century France, if adroitly guided, might have attained.
The sober road of purchase would assuredly have carried her frontier
posts far afield,2 while her enhanced wealth and power after suc-
cessive incorporations would have rendered new advances more easy.
Leibniz urged Louis to acquire a Holland of his own in Egypt, a
halting-place at the cross-roads of commerce, which powerfully
appealed to the instincts of the French. Had he made this choice,
which no Power could have successfully contested, "the necessity of
mastering the Mediterranean and opening the Red Sea. . .would
have compelled the occupation of stations on either side of Egypt,
and France would have been led step by step, as England has been
led by the possession of India, to the seizure of points like Malta,
Cyprus, Aden, in short, to a great sea-power".8 The guidance of
France, however, was not always clear-sighted or adroit, and the
result, as will be shown, was failure.
In 1665, however, war between the two chief maritime Powers
favoured the ambitions of their would-be rival so plainly that some
attributed the Anglo-Dutch struggle to France. Evelyn thought in
April that "this terrible war" had been "begun doubtless at secret
instigation of the French to weaken the States and Protestant
interest."4 In fact, the struggle arose from commercial and colonial
disputes which excited both the rulers and the people of the two
nations, and neither Louis nor Colbert was eager to join in. The early
success of the English was accounted profitable to the Dutch, since
it would compel their French allies to rescue them.5 Before taking
this unwelcome step, the French besought the Dutch to buy peace
by concessions to England in America, Guinea and the East Indies.
Huet, P. D., Bishop of Avranches, Vim of the Dutch trade (London, 1722).
Cf. Dreyss, G., Mtmoires de Louis XIV poiar ^instruction du Dauphin, pp. 552-60.
Mahan, A. T., The wfluence ofscarpower vtom history, 1660-1783, p. 141.
Diary, 5 April 1665. Gf. Davenant, Works, m, 300, 310.
Abraham de Wicquefort to Lionne, a July 1665 (Colenbrander, Beschtidm, I, 239).
314 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
Once embarked, however, Colbert manifested his spleen in his plans
to overthrow the would-be tyrants of the seas. Sweden and Denmark,
he urged, should be stirred up against that ferocious nation. The
danger that the House of Orange might be restored and might then
prove subservient to England should perhaps be countered by lending
Turenne to the Dutch as their stadholder. The Mediterranean and
the Baltic might be closed against the English if France were pre-
pared to endure the loss of trade and the danger to her islands off
the American coast.1
The war pursued its chequered course without decisive result or
great change in the relative power of England, France and Holland
on either side of the seas. Until the Dutch raided the Medway, the
great strokes failed. Counting on the King of Denmark, the English
hoped to seize stupendous riches from the enemy merchant fleets at
Bergen, but "against . . .the opposition of Heaven, Dane and Dutch "
they could accomplish nothing.2 The Dutch largely avenged their
early losses, and by robbing their merchantmen procured the neces-
sary sailors, but the English replied with such a muster "that the
Dutch . . .thought that every oak in England was grown into a ship
since last battle".8 The treaties concluded at Breda in 1667, after the
manifold reverses of the English, registered concessions which could
hardly have been avoided. Pulo Run, disputed for nearly half a
century, was an unhealthy outpost in a region where the Dutch had
proved their superiority. The principle of the mutual retention of
conquests cost us Surinam (now a genuine Dutch colony), worth less
than New Amsterdam, which we retained. To relax the Navigation
Act so as to allow Dutch ships to transport Rhenish goods to England
was elementary statesmanship. As between French and English,
restitution was the basis of the peace. Criticism was provoked by the
return to the French, after thirteen years' possession, of Nova Scotia
(Acadia) "which hath a river three hundred miles up the country,
with copper mines more than Swedeland, and Newcastle coals, the
only place in America that hath coals that we know of".4 The
recovery of Antigua, Montserrat, and our former half of St Christopher
none the less far outweighed this loss according to the common scale
of values of the time. To a seafaring northern nation, a sugar island
was worth more than a continent in the frigid zone.
Although its terms were unimportant, the peace marked a mo-
mentous change in the relationship between the three chief Powers
which made it. The English were relieved of their most exaggerated
fears of invasion, Charles, freed by the fall of Clarendon, could now
for his own ends consort with Louis XIV, while his subjects followed
1 d6mcnt, Lettres de Colbert, vi, 245 seqq.
1 Sandwich, Apology (Golenbrander, i, 257).
8 Gplenbrander, i, 417.
* Sir George Downing, cit. Pepys, Diary, 8 September 1667.
GROWTH OF DANGER FROM FRANCE 315
their Protestant instinct to prefer the Dutch. The French were set free
to throw their strength into the War of Devolution, an attempt to
fortify their eastern frontiers at the expense of Spain, and to advance
the claim of their Qjieen to be heiress of the Spanish Empire. The
Dutch, menaced not remotely by this French advance, were power-
fully impelled towards an understanding with their recent foe.
A lasting entente, however, was unattainable so long as they con-
tinued to threaten English trade and to exclude the King's relations
from their natural place within the State.
After the Peace of Breda, the monopoly question and the Orange
question were for a moment obscured by the threatening progress of
die King of France. Turenne's swift conquests in Flanders and Hai-
nault alarmed both sea powers, while tike loss of Franche-Comt6
roused the Emperor as weU as Spain. Reviving as it seemed a national
and Protestant policy, the league between Dutch and English in their
Triple Alliance with Sweden delighted Londoners and to all appear-
ances immediately achieved its end (January 1668). At Aix-la-
Chapelle Louis limited his conquests to a dozen strong places on the
border of the Spanish Netherlands, and in 1668 he found it less
difficult than in later years to persuade Europe of his moderation.
In the four critical years which followed (1668-72), France en-
joyed the advantages which flowed from her long entente with England
and from her longer championship of the liberties of Europe against
the Habsburgs. The menace to Spain incarnate in Louis XIV drove
Spain, indeed, into a closer association with England which had im-
portant results beyond the seas. In 1670 the voluminous agreement
for peace, commerce and alliance concluded at Madrid three years
before was supplemented by cea treaty for the composing of dif-
ferences, restraining of depredations, and establishing of peace in
America". Tacitly abandoning her claim to monopoly, Spain con-
ceded to the English the right to keep and enjoy for ever all that they
possessed in the New World. While sailing to or trading in each
other's ports in America remained forbidden, either King might suffer
it by licence, and for a generation Spain found it profitable to tolerate
much English trade.1 In contrast with the Latin Powers, the Dutch,
on the other hand, suffered the consequences of their behaviour,
which convinced their new allies that they designed a total monopoly
of oceanic trade.
Sir Josiah Child enumerates no less than fifteen trades lost by
England, and these mainly to the Dutch. These include the Russia
trade, where the Dutch ships are now twenty-two to one, the Green-
land trade, where the Dutch and Hamburgers are perhaps five
hundred to one, and such important trades as those to China and
Japan, to the East Indies for nutmegs, cloves and mace, to Surinam,
and in great part the Plate trade from Cadiz and the trade in Spanish
1 Goxe, W., Memoirs of. . .Sir Robert Walpole, i, 557-60.
316 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
wools from Bilbao. Even "that vast and notorious trade of fishing
for white herrings upon our own coast" and "the trades of Scotland
and Ireland, two of our own kingdoms, the Dutch have bereaved us
of and in effect wholly engrossed to themselves35. Were they freed
from their French fears, he concludes, they might be to the English
as severe taskmasters as the Athenians to the lesser trading-cities of
Greece.1
The Africa and East India Companies furnished an unfailing
supply of local quarrels. "For all this noise", said Clifford at the
rejoicings for the Triple Alliance, "we must have another war with
the Dutch."2 Next year the rumour ran that the most prudent
English statesmen had urged waiting only until France and Spain
were by the ears.8 "If we must fall out with the Dutch", wrote the
architect of the Triple Alliance, "we can never do it in more nor in
better company; for I know not whether we are more dissatisfied
with them at this time than France and Spain and Sweden and the
Bishops of Cologne and Minister . . . Sweden for refusing to secure any
part of their subsidies, and Spain for pressing them to secure the
whole by a hypoth&que of the upper quarter of Gelderland."4
From the standpoint of national necessity, however, the grievances
of all other Powers against the republic were as transient and un-
important as those of France were the reverse. Even England might
accept Temple's verdict that, drunk or sober, the Dutch showed zeal
for her alliance, and that they had no real design to exclude her from
the India trade.5 But to Louis and to Colbert it had become clear
that Messieurs les Marchands blocked both the lines upon which France
might endeavour to advance. The keys to the treasure-houses of the
Indies, no less than the key to Brussels, lay in Amsterdam. Hence
while Colbert waged a tariff war and created a mighty navy, Louis
taxed all the resources of diplomacy to isolate the obstructive Power.
By what base means he succeeded in winning the King of England is
well known. The secret Treaty of Dover, which promised Zealand to this
country, involved English policy in treachery only paralleled by that
which followed the fall of Marlborough. Arlington was compelled to
refuse the accession of the Emperor to the Triple Alliance, to sacrifice
the Duke of Lorraine to France, to inflict cruel wounds on the faithful
Temple and to betray Buckingham, his fellow-servant.6 The regular
and the subterranean diplomacy of France were reinforced by the
clumsy but significant arguments of Colbert. The English, he de-
clared for Charles's ear, ought not to be allied with a Government of
1 A new discourse of trade (and edn. London, 1694), Preface.
* Gookc, G. W. (ed.), The life of the fast Earl of Shqftesbtuy by Mr B. Martyn and Dr Kippis,
p. 360.
8 Pepys, Diaryt 20 March 1669.
Temple, Zrffew,p, 179.
8 Ibid. p. 184.
6 Barbour, V., Henry Bermet, Earl of Arlington, pp. 171 seqq.
ANTI-DUTCH DESIGNS 317
merchants like the Dutch, a Government which was all for commerce
and one whose flourishing condition could only too easily display the
difference between a republic and a monarchy in that regard, while
the French alliance would have the opposite effect. He derided Eng-
lish jealousy of the French power by sea, declaring that the Dutch
alone had dared to equal that of England in the late war, and that as
their commerce increased so would their sea power in proportion.1
These arguments, historically interesting as they may be, were un-
necessary to convince the King and powerless to convince the people.
The Dutch were soon to utter a more cogent appeal when they de-
clared that three years after their downfall England's turn would
come.2 In 1672, however, royal policy prevailed in England as in
France. "Surely", wrote Evelyn when the piratical war broke out,
"this was a quarrel slenderly grounded and not becoming Christian
neighbours."3 Among the factors which determined Charles's de-
claration of war, the hope of seizing Dutch ships, Dutch colonies and
Dutch commerce occupied a leading place. The attempt on the
Smyrna fleet failed, and Southwold Bay was indecisive, but for a time
in 1672 it seemed as though the forces which Louis had marshalled
could do with the republic as they pleased. The small merchant State,
whose great men were at variance, was overwhelmed by Turenne
and Conde, supported by England, Sweden, Munster and Cologne.
Colbert, who had in all good faith directed the bishops to invite
"Heaven's blessings upon an enterprise so just and lawful as this",4
was called upon to formulate terms of peace which should satisfy
the needs of Louis' commerce. His reply5 illuminates both the
political and the commercial theory of the age.
The simplest plan, he pointed out, would be to annex both the
Dutch and their commerce to France. Failing this, their commerce
with France itself might be taxed and that with the northern nations
so hampered as to favour French competition. Their transactions at
the bar of Cadiz he regarded as immune from interference, but their
ships could be kept out of the Mediterranean, and ten to twelve
million limes of trade with the Levant might thus be wrested from
them. Half that sum or more, the price of negroes and gold dust and
other goods exported from Africa to America, might be secured by
taking Cura§oa, Tobago, St Eustatius and a fort on the Guinea Coast.
The great trade with the Indies, no less considerable than that with
the Levant, could be halved by taking one of the Moluccas and a
"place" or two upon the coast of Malabar. All this would flood
France with bullion and thereby swell the revenues of the King.
^As posterity can never forget, this programme of spoliation was
frustrated by de Ruyter, whose strategy foiled the French and English
1 Clement, Lettres de Colbert, vi, 268. a Colenbrander, Bescheiden, n, 165.
8 Diary, 12 March 1672. * Gldment, Lettres de Colberty vi, 288.
5 Colenbrander, Besckeiden, n, 153.
3i8 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
fleets,1 and by William of Orange, who proved himself a worthy
member of "the noblest succession of heroes that we find in any
history".2 He was aided by the natural reaction of Europe against the
monarch who could contrive such a war and the minister who could
wish to end it on such rapacious terms. William never gave greater
proof than in 1672-4 of a self-control in which his partisans had
shown themselves lamentably lacking. He refused alike to make him-
self king, to purchase a fatal peace, and to embarrass his future by a
perhaps unprofitable English marriage. Having given the Dutch a
rallying-point and a policy, he first secured the help of his kinsman
the Great Elector, and afterwards that of Denmark, the Emperor and
Spain. His own advent to power had removed the English King's
chief grievance. Early in 1674, the deeper instincts of England pre-
vailing over jealousies of trade, she relapsed into a neutrality more
and more menacing to France. Although the French neglected no-
thing that could keep her neutral, the inevitable consequence of her
defection was that as between the belligerents the Dutch became
superior at sea. Colbert trembled for the coasts both of France and
of America, though in fact his newly created fleet proved by no means
negligible in warfare, and the French developed and profited by a
taste for privateering.
Among the first effects of the struggle upon colonial and com-
mercial competition was the interruption of the French efforts to
build up their Canadian dominion. In a year in which the King had
to maintain 200,000 soldiers and a numerous fleet, he could send the
colony only a consignment of sixty girls.3 If, in 1678, England had
declared war3 his plan was to suspend all commerce, and make every
available merchantman a privateer.4 The treaties of Nymegen, like
the war which they concluded, were overwhelmingly continental in
character. Restoring Holland, and marking another stage in the long
retreat of Spain, they brought Louis as a European monarch to the
height of Ins power. If, however, contemporaries thought it no
hyperbole to speak of his ambition of a fifth universal monarchy, this
must be ascribed in part to the promise of the fleet, which could be
brought by following Colbert's methods to a strength of some eight
hundred vessels with as many men as might be needed. The French
even boasted that de Ruyter had been vanquished by Duquesne,
and in a few years Spain, Genoa and Algiers were all made to feel
the growing reality of their naval power.
On the other hand, a war which had added Franche-Comt6 and
many northern towns to France, and which had enabled Louis to
throw his aegis magnificently over Sweden, owed its brilliance and
its success not to the sea but to the land. It had confirmed in the
1 distance, Admiral Sir R., A study of War, pp. 30-42.
8 Burnet, p. 703.
8 C16ment, Lettres de Colbert, m, ii, 557. * Ibid, ra, ii, 79.
FRENCH AGGRESSION AND WARS ON LAND 319
autocrat of France that prejudice against naval warfare which showed
itself in his omission to fulfil his many promises to honour the new
naval arsenals with a visit.1 Not until 1680 was he astonished at
Dunkirk, as Bismarck in his old age at Hamburg.2 Louvois, rather
than Colbert, stood first in Louis' favour, and aggression on the
eastern frontier rather than overseas occupied the royal mind. That
France, which had defied Europe in a war of aggression, continued
her encroachments in time of peace, lent additional weight to the
third great consequence of the war, the rise of William of Orange.
The Protestant prince, scion of a great German house, who had saved
Holland, who protected the neighbouring provinces of Spain, and
whose marriage with Mary of York (1677) gave him great significance
in England, seemed to be marked out more clearly year by year as
the predestined champion of Europe against France. William's
attitude towards colonies and commerce was therefore a historical
factor of high importance.
It may be safely said that while no Dutch statesman could ignore
the ocean, and least of all he who had advocated a national flight to
the East Indies to escape from servitude to France, William was
throughout his life compelled to think first in terms of Europe. His
personal preference, like that of Louis, was for the land, and he
lacked interest in other continents. Thus the loss of the directing
mind of Colbert on the one side was not accentuated by the gain upon
the other of a statesman with great designs of empire. The Dutch
people continued to follow those instincts and appetites which had
made their overseas position, but they were denied the interference of
their only statesman who was strong enough to interfere. The ex-
pansion of England under the later Stuarts likewise owed little to
political direction. Charles II, it is true, took an interest in such
matters; James was a gold hunter and a keen seaman; Clarendon
understood the importance of Plantations; Shaftesbury wrote ably
on colonial questions; and the Committee of Trade was not always,
as the Dutch ambassador sneered, composed of men wholly ignorant
of it.8 But if it cannot be maintained that, from 1664 to 1678, Eng-
land was steered by a man or body aiming steadily at power overseas,
still less can this be said of the tumultuous and tragic years which
culminated in the Revolution. Of them in general the words were
true which Burnet applied to the passive acceptance of the bom-
bardment of Genoa in 1684: "We were now pursuing other designs,
from which it was resolved that nothing from beyond sea should
divert us".4 England had profited by four years of neutrality and
French favour to acquire a great carrying-trade, but Parliament
1 C16ment, Lettres de Colbert, vn, p. xlvii.
8 Lavisse, ERstoire de France, vn, ii, 263; Billow, Prince von, Imperial Germany, p. 127.
8 Evelyn, Diary , 5 February 1657.
4 Burnet, p. 384.
320 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
forced the abandonment of Tangier, while James did not hesitate to
trample on prosperous Virginia.
Between the Peace of Nymegen and the outbreak of a general
European war in 1689, therefore, commercial and colonial rivalry
played a secondary part as compared with the constitutional con-
vulsions of England and the assertion of autocracy by France. While
Charles was struggling with the Protestant extremists about Ex-
clusion, Louis was annexing one German city after another in what
is known as the "war in peace". His capture of Luxemburg, for
example, though primarily defensive, was esteemed to make the
French masters of all the Netherlands, to give them entrance into
Germany, and to open the way to universal monarchy.1 Yet England
did not move, and in 1684 the Emperor sanctioned for twenty years
many of the so-called reunions. Not until the oppression of the Hugue-
nots and of the Piedmontese Protestants had seemed to denote "an
universal design to destroy all that would not go to mass throughout
Europe",2 did the English, the Dutch and other Protestant peoples
feel that a new effort must be made. The brutal treatment of Genoa
and the brutal treatment of the Pope helped to unite Powers of both
religions in William's League of Augsburg (1686). The English
Revolution and Louis3 attempt to restore the Catholic James II by
force expanded this league into the Grand Alliance, which from 1689
to 1 697 arrayed Europe with unprecedented unanimity in the defence
of her liberties against aggressive France.
The menace to Europe was the greater in that France could now
employ for aggression the strength which she owed to Colbert.
Colbert himself had died in 1683, ?&& witnessing the failure of many
of his schemes and the loss of his prime influence with the King.
Neither his own dejection at the last nor the manifest error of some
of his ideas should disguise the importance of his contribution to
colonial and commercial France. His improvement of communi-
cations, establishment of free ports and reduction of the rate of
interest at home qualified his country to compete with foreign pro-
ducers. No less important was the improved status which he gained
for French merchants, thus opening their calling to men of gentle
birth. His fleet could not but make a powerful bid for supremacy
at sea and might well become irresistible. With its support, the
imposing empire of France beyond the seas and the considerable
machinery of companies devised for its exploitation must play a great
part in history. In France, moreover, where either the people needed
the initiative of the Crown or were prevented by its obtrusive activity
from developing initiative of their own, Colbert's stream of decrees
and subsidies had produced an appreciable harvest. "Venetian
glass, Brussels lace, the stocking industry, fine cloth of Louviers, of
S&lan, of Abbeville, common cloth of Elbeuf, Caudebec hats, Tours
1 Evelyn, Diary, 26 May 1684. 2 Ibid. 5 May 1686.
STRUGGLE BETWEEN FRANCE AND EUROPE 321
and Lyons silks, tapestry of la Savonnerie, of Beauvais, of Aubusson,
the perfecting of clock-making, the cultivation of madder, various
products of iron, of steel, of leather, of clay"— all these owed their
development to him.1
The war (1688-97), whose beginning was marked by a short-lived
French ascendancy at sea, produced many colonial and commercial
fluctuations and disasters, while in India English progress was
crowned by the foundation of the station which soon became Calcutta.
In America, King William's war compelled the several colonies to
take counsel together for defence against the French. At home, the
new pre-eminence of Parliament within the constitution found
expression in the formation and pervasive activity of a Board of Trade.
Captures and conquests were made by both sides on and beyond the
seas, yet on the whole both the war and the peace were conspicuous
for the unqualified predominance of Europe. The keynote of the
Treaty of Ryswick indeed was mutual restitution. The chief colonial
nations, the French on one side and the Spaniards, the Dutch and the
English on the other, settled their differences without the exchange
of territories overseas. French rule was recognised in Nova Scotia,
and France recovered Pondicheny from the Dutch. Almost a decade
of war, none the less, had developed British sea power, which rested
on a commercial marine, and British colonies, which represented a
genuine migration, in contrast with their respectiveFrench competitors,
which depended upon the authority and the initiative of the Crown.
Seven years had passed since the death of Colbert's son, as brilliant
as his father had been obscure, the Seignelay who had developed the
maritime ambitions carefully inculcated from his birth. His country
had again won laurels upon the land, while the attendant exhaustion
and expense rendered her incapable of reverting immediately to
Colbert's policy overseas. Louis, indeed, might hope that the
approaching dissolution of the Spanish empire would compensate
France for every sacrifice, but the studied moderation of his peace
terms could no longer regain him the reputation forfeited in 1672
and in the 'eighties. He must enter the competition handicapped
by the settled distrust of Europe and by the firm establishment in
England of a Protestant dynasty represented by his lifelong foe.
The truce between France and Europe concluded in 1697 lasted
in fact for little less than four years. These were of necessity filled with
negotiations and preparations for disposing of the Spanish empire.
When Mexico and Peru were at stake, it was idle to expect statesmen
to absorb themselves in St Christopher or Curagoa, while even from
the trader's point of view, Spain or Naples might well surpass any-
conceivable gain outside of Europe.2 A further key to the history is
1 OuSrud, A., De radrmmstration d* Lotds XIV (1661-1672) d'apris les memoires intdtis
d'Ormesson, p. 94.
2 Gf. Gorbett, J. S., England in the Mediterranean, 1603-1713, n, 188, etc.
CHBEI
322 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
furnished by William's belief that France and Austria had a secret
understanding, that a new religious war was imminent, and that the
Protestants would be no match for their opponents.1 Louis, on the
other hand, credited him with the same autocratic control of policy
that he himself enjoyed, and surmised that he might seize the Spanish
possessions in the Indies, or acquire them by the Emperor's con-
nivance-2 In his sincere endeavours after world-peace, however,
William could by no means count upon the English. He was in
reality, men declared, king in Holland but no more than stadholder
in England.8 "One would say", he complained to Heinsius, "either
that this island is the only thing on the face of the earth, or that it has
nothing to do with the rest of the world."4 The facts of his position
compelled him to negotiate only for such terms as seemed to his Dutch
confidants and to himself likely to please an ungrateful and unin-
structed nation.
In these conditions, the record of the bargaining between Louis and
William which resulted in the secret Partition Treaties of 1 698 and
1700 throws an unwonted light upon colonial and commercial
questions. For the first time since 1664, these took a leading share
in determining the policy of States. The Indies, the Mediterranean
trade, and the mastery of the sea were avowed as prime interests of
France and England, whose kings bent all their minds to find a
formula which they could defend against the Emperor, Spain and the
rest of Europe.
England, speaking through the mouths of Dutchmen for Holland
also, naturally placed trade in the forefront, and regarded "places"
only as they might give the necessary security for trade. The con-
tinuance of her Mediterranean trade and the development of trade
with the West Indies called for Geuta, Oran, Gibraltar, Port Mahon,
perhaps all Minorca, and Havana or some equivalent.5 Louis argued
that to share the Indies in any way with the Dutch and English would
be to take the whole from Spain, that Port Mahon would make them
masters of the Mediterranean, and that a demand for Gibraltar
would affront Spain even more.6 He was, however, plainly warned
by his ambassador in London that the English conceived that their
commerce would be ruined if the Indies and Cadiz fell to France,
and that William would be able to draw the last penny from their
pocket for war in such a cause.7 War, moreover, would result in the
seizure of the chief Spanish ports in America by the Dutch and
English.8 These considerations largely determined the provisions of
the treaty of 1 698. Spain, the Indies and the Spanish Netherlands were
assigned t6 a Bavarian prince from whom both parties had much to
* Grimblot, P. (ed.), Letters qf William HI and Lows XIV, 1697-1700, i, 131.
* Ibid, i, 249 and 274. * Ward, A. W., Gnat Britain and Hanover, p, 3.
* Grimblot, Letters, i, 184. « Ibid, i, 344. « Ibid, i, 449.
7 find, i, 508* * Ibid, n, 55.
THE PARTITION TREATIES 323
hope and little to fear, while Louis counted on acquiring the trade
of Spain by annexing Guipuzcoa, and that of all the Mediterranean
by annexing Sicily, Naples and the Tuscan ports. William rightly
judged that this Partition Treaty, concluded without the knowledge
of the English or Spaniards, and with cynical indifference to dynastic
titles and to both the pride and the good government of Spain, would
cause "an amazing emotion" when it became known. And when,
within a few months, the Bavarian died, the opprobrium seemed to
have been incurred in vain. "We are in no small labyrinth, and may
it please God to help us out of it", was his dry comment.1
Despite the protests of Spain, however, Louis and William were
soon hatching new treaties for the succession to her two and twenty
crowns. Colonial questions, perhaps still more the memory of colonial
wrongs done by the Dutch, told against their adoption of the King
of Portugal as the Spanish heir*2 Had the sea power of France be-
come what Colbert and his son designed, Louis would hardly have
acquiesced in the assignment of Spain, the Indies and the Nether-
lands to the Habsburg House. The acquisition of Lorraine as well as
Naples, Sicily and the Tuscan ports, all promised by the treaty of
March 1700, seemed so profitable to France, however, that when the
throne of Spain fell vacant in November, the English ambassador in
Paris expected him to hold firm. William likewise entertained little
doubt that the Emperor would prefer a treaty which gave him much,
to a will which gave him nothing.8 Within a few days, however,
Louis had decided to break his word, and to take the risk of war — the
war, as it proved, which was almost to fill the remainder of his days
and to prepare and predict the triumph of England overseas.
In this momentous decision, commerce and colonies weighed
heavily with the French. "There might be some hope", the diplo-
matic Torcy contended, "that the Indies would be of no small
assistance" if it were necessary to defend the will by force. The
chancellor dared to argue that extension in Flanders was trivial by
comparison with the union of two great monarchies — a union which
would enrich France by the commerce of the Indies and enable
France and Spain to set the pace in Europe.4 The Dauphin, at the
council, and Madame deMaintenon, whom the King regarded as the
embodiment of tranquil wisdom, were on the same side. The Dutch
and English j William declared to Heinsius, were faced with ruin.6
To save Belgium, indeed, they had consented in the Partition Treaties
to yield the Mediterranean to France. Belgium would now turn
Bourbon, and there was but a faint hope that Naples and Sicily, by
declaring for the Emperor, might save the Mediterranean. It would
be but natural if Louis added Portugal to Spain, and set about
Grimblot, n, 1512, 163, 355. * JK£ n, 283.
i Grimblot, n, 1512, 163* *55- „ " *««• n> 203-
3 Ibid, n, 452, 453; Ranke, L. von, History tf England, v, 238.
4 Grimblot, n, 457, 467. * Ibid- B, 477-
21-2
324 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
restoring his Stuart clients to their former thrones. Men who had
suffered from the pitiless monopolies of Colbert knew what value to
place upon his master's argument that England and France would be
secure in the Mediterranean because Naples and Sicily were to pass
not to himself but to his grandson. Yet in April 1701 William could
only report that the English were highly reluctant to begin a war on
their own account, though they would not leave Holland in the lurch. l
At this juncture, politics were complicated by the Darien tragedy,
which threw an unique illumination upon the commercial and colonial
situation of the time.2 Prompted both by the need and by the am-
bition of Scotland and by her envy of the English trade, the "Com-
pany of Scotland trading to Africa and the Indies" had, in 1695,
secured a monopoly in Scotland for trade with Asia, Africa or America
forthirty-oneyears. TheActwhichWilHam'scommissioner was unwary
enough to sanction gavethe Company theright to take unappropriated
territories that were uninhabited or whose inhabitants gave consent,
while it bound the King to protect it against any foreign State.
Although some saw in this a design to sacrifice English commerce to
the Dutch,8 while the Council of Trade protested that Parliament
was usurping its functions, English would-be traders with the East
Indies subscribed £300,000 in nine days, and the men of Hamburg
were no less eager. Government, however, interfered, and although
the Scots, piqued and tempted, promised more than they could easily
perform, the result was a pitifully inadequate capital of £400,000.
Paterson, the hero of the enterprise, held that a settlement on the
Isthmus of Panama would make Scotland supplant Holland as the
entrepdt of eastern trade, and thousands were ready to quit their
famine-stricken country to cultivate a more generous soil. The whole
adventure might have taught a Colbert the value of that dearly
bought adaptation and experience which still remained the almost
exclusive patent of the Dutch. The French and English had long
regarded Panama as a region tempting but forbidden. Now the
Scottish pioneers died by sea and still more by land, while their
leaders were finding great quantities of thin grey paper and small
blue bonnets among their cargoes.4 The days of the Partition
negotiations, moreover, were hardly the season for what both France
and Spain must deem rank piracy, while British planters feared that
the new pirate station would reduce their supply of labour.5 William's
subjects were forbidden intercourse with the intruders, the Governor
of Jamaica refused all aid, while the Spaniards and the fever drove
them out. Although the Darien failure ultimately helped the Union,
its immediate result was to inflame the Scots against the English and
their common King.
1 Ranke, vi, 378.
2 Harbour, J. 5., A history of WilKam Paterson and th* Darien Company, passim.
8 Burnet, p. 621. * Barbour, p. 142. 8 Davenant, i, 415.
THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 325
Meanwhile, a grave prediction was finding fulfilment further north.
"Should the French settle at the disemboguing of the river Mes-
chasipe", wrote Davenant, "they would not be long before they
made themselves masters of that rich province, which would be an
addition to their strength very terrible to Europe. '91 A chain of forts
from the Gulf of Mexico to Canada must enable them to intercept all
the interior trade of the British northern Plantations. But the race
for control of the lower Mississippi was won by Louis9 subjects, and
Louisiana threatened to stifle the British on the Atlantic seaboard.
In Europe, by blunders which may not be related here, a monarch
who in 1701 seemed in secure control of France and the Spanish
Empire found himself two years later confronted by the sea powers,
the Emperor, Savoy, Portugal, Denmark, Prussia and Lorraine.
"I tell you plainly", ran William's last speech to his Parliament,2
"if you do not lay hold on this occasion, you have no reason to hope
for another. " The War of the Spanish Succession was in fact destined
not merely to rescue Britain but to make her the one great sea power
of the world. Within ten years of its outbreak in 1702, she had be-
come "a sea-power in the purest sense of the word, not only in fact,
but also in her own consciousness9'.3 The story of this evolution, the
dominant factor in the history of her colonial rivalry with France, is
traced in another chapter;4 it remains to indicate the part played by
oceanic questions during the war and at the peace.
Britain interfered with the succession in Spain because William III
manipulated a torrent of public indignation against France into a
declaration of war. The ruler of the Dutch and English found his
supreme duty in the defence of the balance of power in Europe.
After Ryswick he had sincerely endeavoured to accomplish this by
agreement with France. Louis9 repudiation of the Partition Treaty
left him no alternative but to attempt the coercion of France, the
task which, as Ryswick proved, had lately been too great for united
Europe. Louis* folly, however, drove the Sea Powers into alliance
with the Emperor, and in the case of Britain added to the traditional
hatred of France an acute care for the Protestant faith, for the right
to choose her sovereign, and for her most cherished trades. When
Louis seemed unaggressive, their cheerful acceptance of Philip as
King of Spain had roused the fury of publicists against the class of
moneyed men. Thirty years earlier, Davenant protested, the shops
would have been shut up at so near a prospect of universal monarchy
as the Bourbon succession implied. But capital was as heedless as
Rome when Catiline's conspiracy was brewing. "They say, if we
have peace, their stocks will rise in value; if a war comes, they can
1 Davenant, i, 415.
8 Oldmixon,J.,Mftory °f England faring the reigns of WttUam and Mary, Ame and George I
(London, 1735)9 p« 254*
8 Mahan, Influence of sea-power, p. 217. 4 Vide infra, chap. xvm.
326 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
again bring money to thirty or forty per cent, interest; so they shall
find their account either way.9'1 When however it became clear that
Louis could and would control Spanish policy, that he would do so
in the spirit of Colbert, and that he styled a papist pretender King of
England, the commercial interest became as bellicose as William
could have desired. They were roused in part by what was done and
in part by what was expected.
The exclusive right to import negroes from Guinea into Spanish
America was conceded by Philip to the French Asiento Company for
ten years from September 1702. An equivalent in goods or metal
might be brought away, and a fourth share in the enterprise was
reserved to the kings of France and Spain. No arrangement could
have more ominously violated that principle of equality of oppor-
tunity with regard to Spanish America which the Partition Treaties
had endeavoured to secure. It was certain that blows would soon
be aimed at trade with the Bourbon lands in Europe.
The will to war which had been directed by William it remained
for Marlborough to maintain. When his long series of victories had
reduced Louis to beg for peace, while the allies had proved impotent
to drive Philip from the throne of Spain, the Tories declared that
the duke's preference for land warfare and Dutch jealousy of British
progress overseas had robbed Britain of maritime conquests. Swift
expressed amazement that "while some politicians were showing us
the way to Spain by Flanders, others to Savoy or Naples . . . the West
Indies should never come into their heads".2 It is true that as a
statesman Marlborough concentrated firmly on the pre-eminent
object of securing the balance of power by subduing Louis XIV, and
that as a strategist he shared the natural distaste of a commander-in-
chief on the main front for " side-shows " far away. <c I dare not speak
against the project of sending troops to the West Indies", he wrote in
1710, "but I will own very freely that I think it can end in nothing
but a great expense and the ruining of those regiments."8 It may
be that this attitude enabled the enemy to continue their commerce
and thus to support the war.4 But it would be rash to assert that
Marlborough's strategy was at fault, and false to suggest that British
interests overseas were neglected.
L In negotiating the alliance with the Emperor he was careful to
guard and extend trading rights with the Spanish dominions. The
first strokes of the war were aimed with ill success at Cadiz and with
greater profit at the yearly fleet from the West Indies in Vigo Bay.
"Nothing can be done without the fleet", wrote Marlborough in
1708, "I conjure you, if possible, to take Port Mahon."5 "If we
1 Davenant, Charles, Works, m, 300 seqq.: "Essay upon the balance of power" (1701).
» The Conduct of the Allies (Works, edTW. Scott), v, 28-31. '
3 Coxe, W., Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, m, 37.
* Swift, Works: "History of the Four last Years of the Queen", pp. 275, 278.
5 Mahon, Lord, History of the War of the Succession in Spain, pp. 44-64 and 254,
THE SPANISH SUCCESSION AND COLONIES 327
look for the hand that held the helm of British naval policy steady for
the Mediterranean, we find almost always that it is Marlborough's",1
and th*e Mediterranean formed the pivot of the continental balance
of power. The flagrant failure of Jack Hill's Tory expedition against
Canada justified his misgivings. The dismal record of mutual and
profitless destruction in the intercolonial struggle goes far to condemn
a form of warfare which must threaten the very existence of the
conquests, while a Power beaten in Europe would readily save itself
by surrendering these distant possessions intact. Marlborough was
in fact, even if unconsciously, the protagonist of British sea power.
After Blenheim the coasts of Britain were secure, and as one hard
campaign followed another, Louis could sustain his armies only by
pillaging his fleet. France continued to produce great seamen and
by raids and commerce-destroying to embarrass the allies. But
rivalry with Britain by sea, still more the ambition of Colbert
and Seignelay, ceased to be possible. As the sea power of France
diminished and her need of respite grew, as Holland became less and
less capable of supporting both war by land and sea and her accus-
tomed commerce, as England found the means to carry all her
burdens and at the same time to expand her trade, inevitably she
became more insistent to demand and Louis less disinclined to grant
terms of peace which should perpetuate her favoured position. The
rise of the barometer is clearly recorded in her diplomatic history.
The treaties of alliance had provided that whatever the Dutch and
English might capture in Spanish America they should retain. In
1707, by a secret arrangement made at Barcelona with the Habsburg
King of Spain, England stipulated that the French should be for ever
excluded from the commerce of the Indies, that an Anglo-Spanish
Company should be formed for its exploitation, and that, failing
this. Englishmen should be ranked with Spaniards for purposes of
trade.2 Two years later, when the terrible winter of 1708-9 had
brought Louis to the verge of despair, Torcy secured written peace
terms from Heinsius, Marlborough and Eugene. These laid special
stress on the total renunciation by France of the Spanish Indies and
their commerce, and to this, as well as to the cession of French posts
and claims in Newfoundland, Louis gave consent. The pride and
greed of the allies, however, and their deep distrust of France, caused
this and subsequent similar negotiations to break down. Not until
October 1711 did the secret and separate negotiations of Harley and
St John issue in an agreement for a more rational termination of the
wax. "Was there no way", Swift had pertinently demanded, "to
provide for the safety of Britain. . .but by the French king turning
his arms to beat his grandson out of Spain?" Now, in return for
that peace which the Emperor was still bent on denying, and, as its
1 Corbett, J. S., England in the Mediterranean, n, 199.
* Stanhope, Earl, History of England. . . 1701-1713, n, 56, 57.
328 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1660-1713
foundation, the acceptance of his grandson's claim to Spain and her
dominions, Louis consented to recognise Queen Anne and the Han-
overian succession, to conclude with England a new treaty of com-
merce, and to raze the fortifications of Dunkirk, the Zeebrugge of an
age of privateers. England was further to retain Gibraltar and Port
Mahon, those keys of the Mediterranean, to receive the Asiento for
thirty years, and to annex all St Christopher, French Newfoundland
and Hudson Bay and Straits, frustrating thus in North America
many of Colbert's plans.
After more than a year of open congress at Utrecht, and further
secret negotiations between France and England, this salutary
bargain was confirmed. France renounced for ever any special
advantage in commerce or navigation with Spain or Spanish America.
In addition to the territorial concessions already named, Nova
Scotia (Acadia) became British once again, and Port Royal, an
American Dunkirk, was thus rendered harmless. Unhappily for
future peace, however, Cape Breton Island and the other islands in
the St Lawrence remained French, and the French retained "the
right to catch and dry fish" upon part of the Newfoundland coast.
England and France further concluded a most-favoured-nation
treaty of commerce and navigation. Louis might thus be said to have
abandoned vast fields of enterprise overseas to the English. He was no
less lavish towards their new dependents, the Portuguese. The clauses
by which he agreed to limit French Guiana renounced all pretensions
to the Amazon and sacrificed "a commercial itinerary of fifteen
hundred leagues".1
Secure of Spain, Philip V could be induced to pay by unbounded
deference his debt to France. He therefore abjured for ever the right
to sell or pledge to her or any other nation any land or lordship in
America. With due safeguards against Jews and Moors, he yielded
Gibraltar and Minorca to Great Britain. The Asiento concession was
rounded off by the grant of a depfit for human livestock on the Rio
de la Plata, and by certain limited rights of trade with Spanish
America in other goods. These were to form the sole exceptions to the
time-honoured law which prohibited all foreigners from engaging in
commerce with the colonies of Spain.
In the complex of international agreements that compose the
Utrecht settlement, nothing is more significant than the difference
between the stress laid on overseas affairs in those concluded with
the English and Dutch and the silence in those concluded with other
non-Latin Powers. If a king had made the war but merchants the
peace, it was in no small degree because during the war England had
become mercantile as never in her former history. The Spectator in
1711 bears witness to an assured cosmopolitanism of expenditure
which would have seemed strange to Pepys less than half a century
* Leroy-Bcaulieu, P., De la cokrdsatitm duz les peufles moderns, i, 172.
THE PEACE OF UTRECHT 329
before.1 "The fruits of Portugal are corrected by the products of
Barbados, the infusion of a China plant sweetened with the pith of
an Indian cane. . . .The single dress of a woman of quality is often
the product of a hundred climates We repair our bodies by the
drugs of America and repose ourselves under Indian canopies. Trade,
without enlarging the British territories, has given us a sort of ad-
ditional empire." Ten years later, it is true, Defoe was indicting
China ware, Japanese goods, tea and coffee as "trifling and un-
necessary"; while sugar, cotton, arrack, copper and indigo he classi-
fied "injurious". Few could doubt, however, that Englishmen would
toil, navigate, and, if need be, fight, rather than deny themselves such
comforts. Few could suppose that laws and prohibitions would
annihilate mutually profitable exchange. Even before the Peace of
Utrecht, the English had supplied New Spain with slaves, receiving
payment, by an ingenious system, in jars of silver covered over with
meal.2 By a still more flagrant connivance of government officials,
both Dutch and English were allowed to import into France goods
from the Levant in French ships.3 Europe, which had discovered in
1648 a new political organisation, was plainly entering upon a new
phase of her existence. Henceforward her constituent nations would
be more and more closely interwoven by way of trade, and that trade
already consisted largely in the exchange of goods from outside
Europe. The colonial and commercial age, with England as its leader,
had begun.
1 Cf. Davenant, Works, i, 30, 91.
2 Anon., An account of the Spanish settlements in America (Edinburgh, 1762), p. 416.
8 Lavisse, ffistoire de France, vn, iii, 256.
CHAPTER XI
THE WEST INDIES AND THE SPANISH-
AMERICAN TRADE, 1713-1748
XN the eighteenth century the West Indies held a place of importance
among the colonies of Great Britain which is difficult to explain by
their size or population, or even by the extent of their productions
or their capacity to absorb British exports. They were the first care
of governments in time of war, for they were in constant danger of
attack; and their white inhabitants were too few to render them in-
dependent of British troops even in time of peace. The high esteem
in which they were held is explained by their value, not merely in
direct commerce, but also as the pivot of several branches of trade.
The sugar trade involved many English interests, shipowners and
merchants, refiners and grocers ; while the lesser products of the islands,
cotton, coffee, pimento and ginger, were all articles of which supplies
within the Empire were insufficient. Throughout the eighteenth
century there was also a steady intercourse with the British colonies
on the mainland. Small coasting vessels plied constantly between the
two, carrying West Indian products, particularly to New England,
and bringing back the provisions and lumber for which the Planta-
tions offered a constant demand. The regular trade with the North
American colonies left the islands to a large extent in the hands of
mainland exporters, and, as these were frequently unwiUiug to take
in return sufficiently large quantities of island produce, a considerable
export of bullion was necessary. It was to avoid this that attempts
were made to open up trade in logwood with Central America. The
attempts were only in part successful, as they were hampered by the
lack of a recognised status on the coast. Expeditions to Campeachy
Bay were organised from Jamaica as early as the reign of Charles II
and ultimately representations to the Government at home led to
the appointment of a Superintendent of the Moskito Shore in I749-1
Frequent conflicts took place with Spanish merchants carrying out
similar projects, and the ventures were long regarded as of doubtful
legality. The trade never reached large enough dimensions to be a
substitute for the trade with North America.
In this Central American trade, Jamaica took the lead among the
British islands, and through the whole of the eighteenth century she
was regarded as the most important of the British West Indies, having
outstripped Barbados in the reign of Charles II. The advantage of
size was greatly in her favour, as was also the fact that her land was
1 McLeish, J., "British Activities in Yucatan and on the Moskito Shore in the i8th
Century", an unpublished thesis in the Library of the University of London.
WEST INDIAN TRADE 331
not "used-up" so early by constant cultivation; but her chief asset
was her geographical position, admirably suited to the entrtpfa trade
to the Spanish Indies. The independent settlers of Jamaica cared
little that their activities were illicit, and it was to the interest of no
one to interfere. The profits were great so long as the trade was for-
bidden, but when attempts at regulation began in the opening years
of the eighteenth century they dwindled. Then for nearly half a
century this phantom of a legal trade deflected colonial enterprise,
and in the end brought it to ruin. The story of this mistaken policy,
which we trace in this chapter, began with the Peace of Utrecht
and is bound up with the activities of the South Sea Company and
the working of the Asiento treaty. It is essential for the history 01
the West Indies, since their fortunes were gravely affected by its
failure brought about by mismanagement and lack of loyalty in the
"trading part of the nation" in England and the islands.
The history of British relations with the Spanish Indies entered on
a new phase with the close of the War of the Spanish Succession, for
an age of contract succeeded one of lawlessness. The treaty of 1670*
had done little to define the English position in the New World, and
had ignored the most significant developments of the period. After
this treaty, as before, Englishmen still acted on the maxim that the
seas were "free to all", and Spain still held that in the New World
they were closed to all. The treaties of Utrecht did not, indeed, en-
tirely set aside these creeds, for they were to be the underlying cause
of the war of 1739. But the change in 1713 was a real one. Hence-
forth there was a specific grant to which to appeal, and English
adventure in the New World gained a new status in international
relations.
In 1713 Spain was starting a new period under a new dynasty.
But it was still the old Spain, with all her old weakness and wealth,
and her old policy of commercial exclusiveness for which her in-
dustrial impotence made her wholly unfit. But her wealth and im-
portance were even yet great enough to fire the imagination of
Europe. She had survived the serious losses of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries; and the new losses were not so great as the
old. Yet it was'the loss of the Italian lands that caused her inter-
national decline; to recover them she sold her diplomatic freedom to
France, and her commercial prosperity to France and England.
The Indies were still valued by the people of Spain, more than any
other Spanish possessions. Even the partition makers of the last
fifteen years had left these territories unimpaired, although to France,
England, and the Dutch, as much as to Spain, they seemed an un-
fathomed sea of riches. Visions of wealth there for the taking had
come to Drake and Raleigh, to Harry Vane and the merchant
advisers of Cromwell, to the diplomatic agents of Charles II j and
1 Vukst&ra, p. 315.
332 WEST INDIES AND SPANISH-AMERICAN TRADE
now they came to the financial schemers of Anne and George I. They
were to visit later both the Pitts in turn, and stir the imagination of
Canning. The manifestations changed in character during these two
and a half centuries, but their inspiration remained the same.
The change came in the time of Cromwell's "Western Design",
for it was only in imagination that this was a revival of the Protestant
fervour of Elizabethan times. Many of the men who furthered it
were London merchants such as Martin Noell and Maurice Thomp-
son, practical men of business. Their Eldorado was to be sought in a
growth of trade, and it was for this that they valued Hispaniola, and
invested capital in Jamaica. From their time onwards to that of
Canning the unreality of the vision lay in the exaggeration of the
possibilities of Spanish American trade, and not in false ideas of the
value of Spanish gold.
In the seventeenth century there were three principal ways of
tapping the wealth of the Spanish Indies. First, the lands of the New
World were rich in minerals and tropical products. Silver and gold,
cochineal, dye-woods, and indigo, were all there in abundance, and
found ready vent in European markets which had none of them. In
the second place, the mines required negro labour, and the supply
of negroes might be made another source of profit. Thirdly, it was
necessary to provide goods for the outward cargoes of the vessels that
brought home the treasure of the Indies. In the earliest period of
English penetration to the coasts, direct seizure of the treasure was
the only method followed. In later times, the tradition of Drake and
Raleigh was kept alive by Blake and the buccaneers of Jamaica, and
lured Narborough and Dampier to voyages in the South Seas. But
the more regular methods gained in popularity, and were the real
concern of statesmen from the time of Blake and Morgan.
It was the misfortune of Spain that while her ambition demanded
that she should be the sole channel through which the wealth of
America was brought to Europe, she was incapable either of obtain-
ing her own labour supply or of providing cargoes for her fleets.
The papal disposition of the world left the African coasts to Portugal,
and Spain did not venture to falsify her own position in the West by
infringing Portuguese rights. But Spanish industry had been stifled
by the religious zeal of the sixteenth century, and it was difficult to
revive it. In the eighteenth century both Alberoni and Patino tried
to do so; but the first had too short a period of influence, and both
were distracted by other aims. Probably both were too late. It was
necessary therefore throughout this period to buy goods and negroes
from the foreigner.
In spite of this, the Spanish colonial system remained one of ex-
clusive commercial monopoly.1 At first from Seville and later from
1 See Dahlgren, E. W., Les relations commerciaks et maritime* entre la France et Its Ctites de
VQctan pacifique; and Haring, G. H., Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies.
SPANISH COLONIAL TRADE 333
Cadiz, a colonial policy was organised whose chief object was the
reservation of colonial wealth to Spain. Every year ships sailed for the
Indies, at first freely in small groups and then in two organised fleets.
In the middle period of the sixteenth century, the fleets sailed separ-
ately, but as the seas grew more unsafe they journeyed to San
Domingo together. One, the fata, went thence to Vera Cruz in New
Spain, calling at Porto Rico on the way. The other, the galleows, was
bound for Terra-Firma or, as the English called it, the Spanish Main.
Cartagena was the first objective. As soon as the ships arrived there,
news of their arrival was sent on to Portobello and Lima, and from
Lima the Armada del Mar del Sur sailed for Panama taking with it the
silver of Peru. From Panama the cargo travelled by caravan to
Portobello. By the time it arrived, the galleons were there too, and
the merchants of Portobello were ready for the great fair. After the
fair the galleons moved back to Cartagena to load the return cargoes.
Thence they sailed to Havana, whither the fata also returned; and
together they passed home through the Bahama channel. At the
height of Spanish power, it is said that the two fleets numbered fifty
vessels of 27,500 tons burthen, but in spite of all precautions, they
suffered heavily, in the sixteenth century from English seamen, and
in the seventeenth from the free-booters and pirates who made their
homes in Jamaica.
It is impossible to estimate the extent of British participation in
this trade, though in the seventeenth century it was probably con-
siderable. But the transport of American goods to European markets
was difficult, and less direct methods of securing a share in the wealth
of the Indies were therefore more profitable.
The most popular method was through the trade in slaves. In the
early years of colonisation, Spain had tried to secure at least a share
in the profits of this for her own merchants, employing them as con-
tractors to supply a given number of slaves to the colonies; and al-
though traffic with the foreigner was necessary to obtain the slaves,
a fair pretence of Spanish agency was maintained. Later the practice
changed. The contract, or Asiento, became a monopoly for a term
of years, and it was frequently granted to foreigners. In the early
period of this new system the Asiento was held most often by the
Portuguese; from the time of the conquest of Portugal in 1580 to its
recovery of independence, they held it almost continuously. Then it
began to be granted to more distant merchants, and Germans, Dutch
and Genoese all participated. The terms of the grant to one group
of these contractors — that of 1663 to two Genoese merchants— in-
cluded a new privilege. They could buy the slaves from the subjects
of any country not at war with Spain. Later contracts included
a similar clause, and the result was a great development of the
slave markets in the Caribbean; and both Englishmen and Dutch-
men shipped slaves there more for Spanish needs than their own.
334 WEST INDIES AND SPANISH-AMERICAN TRADE
Charles II tried to better this in 1667 by asking for the Asiento for his
new Royal African Company, but his application failed, as did a similar
attempt of William III in 1698. The fact was that French influence in
Spain was becoming important, and in 1701 the Asiento was granted
to the French Guinea Company.1 Jealousy of France from this time
forward reinforced other motives for making English statesmen desire
the Asiento.
The Spanish slave trade, however, was valued not only for itself
but also as a cloak for other activities, since the holders of the Asiento
had valuable opportunities for opening trade in European goods.
From early times Spain had found it necessary to admit such foreign
participation in practice, although she denied it in principle. The
Seville merchants who supplied most of the cargoes for the Indies
secured their foreign goods through alien merchants, French, English,
Portuguese, Germans and Dutch, who employed the Spaniards as
their factors, and obtained thus a considerable share in the profit of
the voyages. The practice became so regular that it lost entirely its
illicit character, as had the foreign agency for the supply of slaves.2
It was inconvenient, however, and the factors were subject to a heavy
duty, and another method, therefore, developed in the seventeenth
century, although it was not recognised as legal by Spain. This was
a direct trade in the Caribbean. Here England was in a strong
position through her acquisition of Jamaica, for Spanish merchants
from the coast came to the island to buy slaves, and found it easy ro
arrange also for a supply of European goods. Small sloops carried the
goods to the Spanish ports, and a new source of wealth was opened
to the inhabitants of the islands.8
Towards the end of the century, the merchants of Jamaica began
to be outbid by the French, and French trade grew quickly in the
later years of Louis XIV's wars. Its success was due largely to the
temporary disorganisation of the Spanish commercial system; for no
fleets came to the New World between 1697 and 1706, and even be-
fore this they had become very uncertain. French merchants from
St Malo and from the West Indies therefore organised a coasting
service, bringing goods not only to the staple ports, after the practice
of Spain, but also direct to little towns along the coast.4 The system
was popular in the Indies, and very profitable to the French, but it
roused jealousy in England, and henceforward we find English states-
men beginning to ask for "securities " from Spain for fill] opportunities
for our commerce.
The year 1710 in England brought new men and new schemes.
Harley and St John started a policy of peace, and covered the
1 See Scelle, G., La Traite nlgribe aux Indes de Castille, i, 121-750 and n, passim.
* See Scelle, and also Dahlgren, chap- ii, pp. 42 seqq.
* See Some Observations on the Asiento Trade... (London, 1728). Gf. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS,
28140, "An Essay on the Nature and Methods of carrying on a Trade to the South Sea"
* See Dahlgren, bk n, passim, e.g. pp. 138-144; and Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 28140.
NEGOTIATIONS OF 1711-13 335
abandonment of continental aims by the lure of commercial and
colonial privileges; while Harley went further and planned at the
same time to secure English trade and to re-establish English finances.
At the end of 1710 he was enquiring from the Dutch how they could
best oppose the growing French monopoly of Spanish trade, and at
the beginning of the following year the South Sea Company was
founded under his own presidency. In September the charter of
incorporation was granted, and Queen Anne gave the Company a
monopoly of South American trade south of the Orinoco on the east
coast, and along the whole west coast; only Portuguese Brazil and
Dutch Surinam were exempt, since there freedom of trade already
existed* Upon the financial side, the scheme included the "satisfy-
ing" of public debts, by the funding of nine and a half millions of loan.
Meanwhile the terms of peace were being discussed with Louis
XIV. The request for s&retts rielles for trade in the Spanish Indies as
well as in the Mediterranean alarmed him; and if by this phrase was
meant the cession to England of a port in the Indies, both Louis and
Philip were exceedingly loath to grant it. In June 1711 the English
requirements were defined. The English agents at Paris were in-
structed to ask for the Asiento and stations for the sale of negroes,
an equivalent for any privileges granted to France, and four settle-
ments in the Indies as security for trade. These terms were discussed
at length in the following three months, and finally in September the
English demands were again stated in what was said to be their final
form: the Asiento for thirty years, exemption for English goods from
the 15 per cent, duties charged on exports to the Indies, and lands
for the refreshment of negroes in the neighbourhood of the River
Plate. Louis thought that Spain would accept these terms. A year
later, when Lord Lexington went to Madrid he was instructed to ask
for them. He found, however, that the 15 per cent, exemption was
impossible, unless it was granted to all nations. Lord Lexington
himself was doubtful whether the concession was worth much and he
thought it would be better to "stick to our clandestine trade, which
by the Asiento we have entirely to ourselves, . » . and make it as difficult
to others as we can".
In July 1 71 1 an armistice had been arranged,1 and it was clear that
a final settlement was in sight. Until this should be reached, the terms
of the armistice admitted English ships and goods to a free trade to
Spanish ports, and this enabled the South Sea Company to fit out
its first expedition. It had been prepared to take trade by force,
but this was now no longer necessary, and all the support it needed
was a convoy for the two vessels it had fitted out to trade in the
Indies. Peace came before the ships sailed, and by its terms special
licences were to be granted for these two ships. Finally after many
difficulties, they set out in the spring of 1715.
1 It was formally concluded in August 1711. P*R.O*> St. Pap. For., Treaties, 70.
336 WEST INDIES AND SPANISH-AMERICAN TRADE
The terms of peace, in so far as they affected the trade to the Indies,
were embodied in the Asiento treaty of 16/27 March I7I4,1 and by
this England obtained all her demands, except the 15 per cent, re-
mission, and a new privilege as well. This was the famous concession
of the "annual ship". In order to compensate the South Sea
Company for the losses which its predecessors suffered, and in con-
sideration of an undertaking that it would not carry on any illicit
trade, it might send each year a ship of 500 tons to trade to the
Indies. The cargoes were to be sold only at the time of the annual
fair, and not before the arrival of tiieflota and galleons. The goods
were to be free of all duties in the Indies. The King of Spain was to
have a quarter share in the vessel, and 5 per cent, of the profits on
the remaining three-quarters. Harley had intended from the first
that the whole concession should be granted to the South Sea
Company, and finally in September 1714 the Company was offered
and accepted the whole Asiento, save the quarter share of the King
of Spain.
While these negotiations were being carried on, Committees of
the Court of Directors had been investigating the methods by which
the concession could be worked. The most difficult question was how
to obtain the slaves. The Royal African Company still possessed
chartered rights in the African trade, but the trade was in practice
open, subject only to the payment of dues to the Company. Finally,
in September 1713, a contract was agreed on with the Royal African
Company, giving it a monopoly so long as it supplied the full
number required.2 The South Sea Company reserved the right to
purchase direct in the West Indies, but it was not to buy there
slaves imported after a fixed date. The negroes were to be fetched
from the African coast in vessels supplied by the South Sea Company,
the cargoes being provided by the Royal African Company. The
time to be spent in loading the vessels was laid down, and the parts
of the coast from which the negroes were to be obtained. The destina-
tion of the ships, when the cargoes of slaves were complete, was not
prescribed in the charter, instructions on this head being sent to the
commanders of the ships. Ships for Buenos Aires were usually in-
structed to go direct there, as there was no English colony near
enough to be of value for refreshment of the negroes. Ships for the
northern ports went to one of the English islands in the Caribbean,
and commanders of ships were ordered to unload their cargoes there
and leave the work of transport to the coasts of the Main to small
sloops. By far the most convenient island for these purposes was
Jamaica, and the greater number of the ships stopped there.
The system, however, did not work smoothly. The South Sea
Company was far from popular in Jamaica, where the old irregular
1 P.R.O., St. Pap. For., Treaties, 472.
4 Vide infra, p. 449.
THE SOUTH SEA COMPANY 337
trade had been very profitable, and had contributed greatly to the
maintenance of a sufficient white population. Now the interests of
the island were damaged twice over, for in its early years the new
system meant that only a small proportion of the slaves for the main-
land was bought in the slave markets of the island, while at the same
time the Company's conduct of trade threatened to increase the dis-
proportion between blacks and whites. The Assembly of Jamaica
recouped itself for these losses by imposing a heavy duty on the
exportation of slaves. The duty was doubled for slaves exported by
the South Sea ^ Company,1 on the ground that the Company did
nothing to maintain internal defence. Furthermore the duty was
payable on negroes brought in for refreshment only.
The South Sea Company thereupon appealed to the Crown, and
was referred in the usual course from the Privy Council to the Board
of Trade and Plantations. But redress was hard to get, all the more
because the Assembly of Jamaica was in the midst of its long struggle
with the Home Government, over the grant of a permanent revenue
to the Crown. It was useless for the Crown through the Privy Council
to disallow the Finance Act of the colony, since the Assembly annually
re-enacted it. In 1718 an additional instruction was sent to the
governor that he should not give assent to any tax which was
applicable to negroes landed for refreshment. This safeguarded the
Company until 1721, when the appointment of a new governor in-
validated the additional instruction. A renewed protest was made,
and finally in 1727 the matter was once more settled in favour of the
Company. Henceforth there were no duties on negroes landed in
Jamaica for refreshment only, and no differential duties on the
negroes of the South Sea Company.2
The latter point was by this time the more important, for the South
Sea Company was tending more and more to buy negroes in the
islands. The contract of 1713 with the Royal African Company had
proved a failure. There were, no doubt, faults on both sides, and
certainly both made complaints. The South Sea Company said truly
that the Royal African Company did not produce the full quota of
slaves. The Royal African Company replied that there was unusual
mortality on the voyages; the Spaniards were difficult to satisfy as to
the quality of the slaves; and it was necessary to import twice the
number required by the contract. Further, it had great dangers
to encounter on the African coasts from the French and Dutch, and
serious competition from the private traders. The result of these
difficulties was a revision of the contract in 1721. The Royal African
Company was henceforth required to bring only a part of the whole
quota; the rest were supplied by the separate traders, or fetched by the
1 Gf. the almost contemporary Deficiency Act. See Pitman, F. W., The Development of
the British West Indus, 1700-1763, pp. 35-9.
a See Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 1722-8.
338 WEST INDIES AND SPANISH-AMERICAN TRADE
South Sea Company itself. This, again, was found unsatisfactory,
and the Company was obliged to fill up the number by purchase in
the islands. The court of Spain tried to obstruct them by asserting
that this was a breach of the Asiento, but found it impossible to main-
tain this, and in 1729 abandoned the claim. The Company thereupon
issued a notice that it proposed henceforth to buy its slaves in
Jamaica.
The position of Jamaica as a centre of the slave trade gave it an
important place in the Company's organisation.1 Three agents were
appointed to reside there in 1713, and considerable authority was
delegated to them. They were to supervise the landing and sale of
the negroes, and to control the Company's factors at the Spanish
ports. An agent was appointed also at Barbados, but except for a
short time, when the difficulties at Jamaica were at their height, the
factory there was of minor importance. Upon the agents at Jamaica
rested a large share of responsibility for the good conduct of the
Company's trade. Second in importance were the factors at the
Spanish ports of Vera Cruz, Cartagena, Panama and Buenos Aires.
Six English factors at each port were to look after the Company's
affairs. Subordinate factories, with four factors, were set up at
Havana, Portobello and Caracas. The Company found great diffi-
culty in controlling its representatives, especially at Buenos Aires.
It was almost impossible in fact to prevent private interests and illicit
enterprise from absorbing their attention. In 1729 a change in
system was made, and the factors were paid by commission instead
of by salary. Later, at Vera Cruz and Portobello the factories were
abandoned, and a resident agent looked after the Company's affairs.
Throughout the period, however, the Company was folly aware of
the imperfect character of its control.
The Company's agents and factors in the islands were concerned
mainly with the negro trade; but in England much of the attention
of the Company was given to the supplementary privilege of the
annual ship. The grant had been wrung from Spain by the demand
for even greater concessions, and the exercise of the privilege was
overhung from the beginning with suspicion. It had been a serious
breach in the exclusive policy of Spain, and was looked upon as a
pound of flesh whose taking might involve the destruction of Spanish
commercial life. The history of the annual ship depends for its
elucidation upon the general diplomatic relations between Spain and
England, for cordial relations were essential to the smooth working
of the concession and these were always lacking. In the whole of the
thirty years of the concession there were only eight annual voyages.
The first annual ship — the Royal Prince— sailed in July 1717, with
goods on board to the value of £256,858. Ss. 6d. The second— the
1 See BatchdLer, L. M., "The South Sea Company and the Asiento", an unpublished
thesis in the Library of the University of London.
THE "ANNUAL SHIP" 339
Royal George — was delayed until 1721 by the Anglo-Spanish war of
1718. The resumption of the exercise of its privileges came at the
time when the Company was just recovering from the disasters of the
Bubble crisis. A reorganisation of the Company had followed, but the
changes in. personnel left the system of trade unchanged. The next four
years were the best period of the Company's trade. Thus the third
annual voyage took place in 1723, and the fourth in 1724. The fifth
annual voyage started in 1 725, and the ship was the last to get through
before a new Anglo-Spanish war made another break. A sixth
voyage was rashly begun by the Prince Frederick, but when she reached
Vera Cruz, she was forced to remain there until 1729.
The fall of Ripperda in 1726 made a renewal of friendly relations
possible. For the moment, it is true, the dominance of Konigsegg
was even more dangerous ; but Patino now came into office, and before
long his devotion to the building up of Spanish trade and industry
proved a great asset to England. Like Alberoni, Patino hoped
ultimately to make practicable a purely exclusive mercantile policy,
but he saw that it was first necessary to build up Spanish industry,
and in the interval his zeal for peace made him a friendly negotiator.
In particular he maintained very good relations with Benjamin
Keene, who, in his double position as English minister and Company's
agent, was in charge of all the English interests at Madrid.
In spite of this growing friendliness it was long before the obstacles
to peace were overcome. The war which broke out in February 1727
was ended by preliminaries of peace in August: but there was no
return to peacefiil trade. Even the Convention of the Pardo of March
1728 did not achieve this, and the discussions at the Congress of
Soissons seemed likely to do no more. Finally, in November 1729 the
Treaty of Seville promised the restoration of Anglo-Spanish trade to
the position of 1725, and full restitution for seizures. The details of
the Company's claims were to be settled by Commissaries at Madrid.1
The discussions took two years, and meanwhile outrages in Spanish
waters continued. This was the time of the episode of "Jenkins's Ear".
At last an agreement was reached. In 1731 the possibility of a
Franco-Spanish alliance, which had encouraged Elizabeth Farnese
to hopes of independence, seemed unlikely to materialise, and she
had already lost Austria, who made peace with England in 1731. The
court of Spain therefore adopted a more conciliatory attitude. In
July, Spain acceded to the Anglo-Austrian treaty; and at the begin-
ning of 1732 an agreement concerning relations in the Indies was
signed. Orders were to be issued against depredations, the con-
fiscated ships were to be freed, and the right of the Company to
obtain slaves in British colonies was recognised. Elizabeth in fact
was buying peace and acquiescence in her Italian ambitions by her
1 See Brown, V., " The South Sea Company and Contraband Trade ", American Historical
Remew, July 1926, pp. 662-78.
22-2
340 WEST INDIES AND SPANISH-AMERICAN TRADE
commercial complacency, while Austria was paying the same price
for her dynastic interests. The English Company gained the benefit
of these distractions. The seventh annual voyage was started by the
Prince William just before the agreement was signed. In October 1732
Newcastle declared that British trade was less interrupted than for
many years past. Advantage was taken of this lull when in 1733 the
Royal Caroline set out on the last annual voyage.
It was impossible for the settlement to be more than temporary,
for on neither side was there good-will. Spain, indeed, had to a large
extent the whip hand. The concessions of the Asiento were a pound
of flesh in more senses than one, since they could not be taken alone.
It had been clear from the beginning that, if Spanish policy permitted
it, she could make the whole grant of no effect. This was the lesson
of the negotiations of 1 7 1 3- 1 6, and it was emphasised by the difficulties
of the later period. The Asiento itself contained no stipulation as to
the storage of goods, or the sale of goods or slaves inland. Yet without
freedom to sell slaves inland from Buenos Aires, the trade there was
bound to involve serious losses. In this as in many other minor points,
the feasibility of the contract depended on a sympathetic interpreta-
tion of its clauses, and if this was lacking, the alternative was the
unattractive one of extorting concessions by force. Not only did it
involve a breach of the policy of peace, but from the standpoint of the
Company it meant the certain seizure of its effects. The hostages
held by Spain were too valuable to make the alternative popular.
Good-will was no less necessary to settle the question of depredations.
Theguarda-costas still applied the old criterion of contraband trade, the
presence on board of dye-woods, indigo, or Spanish dollars, although ,
this had been invalidated long ago by the capture of Jamaica. In
fact the rule was retained only because it made condemnation easy.
A review of the period leaves no doubt that, except when Spanish
policy required it, the necessary liberality was absent. But Spain was
only partly to blame for this. It is true that the whole concession was
abhorrent to Spanish policy and that Spain welcomed any chance to
whittle it away, but there was little inducement on the English side
to any other attitude. The Asiento treaty had granted the permission
to send the annual ship on the specific understanding that illicit trade
should cease, but in reality the annual ship served to increase fraud;
and after, as before the grant of the Asiento, colonial shipping
abounded in Spanish waters, carrying on lawful or unlawful trade.
The ships were subject to seizure, and the connivance of Spanish
officials could not always be obtained. The influence of the Company's
factors at the ports was a valuable asset, and the constant arrival of
slave sloops made the detection of illicit trade difficult; but the annual
ship afforded a useful alternative method. The first annual ship was
accompanied by a sloop carrying provisions to Jamaica. On later
voyages there were frequently more than one subsidiary vessel, and
PREVALENCE OF ILLICIT TRADE 341
they did not always stop at Jamaica. It was suspected, no doubt
rightly, that goods were carried as well as provisions; and it is probably
true that the annual ship was refilled secretly at night.1 In any case
Spain believed this and in 1732 the sub-governor of the South Sea
Company feared enquiry sufficiently to prefer resignation. In fact
the prevalence of illicit trade could not be denied; and British minis-
ters were not prepared to take the prohibitive measures which had
been demanded for the suppression of the French trade in 1717-18.
Neither French nor Dutch traders suffered so severely from depre-
dations as the English, since in their case legal and illegal enterprises
could easily be distinguished. The Dutch interlopers were armed for
an avowedly illicit traffic; and peaceful French traders gave bond
that they would not trade in Spanish ports. The English represen-
tative in Spain rebutted a proposal that English merchantmen should
do the same, by saying that this would not be "consistent with our
Constitution, or with the sense of the trading part of our nation".
So long as this attitude was maintained, indiscriminate reprisals were
inevitable.
The final change from negotiation to war was due to the weakness
of English diplomacy. It is true that at the critical moment, Spain
had hopes of a French alliance, and England was stiffened by fear
of it; but England's position was weak, and her conduct uncertain.2
In the first place the South Sea Company was a constant stumbling-
block. It had a special standing among the mercantile interests of
the time, since it had direct relations with the court of Spain, and
employed the English ambassador there as its agent. Moreover, at
the time of the final negotiations, it both owed money to the King of
Spain (on account of duties and profits) and was owed money by
him (on account of seizures in the wars of 1718 and 1727). The
special claims of the Company had postponed a settlement with Spain
both in 1715 and in 1728. In the end they were to prove fatal.
Secondly, the Cabinet was not unanimous, for Walpole was not
content to leave the matter in the hands of Newcastle, who as
Secretary of State was primarily responsible. He tended increasingly
to supplement Newcastle's instructions to the English ambassador,
Keene, by letters written by himself; and in England he as well as
Newcastle negotiated with the Spanish representative, Geraldino.
Newcastle was always more readily influenced than Walpole by the
outcry of English interests, and the dual control was embarrassing
to the policies of both. Thirdly, there was the underlying distaste in
England for the obligations of the Asiento treaty. Its true meaning
had never been accepted by our commercial class. Spain had, in
effect, in the treaty bought English recognition of the Spanish
1 See Brown, ut cit.
8 See Temperley, H. W. V., " The Causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear", Trans. Roy. Hist.
Soc. (1909), pp. 197-236-
342 WEST INDIES AND SPANISH-AMERICAN TRADE
•Key of exclusiveness. England had accepted the bribe, but, like
icon, thought it beneath her pride to be influenced by it. British
merchants still held that the seas were free to all, and resented the
Spanish exercise of a right of search to see that freedom was not
abused. This is the explanation of Keene's reference to "our Consti-
tution", and of the outcry of British merchants when peace seemed
assured in 1738.
Before that time five years of negotiation had seen a series of pro-
posals put forward only to fail. The first negotiations had been carried
•on at Madrid in 1732-4, and had been stultified by the open desire
of Spain to terminate the whole Asiento concession. To this perhaps
the Company would have agreed, given favourable terms; but in the
eyes of the English ministry the proposal was coloured by rumours of
a new Pacte defamille, and the promise of French participation in the
trade. Moreover, the Company became involved at this time in a
dispute with Spain over the rate of exchange; and it still further
postponed agreement by refusing to produce its accounts for the
last four years, which Spain required in order to estimate the value
of the remainder of the concession. And when at last, in August
1736, an agreement was reached upon the questions of currency and
seizures, Patino's illness and death once more postponed peace: and
incidentally ended the negotiations for the abandonment of the
Asiento. It was not until June of the following year that Geraldino
and a Committee of the Court of Directors agreed upon a "Plan"
which covered all outstanding points of difference.
The "Plan" of 1737 was an affair of the South Sea Company, and
before it was confirmed other interests intervened. The long period
of negotiation had been a time of especial vigilance on the part of
Spanish guarda-costas, and the tale of depredations was growing daily.
Moreover the strength of Walpole's administration was waning, and
the Opposition found a valuable catch-cry in the dangers to British
shipping. Newcastle reflected the attitude of Parliament and the
pamphleteers when he sent the new Spanish minister, La Quadra,
a long memorandum on outrages. This was in November, only five
months after Geraldino had approved the South Sea Company's
"Plan.3* Keene was instructed to leave his negotiations for the rati-
fication of the "Plan," and concentrate for the time on securing a
favourable answer to the memorandum. The court of Spain found
opportunity to delay both. The "Plan" was immediately set aside,
and the memorandum was disposed of for the moment by a discovery
that Newcastle had unfortunately cited the treaty of 1667 when he
had meant that of 1670. The interval gave opportunity for further
petitions to Parliament, and for the famous recital of his wrongs by
Captain Jenkins on 17 March.
Moved by these assertions, the Commons passed a resolution which
reflected accurately the .claims of the merchant class and the feeling
THE WAR OF JENKINS'S EAR 343
of the nation: "It was the undoubted right of British subjects to sail
their ships in any part of the seas of America", and the ministry was
exhorted to take action to enforce this right. The ministry fell into line
by sending Admiral Haddock in June to cruise in the Mediterranean.
So strong was public feeling that the news of a settlement with Spain
in August was greeted with more suspicion than rejoicing. The settle-
ment was largely the work of Walpole, co-operating with Geraldino,
now Spanish ambassador. After much discussion it was agreed that
the sum of £95,000 should be paid by Spain, as representing the
balance of Spanish depredations over those committed by England.
This La Quadra approved, and the "Convention Treaty" was
accordingly ratified.1
The South Sea Company did much to make the Convention a
failure, by refusing co-operation, for it would accept no liability
unless the whole of the "Plan" were ratified. Its action was re-
inforced by the outcry of the merchants. The Convention gave it
the practical benefit of compensation; it did not give it a Magna
Carta of commercial freedom. It complained that its rights of
navigation had not been recognised: these should have been stated
"so plain that every country gentleman and every Spanish Governor
could understand". The Opposition therefore condemned it. The
last blow came from within the ministry itself, for secret news from
Paris and Madrid roused fears of a Franco-Spanish treaty. This was
in February. In March a draft of a proposed Pacte defamtile was sent
over from a secret source in France. The ministry replied by counter-
manding their previous orders to Admiral Haddock, and telling him
to remain in the Mediterranean. It is hard to decide whether these
orders, or the attitude of the South Sea Company, was the more re-
sponsible for the change in the tone of the Spanish court. Keene was
instructed to deny the despatch of the counter-orders, but he deceived
no one. In April the South Sea Company again insisted on its
refusal to discuss any terms but those of the "Plan". In May Spain
replied by suspending the Asiento. In June the English ministry was
definitely informed that there was no hope of the payment of the
sum proposed by Spain as compensation so long as Haddock re-
mained in the Mediterranean. By this time the four months allowed
for payment had lapsed, and the " Convention Treaty" was therefore
definitely broken. After this the outbreak of war was only a matter
of time. Newcastle, it was certain, would never resist the widespread
demand for justice by the sword, and Walpole could not hold out
against the united pressure of Parliament, the pamphleteers and his
own colleagues. In October war was declared.
Other factors besides those concerned with the trade of the Indies
made for war. There had long been disputes over the boundaries of
1 See anonymous pamphlet History of the Convention Treaty (London, 1739). Gf. Hertz,
G. B., British Imperialism of the Eighteenth Century, chap, ii, "The War Fever of 1739".
344 WEST INDIES AND SPANISH-AMERICAN TRADE
Georgia and Carolina, and the right to cut logwood in Campeachy
Bay. But the question of the American trade was the most important,
and it is safe to say that without it there would have been no war. The
trade in these parts was, justly, therefore, the most severely affected
by the war. In particular die South Sea Company never again
exercised its monopoly. The Royal Caroline of 1733 was the last annual
ship: the negro trade ceased in 1739. This result was partly an
accident, for it seemed at first that the war would soon be over. The
initial success of Vernon at Portobello was not maintained, in spite
of the reinforcements sent to him. The expedition of Anson into the
Pacific revived the tradition of Dampier, Woodes Rogers and Nar-
borough, but led to no great victory.
On the Spanish side too, the war brought little compensation, for
Spain was disappointed in 1739 of her expectation of immediate help
from France. Fleury loved peace far more than he did Elizabeth, and
nothing but actual seizure of territory by England in the Indies would
have brought France to the help of Spain. France seems to have
learned the lesson of England's experience with the Asiento, and she
did not want it herself. If Spain exercised it, she might gain much of
its profits. As things were she had nearly ahalf shareinSpanish cargoes
to the Indies. So she left Spain to protect her own interests. But
in October 1740 Charles VI of Austria died, and in the general war
that followed France and Spain became allies, and other interests
outweighed the question of American trade.
Negotiations for peace began in 1747 and ended in October of the
following year. By the terms of the settlement, the Asiento was re-
newed for four years, the English demand for seven being defeated.
But no mention was made of the claims of the South Sea Company
against the court of Spain, and the commercial treaty of 1715 was
not among those confirmed. Immediately negotiations were opened
for some compensation to the Company, and to secure the removal
of the prohibitive duties on English goods which were now imposed
by Spain. The Company in fact did not want to re-open trade;
and finally it was agreed by the commercial treaty of 1750 that all
claims under the Asiento treaty were to be surrendered in return for
a payment of £100,000. * Spain undertook at the same time that
duties on English goods should not be higher than they were under
Charles II. Thus the Company ceased to trade, although its monopoly
continued until 1815, and the Company itself until 1856. All that
remained of English trade in the Spanish Indies was the illicit trade
from the islands, now no longer hidden by the Asiento, and the
indirect trade through Spain. Both had lost ground since the grant
of 1713.
1 P .R.O., St. Pap. For., Treaties, 513. "Treaty between Great Britain and Spain as to
the equivalent of the Asiento contract", 2^ €Pt>
SURRENDER OF THE ASIENTO 345
The issue of the conflict showed the measure of the English mistake
in 1713. The French had neither the Asiento, nor the privilege of the
"annual ship", and they had little opportunity for illicit trade; yet
their share in the trade to the Indies gained rapidly upon that of
England. They were thrown back by the English gains of 1713 on the
earlier methods of participation in the trade, the consignment of
goods to Spanish merchants for re-export in the Spanish fleets. Their
share steadily increased in the eighteenth century, and its growth
was favoured by the political relations between the two countries.
The loss to the British West Indies was considerable. Already by
the middle of the eighteenth century the possibility of recovering the
wealth of a hundred years before had practically disappeared. The
decline in the Spanish trade meant continual difficulties of exchange
and currency, and many branches of trade suffered as a result. In the
view of contemporary merchants and statesmen, the shortage of
bullion ranked with the decline in profits of the sugar industry as a
cause of eighreenth-century distress. The planters saw their remedy
in new experiments in illicit trade; but difficulties were increased by
the changes in British policy of the years 1764-6. In 1764 Grenville's
administration issued special instructions through the Commissioners
of the Customs for the seizure of all foreign vessels found in West
Indian ports. Burke reversed this policy in 1765 by the grant of
special privileges for Spanish ships, and went further in 1766, when
the first Free Port Act1 opened certain ports to foreign shipping. But
his efforts were too late, Spanish hostility was roused, and the result
was negligible.
The greed of the English merchants had been fatal throughout to
the interests of the islands, for at their dictation, the solid profits of
trade had been thrown away, in a false hope of gaining easy riches.
The West Indies never had as good a chance of recovery. Burke's
Act synchronised with the outburst of American discontent, and the
interruption in American trade had results which long survived the
period of the war.
In 1763, however, thedeclineof the West Indies was notyet apparent,
and the wealth of Westlndianmer(±iantsajidabsenteesstillmaintained
the islands in their high estimation at home. But in fact their pros-
perity had been undermined. They now had only one string to their
bow — the English sugar trade, and this too was soon to be broken. The
war with America, the whittling away of their colonial preference
and finally the anti-slavery movement were all to strike at it in turn.
The brilliant early prosperity of the islands had passed, and in reality,
the tale of misfortune had started which forms the history of the West
Indies in the succeeding century*
1 Sec Burke, E., A Short Account of a late short Administration, 1766.
CHAPTER XII
RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
JLHE half century which followed the Peace of Utrecht comprised
two further rounds in the struggle between France and Britain. At
Utrecht the British Empire had been expanded as well as saved. At
Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) its natural progress during a generation was
at least temporarily secured. At Paris (1763) its aggrandisement and
primacy in the world were triumphantly achieved. This was the joint
accomplishment of two men above all others, of Robert Walpole and
the elder Pitt. Seldom can two contemporaries whose work was thus
complementary have presented to their own age and to posterity a
sharper contrast. The massive squire and the frail recluse, the party
manager and the idealist, the statesman who feared public opinion
and the orator who courted it, the minister who hated to look beyond
this island, and the apostle of world dominion, they might seem as
opposed in policy and principles as in their personality and fortunes.
Pitt's noble helpmeet thought his nature some emanation of the All-
Beauteous Mind,1 while Walpole turned for companionship to a
Maria Skeritt. In rousing men from materialism, Pitt was the White-
field, if not the Wesley, of politics; whereas Walpole could be satirised
as designing to transfer the not from the commandments to the creed.2
Pitt in his haste denounced Walpole as the embodiment of evil,3 yet
without Walpole he would himself have been as nothing. The creed
" I believe that I can save this nation and that no one else can", came
from Pitt, the practice came equally from Walpole. Johnson styled
Pitt a meteor, Walpole, a fixed star,4 and after six generations,
Walpole seems the mountain mass, Pitt, the crag that crowns its
summit. Pitt inspired the nation, but without Walpole the nation
might well have been incapable of evoking or of answering his appeal.
Neither Walpole nor Pitt, however, guided Britain as a Peter
guided Russia or even as a Belleisle guided France. The Revolution
which had made our policy cease to be dynastic had by no means
made it ministerial. Ministers, as the age of Walpole and his succes-
sors was to prove, could control the king, but they could not in the
long run control the nation. There was in Britain a national limita-
tion upon policy which, like much else, foreigners found it hard to
understand. A king of England, held Ghoiseul, could dishonour
himself without tarnishing the lustre of the nation; a king of France
1 Edwards, E. A., The love-letters of Wittiam Pitt, first Lord Chatham, p. 1 12.
2 Aubrey, W. H. S., The rise and growth of the English nation, i, 163.
* Gf. Thackeray, F., A history of toe Earl of Chatham (London, 1827), i. 41 seqq.
« Boswell, J., Life of Johnson (ed. G. B. Hill), i, 131.
BRITISH LIBERTIES 347
could not.1 Britain, now a united island, traditionally supreme at
sea, speaking a language of her own and worshipping in a Church
which she shared with no foreign people, differed fundamentally
from continental States. The English, thought Voltaire, were the only
people upon earth who had been able to prescribe limits to the power
of kings by resisting them, and who had established that wise govern-
ment where the prince was all-powerful to do good, yet restrained
from committing evil, the nobles great without insolence, and the
people sharers in the government without confusion.2 In the English
population of some 5,000,000, indeed, it was reckoned that besides
the 1600 persons of title there were some 15,000 gentry, 30,000 clergy,
lawyers and merchants, and more than 300,000 freeholders and
farmers, all authorised defenders of their liberty.3 That liberty already
included much that nations not so blest as we must gain in later
centuries, if at all — the rule of law, judicial independence, ministerial
responsibility, popular control of taxation, and the like. Constitu-
tional monarchy or still wider freedoms were already enjoyed, though
precariously, by a few States of small consequence, such as the
United Netherlands, Switzerland, Venice and Poland. Sweden,
oscillating between autocracy and aristocratic anarchy, was on the
way to debating whether the king had or had not the right to veto
the use of his name-stamp for royal proclamations of which he dis-
approved.* But the prevailing continental type was that made classic
by Louis XIV and destined for many decades after his death rather
to increase than to decline in influence. "Papa", wrote5 an Irish girl
in 1764, "is as absolute as the king of France", a monarch whose
words were actually law, who could impose a peace, suspend a debt,
imprison a transgressor, and ruin or create an industry.6 Short of
such brutal violations of purse, family or conscience as made obedi-
ence intolerable, a monarch of that type could shape national policy
as he or as those moving him might please.
British policy, on the other hand, must be national, that is, must
be shown by British kings or statesmen to conduce to the safety and
enrichment of the nation which had given them a temporary and
restricted power to rule.7 Violation of this principle would provoke
adverse divisions, refusal of supplies, and loss of elections, with im-
peachment and even change of dynasty in reserve. In 1714, and for
forty years thereafter, such national British policy comprised three
main aims: (i) To defend the Protestant Succession was to maintain
the foundation of British liberty both in domestic and in foreign
1 Memoires du Due de Choistul, 1719-85, p. 136.
* Letters concerning the English nation by Mr de Voltaire (London, 1733)9 p. 53-
8 Robertson, J. M., Bohngbroke and Wdpolt, p. 223.
4 Hildebrand, E., Sveriges Mstoria intill tjugonde sefUet (Stockholm, 1903), vn, 325.
5 Or is said to have written. Knox, C., The diary of a young lady of fashion MI the year
6 BeUoc, H', Marie Antoinette, p. 41.
7 Seeley, Sir J. R., The growth of British policy, passim.
348 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
affairs. A dynasty selected by the people could hardly claim to dispose
of them by right divine, nor could heretic rulers import the inter-
ference of the Roman Church. (2) To develop commerce, defending,
if need be, the commercial monopolies that Britain had secured, was
to strengthen the Crown, both by increasing revenue and by lessening
opposition. "Discontent and disaffection", as Walpole phrased it,
"are like wit and madness, they are separated by thin partitions ",x
and no Chancellor of the Exchequer ever knew better that with the
wealthy it is always well. "Trade", he wrote, "is the main riches of
the nation and enhances the value of our land."2 "When trade is
at stake", echoed Pitt, "you must defend it or perish."8 Trade and
its offspring luxury, the novelty of the last century, had become the
necessity of the present and were on their way to be the sacred birth-
right of the next. (3) Both the dominant need of securing the Pro-
testant Succession and the vital interest of commerce to Britain in-
evitably prevented her colonial ambitions from rising higher than
third among her aims. To the elder Horace Walpole, the colonies
seemed "the greatest sources of our riches",4 and the Government
sluggish in their defence. "For God's sake think of the West Indies ",
he wrote to Robert in 1735. "I ^ave hitherto preached in vain; but
any misfortune there will hurt you more than any other thing in the
world."5 But although it might be true that the Plantations pre-
served the balance of trade in our favour, that we gained a million
sterling by them, exclusive of the trade for negroes or for dry goods
with the Spaniards in the West Indies, and that 18,000 seamen and
fishermen were employed there,6 none the less it was impossible to
counter in America that threat to our security that might at any
moment render vain all colonies or statistics. Britain could not be
easy until the Stuart menace was dissolved, and ten years after Horace
Walpole's appeal, the Bank of England was driven to pay in six-
pences by the advent of a Stuart prince at Derby.
The degree of Britain's peril from the exiled house can never be
precisely known, but of its reality there can be no doubt. In 1715
"the confidence of their numbers encouraged them to enter into the
rebellion upon their own bottom, destitute of all succours from
abroad".7 The French were at that time betting that in the classic
country of insurrection the Pretender would be king within a year.8
Two years later, when Jacobite hopes centred in Sweden, the Swedish
ambassador to Britain described her as a country where nine out of
1 Coxe, W., Memoirs of the Itfe and administration of Sir Robert Walpole, i, 562.
2 Walpole, R.,C«diww to those who are to chase members to serve in Parliament (London, 1714),
p. 22.
8 Charteris, Hon. £., William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, p. 69.
* Coxe,W., Walpole, m, 182.
a Ibid. 243.
c Gf. Anderson, Origin of Commerce, m, 173.
7 Townshend to Bernstorff, May 1716 in Goxe, Walpole, n, 52.
8 Wicsener, L., Le Rfgent, VabbS Dubois et Us Anglais, p. 28.
THE STUART MENACE 349
every ten were rebels.1 The public Guelph dissensions, for "it ran a
little in the blood of the family to hate the eldest son",2 could not fail
to gild the memory of a dignified and kindly royal line.
God grant the land may profit reap
From all this silly pother,
And send these fools may ne'er agree
Till they are at Han-over3
was the sentiment of many — of how many Walpole could never be
quite sure. They were enough, however, to make almost the whole art
of government consist in the endeavour to reduce their number. As
late as 1738, Yorke, the sagacious lawyer, would not have the army
reduced lest they should rise.4 The clergy, sneered Lord Hervey, who
had been paid for preaching up divine right, were now paid for
preaching it down.6 Statesmen who despised clerical prejudices did
not dare to interfere. In 1718, indeed, the Occasional Conformity
Act and the Schism Act were repealed, but the Test Act was main-
tained. Every domestic upheaval and every threat of continental
war made the Government tremble. Still more alarming was the
possibility that a Stuart heir would adopt the national faith and
make loyalty irresistible. When the South Sea Bubble burst, the
Speaker declared that if the Pretender had then appeared he might
have ridden to St James's.6 For a whole year the Habeas Corpus Act
was in suspense. In 1722, the King's departure was prevented by the
plot which involved the fall of Bishop Atterbury, and in which Spain
was implicated. Almost every year, indeed, some outbreak of opinion
or of force reminded George I and his minister of the fissure in the
foundations of the throne. Every year, it is true, also did some-
thing to cement it over. As more of the people stood to lose by change,
as the hot-heads of the 'Fifteen aged into prudent family men, as a
generation grew up to which Guelph kings were the natural order
and the Stuarts dubious exotics, so the harvest of the "Glorious
Revolution" ripened, and Britain developed from a loyalistic into a
modern patriotic State. Yet in 1733 the failure of the Excise bill
brought many gownsmen into the streets of Oxiord crying, "King
James for ever".7 After Culloden (1746) the royal victor, leaving a
country which to the English seemed as remote as Norway, trembled,
as he declared, "for fear that this vile spot may still be the ruin of this
island and of our family5'.8 Not until France had sacrificed the Pre-
tender at Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) could the Government afford to
despise the Stuarts or Pitt approach his task freed from the burden
1 Chance, J. F., George 1 and the Northern War, p. 169.
« Walpole, H., Memoirs of the reign of King George II, i, 72.
3 Wilkins, W. H.s Caroline fa illustrious, p. 235.
4 Yorke, P. C., Life end Correspondence ofPMKp Torke, Earl qfHardwicke, i, 184.
B Hervey, John, Lord, Memoirs of the reign of George IT, i, 7.
* Gharteris, Cumberland, p. 8.
7 Goxe, Walpole, m, 137.
8 Gharteris, Cumberland, pp. 288 and 147.
350 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
which had always crippled Walpole. For a full generation after
Utrecht the Stuarts had forced posterity to trace the history of the
British Empire rather in the rivalries and intrigues of Europe than
across the seas. If during that time British statesmen were ready to
surrender the most splendid acquisition in the New World for some
mediocre stronghold or concession in the Old it was due to the sound
instinct of a builder that without secure foundations the noblest
fagade will collapse.
Through all these years, moreover, and indeed so long as George II
remained alive, Britain had borne another burden which often
rendered her course incalculable and sometimes perilous — that of her
union with Hanover. But for the Act of Settlement, the connection
of Britain with this haughty and ambitious North German house
would have been but slight. Normally, such commerce as might pass
through Stade, perhaps a treaty for the hire of Electoral troops,
possibly some co-operation based on common Protestantism, or on
common disposition to unite with the Emperor, not inconceivably a
relationship arising from the Guelph rivalry with the Hohenzollerns
of Berlin — such were the points of contact that might have been ex-
pected, had not the mother of Elector George chanced to be the
granddaughter of James I and a Lutheran. Hence it came about
that, in 1714, a veteran warrior of fifty-four, accustomed for sixteen
years to the unquestioning obedience of his Hanoverians, ascended
the uneasy throne of Britain.1 Family pride, financial profit, a sense
of duty to his dynasty and to Europe forbade him to decline or later
to desert his post. He frustrated the hopes of those Hanoverians who
thought that their country was annexing England: he left domestic
matters in British hands : in his last days he chose an English mistress.
But neither he nor his son could fail to be aware that the shepherds
of Hanover were in Britain hireling kings. Here their only comfort-
able hours were those passed punctually with a German mistress, and
their unvarying feelings were those of the royal observation to Queen
Caroline in 1736, "the devil take the Parliament, and the devil take
the whole island, provided I can get out of it and go to Hanover"-2
The first Georges could indeed hardly be blamed for their failure to
admire, or even to understand, our nascent constitution. Thanks to
our party system, the long war in which we had led the Grand
Alliance, Elector George included, to victory over France, had left
the French dynasty, in the words of a papal legate, "superior to the
state in which it had been in the time of Charlemagne ".3 George,
as he assured a timid mistress, had all the king-killers in England on
his side,4 and he^took care to choose their more moderate men for
office and to avoid needless offence to their opponents. To a Han-
1 Cf. Ward, Sir A. W., Great Britain and Hanover, p. 81 and passim.
1 Wilkins, p. 565.
* Head, F. W., Tke Fallen Stuarts, p. 159. « Wilkins, p. 1 10.
GREAT BRITAIN AND HANOVER 351
overian, moreover, there was nothing strange in a small band of noble
families monopolising the ministry and controlling the Estates.1 But
that a particular brand of Whig, a mere temporary majority within
a temporary oligarchy, should be able to designate'his ministers and
to prevent him from governing the country as he pleased, still more,
that this should be done by votes in a packed Parliament and by a
man who disclaimed the title of Premier and approached him as
deferentially as any Hanoverian — all this was as unintelligible as it
was unpleasing to a military German prince. Yet, however complete
his submission to a system which he could not change, his personality
and his kingship were bound to count for something in a still mon-
archic age. Walpole, a trusty servant who, George I declared, had
never had his equal in business,2 thought that only the King's death
had shielded him against Bolingbroke, who had paid the Duchess
of Kendal a sufficient sum.3 "While Britain dared France", said
Chesterfield, "the monarch trembled for his Hanover", and it was
true. Throughout the reigns of the first two Georges, the fact that the
same man was King and Elector profoundly and constantly affected
Britain. It is true that Bernstorff 's attempt to govern her was soon
repulsed,4 and that George II was absent from his kingdom for
barely one month in the year. Britain, moreover, could bear the cost
of satisfying Hanoverian rapacity; it was convenient to hire Han-
overians for her defence; while it was perhaps not unfortunate that
a monarch whose presence she desired without his interference
should have Hanoverian matters with which to occupy his mind.
But the Hanoverian connection warped the King's choice of British
ministers, delayed British business, and far less often helped than
hindered British aims. When the ministers of George the King were
not on speaking terms with those of George the Elector, when the
elector was giving secret verbal promises to foreign Powers for fear
of Parliament which would have disapproved,5 when the treaties or
wars necessary to Britain were jeopardised by subterranean workings
on behalf of Hanover, then the constant disorder of our policy from
this cause merely entered upon a phase more than usually acute. In
steering her way to safety and riches after Utrecht, Britain, already
distracted by her parties, found in Hanover a new and incalculable
disturbing force. Her thoughts and energies were drawn thither
instead of following their natural course across the ocean.
The currents of post-Utrecht politics were baffling enough without
such further complication. Although the major wars, those of the
Spanish and of the Polish Succession, lay two decades apart, an interval
scarcely precedented since the Reformation, the minor wars were so
6 Ibid. p. 80 and passim.
352 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
numerous and the expectations of general strife so keen that within
five years of the peace Europe seems to be in a state of "universal
combustion".1 A quarter of a century of struggling against Louis
XIV had indeed brought some questions nearer to solution. What-
ever the power of France might be or might become, the peculiar
claim of her King to general dictatorship had been refuted. The
European equilibrium, though dear to Ghauvelin and others "as
being subject to so many different interpretations as may... prevent
any action at all",2 embodies none the less an idea which was in-
dispensable to the progress of States. A mechanical balance of power,
it was true, helped rather to adjust the terms on which wars ended
than to prevent them from breaking out, and the wars against
Louis XIV had produced no panacea against a repetition. But they
had removed the probability though not the apprehension of a new
general war about religion, always since Luther the most fertile
source of strife. " God can protect his own cause in the middle of a
thousand errors, and variety of heresies will but give our churchmen
a more ample field"8 — this was a doctrine convenient to the cynical
deists who came to rule in many lands. In many lands besides France,
however, "the church was the society",4 and policy could not remain
unaffected by religion. If their expectations were less precise than
those, based on Daniel and Revelation, which led the Bishop of
Worcester to stake his bishopric in 1712 on Armageddon in I7i6,5
statesmen had none the less to reckon with the force of religious anti-
pathies when they framed alliances and contemplated wars. The
equilibrium of Europe tottered because Prussia would take ven-
geance on her own Catholics for wrongs done to Protestants else-
where, because Protestant princes aimed at choosing a Protestant
emperor or at forming a Protestant fleet, because the Catholic
emperor had qualms about supporting the Guelphs against the
Stuarts or even, on occasion, against the Bourbons, his co-religionists
although of old his foes. Even the deist Frederick used his official
Protestantism to veil his robbery of a Catholic Queen (1740), and,
fifteen years later, she won the alliance of his French accomplice
largely on religious grounds. Religion, while it did not prevent the
Most Christian King from association with the Turks, the Russians,
the Prussians or the Barbary States, always imported into mixed
alliances an unstable strain and complicated an already complex
Europe.
The peculiar and striking complexity of European politics after
Utrecht may be ascribed to many causes other than the waning
factor of religion and exhaustion after a quarter of a century of war.
1 The history of Cardinal Alberordfrom his birth to the year 1710 (London, 1710), p. 82.
* Horace
8 Davenant, C., Political and commercial works, i, 75.
4 Morley,J., Voltaire (edition 1872), p. 332.
6 Swift, J.» Journal to Stella9 i July 1712.
EUROPEAN COMPLEXITIES AND DANGERS 353
It chanced that in an age when princes governed, often through
ministers who were not even their subjects, an extraordinary number
of States owed obedience to rulers of foreign birth or imbued with
foreign ideas. Others were the tools of powerful allies. Prussia and
the dominions of Savoy form almost the sole exceptions to a con-
dition which, while it lasted, rendered Europe more than ever
subject to the whims of a few high-placed men and women. Spain
under Alberoni was governed in part by a Bourbon King, in greater
part by a Parmesan Queen, most of all by the son of an Italian
gardener who remained the envoy of the Duke of Parma, while each
of the three strove for ends which were not those of the Spanish
nation. Princes and even ministers have often found nothing so in-
teresting or exciting as war,1 and war was rendered fatally easy by
the code which then controlled it. All Europe, Germany most of all,
lay open to the recruiting sergeant of every prince. Troops levied by
one might pass by treaty on the outbreak of war to the control of
another without valid complaint by the third against whom they
took the field. The spirit of the best of such levies may have been that
of the Scotch recruit who was questioned as to his reasons for ventur-
ing his life for the Pragmatic Sanction. "They tell me ... to fight, and
egad! I'll down with them an9 I can." "But for whom do you
fight?" "Nay, nay, that I can't tell, but 'tis for some damned queen
or another."2 Others went of their own motion "to fight the foreign
loons in their ain countree", and the departure of some of these was
accounted a useful vent for dangerous elements of the population.
Some princes were forced to make war to find employment for their
armies, while others thought it cheaper to support them abroad than
at home. To win a victory was not seldom to secure the willing
enlistment of hundreds from the ranks of the defeated, while a
difficult retreat might cost a leader half his mercenary force. A
hundred motives impelled selfish princes to make war, and few
beyond empty war-chests told on the side of peace.
To this explosive atmosphere was applied spark after spark arising
from disputed questions of succession. The Spanish Succession had by
no means received its final settlement at Utrecht. The rulers of
Madrid and the rulers of Vienna would find many fresh disputes con-
cerning title, in Italy above all else. The accession of the child Louis
XV (1715) raised a question of the French Succession which swayed
the politics of Europe for no less than fourteen years. Until 1748 at
least, die British Succession could hardly be regarded as secure. The
Polish Succession convulsed Europe in 1733; the Austrian, in 1740.
These questions and many more had to be decided by a Europe
which was changing fast, and which looked in vain to its familiar
1 E.g. the King of the Belgians to Queen Victoria, 4 Feb. 1853, in Letters of Queen
Victoria.
2 Cf. Gharteris, Cumberland, p. 119.
CHBEI 23
354 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
guides. For many years the Paris of Louis XIV and the Hague of his
opponents had formed confronting capitals, and Britain had cemented
the coalition. Now a novel uncertainty prevailed in France: the
Whigs, save when they spoke with the accent of Hanover, had turned
from war to peace; die Dutch computed that with another league
and another war their trade would shrink to their meadows.1 Sweden
was tottering; Spain, showing an unwonted vigour; Prussia, under
the strange guidance of a new King, was multiplying armaments;
above all, Russia under Peter was thrusting herself into Europe.
Estimates not only of what was wise but of what was possible differed
almost beyond belief. Some wiseacres saw in Russia a northern star
which, rightly used, might preserve the liberties of Europe.2 Horace
Walpole reckoned France as the equal of the Sea Powers and Austria
combined,3 while a French statesman held that Spain and the
Emperor were great Powers but England no more than second-rate.4
Among his British contemporaries some were ready to share his
estimate of their country, while Pitt could rally the nation to an over-
weening self-regard and to an energy which made it invincible. A
cynic surveying Europe, indeed, might declare that the only constant
forces were the hereditary hatreds between State and State. Gulliver
proudly proclaimed our noble country the scourge of France.5 Danes
and Swedes preferred the advent of the Muscovite to union. Portugal,
regardless of the future, welcomed an opportunity to injure Spain.
The Italians hated all foreigners, the Germans above the rest.
Prussia and Hanover, Prussia and Saxony, Prussia and Austria were
normally at bitter feud. The French submitted in most matters to
their King, but they would not endorse an alliance with the Habs-
burgs. So deeply did such antipathies enter into the European
system that hints at a rapprochement between two traditional enemies
sounded like blasphemy and anarchy in the ears of other Powers.
In such a Europe, Britain, with Hanover bound round her neck,
must strive for wealth and safety. Her position in the world now far
surpassed what her acreage or her numbers seemed to warrant.
"Posterity", thought Voltaire in the 'twenties, "will very possibly
be surprised to hear that an island whose only produce is a little lead,
tin, fuller's earth and coarse wool should become so powerful by its
commerce as to.. .send.. .three fleets at the same time to three
different... parts of the globe."6 The last war had produced a favour-
able trade-balance of nearly £3,000,000 yearly, and had enabled
Britain to wrest more industries and markets from the French.7 But
1 Wiesener, L., Le Rfgent, p. 215.
* Walpole, H., Memoirs of the reign of King George II, n, 134.
9 Cf. wiesener, p. 93.
* Vaucher, P., Robert Walpole et la politiaue de Fleiay* 1731-1742, p. 149.
5 Swift, J., Works (London, 1801), vi, 115.
* Letters concerning the English nation, p. 69.
' AnH^rc/vn TTT *r\ ef\
Anderson, m, 49, 56.
INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF GREAT BRITAIN 355
in the long run, commerce must depend upon international good-will,
and this necessity, as well as the Stuart threat, spoke strongly for a
policy of peace. Even if peace could be preserved, a Power which
had so recently deserted its allies and passed its rivals would find it
difficult enough to secure their good-will, in an age in which Colbert's
truculent temper still prevailed. In any event elementary prudence
dictated that Britain should keep up her fleet. To build ships was not
difficult, but sources of naval stores must be kept open, and Baltic
questions therefore assumed a large importance.1 If war threatened,
the problem of naval man-power would become acute. It might be
solved for a time by impressing the crews of merchantmen, but in-
evitably commerce would thereby be partially suspended. Since the
profit from a British stoppage must fall to the Dutch, it became a
canon of British policy to embark on no adventure from which the
Dutch refrained. Timid as were the Dutch, however, they realised
that no Power could harm them more than Britain, and that none
had a greater interest in defending the Austrian Netherlands, the
bulwark of both nations against France. These considerations made
the decision of a sluggish, suspicious and divided federation fall
usually in favour of the British cause, and gave some countenance to
the comparison of Holland to a cockboat in the wake of Britain. But
the Dutch were nothing less than warlike, and the peril of Britain
demanded readiness for war. To avert it, and to gain her other ends,
she needed the alliance of some great continental Power.
The Power that could help her most directly was beyond all
question Spain, for Spain owned the lands with which Britain most
desired to trade. By sea Spain could be a useful auxiliary; her
strategic position was important; her army had ceased to be con-
temptible; the precious metals were in her gift; she stood committed
to no alliance. " I could have war with France in twenty-four hours,"
said Stanhope, "but a war with Spain would cost me my head."2
From Spain, moreover, came voices breathing an unwonted liberality.
"God", it was said, "has committed the Indies to the trust of the
Spaniards that all nations might partake of the riches of that new
world; it is even necessary that all Europe should contribute towards
supplying... that vast empire with their manufactures and their
merchandizes."8 Frank alliance with Spain, however, was impossible
so long as Gibraltar and Minorca remained in British hands. The
pride, the slowness and the fanaticism of the Spaniards, moreover,
had survived their change of dynasty. Even their Bourbon King was
heard to assure his Queen that one of his first acts as King of France
would be to drive the Jansenists out of the country.4 Above all, in
1 Cf. Albion, R. G., Forests and Sea Power 9 pp. viii seqq.
2 Cf. Robertson, G. G., England under the Hanoverians, p. u.
8 Montelcone to Graggs, cit. History ofAlberord (1719), p. 174.
* Williams, B., "The foreign poficy of Walpole", EJIJl. xvr, 324, citing Keene's
despatch.
23-2
354 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
guides. For many years the Paris of Louis XIV and the Hague of his
opponents had formed confronting capitals, and Britain had cemented
the coalition. Now a novel uncertainty prevailed in France: the
Whigs, save when they spoke with the accent of Hanover, had turned
from war to peace; the Dutch computed that with another league
and another war their trade would shrink to their meadows.1 Sweden
was tottering; Spain, showing an unwonted vigour; Prussia, under
the strange guidance of a new King, was multiplying armaments;
above all, Russia under Peter was thrusting herself into Europe.
Estimates not only of what was wise but of what was possible differed
almost beyond belief. Some wiseacres saw in Russia a northern star
which, rightly used, might preserve the liberties of Europe.2 Horace
Walpole reckoned France as the equal of the Sea Powers and Austria
combined,8 while a French statesman held that Spain and the
Emperor were great Powers but England no more than second-rate.4
Among his British contemporaries some were ready to share his
estimate of their country, while Pitt could rally the nation to an over-
weening self-regard and to an energy which made it invincible. A
cynic surveying Europe, indeed, might declare that the only constant
forces were the hereditary hatreds between State and State. Gulliver
proudly proclaimed our noble country the scourge of France.5 Danes
and Swedes preferred the advent of the Muscovite to union. Portugal,
regardless of the future, welcomed an opportunity to injure Spain.
The Italians hated all foreigners, the Germans above the rest.
Prussia and Hanover, Prussia and Saxony, Prussia and Austria were
normally at bitter feud. The French submitted in most matters to
their King, but they would not endorse an alliance with the Habs-
burgs. So deeply did such antipathies enter into the European
system that hints at a rapprochement between two traditional enemies
sounded like blasphemy and anarchy in the ears of other Powers.
In such a Europe, Britain, with Hanover bound round her neck,
must strive for wealth and safety. Her position in the world now far
surpassed what her acreage or her numbers seemed to warrant.
"Posterity", thought Voltaire in the 'twenties, "will very possibly
be surprised to hear that an island whose only produce is a little lead,
tin, fuller's earth and coarse wool should become so powerful by its
commerce as to... send... three fleets at the same time to three
different... parts of the globe."6 The last war had produced a favour-
able trade-balance of nearly £3,000,000 yearly, and had enabled
Britain to wrest more industries and markets from the French.7 But
1 Wiesener, L., Le Rtgent, p. 215.
* Walpole, H., Memoirs of the reign of King George IL n, 134.
8 Of. Wiesener, p. 93.
5 y^f* & i$f* WdpoUrt hpoMque de Flewy, 1731-1742, P- '49-
* Swift, J., Works (London, 1801), vi, 115.
* Letters concerning the English nation, p. 69.
7 Anderson, m, 49, 56.
INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF GREAT BRITAIN 355
in the long run, commerce must depend upon international good-will,
and this necessity, as well as the Stuart threat, spoke strongly for a
policy of peace. Even if peace could be preserved, a Power which
had so recently deserted its allies and passed its rivals would find it
difficult enough to secure their good-will, in an age in which Colbert's
truculent temper still prevailed. In any event elementary prudence
dictated that Britain should keep up her fleet. To build ships was not
difficult, but sources of naval stores must be kept open, and Baltic
questions therefore assumed a large importance.1 If wax threatened,
the problem of naval man-power would become acute. It might be
solved for a time by impressing the crews of merchantmen, but in-
evitably commerce would thereby be partially suspended. Since the
profit from a British stoppage must fall to the Dutch, it became a
canon of British policy to embark on no adventure from which the
Dutch refrained. Timid as were the Dutch, however, they realised
that no Power could harm them more than Britain, and that none
had a greater interest in defending the Austrian Netherlands, the
bulwark of both nations against France. These considerations made
the decision of a sluggish, suspicious and divided federation fall
usually in favour of the British cause, and gave some countenance to
the comparison of Holland to a cockboat in the wake of Britain. But
the Dutch were nothing less than warlike, and the peril of Britain
demanded readiness for war. To avert it, and to gain her other ends,
she needed the alliance of some great continental Power.
The Power that could help her most directly was beyond all
question Spain, for Spain owned the lands with which Britain most
desired to trade. By sea Spain could be a useful auxiliary; her
strategic position was important; her army had ceased to be con-
temptible; the precious metals were in her gift; she stood committed
to no alliance. " I could have war with France in twenty-four hours,"
said Stanhope, "but a war with Spain would cost me my head."2
From Spain, moreover, came voices breathing an unwonted liberality.
"God", it was said, "has committed the Indies to the trust of the
Spaniards that all nations might partake of the riches of that new
world; it is even necessary that all Europe should contribute towards
supplying... that vast empire with their manufactures and their
merchandizes."8 Frank alliance with Spain, however, was impossible
so long as Gibraltar and Minorca remained in British hands. The
pride, the slowness and the fanaticism of the Spaniards, moreover,
had survived their change of dynasty. Even their Bourbon King was
heard to assure his Queen that one of his first acts as King of France
would be to drive the Jansenists out of the country.4 Above all, in
1 Cf. Albion, R. G., Forests and Sea Power, pp. viii seqq.
* Cf. Robertson, G. G., England under the Hanoverians, p. 1 1.
8 Monteleone to Craggs, cit. History ofAlberom (1719), p. i?4«
* Williams, B., "The foreign policy of Walpole", EJfJl. xvi, 324, citing Keene's
despatch.
23-3
356 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
defiance of compacts, for many years after the death of Louis XIV
(i September 1715), this same Philip V was a potential pretender to
the throne of France, while the Emperor regarded him as an actual
pretender to the throne of Spain. The Spanish alliance could, there-
fore, offer no guarantee of international good-will, nor could it furnish
a sure shield against the Stuart threat to Britain.
The Emperor, now the slow, proud, obstinate, orthodox Habsburg
Charles VI, with Eugfene as his right-hand man, represented our
traditional counterweight to France. His commercial interests no-
where clashed with ours, unless, as some experiments already hinted,1
his new domain in the Netherlands might tempt him towards com-
merce overseas. Apart from such plans, his dominion over Italy
might be expected to further our Mediterranean trade, while our
security depended in no small degree upon that of Antwerp and the
Belgian coast. Of soldiers he had only too many, and his difficulty
in maintaining them British gold could solve. "The old system",
leaguing the Sea Powers, the Emperor and their clients, therefore,
still had much to recommend it, provided that Britain and not
Britain-Hanover determined its policy, and provided that the latent
enemy of all its members continued to be found in France. In 1716
by the Treaty of Westminster, therefore, we covenanted with the
Emperor for mutual defence.
But must France remain our enemy? "I will always traverse the
views of France,'* ran Carterefs creed, "for France will ruin this
nation if it can."2 The words of a less literate peer, "I hate the
French, and I hope as we shall beat the French",8 like Pitt's com-
putation that our gains were multiplied fourfold by their injury to
France,4 breathed the feeling which, regardless of the close Franco-
British intellectual co-operation, pervaded Britain during the whole
of the eighteenth century and was warmly reciprocated across the
Channel. In a monarchic age, however, a union of hearts might be
dispensed with as the concomitant of a political alliance. Even grant-
ing that the permanent interests of France and Britain — prestige,
industry, commerce, colonies, the lordship of the Low Countries, the
ascendancy in Spain and Italy — even if all these clashed, might not
a temporary entente be to their mutual advantage? The answer de-
pended upon the view taken by the French ruler. To Britain, provided
that the balance of power were not permanently overthrown, the
advantages of working for a time with France were clear. France
alone could cripple the Pretender, as perhaps she alone could make
him really dangerous. This by itself was enough to outweigh all
adverse considerations. But France was a great customer of Britain,
1 About 1714, with interloping ships from England and Holland. Cf. Anderson,
m, 62.
* Williams, B., Ufe of Pitt, p. 99.
8 Hervey, Memoirs, i, 42.
* Hotblack, K, Chatham's Colonial Policy, p. 68.
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE OF 1717 357
and a dangerous commercial rival, to be handled, if possible, in like
manner with the Dutch. Her influence abroad, notably in the Levant,
her unsurpassed diplomacy, her unrivalled army — from all of these
her ally might look for help. Surprises were the less likely that the
old French hostility against Austria, "the poisoner of the Latin
races'3,1 remained unabated, while her old hostility against Spain
was revived in the breasts of some by the pretensions of the King of
Spain to her succession. And, as our statesmen gleefully reflected,
since the British connection was loathsome to the French people, the
ruler who made it for his own purposes would depend on it and on
themselves. This is not the place to describe the calculations of the
French regent, Orleans, or of his minister Dubois, for whom George I
secured as the price of his assistance the Archbishopric of Cambrai,
nor can the involved negotiations in the several centres be followed
out.2 It is sufficient to record that in January 1717, the compact was
framed which linked France, Britain and the Dutch into a Triple
Alliance for preserving the peace of Europe on the lines laid down
four years earlier. The Hanoverian Succession and the regency of
Orleans thus gained the support of the best army and the best fleets
in Europe, backed, as was computed, by nearly one-half of Europe's
current cash.8 The policy embodied in the Triple Alliance was
destined during sixteen years of unexampled complexity to avert the
evil which seemed always imminent — the outbreak of a general war.
It is significant that in such a compact between three of the four
colonial Powers of the world the colonies though implicitly guaran-
teed are not specifically named. How little they were regarded by
the rulers of France in comparison with their own security became
manifest in the amazing French career of Law. In August 1717
Louisiana was lightly handed to a Scottish adventurer who promised
to make France rich. The tobacco monopoly, the Senegal, East India,
China and African Companies followed. Within two years, it might
be said French commerce outside Europe was in his hands. Another
year (1720) and the bubble burst. It had shown how shallow by
comparison with the Dutch and English were the roots of the French
Companies, and it had suggested that if the French Government re-
mained inactive British colonists and merchants had little to fear
from France.4
The Triple Alliance, produced as it was by clear and simple needs
of State, may be rightly regarded by posterity as the outstanding
event in a period of European peace. To the actors in them, however,
the years that followed the death of Louis XIV seemed anything but
peaceful, and politics had never been more obscure. How could
Britain think of empire while at any moment a fresh European
1 Gastclar, cit. Duff, M. £. G., Miscellanies, p. 270.
3 Cf. Wiesener, Le Rjgent. Based on British records.
8 Cf. Anderson, m, 85.
4 Weber, H., La compagruejrangmse des Indes (1604-1875), p. xv and passim.
358 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
combination might overturn her throne? And how could her ministers
ensure the prevalence of a national policy when the King, despite
his dynastic interests, was indispensable? Until the close of 1718, at
least, the student of British imperial history must stare at the kaleido-
scope of Europe.
In the summer of 1715, wrote a contemporary, "the Levant was
covered with ships of war. The Sultan, judging well that he could
not maintain himself upon the throne if he did not find employment
for his militia,. . .fell upon the Venetians ---- France, in a state of
minority, was the only Kingdom that remained neuter".1 For the
pre-eminent result of the Sultan's move was to embroil the Emperor,
already at loggerheads with the Dutch and living in a state of latent
hostility against Spain. The ambitions of Spain forced him to garrison
Italy, while the separatist aspirations of his Protestant subjects in
Hungary constantly taxed his strength. Until the victories of Eug&ne
brought the triumphant peace of Passarowitz in 1718, British states-
men watched with anxiety the fluctuations of the Emperor's power.
But their distraction due to south-eastern Europe was as nothing in
comparison with that arising in the north during the final flight of
"that military meteor" Charles XII. The amazing adventures with
which he had filled the whole century, and the no less amazing career
of Peter, had brought about a Baltic situation which of itself was per-
plexing enough for Britain. Sweden was the Protestant missionary
nation and our commercial friend. But should she be encouraged in
clinging to her eastern Baltic provinces against Russia and Poland,
to her southern Baltic provinces against die North German States,
to her provinces on the Weser and the Sound against their neighbours
in Germany and Denmark? Most urgent of all, what should be our
attitude with regard to the intrusion into civilised Europe of Russia,
an unattractive Power, but one very difficult to assail, and mistress,
if her success continued, of those naval stores upon which British
armaments mainly depended? The problem was made still more
difficult by the " obstinacy and inveteracy " 2 of Charles XII, who vetoed
our commercial intercourse with Baltic ports which his enemies had
held for many years and seized our merchantmen who disobeyed.
The difficulty was increased when the professional soldiers freed by
Utrecht flocked round the foremost captain of the age, and when he
found in the Holsteiner Count Goertz a volunteer but omnipotent
minister who could contrive to pay them. It was increased tenfold
by the compromising manoeuvres of the British King in the interest
of his Hanoverian possessions. It is neither necessary nor edifying to
trace the steps by which his electoral troops had occupied Bremen
and Verden.8 What concerned Britain was that these Swedish fiefs
1 History tfCanTwal 4Zfowm, p. 80.
• Tbwnshend to Stanhope, Nov. 1716, cit. Goxe, Walpole, n, iaz.
* Of. Chance, J. F., op. cit.> passim.
GREAT BRITAIN AND EUROPE AFTER UTRECHT 359
doubled the importance of Hanover, that to keep them George
became the accomplice of Russia and even of Denmark and Prussia,
his detested neighbours, and that no consideration for Britain would
induce him to let them go. To draw or drive us into open war with
Sweden for the aggrandisement of Russia was indeed beyond his
power. But he contrived that in 1715 a British fleet aided Charles's
enemies after the season for trade was over; he convinced the Swedes
that a North German prince upon the throne of Britain could never
be their friend; he brought it about that, early in 1717, south-
western Sweden was reported "chock full of troops", with fleets pre-
paring for a descent on Scotland, and he uselessly embroiled Britain
with Russia for a period that surpassed his life.
Britain, insecure at home, was thus unprofitably involved in the
northern struggle at the moment when the renewal of the general war
was threatened by a sudden aggression on the part of Spain. To the
rulers of Spain the Peace of Utrecht was a settlement achieved without
consulting the laws of God or man,1 and one which had left behind
it the seeds of endless wars.2 To the rulers of Britain it was "the in-
delible reptoach of the age",3 a settlement which confounded the
characters of victors and vanquished, which prompted ministers to
that legal indictment of its contrivers which Walpole took five hours
to read. As at the same time the regency in France, our hereditary
enemy, was the particular object of Spanish detestation, it was not
unnatural that the two countries moved towards an entente. In 1716
the Convention of Madrid so expanded the treaty of commerce,
which they had concluded at Utrecht, that the treaty of 1 667 regained
its force and the subjects of each country enjoyed most-favoured-
nation status in the other.4
British hostility to the Utrecht terms, however, was in the main to
those regarding France; Spanish, to those regarding Italy. That Italy
should be delivered over to the Emperor seemed to Britain advan-
tageous; but to the Italian rulers of Spain, intolerable. Hence when,
in May 1716, peace-seeking Britain made her defensive alliance with
the Emperor, Spain construed it as almost a declaration of war
against herself. The Triple Alliance (January 1717) between all the
commercial Powers increased her indignation. To break with Britain,
France and Holland would be to renounce the Indies. But neither
this peril nor the victorious progress of Eugene could deter her from
striving to re-enter Italy by force. In the autumn of 1717, the
Emperor's island of Sardinia was seized by an expeditionary force
from Spain. While the expedition was in progress, Eugene won his
crowning victory at Belgrade, but without the aid of a naval Power
he could not reconquer an island. Britain as the Emperor's ally was
1 Alberoni, cit. Head, Fallen Stuarts, p. 188.
Pitt to Keene.
1,441.
360 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
thus challenged to uphold the Utrecht settlement against Spanish
attack. She naturally endeavoured to end the war between Spain
and the Emperor without herself taking part in it and without
sacrificing her new alliance with France.
Spain, on the other hand, rejected every plan for an accommoda-
tion, and sought on all sides for allies. The Jacobites, the Swedes, the
Turks and the Russians might be hoped for, but the most attractive
possibility lay in France. There the Regent was morally as isolated
in his union with Britain as was Louis Napoleon in a later age. Until
their deepest feelings are aroused, the British set gain above senti-
ment, knowing that through Parliament they can veto an alliance if
they think it worth their while. The French had neither consolation,
and those who desired the succession of Philip to their throne were
now strengthened by the general anti-Austrian opinion. While
France remained doubtful, Spain found an active ally for her ad-
venture in the ruler of Savoy, whose Utrecht acquisitions in Italy the
Emperor was determined to possess. In 1718 the Spaniards seized
on Sicily with the support of the inhabitants and the enthusiastic
co-operation of their Savoyard King, eager to exchange them for
Sardinia. With Europe, north and south alike, full of firebrand
powers, wise action on the part of Britain, of the Emperor, and, above
all, of France was essential to avert a conflagration. Thanks largely
to British diplomacy, in this case assisted by Hanoverian, the danger
passed as rapidly as it had arisen. Resisting all clamour, the Regent
stood firm by his engagements. The Emperor made with the Turks a
peace (July 1718) which set free an overwhelming force for the
defence of Italy. He was even induced to join with the Sea Powers
and France in a great Quadruple Alliance (August 1718) to defend
the settlement of Europe.1 His reward came without delay, for in
August Byng destroyed the Spanish fleet off Gape Passaro, and in
November the Savoyard yielded Sicily at the price of Sardinia and
the confirmation of his royal title. This prince, "whose politics were
always unsearchable and always so superior to those of all other
potentates",2 was admitted to the Quadruple Alliance and thus
further fettered Spain.
Rather than relinquish her Italian hopes, however, Spain at-
tempted to kindle a world-wide war. The Jacobites, the Swedes and
the Russians should be hurled at Britain or Hanover; British trade
with the Spanish Empire should be plundered; Britain should be
involved; and, to gain the French alliance, the regent should be
overthrown. No single portion of this great scheme prospered, save
the seizure of British merchant ships and goods. The French were
stirred by the Spanish plot into greater energy and actually invaded
Spain. Britain armed furiously and countered the Spanish negotia-
* I^«cq,H.,fli^r«^JajR£«ra igscqq.
* History qf Cardinal Alberom, p. 146.
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NORTHERN SETTLEMENT 361
tions with success. The accidental death of Charles XII (December
1718) removed the most incalculable danger to her peace. The new
Armada never reached her shores. A Spanish landing failed to rouse
the Highlands. British troops joined in the invasion of Spain and
captured Vigo. Alberoni returned for ever to his native land, and,
early in 1720, Spain followed her recreant ally into the Quadruple
Alliance.
At the same time the infinitely complex politics of the North seemed
to be taking a clearer form. In the Baltic region, however, Britain,
hampered by Hanover, had played a poorer part than on the con-
tinent and in the Mediterranean, and was emerging with a less
reward. Her Baltic problem had been to secure a general peace on
terms which should be both fair to Sweden and defensible against
the sinister and victorious Peter. It was complicated by the facts that
Bremen and Verden must be secured for Hanover; that Prussia,
which hated Hanover, must have Stettin; that Denmark subordinated
everything to her revenge;1 that the Saxon King of Poland was hope-
lessly untrustworthy; and that the King of Prussia was filled with an
abiding terror of the Tsar. In general the complaint made earlier
by Goertz was to prove well-founded, that " If... the Swedes must give
up everything that the insatiable greed of their neighbours demanded,
they would not... be sure of their shirts".2 The death of Charles and
the execution of his minister, however, had left no Swedish champion
to contend with fate, and British diplomacy, which had found in
Russia the chief hindrance to a settlement, was aided by the fact that,
next to Denmark, Russia was the greatest bugbear of the Swede.
Lavish bribery and the expectation of British naval help and of a
strong coalition to coerce Russia procured Bremen and Verden for
Hanover (July 1719) and for Prussia the region of Stettin (August
1719). At the same time, with infinite pains, the choleric and timid
King of Prussia was brought into harmony with Hanover and into
opposition to the Tsar. Britain now hoped that with the aid of France,
Prussia, the Emperor and the King of Poland, Russia might be forced
to concede a righteous and abiding peace. This would leave her
Petersburg and the window towards the west, but would restore to
Sweden Finland and those provinces south of the Gulf of Finland
which were at once the granary of Stockholm and the chief centre of
British trade. In February 1720, Britain, Prussia and Sweden were
in line, and it seemed probable that Denmark would be coerced into
concluding peace. To have thus stemmed, even for a time, the
advancing tide of Muscovy, would have brilliantly crowned a series
of services to Europe which had already made the first years of the
Hanoverian dynasty remarkable, and which must have strengthened
its hold upon the British people.
1 Gf. Chance, J. F.a British Diplomatic Instructions, 1689-1789 (III. Denmark), pp. 51 seqq.
8 Chance, Northern War, p. 179.
362 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
Now, however, in the words of an eighteenth-century historian,
"We are to enter upon the year 1720; a year remarkable beyond any
other ... for extraordinary and romantic projects, proposals and under-
takings, both private and national".1 France was convulsively
awakening from the spell cast over her by the financier Law, while
in Britain the speculative fever was running a swifter course. The
achievements both at home and abroad of British statesmen during
the last six years saved the Hanoverians when the South Sea Bubble
burst, but our prestige inevitably suffered. It became impossible to
find allies to combat Russia, and inconvenient to pay for the necessary
aid to Sweden. Denmark, which had claimed so many provinces that
the Swedish revenues would have fallen from eight to three million
crowns, 2 was brought to reason, but when the twenty years of northern
war were closed at Nystad (August 1721) Russia had had her way.
"Since the child is dead," wrote our ambassador, "I shall wash my
hands, change raiment, and eat and drink as David did of old."8
But it could not be denied that our enemy had won for his country
a commanding position on the Baltic, great influence with Prussia
and the Poles, and an association with the Emperor which endured
for many years. Britain must now fear the growth of a great Russian
navy, and only her American Plantations saved her from a fatal
dependence upon Russia for her naval stores.4
The year 1 720 remained memorable no less for personal than for
national changes. The Stuarts gained a new heir and a new hope by
the birth of Prince Charles at Rome. At the same time their Hano-
verian rivals closed their ranks by a family reconciliation which was
duly notified to foreign courts. In the future George II the King
possessed an heir as stupid as has ever reigned in England, while
Caroline, Princess of Wales, was to become her ablest Queen. Her
the King merely termed a she-devil,5 but for the Prince he shared the
feelings of His Russian Majesty, who slew his son, and of His Prussian
Majesty, who proposed to follow that example. In London, however,
a royal father could only break off intercourse, and even this was now
formally resumed. Most important of all, the nation had turned to
Walpole, for whom the South Sea Bubble inaugurated a ministry of
more than twenty years.
Walpole's great merit lay in applying to public affairs a clear
vision, a cool head, and an energy which no volume of business could
exhaust. "We have one minister", wrote Hervey, "that does every-
thing with the same ease and tranquillity as if he was doing nothing. " 6
In contrast to many outstanding figures of his time, he "was not one
of those projecting, systematical, great geniuses who are always
1 Anderson (written before 1763).
* Chance, Northern War, p. 388. * Ibid. p. 467,
* Cf. Albion, op. cit. pp. 160 and 240 seqq.
5 Lord OrfbrcPs Remmscences (London, 1818), p. s8.
* To Horace Walpole, Oct. 1735. Gf. Goxe, Walfole, m, 299.
WALPOLE AND HIS MINISTRY 363
thinking in theory and are above common practice".1 No man could
solve a problem more surely, nor see more clearly what men were.
Unhappily he was devoid of interest in what they might become. In
diplomacy he had had no training, and lacked even the common
accomplishment of French. Foreign affairs were not his province,
though, being "absolutely the helm of government",2 he could never
fail to influence their conduct, and in a crisis he was apt by sheer
competence to take the lead. As a financier, he disliked expense,
though he paid liberally for secret service; as a materialist, he thought
the enrichment of the people the supreme blessing; as a good
Georgian and a good fellow, he was for a quiet life and the benefit of
time. All his instincts therefore impelled him to prolong the entente
with France, and to postpone the realisation of the dream of Louis
XIV, a family accord between France and Spain. Such an accord
would have clipped the wings of Britain on the continent, in the
Mediterranean and above all in the New World, while French and
Spanish commerce would have prospered. For more than a decade
fortune favoured him. The Bourbons remained blind to their mutual
profit; the Pyrenees were not abolished; and men enquired of Walpole
what he had done to God Almighty to make Him so much his friend.3
During the first twelve years of Walpole's power (1721-32), and
thanks in no small degree to his exertions, striking events both in
British and in continental history were rare. At home and abroad,
however, the seeds of trouble remained alive. In Britain, none the
less, each quiet year added strength to the House of Hanover, and
lessened, in England and in Scotland alike, the attraction of the
Stuart line. On the continent, and in the wider world, an artificial
equilibrium prevailed, of which the instability could only become
more evident with the lapse of time. Wearied and shaken by the
wars of Louis XIV and by the collapse of the great schemes of Law,
counterbalanced as always by the power of Austria, France was now
paralysed by the King's minority and by feuds within the House of
Bourbon. With time she must recover, must perceive her false posi-
tion as the antagonist of Spain, must throw off the hampering entente
with Britain, and contend with her for the commercial and colonial
prizes of the world. To gain time, the British Government was slow
to take up the challenge implied in French encroachments in the
backwoods of America. In 1720 the important pass of Niagara was
seized, and in the early 'thirties Grown Point and Ticonderoga
founded, but the latent threat to our remote possessions upon the
mainland was ignored. The regency, equally bent on quiet, dis-
closed Jacobite plots to the British and contributed to the pacification
of Spain.
1 Hervcy, Memoirs, i, 24.
* Count Broglio to the king of France (1724), cit. Coxe, Walpole, n, 302.
8 Ibid, m, 132.
364 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
In Spain, however, an influence prevailed — that of the Italian
Queen— which could be pacified only by the complete satisfaction of
her demands. Italy, she resolved, must be freed from the Habsburg
by the assignment of principalities to her sons. No true peace with
Britain, moreover, was possible while Gibraltar and Minorca re-
mained ours. Vivacious, persistent and domineering, while her
husband was often melancholy and apathetic, she devoted the force
of Spain for twenty years to the fulfilment of these aims, which were
crowned with rare success. Her foremost opponent was of course the
Emperor, who possessed in full the Habsburg appetite for lands in
Italy, and believed himself unjustly excluded from the throne of
Spain. In 1722, however, his policy was swayed by his desire to
realise other and still dearer plans. By a family law known as the
Pragmatic Sanction, he had so varied the succession to his miscel-
laneous dominions that, if he should leave no son, his daughter, Maria
Theresa, would be heir of all. To secure the endorsement of this new
Austria by all Powers domestic and foreign became the constant,
costly and successful object of his life. The Pragmatic Sanction,
however, would extinguish the hereditary claims of several princes,
including the King of Spain. At the same time, the Emperor's ac-
quisition of the Netherlands inevitably drew his attention to the in-
justice of the treaty fetters by which, for the profit of the Sea Powers,
these industrial regions were still restrained from oceanic trade. In
an age in which the South Seas promised boundless profit, while the
Dutch East India Company had paid 24 per cent, over a hundred
successive years,1 the impecunious Emperor clutched at schemes
which might enrich all his dominions from Trieste to the northern
sea. If Antwerp must remain stifled for the advantage of Amsterdam,
Ostend might serve his purpose, and British speculators, shut out
from lawful commerce with the Indies, were eager to provide ships
and funds. In December 1722, to the infinite concern of the Sea
Powers, the Ostend Company was established. Penalties were
promptly denounced against participation by British subjects, but
within a year the spirit of the East India Company was reported to
be so broken that it would neither offer tea for sale nor make
exports the next season.2 While the Sea Powers were invoking
treaties of 1648 and 1670 to prove the Ostend Company illegal, a
congress assembled at Cambrai to settle the differences between the
Emperor and Spain. Distrusting congresses, however, the Emperor,
by a supreme feat of Viennese bureaucracy, contrived to delay the
formal opening until January I724.8 In the meantime three events
had happened of moment to Walpole and to Britain. The failure,
through popular clamour, of the Irish coinage scheme known as
"Wood's halfpence" had shown both the insecurity of the Govern-
, 484.
insecurity
G°"""r Harrison- cit- °"* ""-** "> 366-
THE RETURN OF BOLINGBROKE 365
ment and its moderation. The return of Bolingbroke, thanks to a
stout bribe to the King's Hanoverian mistress, had provided the
opposition with an inexhaustible fountain of ideas. "All they say5',
Walpole declared in 1734, "was only a repetition of the words he
has put into their mouths, and a spitting out that venom which he
has infused into them."1 "With as much ambition, as great abilities,
and more acquired knowledge than Caesar",2 but, as his victim pro-
tested, a natural liar,8 Bolingbroke constituted henceforth a standing
threat to Walpole, such as must increase his caution, tax his strength,
and deter him more than ever from looking far afield. And the return
of Bolingbroke coincided with the deaths of the French authors of
the entente, who were succeeded by the far less able Duke of Bourbon.
The Cambrai Congress, when it actually met, lacked the necessary
moral force to stabilise the peace. When it separated, Europe seemed
to stand on the verge of a general war, perhaps even a war of religion.
For in April 1725 Spain and the Emperor had agreed to join hands
and had concluded the first Treaty of Vienna. Forces which ulti-
mately numbered some 387,000 men could be arrayed to uphold the
Pragmatic Sanction and the Ostend Company, to wrest Gibraltar,
Minorca and commercial privilege from Britain, to restore the power
of Spain in Italy, and, as seemed hardly doubtful, to oppress the
German Protestants and to restore the Catholic Stuarts. All this was
to be consolidated by a great marriage between the Habsburg and
the Spanish Bourbon lines, threatening to issue in a power superior
to that of Charles V. The Emperor's views appeared to British states-
men "as dangerous to Europe in general and to our country in
particular as ever those of Louis XIV".4 It was characteristic of an
age in which a nameless alchemist could be taken by princes and
diplomats for the Wandering Jew,5 that this vast Treaty of Vienna
should be the work of Ripperda, a boastful Dutch adventurer, serving
the adventuress who was Queen of Spain. Its general cause lay in the
conviction of both Spain and Austria that only by thus menacing
Europe could they obtain what the Congress would not give. Its
particular occasion lay in the abrupt return by Bourbon of the
destined bride of Louis XV, an Infanta not yet seven years of age.
"The Bourbons", declared the insulted Queen, "are a race of devils"
— (to her husband) "except your Majesty. "6 The new allies deluded
themselves with the belief that by offering a commercial monopoly
to the British people they could regain Gibraltar and seduce Britain
away from France.7 Failing this, Hanover lay open to the Emperor's
forces, and Russia, even after Peter's death, might be induced to join
with Sweden in establishing the Pretender.
Coxe, Walpole, i, 421.
Goldsmith in his edition of Bolingbroke's Works (London, 1809), i, Ixx.
Coxe, Walpole, n, 344. 4 Ibid, n, 494, citing Townshend.
Weber, K. von, Aus mer Jakrhunderten, pp. 306 seqq.
Ewald, A. C., Sir Robert Walpole, p. 187. 7 Coxe, Walpole, i, 252.
366 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
Britain, however, stood firm by the side of France, and met the
Spanish threat by a squadron in the West Indies. To safeguard Han-
over, she concluded in its capital a treaty which in time embraced
the Sea Powers, France, Prussia and both the Scandinavian States.
To support the Treaty of Hanover, even after the scandalous de-
fection of Prussia in 1726, some 315,000 men could be arrayed, while
the Emperor's need of great garrisons in Hungary and Italy, and the
difficulty of moving Spanish troops by sea, made such a force superior
even on land to that of the Vienna combination. British fleets
simultaneously menaced Spain, cooped up her treasure galleons in
the West Indies, and entered the Baltic to hold Russian and all other
enemies in check.1 "In this perplexed, entangled and amphibious
state of broken peace and undeclared war",2 changes in the govern-
ment of France were of the utmost moment. The Duke of Bourbon,
who had thought to control die young King by an amazing marriage
with the daughter of the exiled Stanislaus of Poland, quarrelled in
1726 with Louis5 aged tutor, and found himself quietly supplanted.
At seventy-three, the obscure bishop known to history as Cardinal
Fleury thus acquired a power greater than that of Richelieu or
Mazarin, and earned the nickname "Your Eternity" by retaining it
for more than sixteen years. He has been judged as variously by
posterity as by those who knew him. It seems probable that he loved
to exercise his right to do everything himself, and desired that no
more business should present itself than an old man could transact;
that as an ecclesiastic he had learned the value of humility, resigna-
tion and a Mazarin's "soft and purring gentleness";8 that while he
disliked self-assertive young colleagues, he realised that a Chauvelin
might serve him as an invaluable Jorkins; that he could play the
garrulous dotard to perfection and deliberately produced that
"strange mixture of sham secrets, feigned trust and sudden cold-
nesses which made it almost impossible to divine his game".4 He
equalled Walpole in appreciating the benefit of time and detesting
unnecessary violence, but while the insular politician abhorred con-
tinental entanglements, Fleury understood the profit that diplomacy
may bring when wielded with real penetration. For the moment his
strength was to sit still, while the contradictions inherent in the Austro-
Spanish league brought about its ruin. Whatever momentary irrita-
tion or specious diplomacy during the "mad year" 1725 might
dictate, the Emperor and the Queen of Spain could not sincerely co-
operate in Italy, nor could they defy the Sea Powers in the field of
commerce, nor could the Emperor desire a Bourbon son-in-law to
succeed himself. Britain's pride and self-will might be trying, but
with time and patience France would come into her own.
1 Cf. Chance, Instructions (Denmark), pp. 68 scqq. » Hervey, Memoirs, i, 87.
8 Macdonald> J. R. M., A history qf France, n, 179.
* Vaucher, p. 158.
FLEURY, WALPOLE AND GEORGE II 367
In February 1727, Spain actually declared war on Britain, but its
languid course showed only the hollowness of the Vienna league and
the strength of the opposition. The timely death of the Emperor's
chief ally, Catharine I of Russia, helped on the cause of peace. It
was agreed to adjourn the disputes and to discuss them at a new
Congress next year. Before the Congress met, at Soissons, the sudden
death of George I had brought about the confirmation and enlarge-
ment of Walpole's power. His new sovereign, after first giving him
the lie and his dismissal, was brought by Queen Caroline and a sense
of his own interests to become his unconscious disciple and his stead-
fast friend. Inferior to his father in weight and vision, George II
resembled him in love for Hanover and in hatred for his heir. The
one made him zealous for the imperial alliance; the other had the
curious effect of safeguarding the dynasty by providing the dis-
affected with a cynosure who was not a Stuart. The Hanoverian
dynasty, however, was still far from popular, nor the Emperor yet
available as its ally, while, in October 1728, tidings of Louis* smallpox
evoked brisk movements on the part of Philip for claiming the succes-
sion to his throne. Fleury, Walpole and George II therefore remained
at one in prolonging the entente, despite the complaints of French
merchants, British planters, and diplomats and statesmen of both
nations.
Fleury, like Walpole, desired peace, but no French statesman could
be expected to base the peace of Europe upon a guarantee of the
aggrandised House of Habsburg. Since the Emperor stood out for the
Pragmatic Sanction or nothing, the Congress of Soissons failed, and
the next European combination embodied another revolution. Spain,
resolute to re-enter Italy, and disillusioned by Vienna, achieved her
purpose by accepting the yoke of Britain. In November 1729, at
Seville, she flung over her imperial ally with his Ostend Company
and collective guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, accepting from
the Sea Powers and France the succession in Tuscany, Parma and
Piacenza, with the right to send 6000 Spanish troops to hold them.
Before the Treaty of Seville was signed, the birth of a dauphin,
frustrating Philip's hopes of the succession, had removed the greatest
barrier between France and Spain. The next great move for a broad-
based peace, however, came from Britain. No treaty, it might well
seem, could have insulted the Emperor more than that of Seville,
whereby his opponents combined with his faithless ally for the forcible
disposal of imperial fiefs. In the spring of 1 730, the Duke of Newcastle
imagined French, Hessians, Danes, British, Hanoverians and Dutch
marching on Austria to safeguard the Spanish cause in Italy.1 Yet,
within eleven months, a second great Treaty of Vienna was in being
(March 1731) whereby the Sea Powers, soon joined by Spain, won
over the Emperor by guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction. In the
1 To Harrington and Poyntz. Gf. Goxe, Walpok, n, 681.
368 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
negotiations, conducted with haste and stealth for fear of France,
Britain had been amazingly hampered by the "little, low, partial,
electoral notions"1 of her King, who demanded as the price of the
treaty judicial decisions by the Emperor in favour of Hanover. Their
successful conclusion in the second Treaty of Vienna seemed to crown
the diplomatic campaign of Britain under Walpole for peace. In
support of our own Pragmatic Sanction, the Act of Settlement, we
had now secured the guarantee of the Emperor, France and Spain,
while Spain was bound to give privileges to our commerce, and all
possible competitors in their several ways to refrain from interference.
In 1732 we felt strong enough to veto a Spanish project for indepen-
dent eastern trade, and to establish our new colony of Georgia on
the very edge of Spain's occupied territories in Florida. The basis of
the new settlement was philanthropic, though Franklin derided the
prospects of an agricultural colony of "insolvent debtors taken out
of the jails",2 and the prohibition of negro slaves and of great estates
soon broke down. But France and Spain could hardly ignore the
threat to themselves in a settlement which trespassed on their pro-
vinces and furnished in Savannah an obvious strategic menace to
their fleets.
Queen Caroline was right, however, in comparing the political
combinations of Europe to the South Sea Bubble, which everyone
knew was a cheat but entered to snatch a profit.3 Two years sufficed
to burst the second bubble of Vienna. In 1 733 France discovered
that she could not look on unmoved while the eastern Powers dis-
posed of the vacant throne of Poland. Louis cheerfully informed
those who thronged the ceremony of his lever on 14 October that his
troops had crossed the Rhine.4 By the end of November, France,
Spain and Sardinia were in arms to coerce the Emperor, and Britain
must tremble for Gibraltar, commerce and prestige.5 Gould she
stand by with folded arms while Europe was shaped by others?
Walpole was determined that the War of the Polish Succession should
not become a war of the British Succession, and the nation did not
disagree. The ministry, weakened by the failure of the Excise bill,
had rallied opinion by betrothing Princess Anne to the Prince of
Orange. This stroke, however, offended the anti-monarchic Dutch,
who instantly drew near to France. Thus reassured, the Emperor's
threat to evacuate the Netherlands could not stir them to action, and
without Dutch co-operation it would be madness for Britain to
venture upon war. In 1 734 and 1 735 the Emperor, with Russian help,
had his way in Poland, where the Saxon Augustus drove Louis'
father-in-law from the throne. The Rhenish and Italian campaigns,
however, went against him, and Don Carlos of Spain was crowned
1 Coxe, Walpole, n, 535, citing Horace Walpole the elder.
* Smyth, A. H., Writings of Benjamin Franklin, i, 355.
9 Robertson, G. G., op. cit. p. 33. * Vaucher, p. 74.
6 Coxe, Walpole, m, 147*
DECLINE OF THE ENTENTE 369
King of Sicily and Naples. Meanwhile the Sea Powers laboured for
peace, and hastened its coming by their refusal of financial aid. When
the third Treaty of Vienna was agreed on, however, France had
approached the Emperor without their knowledge. Nor was this
slight the only British disaster in the war. A Family Compact
between France and Spain had been signed in 1733. When peace
returned, a league of continental powers against Britain had been
brought appreciably nearer. In spite of George's martial zeal, the
Emperor had called on her in vain to fulfil the Treaty of Vienna,
while France had guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction. Five years
before, Newcastle had reported Fleury "not dead, but dead to us5',1
and Fleury was the least Anglophobe of Frenchmen. A war in which
our sea power shielded Poland while our diplomacy favoured the
Emperor could hardly strengthen the entente, though both parties re-
sumed it with feigned enthusiasm. Above all, though with much
distrust and friction, the deadly combination of France and Spain
had been brought about. The territorial adjustments of the third
Treaty of Vienna (1738) securing Lorraine for France, Tuscany for
the Emperor, and the two Sicilies for the Spanish Bourbons,
commanded the assent or at least the indifference of Britain. Its
implications might well leave only the foolhardy calm.
The three years after fighting ceased (1736-38) saw a general
worsening of the position through the rise of our ambiguous French
ally. Chauvelin, our sworn foe, the " shuffling friend "2 whose conduct
made Walpole instruct our ambassador to "pay dissimulation with
dissimulation. . .as all who play fair with sharpers are certainly un-
done55,3 fell early in 1737, but France in that age "pushing into an
universal commerce as the. . .way of coming at their old darling
scheme of universal dominion554 could not be truly our well-wisher.
It was something that the Queen of Spain hated Fleury, the "mitred
Machiavelli55, but Patifio, her great commercial minister, who
threatened to kill him with a staff of cotton by transferring Spanish
trade to Britain,6 had died in 1736^ leaving the government to "three
or four mean stubborn people of little minds . . . but full of. . . the
immense grandeur of the Spanish monarchy".6
The Emperor, upon the maintenance of whose power "the equili-
brium" depended, and who now lost his Eugene, was drawn into
a war between Russia and the Turks, in which the Austrian disasters
reinforced the lesson of the Polish Succession struggle. Military
failure was followed by diplomatic, and the Peace of Belgrade (1739)
formed an immense triumph for France. The Turks were saved;
Russia, baulked of compensation for her loss of 100,000 men; Austria,
1 To Horace Walpole, Aug. 1730; cf. Williams, EJfJl. xvi, 448.
* Delafaye to Waldegrave, Oct. 1731, in Coxe, Walpole, m, 122.
8 Ibid, m, 449. * Anderson, m, 216. 6 Goxe, Walpole 9 m, 473.
6 Keene to Newcastle, 1739, cit. Temperley, H. W. V., "The Causes of the War of
Jenkins* ear (1739)", Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc. 3rd series, m (1909), p. 3.
CHBEI 24
370 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
despoiled and humbled— all by the brains and energy of a French
diplomat and a French military adventurer.1 " Tis Belgrade kills
me",2 said the Emperor, when at the point of death. Austrian in-
fluence with Russia inevitably declined, while Prussia, whose Grown
Prince was learning to reckon on a deep cleavage between France
and Britain,3 proved susceptible to the blandishments of France.
Mistress now of Sweden, with nowhere an enemy, France seemed
to be the arbiter of Europe. Meanwhile the British Government had
survived the Porteous riots in Scotland, disturbances in London, an
open feud within the royal house, and the lamentable death of the
Queen. Still, however, it felt too weak to risk the alienation of the
fundholders by converting the debt to a lower interest basis, and in
1739 the moral weakness of both Government and people was to
place both in jeopardy. In that year, long-smouldering disputes with
Spain issued in a needless rupture.
"The conduct of England from. . . 1737 to the declaration of war",
wrote Goxe ere the century closed, "was inconsistent, unjust, haughty
and violent."4 It was also highly unprofitable, though the worst
disasters were averted by good fortune. Both sides had just grievances
arising from the high claims and lawless practices of Britain and her
subjects in their relations with the Spanish Indies5 and from the
illegal violence shown by Spanish officials towards suspected offenders.6
During the year 1738, negotiations in Spain were stimulated by the
presence of a British fleet, but, early in 1 739, so good was the Spanish
disposition that a convention between the two countries was signed
and an alliance was seriously thought of. 7 Then, while a skilful French
ambassador changed the feeling at the Spanish court, a wave of
public opinion swept Britain into war with Spain. The South Sea
Company inflamed the Government and nation; hopes of mines and
galleons played their part; stories of the Inquisition found ready
credence; and the Opposition made of Captain Jenkins's ear a talis-
man to bring them into office. Pitt stooped to use the argument of
a Louis XIV that might gives right, without Louis' sincere assumption
that man's might is an index of God's favour. "With more ships in
your harbours than in all the navies of Europe, with above two millions
of people in your American colonies", should we, he asked, accept
a dishonourable convention?8 Few could be found to brave the
storm, and Newcastle was certainly not among them. In March
1739 he ordered the squadron at Gibraltar to remain there,9 and
by October, Spain and Britain were formally at war.
Vandal, A., Une ambassadefrancaise en Orient sous Lows XV> 1728-41, passim.
Ibid. p. 41 1 . * Koser, R., Komg Friedrich der Grosse. I, 48.
Coxef Walpole9i9SiQ.
Gf. Johnson, G., Lives of the most famous highwaymen, etc. (London, 1734), p. 267:
"This logwood is but little better than stole".
Vide supra, p. 340. » Temperley, ut cit. p. 21.
<X Thackeray, Chatham, i, 29 (Dr Johnson's version).
Temperley, ut cit. p. 32; Hertz, op. cit. pp. 48 seqq.
THE SPANISH AND AUSTRIAN WARS 371
A year later, Newcastle himself was writing, "From what I see,
France will sooner or later dominate Europe, and perhaps America
also".1 The last clause is the more significant because the war had
been conducted on the lines laid down in Carteret's dictum, "Look
to America. . .Europe will take care of itself".2 The first great plans,
which included a double attack upon Manila, were indeed cut down,
but the Admiralty clung firmly to its design of attacking Spanish
America from the west as well as from the east.3 While Anson pre-
pared for an expedition to the South Seas, Vernon with six men-of-
war made the almost bloodless capture of Porto Bello (November
1739). Such a success, one month after the proclamation of the war,
intoxicated the Opposition and the country. Vernon became a
national hero, and was entrusted with a large fleet for the reduction
of the Spanish Indies. In March 1741, aided by General Wentworth
and 8000 men, he turned to attack the stronghold of Cartagena. The
commanders quarrelled; nearly half the troops perished of disease;
and in mid-April the attempt was abandoned. It had taught the
British how not to wage amphibious warfare in the tropics.4 Anson,
meanwhile, with a host of despairing pensioners and raw marines,
was labouring round Gape Horn.5 His squadron, which dwindled
to a single ship, won great fame and booty, but was powerless to
influence the war. In 1742, Vernon continuing impotent, it became
clear that as a speculation the Spanish war had failed. Fleury, more-
over, had as yet done litde save guard against any diversion in Europe
which could affect a struggle so profitable to France. While the British
continued to lose markets, to squander manhood in the tropics, and
to turn against their incomparable Walpole, the cardinal was drawing
nearer to the Emperor and preparing for a triumphant mediation.
At this juncture, however, death destroyed his hopes. On 31 May
1740, young Frederick of Prussia, Voltaire's disciple, but suspected
of being secretly a foe to France,6 inherited his long-awaited crown.
In October, the Russian Succession passed to a minor, an event
which, as he knew well, must give him greater freedom. At the same
time, Europe was startled by the Emperor's sudden death. This led
to events which broke Fleury's system in pieces, set the world on fire,
and caused the War of Jenkins's ear to be almost literally forgotten.
For Britain, the great significance of the War of the Austrian
Succession (1740-48) was that it foiled and distracted France. As
the immediate consequence of the Emperor's death, Spain turned to
press her claim to Austrian Italy. In December, Frederick marched
into Silesia. "The man is mad", cried the impassive Louis, but the
infection soon spread to Paris. While Fleury disseminated blessings
1 To Harrington, 1 1 Oct. 1740, cit. Vaucher, WaLjxfo et Fbuty, p. 352.
2 Git. Gharteris, Cumberland, p. 88. a Bancroft, G., Hist, of UJS. m, 440.
4 Ibid, m, 442; Richmond, H. W., The Navy in the war $/" 1739-48, pp. no seqq.
5 Walter, R., A voyage round the world in the years 1 740-4 by George Anson, Esq. (London,
1 748). passim. 6 Koser, pp. 54, 1 19.
372 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
and schemed for a judicious increase of French power, the party of
action, crying, "Down with the Habsburgs", captured the King and
nation. Belleisle, earnest, abstemious and soldierly in a society which
lacked those virtues, led a sumptuous mission into Germany, to sub-
stitute for Austria at the head of affairs an aggrandised Bavaria
crowned with the imperial crown and dependent upon France.1
French success, both in the imperial election and in war, seemed to
depend on Prussia. Frederick, whose victory at Mollwitz (April
1741) proved that the only Austrian army could not drive him from
Silesia, skilfully prolonged the auction at which the irreconcileables,
Britain and France, "the most stupid and the most ambitious powers
of Europe", bid for his support. The interference of George II,
zealous for Hanover, helped to decide his Prussian rival against
Britain. The British plan would have purchased by concessions in
Silesia the adhesion of Prussia to a league with Austria, the Sea
Powers, Russia and other States to uphold the Pragmatic Sanction,
for, apart from treaty obligations, a strong Austria seemed a necessary
bulwark against France. The party of no surrender at Vienna, how-
ever, relied on King George and our guarantees, and Frederick cheer-
fully bound himself to lay Germany and the Habsburgs at the feet
of France. In a three days9 struggle at Versailles, speaking for seven
hours on one of them, Belleisle battered Fleury into compliance.8 In
August, cheered by the news of our reverse at Cartagena, French
troops crossed the Rhine, while the Swedes, prompted by France,
marched against Austria's ally, Russia. Claimants to the Habsburg
dominions threatened almost every province. Vienna itself, where
many hoped that the Bavarian Charles Albert would drive out Maria
Theresa's detested husband, Francis of Lorraine, was described as
being in the state prayed for by the Scotch preacher "who asked of
God to spread confusion over the earth that He might show His
omnipotence in restoring order".3 But worse was yet to come, for
the French advance and the menaces of Prussia drove George to
approach Versailles, to declare Hanover neutral, and to promise the
Bavarians his vote. British diplomacy might still be used to recon-
cile Frederick with Maria Theresa; Britain might raise an auxiliary
army for her defence; her personality and the justice of her cause
were not to be despised; and bandits like the Kings of Prussia and
Sardinia were poor material for an enduring coalition. France,
moreover, whose hegemony seemed to be assured when her accom-
plice Elizabeth seized the throne of Russia4 (December 1741), was
justly suspected by her German confederates of aiming at their
permanent subjugation. Belleisle, indispensable in the field, could
not always coerce Fleury into decisive and dangerous action. French
1 Gf. Goxe, W., Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpolc, 1678-1757 (London, 1802), p. 232.
* Koser, pp. 1 15 seqq. * Gharteris, Cimaerland, p. 109.
* Kluchevsky, V. O., Hist, of Russia (trans. Hogarth), iv, 314; Hildebrand, E., Svcrigcs
historia, vn, 135 etc.
AUSTRIAN RECOVERY: TREATY OF WORMS 373
troops, none the less, wintered in Prague, and, in January 1742, the
Bavarian protegt of France became the Emperor Charles VII.
How the tide turned and flowed swiftly in Austria's favour; how
the Prussians and Saxons left the divided and distracted French to
save themselves and their Bavaria as best they could ; how the Spanish
Bourbons were foiled in Italy and the Swedes in Finland— all this
belongs to the chequered history of 1742. For Britain, the great
event was the fall of Walpole, a peace minister forced to preside over
impolitic and ineffective war. Although the King still looked to him
for counsel and his former followers remained in power, the resolute
Garteret became the steersman of belligerent Britain, and we turned
to fight in Europe for the Protestant Succession and America. The
detachment of Prussia and Saxony from the hostile coalition was a
British success. Britain helped to detach Sardinia also and enabled
its King to fight the better for the Pragmatic Sanction by threatening
Naples with bombardment and forcing the Spanish Bourbons to be
neutral. When Fleury died at ninety, in January 1743, France was
already meditating a descent upon our shores to induce us to leave
Germany and Italy alone.
The campaigns, both military and diplomatic, of the year 1743,
however, went strongly in favour of the Hungarian Queen. While
her own troops conquered Bavaria, British, Hessians and Han-
overians moved south from Flanders to shield her from the new
French army of Noailles. By sheer good fortune, our stout-hearted
but ill-led " Pragmatic Army" escaped destruction at Dettingen and
won a resounding victory. "The devil take my uncle," wrote
Frederick, "let no one name the French troops and generals in my
hearing." 1 He had not made peace to look on while the Austrians and
Hanoverians became supreme in Germany, and he preferred to head
a union of imperial States with German liberty as its watch-word.
This line of thought was soon to find its parallel in Britain, though
for the moment Garteret went from strength to strength. In Septem-
ber 1743, at Worms, he brought Sardinia into league with Austria
and Britain for the more vigorous prosecution of the war, and the
Dutch, Saxony and Russia took the same side. To its author, the
Treaty of Worms seemed destined to end the struggle. In reality,
it immediately provoked France to surrender herself to Spain, and
to wage open and earnest war with Austria and Britain. At the same
time it disgusted the British public with Austria, and augmented
their disgust with Hanover. The miracle which saved the Habsburg
at the opening of the Thirty Years' War had been repeated for his
descendant, and at that "good Englishmen" rejoiced. But to lead
another Grand Alliance into a Thirty Years* War for Habsburg and
Guelph aggrandisement was far from their intention. Twelve years
1 To Podewils, July 1743, Politiscfu Correspondent Friedrichs des Grossen, n, 380.
374 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
later, their dissatisfaction bore its momentous fruit and led to the
salvation of Prussia.
The campaigns of 1744 to 174.7 shed much blood for little profit.
In Maurice of Saxony, a natural son of King Augustus, the French
found a Marlborough whose victories steadily won the Netherlands
and who even snatched fortresses from neutral Holland. Against the
most scientific soldier of the age and his superior numbers and supplies,
the British could set no better captain-general than the King's son
Cumberland, whose aim, the wits declared, was to lead his men into
the hottest place he could find and to keep them there as long as
possible. Dettingen, wrote his aide-de-camp, was play to Fontenoy,1
where a third of the British infantry were cut down. Great victories
every year, Fontenoy, Roucoux, Lauffeldt, punctuated a chapter
which Choiseul, who frankly confessed the delight of summer cam-
paigns and Paris winters, declared was prolonged for the marshal's
own advantage.2 Maurice at least added to France valuable regions
which advanced her vulnerable frontiers on the north-east and at the
same time would enable her to threaten her enemy across the sea. In
Italy, meanwhile, fortune fluctuated from year to year as different
hands clutched at the rudder which Louis was incompetent to hold.
When the ministers met, jeered Paris, God's thunder was inaudible.8
In Spain, on the other hand, the death of Philip (July 1746) trans-
ferred control from his Italian Queen to the Portuguese Queen of his
successor, Ferdinand VI, a change which tended towards a more
rational and more successful conduct of policy and war. On the
whole, however, Austrians, Sardinians and British did well in Italy,
and the short-lived invasion of Provence in the autumn of 1746
formed something of a moral offset to the Belgian triumphs of the
French. Continuous warfare in the Netherlands and Italy was
accompanied by intermittent though conspicuous struggles in other
fields. In 1744 Frederick plunged into the second Silesian war. The
motive was fear lest Austria should conquer Alsace and Lorraine,
Bavaria and Silesia. The course was a disastrous offensive, followed
by a brilliant defensive, which saved his own jeopardised provinces
and won a separate peace on the lines laid down by Britain (December
1745). It might safely be predicted that Prussia, now conscious of
the antipathy of almost all Europe, would take no further part in the
war.
As between France and Britain, the year 1745 had seen two new
forces help to turn the scale. Belleisle, brought captive from Hanover
in 1744, declared that he could conquer the island with 5000
scullions of the French army.4 Next year the Young Pretender seemed
to justify this boast and the tandem triumphant on his banner when he
1 Wyndham, M., ChrordcUs of the Eighteenth Century, i, 134.
* Ghoiseul, MtmovrtSy pp. 35, 44.
* Koser, p. 218. * Charteris, Cumberland, p. 206.
"THE 'FORTY-FIVE": LOUISBOURG AND PEACE 375
first encountered George's troops. The work of Walpole, however,
had been too well done. The old statesman, who drank to the health
of his rivals for winning Dettingen, lived to see neither Fontenoy nor
the fulfilment of his prophecy that the Crown would again be fought
for on British soil. But his policy had weaned the masses from the
Stuarts, and 1745 saw the failure of this deadly stroke by France,
Thus the year which confirmed Frederick upon his throne, restored
the Bavarian line, and gave the Empire once more to the House of
Habsburg, also repulsed the long-drawn Stuart threat to the Pro-
testant Succession. While the 'Forty-five ran its course, Britain
replied with a colonial effort which both counted for much at the time
and pointed towards great things in the future. Some 4000 militia,
chiefly from Massachusetts, very efficiently aided by the King's ships,
captured Louisbourg, a fortress upon which the French were said to
have spent a million sterling. Only eternity, urged a divine, would be
long enough for the due thanksgiving.1 Soon all Cape Breton Island
was ours, "the key and protection of their whole fishery",2 making
us the gate-keepers of North America for defence, commerce, and
control of the native races. "Had we not taken Cape Breton this
year and the French had taken Annapolis/9 it was believed, "all
the inhabitants of Nova Scotia would have declared for France
immediately."8 In London, however, neither this distant success,
nor the prospect of seizing the French fishery and controlling their
commerce, nor Culloden with Cumberland's repression of the High-
lands, nor the triumph of ministers over the King which barred
Pulteney and Carteret from power and brought Pitt into employment
— none of these could dispel the gloom caused by the irresistible
progress of the French in the Low Countries. Louisbourg might
safeguard New England, but Antwerp imperilled Old, and Antwerp
seemed defenceless against Maurice de Saxe.
At the close of the year, indeed, the Government raised £4,000,000
in two days and as much again was offered, while the revolution
which made the King's bellicose son-in-law, William of Orange,
stadholder, held out hope of more vigorous Dutch participation in
the war. The Russians, too, were disposed to help Maria Theresa,
and were presently reported to be moving from the Vistula to the
Rhine at the rate of some two miles a day.4 To Newcastle, however, it
seemed politic to desist from a war which was no longer waged for any
British aim nor with any reasonable hope of reaching an anti-French
decision. Though bitterly opposed by Maria Theresa, who clung to
the hope of recovering Silesia, and hampered as usual by the pro-
Hanoverian intrigues of George II, Newcastle in 1747 steadily
shepherded Britain and her allies towards peace. France was no less
1 Robertson, G. G., op. cit. p. in; and vide infra, p. 525.
1 Anderson, m, 248. 8 flM- m, 252.
4 Mordaunt to Cumberland, May 1748, cit. Gharteris, Cumberland, p. 341-
376 RIVALRY FOR COLONIAL POWER, 1714-1748
weary of the financial strain of war. In 1746 she had gained Madras,
but next year the victories of Anson and Hawke in the Bay of Biscay
destroyed the relics of her marine and with them all present hope of
victory* overseas. So weary was her court of the war that the bargain
was struck unknown to Spain, her sole ally, and all Flanders was given
back.1 By the close of April 1748, France and the Sea Powers had
reached an understanding at Aix-la-Chapelle, and in the autumn the
impossibility of fighting on without their aid brought all Powers into
agreement. The peace of 1748 bore out the theory that with Europe
divided between French and British camps future conquests had
become impossible. In every continent the principle of restitution
prevailed. Austria, indeed, must compensate Prussia with Silesia,
Spain with Parma and Piacenza, and Sardinia with the frontier of
the Ticino, sacrifices which disgusted her with Britain. But she
secured the Pragmatic Sanction, the surrender of her conquered
Netherlands, and the return of the Empire to her House. France
gave up Madras and the seaward fortifications of Dunkirk, proving
her loyalty to the Hanoverian Succession by expelling the Pretender,
To complete that security of Old England which had been the
dominant desire of British statesmen since the death of Anne, France
and Austria were induced to accept the re-establishment of the
Flemish Barrier. The price was the return to France of the key of the
St Lawrence, although this must mean that New England would be
insecure. Britain surrendered Cape Breton, but recovered in principle
her favoured position with regard to Spanish trade. The full enjoy-
ment of her rights could be gained, however, only by negotiation at
Madrid on the questions of the South Sea Company's trade and the
measures to be taken against abuses. Such negotiation must in any
event be tedious and uncertain. It remained to be seen whether
Spanish disgust with France for abandoning her cause would out-
weigh the former disgust with Britain for the conquest of Gibraltar
and Minorca. If, moreover, by sanctioning the rape of Silesia, the
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle marked the end of the old Europe based
on hereditary right, it erected no firm barrier against the resumption
of the old struggle between France and Britain. In the seven years'
truce which preceded the Seven Years' War, the injured Powers pre-
pared to reverse its verdict, while France and Britain, intent on profit
from overseas, moved towards their inevitable trial of strength.
1 Choiseul, Mfamres> p. 56.
CHAPTER XHI
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES
UNDER THE FIRST GEORGES, 1714-1755
VvHEN the Peace of Utrecht was signed, most of the British colonies
in America and the West Indies had passed beyond the stage of in-
fancy* Some, indeed, like Georgia and several of the West Indian
Islands, were not yet in existence; others, like Newfoundland and
Nova Scotia, were still in the cradle. But for the greater part they
had reached the era of manhood. From primitive and struggling
settlements they had developed out of different beginnings and by
different means into prosperous and virile communities. The British
West Indies now included the Bahama Islands; Jamaica; the
administrative unit of the "Leeward Charibee Islands", embracing
Antigua, Nevis, St Kitts, Montserrat, Barbuda, Anguilla, and the
Virgin Islands; and lastly Barbados: in addition were disputed claims
to St Lucia, St Vincent, Grenada and Tobago.
Since the resumption of the early charters, Bermuda, Jamaica,
Barbados, and the Leeward Islands had enjoyed representative in-
stitutions. A governor appointed by the Crown, whose powers were
defined and whose policy was directed by his Royal Commission and
Instructions, and a council also appointed by the Crown, largely on
the governor's recommendation, formed the executive. The Legis-
lature consisted of the governor and council forming an Upper
House, and an Assembly of varying numbers, elected by and from
freeholders. But there persisted the tradition of constitutional opposi-
tion to the Crown, inherited from the early English colonists.1
Battles were now to be fought in the General Assemblies over the
same questions of financial control and privilege as had been waged
by Parliament in the seventeenth century. The issue was often ob-
scured by the character of a governor, or by the heat of local factions,
stimulated by that immoderate use of Madeira wine or rum punch
which was characteristic of the period,2 But the struggle was essenti-
ally similar to that which we shall see in progress on the continent.
Elective assemblies opposed imperial executives. They claimed the
right to adjourn themselves and fix their own sessions and to appoint
officers and fix their salaries. They endeavoured to obtain greater
control over expenditure. Arrogating to themselves all the powers of
the House of Commons, they denied the right of the councils to
1 Cf. Penson, L. M., Colonial Agents of the British West Indies, p. 4; Osgood, H. L., American
Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, I, 91.
2 Leslie, Charles, .4 New and Exact Account of Jamaica, p. 32 etc.
378 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
amend money bills. Each of these points involved an infringement of
the prerogative of the Crown, easily interpreted as disloyalty. Dis-
loyalty was repudiated. But opposition to royal governors and to
councils who derived their privileges from the Crown persisted.
Pressure was put upon governors by refusing to vote them salaries
or a revenue for the support of the government and the defence of
the islands. Governors who came out with the hope of repairing a
broken fortune or finding some reward for military services in return
for their labours and the risks of sea and climate, often found them-
selves obliged to finance the government or maintain the king's
troops out of their own pockets. For the colonists felt the exaggerated
distrust of standing armies common to Englishmen of the period,
even though their own safety depended on them. Colonel Parke of
the Leeward Islands, Lord Archibald Hamilton in Jamaica, and a
dozen others shared in these respects the experiences of governors of
New York and Massachusetts. One would yield to the temptation
to recoup himself by exacting excessive fees or embarking in the illegal
trade it was his duty to prevent. Another would strike a bargain with
the Assembly and return home a nabob. For a tactful governor often
succeeded in getting his way by assigning to malcontent members
some of the many offices at his disposal, or by assenting to bills on
which the Assembly had set their hearts, in return for acts which he
himself desired or considered necessary for the security or well-being
of the colony. To prevent the abuse of presents, by which Assemblies
had been wont to influence them, governors were now -assigned fixed
salaries from the Crown, with permission to invite the first Assemblies
after their arrival to supplement them by additional grants during
residence. Governor Worsley of Barbados obtained a grant of £6000
a year in addition to £2000 from the Crown, and £2000 in fees and
perquisites (I722).1
The opening years of this period witnessed a tense struggle be-
tween the Assembly of Jamaica and the British Government. The
fight for complete legislative power through the governor, council
and Assembly, which had been in progress ever since 1678, culmin-
ated in the refusal of the Assembly to grant a fixed and permanent
revenue for the support of the civil government and the maintenance
of the king's troops. Conciliatory methods were tried without effect.
Then pressure was brought to bear by withholding the royal assent
from all new acts and from the renewal of those which were about to
expire. There was a period of grave crisis during which the island was
actually left lawless. At length the Assembly yielded and settled a
permanent revenue of £8000 in return for the confirmation of the
whole body of island laws (i72g).2
If the issue of the political struggle in the West Indies was very
different from that in America, it was probably due to a divergence
1 G-°- 28, 39, f. 59. a C.O. 137, 10 seqq., and 138, 14 seqq.
THE WEST INDIES 379
of economic and social development. During the first half of the
eighteenth century the tide of prosperity in the West Indies rose
rapidly to the flood. In wealth, as in strategic importance, they sur-
passed the colonies on the mainland. But by the close of the century
the ebb was so pronounced that the planters were in sore financial
difficulties.1 Between 1736 and 1784, for example, the exports of
rum and sugar from Barbados fell 50 per cent.2 The question in-
evitably arises, why did West Indian prosperity reach and pass its
zenith whilst the continental colonies continued to wax steadily in
wealth and strength? Probably the most important factors, in addition
to those already considered, were the limited area of land in the islands
and impoverishment of the soil by heavy cropping; over-concentration
on sugar production, involving large estates and the increase of black
labour at the expense of the white population; foreign competition
and fluctuations of prices in the sugar trade;8 and die devastation
wrought by hurricanes, droughts, and earthquakes.
The American colonies enjoyed natural conditions not widely
different from those of Europe. They had limitless areas of unde-
veloped lands. They were therefore increasingly able to attract white
immigrants suited to a temperate climate, who developed into a
distinct and vigorous stock. But the climate of the West Indies is
tropical. It was eminently suited to negroes, and when the supply
of black labour became plentiful, it inevitably ousted white. The
process had been delayed at the beginning by the scarcity of slaves,
and the efforts which were made to secure white immigrant labour.
Rewards were paid to masters of vessels for each newcomer landed.
Indentured labour was supplemented by transported convicts and
political prisoners, notably after the 'Fifteen and the 'Forty-five.4
Indians, too, made captive on the continent, were sometimes sold as
slaves by American governments.5 But neither their labour nor
prison labour proved satisfactory.6
Jamaica and the Leeward Islands had quickly followed the example
of Barbados in turning from the cultivation of tobacco and indigo to
that of sugar as the staple crop. Abounding prosperity was their
reward, but it was not an unmixed blessing. The evil oflatifondia was
introduced and brought in its train the evils of absenteeism and a
decreasing white population. The early settlers and their time-
expired servants had received small grants of land and formed a
sturdy yeoman class, increasing the white population and providing
a valuable militia and a variety of crops and provisions.7 But sugar
1 Davy, John, West Indies before and after Emancipation, pp. 6-8; Penson, pp. 174, 175;
Parl. Pap. 1807 (65), m, i.
* Edwards, Bryan, Hist, of the West Indies, i, 347; C.O. 28, 17 and 24; Pitman, F. W.,
The Development of the British Westln&es, 1700-63, p. 9*.
8 Harlow, V. T., Barbados, 1625-35, p. 56.
4 Hist. MSS Comm., Stuart Papers, n, 453, m, 304.
8 Va. Maga&ne of History, n, 73; JV.C. Col. Rec. n, iv. • Pitman, g. 56.
7 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1716, no. 118; Groans of the Plantations, 1689; Harl. Misc. n, 356, etc.
380 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
plantations demanded large estates, large capital for the purchase
and upkeep of sugar mills and slaves, and a large and cheap supply of
manual labour. Unable to provide the necessary capital, the small
planters sold their holdings to richer men and emigrated to the main-
land. The large estate holders rapidly made fortunes and retired to
England, leaving their plantations to be managed by factors and
worked by negroes.1
Whilst the white population was thus depleted, the supply of white
labour began to fail, partly because profitable land had ceased to be
available for indentured servants when they had completed their
term of service. Vain endeavours were then made to encourage the
importation of white servants. The "Deficiency" laws of Jamaica
and similar acts in the Leeward Islands provided, under penalty of
a fine, that each planter must keep white servants in fixed proportion
to his negroes or acreage.2 But planters preferred to pay the fine, for
negro labour for sugar planting was both cheaper and more efficient.
Three negroes could be kept for the cost of one white labourer.3 The
result of these several causes was that after about 1740 the white
population actually declined in Barbados and the Leeward Islands.4
In Barbados the whites numbered 12,528 in 1712, 18,419 in 1762,
and 16,187 *n 1786. Negro slaves in the same period increased from
41,970 to 70,000, and then decreased. In Jamaica, between 1673 and
1764, the numbers of whites rose from about 8500 to 26,000. But in
the same period, the black population increased from 9500 to 140,000
or more.
The profits of the sugar industry enabled many landowners to
escape from a trying climate and to follow what a governor of Jamaica
described as "the usual inclination of the inhabitants, sooner or later
to go home".5 Absenteeism was naturally resented in the islands. In
Jamaica and the Leeward Islands non-resident owners of plantations
were called upon to pay heavier taxes. Not only were their estates
often extravagantly managed and their negroes brutally treated by
their overseers, but the owners drew large sums from the islands.6
Pitt, in 1789, estimated the annual amount at £4,000,000. 7 This
steady drain of money accentuated one of the many difficulties which
hampered trade, the want of a plentiful and stable medium of
exchange. Lack of currency in the Leeward Islands caused all
business to be done in terms of produce,8 In Barbados, after issues of
paper currency, not properly secured, had temporarily ruined credit
and raised prices, payments were generally made in sugar.9 Jamaica
for a time drew ample bullion from her trade with Spanish America,
1 Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS, 3662, f. 59 a; Thomason Tracts, 669 (n), (115); Harlow,
p. 43; G.O. 28, 21, Y. 10, etc. 2 Acts of Jamaica; G.0. 137, 10-23; X52» 12-15.
8 C,O. i, 37, no. 48. * Edwards, i, 347; G.O. 152, 14-28, and 28, 27-32.
B Col. St. Pap. Col. 1714-15, no. 588. • Pitman, p. 38.
7 Rose, J. H., William Pitt and tfu Great War, p. 370.
8 Cal St. Pap. Col. 1716, no. 120. • Ibid. 1706-8, no. 1 176.
ABSENTEE LANDLORDS 381
but interruptions of that trade, especially after 1737, caused money
to be so scarce that goods could only be paid for by goods.1
^ On the other hand, the absentee landlords were able to exert con-
siderable influence on British politics, and by their wealth and power
to procure legislation favourable to the West Indies, even though it
were contrary to the interests of the other colonies. Together with
the merchants who traded with the islands, they formed a "West
India interest", discussed politics and business with their fellows at
the Jamaica Coffee House, and bought rotten boroughs at the
elections.2 The outstanding achievements of this West India interest
were the passing of the Molasses Act in 1 733, in spite of the protests
of the "Bread Colonies",3 and its extension in 1764; the granting of
direct trade to Europe in 1739; and the defeat of the proposal to
raise the tax on imported sugar in 1744. The Molasses Act was in-
tended to secure to the British West Indies the monopoly of the supply
of sugar both to the American colonies and Great Britain. The same
eagerness to secure a monopoly of the sugar market had long been
a source of jealousy between the islands themselves. They always
scented danger in the development of a rival island. The 4^ per cent,
duty on exports from Barbados and the Leeward Islands, besides
being a grievance because it was not applied to the defence of those
islands and was a handicap in competing with foreign sugar, was also
a cause of jealousy, since it was not paid by Jamaica.
Perhaps the most deplorable effect of absenteeism was that it
deprived the islands of men of the most cultivated and responsible
type. This was doubly disastrous in a community based on slave
labour. Progress in political and social life was accordingly not
commensurate with the wealth produced. Barbados could boast of
only four small towns, the houses of which were mean, and the punch
houses and taverns sordid. Resident planters lived, indeed, in con-
siderable luxury in large country houses, surrounded by leafy
avenues. But gambling, drunkenness and feasting were the leading
features of their social life.4
The colonisation of the West Indies had no basis in a religious
movement like the exodus to New England. Anglicanism prevailed,
but Anglican ministers paid little attention to their duties.5 There
were few Quakers or Dissenters. Codrington College, in Barbados,
founded by the will of Governor Christopher Codrington and begun
in 1716, was the most notable school in the West Indies. Yet at its
most flourishing period (c. 1750) less than fifty scholars ^ attended it.
There were, of course, some elementary schools in the islands. But
1 G.0. 137, 175391,44; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 1 9049; Long, E.,Jamaica, 1,530; Pitman,
p. 146.
* Short Account qf the Interest and Conduct qf the Jamaica Planters, i754;andPenson,pp. 176-
183.
8 G.O. 5, 1093, f. 178. 4 Schomburgk, Sir R., Hist, of Barbados, p.m.
* G.O. 28, 50; Col. St. Pap. CoL 1707, etc.; Leslie, G., Account of Jamaica, pp. 30, 46.
382 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
learning, like religion, was at a low ebb. The ordinary planters were
content that their sons should receive the most rudimentary educa-
tion. The richer sort were taught by tutors and then sent to the English
schools, universities, or Inns of Court.1 The first printing press was
set up in Jamaica in 1718. The Weekly Jamaica Courant is said to have
been first published at Kingston in 1722,2 more than nine years
before the first issue of the Barbados Gazette* if that date is correct.
The varied climate and soil of Jamaica, stretching up from the sea
to the high limestone ranges of the Blue Mountains, not only yielded
a great -variety of produce, but also enabled the planters to follow
the pursuits of English country gentlemen. They rode, fished, and
shot amidst their pastures, and indulged in sumptuous hospitality in
which wine and brandy figured largely. Their houses were for the
most part one-storied dwellings of wood, designed to withstand the
frequent earthquakes and hurricanes. They were generally hand-
somely panelled with mahogany and furnished with a "piazza" for
coolness. But the churches were little better than decent houses with
small cupolas. Negroes of both sexes were allowed to go naked,
except in the towns.4
The destruction of Port Royal by earthquake and fire had occa-
sioned the rise of Kingston. As the headquarters of the West Indian
squadron, its importance and riches were enhanced by the wars of
the eighteenth century. As a depdt for the slave trade it was affected
by the Asiento agreement of 1713; but it reaped a rich harvest as the
port of the logwood-cutters of Honduras and Yucatan and of the
Spanish-American trade, valued at one and a half millions a year at
the beginning of the eighteenth century.6 For after the Treaty of
Utrecht Jamaica became the emporium of the illegal trade by which
the Spanish colonies were supplied with British goods. The Asiento
ship, which by a series of tricks managed to carry to Porto Bdlo more
goods than half a dozen galleons, always touched at Jamaica.6 But
this profitable trade declined after the middle of the century, when
the restrictions upon their colonies were relaxed by the court of
Madrid.
In 1730 — to take a half-way date — exports of sugar, rum and
ginger from Jamaica to Great Britain alone were valued at £362,000,
apart from minor produce such as cotton, fustick, indigo, pimento,
ebony, and lignum vitae. The island possessed 200,000 head of cattle
and 400 sugar works, valued at £1000 each.7 Some of this great
wealth was spent in Spanish Town, on the opposite side of the harbour
to Kingston. Here the rich planters and merchants had town houses,
and attended balls, assemblies and concerts. There was a play-house,
1 G.0. 28, 42; Pitman, p. 24; Leslie, pp. 28 seqq.; Long, i, 438.
' * Isaiah, Thomas, History of Printing; Cundall, Frank, Press ana Printers qf Jamaica, etc.
8
€
Kate
REVOLT OF THE MAROONS 383
and the streets were crowded with chariots and coaches. The Jamai-
cans, too, had their own imitation of "The Wells'* at Bath, where
they indulged in dancing, music, and card-playing in the intervals of
taking the waters.1
It was unhappily almost inevitable that, as the proportion of blacks
increased, the planters should become not less but more oppressive,
and too often brutal towards their slaves. Fears of insurrection, some-
times justified, sometimes exaggerated, here as on the continent led
to cruel legislation, and prompted opposition to all attempts by
Wesleyan or Moravian missionaries to educate the negroes and
convert them to Christianity, lest a common language and religion
should enable them to unite.2 The natural result was a long series of
revolts by runaway slaves. To these, in Jamaica, was added the horror
of the Maroons.
The Maroons were descendants of slaves of the Spaniards who took
refuge in the mountains when the English captured the island. Their
chief resort was among the Blue Mountains, where they lived in a
state of savagery, hunting and raiding neighbouring plantations.
Runaway slaves, too, had formed large settlements in the fertile
valleys of the midland districts. Both found a skilful leader in the
negro Gudjoe, under whom they began to offer an organised resist-
ance. Patrols of planters met with ignominious reverses. Fortified
posts, garrisoned with trained whites and free negroes and dogs for
watching and tracking, were then established near the rebels9 hunting
grounds. A few years before, in spite of Governor Hunter's warnings,
die Jamaicans had been petitioning for the removal of the two com-
panies of regular soldiers which they described as a standing army.
But the very dangerous situation was now saved only by the arrival
of two regiments from Gibraltar (i73i).8 Later, a couple of hundred
Indians, proficient in bush fighting, were brought from the Moskito
coast. Nanny, the chief town of the Maroons, was at length captured
and destroyed (1734). Four years later Cudjoe was compelled to
accept the terms offered by Governor Trelawney. The Maroons were
guaranteed their freedom on condition of rendering aid against
foreign invasions and insurrections of slaves. They were restricted to
definite reserves of land.4 The last terrible Maroon war in 1795 was
the perhaps inevitable result of thus segregating them in settlements
isolated from all civilising influences.
The Indians of the Moskito coast, which extended from Gape
Honduras to St John's River, had always maintained their allegiance
to Great Britain.6 A garrison and a civil officer under the government
1 Leslie, pp. 28 seqq.; Neish, G. F., in Journal qf Institute qf Jamaica, 1895.
* Debates on the Slave trade, 1806, p. 13; Report qf Committee qf Privy Council on the Slave trade;
Buchner, J. H., The Moravians in Jamaica; Edwards, i, 487-95.
* Ibid.' !&-*$; Dallas, R. C., History of the Maroons; Pitman, pp. 114 seqq.; Edwards, i,
522-35. 5 Sloane, Sir Hans, Voyage to Jamaica9 etc. p. 76.
384 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
of Jamaica were established there between 1741 and 1749. The three
British settlements of Black River, Cape Gracias a Dios and Blew-
fields boasted 1400 inhabitants in 1770, 206 of whom were whites.
Besides exporting considerable quantities of mahogany, sarsaparilla,
cocoa and tortoiseshell, Black River served as a refuge for the log-
wood-cutters driven from the Bay of Honduras in 1 730. It also offered
a valuable starting point for trade with the neighbouring Spaniards,
or for attacking their settlements by way of Lake Nicaragua.1
Whilst Barbados and the Leeward Islands turned almost wholly to
sugar planting, the soil of the Bermudas proved suitable only for
raising vegetables. These the inhabitants exported in the sloops they
built, serving also as carriers between the West Indies and the con-
tinent, raking and carrying salt for the Newfoundland and New
England fisheries, "fishing" for wrecks, and sometimes turning
privateers or pirates. But the principal "nest" of pirates was in the
Bahamas. For some time after 1713 the coasts of North America
were infested by them. They met with no little secret support in
Pennsylvania, Carolina, and Virginia. But two expeditions, one
from Carolina and one from Virginia, which resulted after desperate
fighting in the capture of Bonnet and Thatch in 1718, put an end to
their activities there.2 In spite of their strategic importance, the
Bahamas, left derelict by the lords proprietors, were allowed to be so
reduced by Spanish raids that only twelve scattered families remained
there in I7i6.3 In 1718 Captain Woodes Rogers, the famous seaman
and adventurer, was sent to drive out the pirates and to resettle the
Islands.4 New colonists were introduced, including some Germans
from the Palatinate, and constitutional government was established
in due course.5
In Newfoundland, Placentia on being surrendered by the French
was placed under a military governor. The need for a civil governor
was increasingly felt. The system by which the master of the first
vessel to arrive at any fishing ground acted as "fishing admiral" and
sole dispenser of justice until the coming of the commodore of the
convoy had definitely broken down.6 When the fishing season was
over, the few inhabitants who remained for the winter relapsed into
a state of semi-barbarism. From 1728 onwards, therefore, the convoy
captains were appointed as governors. But they could, of course,
only act during their brief summer visits with the fishing fleets. The
first such governor commissioned resident justices who could act in
his absence. Courts of law were presently instituted. The permanent
1 Edwards, v, 202 seqq. See McLeish, J., "British Activities in Yucatan and on the
Moskito Shore", an unpublished thesis in the Library of the University of London.
* JV.C. Col. Rec. n. 8 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1716, no. 108.
4 See Rogers, Woodes, A Cruising Voyage round the World, ed. Mainwaring, G. E.,
Introduction.
5 C.O. 37, 10 seqq.
• Reports by Commodores and Lt.-Gov. Moody, Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1715, passim, and
1 72 6, no. 70,1, etc.
THE AMERICAN COLONIES 385
population, largely recruited from Irish Roman Catholics and
convicts, now began to grow rapidly, rising from 1800 to 2400 during
this period.1
After the Peace of Utrecht, British territory on the continent
reached from Hudson Bay to Savannah. From a coast line roughly
1000 miles long, it extended 100 miles inland. To the hinterland an
indefinite claim was laid. The accession of George I was welcomed in
the Plantations as a guarantee of the continuance of their political
and religious liberties.2 The Jacobite minorities, whether in Barbados
or New York, could not challenge the fait accompli^ and the colonies
settled down to enjoy an era of comparative political calm and rapid
economic development.
All the political questions which were to cause the disruption of
the Empire after the Peace of Paris, had been raised after the Peace
of Utrecht. Already the West Indies had demanded that the im-
portation of foreign sugar into the northern Plantations of the con-
tinent should be prohibited; already enquiries were afoot as to how
the colonies could be made to pay the cost of their governments and
a standing army.8 But as yet the threat of the French had not been
removed from America, and at home there was urgent need of
political calm.
The risings of the 'Fifteen and 'Forty-five confirmed Newcastle and
Walpole in their attitude of not interfering more than could be helped
in colonial affairs. Gradually the opposite policy, for which the Board
of Trade and Plantations stood, was shelved. That policy aimed at
stricter control over the trade and development of the colonies, and
the establishment of a homogeneous system of administration by con-
verting all proprietary and chartered governments into Royal Pro-
vinces, governed directly by the Crown. Between 1700 and 1720
seven bills for the resumption of the charters were introduced into
the House of Commons. They were rejected. The charters of Carolina
and New Jersey were subsequently resumed, but those of Connecticut
and Rhode Island, of Massachusetts Bay, Pennsylvania and Maryland
were allowed to stand.4 Maryland provided an early instance of the
new policy. There the new Lord Baltimore was allowed to resume pro-
prietary government, from which, as a Catholic, his grandfather had
been suspended.5 William Penn died without signing the surrender
of his proprietorship of Pennsylvania (1718). His successors passed
into the position of absentee landlords without his prestige, and of
governors acting through deputy-governors.
Proprietary government in South Carolina had proved incom-
petent, arbitrary and unpopular. To help them in the devastating
war with the Yamassee Indians which broke out in 1715, the
1 G.0. 104, 5 seqq., and 195, 6 seqq.; Browse, Hist, of Newfoundland; Rogers, J. D., Hist.
Geog. ofBnt. Col., Newfoundland.
* Col. St. Pap. Col. 1714-15, p. v. 8 Ibid. 1712-14* PP- ™, vn.
4 Gf. Egcrton, H. E., Brit. Col. PoKcy. 6 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1714-15* PP- **> ***•
GHBBI 25
386 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
Carolinians appealed for aid to the lords proprietors and the other
colonies, and to the Crown to take them under its protection. The
proprietors refused to surrender their charter, but confessed that they
could render no effective aid.1 The majority of the settlers were Anglo-
Irish dissenters. They were equally disgusted by the neglect of the
proprietors and their Anglican policy, by their exercise of the pre-
rogative in disallowing their laws and by their interference with the
distribution of the lands of the conquered Yamassees. A threatened
invasion by the Spaniards in 1719 brought matters to a head. The
governor was obliged to call out the militia. They marched upon
Charleston. An Assembly was elected, styled itself a convention,
and again appealed to the King. Clearly the proprietors had failed
to defend the country and preserve order. The veteran, Sir Francis
Nicholson, was appointed by the Crown to carry on the government.
The surrender of die charter was completed in 1729, a strip of North
Carolina being reserved for Lord Carteret, who refused to part with
his share of the soil. Alarmed by the repeated representations of the
Board of Trade in favour of resuming the charters, notably in 1721,*
and its success in the case of South Carolina, Massachusetts presented
to the King an address for the continuance of its privileges. It was
supported by its colony's agent, Jeremiah Dummer, in his Defence of
the New England Charters. That pamphlet closed a discussion which
had been active for a generation and which was not seriously
reopened for another forty years.3
In direct conflict with the ideal of stricter control steadily urged
by the Council of Trade, stood the ideal of the colonies. In royal and
chartered governments alike that ideal was almost complete in-
dependence after the Connecticut model. There, and in Rhode
Island, the executive and legislature were appointed by the voters.
They chose their own governors, carried on illegal trade with im-
punity, and had no correspondence with the Government at home,
except when they stood in need of assistance from the Crown.4
Deep devotion to the Crown was expressed in all addresses. But
certainly, even at this early period, a strong current of feeling for
independence was running in the colonies, or at least a desire to
manage their own affairs in a way which involved disowning the
sovereignty of the Crown.5 It was so interpreted not only by the
Board of Trade and the Privy Council,6 but by governors of such
different characters as Hunter and Clarke of New York, Belcher of
New England, and Lord Archibald Hamilton of Jamaica, and by
independent observers on both sides of the Atlantic.7 It was, indeed,
Ca/, St. Pap. Col. 1714-15, nos. 517, 524; JV.C. Col. Rec. n, 191 seqq.
N.Y. CoLDocs. v, 591.
Cf. Osgood, H. L., Amer. Col. in the Eighteenth Cmtiny, n, 294-9.
C.O. 5, 752, no. 45; 5, 1294, p. 27.
" '
°°L I?1 1~12' Pp' I03' 10*; G'°- 5» 752, nos. 44, ii, iv, 45; 5, 898, no. 84.
A J.C., CoL m, 329-34- 7 C.O, 5, 1093, ff- 64> 1*6.
GOVERNORS' SALARIES AND REVENUE 387
the natural interpretation of much of the procedure of the Assemblies
during the first half of the eighteenth century. Sometimes the nomin-
ated councils, which with the governor formed the executive, joined
with the representatives in their demands. Sometimes they opposed
the governor on their own behalf, as when in New York (xyag),1
North Carolina, and elsewhere, they successfully challenged his
claim to sit and vote in council when acting in a legislative capacity.
But more usually they acted with the governor in opposing the claims
of the Assemblies. Everywhere, in royal and chartered provinces
alike, the constitutional development was practically the same. By
precisely the same procedure as was pursued in the West Indies, the
legislative Assemblies endeavoured to obtain complete control over
finance, the executive and the judiciary. Using the power of the purse
to induce governors to disobey the Royal Instructions which, they
maintained, were not binding upon themselves, they attempted, by
alternate bribery and starvation, to gain control over all officers of
State. The growing system of placemen and the permitting holders
of Grown appointments in the colonies to act by deputy — an abuse
long combated in vain by the Council of Trade— no doubt stimulated
their opposition to royal nominees and the desire to appoint their own
officers. The peculation and maladministration of bad governors,
such as Lord Cornbury in New York, lent a colour of reason to their
refusal to vote permanent salaries. But the refusal was maintained
equally when there was no such reason. Nor was it a question of
hardship. Though poverty was sometimes pleaded as an excuse for
not voting governors* salaries, yet Massachusetts, New York, and
Jamaica were all ready enough to offer heavier bribes than the
salaries demanded, if they could have their way, and to prolong their
own sessions at a cost greater than the revenues they were asked to
vote. This is the key to the struggle to obtain a permanent and
adequate revenue and fixed salaries for governors which was fought
out in long and bitter controversies during the first part of the
eighteenth century, chiefly in the arenas of Massachusetts, New York,
and Jamaica. In Virginia, where the governor's salary was fixed
and paid out of the permanent revenue, and the Assembly could
therefore put no pressure upon him, political calm reigned. It was
not until 1753 that a principle of financial control was raised there.
Governor Dinwiddie then claimed the right to levy a tax fixed by
himself on all documents requiring the public seal. The Assembly
protested to the King. Its appeal was rejected, but the governor
saw fit to modify his attitude.
In New York, thanks to the firmness and political genius of
Governor Hunter, the issue was temporarily decided in the opening
years of this period, and decided in favour of the Crown. In view of
the Assembly's prolonged refusal to vote an adequate revenue for the
i G.0. 5, 1093* ff- 8*. 85-
25-2
388 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
support of the governor and government, threats were made of
settling a revenue by Act of Parliament over the Assembly's head.
Then Hunter was left in the lurch by the new Tory ministry. The
accession of George I and the return of the Whigs came just in time
to save him from being ruined and recalled. By his conciliatory skill
he succeeded at length in obtaining a vote for a revenue in return for
his passing a Naturalisation Act upon which the Assembly had set
its heart.1 When William Burnet, Whig son of a Whig bishop, came
out to follow in his footsteps in 1720, the province had been restored
to peace and credit. The Assembly voted him a supply for five
years, and among its appropriations was a salary of £1560 for the
governor. It was not until Governor Clarke succeeded Cosby in 1 736
that the opposition, which had been roused by the Zenger case,2
revived in the Assembly all those claims which had lain dormant
since Hunter's time, and which, taken together, constituted a de-
liberate attack upon the executive and the prerogative of the Crown.
Clarke himself was kept without a salary and starved into accepting
a triennial act and other acts aiming at establishing courts by statute
instead of by virtue of the governor's commission; at the appoint-
ment of judges during good behaviour; and at rendering the entire
executive dependent upon the Assembly by a system of appropria-
tions and annual votes for salaries.8
Massachusetts Bay in the meanwhile had remained the chief
centre of political disturbance. Governor after governor for thirty
years was instructed to stop the waste of timber reserved for masts for
the Navy, to obtain the grant of a fixed salary, and the rebuilding of
the fort at Pemaquid, which with the adjacent country had been
abandoned ever since its destruction by the French in 1697, and was
of importance as an outpost and for maintaining the tide of Great
Britain to the territory east of Kennebec River. All these and other
reasonable demands were persistently refused. Only when Colonel
Dunbar, the Governor of Nova Scotia, resettled Pemaquid (1731),
did the New Englanders bestir themselves to assert their claim to it.
Colonel Shute's demand for a fixed salary was steadily refused. When
Governor Burnet came from New York to succeed him, he was in-
structed to move the Assembly for a fixed salary of £1000, and to
warn it that any further delay would necessitate the intervention
of Parliament. The representatives endeavoured in vain to bribe hrm
by voting him larger sums twice a year. His successor, Jonathan
Belcher, with similar instructions, met with a similar reception. He
could only induce the Assembly to agree to vote his salary annually
at the beginning of each session, instead of the half-yearly dole by
which since Dudley's time it had determined to retain control over
the governor's interest. "They are daily endeavouring to incroach
StA Pa% ^ X7'4-I5, nos- 435. 530- » Pi* infra, p. 399.
. Ass. Journals, i, 793 seqq.; cf. JV.J. Archives, v, 86 seqq.
COLONIAL SEPARATISM 389
upon the little power reserved to the Crown in the Royal Charter",
was Belcher's own comment.1
The Privy Council reviewed the Assembly's claims and actions in
I733^ and declared that they evidently showed "that their design is
to assume to themselves the executive power of the government of
the said province, and has a direct tendency to throw off their
dependence upon Great Britain".2 Yet, rather than face the issue
at^ this juncture, the British Government yielded. The policy of
laisserfaire and conciliation prevailed. Belcher was allowed to accept
the offer of an annual grant, and victory rested with the colonists.
The representatives, it is evident, were doggedly fighting for
control of their own affairs. They had no cause to complain of the
character and ability of their governors. Dudley had been a native
of Massachusetts; Shute an "independent" in religion, clear-headed,
and conscientious; Burnet a mild and honest man of the school of
Hunter; Belcher was a Boston shopkeeper, who had acted as agent
in London for the representatives' cause, and a virulent anti-
Episcopalian. It was not against persons but for a principle that the
New Englanders fought. They saw their goal clearly and never
swerved from their course. British ministers, vowing they would
ne'er consent, consented. It was an ominous precedent for the future.
The uniformity of the main lines of the constitutional struggle does
not imply that the colonists were unanimous in their views. There
was, on the contrary, much bitter partisanship having its origin
partly in the different economic conditions of the several provinces,
partly in the various origins of the settlements, and partly in the
action and reaction of political events in England. There was,
for instance, in New York a "country party" whose interests were
opposed to those of the merchants of the towns; there were the
Dutch and French and inheritors of the Leislerian tradition; in
New Jersey, as in South Carolina, the Anglican party was in bitter
opposition to the Quakers, Dissenters, and the Proprietary party;
in Maryland, Protestants opposed and oppressed Roman Catholics.
If the colonies aimed at the management of their own separate
affairs, they were not in the least inclined to unite either for their
independence or their own defence. The idea that they were en-
deavouring to throw off their allegiance to the Crown was scouted by
Dummer8 as fervently as by the Assembly of New York in 1741;*
whilst observers like Thomas Bannister dismissed the notion of the
Plantations ever setting up for themselves as wild and unfounded.
"Different schemes," he declared, ^interests, notions, religions,
customs and manners will for ever divide them from one another and
unite them to the Crown."5 Commercial rivalry, as between New
i C.O. 5, 898, nos. 84, 84, i, 87. • A.P.C., Col. m, 329-34- 0
8 Dummer, J., A Defence ofWJE. Charters. * Ji.T. Ass. Journals, i, 2$*> 8l°-
• "Essay on the Trade of New England"; Col. St. Pap. Col. 1715, no. 508.
390 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
York and New England, was one cause of jealousy and separatism.
New Jersey, for example, which had been administered by the same
governor as New York, demanded and obtained a separate governor
on the grounds that the development of the province was hindered by
its more opulent and powerful neighbour (I73O).1 Boundary disputes
provided another cause of cleavage, as between Virginia and North
Carolina and Maryland, between New York and New Jersey and
Connecticut, and between Maryland and Pennsylvania. Apart from
the general unifying influence of language, constitutions, and political
ideas inherited from the mother country, any tendency towards unity
came from pressure from without, and hitherto with little effect. The
colonies were as unwilling to exert themselves in self-defence as they
were to unite in defending each other. Planters, engrossed in business,
gave a grudging response to the demands of governors for strengthen-
ing their fortifications and militias. The pacificism of the Quakers
in Pennsylvania left their neighbours unsupported; Virginia held that
the British Navy was the true defence of her shores ; and the Carolinas
reserved their strength for combating the Spaniards in Florida and
the Indians on their frontiers.
When South Carolina appealed to the northern colonies for aid
against the Yamassees, the Virginians alone were persuaded by their
lieutenant-governor, Colonel Spotswood, to send troops to their
assistance. He, and men of vision like himself, began to urge some
scheme of organised contributory defence.2 In 1728 Sir William
Keith, ex-Lieutenant-Governor of Pennsylvania, proposed the im-
position of a stamp tax in the Plantations in order to provide a general
fiind for the upkeep of a standing army and the administration and
development of the colonies.3
In 1721, the Council of Trade, in order to remedy faults of ad-
ministration and the evasion of laws relating to trade, quit-rents,
the taking up of land, and the preservation of the woods, and also to
secure co-operation in colonial defence, had suggested the appoint-
ment of a captain-general over all the colonies who should be advised
by two councillors from each province.4 It urged that the danger
of the French advance along the line of the Mississippi should be
countered by building forts along the frontiers, strengthening Nova
Scotia and South Carolina, and planting settlements beyond the
mountains. It also approved Spotswood's plan for a fort on Lake
Erie, and Burners scheme for occupying Niagara. Burnet had
worked hard to prevent the selling to the French of goods which they
resold to the Indians and thereby maintained their influence over
them. To control the Indian trade, he established posts at Saratoga
and Oswego (1727). The opposition of the Dutch and other merchants
at Albany proved too strong, and Burnet's provisions were repealed
1 S'9' 5<4» nos- 44» 455 5» 98o, no- 48. *•> Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1715, nos. 651, 389, i.
» G.O. 5/4, no. 37, i- - 4 MT. Col. X)ocs. v, 59?.
SCHEMES FOR DEFENCE 391
in 1729. But to the founding of Oswego the French replied by
establishing themselves at Crown Point (Fort St Frederic), an en-
croachment on the territory of the Six Nations of Indians which
secured them the control of Lake Champlain (1730}. The ink was
scarcely dry upon the Treaties of Utrecht ere the French began to
fortify Cape Breton, to interpret the cession of Acadia as embracing
only the eastern part of the peninsula, to intrigue with the Northern
Indians and the Six Nations, and to complete a line of forts along the
Mississippi valley, from Detroit to New Orleans (1720), connecting
it with Canada.1 Plainly their guns pointed at the back of the British
colonies, and their expansion barred British development westwards.
Strategically the most important point along the line threatened
by the French was the frontier of New York. Its defence was a vital
concern for all the colonies. The key to it was held by the Six Nations.
Occupying the Mohawk valley, they not only commanded the most
direct communications with the western prairies, but also, by their
conquests over adjacent Indian tribes, extended their influence to
the Mississippi. They acted, therefore, not only as a check to French
development westwards but also enabled the British fur traders to get
into touch with the Indians of the Huron and Michigan region and the
upper Mississippi valley. With the Six Nations, by frequent conferences
and presents at Albany, "the chain of the Covenant was kept bright",
in spite of unremitting French intrigues. At the request of the Society
for the Propagation of the Gospel and the Indians themselves, the sale
of intoxicating liquor to them was prohibited. Too often it had been
used by unscrupulous traders to cheat them of their goods and lands.
The wars with the Tuscaroras and Yamassees had cleared the Carolinas
of enemy Indians, and at the same time brought them into touch with
the Creeks and Cherokees beyond the frontier, and the Indians in the
south-west more directly under the influence of the French. Whilst
Carolina controlled relations with the Indians to the south, Virginia,
halfway between them and the Six Nations, was affected by both.
In these circumstances it might have been expected that common
interest in the loyalty of the Indians would have drawn the several
governments closer together. Actually, events demonstrated their
deep-seated separatism. A congress of governors at Albany in 1722,
called to settle questions that had arisen over the relations of the Six
Nations with the Indians of the Virginia frontier, revealed differences
of opinion between New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and made
it evident that there was little hope of the several governments
combining in a comprehensive Indian policy.
But when at length rupture with France was clearly imminent, a
conference at Albany was summoned by William Shirley, the able
and energetic Governor of New England, by direction of die Council
of Trade, in order to make a joint agreement with the Six Nations.
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1712-14,1108.295,521,522; 1714-15, pp. viii-x;cf. C.O.5, 1093, f. 155.
390 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
York and New England, was one cause of jealousy and separatism.
New Jersey, for example, which had been administered by the same
governor as New York, demanded and obtained a separate governor
on the grounds that the development of the province was hindered by
its more opulent and powerful neighbour (I73O).1 Boundary disputes
provided another cause of cleavage, as between Virginia and North
Carolina and Maryland, between New York and New Jersey and
Connecticut, and between Maryland and Pennsylvania, Apart from
the general unifying influence of language, constitutions, and political
ideas inherited from the mother country, any tendency towards unity
came from pressure from without, and hitherto with little effect. The
colonies were as unwilling to exert themselves in self-defence as they
were to unite in defending each other. Planters, engrossed in business,
gave a grudging response to the demands of governors for strengthen-
ing their fortifications and militias. The pacificism of the Quakers
in Pennsylvania left their neighbours unsupported; Virginia held that
the British Navy was the true defence of her shores ; and the Carolinas
reserved their strength for combating the Spaniards in Florida and
the Indians on their frontiers.
When South Carolina appealed to the northern colonies for aid
against the Yamassees, the Virginians alone were persuaded by their
lieutenant-governor, Colonel Spotswood, to send troops to their
assistance. He, and men of vision like himself, began to urge some
scheme of organised contributory defence.2 In 1728 Sir William
Keith, ex-Lieutenant-Governor of Pennsylvania, proposed the im-
position of a stamp tax in the Plantations in order to provide a general
fund for the upkeep of a standing army and the administration and
development of the colonies.8
In 1721, the Council of Trade, in order to remedy faults of ad-
ministration and the evasion of laws relating to trade, quit-rents,
the taking up of land, and the preservation of the woods, and also to
secure co-operation in colonial defence, had suggested the appoint-
ment of a captain-general over all the colonies who should be advised
by two councillors from each province.4 It urged that the danger
of the French advance along the line of the Mississippi should be
countered by building forts along the frontiers, strengthening Nova
Scotia and South Carolina, and planting settlements beyond the
mountains. It also approved Spotswood's plan for a fort on Lake
Erie, and Burnet's scheme for occupying Niagara. Burnet had
worked hard to prevent the selling to the French of goods which they
resold to the Indians and thereby maintained their influence over
them. To control the Indian trade, he established posts at Saratoga
and Oswego (1727). The opposition of the Dutch and other merchants
at Albany proved too strong, and Burnet's provisions were repealed
1 C.O. 5/4, nos. 44, 45; 5, 980, no. 48. £ Col. St. Pap. Col. 1715, nos. 651, 389, i.
8 G.O. 5/4, no. 37, i. . * JV.r. Col. Docs, v, 591.
SCHEMES FOR DEFENCE 391
in 1729. But to the founding of Oswego the French replied by
establishing themselves at Crown Point (Fort St Frederic), an en-
croachment on the territory of the Six Nations of Indians which
secured them the control of Lake Champlain (1730). The ink was
scarcely dry upon the Treaties of Utrecht ere the French began to
fortify Cape Breton, to interpret the cession of Acadia as embracing
only the eastern part of the peninsula, to intrigue with the Northern
Indians and the Six Nations, and to complete a line of forts along the
Mississippi valley, from Detroit to New Orleans (1720), connecting
it with Canada.1 Plainly their guns pointed at the back of the British
colonies, and their expansion barred British development westwards.
Strategically the most important point along the line threatened
by the French was the frontier of New York. Its defence was a vital
concern for all the colonies. The key to it was held by the Six Nations.
Occupying the Mohawk valley, they not only commanded the most
direct communications with the western prairies, but also, by their
conquests over adjacent Indian tribes, extended their influence to
the Mississippi. They acted, therefore, not only as a check to French
development westwards but also enabled the British fur traders to get
into touch with the Indians of the Huron and Michigan region and the
upper Mississippi valley. With the Six Nations, by frequent conferences
and presents at Albany, "the chain of the Covenant was kept bright",
in spite of unremitting French intrigues. At the request of the Society
for the Propagation of the Gospel and the Indians themselves, the sale
of intoxicating liquor to them was prohibited. Too often it had been
used by unscrupulous traders to cheat them of their goods and lands.
The wars with the Tuscaroras and Yamassees had cleared the Carolinas
of enemy Indians, and at the same time brought them into touch with
the Creeks and Cherokees beyond the frontier, and the Indians in the
south-west more directly under the influence of the French. Whilst
Carolina controlled relations with the Indians to the south, Virginia,
halfway between them and the Six Nations, was affected by both.
In these circumstances it might have been expected that common
interest in the loyalty of the Indians would have drawn the several
governments closer together. Actually, events demonstrated their
deep-seated separatism. A congress of governors at Albany in 1722,
called to settle questions that had arisen over the relations of the Six
Nations with the Indians of the Virginia frontier, revealed differences
of opinion between New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and made
it evident that there was little hope of the several governments
combining in a comprehensive Indian policy.
But when at length rupture with France was clearly imminent, a
conference at Albany was summoned by William Shirley, the able
and energetic Governor of New England, by direction of the Council
of Trade, in order to make a joint agreement with the Six Nations.
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 17122-14^08.895,521,522; 1714-15, pp. viii-x;cf.G.0. 5, i093,f. 155.
392 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
Commissioners were sent from Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire,
New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Connecticut
(June 1754). Benjamin Franklin laid before them his "Albany
plan of Union". It provided for a council which was to be elected
by the colonies, with a president appointed by the Crown, and to deal
with questions of Indian trade, defence, and unoccupied lands. It
was accepted by all the commissioners, but by none of the colonies,
for each was jealous of tie surrender of power it involved.1 Two
months later the Council of Trade submitted to the King a scheme for
a union of the colonies for military purposes, by which each colony
was to have one representative at a conference for fixing quotas of
men and money, to be at the disposal of a royal commander-in-chief.
This scheme too was shelved.
The objection of Quakers to the use of "carnal weapons" was
always an obstacle to combined defence. When war with Spain was
imminent in 1739, the Assembly in Pennsylvania refused to establish
a militia or to build a fort to secure the Delaware River. Benjamin
Franklin solved that difficulty by organising a volunteer militia and
providing a fund for fortification by means of a lottery. Again, in
1745, the Assembly refused to take part in the attack upon Louis-
bourg, or to vote money for arms or ammunition for that place when
taken. But it appropriated sums for buying wheat, and "other
grains", which the governor interpreted as including gunpowder.
A more serious situation arose in 1754. The outbreak of the French
and Indian war was followed by the disaster to General Braddock.
The Indians in the northern and western parts of the province im-
mediately went over to the French. Pressure was put upon the
Assembly to grant money for military purposes and to pass an act
for punishing mutiny and desertion in the militia. But this was not
only contrary to the principles of the Society of Friends, but also
involved consideration of the methods of raising such money. It was
a long-standing grievance that the proprietors, whilst deriving a large
revenue from occupied lands and holding an enormous area of un-
settled territory for eventual profit, paid no taxes. The Assembly, in
which Quakers were in a majority of six to one, proposed to tax both,
and voted £10,000. The governor's instructions prohibited him from
agreeing to this. The proprietors objected to paying taxes on un-
occupied lands. It was not till 1759 that a compromise was reached.2
The most successful military exploit of this period, the capture of
Louisbourg in 1745, was the proud achievement of New England
almost alone, but with effective help from the British Navy.8 Little
had been done by the British Government to forward the settlement
1 Corresp. of W. Shirley, n, 103-1 18.
4 Minutes of Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, vm, 524seqq.; Perms. Mag. Hist, xxm-
xxy ; Shepherd, Permsylparda9 v; Sharpless, Quaker Government, i, 252 seqq.; Smith, William,
Brief State of Pennsylvania^ Votes of Pennsylvania, iv; Charming, Hist. UJS. n, 33 seqq.
3 See chap. xvm.
NOVA SCOTIA: VIRGINIA 393
™r P naction
m S £°yalse e™d to suggest *«* they were a^o
? if, ?rench/ Awards there were long delays in
g the granting of lands to settlers, partly caused by the
°erVe 20°'000 acres °f timber for
• ome of
SoS Bm t£ ^°m,had ^ ** oath of ^fiance to King
an? Suit m;5 ?yalty ,WaS more ^^ doubtful. French agente
b?^LTwnaneS. W°rked P^^tly *> kduce them, jitf the
££n ThT1™1 5 transfer themSdveS and ^dr'catfle to
not 5^'tJ ^ ^combative sense of the New Englanders
^^^ C^e Breton was a direct threat, not
^ N«*«™flMd, but also to their own coast
sea-borne trade. The bitterness they felt when Louis-
df rtT? t0 ** French ^748) was accentuated when
ItS T f the,T5ortress was bei^g reQdered more formidable
h I f^ reas^n Aat *e British Government decided
,at Chebucto ^ » Nova Scotia' in o^^
the entrance to the Gulf of St Lawrence.
°f 25°° were sent out to found the
was ** on]y English colon in
-- ny n
Ammca founded by direct government action. It prospered rapidly.
Whilst the northern provinces advanced steadily along the paths
£Srf?n f mdustriiP^ess, the growth of V^was
that of a plantation colony. The Old Dominion was a typical royal
£Z"0ei ^ 'S Wfilled Ae Meal of ^ mother country bfproducbg
crops only, and consuming British manufactures. Like Maryland
ite prospenty vaned as the price of tobacco rose or fell. Its larg?trade
m tobacco kept Virginia in close touch with Great Britain, and
«£3RV? ""^"^ of planters who tended to monopolize the
council.* Lying midway between the northern and southern colonies
steSr.lT38^6?8^7 °f **" ^Portance both poUticaUy and
^rategicaUy. This importance was enhanced by its western frontier.
A 01.- J^?88*6 across ^ mountain barrier led directly into
AT! ~? £*"*' pointinS to ^ Mississippi. Lieutenant-Governor
Alexander Spotswood, who succeeded Colonel Nicholson in 1710
was a pioneer not only of empire against the Indians and French, but
ot colonial enterprise and development. Shortly after his arrival,
^
. ,
S^T^^ *** revenue ^d sy84601 of granting lands, he
formed schemes for pushing beyond the mountains with the object
ot opening trade with the remote Indians and forming a barrier
against the French.8 Under his direction the first ridge to the west-
ward was explored. He learned that iron ore existed near the falls
ot James River. The Assembly refused to help him in working it, and
and 1716^0.51. ' ML I7i*-i5,*«fa; 1717,
Spotswood, Letters, i, 39; Col. St. Pap. Col. 1710, no. 555!
394 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
the Board of Trade discouraged him from doing anything to develop
the manufacture of iron in Virginia. So, in Pennsylvania, the pro-
duction of iron was checked by the Act of 1750 which prohibited
its manufacture except in the early stages. Spotswood was, however,
able to set some immigrant Palatines to work at mining for iron ore
at Germanna. He himself secured a tract of 45,000 acres subsequently
known as Spotsylvania County (1720), to which he afterwards re-
tired.1 He was presently succeeded by another Scotsman of equal
energy and ability, Robert Dinwiddie. He determined to uphold the
British claims westwards between the mountains and the Mississippi,
where fur traders, passing over the Alleghanies by Will's Creek or
working down from Pennsylvania, had established their influence.
In 1749 two Virginian land companies received large grants of lands
for settlement in the Ohio Valley. In the same year the Governor of
Canada sent thither a force under Celeron de Bienville to assert the
French daim to it.2 Four years later the new French governor,
Duquesne, who had been instructed to build forts on the Ohio,
despatched 1000 men into that country. At Venango they seized an
English trading house and converted it into Fort Machault. Din-
widdie thereupon sent George Washington, a young Virginian
surveyor, to demand their withdrawal, and began to build a fort on
the forks of the Ohio. This work was interrupted by the French, who
compelled the British to retire, and constructed Fort Duquesne on the
same spot. Dinwiddie had no efficient military force at his disposal,
but he raised a few hundred men and despatched them under the
command of Colonel Fry and Washington. At Great Meadows on
the western slope of the Alleghanies, Washington came into collision
with the French, and was presently forced to surrender (July 1754).
The first blows had been struck in the struggle which was to end in the
expulsion of the French from the eastern half of North America.
The difference between the two Carolinas was strongly marked.
A certain amount of tobacco was grown in North Caroluia, but the
main industry was the production of naval stores, encouraged by the
bounties offered by the British Government. Tar, pitch, and turpen-
tine were extracted from the pine trees in the sandy soil. In South
Carolina after 1700 the chief product was rice. Both provinces traded
with the Indians for furs and skins. But the difference between their
staple industries resulted in a divergence of social and economic
conditions. The growing of rice in the paddy fields of a tropical
climate involved the increasing use of black labour in the southern
province, the development of large estates, and the congregation of
rich merchants and landowners about the growing port and capital,
Charleston. North Carolina, on the other hand, had no towns at all.
Bath, the largest village, consisted of only a dozen houses. In South
1 Spotswood, Utters, n, 70, 196 seqq.
8 Celeron's Journal, printed, Catholic Historical Researches, n, 61-1 17.
CAROLINA AND GEORGIA 395
Carolina the population in 1719 amounted to 9000 whites and
12,000 negroes.* By 1763 there were 70,000 blacks to 30,000 whites."
In North Carolina, where the industries were more suited to white
labour^ the proportions were reversed. The whites increased from
32,000 m 1732 to 77,000 in 1760, and the blacks from 6000 to only
ib,ooo.3 The scattered planters, lumbermen, and Indian traders of
JNoith Carolina formed a rough and turbulent community. Even
after the Crown had bought out seven-eighths of the proprietors,
internal feuds, reflected in the Assembly, persisted and rendered the
task of^the royal governors no light one. An attempt to regulate the
collection of quit-rents by Governor Johnston called forth a remon-
strance from the Assembly, appealing to the terms of the "Grand
IJeed of 1668. It was backed by 500 planters in arms, and there-
alter the amount of quit-rents collected was almost negligible.4
The successful issue of the Yamassee war prepared the way for the
settlement of central South Carolina and the territory soon to be
known as Georgia. The presence of the Spaniards in Florida had led
Governor Nicholson to establish a post and garrison on the Altamaha
River. It was soon abandoned, for the site was unhealthy and the
establishment ^ expensive. But the threat of St Augustine and the
danger of Indians incited by Spaniards to attack the frontier planta-
tions remained. In these circumstances James Edward Oglethorpe
had no difficulty in obtaining a charter to establish a buffer colony
between the Savannah and Altamaha Rivers. Lands were granted
in 1732 to a Corporation of "Trustees for the Colony of Georgia",
with full powers of administration for twenty-six years, after which
control was to revert to the Crown. As a member of the House of
Commons, Oglethorpe had interested himself in the hapless fate of
poor debtors confined in the wretched prisons of the period.6 He
proposed to give such debtors a new start in life. He was assisted in
'his project by Thomas Coram and other philanthropists. Coram had
had early associations with New England as a shipbuilder, and had
previously taken part in similar schemes for settling disbanded officers
and soldiers on undeveloped lands there or in Nova Scotia,6 The
principle of his proposals was to relieve the surplus population by
emigrants who should strengthen the frontiers against the enemy
and produce naval stores. Thus the Elizabethan conception of
colonisation reappears in the new venture in Georgia.
In February 1733 Oglethorpe arrived in the Savannah River with
1 14 emigrants and there founded a settlement on a well-chosen site,
which was named Savannah. Four years later, another settlement,
t MSSComm. Rep. xi, iv, p. 254. * CarroWs Historical Collections, n, 478.
A »r^' S?V ^ew" ^ pp* Xvii' 4s4' v>iii> l6l> Bassctt* J- S-, Slavery in North Carolina.
* Jv.C. Col. Recs. iv, v; Charming, E., Hist. US. n, 360.
5 Wright, R., Lt> of Oglethorpe; Jones, Charles, '&^fl; Gandler, A. D., Record's of
Georgia; S.C. Col. Recs. TV; Roberts, R. A., Trans. ofR. Hist. Soc. iv* ser. vol. vi, pp. 73-93.
• Col. St. Pap. Col. 1712-14, no. 460, i, etc.; G.O. 217, 2, no. 24.
396 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
Frederica, was made on the Altamaha River, seventy miles south of
Savannah, wh2st a hundred miles north of it a post for the Indian
fur trade was established at Augusta. A little to the north of Frederica,
some Highlanders settled at New Inverness. Oglethorpe acted as
judge and lawgiver of his new colony, but the settlers soon began to
resent the paternal nature of his government. They were not allowed
to own slaves; the use of ardent liquors was forbidden; and grants of
land were restricted to fifty acres per freeholder.1 These well-meant
regulations proved economically disastrous. For the smallholders of
Georgia, without slave labour, could not compete with their neigh-
bours in South Carolina, whose large estates were worked by negroes.
They were, moreover, in perpetual conflict with the Spaniards,
sometimes being attacked, sometimes making expeditions against
St Augustine. Oglethorpe returned home in 1743, wearied by these
struggles, and the trustees resigned their charter in 1752. Under the
administration of the Crown, Georgia received the normal colonial
constitution. The debtor settlers made good in their frontier province.
But their numbers increased slowly. In spite of a reinforcement of
Protestant refugees from Salzburg, they only numbered in 1760 some
5000 whites with 2000 blacks. The climatic conditions had caused
them to disregard the founder's instructions both as to slaves and
alcoholic liquors.
Reaching from Hudson Bay to Georgia, the British settlements
varied in climate from sub-arctic to sub-tropical. Such variety re-
sulted in divergence of products, of population, and of social condi-
tions. Their steady expansion was due to two causes, increase of
population and cultivation of the land. British immigrants did not,
like the Spaniards, seek primarily for gold and silver, but devoted
themselves to agriculture and trade. The southern colonies fed them-
selves. The middle colonies grew wheat and corn and exported flour
and meal to the West Indies, whilst New England sent thither
potatoes, vegetables, cattle, horses, and fish, and sawn timber, in
return for sugar and molasses. These were needed for the great rum
distilleries which had sprung up in Boston, New York, Philadelphia,
Medford, N.J., and Newport, R.I. Rum was consumed by the
colonists themselves, and used in the Indian fur trade and the
African slave trade. The duties laid by the Molasses Act of 1733 on
the cheaper sugar and molasses imported from the French sugar
islands were largely evaded by smuggling. No great effort was made
to prevent it. For the British West Indian sugar planters had no
sooner obtained the passing of that Act than they discovered that
the solution of their troubles was permission to export their produce
direct to Europe, and this permission they obtained. All the northern
colonies exported furs and skins, the product of trade with the Indians,
1 State of Province of Georgia, 1740; True and Historical Narrative of the Colony of Georgia, etc.
(1741), Am. GoL Tracts (Rochester, 1897).
SHIPBUILDING AND CURRENCY 397
and naval stores to a greater or less extent. But prolonged attempts
to preserve trees in the king's woods fit for masts for the Royal Navy
were opposed by the New Englanders, who could not be restrained
by Acts of Parliament from cutting them for their saw-mills and
lumber trade. The northern colonists were to a large extent also a
sea-going people. Massachusetts alone was building 150 vessels
annually by 1729, and could boast a fleet of 190 sail.1 Indeed the
shipbuilding activity at Boston, Rhode Island, and New York was
beginning to cause anxiety in the English yards. These Plantation-
built vessels were employed in the carrying trade to the West Indies,
England, Spain, and Portugal, but mainly in the coast-wise trade and
fishery. All along the coast from Boston to Canso the New England
fishermen plied their calling. They took their share in the New-
foundland fishery as well, where they caused much complaint by
debauching the English fishermen with rum, and carrying them off as
indentured servants to the mainland.2 In return for their exports of
raw material the American colonies imported British manufactures.
These were retailed at a profit of from 100 to 300 per cent. All who
could afford it wore good English cloth, and only those who could not
wore homespun.5
Fostered by the Acts of Trade and the policy of the British Govern-
ment, which discouraged all manufacturing industries in the Planta-
tions, the balance of trade was permanently in favour of the mother
country. It grew from about £50,000 a year at the beginning of this
period to nearly £2,000,000 in 1760.* This adverse balance, which
had to be liquidated by the colonies in gold or silver, was made good
by trade with the British West Indies, by freight money earned by
shipping, and by illicit trade with the French, Spanish, and Danish
West Indies and the French and Spaniards on the continent. But the
colonies were drained of specie, whilst the growth of the population,
the expansion of trade, the expenses of the intercolonial wars, and
the inconvenience of barter all created a demand for an increase of
currency. British coins were almost unknown in the Plantations.
Spanish pieces of eight (reals) formed the metallic basis of the colonial
monetary system. But their value, though fixed by Act of Par-
liament, was a fluctuating one. For a long time all payments in
Virginia were made in tobacco, in the West Indies in sugar. Wheat
certificates were used in Pennsylvania, and there the property tax
was made payable in money or flour. In North Carolina seventeen
commodities were declared legal tender, and so remained throughout
this period. The need for an increased currency was met by paper
money. The issue of paper bills of credit was begun by Massachusetts
as early as 1690, to defray the expenses of the Quebec expedition. The
1 C.O. 5, 752, no. 45. f Col. St. Pap. Col. 1715; 1716, no. 70, i, etc.
* 8 Ibid. 1714-15, no. 673, etc.
* Jfacpherson,I).,Afm&ofCommerce,m,$4p; Wt<b&,Dr John, The State of the Colonies,
p. 280; cf. C.O. 5, 1093, f. 178.
398 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
subsequent war with the French and the cost of defending the frontier
against the Canadian Indians, amounting to £30,000 a year, led to
further issues. By 1715 they totalled £474,000. These bills were
issued by the Government. But in 1701 a plan was put forward for
establishing a Land Bank, to issue paper money on security of land.
This scheme was revived in 1 714. It was supported by a large body
of debtors and others impoverished by the war, who looked to an
inflation of the currency as the cure for their financial and commercial
troubles. It was opposed by those who favoured restricted govern-
ment issues with suitable sinking funds. The question long remained
a burning one in Massachusetts^ politics. As the issues increased, the
value of paper money declined. By 1 729 it was barely a quarter of
that of sterling.1 At length, the £175,000 sterling voted by Parlia-
ment to New England in compensation for the return of Louisbourg
was well and wisely applied to the reduction of its paper at the rate
of 7J to i. In 1751 Parliament forbade further paper issues in New
England except for certain stated objects.
Wars with the Spaniards and Indians were likewise the occasion
of paper issues in South Carolina. The first was made in 1 702 and
others followed rapidly, secured on land and crops. Depreciation
was soon acute. Bank bills were rated by an Act of 1722 at 4 to I in
silver. In Pennsylvania the deficiency of coins, caused by contraction
of trade with the West Indies after the war, was made good by an
issue of bills for £50,000 in 1 723, which was followed by others for
small amounts. A limited paper currency of this kind proved wholly
beneficial.2 The danger lay in excess. The wise policy of the Council
of Trade was to restrain the amount of the issues, to secure the
provision of adequate funds to sink the bills, and to see that such
provisions were not altered by appropriations and diversions by sub-
sequent Assemblies, as in the case of Carolina and New Jersey. To
this end, governors were forbidden to assent to bills for further issues
without a clause suspending their operation until they had received
the assent of the Crown.3 The need for such wholesome restraint was
proved by Rhode Island, where no such control could be exercised.
There the paper currency became a veritable political scandal. Bills
for half a million were issued to private individuals in proportion to
their political influence. By the end of this period the resulting de-
preciation was so great that the exchange stood at 32 to i.4 \VThere
depreciation became too great^ reversion to barter ensued. One of
the difficulties with which the struggling post office in Virginia had
to contend was that there were no small coins, and the postage was
smaller than the smallest bill.6
1 G.0. 5, 898, no. 64; cf. Hutchinson, Thomas, Hist, of Mass.; Davis, Andrew, Currency
and Banking in Mass. Bay. \
3 Pa. Votes, n, 483; m, 32; Franklin, B., Works, n, 254. 3 AJ>.C., Col. m (172*0).
* Rider, Sidney, Rhode I. Hist. Tracts, ist ser. vni.
• Col. St. Pap. Col. 1710, no. 437.
POST, EDUCATION AND NEWSPAPERS 399
Posts were already in operation in Pennsylvania and New Jersey,
as well as between Boston and New York and Williamsburg, when
Parliament established a General Post Office for all His Majesty's
Dominions in 1710. Letters cost 4*. an ounce from London to New
York. Mr Dummer's service of packet boats to the West Indies and
New York had been ruined by captures in the French wars. A fort-
nightly service to New York was reopened in 1755.* Inland, com-
munication improved slowly. Main roads were built from Boston to
New York, and from Philadelphia to Maryland, Virginia, and Caro-
lina. But for the most part, especially in the south, bridle tracks pre-
vailed, and water transport by rivers and coasting sloops. As late as
1731 one-third of the Assembly of New York came to town by river.2
Facilities for education varied greatly in the several colonies. In
New England not only had Harvard College been founded in 1636,
but from the earliest times in every township of fifty householders in
Massachusetts and Connecticut elementary schools had to be pro-
vided, and schools for higher education in those of one hundred. In
the middle colonies great diversity of religious belief militated against
the establishment of any general school system. There were several
schools in Pennsylvania, and there the Academy at Philadelphia
provided a liberal education, thanks largely to the efforts of Franklin
(1749). Otherwise, the colleges founded in the eighteenth century,
such as Yale (Connecticut, 1716), and Princeton (New Jersey, 1746),
were designed principally for the training of clergy. Dartmouth
College (New Hampshire, 1769) was intended to train Indians as
missionaries. In Maryland, every county was required to have a
school. In the southern colonies, the conditions of education as of
labour were similar to those in the West Indies. Virginia had a dozen
free schools, but rich planters usually maintained a tutor or sent
their sons to school and college in England. Here, too, Lieutenant-
Governor Nicholson and James Blair had founded, with help from
England, the College of William and Mary for the education of
youthful Virginians and the sons of Indian chiefs ( 1 69 1 ) . Virginians,
too, could boast of writers like Beverley, Byrd, and Stith, who could
write the history of the Dominion with elegance and ease.
The first regular newspaper, the Boston Newsletter, was published
in 1704. In 1721, James Franklin began to publish the New England
Courant, and successfully resisted an attempt by the Assembly to
impose a censorship of the press. His brother Benjamin, after making
his way as a journeyman printer, founded the Pennsylvania Gazette. The
first number of the New York Weekly Journal appeared in 1733. It was
published by John Peter Zenger3 whose trial for libel was undoubtedly
one of the turning points in American history. When Governor
William Cosby, a strong-willed Irish soldier, arrived in New York,
he called upon Rip van Dam, who had acted as lieutenant-governor
* Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1708, no. 10; 1712, no. 10, i. 2 G.O. 5, 1055, f. 210.
400 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
before his arrival, to refund half the emoluments received since his
appointment, in accordance with the usual practice and instructions.
Van Dam refused. As Cosby was himself chancellor, he could not
have the case tried in Chancery. He therefore took it to the Court
of Exchequer, before judges sitting as a Court of Equity. The right of
governors to constitute courts had long been challenged in the
colonies, but was consistently maintained as part of the prerogative
of the Crown. When the legality of a court which had no statutory
basis was now again questioned, the chief justice, Lewis Morris, a
man of great political distinction, admitted its invalidity, and retired
from the bench. He appealed to the people, obtained decisive
victories at the elections, and defended his position in Zenger!s pager.
Zenger was prosecuted for publishing a false and scandalous libel.
His counsel, Smith and Alexander, questioned the validity of the
court, and were promptly disbarred. But Andrew Hamilton, a
Scottish lawyer of consummate ability and a leading figure in public
life in Philadelphia, suddenly appeared for the defence. He was now
eighty years of age. His eminence in the profession compelled the
judges to listen to him. They ruled that it was not necessary to prove
that the publication was false; and that it was for the court to decide
whether it was libellous. The jury had only to decide the fact of
publication. With rare eloquence and close argument, Hamilton
then appealed to the jury for a verdict in the cause of liberty — the
liberty of "exposing and opposing arbitrary power", and won his
case (1735). He did more. Not only had he persuaded an American
jury thus to break away from the rule of English courts, but also to
strike a blow for the right to discuss and oppose the Government in
the press.1
Meanwhile lands were being rapidly taken up, and the spaces
towards the frontiers and the coasts occupied. Townships developed
and multiplied. Northwards towards Canada, southwards towards
Florida, westwards towards the Alleghanies, expansion took place.
In some directions, as in New York and Massachusetts and Virginia,
this process was delayed by the excessive grants of lands made to
individuals. The Council of Trade endeavoured with some success
to rectify land speculation of this kind in New York and Virginia.2
But its alternative policy of small holdings of fifty to a hundred
acres, as in Nova Scotia and Georgia, was found to discourage
settlers.3
The population is said to have doubled itself every twenty years,
mainly by natural increase of the native-born. The censuses are im-
perfect, but conjectural estimates give the total number of whites in
1720 as 339,000, and blacks 96,000. 4 The combined population had
i Channing, n, 488 seqq.; Osgood, n, 443 seqq.; Chandler, American Criminal Trials,
9 1 n5i T^ *¥• Jft*-1?13'-**1^ * G-°- 5/971, no. 34; 5/898, no. 62.
* Doyle, J . A., English in America, vol. m, app. i.
POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION 401
risen to 1,500,000 in 1760, of which 299,000 were blacks in Maryland
and the south. Only about 8 per cent, of the 878,000 inhabitants
north of Maryland were negroes. For in the northern colonies, where
grain was raised, climate and occupation were more suitable for
white labour, and negro slaves were kept chiefly in the port towns.
Wages were high and the demand for free labour and indentured
white servants was constantly increasing. Some colonies, however,
endeavoured to protect themselves against the importation of felons,
but their acts were annulled by the Home Government.
South of the Potomac the conditions of climate and labour were
more suitable for negroes. In Virginia the number of slaves rose
from 12,000 in I7O81 to 150,000 in 1760, forming half of the total
population- They were reckoned as chattels or merchandise, and
laws, brutally severe, sanctioned burning and mutilation among their
punishments. Insurrections or conspiracies, as in New York in 1712
and 1741, sometimes caused panic executions and legislation, which
some governors did their best to restrain.2 On the other hand, there
was a growth of feeling against slavery. In Massachusetts, Samuel
Sewall3 argued that all men had a right to liberty, and in Pennsyl-
vania, whereas Perm had owned slaves without a qualm, Friends in
1758 were advised to set their negroes at liberty.4
In race, as in religious and political outlook, New England retained
its homogeneity, in contrast to the middle colonies, where to the
original Swedish and Dutch populations were added waves of im-
migration. Encouraged by the British Naturalisation Act, and by
their generous reception in England, Protestants from Switzerland
and refugees from persecution in the Rhenish Palatinate began to
pass in increasing numbers through Holland and England to the
American colonies. The movement began in 1708, when a few
Palatines under Joshua von Kocherthal, a German minister, came
to England, and were sent to New York. There they founded New-
burg. In die following year 13,000 poverty-stricken refugees from
the Palatinate arrived in London. Some hundreds of these went to
North Carolina, together with some Swiss immigrants, and founded
New Berne. They were led by Baron Christoph de Grafienried, who
had received large grants of lands from the lords proprietors.6
Another 3000 were sent over with Governor Hunter and settled in
New York. They were to receive forty acres apiece after they had
paid for their passage and subsistence by the manufacture of naval
stores. This early experiment in state-aided emigration was not a
success. The Palatines proved mutinous, and before their work came
to fruition, the Tory ministry stopped supplies. Hunter, nearly
ruined by supporting them, was obliged to allow them to shift for
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1708, no. 216.
1 Ibid. 1711-12, no. 454; 1712-14, nos. 293, 525, etc.; 1714-15, no. 673.
8 Sewall, S., The Selling of Joseph, 1701. * Sharpiess, I., Quaker Government, i, 432.
6 Graffenried's Narrative, N.C. Col. RMS. i.
26
400 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
before his arrival, to refund half the emoluments received since his
appointment, in accordance with the usual practice and instructions.
Van Dam refused. As Cosby was himself chancellor, he could not
have the case tried in Chancery. He therefore took it to the Court
of Exchequer, before judges sitting as a Court of Equity. The right of
governors to constitute courts had long been challenged in the
colonies, but was consistently maintained as part of the prerogative
of the Crown. When the legality of a court which had no statutory
basis was now again questioned, the chief justice, Lewis Morris, a
man of great political distinction, admitted its invalidity, and retired
from the bench. He appealed to the people, obtained decisive
victories at the elections, and defended his position in ZengerU paper.
Zenger was prosecuted for publishing a false and scandalous libel.
His counsel, Smith and Alexander, questioned the validity of the
court, and were promptly disbarred. But Andrew Hamilton, a
Scottish lawyer of consummate ability and a leading figure in public
life in Philadelphia, suddenly appeared for the defence. He was now
eighty years of age. His eminence in the profession compelled the
judges to listen to him. They ruled that it was not necessary to prove
that the publication was false; and that it was for the court to decide
whether it was libellous. The jury had only to decide the fact of
publication. With rare eloquence and close argument, Hamilton
then appealed to the jury for a verdict in the cause of liberty — the
liberty of "exposing and opposing arbitrary power55, and won his
case (1735). He did more. Not only had he persuaded an American
jury thus to break away from the rale of English courts, but also to
strike a blow for the right to discuss and oppose the Government in
the press.1
Meanwhile lands were being rapidly taken up, and the spaces
towards the frontiers and the coasts occupied. Townships developed
and multiplied. Northwards towards Canada, southwards towards
Florida, westwards towards the Alleghanies, expansion took place.
In some directions, as in New York and Massachusetts and Virginia,
this process was delayed by the excessive grants of lands made to
individuals. The Council of Trade endeavoured with some success
to rectify land speculation of this kind in New York and Virginia.*
But its alternative policy of small holdings of fifty to a hundred
acres, as in Nova Scotia and Georgia, was found to discourage
settlers.3
The population is said to have doubled itself every twenty years,
mainly by natural increase of the native-born. The censuses are im-
perfect, but conjectural estimates give the total number of whites in
1720 as 339,000, and blacks 96,000.* The combined population had
^ i Channing, n, 488 seqq.; Osgood, n, 443 seqq.; Chandler, American Criminal Trials,
9 ! n??"/^ °iL #?^7I3'A*«' 8 C.O. 5/971, no. 34; 5/898, no. 62.
* Doyle, J . A., English in America, vol. m, app. i.
POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION 401
risen to 1,500,000 in 1760, of which 299,000 were blacks in Maryland
and the south. Only about 8 per cent, of the 878,000 inhabitants
north of Maryland were negroes. For in the northern colonies, where
grain was raised, climate and occupation were more suitable for
white labour, and negro slaves were kept chiefly in the port towns.
Wages were high and the demand for free labour and indentured
white servants was constantly increasing. Some colonies, however,
endeavoured to protect themselves against the importation of felons,
but their acts were annulled by the Home Government.
South of the Potomac the conditions of climate and labour were
more suitable for negroes. In Virginia the number of slaves rose
from 12,000 in I7O81 to 150,000 in 1760, forming half of the total
population. They were reckoned as chattels or merchandise, and
laws, brutally severe, sanctioned burning and mutilation among their
punishments. Insurrections or conspiracies, as in New York in 1712
and 1741, sometimes caused panic executions and legislation, which
some governors did their best to restrain.2 On the other hand, there
was a growth of feeling against slavery. In Massachusetts, Samuel
Sewall3 argued that all men had a right to liberty, and in Pennsyl-
vania, whereas Penn had owned slaves without a qualm, Friends in
1758 were advised to set their negroes at liberty.4
In race, as in religious and political outlook, New England retained
its homogeneity, in contrast to the middle colonies, where to the
original Swedish and Dutch populations were added waves of im-
migration. Encouraged by the British Naturalisation Act, and by
their generous reception in England, Protestants from Switzerland
and refugees from persecution in the Rhenish Palatinate began to
pass in increasing numbers through Holland and England to the
American colonies. The movement began in 1708, when a few
Palatines under Joshua von Kocherthal, a German minister, came
to England, and were sent to New York. There they founded New-
burg. In the following year 13,000 poverty-stricken refugees from
the Palatinate arrived in London. Some hundreds of these went to
North Carolina, together with some Swiss immigrants, and founded
New Berne. They were led by Baron Christoph de Graffenried, who
had received large grants of lands from the lords proprietors.5
Another 3000 were sent over with Governor Hunter and settled in
New York. They were to receive forty acres apiece after they had
paid for their passage and subsistence by the manufacture of naval
stores. This early experiment in state-aided emigration was not a
success. The Palatines proved mutinous, and before their work came
to fruition, the Tory ministry stopped supplies. Hunter, nearly
ruined by supporting them, was obliged to allow them to shift for
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1708, no. 216.
a Ibid. 1711-12, no. 454; 1712-14, nos. 293, 525, etc.; 1714-15, no. 673.
9 Sewall, S., The Setting of Joseph, 1701. * Sharpless, I., Qyaker Government, i, 432,
* Graffenried's Narrative, M.C. Col. Recs. i.
26
402 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
themselves.1 Some settled on lands purchased from the Mohawks in
the frontier valley of Schoharie, others along the Mohawk River,
forming, \vith Fort Hunter and Oswego, the new frontier of New
York2 (1726). Some, at the invitation of Lieutenant-Governor Keith,
settled on the north-west frontier of Pennsylvania. Their leader,
Conrad Weiser, long served the Pennsylvanian government in nego-
tiations with the Indians.3
New York had thus hardly fulfilled the hopes of wealth and liberty
held out by the "Xewlanders", as the emigration agents were called.
Accordingly the greater part of the 75,000 Germans who crossed the
Atlantic after 1717 was attracted rather to Pennsylvania. There they
helped to settle the western frontier as far as the Susquehanna.
Others passed onwards along the Shenandoah Valley into the Valley
of Virginia and North Carolina and western Maryland, forming
always a barrier force on the western frontiers.4
In South Carolina, Swiss emigrants brought by John Peter Pury
of Neuchatel under contract with the Government to cultivate vines
and silk, founded Purysburg on the Savannah River in 1731. Other
German settlements continued to be made in the neighbourhood,
along the Edisto and Congaree Rivers, until the central and south-
western part of the province was to a considerable extent peopled
by them. These German emigrants had little influence politically.
They were the product of an economic as well as a religious move-
ment. Sold as indentured labourers and servants to farmers in the
interior, they passed through a term of toil and servitude to posses-
sions and freedom they could not have attained at home. They
formed agricultural settlements, where they kept to their own lan-
guage and customs, and left the government to the British settlers.
Their chief importance was as an occupying force, destined to form
part of a new civilisation not wholly British in character, and as
helping immediately in the westward movement to the mountains.
All such foreign Protestants who had resided in the colonies for seven
years were naturalised by an Act of Parliament in 1740. Before that,
foreign-born immigrants had been naturalised in the several colonies,
either by special act or general law, as in New York in 1715, and in
Massachusetts in I73I.5
Purely British elements were contributed by the emigration of
disbanded soldiers, Jacobitess and the transported felons. Many
Scottish prisoners, military and political, after the risings of 1715 and
1 745, were sent to the Plantations and sold into service.6 Others came
of their own accord, and foujided separate settlements, as in North
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1710-15, passim, a JV.r. Col. Docs, v, 460-634.
* Walton, Joseph, Conrad Weiser and the Indian Policy of Colonial Pennsylvania.
* Hercheval, History of the Valley of Virginia-, Wayland, The German Element in the Shenan-
doah Valley; Schmidt, History of German Element in Virginia; Faust, Virginia Mag. Hist.
5 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1715, nos. 435, 530; Mass. Provincial Laws, n, 586.
b JV.C. Col. Recs. iv, p. ix; Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1716, nos. 309-314.
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS 403
and South Carolina. Many Irish Roman Catholics settled in Mary-
land, and many Protestant "Scottish-Irish", mainly from the north
of Ireland, on the borders of New England and Nova Scotia,1 or
passed through Philadelphia and made their way south and west.
The German Protestants were for the most part Baptists. Their
several sects — Mennonites, Bunkers, Schwenkfelders, Moravians —
derived from that " Pietism" which was a revolt against the formalism
of the Lutheran and reformed Churches. By their insistence on
simplicity of life, liberty of conscience and a popular Church, they
represented essentially the same tendencies as Quakers and Methodists.
It was, indeed, from the Moravians in Georgia that John Wesley
learned the Pietistic features of their faith, which led to his foundation
of Methodism. Eager for missionary work among the Creeks and
Cherokees, they had obtained a grant of land there. But their re-
fusal to bear arms against the Spaniards (1737) led to their removal
and settlement at Bethlehem, Pa., near the abortive settlement of
Nazareth, where George Whitefield had attempted, in 1 740, in con-
junction with them to found a school for negroes.2 With Scottish-
Irish immigrants, the influx of Presbyterianism advanced steadily,
in spite of attempts at repression as in Virginia, and Baptists also
increased all over the continent, especially in North Carolina. There
were relatively few Roman Catholics in the colonies. Where they
were most numerous, the laws against them were severest. In Mary-
land where, owing to its origin, they formed about one-thirteenth
of the population, they were penalised by a double tax, and dis-
franchised if they refused to take the oaths appointed, whilst their
neighbourhood to Virginia led to restrictive legislation in the Old
Dominion. In general, the proximity of French Jesuit missionaries
and their intrigues with the Indians, and resentment at the political
interference of the Pope, helped to keep the colonists intensely hostile
to Roman Catholicism. In New England, every township had a
Congregational Church, which formed the centre of its society. It
was only by degrees that some toleration was extended to other
denominations.8 In New York and New Jersey, where politics
blended with ecclesiastical issues and the suspicion of Jacobitism hung
over many of the Anglican clergy, it was said that the proportion of
Anglicans to Dissenters was one to forty.
Under the influence of the Anglican reaction the Church of
England began to take a more active part in colonial life. The
Bishop of London was assigned ecclesiastical jurisdiction as metro-
politan of the colonies. He was represented by Commissaries, of
whom the most eminent were James Blair of Virginia and Dr Bray
of Maryland. In Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, the Church
1 C.O. 5, 898, nos. 55, 61.
8 Transactions of the Moravian Society; Levering, Hist, of Bethlehem.
3 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1714-15, pp. v, vi; G.0. 5, 752, no. 45.
404 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES, 1714-1755
of England was established by law. Unhappily, the character of the
clergy was deplorable, save in South Carolina, where the Church had
to compete with dissenting sects and the ministers were mainly
supplied by the Society for die Propagation of the Gospel.1 Towards
the middle of the century, a demand for a resident American bishop
was raised by those who wished to improve the status of the colonial
clergy. The project was viewed with alarm by the dissenters of New
England and the middle colonies. Rather than rouse old contro-
versiesa Walpole and Newcastle rejected Bishop Sherlock's proposal.2
It had been urged also by George Berkeley, Dean of Cloyne, who had
settled in Rhode Island with the object of founding a training college
for priests of the Established Church. His scheme failed for lack of
funds,3 and perhaps for want of proper direction.
It was largely due to the advocacy of Commissary Blair that the
venerable Society- for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts
had been founded in 1701. Its missionaries laboured not only to
convert the Indians and negroes, but also to draw Quakers and other
dissenters into the Anglican fold. Their efforts were resented, and the
close connection of the Society with the British Government caused
it to be regarded as part of a political design to exercise greater
control over the colonies. Yet their work was not without effect
even in New England, and especially in Connecticut. At Yale
College, many undergraduates were converted to the Anglican creed.4
It was at Yale thai Jonathan Edwards was trained, whose preaching
in Massachusetts in 1734 began that great revival of religious en-
thusiasm known as the *fc Great Awakening". He was followed by
George Whitefield, an ordained priest of the Established Church,
who came to Boston from Georgia in 1740 and travelled through the
colonies from New England to the south, preaching often in the
fields and with Edwards making thousands of converts.6
1 Hawks, F. L., Contributions to the Ecclesiastical History of the United States, n, 249; Bishop
Meade, Old Churches, etc. of Virginia, n, 351.
* Newcastle Papers, printed in Cross^ Anglican Episcopate, app. XL
3 Fraser, A. G., Works of George Berkeley; Foster, W. E., Amer. Antiquarian Society Pro-
ceedings, April, 1892.
* Osgooa, H. L.s Amer. Cols, in the Eighteenth Century, vol. n, chap, i; Perry, Hist. Amer.
Episc. Clnffch* vol. i; Hist. MSS Comm. Rep. xrv, app. R, p. 32.
5 Tracy, Joseph, The Great Awakening; Edwards, Jonathan, Thoughts on the Revival of
Religion in New England, 1 740.
CHAPTER XIV
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
JLO discover the origins of government in the British colonies in
America one must examine the efforts of private proprietors, corpor-
ations, and individuals to establish order and produce contentment
in the Plantations which they were setting up in the New World, for
none of the early settlements overseas was projected or carried out
as an act of official enterprise. Though Virginia, Barbados, and
Bermuda became royal colonies in the seventeenth century, each had
already established the main features of its government while still in
private hands. Each had a governor, council, and Assembly; each
was making its own laws with the approval of its proprietor; and each
was subject, within certain limits, to proprietary supervision and
control. The Grown, on taking over these colonies, continued, after
some consideration of other plans, the forms of government already
in operation.
With Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Massachusetts Bay, and New
York — the only other colonies that came into the hands of the Grown
in the seventeenth century — the case was somewhat different. Jamaica
was a conquered province, the Leeward Islands, though possessing
independent governments of their own, remained under Barbados
until 1671 ; Massachusetts Bay, deprived of its charter in 1684, suffered
serious curtailment of its self-governing powers, when it was merged
in the Dominion of New England in 1686; while New York, likewise
a conquered province and for twenty years a propriety under the
Duke of York, remained a royal colony without an Assembly for three
years, after which it, too, became a part of the same Dominion. In
the last two instances, Stuart policy preferred an executive form of
government as most suitable for a colony, and rejected the established
practice of the older colonies where popular Assemblies had become
an accepted part of the colonial system. But with the Revolution of
1689, rule by governor and council without Assembly came to an
end. When, in 1691, Massachusetts Bay and New York emerged
from the aftermath of the Revolution, each received the familiar
form of government by governor, council and Assembly, and these
were the last of the seventeenth-century settlements, under the old
British system, to reach a self-governing basis. Jamaica and the
Leeward Islands offer a different story. One was a newly acquired
tropical island, where heat bred animosity and people died very
fast and suddenly (as Governor Inchiquin said) ; the other, a group
of four small islands, lying in close proximity to each other, too small
406 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
for complete separation, yet too far away and self-sufficient for
permanent union under a centralised control,
Jamaica for the first five years was under military rule; in 1661
civil government was set up with governor and council, though an
Assembly was not called until 1 663. For a short time laws were passed
either by the governor and council or by the Assembly; but in 1664
this dual system was given up, and governor, council, and Assembly
became the law-making body. However, as the laws thus passed
lasted for only two years unless confirmed by the Crown, and as in
fact they remained 'without attention from the Privy Council for
more than ten years, the colony was obliged to hold biennial As-
semblies in order that the people should not be without the necessary
legislation. Among these laws, passed in 1664, was one declaring the
laws of England in force in the island and designed, as Governor
Modyford wrote, to make the colonists "partakers of the most
perfectly incomparable laws'5 of their native country. These together
with its own "municipal laws", as he called them, were expected
to meet the needs of the colony. But in 1677, the Lords of Trade,
newly in office and the first body to give serious thought to the form
a governor's instructions should take, found themselves facing a
perplexing situation in the colony: laws in force for but two years
unless confirmed; laws not confirmed in England for ten years; the
colony holding biennial sessions; revenue insufficient and temporary;
fortifications out of repair and no funds with which to improve them.1
They, therefore, made a new experiment in colonial history. Con-
struing Jamaica and Virginia as in the same class with Ireland —
Plantations under the Crown — they decided to apply to them
Poynings's Law. In 1677 in the instructions to Carlisle (Jamaica)
and in 1679 in the instructions to Culpeper (Virginia) they recom-
mended, and the Privy Council consequently ordered, that the
Assemblies meet only at the direction of the King, and that all laws
already passed be sent to England and thence returned for the
consent of the Assemblies, "as laws originally coming from your
Majesty". Such laws were to be passed under the style "Be it
enacted by the Bang's most excellent Majesty by and with the consent
of the General Assembly55.2 Had this instruction been enforced it
would have taken away from the Assembly all powers of initiation
and deliberation, particularly in matters of revenue. There is nothing
to show that Culpeper ever disclosed his instructions to the Assembly
in Virginia, and the matter is taken much too seriously by Virginia
historians.8 The Assembly there, willingly enough, passed the three
acts which he brought over — a naturalisation act, a revenue act, and
a Bacon's rebellion act — even though these acts were drawn up in
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1677-80, p. 368.
1 A.P.C., CoL i, no. 1177; Qtf- •&• Pap- Col. 1677-80, nos. 412, 480, 641.
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1677-80, nos. 971, 973, 1210, 1211; P.R.O., Colonial Office, 5/1355,
P- 334; Wertenbaker, Virginia under the Stuarts, p. 226.
EARLY EXPERIMENTS 407
England; and the interference went no further. But the Jamaica
Assembly, aroused by Governor Vaughan to a sense of its own
parliamentary importance, rejected the plan completely and gave
its reasons therefor, among which was the "superiority of the
former system". The Lords of Trade, taking a very exalted view of
the King's prerogative, answered the objections of the Assembly,
threatening to revert to an executive form of government and declar-
ing that the Assembly had no right except by the King's favour to
meet or to pass laws at all. But in the end they capitulated without
reserve. In 1680 they agreed that the Assembly in Jamaica was to
meet "after the manner and form now in practice, to make laws with
the advice and consent of the governor and council, such laws to be
agreeable, so far as may be, with the laws of England, and every one
thereof to be transmitted to England within three months. The King
reserves the right of disallowing laws and gives the governor the power
of veto".1 The most important outcome of this experiment was the
obtaining for the King's use in Virginia the two shillings a hogshead
export duty in perpetuity and the starting of a train of events in
Jamaica which led to the passage of the permanent revenue act of
1728, in return for the Crown's consent that the island enjoy all such
laws and statutes as had been "at any time esteemed, introduced,
accepted or received " there.
Of equal interest, constitutionally speaking, was the experiment
tested in the Leeward Islands, where the imperative demands of war,
the need of unity in legislation, and the desirability of financial co-
operation called into being a remarkable attempt at a form of federal
organisation. The four islands, Antigua, the largest and wealthiest,
St Christopher, the mother island, Nevis, and Montserrat, were
settled in the years following 1623 and almost from the first had local
Assemblies, each with a deputy-governor, under a governor-in-chief,
Sir Thomas Warner, the earliest of England's colonisers in the West
Indies.2 Warner, appointed governor of St Christopher in 1629 by
the Earl of Carlisle, whose proprietary claims had been finally
established in that year, and a third time "governor and lieutenant-
general of the Caribbee Islands " by the parliamentary commissioners
for Plantations in 1 643, laid the foundations so strongly that the system
weathered the Restoration and the separation from Barbados in 1671 .
Under Wheler, the first royal governor-in-chief, properly so called,
of the Leeward Islands, each island had its lieutenant-governor,
council, and Assembly and continued to retain this familiar form of
local government throughout the eighteenth century.8 The Assemblies
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1677-80, nos. 954, 1009, 1030, 1239, 1570, 1648.
* Vide supra, p. 143.
8 Harlow, V. T. (ed.), Colonising Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana, 1625-67
(Hakluyt Soc.) and Hist, of Barbados, 1625-85; Watts, A. P., Colonies anglaises awe Antilles,
1649-60; Williamson, j. A., Proprietary Government in the Caribbeef; Higham, G. S. S.,
"General Assembly of the Leeward Islands", EJfJt. April-July, 1926.
408 THE GOVERX3MENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
were small in size and in later years the councils tended to play a
dominant part in the administration, the lieutenant-governor being
seldom resident.1 In the eyes of the British Government these islands
formed a single royal colony, with a single governor-general, but in
fact they constituted four separate governments, each with its local
interests, prejudices, jealousies, and rivalries, which created among
them strong individualistic traits. Communication between the
islands was difficult and slow, and the governor frequently spent
four or five months making his yearly tour of them.
In 1674 Wheler was recalled and Sir William Stapleton, "one of
the best governors the King had in any of his Plantations",2 was sent
out in his place. As sole governor he soon felt the need, particularly
in time of war, of greater co-operation and advice, and early began to
call into consultation members of the local councils and Assemblies
of the four islands.3 Soon he conceived the idea of a kind of General
or Federal Assembly with legislative powers — "A General Council
and Assembly of the Islands", it was usually called — and he outlined
his plan in a letter to the Lords of Trade, 16 August i682.4 This body
was to be made up of two or three members of each council and a
like number of representatives, locally appointed or elected on in-
structions from the governor-general. The home authorities raised no
objection to the plan either at this time or afterwards. The first
meeting was held at Nevis in November 1682, and others, at inter-
mittent periods on the call of the governor, were held until 1711. The
federal machinery consisted of a council (eight), and an Assembly
(twelve) , the latter after 1692 elected in each island by the freeholders.
While the General Assembly was in session, the local Assemblies were
supposed to dissolve, though there appears to have been some differ-
ence of opinion on this point. The new legislative body encountered
two main obstacles: one, the unwillingness of each colony to accept
as binding any act of the General Assembly that was not formally
approved by their representatives present or that conflicted in any
way with their local law; and the other, their unwillingness to con-
sider the creation of a federal fund or any form of federal levy, so
that all expenditure had to be met by joint action among the local
treasurers.5 The elder Codrington, whose letters are always breezy,
became at one time so exasperated that he recommended the an-
nexation of the colonies to the kingdom of England with representa-
tion in the English Parliament, in order that he might be delivered
from their "turbulent practices", and begged that the local militia
be subjected to the discipline of the King's troops, for, he added, " the
trouble of governing a voluntary army is inexpressible".6
But as long as the islands suffered from the menace and danger of
I Edwards Bryan, West Indies (1801), n, 396-7. * Higham, p. 194.
» Col. St. Pap. Col. 1677-80, no. 733- * Aft. 1681-5, no. 654-
I HigHam, pp. 197-*; Col. St. Pap. Col. 1701, no. 1132.
• Col. St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, pp. 355, 356.
NORMAL TYPE OF COLONIAL GOVERNMENT 409
war, the General Assemblies continued to meet. Laws were passed,
taxes were levied for local expenditure, and the business of shaping
the constitution and procedure of the Assembly was continued. When-
ever peace came, as at Ryswick in 1697, the separatist influences
revived, and in some quarters the opposition went so far as to demand
complete independence for each island in all matters of civil concern.
When war again threatened, as in 1701, the need of centralisation was
felt, and the General Assembly was restored. But as the years passed,
the latter gradually lost ground. With the arrival of Governor Parke
and the disorders which accompanied his unfortunate administration,
the quarrel between local rights and the royal prerogative reached
its height. A last Assembly met to enquire into the circumstances of
Parke's murder, December 1710, and sat from February to March
1711; but at its own request it was dissolved and for more than
eighty years never met again. Particularism and the jealous main-
tenance of local rights won the day over centralisation and a system
of federal co-operation. In the history of these four little islands in
the West Indies, we find many of the features that characterised the
struggle of the larger continental colonies, first against any sort of
federal union under the Grown, and later to organise a federal system
after independence had been won.
Thus by the beginning of the eighteenth century all experiments
with different varieties of government for the royal colonies in
America came to an end, and a normal type of organisation, familiar
to us 33 the "old representative system", became established. This
system prevailed everywhere (except in Connecticut and Rhode
Island, which were completely self-governing), for even in the pro-
prietary colonies, all but two of which were destined to become royal
before the middle of the century, conditions were essentially the
same, the proprietor taking the place of the King. The government
consisted of a governor and council, representing the outside control
of the royal prerogative, and an elected Assembly, representing the
voting constituencies of the colony. In the development of the system
from its early beginnings, though variations appear in practice and
procedure, the characteristics and tendencies were everywhere the
same. On the other hand, throughout the entire period to the
American Revolution grave differences of opinion prevailed between
the Home Government and the delegates in Assembly as to the rela-
tive importance of the executive and legislative branches of the
government and the place that the Assembly should occupy in the
composite group. To the King and his advisers the dominant factors
in the government were the governor and council, who drew their
authority from the prerogative and in whose hands lay the ultimate
control of all administrative, financial, and judicial business; while
the popular Assembly was in an inferior position, partaking of the
nature of a provincial or municipal council, the function of which was
410 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
the passage of by-laws and ordinances for meeting the immediate
needs of the colony itself. Despite the various attempts that were
made, between 1664 and 1689, to prevent the establishment of a
popular Assembly, as in New York and New England, or to deprive
such Assembly of the right of initiation and deliberation, as in Jamaica
and Virginia, the presence of such a representative body was every-
where recognised before the end of the century, as essential to the
prosperity and good government of a colony. But there was no
intention at home of allowing the popular branch of the government
to diminish in any way the power of the prerogative in America, for
the King and his ministers saw no parallel between the position of the
Parliament in England, which had won its preponderant influence
through a steady encroachment on the powers of King and Council,
and the position of the Assemblies in America in their relation to the
governors and their councils there. As events were to show, the
struggle in one case was similar in principle to the struggle in the
other. For the first century and a half the constitutional conflict in
America was between the popular Assemblies and the prerogative;
and it was not until that victory had been won and the growth of
these Assemblies had led to the decline of the royal system of
government in the colonies, that they were destined to face the
British Parliament as the great antagonist.
After 1689, tiie ultimate control of affairs within the realm of
England and in the colonies lay in the hands of Parliament, the
supremacy of which appears in the not infrequent threats of royal
officials to call upon that body to legislate when the colonies seemed
unusually contumacious, and in their efforts to obtain from that body
increased authority for the King in America. It seems strange at
times that Parliament did not intervene, especially when the colonies
were flouting the Royal Instructions, in such cases, for example, as
the passage of perpetual revenue bills; but the explanation probably
lies in Parliament's fear of any action that would increase anywhere
the powers of the Crown. It limited its activities to the super-
vision of colonial trade and its attendant interests, chiefly of a
financial nature, and in but very few instances dealt with matters
that affected colonial government. There can be no doubt but that
in the eighteenth century it considered itself wholly competent to
legislate for the colonies and that the colonies recognised without
serious demur its right to do so. It is equally clear that before 1765
Parliament held almost entirely aloof and left to the King and Privy
Council complete oversight of colonial affairs, taking care, however,
that at their hands there should be no increase of the prerogative,
which was a matter of the common law, unless ousted or restrained
by statute. Thus, in fact, in all that concerned the government in
America, the King and Privy Council constituted the highest authority
in the kingdom and their decisions were final. They constituted the
ROYAL OFFICIALS IN THE COLONIES 411
ultimate court of appeal in civil, criminal, and admiralty matters,
and they alone could give legal sanction to the recommendations of
the Board of Trade. The executive departments of the Treasury and
the Admiralty exercised their functions only by virtue of their com-
missions from the King, and only as servants of the King could the
secretaries of state perform their duties.
^ Throughout the period under consideration, colonial administra-
tion was never conceived of apart from the regular government of the
realm. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, as interest in the
colonies increased, an occasional official was appointed for colonial
purposes, such as the surveyor and auditor-general of all the royal
revenues arising in America, whose business it was to bring the royal
revenue in the Plantations "under a more certain method of account",1
in a manner similar to that employed by other auditors of the Ex-
chequer in England. There were also a few officials and clerks
appointed in the London Custom House to take charge of such
revenues as the Plantation duty and the 4! per cent. ; and in the
office of the Secretary of State for the Southern Department is found
an occasional extra official who was the custodian of papers accumu-
lating as the result of relations with the colonies. But these were
exceptional. Generally speaking, no new machinery was set up for
the supervision of the colonies. By enlargement and adjustment the
prevailing system was adapted to meet the new demands, and even
these demands did not become serious until after the middle of the
eighteenth century. Except in the case of the papers of the Board of
Trade and the Secretary of State, no special files of documents were
set apart containing the record of business done with America and
the West Indies. In the various offices of the Admiralty, Treasury,
and War Office, in the Custom House, Post Office, and High Court
of Admiralty, the details of colonial administration were entered in
the regular books or filed in the regular bundles that contained the
record of official business done in England or elsewhere as part of
the ordinary routine of the day.
With but few exceptions, every official in a royal colony exercised
his authority by virtue of a grant from the King either directly, or
through one of the executive departments in England, or through the
governor or secretary in the province itself. This delegation of power
created in the colonies a group of office holders — chief among whom
was the governor himself— who held their offices at the King's pleasure
and considered themselves responsible to the King alone. These offices
of governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary, attorney-general, re-
ceiver-general, deputy auditor, provost marshal, sheriff, naval officer,
and collector of customs— were held as a property, sometimes even
as an investment from which a profit might be made. Though the
method of appointment varied — some of the appointees being patent
1 Massachusetts Col. Rccs. v, pt n, 521-6.
414 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
which they sent to the Privy Council, the House of Lords, and the
House of Commons and in the letters which they wrote to the
Secretary of State, the Treasury, the Admiralty, the Commissioners
of the Customs, and the governors and others in the colonies, they
upheld the mercantilist point of view, with strict regard for tradition
and precedent, and insisted to the end that the colonies should remain,
apparently for ever, in a position of dependence and subordination,
subservient to the mother country and contributory to her prosperity
and power. In reaching their opinions, they sought information and
advice from a great variety of sources, including hearings at the
Plantation Office and correspondence with departments and officials
both in England and America. Among their most influential advisers
was their standing counsel, first appointed in 1718, whose mlings on
colonial legislation determined in most cases the decision of the King
in Council as to the confirmation or disallowance of colonial laws.
For example, Francis Fane, K.C., who served in this capacity for
twenty-one years and was for a number of years afterwards a member
of the Board itself, must always be considered as having played an
important part in shaping England's relations with her colonies.1
Although the Council in Committee sometimes altered or refused to
accept the recommendations of the Board, its reasons for doing so
were not based on any opposition to the policy involved, for the
members of the Privy Council were probably as mercantilist as the
members of the Board. Though the latter had no executive powers,
their influence in shaping executive action was very great. The Plan-
tation Office was a workshop in which was prepared material for many
important official documents. Large numbers of Orders in Council,
royal warrants counter-signed by the Secretary of State, the Treasury,
and the Admiralty, and even occasional royal proclamations and
Acts of Parliament found their origin in the activities of this office.
The Treasury, with the Commissioners of Customs and the Post
Office, the Admiralty, Navy Board and High Court of Admiralty,
and the War Office, were all brought into a more or less regular
contact with the colonies, particularly in time of war. The Treasury
had to do with the disbursement of all moneys appropriated by
Parliament to be spent for or in the colonies and had oversight of all
revenue there raised for the King's use, such as the 4^ per cent, in
Barbados and the Leeward Islands, the two shillings a hogshead in
Virginia, and certain casual returns that came to the King by virtue
of his prerogative. (The revenue in Jamaica seems to have been con-
trolled by the colony itself.2) It received memorials, petitions, and
statements of claims in great variety from the colonies, either directly
or from the Secretary of State or the Board of Trade, and in
1 Chalmers, G., Opuaons of Eminent Lawyers; Andrews, G. M., Introduction to Reports
of Francis Fans on the Connecticut Laws, § m (Acorn Club Publications, 1915).
1 G.O. 140/17, Council Minutes, 22 Jan. 1723.
TREASURY AND ADMIRALTY 415
consequence became interested in many important colonial issues
involving expenses incurred in the service of the King. It paid the
salaries and contingencies of special agents to America; met in part
the cost of civil administration in Nova Scotia and Georgia and of
the Royal African Company; made various disbursements for pro-
moting friendly relations with the Indians; and, in conjunction with
the Board of Trade, handled the claims of certain colonies to money
granted by Parliament as recompense for military co-operation in
the capture of Louisbourg and for services rendered during the French
and Indian wars. It drafted warrants and commissions touching
salaries, contracts, grants and remittances, prize money, transporta-
tion of convicts, and other matters relating or not relating to money,
and in general controlled all payments by the Exchequer in peace
and war. It appointed the Paymaster-General of the Forces, had
charge of the customs service, the commissariat and transport service,
and the Post Office, though leaving to these subordinate offices the
routine management of their own affairs. Its relations with the
colonies were conducted as a part of its regular business and the
records of its transactions were entered and filed in their proper
places in the books and papers of the Board.
The Admiralty played a more conspicuous part than the Treasury,
for upon it rested the burden of colonial defence on the naval
side. It despatched squadrons into American waters and carried
on a voluminous correspondence with admirals, vice-admirals,
captains, commanders, and lieutenants, as well as with colonial
governors. Under direction from the King, as expressed in Orders in
Council or instructions from the Secretary of State, it controlled
the movements of ships, determined the times of sailing, and kept
watch over the execution of its orders. It was in constant communi-
cation with the Navy Board, Victualling Board, Medical Board,
and Transport Office, and kept in touch with other branches
of admiralty administration in matters connected with equipment,
victualling, and supplies. It provided frigates for patrol in Ameri-
can waters, men-of-war for convoying merchant fleets back and forth
across the Atlantic, and transports for soldiers in time of war. It
supplied colonial sea-captains with Mediterranean passes, sought to
suppress piracy and to check illicit trade in America, issued letters
of marque and reprisal, and in time of war co-operated with the
colonies, furnishing ships, frequently with indifferent success, for
such expeditions as those against Port Royal, Quebec, Cartagena,
and Louisbourg. It provided vessels for the transportation of royal
governors, arranged for the packet service to the West Indies in the
early part of the century and to the continental colonies after 1757,
saw to the collection of the sixpenny Greenwich Hospital duty im-
posed by Act of Parliament in 1698 and extended to America in 1729,
and was responsible for the marines while on the men-of-war.
4i 6 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
England's insular position and the wide expanse of water that
separated her from her Plantations rendered the Navy the main
support of her commercial supremacy and national strength. For
that reason Englishmen sought from the colonies raw materials for
the building of their ships, advocated the enumeration of naval stores
from America, and later granted elaborate bounties that there might
be a sufficient supply of masts, bowsprits and spars, pitch, tar,
turpentine and resin, and hemp for cordage. The Navy Board, whose
business it was to build and equip the ships, inspected these supplies,
criticised the tar as too hot, the pitch too thin, the turpentine short
in weight, or the lumber warped and green, encouraged the pro-
duction of saltpetre and potash, and sought to promote in America
whatever would relieve the mother country from dependence on the
European market. Sometimes, but not often, the Board purchased
or rebuilt for the Royal Navy ships that had been constructed in New
England ship yards. With the High Court of Admiralty, sitting at
Doctors9 Commons, the colonies came into occasional contact, as
colonial suits on appeal were heard there as late as 1767.
Except in time of war, the War Office, at the head of which was
the Secretary- at War, who took his orders only from the Privy Council
or the Secretary of State, had very little to do with the colonies. There
were certain companies located at Placentia, Annapolis Royal,
New York, Charleston, St George's (Bermuda), Providence (Baha-
mas), St John's (Antigua), and Kingston (Jamaica). Some of these
were regular regiments of foot, others grenadiers, and still others,
independent companies of fusiliers. The latter were raised separately
from the regulars for special service generally out of England. They
were recruited at large or from other regiments, were on the establish-
ment, English or Irish, and were paid out of funds appropriated by
Parliament. Among them were invalids, that is, soldiers disabled
by wounds or disbanded after twenty years in the army and unfit for
further active service.1 Those at New York — the four independent
companies — were ill-clothed, ill-fed, and ill-paid and made very poor
soldiers as New York learned to her sorrow.2 British troops sent to
America before the middle of the eighteenth century were neglected
and almost forgotten because responsibility for their maintenance was
to all appearances so divided among the Privy Council, the Secretary
of State, the Board of Trade, and the War Office as to rest very lightly
anywhere. The Board of Ordnance was supposed to supply these
troops with their arms and accoutrements, just as it sent over, at
the command of the King, ordnance, ammunition, and supplies to the
various forts in the colonies from New Hampshire to Barbados. But
both functions it performed very badly.
1 Cd. St. Pap. CoL 1711-12, nos. 95, 231; B.T. Journal, 1709-14, p. 525; 1714-18,
pp. 20, 2Q, 2OI .
2 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1701, no. I, i; 1702, no. 994; 1702-3, no. 29.
COLONIAL GOVERNORS 417
In truth, there was very little military or naval protection for the
colonies before 1 756, for England in the first half of the eighteenth
century was poorly organised for efficient action in any direction.
Not only were the offices of administration widely scattered between
Whitehall and the City, at a time when communication was slow and
difficult, but corruption, maladministration, and delay prevailed
widely, and rivalry and jealousy prevented co-ordination and co-
operation among the different departments and offices. With the
Admiralty Board at Whitehall, the Navy Office in Seething Lane,
the Victualling Office at the end of East Smithfield, the supply of
ordnance at the Tower, the officials concerned in despatching a fleet
were so far apart as to render mutual action difficult and rapid action
impossible. Orders and instructions waited days and even months
for execution. The Secretary at War carried little responsibility and
performed few duties other than those of a routine character In all
matters of policy he was overshadowed by the Privy Council and the
Secretary of State. The Treasury was notoriously slow in making
payments, either in England or America, while the Paymaster-
General of the Forces and the Paymaster of Marines spent much
time in lining their own pockets and neglecting the interests of
sailors, soldiers, and marines, just as the Treasury itself neglected
clerks, postmen, labourers, and other lesser folk. The system of ad-
ministration in England, in all that concerned the colonies, was slow,
ineffective, and characterised by a prevailing official attitude of
indifference and irresponsibility.
The connecting link between the Crown and the royal colony was
the governor, the active agent of the prerogative in America. The
governors were divided into three groups: provincials, military and
naval officers, and English members of the office-holding class at
home, similar to those who were carrying on the real government of
England herself. Among the 321 governors-general, governors, and
lieutenant-governors were two dukes, nine earls, two viscounts,
thirteen barons, five "courtesy55 viscounts or lords, six other sons of
peers, and forty-seven baronets or knights. There were at least thirty-
eight matriculants of Oxford or Cambridge or other British or con-
tinental universities, and eleven graduates of American colleges.
There were at least twenty-one members of the Inns of Court and
eleven Fellows of the Royal Society. Forty-five had had parliamentary
experience. Of the 250 men from many different walks and ranks
of life, who received their appointments after 1685, a few were
"greedy proconsuls" (Fletcher, Cornbury, Parke, Cosby, Crowe);
more were men of mediocre powers, lacking tact, ability, and political
common-sense (Sloughter, Belcher, Shute, Cranfield, Reynolds);
while others were guilty of conduct that led to their peremptory
recall (Douglass, Josiah Hardy). Two committed suicide while
in office (Osborne, Elliot). By far the greater number, however, were
GBBEI 27
4i8 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
men of honour, who did their best in an impossible situation. No one
can study the careers of the Codringtons, father and son, Stapleton,
Thomas,' Pa\ne, Nicholson, Spot!>wood, Gooch, Shirley, Pownall,
Bellomont, Dudley, Sharpe, Eden, Ellis, Wright, the Popples, Gren-
ville, the Wenttvorths, Hunter, Tryon, Monckton, and Moore, to name
only the more conspicuous among them, without realising that they
were conscientiously trying to do their duty and represented a fairly
high type of official equal to those holding similar office in England
at the same time. But they stood for a different idea of government
from that which was gradually shaping itself in America — govern-
ment by royal grace and favour instead of government by consent of
the governed — and legally were obliged to direct their administration
according to the wish and will of the executive authorities at home.
They came to their respective colonies endowed with powers that
placed them at the head of the government and made them the source
of all authority, for without their consent the colony could not func-
tion legally as a political organism. They received their commands
from men who were 3000 miles a\vay, had never been in America,
had no understanding of the convictions that were slowly taking
form in the minds of the colonists, and, even if they had understood
these convictions, would not have sympathised with them. In all the
"West Indian colonies, and in all but four of those on the mainland,
the system of government, framed in England according to certain
preconceived notions regarding a royal colony, was based on ideas
already established as to what such a government should be.
Though the appointment of a governor was made in the name of
the King, and though the Secretary' of State, except for the years from
1752 to 1761, when the Board of Trade controlled patronage,1
generally exercised the right of nomination, many influences, personal
and political, were brought to bear to aid one candidate or another.2
In 1754, when the Earl of Albemarle, titular governor of Virginia,
died, no less than five British noblemen, we are told, were mentioned
for titie post.3 There were always a number of applicants for the
Secretary to choose from, and in some cases the competition took the
form of a scramble for office. On the other hand, between 1702 and
1 737 thirteen appointees failed to enter upon their governorships. One
was bought off,4 four died before sailing, one was drowned in the
Thames, one was drowned en route, and one was captured by the
French; but in the cases of the others the reasons are not known. It is
quite likely that they got better posts.
The instructions which the governor received, though legally the
private orders of the King, were in fact a composite draft, showing the
handiwork of nearly every prominent official who had to do with the
1 AJ>JC., CoL iv, 154-7.
2 Lincoln, G. H., Cotreipondetice of Vvdham Shirley, i, passim.
8 Brit. Mus., Newcastle Papers, Add. MSS, 32,737, ff. 505-6, 514.
4 Matthews, A., "Elizeus Binges" Proc. CoL SGC., Mass, xiv, 360-372.
GOVERNORS9 INSTRUCTIONS 419
colonies. The Board of Trade, in \vhose office these instructions were
drawn up, sought assistance from many quarters. It called on
former governors, merchants, and colonists resident in England. It
sometimes allowed the appointee to make suggestions, as in the
case of Alured Popple, its former secretary, whom it permitted to
draft many clauses. It introduced articles composed or revised by
the Admiralty, the Treasury, the Commissioners of the Customs,
the Auditor-General of the Plantation Revenues, and the Bishop of
London. Thus the instructions were a co-operative affair, the product
of many official minds, expressing the best that the British authorities
could bring forth. They were not mere formal documents, drafted to
cloak a more liberal policy on the part of these authorities. The
Secretary of State rarely meddled with matters of civil administration
in the colonies, and the Board of Trade, in its hundreds of letters
to the governors, adhered with the utmost tenacity to a strict inter-
pretation of the text. It is doubtful whether the Board ever wittingly
or intentionally connived at a governor's departure from the literal
interpretation of his orders. On the contrary, it not infrequently
reprimanded him for violation of his instructions, when, as sometimes
happened, he was forced to yield to pressure from the Assembly, and
it was constantly reminding him of the fact that the instructions,
representing the "true principles of a colonial constitution", were
given him to be obeyed. There was no discrepancy between the
policy laid down in the instructions and that adopted by the Board
in its correspondence with the governors.
In the eighteenth century the instructions generally followed a
common pattern, admitting alterations only in matters of arrange-
ment and detail. Though in the twenty-five years before the American
Revolution three attempts were made to revise them (1752, 1768,
1782), only once, in 1752, under Halifax as president of the Board of
Trade, was any serious effort expended upon them, and even then none
of the changes, though numerous, was marked by any modification
in the mercantilist point of view held by the Board of Trade and by
British officials generally. Probably the mercantilist tendencies in
England were never stronger than during the period of twenty years
from 1755 to 1775. Thus, during a critical time when the colonial
Assemblies were losing their respect for the King's instructions and
denying their mandatory character, the authorities at home, deter-
mined to preserve unchanged the dependent status of the Bang's
possessions across the seas, were insisting more strenuously than
before on a complete obedience to the King's instructions and the full
maintenance of the royal prerogative in the colonies. The failure of
the Board of Trade to seize the opportunity of 1752 to adapt the in-
structions to the needs and sentiments of the colonists aroused resent-
ment in America and became a landmark in the divergence which
was taking place between that which was English and that which
27-2
420 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
was American. The English system was already breaking down before
the persistent refusal of the colonists to accept in its entirety a method
of control that was already showing itself opposed to their convictions
and ill-adapted to their needs.
With his commission and instructions in hand, the governor pre-
pared to set sail for his post across the Atlantic. The Admiralty
furnished a vessel for his transportation and for that of his family,
his servants, and his belongings, often covering a wide selection of
household furnishings, and the voyage lasted for six or seven or even
more weeks. Arriving at his destination, he was greeted with the
respect due to one of his station, and after a proper exchange of
greetings and compliments was escorted to the town hall or govern-
ment house or other building in which was the council chamber.
There he read his commission, took the required oaths, and ad-
ministered the same to the members of the council. Following English
precedent, he then issued a proclamation announcing his appoint-
ment and requesting all officials to retain their posts until further
orders. After this proclamation had been read from the balcony or
steps to the assembled people, the procession reformed, and the
governor was conducted to a neighbour ing tavern where entertainment
was provided at the expense of the public purse. The celebration,
accompanied by speeches and fireworks, sometimes lasted for several
days, the details of which were printed in the local newspapers, if
such there were, and formed a fitting subject for local congratulation
and gossip.
The first branch of the administration with which the governor
came into official contact was the provincial council, a body which
more nearly resembled the Privy Council than it did the House of
Lords, and in the eyes of the British Government was deemed scarcely
less important than the governor himself. It was composed of leading
men of the colony, "of good life, well affected to the government, of
good estates and abilities and not necessitous people or much in
debt",1 and in numbers ran from ten to twenty-eight, with a quorum
of from three to seven. It was made up largely from the provincial
aristocracy, but it did not represent the colony. Its members were
appointed by the Crown, on representation from the Board of Trade
after approval by the Privy Council. The governor had an important
part in naming his council, but so did the Secretary of State and
others who sent in recommendations to the Board, so that the
governor was never certain of the extent of his own patronage. Some-
times he was ordered, to his chagrin and loss of local prestige, to re-
instate a councillor whom he had suspended. The councillors served
in three important capacities: as an advisory board to the governor,
when sitting as an executive body; as the upper house of the legis-
lature, when sitting as council in Assembly; and as a court of chancery
1 From the governors' instructions, e.g. N.T. Col Docs. v. 125.
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL 421
with the governor (as early as 1641 in Barbados1) and the highest
court of appeals in the colony, when exercising judicial functions.
But they had no executive powers apart from the governor, and even
in the case of the latter's death or absence, where there was no
lieutenant-governor, and the headship of the colony devolved, after
I7°7>2 on tita president of the council, they were not expected to do
much more than keep the government going until the governor
returned or the next incumbent arrived.
Their legislative independence was considerably curtailed by the
governor's habit of sitting and voting with them when acting as an
upper house, as in New York, Massachusetts, and North Carolina —
a right not recognised in some of the colonies — and by the insistence
of the lower house that they had no power to initiate legislation or
to originate or amend money bills. In Barbados, the lower house
frequently conferred with the council on money bills and occasionally
the council amended such measures. Certainly in the seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries the lower house did not insist on the sole
right to originate bills of this kind. Many battles royal were fought over
this question, first in Jamaica3 and later in New York, New Jersey,
South Carolina, St Christopher, and elsewhere, for the Board of Trade
ruled in 1706 that the council had "as much to do in framing bills for
the raising and granting of money as the Assembly has ", and in 1 718-
20 the King sent a general instruction to that effect to all the governors.
But this instruction was not obeyed, the Assembly in North Carolina
declaring that for the council to amend money bills was "contrary to
the custom and usage of Parliament and... tends to infringe the rights
and liberties of the Assembly who have always enjoyed uninterrupted
the privileges of framing and modelling all bills by virtue of which
money has been levied on the subject by an aid for his Majesty".
The Board in reply declared vehemently that no Assembly in the
Plantations ought to pretend to all the privileges of the House of
Commons, "which will be no more allowed than it would be to the
councils if they should pretend to all the privileges of the House of
Lords".4 But there was never any danger, either in the West Indies
or on the mainland, that the members of the council would make
any such pretension. Though their influence varied in the different
colonies, due to the personal prominence of the members, who in
New York and Virginia were a powerful clique, bound together by
inter-marriage, blood relationship, and common interests, and holding
office for life, nevertheless as an institution they were completely
overshadowed by the governor and the Assembly. Representing
neither the colony nor the King, lacking both responsibility and
1 Bell and Parker, Guide, p. 334.
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1706-8, nos. 575, 697, iv, v, 831, i, 948, i.
8 C.O. 137/10, ii, 13; 138/14, 16. The instruction was first sent to Jamaica in 1718.
4 N.T. Col. Docs, iv, 1171-3; JV. Carolina Recs. v, 287, vi, 909; Smith, W. R., South
Carolina as a Royal Province, pp. 289-90, 294-5, 306-12, 317-19, 321-9.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
executive authority, and exercising only a negative influence on the
passage of laws, the colonial council was never able to grow into a
constitutional body comparable with either the House of Lords or
the Privy Council. The members stood for honour and dignity,
personal influence and family pride, but though they struggled at
times to control the governor and to resist the Assembly, they never
succeeded in winning more than an occasional and temporary
victory. Never had they the full confidence either of the King or
of the colony.
The real test of the governor's influence was evinced not in his
dealings with the council but in the skill with which he was able to
preserve friendly relations with the Assembly. This representative
body had started as a small rudimentary group of delegates, exercising
no more power than they possessed by grant of company or pro-
prietor, for the purpose of co-operating with the governor and council
in matters of legislation. After corporate and proprietary control had
come to an end in Virginia and Barbados, the Assembly was continued
by the King in his instructions to his governors, but received little
attention in England until, in the period from 1675 to 1680, the
Lords of Trade began to investigate, more carefully than had any
council before that time, the conditions of government in America.
Following the failure of the "Poynings's Law" experiment in these
two provinces, the Assemblies, which had at no time been seriously
menaced by that attack upon their local independence, established
their right to exist, and finally, after the Revolution of 1689, were
recognised everywhere as essential to the proper organisation of a
royal province. From this time forward every set of instructions to
the governors contained specific details regarding the calling of the
Assembly and its constitution and powers — details which steadily
increased in number and precision as the years passed.
But the Board of Trade and the Privy Council had no intention of
allowing the Assembly to get beyond control. Taking the position that
the popular branch of the government owed its very existence to
the King's will and pleasure, they deliberately circumscribed its
powers in the governor's instructions in order to demonstrate its
inferiority as a law-making body. According to these instructions,
the governor was empowered to summon, prorogue, and dissolve
the Assembly and even to control adjournment, if the period was
longer than from day to day.1 In the early years the Assembly in
Barbados controlled its own adjournment, but towards the end of this
period it got into the habit of asking the governor's permission to
adjourn.2 This early peculiarity may, perhaps, be explained by the
fact that the Assembly sat for but a few days at a time, so that frequent
meetings and frequent adjournments were necessary. The governor
1 A frequent subject of dispute in most of the colonies.
8 Frere, G., Short History of Barbados, p. 96.
POSITION OF THE ASSEMBLY 423
could refuse to approve its choice of speaker, could issue writs of
election, determine membership, and select the place of meeting.1
He had the right to suggest legislation, could scrutinise very closely
the character of the laws passed, and was expected to veto such as
were not in accord with his instructions or were repugnant to the
laws of England. By successive instructions and by decisions of
the Crown lawyers or of the counsel to the Board of Trade, the
Assembly was forbidden to concern itself with any matter that lay
outside the province it represented or which trespassed upon the
prerogative of the King or the powers of Parliament. It could not
interfere in any way with the laws of trade or discriminate in favour
of the colonists at the expense of British merchants engaged in colonial
trade. It could not pass private acts without a clause saving the
rights of the Grown, bodies politic and corporate, and all private
persons, nor could it pass these and other acts, the nature of which
was specified, without first obtaining the King's consent or introducing
a suspending clause binding the colony not to enforce the act until
the King's will were known. Thus the freedom of the Assembly was
hedged in at many points by the instructions which the King sent to
his governor, and it was against the barriers which such instructions
set up that the Assemblies in the royal colonies in the eighteenth
century fought with all the resources in their possession. They opposed
"ministerial mandates " and government by instructions on the ground
that such were inimical to the liberties of a free people, and would
have no more of them than could be helped. But the Privy Council
and the Board of Trade viewed the instructions as a fundamental
part of the constitution of a royal colony, to be obeyed as the com-
mands of the King. It may be said with much justice that the question
of the King's authority as expressed in his instructions to his governors
lay at the very centre of the colonial conflict.
Even if an act of Assembly passed safely the tests that the British
authorities imposed upon it in the instructions — tests which they
deemed wholly warranted because "founded on the principles of
reason and justice"3 — it had still to face a further exercise of the pre-
rogative in the right which the King reserved to himself of confirming
or disallowing the act after it was received in England. The practice
came into use slowly and was not fully adopted before the eighteenth
century, but it proved an efficient form of colonial control, in many
ways beneficial to the colonists themselves. Particularly in the
earlier period, it prevented the colonists from passing hasty and ill-
considered legislation that was often obscure, loosely worded, and
even technically poor and contradictory, and it served to improve
legislation and to prevent local retaliatory measures in matters of
general concern. The English authorities would not tolerate any acts
1 Another subject of dispute, particularly in Massachusetts Bay (Acts and Resolves, xx,
234 n.) and Jamaica (G.O. 138/20). a A.P.C., Col. ra, 164.
424 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
contrary to the laws of England which affected trade or the interests
of British merchants, or infringed on the royal prerogative. In the
first two particulars they were successful in their efforts; but in the
third they made little headway, for the popular parties in the colonial
Assemblies fought the prerogative in whatever form it appeared, and
employed many devices to thwart the royal will. They re-enacted
laws that had been disallowed, passed temporary acts chiefly con-
cerning revenue, and paid as little attention as they could to the
suspending clause, which the Pennsylvania Assembly declared to be
"destructive to the liberties granted to the people of the province by
the royal and provincial charters, injurious to the rights of the pro-
prietors, and without precedent in the law of the province".1 It is
true that in many instances the colonies suffered hardship and in-
justice because of the disallowance, but it cannot be said that in
principle such a review of colonial legislation was either unwise or
objectionable. The trouble with the disallowance, as with other
forms of royal control, was that it admitted of no proper adjustment
to the changing needs and sentiments of the colonists.2 It tended to
become more inflexible as time went on, and was as rigidly inter-
preted just before the American Revolution as at any time in its
history. The British regulations were never more rigorously enforced
than after 1763, and that, too, at a time when the colonial Assemblies
were reaching the maximum of their strength and influence.3
The growth to maturity of the colonial Assemblies is the out-
standing feature of the old British system of colonial government.
Though legally conceived as inferior bodies, they had acquired from
the beginning deep-rooted notions as to the rights of Englishmen in
all parliamentary matters; and the example of the parliaments of
the Interregnum was early followed in Maryland, Virginia, South
Carolina, and Barbados,4 where there were "parliament men"
already indoctrinated with the idea of parliamentary supremacy.
Parliamentary privileges were early asked for by the Speaker of the
House and granted by the governor in most of the royal colonies.
Jamaica as early as i6775 ^d Virginia a little later "prayed in
behalf of the burgesses now assembled that they might enjoy all those
privileges that have heretofore at any time been used or indulged in
by former ^ Assemblies".6 The Speakers of Barbados and North
Carolina did the same, though the record is of later date, when they
52-
8 See C.O. 138/14, quoted in Bell and Parker, Guide, p. 211.
3 Andrews, The Royal Disallowance; Borland, The Royal Disallowance in Massachusetts',
Russell, Review of American Colonial Legislation.
* Fendall's, Matthews's, and Owen's parliaments in Maryland, Virginia, and South
Carolina; and, for Barbados, see Cal St. Pap. Col. 1661-8, no. 1017.
6 JJH.R. Jamaica, x, 11, 23, 119. « JJf.B. Virginia, 1695, p. i.
CONTROVERSY OVER PRIVILEGES 4*5
asked for "the privileges necessary to the constitution of a free
Assembly".1 The Assembly in Barbados was always less insistent on
its privileges than were many of the other Assemblies and less
sensitive to affronts on its dignity. The demand for privileges does
not appear to have become until very late a regular part of its
procedure.2 In New York the demand was made at the meeting of
the first Assembly in i6gi,8 and in 1695, t^iree Years aft61" Massachu-
setts Bay received its new charter, its House of Representatives
claimed "all the liberties and privileges of an English Assembly".4
With the beginning of the eighteenth century the custom was widely
established, and the designations "House of Commons", "Commons
House of Assembly", "His Majesty's Commons", and "Parliament",
were already in use.5 The privileges, at first asked for and later taken
for granted, were those customary to the Parliament in England —
freedom of speech; freedom from arrest for members and servants,
except in cases of treason, felony, and breach of the peace; freedom
of access to the governor — a request dropped in Virginia after 1727;
and favourable construction on all acts of Assembly. A common
request was that the mistakes of the Speaker be not imputed to the
House — also omitted in Virginia in 1705, but resumed in 1738—
which was usually a part of the Speaker's "excusatory" or "dis-
abling" speech, made in Jamaica, Virginia, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Maryland, at the time of his election.6 In addition,
the Assembly endeavoured to gain further advantages, such as the
right to adjourn itself for longer than from day to day,7 partly to
protect itself against the governor, and partly to demonstrate its
own view of the situation, that the exercise of functions necessary
to the well-being of an Assembly was not a matter of grace or favour,
but something that the King had no right to deny. By the eighteenth
century, the phrase "ancient rights and privileges" was beginning
to be heard; and in 1736 the Speaker of the House of Burgesses in
Virginia asserted that aU these privileges had been long enjoyed and
were its undoubted right.8
The controversy over privileges was particularly keen in Jamaica,
where in 1716 the governor threatened with extraordinary measures
an Assembly which refused to grant supplies, and finally conceded
the demand for privileges with the promise to allow them only so far
as it was consistent with his instructions. This form of acceptance
1 G.O. 31/36; JV. Carolina Recs. vi, 363.
a Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1661-8, pp. 352-4; 1679-80, p. 387; Frere, Short History, pp. 81-85.
8 JJ-fJ?. New York, i, 2. * Acts and Resolves •, 1694-5, chap, iii, i, 65, 89, 90 n., 130, 382.
6 In Jamaica after 1689; Long, n, 9-10.
• Maryland Archives, I, 460; n, 10; vn, 335; xm, 252, 350; xxiv, 327, 357. Pennsylvania
Col. Recs. n, 517; ra, 140, 319-20.
7 A.P.C., Col. ra, p. 102 ; Hutchinson, T., History of Massachusetts Bay, i, 257-8 for the case
in Massachusetts; Georgia Col. Recs. xm, 91, 92, 95, 98, TOO, 101.
8 J.HJB. Virginia, 1727-40, p. 239; votes and Proceedings, H.R. Pennsylvania, m, 320;
S. Carolina Recs. i9 i, 529.
426 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
continued to be used for many years. In 1 764 the question was again
raised, and this time the House took occasion to define its privileges
without regard to the instructions, laying down in eight clauses its
constitution. The Assembly was immediately dissolved, but a new
Assembly met in 1765 and re-passed the resolutions of its prede-
cessor. Prorogued, it refused at its next session to ask for privileges
at all, apparently on the ground that it did not consider such recog-
nition of the royal right to be necessary. In 1766 a new Assembly,
taking even higher ground, declared that the House was the sole
competent judge of its own privileges1 and that these privileges
were not founded on Acts of Parliament or royal instructions, but
were "a birthright, inherent in his Majesty's most loyal and dutiful
subjects of the Commons of Jamaica and founded on the law of
Parliament [lex parliamenti\, which is part of the common law of
England". The Assembly further asserted that such privileges were
its rightful, lawful and undoubted inheritance, of which it could
not be lawfully deprived while it continued in allegiance to the
King, a point it attempted to prove, much as Virginia had done
in 1736, by drafting a history of its constitutional rights. In this
document it said that it held the same position in the constitution
as did the House of Commons in England and enjoyed a superi-
ority over all courts of justice with power to examine their conduct.
"Here, as in England," it said, "we owe it to the wholesome and
frequent exercise of such power in the representative bodies of the
people that we are this day a free people." Later, it added, "The
House has all the privileges of the House of Commons in England and
no instructions from King or ministers can either abridge or annihilate
the privileges of the representative body of the people of this island."2
Were it otherwise, it might have added, as did the New York
House of Representatives on an earlier occasion, it would be "of
pernicious and dangerous consequence to the liberties of the people".3
Thus the Assemblies in the colonies were becoming extremely
sensitive to any infringement of their dignity. They resented re-
flections on the House or on any of its members, such as hostile
remarks, damning of the Assembly, false or scandalous tales,4 dero-
gatory petitions, printing of rules or proceedings without authority,
libels,6 insults, or the sending of a challenge to a deputy. In Mas-
sachusetts the House legislated against all unnecessary outside
noises made by those who drove by the State House in which the
Assembly was sitting.6 Those guilty of such breaches of privilege or
Privileges m'ifie' American Colonies" (Yale University Library), Miss Mary P. Clarke
has given an account of this and other similar controversies.
3 J.H.R. New York, i, 572. * JV. Carolina Recs. HI, 317-18; vn, 953, etc.
6 See JJiTJi. Jamaica, i, 56, 24.3-5.
6 Acts and Resolves, m, 360, 467, 516, 869; rv, 370.
POWERS OF THE ASSEMBLY 427
decorum were summoned to the bar of the House, required to ask
pardon (sometimes on their knees1), pay fines, and suffer a severe
reprimand. Professor Jacob Rowe of William and Mary College, at
the time of the "Parsons' Cause", said publicly that any member
voting to settle the salaries of the clergy in money would be a scoun-
drel, and should such an one apply to him to receive the sacrament he
would refuse to administer it to him. For these remarks he was taken
into custody, made to apologise, and pay fees.2 Such cases were legion
and could be cited from the legislative journals of nearly every colony,
royal, proprietary, and corporate, West Indian and continental.8
The Assembly claimed full right to exercise authority over its
own members also, particularly in matters of disputed elections, the
most important business that came before it for adjudication. Most
of the Assemblies took this responsibility seriously, appointed a
standing committee on privileges and elections,4 heard witnesses and
arguments by counsel, ever anxious not "to endanger the liberties
and property of [their] constituents".5 The matters investigated
were usually bribery, wrong methods of holding the election, undue
influence, disorderly conduct or intimidation, or any action serving
to prevent an honest count. Sometimes the qualifications were un-
satisfactory, as to residence, race, property, religion, or naturalisation
(as in the case of de Lancey of New York6) . In most of the colonies,
except in Barbados where the Assembly cited its own precedents,
English practice was frequently followed and sometimes the journals
of the House of Commons were consulted. There is at least one
instance where a number of people were disqualified for reasons that
would not have been accepted in England.7 In the West Indies the
chief trouble was insufficiency of freehold and many controversies
arose between the governors and the Assemblies over the matter.
Legislative practices in Barbados differed in many respects from those
of Jamaica and other royal colonies that accepted British parlia-
mentary precedents. The Assembly in Barbados began to work out
its own procedure as early as 1639 and it continued to follow these
precedents in later years. In 1754, the Jamaica House resolved
that it had "an undoubted right, whenever they shall see cause, to
declare void all writs issued by the governor during the continuance
of the Assembly for electing members to serve in the House when such
writs shall be issued without the request of the House".8 As a rule
members expelled by the House and re-elected by their constituents
were allowed to take their seats, though there are instances to the
1 Votes and Proceedings, Pennsylvania, m, 88 (1729); Cat. St. Pap. Col. 1702-3, p. 554.
* J.H.B. Virginia, 1758-61, Sept. 22.
3 See for example Connecticut Col. Recs. v, 492-3; Georgia Col. Recs. xm, 39; Minot,
Massachusetts Bay, I, 206-12.
4 JV. Carolina Rect. vi, 374, 406, 1154^; ix, 457.
5 J.H.R. New York, i, 755; n, 77-80, 648. '' Ibid. I, 514-20.
7 S. Carolina Recs. n, 29-36.
' C.O. 140/43.
428 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
contrary.1 On one occasion the governor in Jamaica declared that
the freedom of election was an inherent right of the people of England,
and that as the Assembly allowed the people to elect, "they should
not require that they elect only those whom they [the Assembly]
wished".2
The House disciplined members for betraying secrets,8 for being
absent without leave, for uncivil or unparliamentary conduct, for
irreverence or anti-Christian statements,4 for scandalous immorality,5
for charges of sedition,6 for contempt or affront to the dignity of the
House, for drunkenness and profanity, and for refusal to obey the
orders of the House. Attendance was uncertain in the West Indies,
owing to the heat, frequent absences from the island, and negro
troubles which kept members at home; and in Jamaica those who
persistently refused to appear were automatically expelled. De-
linquents were punished by fines, censures, admonitions, apologies,
imprisonment, expulsion, kneeling at the bar, and threats of even
severer penalties. As the Assemblies became more powerful and sure
of their own strength, they took cognisance of all forms of misconduct
by anyone, whether members, private persons, civil and judicial
officers, or even appointees of the Crown. In Pennsylvania, in 1757,
a famous attempt was made to remove one William Moore, a justice
of the peace, for a pamphlet filled with "shameful calumnies. . .and
tending to bring the House into derision and contempt among the
people". Moore was sent to gaol and the pamphlet was ordered to be
burnt by the common hangman. William Smith, provost of Phila-
delphia College, who was charged with helping Moore, was called
upon to apologise, and when he demanded his right of appeal to the
King was told that there could be no appeal from judgments relating
to privilege.7 In Virginia, in 1748, a member of the council was
charged, in the presence of the council itself, with "scandalous and
malicious reproaches. . .highly reflecting upon the honour of the
Speaker and of the House", and was compelled to apologise.8 Even
more noteworthy was the punishment meted out to a king's appointee,
the naval officer for York River, who for a "scandalous insult" was
reprimanded and committed to gaol "in close confinement, without
pens, ink, or paper, to be fed on bread only and allowed no strong
liquor".9
This increase in self-importance and self-consciousness was due in
part to the rapid growth of wealth and population in the colonies and
to the enhanced dignity which, in America as in England at the
same time, was attaching itself to membership in the representative
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1702-3, pp. 695, 705.
1 JM JR. Jamaica, i, 300-25. 3 JV. Carolina Recs. vi, 961 .
4 JJIJl. Massachusetts, m, u, 123. 6 J.H.R. Massachusetts, i, 10.
6 TV. Carolina Recs. vm, 268-9, 33 f> 47 r> 494-
7 Votes and Proceedings, Pennsylvania, 1757-8, pp. 33 seqq.
8 JJIJ3. Virginia, 1748, p. 290. • Ibid. 1767, pp. 91, 97, 98, 99,
etc.
ASSEMBLY PROCEDURE 429
body. It was due also in further part to the realisation by the
Assemblies themselves of the fact that they were not municipal or
provincial councils but were becoming in reality "his Majesty's
Commons" in America, analogous to and co-equal with the House
of Commons in England. The likeness appeared not only in the
powers which the Assemblies exercised and the privileges which they
enjoyed but also in the procedure they followed. In Virginia, this
similarity of procedure was almost complete, even to the appearance
of the Assembly chamber and the manner of the sitting of the members,
which paralleled very closely the arrangements in St Stephen's
Chapel, Westminster.1 Only in Connecticut and Rhode Island was
the simpler system of a moderator's meeting employed, for in those
colonies there were no standing committees, no readings of bills, and
no dissolution, the Assemblies being adjourned, never dissolved. Yet
even in these Assemblies there was a Speaker and their practice in-
evitably included certain parliamentary forms. The House of Repre-
sentatives in Massachusetts, though similar in origin to the Assemblies
of Connecticut and Rhode Island, adopted, under its royal governor,
a number of parliamentary precedents, though less conspicuously
than did either Virginia, Pennsylvania, or New York. Only occa-
sionally did it make use of the standing committee, and only on rare
occasions did it resolve itself into a committee of the whole House,
a device which it used rather as a measure of secrecy against the
governor than as a step in the process of passing a bill. A similar
situation prevailed in Georgia, where, on going into committee, the
members ordered the door to be locked and the key laid upon the
table before the chairman and declared that no one could leave
without incurring the censure of the House. Even in Virginia the
committee of the whole House was frequently employed as a weapon
in the Assembly's struggle with the Crown. The committee of the
whole House was known in Jamaica,2 but was rarely used in Penn-
sylvania; and in North Carolina, while it acted sometimes in the usual
manner, it took cognisance also of much business that in other
colonies was dealt with by standing committees. The Barbados
Assembly employed few standing committees and (as far as can be
discovered) no committee of the whole House; but it made frequent
use of joint committees, two of which, those on accounts and on
instructions to the agent, were standing committees. There were also
conferences or "grand committees" of the two Houses.
In nearly all the royal colonies the procedure employed followed
a more or less uniform course, with many variations in detail. It is
probable that most, if not all, of the Assemblies adopted standing
orders or rules of procedure, though in a few cases only have they
1 Hening, Statutes at Large, in, 213, 419; JJK.B. Virginia, 1703, pp. 30, 55, 61 ; Pargellis,
S. M., "Procedure in the Virginia House of Buxgesses", William and Mary Quarterly, 1927.
8 Col St. Pap. Col. 1702-3, p. 694.
430 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
been preserved.1 Such rules concerned the conduct of members,
attendance and absence, manner of debate, order of business,
matters of privilege, and the care of the records. Generally speaking,
there appears to have been no attempt made in the Assemblies to
restrict discussion or to deal with filibustering and obstruction. Only
in Pennsylvania was the Speaker allowed to stop unnecessary,
tedious, and superfluous debate and to demand silence when needful.
The Assemblies were never in a hurry, and there is little to show that
the freedom of speech was abused. The obligation to turn out laws
was never pressing, and the total number passed is, relatively speaking,
small. In the modern sense of the term there were no parties and no
whips, though in the case of a vote the messenger might be sent to
summon those who were absent; nor were agreements arranged
beforehand. There was no calendar or order of the day, though
probably the Speaker was accustomed to control the sequence of
business. "The members ", says Josiah Quincy, speaking of the South
Carolina Commons House of Assembly, where the deputies repre-
sented the planting interests as did the deputies in the West Indies,
"all sit with their hats on and uncover when they rise to speak. They
are not confined (at least they do not confine themselves) to any
one place to speak in. The members conversed, lolled, and chatted
much like a friendly jovial society, when nothing of importance was
before the House. Nay, once or twice, while the Speaker or clerk
were busy in writing, the members spoke quite loud across the room
to one another. A very unparliamentary appearance. The Speaker
put the question sitting; the members gave their votes by rising from
their seats, the dissentients did not rise."2 When either Speaker or
clerk referred to a member he did so by gesture or title and not
by name. Though many members were careful of their dress and
appearance, there is reason to believe that those from the more
remote sections paid little attention to clothes or manners, and the
fact that drunkenness, smoking, and unseemly conduct were given
prominent place in the standing rules of the House shows that such
breaches of decorum were not uncommon. Except in Barbados,
South Carolina, and Georgia the members were paid for their services.
The Speaker was elected by the House and approved by the
governor; the clerk, except in Massachusetts and North Carolina,
and the sergeant-at-anns were governor's appointees. In Bermuda
the Speaker was elected every fourth year, a practice which the
Board of Trade wholly forbade because not in accord with the
usage of Parliament. The right of the Crown, through the governor,
TTC uavc me aiouuuig uiuci^iur jTcnnsyivama i K0t6k ana rroceeaings, u, 210—1 g; ; Otul^ia
(GeorgiaCol. facs. xiv, 5 1 ; xv, 326) \ tnose for V irginia, first adopted in 1663 (Henuig, u, 206)
and revised and extended in 1 769 (JJH.B. 1 769, p. 323) ; for Jamaica at various times (Col.
St. Pap. Col. i675-£ PP- 2i5-i«; 1702-3, p. 717; 1704-5, PP- 42B-95 Jt-ong, i, 55). For
Barbados see Cat. St. Pap. CoL 1661-8, pp. 352-4; for New Hampshiie w:e AJL rfov. Pap.
v> 3*5-
8 "Journal of Josiah Quincy, Jr." Proceedings, Mass. Hist. Soc. June 1916, p. 452.
THE SPEAKER 431
to reprove or reject a Speaker was absolutely insisted on.1 The
Speaker had a position of honour and respect within the As-
sembly, though in the actual exercise of authority his position varied
in the different colonies. He controlled the business of the House,
and saw that it was conducted with order and propriety. He issued
writs to the sergeant-at-arms to bring persons before the House for
examination or reproof, and served as the mouthpiece of the House
in communicating with the governor or council or the outside world.
While there is no reason to suppose that the Speakers anywhere were
intentionally partisan, except in their opposition to the prerogative,
the only one who consciously followed the non-partisan example of
Speaker Onslow in England was John Randolph of Virginia. He
promised when elected in 1 734 to make his own "fancies and humours "
subservient to the rules, and begged the House to lay aside ill-
grounded conceits, prejudice of opinion, affectation to popularity,
and private animosities or personal resentments.2 Randolph lived
up to his pretensions and gave to the speakership in Virginia excep-
tional dignity. Though in general the Speaker could vote, he rarely
exercised the privilege, except to break a tie, but whether he made
use of this privilege in all the colonies is not clear.8 The Speaker, the
clerk, the clerk's assistant (if there was one), the sergeant-at-arms,
and the mace-bearer were all robed in Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, New York, and Maryland, and probably
in the West Indies; and the tendency towards ceremonial manifested
itself clearly as the years passed and the Assembly grew in popular
esteem. In North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, and
it may be elsewhere, a mace was borne before the Speaker on his
entrance and laid on the table while the House was in session. In
Jamaica it was borne before the governor. Usually the House had
a chaplain (except in Georgia), or at least a clergyman invited to
conduct prayers, and the members generally attended church in a
body at the opening of the session. Proceedings were conducted secretly
until after the middle of the century, when galleries or a bar were
built in Massachusetts,4 Rhode Island, and Virginia5 for the accom-
modation of such of the public as the members might invite to attend.
These galleries could be cleared at any time should secrecy be desired,
In 1773 Quincy wrote of Pennsylvania, "Their debates are not
public, which is said now to be the case of only this House of Com-
mons throughout the continent."6 In consequence of this publicity,
a change took place in the character of the oratory in the chamber,
because henceforth it was of use in influencing public opinion.
In the passage of bills, the familiar parliamentary system of three
1 Bell and Parker, Guide, p. 1 13.
8 J.H.B. Virginia, 1734, p. 174; 1736, pp.
3 In Virginia the Journal records but nine such instances, for example, 1 720, p. 300.
4 Moore, G. H., Prytanewn Bostoniense, pp. 11-55; J-HJl. Massachusetts, 1773-4, p. a6.
' JJf.B. Virginia, 1764, p. 61 ; 1766, p. 44. " "Journal", p. 476.
432 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
readings prevailed everywhere except in the corporate colonies, but
with some variations from English practice. A bill might pass through
its three readings in one day or be prolonged over many weeks. It
was always read in full at each reading and not merely by title, and
debate might follow in each case. It might be rejected at the first
reading or, as in Massachusetts, when first presented by individual
or committee, if a majority of the House were opposed, and so not
be introduced at all. In North Carolina an unusual custom pre-
vailed of sending the bill after each reading to the council for its
assent before passing the measure on to the second or third reading,1
thus indicating a very close correspondence between the two bodies
and establishing a practice unknown elsewhere. Bills might originate
with the governor, the council, the Speaker, a committee, or an
individual member of the House, but in practice the last two usually
initiated bills, the House generally appointing them for the purpose.
Money bills had to originate with the popular body and these the
council was not allowed to amend, though it could and did
amend other bills. If the two bodies disagreed, agreement might be
reached by adjustment or conference, or the bill might be abandoned
altogether. When finally passed by both Houses, the bill went to the
governor and eventually to the Privy Council in England. Votes
were generally indicated by rising, but the ballot was used, though
the Board of Trade deemed it irregular.2 In Barbados the ballot
was used in the election of the Speaker, who in the early years was
accustomed to keep the chair for only three sittings, thus rendering
frequent elections necessary. There is evidence, in Virginia, of a
division, one side leaving the room, with tellers appointed to take the
vote.8 That the House of Commons was the great exemplar is clear,
not only from the actual procedure adopted in the colonial Assem-
blies, but from the not infrequent consultation by governor, council,
and Assembly of the Journals of the House of Commons and the
House of Lords, which with the Statutes at Large and many legal
treatises were available in most of the colonies.
Until 1763, the leading constitutional issue in America was the
integrity of the royal prerogative as embodied in Orders in Council,
in royal mandates and warrants, and in instructions to the governors,
all of which the authorities at home were endeavouring to maintain
in the face of the growing power of the popular Assemblies. The pre-
rogative was not exercised in Connecticut and Rhode Island, where
no such conflict took place, and in Maryland and Pennsylvania the
issue differed in form, though not in principle, owing to the domin-
ance of the proprietary element. But not a royal colony escaped. On
one side was the King, the Privy Council, the Secretary of State, the
Jf. Carolina foes, iv, 565 seqq.; v, 281 seqq.; vn, 357 seqq.
2 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1704-5, pp. 428-9.
*//?•*(:*• X*®1"*'* W6> PP- 253> 26°; '738, p. 347; i?6a, p. 551 17&*, P- 258- Cf.
N. Carolina Recs. iv, 569.
CONTROL OF THE FINANCES 433
Board of Trade, the royal governor, and the royal appointees; on the
other the popular Assemblies, which slowly but surely were breaking
down the British system of government in America and eliminating
the control of an outside authority resident across the sea 3000 miles
away.1 Having secured the right to initiate legislation, as they had
everywhere done before the end of the seventeenth century, they
were in possession of a position of strategic importance, from which
advances were possible in many directions. As they perfected their
organisation and established their privileges, they built up a machine
to use against their governors that was effective because it possessed
much of the strength and efficiency of the Parliament at home. The
home authorities refused to recognise the parliamentary status of the
colonial Assemblies, but inasmuch as they never adequately backed
up their governors in America, the latter, over and over again, were
incapable of anything more than empty protest and denunciation.
In their control of the finances the Assemblies had another powerful
instrument wherewith to bend the governors to their will, for the
King had no adequate revenue in America that could be used to free
all his appointees from dependence on the popular body, and Parlia-
ment was willing to appropriate money from the English Exchequer
only in the cases of Nova Scotia, Georgia, and the Floridas. Except
for the grant of the 4$ per cent, and the two shillings a hogshead duties,
the only instance in which the Crown obtained the passage of a
permanent revenue bill in a colony was in Jamaica, where, the con-
troversy having lasted for nearly fifty years, the grant in 1728 of
£8000 a year to the King in perpetuity brought the struggle to a close.2
But even this amount was never sufficient to meet the expenses of
the colony, so that there too the Assembly was able in part to control
appropriations. The determination of the Assemblies in all the royal
colonies to dispose of the money thus appropriated, through treasurers
appointed by themselves, brought them into sharp conflict with the
Royal Instructions, which enunciated the principle that though the
Assembly might raise the money, the King through his governor was
to say how it should be spent. Only in North Carolina and Barbados3
did the Grown ever yield on this point. Incidental to this issue, but
of less importance, was the question of the governor's salary, which
was troublesome only in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York,
and New Jersey; for elsewhere, in the South and the West Indies, the
governors were paid from such royal revenues as the quit-rents, the
two shillings a hogshead in Virginia, the 4^ per cent, in Barbados
and the Leeward Islands, and the permanent revenue in Jamaica.
Controversy, at times sharp and prolonged, arose over the appoint-
1 See the writings of Greene, Osgood, Burns, and Labaree. .
* The documents relating to the passage of this act, one of the most important in the
constitutional history of Jamaica, can be found in C.0. 137/13* J4> *6> i?-
3 JV. Carolina Recs. in, 141; vn, 443; Col. St. Pap. Col. 1710-11, pp. 79-&>> "5-io> I53»
218,367.
CHBBI
434 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
ment of the colonial agent. This important personage, whose origin
can be traced to the days of Cromwell and the settlement of Jamaica,
had become in the eighteenth century a well-established bond of
communication between the colonies and the mother country. The
colonies needed representatives in England to look after their
interests, and the authorities at home found it advantageous to have
on the spot a spokesman for a colony, as is evident from the clause
inserted in the charter to Perm in 1681 requiring him to keep an
agent in England. The business of the agent was "to stand sentry and
be watchful", guarding the welfare of the colony in such matters as
the issue of Orders in Council, the passing of Acts of Parliament, the
confirmation or disallowance of colonial laws, allowances for defence,
disputes about boundaries, and other analogous matters. Long and
heated, quarrels arose over the questions of authority and control,
appointment and tenure. Did the agent represent the colony as a
whole, the governor and council, or the Assembly? By whom was
he appointed and from whom did he take his orders? Eventually
in most of the colonies the Assembly got control, and in some in-
stances the governor was obliged to have his own agent in addition
to the official agent of the colony. Such towns as Halifax and Boston
had agents also; and in the case of Newfoundland, Gape Breton,
Nova Scotia, Georgia, and the Floridas the agent was appointed in
England by the King. The agents were frequently English attorneys,
merchants, or even clerks in the Plantation Office, and they were
watched over by the Assemblies, who reproved or commended them,
examined their accounts, and dismissed them if they failed to give
satisfaction. The West Indian agencies were far better organised and
more influential than were those of the continental colonies, for West
Indian interests called for group action, whereas it was rare for the
continental colonies to combine on anything. Important men served
in this capacity, and after 1750 the presence of such men in England,
ready to act on a colony's behalf, had become a recognised and
permanent feature of British colonial administration.1
Additional questions at issue between the governors and the
Assemblies were as manifold as were the claims of the royal pre-
rogative, and followed closely the attempt of the governors to main-
tain the prerogative and obey their instructions. Second only to
finance and the control by the Assembly of the civil administration
of a colony, was the control of the administration of justice, histori-
cally a branch of the prerogative, for as the Board of Trade said :
"Her Majesty has an undoubted right of appointing such and so
many courts of judicature in the Plantations as she shall think
necessary for the distribution of justice".2 The Assemblies refused to
* See Pempn, L. M., The Colonial Agent of the British West Indies; Tanner, Colonial Agencies
tnUngtandi Bond, The Colonial Agent as a Popular Representative.
2 New Torh Col Docs, v, 333.
OTHER FORMS OF ENCROACHMENT 435
accept this view of the case, and over and over again took into their
own hands the establishment and regulation of the courts of common
law for the colonies. Chancery courts and courts of exchequer they
frequently opposed on the ground of expense, but they made little
serious effort to prevent their erection by the governors. Their
attempts to establish systems of judicature by statute were frequently
unsuccessful and led to a great deal of friction and consequent ill
will. The tenure of judicial employments was also a fruitful source
of trouble, for the royal tenure continued only during the King's
pleasure, whereas the colonists were coming to believe that judges
should hold office during good behaviour or for life.1 The issue was
joined in Jamaica, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, and
laws were passed to that effect only to be disallowed by the Crown.
Even the governors themselves sympathised at times with the position
of the Assemblies, as when Edward Trelawney of Jamaica wrote that
"a standing body of planters made judges for life would have a
much greater influence and authority than the governor and council
appointed by his Majesty".2 But the Board of Trade would have
none of it.8 In the end the Crown won a Pyrrhic victory, for though
the debate over judicial matters was less violent than that over
finance, it involved much bickering and discontent, and marked the
increasing dissatisfaction which the colonists felt with appointments
made in England to civil and judicial offices in the colonies.
Among the minor forms of encroachment upon the Bang's pre-
rogative of which the Assemblies made use were these. They passed
biennial and triennial acts limiting the duration of sitting, which the
Crown, with some exceptions (New Hampshire and South Carolina)
due perhaps to inadvertence, regularly disallowed because they in-
fringed on the governor's right of summons and dissolution. They
excluded certain officials from sitting in the Assembly, fearing the
formation of a prerogative party in the House, and they forbade
councillors to vote for Assemblymen, much as peers are not allowed
to vote for members of the House of Commons to-day. They denied
the right of the governor and Secretary of State to appoint clerks and
other officials in council and Assembly and in some of the courts, on
the ground that these bodies should control their own appointments.
They opposed the governor's attempts at various times to see the
journals of the lower house or to obtain information from the clerk,
who was always sworn to secrecy. Finally, they claimed full right,
in conjunction with the council, to shape legislation, and denied
that the governor or even the Crown could veto or strike out clauses
or riders, the latter a device frequently used to thwart the governor's
wishes.4 In 1 752 the Jamaica Assembly, in refusing to use a suspending
1 JST. Carolina Recs. v, 1104. a C.O. 137/25-
8 Instructions, 1761, New York Col. Docs, vn, 479; New Jersey Archives, ix, 322-3.
* Cf. Col. St. Pap. Col. 1677-80, pp. 44I~5> 4&, 49&
28-2
436 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 1660-1763
clause or to repass acts modified by the Board of Trade, denied
the right of the Board "to direct their procedure by any proposal
or decision whatever". The conflict assumed different forms in
different colonies, and victory lay sometimes with one side and some-
times with the other. Governor Benning Wentworth of New Hamp-
shire, because he had greater powers of endurance, defeated the
Assembly there in the controversy over membership, when the Assem-
bly tried, by starving the province, to bring the governor to terms.
But Governor Clinton in New York failed, partly because he was a
weaker man in a more defenceless position, and partly because he
was not adequately supported by the authorities at home. He wrote
with some sarcasm both to the Secretary of State and to the Board of
Trade that the prerogative could not be maintained by the governor
alone. Upon the Home authorities must rest the ultimate responsi-
bility. They might expostulate in orders, instructions, and letters,
but words without continuous and consistent action were a lame and
impotent weapon. The Assemblies disregarded the King's commands
and gradually reduced to a minimum the governor's power and
influence. Governor Knowles of Jamaica wrote in 1752 that the
Assembly had succeeded in making itself the preponderant element
in the government there, a state of affairs that existed in different
measure in all the royal colonies.
Thus the royal system of government in America was rapidly dis-
integrating in the decade before 1763; the prerogative had lost its
force and its importance, and the representative Assemblies, them-
selves doing what Parliament had done a century before, had become
the centres of actual government. British subjects in America had
attained, in fact if not in law, an equal political status with British
subjects in Great Britain, and their governing bodies had won a
position of commanding prominence and authority, similar, each in
its own sphere, to that which the British Parliament had won in the
realm. It was the failure of the British Government to see this fact
and to find a solution whereby equality might be substituted for
subordination and subservience that in part at least brought on the
American Revolution.
CHAPTER XV
THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND
THE AFRICAN SETTLEMENTS
J.HE English slave trade had a life of about a century and a half
as an active branch of national commerce, and during this period it
contributed greatly to the building of the overseas Empire on both
the eastern and western coasts of the Atlantic. To it in no small
measure was due the economic progress of some of the American
sea-board colonies and of the West Indies, while from the posts
established for the pursuit of the trade the British West Africa of
to-day has developed. The vital importance of this trade in the seven-
teenth century as the very foundation of West Indian prosperity has
been to some extent obscured, partly by later arbitrary distinctions
between commercial history and colonial history, and partly by the
work of the humanitarian writers of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, who have made the slave trade appear so dark
a disgrace to those who shared in it that there is a natural reluctance
to admit its great importance in the overseas Empire of the Stuarts
and Hanoverians. No such separation of the interests of the colonies
from those of trade existed in the days of the Board of Trade and
Plantations, and no reluctance to give the slave trade its due weakened
estimates of its value by contemporary writers. An anonymous
pamphlet of 1 749 expresses views typical of those found in many others:
The most approved Judges of the commercial Interests of these Kingdoms have
ever been of opinion that our West-India and African Trades are the most nation-
ally beneficial of any we carry on. It is also allowed on all Hands, that the Trade
to Africa is the Branch which renders our American Colonies and Plantations so
advantageous to Great Britain : that Traffic only affording our Planters a constant
supply of Negroe Servants for the Culture of their Lands in the Produce of Sugars,
Tobacco, Rice, Rum, Cotton, Fustick, Pimento, and all other our Plantation
Produce: so that the extensive Employment of our Shipping in, to, and from
America, the great Brood of Seamen consequent thereupon, and the daily Bread
of the most considerable Part of our British Manufactures, are owing primarily to
the Labour of Negroes; who, as they were the first happy instruments of raising
our Plantations : so their Labour only can support and preserve them, and render
them still more and more profitable to their Mother-Kingdom. The Negroe-Trade
therefore, and the natural consequences resulting from it, may be justly esteemed
an inexhaustible Fund of Wealth and Naval Power to this Nation.1
The rise of this all-important trade, if the English share only be
considered, was extraordinarily rapid. In 1650 England had no
organised slave trade, yet twenty-five years later a flourishing trade
was being carried on by an English company. Two factors contributed
to this rapid progress: the first that though the English had no slave
1 Anon., The national and private advantages of the African Trade considered, London, 1749.
438 THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND WEST AFRICA
trading company in 1650 they had an old-established African trade,
and the second, that an Atlantic slave trade had been developed by
other European countries so that the pioneer work had already been
done when English merchants in the mid-seventeenth century began
to share in it.
The early English voyages to Africa have been treated in another
chapter of this volume,1 and here the story is taken up at the time when
royal patronage was openly given to groups of Guinea Adventurers.
Part of the price of English support to Don Antonio in his struggle
against Spain was the opening of the Portuguese African territories
to English enterprise, and in 1588 Queen Elizabeth made the first
royal grant of privileges for trade with Africa.2 Within the district
of the Senegal and Gambia only, the Adventurers were allowed a
monopoly of the trade. Supported by royal patronage the organisa-
tion of the African trade advanced rapidly. In 1618 James I granted
a monopoly of the trade in West Africa to Sir William St John and
others, under the title of "The Governor and Company of Adven-
turers of London trading to Gynney and Bynney".8 These Adven-
turers, however, failed to serve the object of their charter— the
securing of a large supply of gold — and their privileges were adjudged
a grievance in the monopoly debates of 1620-1.*
A second company was composed of some of the interlopers who
had broken the Gynney Company's monopoly. They united under
Sir Nicholas Crisp and received a grant of the sole trade of the
African coast for thirty-one years, and the sole right to import any
African commodities into England.5 The special service of this
Company to the development of the English African settlements
was the building of a fort on the Gold Coast at Cormantine, and a
walled factory near Sierra Leone, to protect its trade. These Adven-
turers continued to be the English monopolists of the African
coast until changes were made under the Commonwealth. In spite
of their privileges they found difficulty in carrying on the trade
because of the heavy burden of defence against European enemies
and the rivalry of English interlopers who were extremely active on
the coast at the time. The Commonwealth Council of State considered
the African trade of sufficient importance to merit careful investiga-
tion and in 1 650 the Council of Trade was instructed to prepare recom-
mendations "for settling the trade to the best advantage of the
Commonwealth".6 The Council of Trade gave the Company an
opportunity to defend itself and after making investigations drew up
a report (9 April i65i).7 Its proposals were based on two serious
considerations, first that the quarrels between the Company and the
1 Sec chap. n. a Hakluyt, v, 443-50.
8 Carr, C. T., Select Charters of Trading Companies (Seldcn Soc. Publications), xxvm, 99.
* C.J. i, 793-
5 Col. St. Pap. Dom. 1631-3, p. 186.
8 PJLO., Interregnum Entry Book, 1650, i, 9. 7 Ibid. 1651, i, 65.
SIR NICHOLAS CRISP'S GUINEA COMPANY 439
separate traders had been disastrous to the prosperity of the English
interest in West Africa, and second that this trade was conditioned
by " peculiar circumstances " which needed careful attention. Among
these circumstances was the difficulty of preventing the market for
English goods from being ruined, when, as frequently happened in
an unregulated trade, a number of vessels chanced to anchor at the
same time off the English ports on the coast. The consequent glut
resulted not only in a lowered price for English goods, but also
diminished the return in gold for the merchandise carried out, and
gold was the great object of the trade. Another particular condition
was the need of forts on the coast to protect the English traders
against molestation by their European rivals, the Portuguese and the
Dutch. These conditions suggested the value of the monopolist
Company which had built forts and carried on a regular trade in
spite of Dutch opposition, though both activities had demanded a
very heavy expenditure, and the Adventurers were stated to have lost
£100,000. In investigating the Company's claims to consideration
the Council of Trade also took into account its propositions for the
future. The Adventurers engaged to provide an ample supply of
commodities for barter, to regulate trade with the Dutch, and to
undertake a new search for gold, of which they engaged to bring to
England £10,000 worth in three years.
In consideration of the past services of the Company and its
promise of future assistance to national commerce the Council of
Trade agreed to allow it to continue as a limited monopoly in
spite of the outcries that had been made against such grants. The
resulting privilege was restricted to a fourteen years' tenure of land
lying twenty leagues on each side of the two chief trading places
established by the Company, Cormantine on the Gold Coast, and
a port in Sierra Leone, and the Council suggested that a like privilege
of forty leagues' monopoly should be granted for fourteen years in
respect of any new discovery by the Company on condition that the
place should be fortified and secured "to the interest of the Common-
wealth". This report of the Council of Trade was sufficiently favour-
able to encourage the Company to continue its activities, but the
undertaking was made dangerous by Prince Rupert's enterprises in
preying on vessels off the African coast. Though gold appeared in the
Council of Trade's report as the object of the African trade it was
under the aegis of this Company that attention was transferred from
gold to slaves. In 1651 some of Crisp's associates undertook a voyage
to the Gambia with the declared object of securing a cargo of slaves,
and had it not been for the continuance of the conflict between
Commonwealth and Royalists at sea it seems possible that the English
slave trade might have been established under Puritan rule. The
hazards of the war were, however, too great and in 1657 the Company
sold the remaining years of the lease of the Gold Coast to the East
440 THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND WEST AFRICA
India Company to whom the forts were valuable as providing ports
of call for its ships on the way to the East.1 Though the Common-
wealth government failed to establish an English slave trade a be-
ginning had been made, and the way was prepared for more successful
measures under the later Stuarts.
The Restoration Government in making arrangements for the
African trade did not at first specifically promote the slave trade. In
1660 a charter was granted to a group of merchants under the title
of "The Company of Royal Adventurers into Africa",2 who received
the privilege of incorporation, and the right to hold the land and
islands of West Africa from Cape Blanco to the Cape of Good Hope
for 1000 years. The chief trade for which the Company was incor-
porated was that of "discovering the golden mines", and the other
commodities to be procured were ivory, dye-woods and hides, no
allusion being made to a trade in slaves. As there was uncertainty
about conflicting rights to parts of the coast granted to the Adven-
turers it was provided that these should be investigated before the
new Company's privileges were fully confirmed to it. The rival
claims were those of the East India Company, whose lease of the
Gold Coast still had five years to run, and those of the holders of the
Crisp patent. As the East India Company's rights were based on an
arrangement made in the Interregnum they were disregarded, and
only the claims of the Crisp Company were considered.3 These were
finally dropped and after the expiration of Crisp's patent a new
charter was granted to the Royal Adventurers. The two years of
trading from 1660 to 1662 were responsible for great changes both
in the organisation and objects of the Adventurers. The new
charter of i6634 Save ^Gm ^e title of "The Company of Royal
Adventurers of England Trading into Africa", and increased their
territorial privileges, the boundaries within which they were to have
a monopoly being extended on the north to reach the borders of
Morocco, while the Cape of Good Hope remained the southern
boundary. In keeping with their greater privileges more elaborate
arrangements were made for the government of the Company, which
was to have a governor, sub-governor, deputy governor, court of
assistants and an executive committee. The greatest change was in
the object to be pursued by the Company. The needs of the Planta-
tions for labour had become increasingly insistent, and the Royal
Adventurers therefore decided to make the slave trade their main
pursuit. It was expressly provided in the new charter that they
should have the "sole, entire and only trade" in negroes on the West
African coast. This was the first English charter in which definite
statement was made of the slave trade as a recognised branch of
1 Cal.St.Pap. Col. 1574-1660, D. 383. * For the charter see Carr, p. 172.
8 Zook, G. F., The Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa, p. 14.
* Carr, p. 177.
FRENCH, DUTCH AND ENGLISH ON GOLD COAST 441
English commerce, and from this time onwards until the Abolition
Act of 1807 it was ranked as a valuable national asset, essential to the
progress of the commercial empire. This first slave-trading company
had a brief life, as the expense of setting up an effective organisation
was disastrously heavy, owing to the rivalry of the other European
traders, which necessitated elaborate outlay for naval and military
defence upon the coast.
The Dutch had ousted the Portuguese from many of the best
trading places, and like them claimed to exclude all other nations,
and the French had gradually secured a strong position in the
Senegal region. Both French and Dutch entered into conflict with
the English, and a triangular struggle took place. In 1663 after the
revision of the Royal Adventurers' charter an English force was
despatched to the Guinea Coast for the protection of the forts and
trade.1 Admiral Holmes, in charge of the expedition, found a severe
conflict going on in the Gambia with the Dutch, who were attacking
the English traders from their base on the island of Goree, which was
captured and then garrisoned by the Company's servants. Retalia-
tion for this came in 1664, when de Ruyter recaptured the island.2
The struggle was also waged on the Gold Coast where the Dutch fort,
Cape Coast Castle, surrendered to Holmes in 1664. de Ruyter was
less successful on the Gold Coast, and Cape Coast Castle remained
with the English, though they lost their fort at Cormantine. In
the peace of 1667 tbeir right to share in the African trade received
formal recognition, and the transfer of Cape Coast Castle was
confirmed.
About the same time the third European Power in the contest,
the French, were advancing their power under the care of Louis
XIV's able minister, Colbert. In 1664 a French West India Company
was established, the successor to a series of unsuccessful companies.
This organisation, which was supported by the French Government
and active in the Senegal region, became a serious rival both to
English and Dutch. Well-defended forts were essential for a trade so
strongly contested, and this expense taxed the resources of the
Companies. At the same time the Adventurers could not satisfy the
demands of the West Indies for negroes, and petitions that the West
Africa trade should be thrown open were heard from 1668 onwards.
In addition there was a burdensome war with interlopers, and the
profits of the Company were insufficient to meet its liabilities.
Being so heavily burdened by debt the Royal Adventurers were willing
to surrender their charter in 1672,* and a new Company, "The
Royal African Company of England", immediately followed them,
receiving a royal charter in the very year of the Adventurers' dis-
solution.4 The privileges granted to this Company were in many
points similar to those of its predecessors. Its monopoly grant
1 Zook, p. 1 8. a Ibid. p. ao. 3 Ibid. p. 27. 4 Garr, p. 186.
442 THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND WEST AFRICA
covered the same extent of the African coast and the same period
of 1000 years, and prescribed a similar form of government. This
Royal African Company had the longest life of all the English
African companies; it was the most powerful, and did more for the
extension of English authority on the coast than any of its predeces-
sors or than its immediate successor. The years of its greatness were
from 1672 to 1687, in which time the Company planted forts and
factories on the coast and up the Gambia River, made treaties with
the natives, ensured English trade in spite of Dutch and French
rivalry, exported large quantities of English manufactures to Africa,
and increased the prosperity of the West Indies by supplying them
with some 5000 negroes a year. During the years of its success the
history of this aristocrat of African Companies is the history of the
English slave trade and of the English West African settlements.
Its chief assets, received from the Adventurers, consisted in two
forts, one in the Gambia, and one on the Gold Coast (Cape Coast
Castle), and six factories, for which £34,000 was paid to them.1 A
bold policy of extension was decided upon by the new Company, and
the circumstances of the time were propitious for the English, since
Colbert's Compagnie des Indes occidentals was dissolved in 1672 as a
complete financial failure,2 while the Dutch West India Company
which had been founded in 1621 was for the moment hopelessly
crippled by internal quarrels and by the expenses of rivalry with
France.8 On the coast everything was favourable for an energetic
English Company, and the plantation demand for negro labour was
increasing. The difficulties of the Dutch West India Company had
shown that unity and sound organisation were necessary for successful
trade, and the Royal African Company paid no little attention to
the subject. Its charter had laid down the outlines of a scheme of
government, but many additions had to be made to this machinery
in the interests of efficiency and despatch of business.
The Court of Assistants was a hard-working body, meeting from
five to nine times a month to decide on general lines of policy, and
to consider reports from sub-committees which it appointed for
special matters. The Court kept firm control over all affairs con-
nected with the slave trade or with its holdings in Africa. The coast
service was entrusted to the versatile overseas servants of the Company,
typical of the seventeenth century, who were required to be at
once expert in trade and able to negotiate a treaty or wage a war.
No doubt as to the subordination of the coast government to that
of the Court of Assistants was entertained. The chief officer on the
coast was an "agent general", and the position was so little sought
1 "Some observations on tracts taken out of the Report of the Lords Commissioners for
Trade and Plantations" (c. 1708), Brit. Mus. 8223, e. 4/12.
» Chemin-Dupontes, P., Les Compagmes de Colonisation en Afrique occidental* sous Colbert,
p. 81.
3 Lannoy et Vander Linden, Histoire de V expansion chez lespeuples modern**, u, 190.
METHODS OF THE SLAVE TRADE 443
that in 1680 the Court of Assistants had to consider methods of
encouraging "able and honest men to sue for chief at Gabo Corso".1
There were many reasons for the lack of enthusiasm for the position.
It was extremely onerous, and the climate made it dangerous.
William Bosman, a chief factor in the Dutch service, ascribed the
unhealthiness of the Gold Goast to "a thick, stinking and sulphurous
damp or mist", which prevailed in the early morning, and to native
habits, among them their "pernicious custom of laying their fish for
5 or 6 days to putrify before they eat it", so that "if this odious
mixture of noisome stenches very much affects the state of health,
here, it is not to be wondered". He believed that the appalling rate
of mortality among Europeans on the coast was also due to bad
feeding, excessive drinking and absence of medical assistance, "for
we have no help to have recourse to but corrupted Medicines and
unskilful Physicians".2
A certain spice of adventure was the chief compensation for the
risks of the position, but adventures were not a daily part of the life
of the chief agent, and were far from being the lot of those lower in
the service. The Company had been founded mainly for the purpose
of buying and selling slaves, and the dull routine duties connected
with this commerce in Africa were the chief occupation of the Com-
pany's servants. By this time the European slave purchases in West
Africa were made according to a recognised system. Most of the
slaves for export were brought down from the interior to the European
trading stations on the coast by native middlemen who kept this
part of the business in their own hands. Details in methods of trading
varied on different parts of the coast, but both Bosman, who described
Gold Coast conditions in the seventeenth century, and Cornelius
Hodges, a factor of the Royal African Company, who preceded
Mungo Park in exploring the Senegambia interior in i6go,s agree on
this point. The elaborate organisation of the Moorish slave trade in
Senegambia is described in detail by Hodges, who noted with interest
the length of the Moors' journeys, "above noo miles on Camels",
and their determination to dispose of their slaves for certain com-
modities and no other. He also remarked that penetration into the
interior in order to get cheap slaves was no real advantage, as what
was gained in cost price was lost in tolls to native rulers on the
journey.4 Bosnian's description of the Gold Coast mentions the same
inland trade, the control by native middlemen, and similar payments
of customs to native rulers. When the supply of slaves brought down
to the coast was scanty, native traders were occasionally trusted with
goods to be sent up country to inland markets.5 The idea that
European traders could carry on the business for over four centuries
1 Minutes, Court of Assist., R. African Go. 29 July 1680 (P.R.O. T. 70/78).
2 Bosman, W-, A new and accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea, 1705, Letter vra.
8 Stone, T. G., "The Journey of Cornelius Hodges", E.H.R. xxxix, 89.
* Ibid. p. 92. 5 Bosman, Letter xix.
444 THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND WEST AFRICA
by the simple practice of kidnapping the inhabitants of the coastal
districts seems too absurd to need contradiction, but as the question
was put to witnesses in the parliamentary enquiry about the African
trade in 1817, the persistence of the idea can be seen. Some of the
dwellers on the coast undoubtedly were sold for crime or debt or
when taken prisoners in war. A certain amount of kidnapping
existed among the natives, but Europeans, as a general rule, could
not condemn free blacks to slavery. They had to abide by native
customs as to what constituted a slave and what a free man in the
subtle code of the coast. Custom was a power which gave protection
in West Africa as well as on English manors, and the domestic slave
of the coast was by no means always the rightiess creature he has been
painted. The prices paid for slaves to the native dealers varied very
greatly in the second half of the seventeenth century. When the
Company had a monopoly of the coast the purchase price in Africa
of a slave was about £3 and the sale price in the West Indies from
£13 to ^iS,1 but at the end of the century the planters were com-
plaining that the prices had gone up intolerably.
The goods with which these sums were paid in West Africa varied
to some extent during the period, though certain goods had a never
failing popularity. Before the English slave trade began, the Dutch
had been getting to know the mind of the West African market, and
in 1600 a Dutch traveller described vessels of copper (especially
basins and kettles), iron, tin, linen, serges and beads as the most
valuable articles in trade.2 The Royal African Company frankly
imitated the Dutch, and tried to beat them in the market they had
built up. In 1677 the Committee of Goods was directed by the Court
of Assistants to have certain Dutch materials copied in England.3
The Company also developed a trade in English woollen cloth, for
all kinds of which, from broad cloth to serges, there was a good de-
mand in spite of the climate. It claimed that it was also the means
of introducing new manufactures into England for the express
purpose of the African market, among the new materials invented
expressly for this trade being "annabasses", "nicanees", "tapseils",
and "brawls" made in London, and striped carpets and "boy-
sadoes" made in Kidderminster.4 European merchants found the
natives extremely shrewd business men, and, as the Dutch traveller
who has been already quoted pointed out in something of an ag-
grieved tone, the natives were quick to discover and reject faulty
merchandise, and in making purchases inspected them "as curiously
as in Europe is done".5
1 A Clear Demonstration...^ the Recovery. ..of Britain's share of the Trade to Africa is wholly
owing to the industry, care and application of the Royal Africa Company (Brit. Mus. 8223, c. 4) .
a Purchas, vi, 282, "Description of Guinea", translated from the Dutch, 1600.
8 Minutes, Court of Assist., R. African Go. 21 August 1677 (P.R.O. T. 70/77).
4 A Clear Demonstration (Brit. Mus. 8223, e. 4) .
B Purchas, vi, 283.
METHODS OF THE SLAVE TRADE 445
When the slaves had been purchased, the next concern of the
Company was to despatch them to the West Indies with the greatest
possible speed. Sometimes negroes were brought to the ports when
there were no vessels on the coast, and even when the vessels were
awaiting their cargo, delays in loading were inevitable. During these
intervals the slaves were kept in the forts in the horrible quarters
called by the English "the slave hole", or, more frankly by the
Dutch, "the prison". There they were kept and fed at the expense
of the Company till they could be put on board the vessels. Of all
the barbarities of the slave trade, with the possible exception of the
long forced marches down from the interior to the coast, the Atlantic
crossing — the "middle passage" — was without rival the worst. The
object of the Company was to transport as many slaves as possible
in each vessel and it succeeded to an appalling extent.1 The space
allowed for each slave was the amount of deck on which he could
lie at full length, and the height allowed was just sufficient for him
to crawl out to go to the upper deck for fresh air and meals. Specially
decked vessels were built for the trade. In these narrow decks the
slaves were packed as closely as possible, and not much imagination
is needed to picture the condition in rough weather. Bosnian main-
tained that the Dutch were better than other countries in their
attention to the cleanliness of the slave vessels, "the French, Portu-
gese and English slave ships are always foul and stinking; on the
contrary ours are for the most part clean and neat".2 One of the
explanations of the long survival of the slave trade is that these
vessels did not call with their human cargo at English ports but
sailed direct for the West Indies and therefore the worst conditions
of the middle passage were not generally known. Second in misery
to the slaves were the sailors on the slaving vessels. They had to live
in a foul atmosphere, and attend to the miserable cargo, and in
addition to the danger of enemy attacks common to seventeenth-
century voyages there was the constant danger of a slave rising.
When the vessels reached the West Indies the negroes were again
sold and passed to the plantation owners. The percentage charged
for the expenses of the Company in delivering the slaves to the West
Indies does not represent a striking profit, when in addition to the
expenses in Africa and on the passage in feeding the slaves, the
serious risks of loss of a large part of the cargo by illness or accident
is considered. The number of slaves carried by the Royal African
Company to the West Indies in the late seventeenth century was
about 5000 a year, each ship carrying from 120 to 700.
For security against rivals the Royal African Company had to
extend its holdings in Africa. It therefore built new forts and
enlarged those it had received from the Royal Adventurers. By
the end of the century its forts were well distributed along the
1 Bosnian, Letter anx. a Ibid.
446 THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND WEST AFRICA
coast, giving entrance to a very wide trading field, their chief centres
being the Gambia and the Gold Coast.
The greatest expense to the Royal African Company, and at the
same time the strongest argument for its tenure of exclusive privi-
leges, was the part it took in contest with other European Powers.
The propitious conditions in which it began did not continue,
for both the French and Dutch reorganised their African trade and
prepared for a revival of the struggle for mastery; in 1674 a new
French Company was formed, and in 1675 the Dutch Company was
remodelled. Fortunately for the Royal African Company the main
contest after 1674 was between the Dutch and the French. The victory
went to the French, who in 1678 captured Goree and Arguin from
the Dutch, and established themselves so unquestionably as the
stronger power in the Senegal region that Barbot wrote in 1732 that
the Dutch "have lost all their interest in these parts of Africa and
all manner of trade whatsoever; unless now and then some inter-
lopers of that nation will run the hazard of being seized, and their
ships and goods confiscated by the English agent, or the commanders
of the Royal African Company's ships following that trade".1
With the eclipse of the Dutch the Royal African Company became
the chief rival to the French, who maintained that their capture of
the Dutch posts in the Senegal region gave them a monopoly of the
trade of that territory, and the English Company had thus to face
determined opposition even in the Gambia where it had been
trading for many years. The French Senegal Company failed because
it attempted too much, but in 1684 a new Company with more
compassable aims was founded, and was extremely active and
hostile to the English.2 In 1688 the French attempted to capture
James Fort in the Gambia from the English but failed.
The situation of the English Company changed when William III
came to the throne, and the ensuing war gave an opportunity for
settling the Senegal dispute. An English force captured Fort St Louis
and Goree in 1692, but the Company was unable to maintain a
fortified post at Goree and in 1693 the French retook the island. In
retaliation for the English victory in 1692 James Fort fell to the
French in 1695. The war weakened both Companies seriously and
by the Treaty of Ryswick the status quo ante bellum was re-established
and conquests were restored.
Meanwhile the Company's profits were also being affected by a
conflict with interlopers in the trade. The trouble was by no means
new, for within a few months of receiving its charter the Company
had petitioned the Crown to order a special proclamation against
the intrusion of unauthorised persons into its territory.3 Charles II
1 Barbot, J., Descrtition of the Coasts of Guinea, 1732, p. 75.
* Stone, T. G., "The Struggle for power on the Senegal and Gambia, 1660-1 713" (an
unpublished thesis in the Library of the University of London).
* Minutes, Court of Assist., R. African Co. 20 October 1674 (P-B..O, T. 70/76).
THE ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY'S MONOPOLY 447
and James II had inclined to support the Company's claims, as a
certain proportion of all prizes went into the royal exchequer, and
the Company exercised its monopoly rights vigorously. Yet in spite
of such discouragements interlopers continued their attacks, and
with the first opportunity they asserted their claims. The moment
came with the accession of William III when the Bill of Rights was
interpreted as implying that all monopolies that had been granted
through the exercise of the royal dispensing power were no longer of
effect.1 This interpretation of the Bill was not accepted by the Royal
African Company, but the contemporary attacks on the East India
Company showed how far from secure those who held royal charters
were. The Court of Assistants therefore attempted to get parliamentary
sanction for its privileges,2 arguing that the Company had for years
supported the trade, and that it would be compelled to give the
trade up unless it were protected from being disturbed. In answer to
this the "free traders" submitted that the West Indies would be
benefited by a free and enlarged slave trade.3 From 1690 to 1697 the
opposing arguments were at intervals presented to the Commons,
who seemed unable to take decisive action. In 1694 t^Y voted that
forts and castles were necessary for the support of the trade, and that
they could only be maintained by a joint-stock company,4 but no
measure was passed to confirm the royal charter. In 1696 the
Company again attempted to secure confirmation of its privileges,
but again the "cheap slave" interest defeated it. Two years later
the Company changed its tactics, as it realised that the demand
of an open slave trade had become irresistible, and instead of con-
tinuing the hopeless attempt to get parliamentary confirmation of
its monopoly from Barbary to the Cape of Good Hope, it
offered to leave to the free traders all the coast except the Senegal
and Gambia, if that region were confirmed to it.5 The offer
aroused no enthusiastic gratitude in the hard hearts of the free
traders, and caused a storm of opposition from the cloth manu-
facturers, who depended on the Gambia for the supply of dye-
woods.6 The proposal, though it was rejected by the Commons, led
to the passing of an Act7 which provided that the whole African trade
should be open to all His Majesty's subjects, the Company receiving
10 per cent, on all goods imported into Africa, to enable it to
defend and maintain the forts for the protection of all traders. An
additional duty varying from 5 to 10 per cent, was to be levied in the
Gambia region on all exports from Africa except slaves. The Act
was to last for thirteen years. From 1698 to 1713 the trade was
carried on under its provisions, but from the first it worked badly.
Macpherson, D., Armals of Commerce, n, 569.
C.J. x, 360, 31 March 1690. . * Ibid. pp. 448-56.
Ibid, xi, 68, 24 January 1694; 113-29, 2 March 1694.
Petition of R. African Go. 13 January 1697-8 (P.R.O. T. 70/170).
C.J. xn, 133, 28 February 1697-8. 7 9 William III, c. 26.
448 THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND WEST AFRICA
The Company complained that the sums it received from the
duties were quite insufficient for the upkeep of the forts, and the free
traders that trade derived no benefit from the Company.
In the period of difficulty with the free traders the Royal African
Company was not strong enough to oppose French attempts to trade
in the Gambia and even James Fort was attacked and forced to
capitulate in I7O2,1 and the Company was unable to spare the
money and arms to reconquer it and restore trade there. In this weak
position the Company decided to treat with the French Company,
and, as the Compagnie de Stntgal was in little better state than its
rivals, a treaty for mutual assistance against disturbers of the trade
was signed in 1705.* It was an alliance of privileged Companies
against the detested interlopers, and after its signature both Com-
panies tried to restore their trade, but financial trouble continued to
beset the English Company, and many of the forts and trading posts fell
into a state of utter dilapidation, James Fort being abandoned in I yog.3
As the thirteen years of the Act of 1697 caine to an end the separate
traders renewed their efforts to secure the complete abolition of all re-
strictions. Insupport of theirviewthey canvassed opinion in Parliament
by means of petitions, and in the world at large through a torrent of
pamphlets- On the side of the Company it was maintained that the
competition of the open trade on the African coast had so greatly raised
the purchase price of negroes there that instead of resulting in a lowered
sale price in the West Indies, as had been hoped, the Act had had the
reverse effect. On the other hand it was the planters, who might have
been expected to understand their own interests, who petitioned most
eagerlyfor anopentradein the hopes of more and cheaper negroes. The
Company also declared that it performed a great national service
by encouraging the woollen manufacture, but the manufacturers
protested that their trade to Africa was cramped by the monopoly.
Just when opinion in Parliament seemed to be so clearly in support
of a free trade that the next action to be expected was a decisive
pronouncement in its favour, the Company produced a new argu-
ment. In a petition to the Commons in 1710 it suggested that a
strong joint-stock company would be necessary if England were to
get the Spanish Asiento.4 No immediate action followed this petition,
except the inevitable counter petition from free traders, but when the
preliminaries of the Treaty of Utrecht were being negotiated, the
views of the Company were allowed some consideration. By the
grant of the Asiento in the Treaty of Utrecht England became the
sole importer of slaves into Spanish America. The privileges of the
Asiento were assigned by the Crown to the South Sea Company,
whose history is dealt with elsewhere in this volume.5 The resulting
1 Stone, utcit. p. 185. a Labat, iv, 346.
8 An answer to a scurrilous paper... (Brit. Mus. 8223, c. 4).
4 C.J. xvi, 275, 24 January 1710. a Vide supra, chap. xi.
THE ENGLISH PORTS AND THE SLAVE TRADE 449
difficulties with Spain did not greatly affect the progress of the
English slave trade and hardly at all the English African holdings.
As the South Sea Company had no trading places in Africa of its
own it entered into a contract with the Royal African Company
to supply it with the slaves it needed for importation into the
Spanish colonies.1 The contract did not restore the fallen fortunes
of the Company, and its position after 1713 was far from happy. The
10 per cent, duty had ended in that year, and as it was not renewed,
the Company had to depend upon what profits it could make in the
open market and by the Asiento. Such profits were quite insufficient
for the upkeep of the forts. From this time, and possibly from 1697
onwards, the history of the Company ceased to be the history of the
English slave trade, as the progressive elements in the trade were to
be found in the groups of independent merchants, in the growing
ports of Bristol, Liverpool, Plymouth as well as London, and in the
colonies. The separate traders claimed, and were not convincingly
answered by the Company, that before the 1697 Act came to an end
they had beaten the Company in the trade and had secured the larger
part of it themselves,2 to the advantage of the woollen manufacturers
and of the West Indian planter. This open trade of the early eighteenth
century, built up from a number of comparatively small groups,
helped not only to develop the English ports, but also to establish
English naval supremacy.
The numbers of vigorous free-traders were increasing in London,
and adding considerably to the volume of ocean-going craft from that
port, but progress in Bristol and Liverpool was more striking. The
mutually contradictory figures with which the disputants adorned
their arguments in Parliament to show the vast extent of their
shipping and the numbers of negroes carried by them cannot be
accepted as a trustworthy guide to the progress they had made, but
historians of both Bristol and Liverpool maintain that on this trade
the fortunes of those ports were built in the eighteenth century.
Bristol prospered so well in the slave trade that in 1713 her mayor
declared it to be the "great support of our people",3 and Liverpool
made such successful use of the open trade that it was said to have
become by the second half of the eighteenth century "the principal
slaving port not only in England, but in Europe".4 In this con-
nection it may be noted that in 1772, Lord Mansfield, in his famous
judgment on the case of the slave Somersett, pronounced that slavery
was "so odious that nothing could be suffered to support it but
positive law".5 Somersett thereby became a free man, and slavery
was henceforward illegal on the soil of England.
1 Correspondence of the Royal African Company with the South Sea Company 1 71 3-5
(P.R.O.T. 70/38).
8 An account of the number of Negroes delivered in the islands ofBarbadoes, Jamaica and Antego
(Brit. Mus. 8223, e. 4). 8 Hunt, W., Bristol, p. 214.
* Muir,Ramsay, A History of 'Liverpool,?. 192. 5 SeeHoweU,T.,StofcTnafr,xx,82.
GHBEI 29
450 THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND WEST AFRICA
While accepting the principle of free trade in Africa Parliament
retained a well-founded belief that the Royal African Company's
forts were of great importance in defending the English claim to
certain of the African slave trade areas, and therefore when the
Company presented a petition in 1730 setting forth that, though
the trade had been open, it had maintained the forts for seven-
teen years without assistance, and that it was in urgent need
of relief from its "insupportable burden", the petition was fol-
lowed by renewed examinations in Parliament of the conditions
of the slave trade. Resolutions on the matter were agreed to, in
which the Commons declared their opinion that the forts were
necessary for the promotion of the trade and that an allowance from
the national Exchequer should be made towards their upkeep.1 From
1730 this policy was continued, and the Company received annual
grants of £10,000 till 1747, when no grant was made, and the Com-
pany had once more to become self-supporting. The impossibility
of keeping up the forts without assistance provoked another petition
to the Commons, and the Board of Trade was instructed to collect
information and report to Parliament its conclusions. In 1 749 the
Board, well-informed and able as it was, reported itself unable
to come to a conclusion from the evidence submitted to it as to the
best means of carrying on the trade. It therefore presented to the
Commons a number of papers which summed up the chief conflicting
views.
In choosing between the rival nostrums for the restoration of
vigour to the slave trade Parliament finally declared in favour of a
compromise embodied in an Act of I750.2 This solution departed
from the wishes of those who opposed all Company rule by providing
for the erection of a new Company to which the management of the
forts was to be entrusted, and departed from the desires of the joint-
stock Company supporters by forbidding the new Company to hold
any joint stock or to undertake any trading in its corporate
capacity. A project for the assumption of direct control by the
Government was not favoured, probably because the work of super-
vising the forts would be too heavy a burden on it.3
The Act provided that the forts and other possessions held by the
Royal African Company on the West African Coast should be vested
in a regulated company, the "Company of Merchants trading to
Africa". Admission to the new Company was to be open to all His
Majesty's subjects on payment of a fee of forty shillings, and the
government was to be in the hands of a Committee of nine annually
elected, chosen by the freemen of the Company in the three ports
principally concerned with the slave trade, Liverpool, Bristol and
London. This Committee was made responsible for the management
I CJ., xxi, 522. a 23 George II, c. 31.
8 Martin, E. C., The British West African Settlements 1750-1821, p. 27.
COMPANY OF MERCHANTS TRADING TO AFRICA 451
and upkeep of the forts. It was to appoint all necessary servants
and officers for the service, and to make annual returns to Parliament
of its expenditure. Nothing was said in the Act as to the source of
the income from which the Company was to defray its necessary
expenses, though provision was made as to the way in which it was
to be accounted for. For supervision of the work of maintaining the
forts it was provided that the captains of the vessels of the Royal
Navy on the African coast should report to the Admiralty on the state
and condition of the forts.
As the Company of Merchants trading to Africa was incorporated
to prevent the evils of a close trading corporation, careful provision
was made that the Committee should not become an exclusive auto-
cratic body, and in addition to the rule of annual election it was pro-
vided that no member of the Committee might be elected for more
than three successive years. This regulated company was not in its
corporate capacity a trading company, but an organ of local govern-
ment in West Africa. The slave trade, after the Committee of the
Company entered fully upon its powers, was left entirely free and
open to all His Majesty's subjects, and the new Company was
stringently debarred from exercising any restrictive authority what-
ever over traders on the coast. Those who engaged in the slave trade
were therefore free to pursue it as they chose, and entitled to the
protection of the forts, which were to be maintained out of an annual
parliamentary vote. The Committee appointed to undertake the
management of the forts was representative of all the traders who
chose to pay the small admission fee and thus the victory of the
separate traders was complete. "Free Trade to Africa by Act of
Parliament" was the motto on the Company's seal, and under this
motto the slave trade was carried on until its abolition in 1807.
An Act passed in 1752 "for making compensation and satisfaction
to the Royal African Company for their charter, lands, forts",1
provides an opportunity for surveying the extent to which the
English slave trade had added to the English possessions. It included
a list of the forts which were handed over to the 1750 Company,
namely one fort on the Gambia and seven on the Guinea Coast, thus
affording evidence of the decline in the Company's power from the
days of its brief prosperity in the seventeenth century. By 1750 the
slave trade had fallen into the hands of small groups of independent
traders, and the government of the British West African holdings
was passing from the Company control of the seventeenth century
towards the direct assumption of authority by the Crown which was
to come in the nineteenth.
Though the coasts had been frequented by British vessels from the
fifteenth century, not much addition to the knowledge of the interior
of Africa had been gained by the middle of the eighteenth. The slave
1 25 George II, c. 4.
29-2
452 THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND WEST AFRICA
trade was to a large extent responsible for this ignorance. Peaceful
penetration was difficult in a continent where strangers were liable
to be captured and sold as slaves, and armed penetration was not
possible for the small groups of Englishmen who frequented the coast
either as representatives of a trading company, or as individual
adventurers. Nor did the English traders greatly desire to undertake
the work of exploration. Their position in the slave trade was that
of one of the many middlemen between the Muhammadan or other
slave raiders and the English planters in the West Indies. For this
occupation adventures into the interior would have been a great
additional danger and expense, without providing compensating
financial gain. The safest method of penetration for Europeans,
strategically, was by the rivers, but the climate of the rivers of tropical
Africa exacted so heavy a mortality from Europeans that the pro-
tection given by the ships' walls against human enemies was offset
by the decimation of the crews in their cramped quarters and
the unhealthiness of the moist atmosphere. For these reasons
the English, in company with other European Powers, left the ex-
ploration of the interior until conditions changed at the end of the
eighteenth century.
By 1750 the Africa that was known to Western Europe, apart from
Mediterranean Africa, consisted of a well-defined coastline and a
number of regions in which the Europeans had their trading posts,
with some features of the interior sketched in, according to hearsay
or imagination. The region of the Senegal and Gambia rivers was
well known, for traders had penetrated some considerable distance
up these rivers ; the coastline and islands between the Gambia and
the coast of the Gulf of Guinea were also accurately known and
charted, as was the Guinea Coast itself. The French had a fort on
the island, of Goree guarding the approach to the Senegal, and one
on the island of St Louis in the mouth of the river, and many factories
up its course. The British, in addition to a fort on James Island in
the mouth of the Gambia, had a number of factories up the river
the entrance of which they commanded. The Portuguese had trading
stations on the Bissagos islands, and the Guinea Coast was dotted with
European holdings. This shore was divided, from west to east, into
the Grain Coast, Tooth (or Ivory) Coast, Gold Coast and Slave Coast,
the majority of the forts being concentrated on the Gold Coast, where
the Dutch and English together had some twenty-five forts and
factories, the Brandenburgers two, and the Danes one. Other trading
posts were established and abandoned, so that the number of places
in effective occupation varied from time to time. All these Guinea
forts were erected on a strip of coastal plain separated by a range of
mountains from the little-known interior.
The power of the native kingdom of Ashanti was being built up,
but it was still an inland power only, and the coast was in possession
DEFECTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTERIOR 453
of a number of small native powers of which the Fantis were the
strongest. From the coast to the Ashanti borders there was com-
munication by trading paths down which the slave coffles came,
except in time of native wars when these were blocked. Behind the
Ashanti territory lay a region about which there was no accurate
knowledge. The most disputed feature of this distant interior was
the great riverway of the Niger, concerning which men made inter-
esting speculation. The most accurate cartographer of Africa in the
early eighteenth century, the Sieur d'Anville, who was employed by
Louis XV, made no guess at the course of the river, and left the Niger
out of his maps, inscribing "on n'a aucune connoissance de ce qui
est plus avant dans les terres" on the land just north of the coastal
region,1 but others who followed him had less restraint. An English-
man who published a map in 1760 depicted the Niger as a river
flowing between two lakes about longitude 3° East and a marsh in
longitude 10° West, with no egress to the sea.2 This was more accurate
than a commonly accepted view, which was expressed in the Annual
Register in 1758, that the source of the Niger was in East Africa, and
that it flowed westward to the coast dividing into three branches,
the Senegal, the Gambia, and the Rio Grande, by which it entered
the Atlantic. Until the time of Mungo Park's explorations, however,
this view remained current in England. To the east of the Gold Coast
the native kingdom of Dahomey, where the British had a fort at
Whydah, was a synonym for barbaric tyranny, and knowledge of the
interior was possible only so far as it was allowed by the native ruler.
Though there were no English settlements in the Congo region there
was some knowledge of that interior due to the Portuguese settle-
ments there. In the eighteenth century East Africa belonged to an
entirely different sphere from that of West Africa, the latter per-
taining to Atlantic commerce, the former to that of the East Indies.
Oceans, not continents, made unities in the eighteenth century, and
the English thought of Africa from 1 750 to 1 787 as the Atlantic coast-
line opposite the West Indies, an essential part of an important
triangular trade.
The Company of Merchants had not long been established before
rivalries with the French in the Gambia and with the Dutch on the
Gold Coast disturbed its peace. French rivalry, though it was
strongest in the Gambia region, was also felt on the Gold Coast,
and the English traders sought to secure a footing farther north than
the Gambia, so that they might have free entrance to the gum trade
from which the French were attempting to exclude them.
The Seven Years* War stimulated the rivalry of English and French,
and the wishes of the English traders were met by the prosecution of a
vigorous African campaign in 1758. The English forces captured the
1 d'Anville, J. B., Carte particidiere de lapartu principals de la Guinte, 1 729.
2 Bennett, R., Africa according to Sieur d'Anville, 1760.
454 THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND WEST AFRICA
French headquarters at Fort St Louis in the Senegal in May 1758,
and Goree in December.1 The Gold Coast was little troubled by
the war. The French attempted in 1757 to capture our head-
quarters at Cape Coast Castle, but failed,2 and by the end of the war
the British had won substantial successes over the French. Yet at
the Peace of Paris the English captures in Africa were not all retained,
the claims of the African traders not being appreciated to the same
extent by those who concluded the treaty as they had been by Pitt.
By the treaty of 1763 England acquired the Senegal with its forts
and dependencies, but restored the island of Goree to France, a
cession which caused much indignation. Pitt had insisted on the
English retention of both Goree and Fort St Louis, and he now pro-
tested against the restoration of Goree to France as unstatesmanlike
and unnecessary.3 The retention of the island gave France a base in
a good strategic position for preying on the English trade. England,
however, gained a large new trading ground situated in a valuable
region.
With the French continuance in Goree a strong government was
needed for the new English territory if the claim to control the gum
trade, which the English merchants had desired, was to be made
effective. The great value of this trade in the eighteenth century was
due to the importance of gum in the finishing processes of silk
materials, and it was, therefore, a necessity to the manufacturers of
both France and England. The region north of the River Senegal was
the best gum-bearing area in West Africa, and both countries wished
to keep their rivals out of this extremely desirable territory. It was
also urgent that some authority should be put in command of the
ceded forts without delay. In 1764, in answer to a request from the
Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, an Act
was passed by which the Senegal was united with the other English
forts under its management.4 This arrangement for the govern-
ment of the new territory did not last long, as there were complaints
of the weakness of the Company's administration and of its failure
to maintain English authority against French aggression. In con-
sequence the Board of Trade and Plantations recommended that the
British holdings should be divided into two groups, those in the
Senegal and Gambia region being under a new form of administra-
tion, the others being left to the control of the Company, and this
arrangement was adopted.5 Following this Act a Crown province
was erected out of the old Gambia holdings and the new Senegal
forts ^ and dependencies, under the name of "Senegambia". Its
administration seems strikingly elaborate in comparison with that
1 See G.O. 267/12.
2 Letters, Go. of Merchants trading to Africa, 13 Feb. 1757 (P-R-O. T. 70/30).
8 Parl. Hist, xy, 1266. « 4 George III, c. 20.
5 Representation by the Board of Trade to the Grown, 2 Feb; 1765 in Colonial Office
papers. 0.0.391/72.
THE GOVERNMENT OF SENEGAMBIA 455
which had been considered adequate for the rest of the coast.1 The
constitutional scheme, probably due in the main to Lord Shelburne,
was designed in imitation of the government of the American
colonies with certain modifications adapted to the particular con-
ditions of West Africa. The chief authority was entrusted to a
governor, acting with a small council. A chief justice had power to
erect the necessary courts for both civil and criminal cases. Trial by
jury was to be instituted, and justices of the peace and constables
appointed after the English fashion. There was to be an agent as
well as a secretary to the province, and for native affairs a secretary
conversant with the Moorish tongue. That the province should lack
no aid to civilisation, the establishment included schoolmasters and
chaplains, and to strengthen the governor's position in maintaining
the defence of the colony a vice-admiralty court was to be set up
for the trial of cases of piracy and adjudication on prizes, under the
presidency of the governor. The raison d'Stre of this province being
the extension of English commerce, a superintendent of trade was
appointed to guard that interest. Three companies of white soldiers
called Independents provided the necessary defence. As good
salaries were provided for the chief officers in this establishment, the
governor receiving £1200 a year, and the chief justice £400, the
cost of the Senegambian administration amounted to about £10,050
a year. To meet the burden Parliament passed an Act in 1 765 laying
a duty on all gum exported from the coast.2
Whatever the merits in the abstract of this scheme of government
it failed to suit the conditions of the country, and the successive
governors found themselves involved in difficulties in carrying out
the terms of their instructions.
The first governor, Colonel Charles O'Hara, arrived in West
Africa in lySS.3 In accordance with his military interests, he set
himself at once to remedy what he considered the appalling weakness
of the province, and without greatly troubling himself about the civil
administration he began to rebuild the defences of Fort St Louis and
to prepare for vigorous measures against the French. The delimi-
tation of boundaries being ambiguous in the treaty of 1763, O'Hara
gave to it an extensive interpretation, and prepared to deal severely
with any French intrusion upon British claims. Though his rule
seems to have been generally popular, he offended the inhabitants of
the island on which Fort St Louis stood by moving some of them to
the mainland on grounds of military necessity. His rule came to an
end with his recall and dismissal for having failed to carry out the
terms of his instructions. He left the coast late in 1776, and in the
following year a heated debate on the African settlements and their
1 See Martin, E. G., The British West African Settlements, pp. 57 seqq.
2 5 George III, c. 37.
8 See Martin, pp. 76 seqq.
456 THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND WEST AFRICA
government took place in the Commons.1 It turned mainly on the
mismanagement of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa,
but the Opposition now tried to censure the extravagance of the
Government in Senegambia. The attack was eluded by Lord North,
but the governor appointed to succeed O'Hara felt its effects. After
an interval of some months, John Clarke arrived to take command
of the province in April 1777. His instructions were a revised edition
of those which had been given to O'Hara, and he was advised not
to fall into his predecessor's errors. The new governor attempted to
set all parts of the administrative machinery working, but found very
great difficulty owing to the lack of a resident English population.
During his rule courts of judicature were set up and used, but when
appeal was brought against them in England, they were pronounced
to have been illegally constituted — a ruling which brought both the
governor and the chief justice under risk of penalties for illegal
action. Constant criticism was Clarke's portion, as the Government
wished to be able to answer its opponents, and Lord George
Germaine informed him that the Senegambian establishment was
to be retrenched. Before he had an opportunity of putting the
reforms into practice Governor Clarke died, a victim to an epidemic
that swept the garrison in August 1778. While he was in command,
the French declared war on Great Britain; but Clarke died just as
the first French expedition to Africa was on its way to the coast. A
quarrel arose among the British officers as to who should succeed
him, and the rival parties finally attempted to settle the matter by
force. When the French vessels arrived off the island of St Louis, one
part of the British garrison was occupied in holding the fort against
another, and, engaged in this dispute, they offered no serious re-
sistance to the French, who settled the quarrel by taking the
command upon themselves.2 This loss of the headquarters in Sene-
gambia was not allowed to pass without retaliation, and in 1779
Goree fell into our hands.
On the rupture with Holland in 1780 there was a contest on the
Gold Coast, though neither the Dutch nor the English there desired
a trial of strength by engaging in open warfare. The Dutch had just
lost a very able governor, and his successor was a man of far less
vigour, while the English were conscious that their forts, garrisons,
and supplies were in an extremely precarious condition. When news
of impending hostilities reached the coast, they, therefore, agreed
among themselves to maintain an attitude of neutrality.3 Owing to
this policy no welcome was given to some British privateers who
appeared at Cape Coast Castle in February 1781, with captured
Dutch vessels, or to the news they brought of the official proclama-
1 Parl. Hist, xnc, 291 seqq.
2 Letter from Schotte, 29 March 1779 in G.O. 267/20.
» Governor at Cape Coast Castle to Committee of Co. 19 March 1781 (P.R.O. T.
WAR WITH THE FRENCH AND DUTCH 457
tion of the outbreak of hostilities. Instead it was agreed by the Dutch
and British to continue at peace. The British desire for neutrality
waned after the arrival of the store ship in May 1781, and though the
governor wished to hold to his agreement with the Dutch, he was
over-ruled by the council, and a force of volunteers from the British
forts, acting in co-operation with Captain West of H.M.S. Champion
who had been sent out to protect the coast, attempted the capture of
one of the Dutch forts. The expedition failed, and the Dutch re-
taliated by a successful attack on one of the English forts. Matters
became more serious when both sides attempted to strengthen their
position by enlisting native support. Neither was, however, strong
enough to undertake any formidable attack until reinforcements
were sent from Europe. Finally in February 1 782 a naval and military
force arrived from England under the joint command of Captain
Shirley of H.M.S. Leander and Captain Kenneth Mackenzie in com-
mand of two Independent companies; but a combined sea and land
attack on the Dutch headquarters at Elmina failed, owing to lack of
co-operation between the commanders; and Captain Shirley, re-
fusing to act with Captain Mackenzie, made a naval attack on the
lesser Dutch forts. Of these he captured five; four surrendered on
summons, Mouree, Cormantine, Apam, Berracoe, and the fifth,
Accra, after a twenty days' siege.1 Having thus to some extent
covered the disgrace of the defeat at Elmina, he sailed to the West
Indies and left Mackenzie to garrison the conquests. The Annual
Register, never a very discriminating authority on African matters,
in commenting in 1783 on the campaign pictured its results as the
collapse of Dutch African power "stripped of most of their settle-
ments on the Coast of Africa by Captain Shirley".2 Opinion on the
coast, however, was that his operations had been badly planned,
worse executed, and were of very little practical use because the
Dutch headquarters had been left intact.8
During the negotiations for peace the African holdings were among
the matters which caused difficulties. Vergennes declared to the
English representative that France expected to get revenge for the
humiliations of 1763,* which included her African losses. In the
treaty discussions, however, it was early agreed that the Senegal was
to be restored to France, the Gambia continuing in British posses-
sion; but the British merchants were anxious that their right to an
exclusive possession of the Gambia should be clearly recognised by
France. It was a long-standing grievance that the French persisted
in trading within the river and keeping a station at Albreda. Governor
O'Hara had taken vigorous steps against all such attempts, consider-
ing the French as intruders, but the Board of Trade and Plantations
1 Shirley to Adm. 23 Feb. 1782 (PJR.O. AD. 1/2485).
2 Annual Register, 1783, p. 115.
3 Governor of Gape Coast Castle to Committee of Co. 6. June 1782 (P.R.O. T. 70/33).
4 Alleyne Fitzherbert to Lord Grantham, 31 July 1782 (F.O. 27/3).
458 THE ENGLISH SLAVE TRADE AND WEST AFRICA
had been uncertain on this point. Fitzherbert, the British repre-
sentative, was instructed to secure an admission from France of the
British claims, but he failed, and his correspondence suggests that he
himself considered the claim unreasonable.1 The final terms left the
Gambia rights undefined, and contained other matter for future
quarrels. By the treaty of 1783 it was provided that France should
regain the Senegal and Goree, that England should retain the
Gambia, and have a right to share in the gum trade, and that the
two nations might frequent the rest of the African coast as they had
done in the past. Accordingly British Senegambia came to an end,
the Gambia territory alone remaining of the former province. Yet
the position of the rivals was not quite that of 1750, as the British
right to a share in the gum trade had been recognised.
The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 20 May 1784 provided for a mutual
restitution of conquests, and the appointment of commissioners by
both countries to settle a dispute concerning part of the Gold Coast.
The restitution of conquests was equitable, as the burden of main-
taining five additional forts would have been a useless expense at a
time when the decline of the Dutch power on the coast had become
evident.
A comparatively peaceful period of ten years followed the treaties
of 1783 and 1784, during which certain changes in the balance of the
various Powers became evident. The Dutch authority on the Gold
Coast was no longer a serious menace to the English forts, and in the
Senegal and Gambia region the French and English were much more
evenly matched than they had been in 1750. Another interesting
change that had taken place almost unnoticed during the American
War indicated the passing of certain old traditions in African trade.
Spain had remained without a holding on the African coasts from the
time of the delimitation by the agreement of Tordesillas in 1493, but
during the American War she secured from Portugal the island of
Fernando Po, which with the island of Annobon became posts from
which she secured a share in the slave trade.
France being now in possession of the Senegal it was essential that
effective occupation should be maintained in the Gambia when it
had been confirmed to England. The Province of Senegambia having
ceased to exist there was no English authority expressly responsible
for the government of the district. The Company of Merchants
trading to Africa was still in charge of the forts and trading posts
south of the Gambia, but by the Act of 1765, which was still in force,
it had no powers further north. Thus there was the choice before
the Government of re-establishing a Crown Colony in what remained
of Senegambia, or of re-extending the boundaries of the Company
of Merchants, unless it was to devise some new scheme of local
government for West Africa. The cheapest and easiest course was
1 See Fitzherberfs despatches January 1783 (F.O. 37/5).
CHANGE IN BRITISH RELATIONS WITH AFRICA 459
chosen, and in 1 783 an Act was passed by which the Gambia was
revested in the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, which was
to receive an annual grant for its upkeep.1 The administration of the
forts and settlements in the Gambia and on the Gold Coast by the
Company of Merchants continued until the slave trade was abolished
in 1807.
In the history of our relations with Africa the years 1784 to 1787
may be taken as the end of the period in which the promotion of the
slave trade was considered the raison fStre of the English connection.
The literature concerning Africa that was published in England
indicates the change. Up to 1787 the bulk of the printed matter
about the subject was concerned with arguments as to the best
means of promoting the slave trade, or eulogies on its importance,
and little else, but after 1787 there is far more variety in the topics
of books or articles on Africa. The settlement for freed negroes at
Sierra Leone founded in 1787, the argument about the justice of the
slave trade after the beginning of the abolition campaign in the same
year, and the beginning of modern scientific exploration, with the
foundation in 1788 of the Society for the Promotion of the Explora-
tion of the African interior, introduced a new age in the British
connection with Africa.
1 23 George III, c. 65.
CHAPTER XVT
THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
1 HE decade after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle witnessed staggering
changes in Britain's fortunes. Five quiet years, which bequeathed to
history their catchwords of "no Jews, no wooden shoes"1 and "give
us back our eleven days", yielded at Pelham's death (March 1 754) to
a time of brisker motion. It seemed in 1755 that Newcastle, his
brother and successor, had secured for Britain and Hanover enough
sponsors among the Powers to warrant an aggressive defensive against
the French. Next year, however, Newcastle's house of cards fell down,
and at midsummer 1757 a seemingly ruined country turned as a last
resort to William Pitt. Before the following year was out, the seas
at least were safe and Hanover defended, while the Americans were
expressing with the aid of 60,000 gallons of rum their relief from the
Canadian menace. In every continent the stage was already set for
the classic triumph of 1759. Pitt, anti-Bourbonism incarnate, had
made the history of Britain seem his own.
The Seven Years' War (1756-63), indeed, which for Britain may
be said to have substantially begun in April 1755, contrasts with that
of the Austrian Succession (1740-8) as Pitt with Carteret, his
master.2 Each war began as a struggle for power in the New World,
and each was swiftly complicated by the conflicts of the Old. But
while in each, as the history of Hanover may show, the interests of
Europe proved decisive, Pitt's world-embracing vision was never
dimmed by the tradition of the scribes. The threat of French in-
vasion, all-potent in 1744 and 1756, was not suffered to disturb his
plans in 1759. The people's minister thus made conquests that the
people would not resign, and while imperial history recalls but faintly
the peace of 1748, it commemorates no prouder trophy than the
peace of 1763.
The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, indeed, was a "mere end of war
because your powder is run out",3 a conscious breathing-space for
the unsolved problem, "France or Britain"? While Newcastle
dreaded bankruptcy, Lady Yarmouth had neither the will nor the
power to play the Pompadour, and her royal lover was regarded as
a miser. Sober estimates in the 'fifties credited George II with a
hoard of £15,000,000,* while France, with a tradition of international
1 Hertz, G. B., British Imperialism in the eighteenth century, passim.
« Williams, B., The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, r, 52.
* Garlyle, T., History jF Frederick the Great, bk xvi, chap. iii.
* Wyndham, H. P., The diary of the late George Bubb Dodington, 29 May 1754 and 3 Sept.
FRANCO-BRITISH ANTAGONISM 461
munificence to support, failed to subscribe a royal loan in Haifa year
of peace.1 Such sordid considerations might impel the French to
postpone a rupture, and Louis' preference for the excitement of dis-
missing ministers to the labour of selecting good ones2 helped to
make his policy feeble, short-sighted and unpatriotic. But Britain,
none the less, remained the enemy — a heretic and unmonarchic
state, the leader of Europe against Louis XIV, the patron of militant
Germany, and, alike in the Netherlands and by sea, the unsleeping
gaoler of France; a Power always intent to divide the Bourbons, to
filch away French commerce, and to cripple French dominion over-
seas. Thirteen years after the so-called peace and six after the renewal
of strife, Stanley and Ghoiseul "at last agreed that the real sources
of the war had been the leaving the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle im-
perfect and incomplete5'.3 No agreement in 1748, however, could
do more than palliate the symptoms of so deep-seated a disease. A
truce, even an entente between France and Britain, merely gave them
time for fresh growth and tacit preparation. Only the subjugation
of one or a revolution in the conception of nations as natural rivals
could end their recurrent feud. And France at least was too vast,
rich and well-peopled to share the fate of Portugal, Spain and
Holland.
But although the Peace of 1 748 had been powerless to harmonise
France and Britain, it had silently registered the solution of two other
great questions which the war had no less been waged to solve.
Austria, it was clear, survived, and Prussia had made good her bold
intrusion into the inner circle of great States. These plain facts must
obviously affect Britain in the future only less powerfully than her
unappeased antagonism to France. For her it had become a common-
place that France was "the only state which either Europe in general
or England in particular can be endangered by".4 Against France
she naturally sought aid from Germany, that body composed of some
two hundred fragments but with a Habsburg emperor at its head.
That this simple and natural arrangement, the very fulcrum of the
balance of power, should give place to a dualism whereby Germany,
as a counterpoise to France, was well-nigh abolished — such a revolu-
tion seemed to Newcastle and his colleagues almost beyond belief.
Their perplexities were increased by the fact that Hanover lay
defenceless against Prussia, with her 130,000 well-trained troops and
her fortress of Wesel, convenient to admit the French across the
Rhine. They found it hard to believe that, with the interest of Britain
and the liberties of Europe to serve, Austria and Prussia could not
be brought, as of old, into an alliance.5 Maria Theresa and her
F.O., France, 250, Paris, 23 April 1755-
Memoires du Due de Choiseul, 1719-85, pp. 134, 141-
F.O., France, 251, Paris, 8 June 1761.
[Mauduit, I.], Considerations on the present German war (5th edn, London, 1761), p. 13.
Ruviile, A. von, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, i, 384 seqq.
462 THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
ministers, none the less, had the best of reasons for the "absurd
peevishness"1 with which they placed the eventual recovery of
Silesia before all other objects. Silesia had been the Habsburgs' best
province. Its loss not merely damaged their prestige both in Ger-
many and throughout their heterogeneous empire but constituted
a grave strategic threat both to Prague and to Vienna. More weighty
still was the shock which the rape of Silesia gave to the moral basis
upon which all States rested and dynastic Austria most of all. "The
Prussian soldier and his atheist theory", it has even been maintained,2
"had compassed the first mere conquest of European territory which
had been achieved by any European power" since Europe had been
Christian. If Silesia remained Prussian, European anarchy would
begin.
His Most Christian Majesty, indeed, the Habsburgs' hereditary
foe, was as little moved as was the British public by such refinements.
To the one Prussia formed an efficient if untrustworthy ally, while
the other could not regret Protestant success in a domestic quarrel
between Germans. Since Silesia had become Prussian, the interest
on the Silesian loan had been paid, a duty which Austria had
consistently neglected.3 Prussia's remaining neighbours, however,
viewed her rise with less indifference. Augustus, Elector of Saxony
and King in Poland, could not be unaware that Saxony and Polish
Prussia ranked next to Silesia on the list of Prussian desiderata.
Elector George of Hanover distrusted and detested his nephew
Frederick on every ground. Sweden, a distracted Power threatened
with dissolution, feared for her remnant of Pomerania. In Russia,
Elizabeth, a daughter of Peter the Great, now reigned (1741-62).
Indolent and dissolute as she was, her deepest feelings were outraged
by Frederick's life and tongue, and she never lacked energy when it
was a question of removing such an obstacle to the advance of Russia
as this satirist of herself and standing offence to God. Such were the
clouds on Prussia's horizon which made it possible to argue that of
all possible allies for Britain Frederick was the worst, since he must
bring with him the enmity of all Europe.
In 1748, therefore, a British servant of George II had two chief
problems to consider, a German and a French. The rise in Germany
of a Power inherently aggressive, spending five-sixths of its revenue
upon armaments, and fettered neither by geography nor by morality
in its advance, rendered further aggression or counter-aggression
certain, whether Frederick lived or died. No less certain was the
renewal of the strife between France and Britain. Conscious of
what we had gained by the destruction of the French marine and the
dissipation of the Stuart threat, we could await without dismay the
1 P.O., Prussia, 65, Mitchell, Berlin, 24 June 1756.
2 Belloc, H., Marie Antoinette, p. 8.
8 Satow, Sir £., The Silesian loan and Frederick the Great, p. 2.
THE PROBLEM OF ALLIANCES 463
outbreak of such a struggle, if only it was uncomplicated by the
intrusion of other Powers. On and across the seas our superiority was
enough for victory. On land, however, our inferiority was no less
marked. And on land we were painfully vulnerable both in the
Netherlands, which were vital to the nation, and in Hanover, which
was vital to the King. So long as George II remained alive, British
policy must be swayed by that separate interest which prompted the
words " Tour America, your lakes, your Mr Amherst might ruin you or
make you rich, but in all events / shall be undone".1 The famous
constitutional formula of the Princess of Wales, "The King may
sputter and make a bustle, but" [when the ministers say it is necessary
for his service] "he must do it"2 might hold for domestic politics
but not for British-Hanoverian. We were, therefore, indeed become
"an insurance office for Hanover", and with such risks as France
and Prussia impending, the premium would be a high one.
In the Netherlands, indeed, we reckoned upon help from the
Emperor, who owned them, and from the Dutch, to whom it was a
vital interest that they should not be French. Austria, however,
might contend with some reason that, since the defence of these
provinces was vital to the Sea Powers, and since the commerce of
Ostend and of Antwerp was restricted for their advantage, they
should regard it as their privilege to do the work themselves. Austrian
pride was outraged by the renewed stipulation in 1748 for a chain
of forts to be garrisoned by the Sea Powers and to defend the Austrian
Netherlands against France.8 If, therefore, France and Prussia re-
mained allies, a future Silesian war meant for Austria either the
detachment of an enormous garrison to hold the Netherlands or, at
the peace, the sacrifice for their redemption of what she might have
conquered nearer home.
The connection between France and Prussia, indeed, was so em-
barrassing to Austria that it might well prompt her to reconsider the
policy traditional since Charles V. Why should the House of Habs-
burg continue to regard itself as bound by fate to struggle always and
everywhere against the House of Bourbon? The crime of France
against the Pragmatic Sanction seemed as nothing in comparison
with that of Prussia, and at Aix-la-Chapelle the deepest wounds had
been inflicted not by France but by Britain. If post-war France were
anywhere aggressive, it was beyond the seas, in regions with which
Austria had no concern. In Kaunitz, moreover, Austria now possessed
a statesman capable of new ideas, and one who by 1749 had already
framed a project of entente with France.4 That France would consent
seemed indeed to many as improbable as that Austria would ever
* Williams, I, 384. a Dodington, Diary, 8 Feb. 17^
8 Gf. Rousset, Recueil hutorique facto, etc. i, 37 seqq.; and Koch et Scholl,
3es iraitis de paix, u, 420.
« Koser, R., Komg Friedrich der Grosse, i, 474.
464 THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
ask. Newcastle pooh-poohed the idea,1 and, fed with the ordinary
fair words of diplomacy, persisted for seven years more in endeavour-
ing to galvanise and fortify "the old system". But in the argument:
France and Britain must stand opposed; Austria must regain Silesia;
for this purpose Britain can give less help than France, there lay too
much of truth to perish, and the ever-famous Revolution in Alliances
of 1 756 was the result.
If indeed "the old system" were not moribund beyond hope, the
conduct of the British Government during the six years after 1748
cannot be called unwise. The sluggishness or ill will of Austria, the
mainstay of "the old system", was overlooked, and every opportunity
of propitiating her was eagerly accepted. To spare her susceptibilities,
Britain shunned a new entente with France.2 George II laboured un-
ceasingly to secure the succession of Maria Theresa's firstborn to the
imperial crown and actually procured the marriage of her second
son to a Modena princess.3 The great object of reconciling the
Habsburgs with the Dutch was in part at least accomplished.
Sardinia, invaluable to Austria in Italy, was secured so far as such
a term could ever be appropriate to her inconstant and shifting
alliance. It was hardly less important to Austria than to Britain that
Spain should stand aloof from France, and the cleavage between
these Bourbon Powers was happily maintained. Above all Britain
prepared to follow the advice given by Kaunitz in October 1749 by
securing Russia, "a power raised up by Providence to supply the
losses the alliance had suffered in the late wars, and to bring things
to their ancient equality".4 Within four years the rumour ran that
30,000 Russians had been brought into Livonia, with the plain intent
of forbidding Frederick to move. France threatened in that case to
despatch an equal force to Flanders,5 but no long time elapsed before
Britain returned to the idea. If "the old system" meant that Prussia
might be paralysed by a British-paid Russian army, Vienna would
not lightly let it go.
In March 1754, then, when "Pelham fled to heaven", and New-
castle, unchallenged alike in the Foreign Office and in Parliament,
succeeded, the peace of eastern Europe seemed unstable. Armed
beyond all precedent, the conqueror of Silesia could hardly be ex-
pected to remain contented with a single acquisition, or to view with
passive tolerance the hostile entente with which he was confronted.
"Have I", he once exclaimed, "a nose intended to be pulled?" and
his attitude, uninfluenced by niceties of law save when they favoured
him, was well displayed when in 1755 he suspended the payment of
1 F.O., Germany, 180, to Keith, 3 March 1749 O.S.
* Ibid, 1749, passim.
8 Ibid., 191, 14 Aug. 1753.
4 Conversation with Keith; cf. P.O., Germany, 30 Oct. 174,0.
8 F.O., Germany, 191, 21 Sept. 1753.
FRENCH AND BRITISH IN AMERICA 465
his debts to individual Britons in order to convert their Government
to his view.1 The populations and resources of his enemies were
perhaps eight times superior to his own and their comparative
efficiency was growing. If Frederick lived, a preventive war, if not
a war of retribution, could hardly be long delayed.
Yet, as posterity knows well, war broke out first between France
and Britain and forced itself upon their reluctant statesmen as the
result of local quarrels outside Europe. In the Britain of 1754, King,
premier, chancellor, secretaries of state, heads of the Army and Navy
— each seemed less likely than the other to design a great war about
America, and the Commons at that time existed only to register the
ministers* decrees. The late war had been one "in which Great
Britain and France gained nothing but the experience of each other's
strength and power".2 France had been the more exhausted and
remained in the feebler hands. Puysieulx, the author of the peace,
had even proclaimed a vision of the two States, supreme by sea and
land respectively, united as in 1717 to dictate peace to Europe.3 The
local and spontaneous strife of their nationals in India was stifled at
any cost. So pronounced was the novel accent of his ally, and so
clear the signs of her degeneracy, that Frederick came to regard her
alliance as of doubtful value.4 Beyond the Atlantic, however, a
different tone prevailed. When the history of colonial expansion,
British and Russian alike, throughout the nineteenth century is
reviewed, the folly of ascribing conscious duplicity to Louis XV and
his ministers becomes apparent. On the North American mainland
the French continued as they had begun, preferring the fur trade to
axe and plough, ranging far afield rather than pursuing intensive
development, organising empire instead of multiplying homes. Since
Canada, theirs by every title, was severed from the mother country
by waters often impassable and always commanded by British coasts
and islands, it would have been strange if they had not sought to
connect that province with their sally-port at New Orleans. Always
more intelligent and often more humane than the New Englanders
towards the Indians, they were strengthening this connection by
building forts and expanding their empire by conversion and by
annexation. Year by year, while the French and ^ British commis-
sioners at Paris vainly strove to determine boundaries, these accom-
plished facts grew more numerous. La Galissoniere, who as Governor
of Canada had in 1749 initiated the aggressive defensive of French
America against the instinctive expansion of the British masses,
enjoyed the luxury, two years later, of rending asunder the juridical
cobwebs spun by our statesmen to veil some of these proceedings.
With regard to Nova Scotia, he declared, the boundary claims of
Britain rested on the assumption that France had never possessed
1 Satow, op. cit. passim. * Coxe, W., Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpol*, p. 359.
* P.O., France, 333, Feb. 1749. * Satow, pp. 34* >8x; Koser, i, 569 seqq.
CHBE I 30
466 THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
it save by her gift, and upon an interpretation of the Treaty of
Utrecht invented some forty years afterwards and contradicted by
the documents which she herself produced.1 The French claims on
the Ohio doubtless lay open to an equally destructive analysis. But
in the whole collision2 English critics, like those of every country
and of every age, saw clear proof of the unscrupulousness of the
foreign Government and of the incompetence of their own. To the
younger Horace Walpole the sins of the French in evading the due
evacuation of Tobago and other islands and in disturbing Nova
Scotia seemed to be but part of a scheme of general aggression over-
seas. "In the East", he declared, "they were driving us out of our
settlements, and upon the coast of Africa seizing our forts, raising
others, inveigling away our allies, and working us out of our whole
negro and Gold Coast trade."3 Although the French king was at
this time steeped in pleasure, his ministers of foreign affairs transient
phantoms, and his diplomatists parodies upon their predecessors, it
is true that the interests of France and Britain overseas clashed so
sharply that in many regions desultory fighting had gone on un-
checked by peace in Europe.4 Louisbourg had been refortified and,
early in 1751, news reached Whitehall that no fewer than 7800 troops
had left Rochefort for the colonies.5 In America French reinforce-
ments found a field where though the British residents might be
twenty times the more numerous, expeditionary forces were reckoned
only by hundreds, while bands of cannibals stood ready to join the
victors. To maintain French claims on the Ohio the mere show of
local force might be enough.
In other disputes meanwhile the French were trying British
patience but by no means challenging to war. After discussions pro-
longed over several years, it was arranged that the four disputed
West India islands, St Lucia, Dominica, St Vincent and Tobago,
should be evacuated until the question of right could be determined.
The method seemed drastic, and the Governor of Martinique pro-
tested that he could not hunt the settlers out like wild boars, but the
pacific Puysieulx gave way. In 1753, moreover, the dreaded works
at Dunkirk, which were supposed to contravene the Treaty of Aix-la-
Chapelle, were actually submitted to inspection, though the result
proved that British suspicion was well founded.6 More inflammatory
and no less juridically obscure were the unending quarrels with
regard to Nova Scotia. Here boundaries, allegiance and develop-
ment were all contested. In 1749 the town of Halifax had been
created, and in three years its population, mainly of disbanded
soldiers, passed 4000. This challenge to Louisbourg impelled the
* Memoires des commissaires star les possessions et les droits respectifs des deux courormes en Am£rique
(Paris, 1755), i, 181. 2 Cf. Carlyle, Frederick the Great, bk xvi, chap. xiv.
3 Memoirs (finished Oct. 1759), I, 82. * Williams, i 218
6 P.O., France, Feb. 1751 (Paris).
6 Ibid. 248, 29 Nov. and 30 Dec,
WASHINGTON AT FORT NECESSITY 467
local French to fresh endeavours to reduce the British power. Their
clergy were conspicuous in persuading the inhabitants to quit the
country rather than suffer British rule, and even in hounding on the
Indians to make life near the disputed frontier impossible.1 If it was
difficult for the French to explain away their own doings by land
they could at least charge the British with illegalities by sea. In 1750
the Governor of Cape Breton Island declared that for the French
there was no safety, since their ships, cargoes and sailors were con-
stantly seized by the English.2 British ships were seized wholesale
by way of reprisal, while each nation accused the other of building
forts on ground which was not its own.
In 1 753 these local incidents were eclipsed by a conflict which was
deliberately provoked and which pointed less obscurely towards
war. In the summer of that year die new Governor of Canada,
Duquesne, established two forts to the south of Lake Erie, with the
plain intention of following exploration in the valley of the Ohio by
effective occupation. In British eyes these forts stood on Virginian
soil. Dinwiddie, the Governor of Virginia, was directed by the British
Government to build forts on the Ohio and if necessary to remove
the French by force. On 1 1 December, therefore, George Washing-
ton, a young Virginian surveyor in the public service, summoned the
Commandant of Fort-le-Boeuf to depart. A firm refusal left him no
alternative but a toilsome and perilous retreat. The local superiority
of the French became apparent when Dinwiddie attempted to follow
words by deeds. Of the remaining colonies, North Carolina alone
consented to help Virginia. In 1754, however, Fort Necessity, a
stockade nearly 1 50 miles south of Fort-le-Bceuf, was built as the
preliminary to the expulsion of the French from their new position
on the Ohio at Fort Duquesne. In May, at Great Meadows, a little
expeditionary force under Washington killed a French lieutenant
and ten of his men who were bringing a letter from the governor.
On 3 July the brother of the slaughtered officer with 1500 men re-
ceived from Washington the surrender of Fort Necessity. The French
forward movement had triumphed in the face of merely local oppo-
sition. Would the British Government acquiesce, negotiate or fight?
Acquiescence was plainly impossible. As Newcastle declared to
Albemarle, our ambassador in Paris, the French were claiming
" almost all N. America except a lisiire to the sea to which they would
confine all our Colonies and from whence they may drive us when-
ever they please".3 Such strangulation we could not suffer, even if
the French had not clearly broken the agreement by moving while
the commission still sat. Negotiation, on the other hand, might not
seem hopeless. For a colonial struggle, indeed for any struggle against
1 Parkman, F., Montcalm and Wolfe, vol. I, chaps, i-iv, and App. B.
2 Germiny, M. de., Les brigandages maritime* de I'Angleterre, i, 88.
3 Newcastle to Albemarle, 5 Sept. 1754* cit. Gharteris, Cumberland, p. 125.
30-2
468 THE SEVEN YEARS5 WAR
Britain, France must fit out a fleet, but early in 1754, Albemarle re-
ported that no activity was visible at Brest, and at Rochefort and
Toulon a palpable reduction.1 Louis, as usual, showed himself inert;
Madame de Pompadour, conciliatory; the ministers, so pacific as to
recall Dupleix from India. The crushing superiority of our Navy and
the countenance of Austria, Holland, Russia, Sardinia and Spain,
might well indispose the French Government to court disaster for the
sake of far-distant acres of wilderness and snow. Considerations of
higher statesmanship, however, seldom restrain the actions of remote
consuls and pioneers. Boundaries in unknown regions based on
speculations as to the rights of savage nomads simply invited disputes.
Report after report of French encroachment reached Whitehall.
Within two years of the peace our statesmen were convinced that for
all her fine promises in Europe France sought to keep all she could
overseas. "If that be the case, it must be seen who is the strongest
and best able to defend their rights."2 Time and negotiation seemed
to bring only an aggravation of the offence. On 26 June 1754 seven
ministers, assembled at Newcastle House, resolved that, as the French
had destroyed our fort on the Ohio, invaded our territory with a
thousand regulars, and endangered all our northern colonies and
their trade, most effectual measures should be forthwith taken.3 The
most obvious effectual measure, since war was neither expected nor
desired, would have been to organise a sufficient colonial defence
force from the British American population. Fourteen years before,
Sharpe, the Deputy-Governor of Maryland, had proposed to take
one man in twenty-five, in all more than 20,000, and conquer the
French possessions.4 Now with a contest for the future of America
clearly ripening, men like Franklin turned to thoughts of voluntary
union.5 American authorities, from Halifax downwards, advocated
compulsion.6 British statesmen, however, alive to a "mobbish turn"
across the ocean,7 feared that colonial union might lead to thoughts
of independence, while the remoter colonies shrank from any
sacrifice for the good of those immediately concerned.
The British Government, however, was firmly resolved that if, as
there seemed reason to believe, the French were negotiating only to
gain time for naval preparations, they should not profit by their
previous aggression. For 1755 it designed, according to the plan of
the victor of Culloden,8 a fourfold offensive against the Canadian
positions. In November 1754 Braddock, a stiff, rough, elderly Major-
General, was ordered overseas with a thousand men, to repel force
by force, but to do nothing that might be construed as an infraction
of the general peace. His mission was explained to the French by
Albemarle, whom a love affair enchained to Paris, with such tact
1 P.O., France, 249, Jan and Feb. » Ibid. 1750.
3 Newcastle Papers, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 33039. * Ibid. 7 Nov. 1740.
! *???roft> #**•/ U£"™> 9J. 12.3 seqq. • Ibid, iv, 165 scqq
7 Shirley to the Board of Trade, cit. ibid. TV, 39. • Chartera, pp. 127 seqq.
TENSION BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN 469
that negotiations could continue. Frederick indeed sneered at the
ministers of Louis as children who put their hands before their eyes
and thought themselves invisible. A humbler or a weaker State
than France, indeed, might well have refused to look on impassive
while her rival thus filched away the power to defend her colonies.
When, however, she in her turn prepared for larger reinforcements
the risk of a rupture was necessarily much increased. At this moment
Albcmarle untimely died. The New Year's despatch of his lieutenant1
portrayed the natural indignation of the French at the King's mention
of their "encroachments"2 in his speech to Parliament and at British
warlike preparations. They were now arming by land and sea and
as the time drew nearer when Canadian waters would be freed from
ice, hope of a peaceful issue was clearly dwindling.
On 14 February, Frederick declared that the odds on war were ten
to one.3 They were not reduced when Paris learned that George II
had pledged himself to neglect no means of securing British rights
and possessions, and that Pitt had stated that if Britain would be just
towards France, she had not thirty years to live.4 When both sides
formulated their demands, moreover, a well-nigh impassable cleavage
was disclosed. France declared herself unable to submit to negotia-
tion either the south bank of the St Lawrence and its contributory
lakes, or the belt of land twenty leagues wide on the Canadian side
of the Bay of Fundy, or the land between the rivers Wabash and Ohio.
These, Britain declared, were the very points regarding which nego-
tiation was desirable.5
Not until mid-July, however, did diplomacy confess its failure.
Paris then heard that the Canadian reinforcements had been attacked
at sea by Marlborough's great-nephew, Boscawen, that many had
been killed, and that two men-of-war, the Alcide and the Lys, with
eight companies of soldiers and 200,000 livres, had been taken.6 The
London merchants, scenting commerce and prizes, approved of this
violence, but ministers realised that either too much or too little had
been done.7 As Granville and Fox had falsely assured the French
ambassador in May that Boscawen had no orders to attack, so now
Newcastle protested that the attack was due to a misunderstanding.8
The lie at least helped France to postpone a rupture for which she
was not yet prepared, and to decline Frederick's proposal that she
should attack Hanover while he hurled 140,000 men against Austria,
Britain's supposed accomplice.9 Though the French talked wildly of
piracy, they were certainly not taken by surprise. Boscawen's action,
none the less, went far towards attaching to Albion the stigma of
Ruvigny de Gosne, P.O., France, 250. a 14 Nov. I754-
To Michell, Pol. Corr. xr, 55. 4 Germiny, Les brigandages, i, 84.
F.O., France, 250, RoiiiHe" to Mirepoix, 13 April 1755.
Ibid. 23 July (from Compiegne).
Charters, p. 168. 8 find. p. 153.
Bernis, Abbe", Mtmoircs, I, 210 seqq.
470 THE SEVEN YEARS5 WAR
"perfidious3*, nor was this attenuated when the captain of the Alcide
reported that the order to fire upon him followed hard upon Captain
Howe's assurance that the two countries were at peace.1
Despite Boscawen's action, the bulk of the French forces had
reached their destination. Soon after came the news that Braddock's
fourfold onslaught on French America had failed. The capture of
Fort Beaus^jour, indeed, cleansed British territory from an alleged
encroachment and severed the French land route between Canada
and their northern islands. To secure the position, the deportation
of some 6000 French settlers from Nova Scotia was soon deemed in-
dispensable. Their firm refusal to transfer their allegiance to Britain
portended a renewal of the insecurity and wholesale murder that had
marked the years preceding, at the instigation, as seemed clear, of
the French. But the attacks on Crown Point and on Fort Niagara were
destined to produce only an unfruitful victory in the field and the
garrisoning of Fort Oswego. Braddock himself, on his way to Fort
Duquesne, incurred a resounding disaster. The General perished;
his mistress the Indians outraged, tortured and devoured; the
second-in-command behaved disgracefully; the fleeing troops lost
their moral; the British colonists were disheartened and disgusted,
the French proportionately encouraged; while the Indians, as
always, inclined towards the stronger side. The undeclared war of
1755 had not gone well for Britain.
Not even the seizure of French ships by scores and French sailors
by thousands could provoke their Government to declare war pre-
maturely and thus play Britain's game. Although the French diplo-
matic representatives left Hanover and London, a captured British
cruiser was actually released.2 All efforts to win outside support by
denouncing Britain failed, however, to impress the Government of
Spain. Newcastle, though dismayed when he thought of the expense
of war, might still calculate that the French must be beaten at sea,
and that his conventions, crowned by that of 30 September 1 755
with Russia, made "the old system " secure in Europe. The necessary
payments had indeed driven Pitt into opposition, but Pitt, it was
said, could do anything with Parliament except win votes.
The year 1756 saw the statesman's confidence raised high only to
be shattered. While Britain dared France, patriots complained, the
monarch trembled for his Hanover. In 1755, the ambiguous
attitude of Austria had given frequent cause for alarm. It would
have taxed an even more astute diplomatist than Kaunitz to reveal
no trace of his sincere and long-standing preference for France.
When, as occurred in August, his plan had been adopted by an
Austrian conference at Vienna, the difficulty was increased.3 While
1 Genniny, i, 123, The English version runs quite differently; cf. Horace Walpole,
Memoirs, n, 27.
a Germiny, i, 139. a Koser, 1, 586.
THE CONVENTION OF WESTMINSTER 471
Austria was sounding France and quietly arming, he evaded our
demands for a closer connection and for that strong garrison in the
Netherlands which formed the best safeguard of Hanover against
the French.1 His desire for a French alliance, however, was dictated
by hostility to Prussia, not to Britain, and he unfeignedly desired
to save the Continent from the contagion of a Franco-British war,
Britain, after all, was reckoned anti-Prussian, and her anti-Prussian
treaty with Russia gave Austria real pleasure. When the old year
closed, the foes of Prussia might count upon the coming distraction
of France, her ally, by a war in which none of them would
necessarily be concerned.
The King of Prussia, however, was the least likely person in the
world to be caught at a disadvantage through inertia. Britain was
in his eyes the indispensable paymaster of the Austro-Russian-Saxon
combination against himself. Could he not buy his own security by
providing that security for Hanover which seemed to dominate her
desires? Superior to family hatreds or diplomatic traditions, the
philosopher-king proposed a mutual covenant with Britain to keep
Germany free of war. George and Newcastle, now faced with vast
French armaments, eagerly accepted, and, on 1 6 January 1756, the
Convention of Westminster sealed the bargain. Hanover, thought
the self-centred British, is now safe, since both Prussia and Russia
are pledged to its defence, while Austria cannot object to a British
guarantee of Silesia which already enjoys an Austrian. "The old
system" seemed thus to have triumphantly added Russia and Prussia
to its ranks. Frederick, on the other hand, plumed himself on having
transferred to his own side one of the two great Powers, France and
Britain, whose command of money made war possible for those who
had only men. Britain, as he calculated, would always dispose of
Russia, while France could never uphold Austria, the Power which
Richelieu had laboured to pull down.
In these calculations, Newcastle and Frederick alike displayed the
traditional failings of their race. While the Briton could not com-
prehend that Germans should think mere differences between
Austrian and Prussian vital, Frederick attested the truth of the
aphorism that of all nations the German is the least capable of
adapting himself to the mentality of others.2 Frederick, moreover,
could hardly be expected to realise that, in addition to the in-
stinctive reaction of the European society against a member who
had undermined its basic law, he was faced with a personal hatred
passing the hate of rr^en. By political concessions he had dispelled
his uncle's seemingly invincible detestation. That of Maria Theresa,
Elizabeth of Russia and Madame de Pompadour nothing could
dispel save his destruction. Surmising that he might be attacked in
1 F.O., Germany, 1755, passim.
* Count Czernin, cit. Haldane, Viscount, Before the war (1920), p. 154.
472 THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
1757, conscious of perfect readiness for war and unconscious of the
deeper realities of the position, Frederick reckoned that a swift
offensive would overwhelm the Austrians and perhaps leave Polish
Prussia or Saxony within his hands. The seeming climax of British
good fortune was therefore swiftly followed by collapse. In January
1756 Newcastle could pride himself upon the triumphant convention
with Prussia and upon the rise of our land and sea forces to some
80,000 and some 50,000 men.1 February brought the news that
Vienna had received the convention with a displeasure which offers
of British and Russian protection against Frederick could not remove.
Their court, said the Austrian public, might soon engage with France. 2
In March, while the French continued to threaten invasion, they
were reported to be preparing a great expedition against Minorca
and to be hopeful of winning Spanish help against Gibraltar.8 In
May, when at last open war was declared against France, and
ominous convulsions were reported in Sweden, it became apparent
that the greatest diplomatic revolution in history had been effected.
Protesting that the Convention of Westminster had smitten her like
a stroke of apoplexy, Maria Theresa declared that she must seek to
secure herself from the risk of war,4 and the Franco- Austrian Treaties
of Versailles followed. June brought the alarming news that Russia
was declaring that she was bound only to resist an attack upon Han-
over by Prussia, while it became clear that Byng's inexplicable
failure had lost Minorca to the French and that the nation would not
condone it. "Shoot Byng or look out for your King"5 was a cry to
cowe Newcastle if not his master. "We are not able to carry on the
war", lamented old Horace Walpole, "nor can we tell how to make
peace."6 In August, despite all British admonitions, Frederick in-
vaded Saxony, and a war of incalculable dimensions had begun.
In September, therefore, when news arrived that Oswego, "often
times more importance than Minorca",7 had fallen to Montcalm,
Newcastle's system had almost everywhere collapsed. Spain, indeed,
disillusioned by French co-operation in the last war, and governed
by friendly hands, refused French offers to return Minorca, and for
the time being bore with those practices at sea by which Britain
always irritated neutrals. But Austria, by tradition our principal
ally, was now engaged in a life or death struggle with her successor,
the most faithless of princes and the enemy of all Europe. Far from
defending Hanover, it was not long before Frederick was explaining
to Britain the necessity for evacuating his own western possessions
which lay between Hanover and France,8 and bidding her send a
I Charteris, pp. 203, 237. » P.O., Germany, 4 and 1 1 Feb. 1756.
8 Ibid. Spain, 150, 17 March 1756 (Keene).
* Ibid. Germany, 17 May 1756.
5 Besant, Sir W., London in the eighteenth century* P- 22-
• Coxe, p. ±56 (to the Archbishop of Canterbury).
7 Horace Walpole, Memoirs, m, 41.
8 Politische Correspondent, xiv, 4 Nov. 1756.
THE ADVENT OF WILLIAM PITT 473
large and vigorous army to oppose the French. Thus the old cleavage
between George II, with whom Hanover stood first, and his subjects,
who cried, "Sea war, no continent, no subsidies", seemed likely to
return, and with it the half-paralysis of Britain. Byng's failure had
aroused suspicions that the Navy, however large, lacked spirit, while
the American campaign proved that the colonists were disunited,
and suggested that neither they nor the regulars were of much account
in border warfare. The bad beginning and worse prospects of the
struggle made a change of ministry inevitable.
During the two-and-forty years of Georgian rule, no real transfer
of power from one party to another had yet been made. The Whigs
remained the only servants whom a Hanoverian King could trust.
Even the fall of a Walpole or a Garteret had changed the tempo of
policy rather than its direction. Such changes caused little more than
a reshuffling of high offices among those members of the great Whig
families of whom, as likely to do his business, the King could be per-
suaded to approve. Such persuasion might come from a premier,
a relative or a mistress, but the candidate must not be too distasteful
to the Commons, placemen though half the members were. An
aspirant upon whom the invincible load of royal displeasure fell
could in normal times hope only for a change of King.
Such a man, at this time nearly forty-seven years of age, was
William Pitt. Conscious of powers incomparably greater than his
rivals', he was far from concealing his superiority from them or from
the public. "When he was angry or speaking very much in earnest",
said his granddaughter, "nobody could look him in the face."1 The
Duke of Bedford was perhaps the only man in England whom an eye
as terrible as Frederick's failed entirely to subdue. Newcastle con-
fessed that he dared not approach him on distasteful business.2 His
voice, his glance, his biting wit, his lofty and passionate appeal
electrified the House of Commons. An actor of majesty in an age
to which majesty appealed, his influence came from his power to
regard men and causes, himself by no means least, in their nobler
aspects and from the loftiest point of view. Where many saw a stupid
and pretentious little old man in George II, Pitt always recognised
the incarnate majesty of Britain. But he also learned to reverence
the British people, invested by the Revolution with the ultimate
supremacy over their own affairs. He indeed personified the better
Britain of his age, that which to sense added sensibility in no small
degree, and which contemptuously rejected the place-hunter's
advice, "Strive thy little bark to steer With the tide but near the
shore".3 Britons who instinctively desired a purer administration,
wider opportunity for merit as compared with birth, a bolder con-
frontation of corrupt and reactionary France in the struggle for trade
1 Williams, i, 20. f Dodington, Diary* p. 397.
9 Dodington, cit. Williams, I, aio.
474 THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
and empire — such found in Pitt a man whose passionate convictions
made him the champion of their ideas. Unhappily for his hopes of
power, his lack of fortune, his popular principles and his uncom-
pliant personality long closed the Cabinet against him. In November
1755 when he, as Paymaster, opposed the payment of subsidies to
foreigners to defend Hanover, he was dismissed. Within a year,
however, the collapse of Newcastle's measures had brought the nation
into a condition which some thought more critical than that of 1 745 -1
Newcasde himself was pelted by the Greenwich mob.2 Everything
compelled recourse to the impressive reserve-force comprised in the
personality of Pitt. Too regal to accept high office save on his
own conditions, he demanded that Newcastle, notwithstanding his
quarter of a century of office, should resign. In November he became
Secretary of State with the Duke of Devonshire as a colleague and
figurehead.
Pitt's first administration lasted a little less than five months. The
time was long enough to prove that his reverence for himself was not
ill-founded, and to confirm him in the eyes of the public as indis-
pensable. The Opposition orator turned minister showed amazing
capacity for administration, a vision that embraced the globe, and
an energy unquenchable by gout and toil. What statesman in that
age save Pitt could declare the hearts of Bengal worth more than all
the profits of monopolies?3 The minister of George II, he set Britain
above dynasty or party, and rallied to the national cause both the
Tories and the camarilla of the future George III. His reluctant
master was compelled to declare to Parliament that he relied with
pleasure on the spirit and zeal of his people. For that spirit and zeal
Pitt prescribed an outlet in a national militia, while striving to sustain
them by measures to combat the painful rise in the price of corn.
Highlanders, ten years before regarded as inveterate enemies, were
to conquer America, and Americans to be enlisted as willing and
equal co-operators in the common task. Eight thousand infantry and
a powerful fleet might with local aid atone for Braddock's failure
and the loss of Fort Oswego, while in India, Africa, the West Indies and
the Mediterranean the French were to be steadfastly opposed. Pitt,
as he proved later, had the courage to defy all threats of French
invasion designed to check these plans.
The weightiest among the problems which confronted him, how-
ever, was that of our attitude towards Prussia. Was it to the ad-
vantage of the nation that the war against France should be single,
or that it should be compounded with a struggle on which Frederick,
for his own ends, had embarked against the Habsburgs? Hanover,
the obvious link between the wars, might declare neutrality as in
1741, and Frederick be abandoned to his fate. That fate, in spite of
1 Williams, i, 362. a von Ruville, n,
col<mul policy, ' '
ANGLO-PRUSSIAN GO-OPERATION 475
his unrivalled army and his conquest of Saxony, was likely to be hard,
for a great Russian host was preparing to move against his rear, the
Swedes and the German Empire were arming, and France, with her
long list of recent victories and vast supplies of men, had pledged her
co-operation. Nothing in the Convention of Westminster bound us
to partnership in Frederick's aggression.
That Pitt, recanting in the stress of war his most consistently up-
held opinions, determined to engage Hanover in the fight for Prussia
and Britain in protecting her from France, may well be ascribed less
to calculation than to instinct — the national instinct to deal gener-
ously, at least in the early stages, with our associate in a struggle
against France. Nothing was less expected from a proud and in-
tractable statesman who had seemed to accept ruin rather than turn
a single into a double war. When, in April 1757, the King, at the
demand of Cumberland, drove from office a minister whom he de-
tested, who was often inaccessible through sickness, who, besides
commanding no majority in Parliament, had as yet secured no
success in war, Frederick congratulated himself that in Pitt a mere
spouter and an opponent of action in Hanover had been removed.1
As the campaign developed, however, Britain's need for Pitt and
Frederick's amazing talents were both made clear. Three theatres
of war stood out pre-eminent — Bohemia, Hanover and the American
mainland. In these, it seemed at the outset, the chief issues must be
determined. The Indian struggle, pregnant as it proved to be, was
a distant affair of merchants which could not reverse the verdict
nearer home. A Prussian conquest of Bohemia, however, might
make the continental coalition harmless, unless a French conquest
of Hanover should restore its offensive power. The mere defence of
Hanover, on the other hand, could not save Frederick from the con-
sequences of disaster in Bohemia, since the victorious Austrians
would be assisted by both Swedes and Russians if not by an auxiliary
army of the French. Failure in both Bohemia and Hanover would
pave the way for the partition of Prussia and the extension of the
French littoral to Ostcnd, perhaps to Antwerp. The American
struggle and the European could affect each other only in so far as-
they exhausted in a greater or less degree the eneigy and resources
of the sole American combatants, France and Britain.
When winter was drawing near, the course of events in every
theatre had proved such that the cause of Britain and Prussia might
well seem lost. Frederick, after a costly victory at Prague, had been
driven from Bohemia by a crushing disaster at Kolin. A lieutenant,
striving to shield East Prussia, had discovered to his cost that the
invading Russians were something more than the strong but headless
body of Frederick's imagination. The Austrians were reconquering
Silesia, while the French and Imperialists threatened to wrest
1 von Ruvillc, n, 1 12, 1 13.
476 THE SEVEN YEARS9 WAR
Saxony from his grasp, and without Saxon resources he could hardly
continue to make war. In Hanover, meanwhile, Cumberland's
prescribed defensive had for a time embarrassed the superior French,
the more so as they were far from home, and 1757 a year of wide-
spread dearth. After Kolin, however, Frederick could send him no
assistance; Britain preferred to attack the coasts of France; and the
French, using methodically their superiority of nearly two to one,
drove him from Hastenbeck in flight towards the sea (26 July).
When the news of Kolin and Hastenbeck reached England, Hard-
wicke, the wise Chancellor, thought that both Hanover and Prussia
would come to terms.1 Kolin had indeed moved Frederick to make
overtures to France; Hastenbeck increased his eagerness for "the old
system"; on 6 September his envoy sought the victors' camp.2 Four
days later, Cumberland did in fact sign the Convention of Kloster-
zeven, which saved his so-called Army of Observation, but resigned
the Electorate to the victorious French.
While five months of the campaign seemed thus to have brought
Hanover and Prussia to ruin, news only less disastrous had been
reaching Britain from overseas. In the subordinate theatre of India,
it is true, Clive had already regained Calcutta, and, by the miracle
of Plassey (23 June), had secured Bengal for Britain. That news,
however, could not reach Britain for many months. Meanwhile all
that could be known was that in 1756 Calcutta had been lost and the
hideous tragedy of the Black Hole enacted. Tidings from America
arrived more promptly and were uniformly bad. The capture of
Minorca, setting free Toulon, and a gale which scattered our block-
ading force off Brest had enabled French fleets to win the Atlantic
race, thus rendering London's great attack on Louisbourg impossible
(July 1757). Early in August, Montcalm took from us Fort William
Henry, exposing Albany to French and Indian attack. French
squadrons cruised securely off the coasts of Africa and the West
Indies, while in September Pitf s great coastal attack upon Roche-
fort, the naval base for supplying Canada, merely alarmed the French.
"We are no longer a nation", wrote Chesterfield in July.3 Nothing
had since occurred to stem the tide of disaster. "The Empire ", wrote
Pitt in August, "is no more, the ports of the Netherlands betrayed,
the Dutch Barrier treaty an empty sound, Minorca and with it the
Mediterranean lost, and America itself precarious. " To win over
Spain and thus regain Minorca, he was ready to sacrifice Gibraltar
and the logwood coast, but the offer was of no avail4 In September
the King declared that he was ruined, while the yokels of seven
counties were opposing the Militia Act by force. From Bristol to the
City men suspected that the national struggle with France was being
i I 2 Koser» n>
• Miscellaneous Works, iv, 198.
4 Pitt to Keene, 23 Aug. 1757, in Pitt's Correspondence, i, 247 scqq.
PITT AND FREDERICK THE GREAT 477
crippled for the sake of Hanover.1 The nation, none the less, had
already drawn from its bosom the key that was destined to unlock
the gates of "Doubting Castle". Pitt was once more in office, and,
as never hitherto, in power. Cowed by the fury of the towns, his
would-be ministers had taught the King that this terrible servant was
indispensable, while the concession of patronage to Newcastle and
of opportunity for enrichment to Fox made it certain that Parliament
would give no trouble. If Frederick was worth 30,000 men to Prussia,
Pitt trebled the efficiency of Britain, for his presence meant unity of
command, energy in execution and enthusiasm on the domestic
front. Anson at the Admiralty guaranteed the efficiency of the
Service upon which Britain must mainly rely for victory, and by a
happy chance his relationship to Hardwicke, Newcastle's oracle and
confidant, procured an unwonted harmony in the conduct of the
war. Within two years of Pitt's reinstatement, Britain was harvesting
laurels in every quarter of the globe.
Frederick, however, was the first to stem the tide of enemy success.
Having begun the campaign, he declared, as a general, he was ending
it as a partisan.2 "We are destroyed", he wrote on i October, "but
I fall sword in hand."3 Brilliant leadership and execution, however,
enabled his little force to rout an army more than twice as numerous
at Rossbach (5 November 1757). A single hour had changed much
in the history of the world, for it was chiefly the forces of the French
King that were put to open and memorable shame in the sight of both
French and German peoples. The Protestant victor over persecuting
Catholics became a hero even to his Protestant opponents, and
religion cemented the close alliance with Britain which followed on
the scornful rejection of his peace overtures by the French. Having
saved Saxony from the Franco-Imperialist combination, Frederick
hurried to check the reconquest of Silesia by the Austrians. After
Leuthen (5 December) the Prussians boasted that with a watch-
parade their King had beaten an army 80,000 strong.4 The fall of
Breslau crowned this amazing display of Prussian energy and skill.
The effect of Rossbach upon Pitt was to prove little less than the
salvation of Prussia. Hitherto he had regarded the German war as
a side-issue to which the subjects of a Hanoverian King must accord
only the inevitable minimum of support. Now he perceived in
Frederick a power which, rightly used, might sway the Franco-
British struggle. It was certain that, if Hanover remained in French
hands, peace, when it came, would necessitate a ransom paid by
Britain. It was certain also that if Frederick collapsed, or, as his
custom was, deserted his ally, Hanover could never be reconquered.
It was hardly less certain that in either case the French would secure
1 Potter and Beckford to Pitt, Oct. 1757, ibid, i, 277 scqq.
2 Koser, n, 113. 3 Ibid, n, isx.
4 Local mural tablet.
478 THE SEVEN YEARS9 WAR
their dreaded aggrandisement towards Ostend. America might yet
be won in America and on the seas, but hardly Hanover or Flanders.
To assist Frederick, therefore, was, after 1757, politic beyond all
question, and Pitt gave no half-hearted contribution. "No treaty
like it since the time of King John" sneered critics of the compact of
April 1 758.* A British subsidy of £670,000 was promised, a sum
which ranked with her own normal revenue and that wrung from
Saxony as one of the three chief financial supports of Prussia.
Frederick was bound to nothing save to exert himself and to abjure
a separate peace. The Convention of Klosterzeven, unratified and
almost as shocking to the French as to the British,2 had now been
swept aside, and the British-paid Hanoverians re-enlisted. Ferdinand
of Brunswick replaced Cumberland at their head, and Britain con-
tinued to support this German army, 55,000 strong, at a cost of
£1,800,000. Leuthen had brought Austria near to impotence and
despair,8 and Pitt might hope to see Frederick lead his Prussians
against the French. Although .courage returned to Vienna and Louis
XV proved true, so long as Ferdinand showed skill and vigour
Frederick's western flank was safe.
For a time, indeed, it seemed as if the Army of Observation might
do more than safeguard Hanover and Berlin against the French. By
midsummer 1 758, Ferdinand had recovered the Electorate, crossed
the Rhine, and won a signal victory at Crefeld. In August, it is true,
the threat of a second French army to his communications forced him
back, but with the aid of 12,000 British troops he manoeuvred so that
the two were unable to join forces and Hanover was left in peace.
Thanks to Britain, therefore, Frederick could devote the year 1758
to making head against his remaining foes — Austrians, Russians,
Imperialists and Swedes. To British eyes, this campaign, after the
greatest fluctuations of fortune, seemed to leave her ally almost as it
had found him. Exhorting Pitt to take a high tone about peace
terms and abandoning Swedes and Russians chiefly to distance and
their presumed incompetence, Frederick had striven first to crush
the Austrians by a swift offensive in Moravia. He failed, but by
paying a great price at Zorndorf (25 August) he drove off the tardy
Russians. Early in October, his own rashness allowed the Austrians
a second triumph at Hochkirch, but by Prussian mobility and skill,
Silesia and Saxony were both preserved. Frederick and Ferdinand
had thus given grounds for hope that in 1759 the Prussian and
British cause might continue to maintain itself in Europe. The French
and Austrians, however, closed the old year by a treaty which pro-
longed though it attenuated their alliance, while Frederick was
forced to admit that his numbers no longer sufficed for an offensive.
His ambition was now only to secure Turkish aid and to induce
the Austrians, too formidable among ravines and woods, to tempt -
1 Mauduit, Considerations, p. 47. * Gharteris, pp. 307 scqq. s Koscr, p. 167.
BRITISH VICTORIES IN 1758 479
fortune on the north Silesian plain. The shattering disasters of 1759
proved his forebodings true.
Britain, on the other hand, was already tasting the joys of which
that year of victory was full. The success of her stipendiaries at
Crefeld, indeed, had brought neither the recovery of Frederick's
Rhine fortress of Wesel nor the hoped-for participation of the Dutch.
Raids on the coast from Cherbourg to the mouth of the Charente
had done material damage and helped Ferdinand's offensive, but
at the price of many casualties and no little discontent. Soldiers and
sailors alike loathed this conjoint buccaneering and after 1758 it
ceased. Pitt's decision to send troops to Germany broke his own re-
peated pledges, overrode the prejudices of the Prince of Wales and
wounded the sentiment of the nation. But whereas in 1757 ten
military or diplomatic disasters followed on Kolin, in 1758 the* tide
flowed strongly the other way. At Senegal, Fort Louis with 92 guns
and a vast treasure fell easily into our hands. Goree followed, securing
a gum very necessary for the manufacturers of silk. Ere the year
closed, supremacy in the West Indies, perhaps the central object of
Pitt's commercial policy,1 was being sought by the despatch of ships
to Martinique. Although Minorca and Corsica were French, our
colonies traded profitably in the Mediterranean and our privateers
had reduced the Provengals to despair.2 The great design of the
campaign, however, contemplated the expulsion of the enemy from
North America. Louisbourg, "the darling object of the whole
nation",3 must be conquered anew, and, with the aid of the colonists
and the Navy, a triple attack must be launched against Montreal.
The scheme was too grandiose, the agents perhaps too clumsy
and the communications too rudimentary for a spectacular success.
Naval victories, none the less, prevented French help from Toulon
or from Rochefort, and Boscawen and Amherst reached Louisbourg
with an immense superiority of force. On 26 July, the crucial fortress
fell. Although this proved too late for an expedition to Quebec, the
capture isolated Canada and brought Pitt an invaluable accession of
prestige. The bloody repulse of the insensate Abercromby by Mont-
calm at Ticonderoga (July) could not ruin the strategic situation,
and next month the seizure of Fort Frontenac cut off Canada from
the French south-west. Before the year closed, Fort Duquesne had
been rebaptiscd as Pittsburg, Indian allegiance secured, and
Canada turned into a sick man to be kept alive with cordials, in the
hope of cure after a happy peace.4 The grant of enormous power to
the able and resolute Choiseul might reanimate France, but Pitt no
longer feared invasion, and in November Britain declined the offer
of a separate treaty.
1 Hotblack, p. 54. a Ibid. pp. 122, 100.
3 Chesterfield, cf. Williams, I, 136.
* Corbett, J. S., England in the Seven years9 War, 1, 412.
480 THE SEVEN YEARS5 WAR
The world war had now passed through three costly and strenuous
campaigns. In every land the easy hopes and lies which prompted
its outbreak had been exposed, and in every land save two the appe-
tite for peace might at any moment pass beyond control. If one of the
bullets from which he never hid should strike down Frederick, or a
deeper debauch than usual the Tsarina; if a second Damiens should
rid the world of Louis XV or a new royal illness send back the
Pompadour to her husband; if even some new convulsion should
twist the steering-wheel in incalculable Sweden,1 then in a moment
the war would change its character and might even end its course.
Only to Austria and Britain it still appeared necessary and full of
hope. Neither Austria nor Britain, however, could fight on without
allies, while financially Austria remained dependent upon France.
For Britain, although Bute's memorable optimism in August 17572
had been amply vindicated by events, the horizon was by no means
free from cloud. Could the small island, which, eighteen months
earlier, had seemed ruined and disgraced, command sufficient force
for world conquest against a neighbour far superior in wealth and
man-power? Anson, it is true, had in 1758 so vigorously schooled the
Navy that its superiority to that of France in size could no longer be
offset by any French superiority in tactics.3 It was possible, however,
that the rough and sometimes almost piratical conduct of British
cruisers and privateers might rouse other Powers against her, and
that Swedish, Danish and Genoese warships might be added to those
of France. A still more serious danger came from Spain. Thanks to
Ferdinand the Pacific with his Portuguese consort and their foreign
and pro-British minister, it had been possible for the astute Keene
to prolong a neutrality which threatened Spain with lasting dis-
advantage overseas. Now, however, the Queen and the diplomatist
were dead, the King deranged and dying, while at Naples a vigorous
heir was determined to play a very different part. Don Carlos,
indeed, with vivid memories of the British admiral who in 1742 had
given him an hour to change his policy, and with a Saxon wife whose
father Frederick had despoiled, was awaiting the moment to range
Spain with her empire, ships and treasure by the side of his brother
Bourbon. In Pitt, it is true, Britain possessed a leader unequalled
save by Frederick, but even Pitt's position was not perfectly secure.
His gout might lay him low; his royal master was past seventy-five;
his own temperament made sudden explosions certain; even to his
colleagues his rule was an offence. The view of the grandees as ex-
pressed by Lady Yarmouth, "Keep Mr Pitt till we have peace and
then do what you like with him",4 was no less politic than self-
revealing, but the needful self-restraint was difficult. The homage
which the City and the provincial towns paid to Pitt only increased
1 Hfldebrand, Sveriges historia, vn, 262 seqq. a von Ruville, in, 377.
* Ibid, u, 78. * Williams, 11, 39.
PITT AND THE FRENCH INVASION 481
the resentment of the Whig dukes at the trespass upon their preserves
which his virtual dictatorship implied, and that dictatorship he
emphasised rather than disguised. His trembling colleagues cherished
their own foreign policy, based on intelligence which they regarded
as their private property.1 To be rid of Pitt, Newcastle, it was be-
lieved, was inciting a home demand for peace and even intriguing to
lower the national credit and embarrass further loans.2
It was, therefore, mainly in reliance upon a mandate from the masses
that Pitt marshalled the forces of Britain for the formidable task of
1759. In Ghoiseul he had now to contend with a virtual dictator like
himself, but one to whom the accumulation of offices gave legal
power where a Pitt must trust to mere ascendancy. Against this
able and resolute soldier, bred to regard none save the King of France
as his superior,3 and seconded by Belleisle in the War Office, and the
vigorous Berryer in the marine, Pitt had a fourfold duty to perform.
To save their colonies, to win Austria's battle, and to conquer peace
the French must invade Great Britain. To this end Belleisle prepared
a plan more menacing than that of Napoleon.4 Vast French forces
from many ports sailing to the Clyde and to the Essex flats, Russians
and Swedes assisting — of all this the premonitory signs and the dis-
covery of the actual scheme would have paralysed the aggressive
activities of a lesser man than Pitt. Declining to be disturbed, he
met it by diplomacy, by armament and by inspiration. The legiti-
mate grievances of neutrals were palliated by courtesies wherever
possible and especially by a Prize Bill which cancelled the commis-
sions of the smaller privateers.5 No diplomatic exertion was spared
which might prolong the neutrality of Spain with her (nominal)
90,000 soldiers and nearly a hundred ships.6 The Army and Navy
were of course increased; a great camp in the Isle of Wight at once
guarded Britain and threatened France; French coasts and shipping
were attacked so as to destroy the danger at its source. In July
Rodney showed at Havre what the light forces could do to paralyse
a section of the would-be invaders, and greater ruin lay in store for
them when they should tempt fortune on the open sea. But Pitt's
greatest triumph lay in so -rousing the spirit of the nation that it was
willing to bear new taxation, furnish the necessary man-power7
and confront not only the threatened invasion but an indebtedness
mounting year by year to unprecedented heights. t
If Britain remained undaunted and inviolate, the concentration
of French energies on the invasion could only advantage her in the
other theatres of war. But to keep what might be won elsewhere
Gorbett, n, 14 seqq.
von Ruville, n, 235; Pol. Corresp. xvm, 337. ' 8 Ghoiseul, Memoins, p. 2.
Gorbett, n, 22; Walpole, Memoirs, m, 184.
Hotblack, p. 160; F.O., Spain, 5 June 1759 et passim.
Ibid. 12 Dec. 1759, to
Williams, i, 400 seqq.
482 THE SEVEN YEARS* WAR
Hanover must be defended by an army which only Britain could
raise and pay. From Frederick, struggling for existence, no more
could be expected than the gift of Ferdinand of Brunswick, of much
advice and of a tiny troop for purposes of policy and moral. ,l To meet
this new situation, in which we had made conquests overseas,
counted on making more, and knew that we must save Hanover to
keep them, Pitt raised some 52,000 British troops and sent them to
Germany. He was by no means without hope that a new Rossbach
won by Ferdinand might subdue exhausted France.2
The need of supporting Frederick now rested at once upon simple
and complex considerations. Elementary loyalty and good faith
forbade the desertion of a partner in an enterprise which had brought
profit to one member and to the other loss. The fact that Prussia was
Protestant and her foes the great Catholic Powers was still significant
and weighty. And although no member, save France, of the anti-
Prussian coalition was our enemy, no one could predict the com-
binations that would follow a Prussian collapse. While the Third
Silesian War went on, the participation of France meant the diver-
sion of French blood and treasure from her struggle with Hanover
and Britain. If it ended with Frederick's defeat, he might even in-
demnify himself at Hanover's expense. Both as against her enemy
and her ally the British subsidy of £670,000 was a wise premium of
insurance.
Entrusting the defence of Britain to her own sons and to the Navy
with its triple screen of cruisers, sending men to Ferdinand and
money to Frederick, Pitt set about the conquest which was to be the
main work of 1759. Filled with the national hatred of a Popish and
absolutist natural enemy, and following the economic ideas of the
time, he aimed at sweeping the flag of France from every continent
and island, and at abolishing her commerce and marine. "The West
Indies where all our wars must begin and end"3 formed naturally
his first objective. Of the islands, Martinique and Guadeloupe were
far superior even to Jamaica both in produce and in strategic
strength, while on the mainland Qjiebec stood between us and the
conquest of Canada, with all its profit to our colonies, fisheries, fur
trade, revenue and naval power. Bitter experience, however, told
against assaults either upon well-defended coasts within the tropics
or upon the distant and difficult St Lawrence, which in 1711 had
cost us eight ships and nearly a thousand men.* Undeterred by
memories of Cartagena or of the failures of amphibious expeditions
nearer home, Pitt ordered both tasks to be attempted.
The plan for the conquest of Canada by converging attacks upon
1 Pol. Corresp. xvm, 11 et passim.
2 Chatham MSS. Intelligence, Versailles, 21 Jan. 1761, no. 8.
8 Alderman Beckford (1753), cit. Walpole, Memoirs, i, 307.
/AX?**' X' 4?1 ' ^olfe confirms to Pitt (Correspondence, i, 378) the " thorough aversion"
of the Navy to that river.
VICTORIES OF 1759 483
Montreal was in part safe and in part a dangerous speculation. Since
the French garrison was small, the country vast, and the British
invaders assured of reinforcements, the cautious Amherst might
safely be expected to isolate the capital from the south and west, if
given sufficient time. Wolfe, on the other hand, had to face unknown
difficulties of navigation, with the certainty of finding himself, if
successful, confronted at Quebec by strong positions, defended by
forces which might even be superior to his own, and which knew that
the approach of winter would compel him to raise the siege. It is,
therefore, not surprising that despite the heroism of Wolfe and his
followers Canada was not conquered in 1759, and that when the
campaign closed Quebec was a most precarious possession.
The year none the less brought a harvest of victory unparalleled
in British annals until the autumn of 1918. Six major triumphs and
a host of minor were hardly discounted by defeat, and ChoiseuPs
great scheme for the invasion of these realms was frustrated before
it could be set in motion.1 Ferdinand, it is true, began with a failure
at Bergen2 (13 April), and the French, now more than ever intent
upon Hanover, captured Minden and Munster on their way. In May,
however, the rich island of Guadeloupe was ours, and in July, after
Rodney's telling blow at Havre, Wolfe made Quebec so hot that the
defenders complained that there was only one place in which they
could with safety pray.3 In the same month Amherst took Ticon-
deroga, and Fort Niagara fell to his men, while on i August the
British infantry shared gloriously in the French defeat at Minden.
Although Ferdinand achieved no superiority in force, Hanover
was saved, Frederick's flank secured and the continental war
made almost popular in England. The victory known as Lagos
or Cape St Vincent followed (17 August), when Boscawen destroyed
a confluent of ChoiseuFs torrent of invasion and at the same
time powerfully influenced the new King of Spain in the direction
of continued neutrality. On 13 September Quebec fell — "a peace-
begetting conquest" as the hard-pressed Prussians thought.4 These
dazzling tidings were swiftly followed by those of the desperate
sea-fight off Quiberon (20 November), "the Trafalgar of this war",5
and a further warning to Charles III of Spain. The glories of 1759,
" the greatest year England ever saw ",6 were crowned by the triumph
of Britons in India. Striking hard with a tiny force, Forde stormed
Masulipatam in April, and next month the frustration of the French
in Southern India was attested by the cession of the Northern Circars
to the British.
See infra, chap. xvm.
Waddington, R., La guerre de Sept ans, m, 13.
Knox, Capt., Journal of the Campaign of 1759, ed. Doughty, i, 431 n., 436.
Mitchell from Torgau, 28 and 30 Oct., P.O., Prussia.
Mahan, A. T., The influence of sea-power upon history, p. 304.
6 Rigby to Pitt, 23 Dec. 1759 in Correspondence of Pitt, i, 480.
3i-3
484 THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
While Britain thus triumphed on every side, and by diplomacy,
subsidies and fighting gave "fair, candid and honest"1 aid to her
ally, the fortunes of Frederick seemed to be sinking beyond hope.
Far outnumbered by the Austrians and Russians, he could neither
bring the Austrians to give battle nor the Turks to paralyse the
Russians by entering the war. In July, a lieutenant failed disastrously
to stay the Russian invasion and the fall of Frankfort-on-the-Oder
followed. The King himself dashed northward to save Berlin, but
at Ktinersdorf (12 August) Russian guns and Austrian horsemen
crushed his army and drove him to the verge of suicide or abdication.
The coup de gr&ce> thanks to the jealousy and incompetence of the
allies, was not given, but the loss of Dresden and two further grave
disasters in the field must convince any ordinary observer that the
downfall of Prussia was at hand. Even before these blows fell
Frederick had confessed that he could not sustain the conflict for
another year, and that Britain's triumphs and "the honourable and
disinterested views of Mr Pitt" could alone rescue him from ruin.2
Time would show what in the great patriot's judgment were the
conditions of a righteous and abiding peace.
1 Mitchell to Pitt, 8 Jan. 1759, Pol. Corresp. xvm,
8 To Knyphausen, i Sept. 1759, ibid, xvm, 512.
10.
CHAPTER XVII
THE PEACE OF PARIS
JL HE year 1759 saw the zenith of the glory of England and of Pitt.
The mere reading of the battle roll will explain why. First came the
news that Goree had fallen and that England had secured the whole
West African trade in slaves and gum. Next it was announced that
the French had surrendered Guadeloupe, their richest sugar isle of
the West Indies, and, soon after, the isles of Basse Terre and Marie
Galante. Then came that victory, called by Pitt the "Marathon of
Minden", where the British infantry won immortal fame. Next it
became known that Amherst had occupied Ticonderoga and avenged
our defeat of the year before, that Johnson had seized Fort Niagara,
that Wolfe had passed up the St Lawrence and was bombarding
Quebec. From India, where the British had been hard pressed the
year before, came the joyful tidings that the French had been re-
pulsed from the walls of Madras and beaten at sea, while Surat
had fallen to British arms. In August Admiral Boscawen reported
his victory over the Toulon fleet off Lagos in Portugal. In the
very week in which Parliament assembled, came the news of the
capture of Quebec and of Wolfe's glorious death in the moment of
victory. Even yet the cup of triumph was not full. In November
Hawke won at Quiberon Bay the greatest victory over the French
that England had yet achieved. Thirty-one French sail of the line
had been captured or destroyed in the war, and of these a third had
been taken in this year. On 29 November a royal proclamation
ordained a public thanksgiving to Almighty God "for disappointing
the boundless ambition of the French", and because "He had given
such signal successes to our arms both by sea and land".
Undazzled by success Pitt planned the campaign for the new year
in the autumn of 1 759. Victories hardly less splendid than those of
1 759 were won by the generals of Pitt's choice. The British garrison,
which had been besieged in Quebec, was relieved in May. In June
Amherst advanced from the south and, by a triumph of organising
skill, united his three converging columns beneath the walls of
Montreal. On 8 September the surrender of that city took place,
and with it all Canada was British.
In India, as in Canada, 1760 was the year of final conquest. On
22 January Coote defeated the French at Wandewash in a battle
second only to Plassey in importance. February saw the fall of
Arcot, April that of Caracal, and May the blockade of the French in
486 THE PEACE OF PARIS
Pondicherry. It is striking to see the impression made by the events
of 1760 even upon the timid Newcastle party. On hearing of the fall
of Quebec in 1759, the sage Hardwicke doubted whether we could
keep it, or Louisbourg or all Canada "without fighting on for ever".
But when negotiations began in 1761 everyone in the Cabinet voted
for keeping all Canada.
The tide of war had turned also in Germany. In July 1 760 Prince
Ferdinand triumphed at Warburg where Granby and the British
cavalry excelled themselves. Frederick won a brilliant victory at
Liegnitz in August, and a more solid success at Torgau in October.
He had not expelled his enemies from his territory but he had ad-
ministered decisive checks to them. By giving troops to Ferdinand
and subsidies to Frederick Pitt had used Germany to contain the
French. He intended to celebrate the year 1761 by capturing
Dominica, Martinique and St Lucia. He meant also to touch French
Sride and to obtain an equivalent for Minorca by seizing Belleisle.
ut he was fully conscious of the need of a diplomatic, as well as of
a military, strategy. And the chief aim of his policy towards neutrals
was to conciliate Spain.
Pitt dreaded the union of the Spanish and French crowns. He
had witnessed two Family Compacts between the Bourbon rulers
and wished to avert a third. He began in 1757 by offering Gibraltar
as the price of an alliance, provided that Minorca (just captured by
France) was returned to England.1 And even when this handsome
offer was refused, Pitt continued assiduously to court her favours.
The feeble Ferdinand died in the autumn of 1759. He was succeeded
by Charles III, the Bourbon ruler of Naples, and a very different man.
A philosophic despot, obstinate, bold, haughty, energetic, he brooked
no resistance at home and was impatient of opposition from without.
He had special reasons for disliking England and her sea power.
Seventeen years before, a British captain had stood by him at Naples
with his watch in his hand and forced him, by a threat of bombard-
ment, to sign a treaty of neutrality in an hour. To this personal
humiliation of the new King was added his great interest in the com-
merce of Spain, and his irritation at British smuggling. The French
Foreign Minister, Choiseul, at once sought to inflame Charles Ill's
hatred of England, by proposing an alliance with France. For this
Charles was not as yet prepared. Being an admirable administrator
himself he wished to reorganise the commerce, the army and the
fleet of Spain, and such a process took time. Moreover, he did
not, as yet, want to be too dependent on France. He preferred
to offer himself as a mediator between France and England, with
a threat of siding with the Power which rejected his mediation.
If he was unable to play this glorious part, if England failed to
redress his grievances, he might ally himself with France, the
1 Hist. MSB Comm. Rep. x, Wetton-Underiuood MSS9 1, s*xa, asi.
POLICY OF CHARLES III 487
weaker party. But, for some time at any rate, he was not prepared
to move.
Towards the end of 1759 there was much talk of a peace congress.
Immediately after the accession of Charles, d'Abreu — the Spanish
ambassador — suggested Spain as mediator between France and
England. Pitt declined the offer with much politeness.1 The Spanish
minister, however, made suggestions as to the balance of power being
disturbed by English victories in America. In December, d'Abreu
actually handed in a memorial to the effect that his master "could
not see with indifference the English successes in America". This
was written from Saragossa, where Charles III was then resting on
his journey between Naples and Madrid, as Pitt did not fail to note.
He suspected French influence at once, and thought this view con-
firmed when a fresh offer of Spanish mediation was transmitted at
the end of 1759. The offer was promptly refused.
At the same time Pitt recognised that some of the specific Spanish
complaints as to English conduct were real. Her claims were first,
a share in the Newfoundland fishery. This was merely a concession
to Spanish pride, for only two Spanish ships had sought to go there
during many years. Moreover Pitt could hardly grant it without
thereby recognising the much better grounded fishery rights of the
French. Her second claim concerned the English right to cut log-
wood in Honduras. Here Spain had the best of the argument, but
concession would have been unpopular in England and certainly
have discouraged the West Indian colonists from helping in the prose-
cution of the war. Her last claim concerned the execution of the
treaty of commerce signed 5 October 1750. This was open to mis-
interpretation, and Spain had real cause of complaint both as regards
Spanish prizes taken by privateers in the war and as to British
smugglers both in peace and war. Pitt resolved to satisfy Spain by
dealing drastically with smugglers to her American shores. In the
autumn of 1759, therefore, he issued a circular to colonial governors
prohibiting illicit trade and enforcing its prohibition by the action
of British cruisers. But in the following year means were found to
evade this prohibition and a considerable illicit trade was carried
on by British smugglers with the Spanish port of Monte Christi in
Hispaniola.
Pitt's circular had some effect, for Charles III wrote a friendly
letter to George II on 13 December 1759, and disavowed d'Abreu.
This more amicable attitude continued till 20 June 1760, when
Fuentes, the new Spanish ambassador, presented a haughty me-
morial as to Spanish prizes. He added a demand for reparation,
which was politely refused. On 9 September Fuentes presented
further complaints relating first to Honduras, and next a memorial
on the Newfoundland fishery, adding that it had been sent to the
1 Yorke, P. C., Kardwicke, m, 236, 241.
488 THE PEACE OF PARIS
French Government. Pitt tactfully offered to instruct his ambassador
at Madrid to confer with the Spanish Foreign Minister on the Hon-
duras question. As to Newfoundland, he declined to give a written
answer, but in a verbal response to Fuentes said that the King had
ordered him to express surprise and regret that Spain should have taken
the extraordinary step of communicating her differences to a court
at open war with England. Even the pacific Hardwicke denounced
Spain's conduct as most unusual and highly approved Pitt's reply
as being as "measured" as was possible under the circumstances. This
incident is important, for when Ghoiseul introduced the question
of Spanish grievances into the negotiations of 1761, both he and
Spain were aware that such a step would be regarded by England
(and it seems justly) as undiplomatic and provocative.
One King's accession at the end of 1759 was to be fatal to Pitt's
design of separating the Bourbon Crowns ; another King's accession
at the end of 1760 was to be fatal to himself. For, when George II
died on 25 October, Pitt was confronted with a young King whose
advent raised wholly new problems. The King was a Tory and the
Great Commoner a Whig, though both favoured the idea of a
national, and not of a party, government. George had indeed learned
at his mother's knee, and from all his political tutors, that he was
to be King in deed as well as in name. But Pitt was susceptible to
the majesty of kingship and the King knew the value of popular
support.
Differences of principle indeed showed themselves at once. The
King wished to insert in his public declaration to the Council a passage
referring to the losses in blood and gold which the war had brought
upon his people. Pitt begged to substitute "just and necessary"1
for "a bloody and expensive" war. Bute, the King's adviser, agreed,
but the King himself held out for a day after his adviser had yielded.
But this ominous episode was not in itself decisive. Some months
later, when the war in Germany was criticised, Pitt offered to re-
consider the matter if that were the King's wish, so that both parties
had made some attempt at compromise. The difficulty was that the
King, or Bute, had devised a personal policy which they intended to
execute themselves. To sheathe the sword and to end the war
quickly would associate the new King in the public mind with the
restoration of peace and economy. It was a bold bid for power and
popularity. But it must be known to be the personal act of the young
King, and that would only be clear if the King's adviser was known to
have made the peace himself. As the avowed representative of the
King, Bute entered the Cabinet within less than a month from his
master's accession. He became Secretary of State within six months,
and Prime Minister in less than two years. Even apart from the
disturbing suddenness of his rise to power, Bute was almost certain
1 The same expression occurs in the King's Speech to Parliament of 18 Nov. 1760.
BUTE AND PITT 489
to disagree with Pitt. He resembled him in haughtiness and theatri-
cality of manner, but had little knowledge either of diplomacy or of
war. When differences appeared early in 1761, Pitt did not disguise
his contempt for Bute's inexperience. Pitt might have modified some
of his views on the peace, or deferred to some of the King's wishes;
he could not bring himself to defer to those of the King's instrument.
Bute, who did not lack a certain shrewdness, did not wish to attack
a minister idolised by the people and successful in the conduct of
a great war. He wanted, indeed, if he could, to use Pitt, and not to
expel him from the Cabinet. But he prepared for a possible struggle,
by demonstrating that he was the real dispenser of royal favours.
He got Henley made Chancellor early in 1761 ; he promoted George
Grenville, whose financial gifts made him suspect Pitt's war policy,
and kept him informed of all important business. Bute next dismissed
Legge, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for differing from him over
an election, and replaced him by Lord Barrington, an avowed tool
of the Crown. Finally, in March, he persuaded Lord Holdernesse to
resign the seals of the Secretary of State, which he himself assumed.
Pitt, who was now to share the direction of foreign policy with Bute,
actually did not hear of the proposed appointment until it was too
late to oppose it. And in this very month diplomacy became of
supreme importance. For France began to negotiate for peace.
The military events of 1 76 1 had an important effect on its diplomacy.
Early in the year, and in spite of Newcastle, Pitt had sent an ex-
pedition to Bclleisle, and the failure of the first attack and the delay
in the final capture (it only fell on 7 June), gravely affected British
diplomacy. An attack on Mauritius also failed, but these failures
were balanced by a success in Germany, and by captures of Dominica
in the West Indies and of Pondicherry, the last French stronghold
in India. The British Cabinet were encouraged to hold their heads
high in the critical days of July. Apart from Pitt, the Cabinet were
generally for peace, and largely on financial grounds. As far back as
9 April 1760, Newcastle wrote: "Mr Pitt flew into a violent passion
at my saying we could not carry on the war another year; [he said]
that that was the way to make peace impracticable and to encourage
our enemy".1 But Newcastle was supported by Hardwicke, and by
the military and naval advisers, Lords Ligonier and Anspn, who
favoured concessions to France because they did not think that
England could fight a Franco-Spanish combination. Bute and the
King for a time mediated between Pitt and Newcastle, but neither
George III nor his adviser had any real experience of diplomacy and
war, or the insight or capacity to form a correct judgment on either.
It is probable that no British minister realised either the strength
or the weakness of Choiseul's position. Though dependent on the
favour of Louis XV and La Pompadour, he had also appealed for
1 Yorke, Hardwicke, m, 244.
49o THE PEACE OF PARIS
support to the French public, and could not consent to humiliating
terms. Moreover, he was hampered by two allies, one actual, Austria,
one potential, Spain. Austria wanted to continue the war; Ghoiseul
wanted to make a separate peace with England. Spain was likely
to join in the war if England's peace terms did not satisfy France.
Hence, though willing to offer terms, Choiseul was not negotiating
like a really beaten enemy. For, if the war continued, he was likely
to have a new ally.
Late in March 1761, Ghoiseul, through the Russian ambassador in
England, suggested the assembling of a European peace congress
at Augsburg. This was to be preceded by the conclusion of a separate
peace between France and England. The basis of that peace was to
be the utipossidetis, i.e. the territory actually held by each Power at
a certain date. But the dates were to vary with each theatre of war,
so that operations, already en train, might have a chance of being
completed. Choiseul proposed that the date for Europe should be
i May, that for the West Indies and Africa i July, and that for the
East Indies i September. But these detailed dates, together with the
question of compensation for surrender of territory, were to be
matter for negotiation. The British Government replied by accepting
in principle both the peace congress and the separate negotiation,
but demurred as to the proposed dates at which hostilities should
cease.
Ghoiseul at once changed his tone and refused to alter the dates.
Pitt, who hoped soon to capture Belleisle and, therefore, to have a
further card in his hand, induced the Cabinet on 27 April to reject
ChoiseuTs dates, and to refuse to fix new ones until Belleisle fell. It
was, however, agreed to receive a French negotiator (Bussy) in
London and to send a British one (Hans Stanley) to Paris. The in-
structions to Stanley were decided in a Cabinet meeting of 1 3 May.
Pitt was unable to persuade his colleagues to take a definite decision
as to what was to happen to her German allies, some of whose terri-
tory was in French hands. All they would say was that Ghoiseul was
to be informed that England would not desert the King of Prussia.
Bussy's mission to England is a matter of much mystery; in days
past he had earned English gold for revealing French secrets.1 He
seems to have been conciliatory to Newcastle, but unbending
towards Pitt, and to have tried to sow dissension between the two
parties in the Cabinet. At any rate Choiseul proved more con-
ciliatory in France. After the fall of Belleisle (7 June) the British
Cabinet fixed the uti possidetis date in Europe as 16 June, informed
Choiseul that peace must be signed by i August, and upon terms to
be considered as final, apart from what happened at Augsburg.
These suggestions were never really considered, for they crossed a
proposal made by Choiseul on 1 7 June. He proposed to get over the
1 Waddington, Rewersement des Alliances, p. xoi; Yorke, Hardwicke, nx, 128.
CHOISEUL'S NEGOTIATION 491
difficulty of the dates by specifying the terms. He would restore
Minorca to England in exchange for Guadeloupe, Marie Galante
and Goree. He would cede Canada with new boundaries, but what
they were is not easy to see.1 If we may judge from his memorial of
I5 Juty> he wished to interpose a neutral belt between Louisiana, the
Great Lakes and the Ohio. He desired to retain, though not to
fortify, Cape Breton Island (i.e. to maintain France's fishing rights
in the St Lawrence), and also to keep fishing rights off Newfoundland.
He offered to surrender her conquests from the German allies of
England. These terms were probably sincere, though Choiseul
wanted not a lasting peace but a truce, in which he could reorganise
French resources.
On 24 June, the British Cabinet all agreed to reject the claims for
redefining the boundaries of Canada and for restoring to France
Cape Breton or the fishing of the St Lawrence. Opinion was divided
over the Newfoundland fisheries. The Newcastle party (including
Halifax, the colonial expert) wished to concede the French demands;
Pitt and Temple to reject them. Bute (and the King) wished to
negotiate further and see if France would yield. Pitt seems to have
criticised this not wholly unstatesmanlike idea with undue asperity,
and thus perhaps provoked their opposition. He drafted a reply to
Choiseul (accepted by the Cabinet on 26 June) demanding all
Canada, and stating that France could not enjoy her rights to
the Newfoundland fisheries under the Treaty of Utrecht without
substantial compensation to England. Guadeloupe and Marie Galante
would be restored only if the territory of England's German allies
was immediately evacuated. Senegal and Goree were to be ceded to
England and Dunkirk was to be dismantled according to the con-
ditions of Utrecht.
Ghoiseul seems to have been sincerely convinced that he could not
make peace without "saving face" by extorting some British con-
cession over Dunkirk, and without obtaining at least a partial
concession over the fisheries. He still pleaded for Cape Breton, but
this may have been a way of bidding higher for Newfoundland. His
reply of the isth which reached England on 20 July demanded a
share in the Newfoundland fisheries and Cape Breton Island as well.
He added ominously that, while he would surrender the French
conquests from the German allies of England, he must except those
of the King of Prussia. He could not restore these last without the
consent and knowledge of Austria, and in a private memorial he
intimated that she would not surrender them. More ominous still,
he sent a private memorial to England advising her to end her dis-
putes with Spain, and "agree to invite" Spain "to guarantee" the
new treaty. This last step seems to have been a grave departure from
1 The wording is "une fixation des limitcs du Canada dans la partic de TOhio d£ter-
min6c par les eaux pendantes". P.R.O., Chatham MSS, vol. LXXXV.
492 THE PEACE OF PARIS
diplomatic etiquette, against which Spain had already been warned.
The British reply was decided upon on 24 July, after the news of the
fall of Pondicherry, of the capture of Dominica and of Ferdinand's
victory at Vellinghausen reached England. It declared both private
memorials inadmissible. In other respects the British answer, sent
on the 25th but known by the date of its reception as the "ultimatum
of 29 July", was a stiff one. It declined again to permit the French
rights of fishery in the St Lawrence or to restore Cape Breton. It
demanded the demolition of the fortifications of Dunkirk in return
for a French share in the fisheries of Newfoundland. It declined to
draw any distinction between the King of Prussia and England's
other German allies. It demanded the restoration of Minorca by
France in return for the British restitution of Guadeloupe and Belleisle.
On receiving this reply on 29 July, Choiseul decided to continue
the war. But, though no longer sincere in his desire for peace, he
tried to prolong the negotiations to prevent any English attacks that
year. On 15 August he achieved his great masterpiece, and signed
the third Pacts de Famille with Spain. He engaged to support Spanish
interests and Spain promised to come into the war with all possible
speed.
Ten days before the signature of the Pacte de Famille, Choiseul
delivered to Pitt what was afterwards known as the "French ultimatum
of 5 August". He demanded French fishing rights and an island in
the St Lawrence and the erection of a barrier territory formed by
neutral Indian tribes in the hinterland between Louisiana and Canada.
In the West Indies he demanded St Lucia and the restoration to France
of Guadeloupe and Marie Galante. On the coast of West Africa he
demanded the return of Senegal. But he refused to restore Minorca
or to evacuate the territories of the King of Prussia. Pitt returned a
strong answer on 16 August. There was, however, some justification
for this attitude, for Bussy, in presenting the "French ultimatum",
stated that the British one of "29 July" "betrays the aversion of the
Court of London for peace". He warmly deprecated Pitt's refusal
to receive the Spanish memorial, and said that refusal would draw
closer the bonds between the French and the Spanish Bourbons.
But the stiff attitude of Pitt, which Bute and the King had hitherto
upheld, now aroused their fears and provoked a reaction. Bute did
not even yet wish to expel Pitt, but to outvote him. Feelings had
already ruled high in the Cabinet, Pitt had thumped the table, and
said he would not "take a cobbled draft". Now, on 17 August, he
was outvoted and obliged to transmit a very conciliatory communi-
cation to France. England now offered a share in the fishing rights
of the St Lawrence and Newfoundland, together with the isle of
St Pierre. For the strict provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht regarding
Dunkirk were now substituted the milder ones of Aix-la-Chapelle.
These concessions were made just after the Pacte de Famille had
PITT'S LAST COUNCIL 493
been signed. Stanley's communication was dated I September. As
Choiseul gave an unsatisfactory reply, the Cabinet ordered Stanley
to return to England (15 September).
On 1 8 September Pitt summoned the Cabinet to take an even
more important decision. He proposed to anticipate the danger of
a union of the Bourbons by demanding explanations of Spain and
by attacking her if they were not satisfactory. He had pierced to the
heart of the situation and divined that France would not make peace
because Spain was ready to make war. Pitt knew more of the Spanish-
French designs than any other Cabinet minister, for his naval and
colonial despatches proved that Spain was conspicuously unfriendly
to British trade in America.
Apart from this, his evidence, though not good in a court of law,
was good enough. The private memorial of Choiseul referring to
Spain was gravely suspicious. For Pitt now knew that it had been
made with the full approval of Spain, which had been warned
against such joint diplomatic action in 1 760, and Bussy's remarks in
presenting the ultimatum of 5 August were menacing. More than
one intercepted diplomatic despatch roused suspicions as to Choiseul's
conduct at the end of July. Another established the existence of the
Pacte de FamUle; Pitt did not indeed know all the terms, and could
not prove, though he shrewdly guessed, that Spain had pledged her-
self to make war with France against England. But it did not need
much penetration to see that a secret agreement of this kind, signed
after Choiseul had stiffened his terms, must have been of this nature..
But only Lord Temple supported Pitt's views on "preventive war".
On 21 September the King refused to receive a paper signed by Pitt
and Temple giving the views of the i8th, and the Cabinet decided
to await further news from Stanley. This marked the final stage, for
Bute had at length determined to abandon Pitt as he would not give
up his scheme of "preventive war".
The last meeting was on 2 October. In after days Pitt spoke of
it as "a trembling council". All were against Pitt and Temple, but
from different motives. Newcastle and Hardwicke were influenced
partly by a belief that strong action might produce the union they
feared, and partly by the belief (encouraged by Anson and Ligonier)
that England could not fight both Spain and France with success.
Bute seems to have refused to believe that the peace he desired would
be endangered. We have broken snatches of what Pitt said: "I have
in my bag so much matter as I think would be criminal matter
against any Secretary of State who lets it sleep in his office. [It is] the
highest indignity that ever was offered to the Crown of England.
As to the safety of the public, 'tis the worst species of war [for Spain]
to abet France with her full weight, [to] cover her trade and lend her
money and abet France in negotiation. You are now at war with
the House of Bourbon. You are prepared and she is not". He
494 THE PEACE OF PARIS
concludes, "I will be responsible for nothing I do not direct".1 Lord
Temple then made a haughty speech and retired. Speeches of com-
pliment then passed between Lord Granville and Pitt in which the
latter covertly reproached Bute. Pitt then withdrew and thus ended
the most brilliant administration in English history.
The resignation of Pitt and Temple followed on 5 October, and
Lord Egremont, who was to be Bute's supporter, became Secretary
of State. At the end of October Bute carried a measure for asking for
explanations from the King of Spain as to the Pacte de Famille. New-
castle vainly opposed this, perceiving that such a policy could only
end in war. On 2 January 1762, Spain's explanations proved so
unsatisfactory that England declared war upon her. Even New-
castle now admitted that Pitt had been right. Bute's policy had lost
the advantage of the initiative, the opportunity for capturing the
Spanish Plate Fleet, and the greatest war minister England ever
had.
Bute was equally unfortunate in his treatment of Kong Frederick.
He and the King cared very little about Germany, and even less
about Prussia, and were unduly sensitive to British public opinion
which showed a steady and rising dislike of the German war.2
George III was shocked at the irreligion of King Frederick, and Bute
was annoyed at his wit, for an intercepted letter told him that the
monarch had suggested Bedlam as a suitable place for himself. Both
were afraid of being accused of German tendencies. Moreover the
beginning of 1762 marked another change. For the Tsarina Eliza-
beth died, and her successor, Peter III, not only withdrew from the
war, but even offered Frederick an alliance. Bute, therefore, held
that Frederick was quite safe. When the Prussian minister adopted
a threatening tone in demanding the British subsidy of £670,000 for
the campaign of 1 762, Bute said that its payment would depend on
the pacific tendencies of Frederick. He added to his faults by some
clumsy diplomacy in which he revealed both to Russia and to Austria
his desire for peace and the fact that he was putting pressure on
Frederick. Bute definitely refused to pay the subsidy at the end of
April, despite the opposition of Newcastle's party. He also made
clear that he would greatly reduce the British military forces in
Germany. This — and a number of other incidents — proved too
much for Newcastle, and that assiduous devotee of office was ex-
pelled with scant courtesy from all his posts before the end of May.
Hardwicke, the great lawyer, unwillingly retired with his friend.
The ministry was then reformed, Bute becoming First Lord of the
1 Brit. Mus., Hardwicke MSS, 35870, printed by me in E.H.R. xxi, 327-30. Hardwicke
added a note to this last sentence of Pitt : "Surely the most insolent declaration ever made
by a Minister".
2 Yprke, Hardwicke, m, 357; Newcastle to Sir J. Yorke, 14 May 1762, "Popular maritime
expeditions in war, and a total dislike of all continental measures, are the basis of his (Bute's)
politics". Italics my own.
BUTE AND THE PRUSSIAN SUBSIDY 495
Treasury, and George Grenville Secretary of State, along with
Lord Egremont.
Bute's conduct towards Frederick has been severely criticised.
Bute could not remove Frederick from office, like Newcastle or Pitt,
but he could (and did) deprive him of his subsidy. Bute's technical
position towards Frederick was bad, and the means he used to ter-
minate the subsidy and to force Frederick to peace were clumsy and
inconsiderate. But the subsidy had been given originally to Frederick
to preserve him from ruin. If he intended to use it to prolong the
war (now that Russia offered him not only peace, but an alliance),
why should Bute allow him to do so? Bute would certainly have done
better not to refuse but to reduce the subsidy, as he did that support-
ing Ferdinand's command in Westphalia. But it seems absurd to
accuse Bute of treachery (as the British public did) because he re-
fused to pay in full a subsidy originally granted for a totally different
purpose from that to which Frederick now proposed to apply it.
It is, however, true that Bute did not properly regard Frederick's
interests when the final peace was made.1
By the end of April Bute had disposed of Frederick, and was
negotiating again with Choiseul. Stanley had left Paris in October
1761, but in November Count Viry, the Sardinian minister in London,
intimated to M. Bailli de Solar, his colleague at Paris, that England
would discuss terms of peace. On 8 December Choiseul intimated,
through Solar, that he would listen to any overtures for a separate
peace from Bute, to which Viry replied on the i3th by suggesting
the British ultimatum of 29 July and the French of 5 August as bases
for negotiation. He added that the British conquest of Martinique
(which was expected) would make a difference, and that public
opinion would demand that peace should be (inform at least) offered
to, and not received from, Great Britain. The British declaration of
war against Spain made little difference to the British desire for
peace, and Choiseul felt strong enough to reply (23 January 1762)
that the British capture of Martinique would not affect French policy.
As Martinique was the strongest and largest French West Indian
island, and as it fell in February, this was a strong statement. Bute
was indiscreet enough to let it pass unchallenged, but Lord Egre-
mont finally stated the terms as follows. Neither Power was to assist
her allies in Germany after the conclusion of the Franco-British
peace, except with money; Goree was to be returned to France;
rights of fishing in the St Lawrence with the Isles of St Pierre and
Miquelon and fishing off Newfoundland were to be conceded to
France.
1 By the Preliminaries of 3 Nov. 1762 as well as by the Peace of Paris of 10 Feb. 1763,
France agreed to restore the territory of England's other German allies, but not that of
Prussia, only promising to evacuate it and not to render further assistance to her own allies
(i.e. Austria). By the Treaty of Hubertusburg (between Prussia and Austria) of 15 Feb.
1763 Austria agreed to evacuate Frederick's territory.
496 THE PEACE OF PARIS
The majority of the Cabinet were ignorant of these negotiations,
but on 29 March they were induced to sanction one overture to
France, and another to Spain. On 15 April, Choiseul answered by
accepting the basis of the French and British ultimatums, but
demanding the restoration of Martinique. This provoked hot dis-
cussion in the British Cabinet, but Newcastle finally induced Bute
to lower his terms. Egremont made an official reply to Choiseul,1
insisting on his previous terms, and adding that England would
restore Martinique, but demanding the Neutral Isles for England,
of which St Lucia, from its position, was of the highest strategic im-
portance.2 Egremont indeed said later that the Barbados were unsafe
if St Lucia remained in French hands, and George Grenville to the
end remained strongly in favour of its becoming British. This was
an extension of British demands and due to fresh conquests. Pitt had
declared he would accept a partition of the Neutral Isle in 1761.
So far the negotiations had been conducted with the approval of
Newcastle, Hardwicke and his party, but they now retired from the
Cabinet and did not influence subsequent events. Choiseul was
much alarmed over the fall of Newcastle, as he thought it might let
in Pitt, and intimated plainly to Bute that there could be no peace
if that minister returned to office (23 and 25 May). On 25 May
Choiseul, in a lengthy memorandum, insisted on retaining St Lucia
and Martinique, but offered to surrender Mobile on the mainland,
suggesting, but not insisting, that Cape Breton Isle should be re-
stored to France, and also that concessions should be given her on the
coast of Coromandel. On 28 May he wrote again to Solar saying
that he would rather break off the negotiations than surrender
St Lucia.
On 21 June Bute found the Cabinet opposed to the restoration of
St Lucia, and received some sharp criticism. None the less, on
27 June, Bute in concert with Lord Egremont and the King, and
unknown to the rest of the Cabinet, gave a secret pledge to restore
St Lucia if France were favourable on other counts. They stipulated,
however, that the secret of this transaction was to be inviolable. But
their conduct in thus defying the majority of the Cabinet was less
rash than it appears, for on 17 June Solar had reported Choiseul as
saying that peace was made if the British answer was favourable.
And it was.
On ChoiseuPs advice, Bute had negotiated with Spain and re-
ceived a somewhat haughty reply early in July. This fact added to
his difficulties in the Cabinet, and made him unexpectedly stiff when
1 His reply is undated, but must have been sent at the end of April or very early in May.
All the quotations in the next few pages are from the Shelbume MSS, vols. ix, x, xi, now
in the Library of the Univ. of Michigan.
8 Tobago and St Lucia were already in British occupation; the fall of Grenada and the
Grenadines was announced as the despatch was being written: that of St Vincent was
expected.
BUTE AND BEDFORD 497
Ghoiseul tried to extract further concessions. On 12 July Bute in-
formed Viry that he would not surrender Dominica, and that
England was to retain the western bank of the Mississippi. He added
that Ghoiseul must now write a memorandum, capable of being
shown to the Cabinet (and thus concealing the secret negotiation),
"by which France will grant all the demands it is definitely
determined to grant" at the same time insisting on the cession of
St Lucia as an Article and sine qud non. Bute also hinted strongly
that, if Spain did not corne to heel, popular pressure might force
him to retain Cuba, when captured. Viry reported that Bute
seemed un pen fdche, and Choiseul, realising that the limits of his
patience had been reached, sent a reply in the desired sense.
When Bute laid ChoiseuPs answer before the Cabinet, on 26 July,
he proposed to make a separate peace with France at once, leaving
Spain to assent to the fait accompli or to be crushed by England's
power. Bute had some justification for this view, for Choiseul had
secretly assured him that he could induce Spain to accept the
terms; "England will only have to insist" (30 June). But Bute could
not say this openly. He was outvoted and attacked in the Cabinet
by everyone, and always referred to his humiliation with peculiar
bitterness. Lord Granville even suggested that he was the dupe of
France, and George Grenville stressed Ferdinand's victory in Ger-
many. Bute was compelled to abandon his claim to disregard Spain,
but he managed to get the Cabinet on 28 July to agree to the restora-
tion of St Lucia. He conceded in return that the King should not
assent to the French terms, except on condition that France should
try to persuade Spain to accept the treaty.1 This attitude placed
Choiseul in a difficulty. If he failed to persuade Spain, and the war
continued, England's terms would rise and he would lose St Lucia.
Viry warned him that delay was dangerous, and that Bute was
"bolder, and more decided than we thought" and "a perfectly
honest man". Choiseul did not keep Bute waiting long, and, by
*nid- August, had agreed to the British terms, and by the end of the
month had also induced Spain to agree to treat.
The Duke of Bedford had already been appointed, as British Pleni-
potentiary, to go to Paris to sign secret Preliminaries of Peace with
Choiseul and with a Spanish Plenipotentiary (Grimaldi). He arrived
at Paris in September, preceded by four carriage horses and twenty
bottles of sack, which Bute had sent as a present to Solar. The Duke
was not a wholly fortunate choice, for he was known to be the most
pacific, and thought to be the most pliable, of British ministers. He
was something of a philosopher and believed that England was be-
coming too supreme in Europe, and that the treaty should exhibit
her moderation and make the extent of British power and her gains
1 The formal answer to France agreeing to restore St Lucia, etc. was given by Egremont
on 31 July 1762, it had been preceded by the secret pledge of 27 June.
3*
498 THE PEACE OF PARIS
in territory acceptable to the world at large. But he was not always
easy to negotiate with in detail. Moreover, the revolt in the Cabinet
had awakened a justifiable suspicion that Bedford was the instru-
ment of Bute. Accordingly, they decided (19 September) that the
Preliminaries must be approved by the King (i.e. by the Cabinet)
before being signed. Bedford was annoyed at thus having his hands
tied by "instructions one would not give to a clerk".
ChoiseuPs terms, as finally offered, owed something to Bedford's
pressure. In two points they differed from the Preliminaries as
eventually signed. There was no guarantee that the French fishing
boats would keep at a reasonable distance from the English coasts
of Newfoundland, and no compensation was offered for the fall of
Havana. The French answer arrived on 28 September and it was
known on 29 September that not only had the city itself fallen but
nearly a million pounds of treasure and about a quarter of the Spanish
fleet were captured. The young King saw the Duke of Cumberland on
i October and declared that he would demand compensation for
Havana, hinting at Florida.1 It is curious that Bute was not wholly
in favour of this view.2
Bute found the opposition so formidable in the Cabinet that he
adjourned the date of its meeting till 22 October. In the interval he
reorganised his Cabinet. He replaced the ablest of his opponents,
George Grenville, by Lord Halifax, in the office of Secretary of State.
He also deprived Grenville of the leadership of the Commons and
gave it to Henry Fox, an old parliamentary hand, accustomed alike
to obedience, to debate, and to parliamentary management. To the
surprise of everyone Grenville retained his seat in the Cabinet, but
he was shorn of his power. If he gave any trouble, Bute could let
Halifax conduct the negotiations with France and make Fox defend
them in the Commons. Thus assured of making his will prevail in
his own Cabinet, Bute felt strong enough to demand compensation
for Havana. Spain offered Florida, and France made a concession
as to the distance of the French ships from the British coast of New--
foundland. The Preliminaries of Peace were signed between France,
Spain and England on 3 November at Fontainebleau.
These actions of Bute drove the Whig party into opposition
Overtures of office made by him to Newcastle were declined and this
led to an active campaign against the Whigs.3 The Duke of Devonshire,
the only one of them left in the Cabinet, was forced to resign the
office of Lord Chamberlain (28 October), was insulted by the King
in the process, and removed from the list of Privy Councillors. The
1 Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 35839, i Oct. 1762, "Some Account of the Terms of the Peace
given by the K. to H.R.H. the D. of G. at St. James's".
2 Shelburne MSS, vol. CLXvni (renumbered ccn), Letters from Galcraft to Grenville
of 3 Oct. 1762. Both writers desired compensation.
3 Bute had made tentative suggestions to Newcastle in July 1762.
RESIGNATION OF BUTE, APRIL 1763 499
few minor Whigs who remained in the administration then resigned
to mark their disapproval.
On 25 November the King's Speech at last contained that allusion
to the "bloody and expensive war" which Pitt's insistence had re-
moved from the royal declaration of two years before. Parliament
was informed that Preliminaries of Peace had been concluded and
advised of the actual terms in December. Pitt violently attacked the
Preliminaries in the Commons but could muster only 65 votes
against 329. Bute admitted that £25,000 was paid out of the
Secret Service money in December lySa.1 Of this sum £10,000 had
always been drawn from the Secret Service Fund at this time of the
year. The extra £15,000 was probably spent in pensions given to
adherents on the waiting list for pensions. This was, of course, a usual
procedure on the entry of a new ministry into office, and the sum does
not seem a very large one. The amount does not enable us to suggest
that the size of the Government majority in the Commons was due
to bribery alone. In the Lords, Newcastle, Hardwicke and Grafton
opposed the peace but found a "great majority" against them. Fox,
who seems to have already acted with great success in influencing
wavercrs, showed neither scruple nor mercy in a campaign against
the Whig placemen. He removed the Whig magnates from their lord-
lieutenancies, and hunted their dependents from places and from
pensions, "in order to be revenged on me", said Newcastle. No such
severity in proscription had ever been known, and it is the more
remarkable because the parliamentary consent to peace had already,
in fact, been secured by triumphant majorities.
Fresh surprises were in store for the Opposition. On 10 February
1763 peace was finally signed. On n March, Bute spoke to Fox of
resigning office, on the i8th the terms of peace were placed before
Parliament,2 and Bute laid down his office early in April. There
seems to be no reason to doubt that his resignation was due to a
simple cause. He had taken office with but one object, to assist his
young master in carrying the peace to a successful conclusion. This
he had now done. He was ready to resign, and perhaps hoped still
to pull wires behind the scenes. He was disinclined for the "bull-
fight" of politics and fully aware that his own great unpopularity
might easily be transferred to his master. That he loved the young
King with a deep affection his private letters show. That he was
without personal ambition, and only desirous of being useful to his
master, his whole conduct seems to prove. The amazement of his
contemporaries at his conduct is indeed the best proof of his personal
disinterestedness.
His conduct of the peace negotiations is naturally open to criticism,
1 See Bute to the King of 4 Nov. 1769. Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, n, no. 735,
32-2
pp. 109-10,
a No debate on them is recorded.
500 THE PEACE OF PARIS
though we can understand his motives and the practical possibilities
better than his contemporaries did. The plan was simple. Bute, like
his master, ardently desired peace, and he told Ghoiseul so frankly
enough. "Instead of going the ordinary way of forming pretensions
much stronger than one would wish to conclude, I have traced the
plan of an equitable peace such as France could accept with honour." *
He added that he had not hesitated to make great sacrifices for this
result, wishing to make a permanent alliance instead of a pldtree
peace. Viry certainly thought, and Choiseul sometimes admitted,
that Bute had acted up to his professions. The aim was in itself a
high and noble one and worthy of a great statesman, but the prospect
of a permanent alliance was certainly premature, and almost absurd.
There was no prospect even of more than a truce. In fact, Ghoiseul
began reorganising the French fleet and increasing his armaments
so soon as peace was concluded and remained decidedly aggressive
until his fall seven years later.
Bute failed equally in his lesser aim of securing good terms by
avoiding the diplomacy of the auction-room and offering le dernier
prix. The secrecy of the negotiation gave Ghoiseul endless opportuni-
ties of playing Bute off against his own colleagues and against Spain,
which he was not slow to use. Bute's worst error would appear to
have been his over-zeal for peace, and his disregard of the fact lhat
the military events were likely to tell in England's favour. His
conduct towards Frederick cannot be entirely defended either as
moral or as expedient. The operations in Germany, in fact, gave
Bute a valuable lever in negotiation which he rashly threw away at
the outset.
On the other hand, the Newcastle-Hardwicke section of the
Cabinet, while wishing to retain St Lucia and to get compensation
for Havana, contributed largely to Bute's blunders over the Spanish
question. Under the influence of Ligonier and Anson they seemed
to have been obsessed with the idea that Spain and France would
be too strong for England and that any concession was justified
to avert that result. It may be doubted whether any concession
could have done so, and, as it turned out, England proved stronger
than France and Spain combined. But it is only fair to say that
Legge, the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer (and by no means
friendly to Newcastle), expressed in a paper, written on 1 1 February
1 76s,2 the view that immediate peace was necessary, to avoid bank-
ruptcy. So the Whigs had technical advice from naval, military and
financial quarters, all in favour of a speedy peace. On the other hand,
the Duke of Cumberland, their honourable and impartial adviser,
was strongly against giving way over the Newfoundland fisheries or
discontinuing the war in Germany, and deeply suspicious of any
1 Shelburnc MSS, vol. xi, Viry to Solar, 26 June 1762, reporting Bute.
a Brit.Mus.,Add.MSS,35839,ff.262-3. (An endorsed "abstract of Mr Legge's paper'1.)
THE VALUE OF THE PEACE 501
concessions to Spain.1 And, when it came to the point, the Newcastle
party had refused to give up St Lucia.
If the Newcastle policy represents the nadir, that of Pitt represents
the zenith, of possible diplomatic achievement. Choiseul lost no
opportunity of declaring Pitt's policy to have been undiplomatic in
the highest degree, and he has been followed by the most distinguished
French historian of this period. Even Stanley, an excellent judge,
thought Pitt's diplomatic methods too harsh, and declared he could
have made peace had the concessions of 17 August been made
earlier. But Stanley did not know what we now know. Such criticism
assumes cither that the Franco-Spanish union could have been
averted, or that it did not mean war. Both propositions seem doubt-
ful. Spain would hardly have approved of ChoiseuFs private
Memorial of July 1761 if she was not prepared to risk war. And
Charles III seems to have been prepared to run that risk in order to
reduce the increasing predominance of England in America. He
had told England this in so many words nearly two years before. If
the balance of power was thus really disturbed, soft words from Pitt
would not have prevented Spain from joining France.
Assuming war to be inevitable after the signature of the Pacte de
Famille, Pitt's policy of cowing or attacking Spain was right. Bold
counsels were necessary and the first blow would have been struck
by England. The conduct of the war was much weakened by his
departure, for no other minister could awaken the moral enthusiasm
or appeal to the commercial needs of the country. He had not only
united England behind him; he had made "trade flourish by means
of war". To take two instances: shipping went up from 451,000 tons
in 1 755 to 56 1 ,000 in 1 763 ; the slave trade had almost doubled in
amount between 1758 and I762.2 A continuance of the war under
such leadership would not have led to bankruptcy and would
certainly have led to greater victories, or at any rate, to a greater
price being exacted for victories,
Was it possible for Bute to have exacted a greater price? There is
a beautiful talc of how old Lord Granville signed the treaty papers
as he lay dying, quoted Homer over them, and pronounced the
peace "very glorious" to his country. It was the last utterance of
an able and disinterested statesman who had himself censured Bute
for faintheartedness during the negotiation. Weight too must be
attached to the utterance of Choiseul himself: "There is no modern
example in which a peace has been made when the conquerors kept
the whole of their conquests".3 True as this dictum was, the contrast
between what England retained at the peace in the New World, and
what she restored, was astonishing.
1 Lord Granby favoured the peace, as it stood. His technical military opinion is some
offset to that of the Duke of Cumberland, but he seems to have been influenced by political
motives.
2 Slave trade figures in G.O. 325/2. * Memo, of 25 May 1762.
502 THE PEACE OF PARIS
She gave back to France Belleisle, Goree, and a share of both
the disputed fisheries in Canada: she restored Martinique, Guade-
loupe, Marie Galante and St Lucia. She gave back to Spain Cuba
in the Caribbean and Manila in the Pacific. Pitt's own plan is
difficult to ascertain, for he might have approved in office some of
the cessions which he condemned in opposition. That he was sincere
in his opposition is certain, for he severed all political connection
with anyone who had had a hand in the peace at the time and even
maintained this attitude three years later. The Board of Trade's
Secret Report on terms of peace of 13 April 1761 went further than
Pitt himself in demanding the exclusion of the French not only from
the Newfoundland fisheries,1 but also from Louisiana and from the
Neutral Islands and Guadeloupe. Pitt had agreed to some compro-
mise over the Newfoundland fisheries, though he did not accept
Bute's eventual settlement. In this he would seem to have erred, for
a report from Newfoundland in 1767* showed that the results of the
treaty had enabled English trade to increase at the expense of French,
and had reduced the number of French fishers by about 1000.
Pitt's mind seems to have been exercised by the reflection, which
time proved to be correct, that the main trade of Guadeloupe and
Martinique must go to the North American continent in any case.
And, if so, it was better that British should be substituted for French
sugar, and that a potential naval reserve should be withdrawn from
France. It has been ingeniously argued3 that Pitt's consent to giving
up Guadeloupe in 1761 was due to the fact that he adopted the new
doctrine that Canada with a growing population was a better market
for home manufactures than Guadeloupe. When he demanded the
retention of Guadeloupe or Martinique in 1 762, it is held that Pitt
had reverted to the old ideas that a sugar isle was a base of supply.
But this omits to consider the political influences on Pitt in each case.
He condemned the restoration of St Lucia and of Gorce on strategic
grounds. "They seemed to have lost sight of the great fundamental
principle that France is chiefly, if not solely, to be dreaded by us in
the light of a maritime and commercial Power." He pointed out the
dangers of the union of the two Bourbon Crowns, andsaid that Spain was
not to be trusted. Havana ought to be retained, for from the moment
of its capture "all the riches and treasure of the Indies lay at our feet".
On the whole Pitt was an advocate of the doctrine of the need for
controlling trade routes and obtaining markets. He wished for Cuba
to secure the trade of Spain, for Guadeloupe to secure that of France.
He wished for St Lucia as a strategic post in the West Indies. In
West Africa he desired Senegal on commercial, and Goree on strategic,
1 Jenkinson (afterwards Lord Liverpool) thought Canada hardly worth acceptance
without the fisheries. For Board of Trade Report see Bnt. Mus., Add. MSS, 35913,
fT. 7^ seqq.
8 Shelburne MSS, vol. LXV, 15 Dec. 1767, Hugh Palliser to Shelburne.
3 Beer, G. L., British Colonial Policy (1754-65), 1917, p. 136.
PITT AND THE PEOPLE 503
grounds. He wished for the exclusive right to the fisheries of the
St Lawrence and Newfoundland in order to drive French sailors from
the New World.
Pitt was loss of a free agent in his policy than either Bute or New-
castle. He is lo blame for disdaining the one, and for making himself
intolerable to the other. But he was to some extent compelled to do
this, in order to retain his power. For he was "called to office", as
he said in his farewell speech at the Cabinet, "in some degree by the
voice of the People" and he stood for bold measures and vigorous
action. Bute or Newcastle could rely on their command of pensions
or of places to win support; Pitt rested on his popularity alone. And
he depended in large part on the goodwill of the City, in particular
of his chief supporters, Bcckford, Hodges, Price and Wilkes. Burke
bitterly commented that the "Great Commoner" knew nothing of the
"great extensive public" but only "of a parcel of low toadeaters"
and by ihcsc he meant the City Elders. All of these held that the
French must be totally expelled both from Canada and the New-
foundland fisheries. The unanimity of the City Council in this matter
seems to supply the reason why Pitt consented so unwillingly to any
modification of our exclusive rights.1 Immediately after his fall he
spoke in the Commons, declaring that he repented his concession and
that, when we resumed negotiations, "we should have the exclusive
fishery in the Gulf a sine qud non",2 and he was supported in Parlia-
ment by his special friend and crony in the City, Alderman Beckford,
and by Wilkes in the press.
On the West Indian question Pitt's City friends were much more
divided. Lcckford argued that the acquisition of French sugar isles
would injure existing British isles by reducing the price of sugar.
But this view was contested by others of Pitt's City friends. And Pitt
was, therefore, able to take his own line more easily. He surrendered
Guadeloupe indeed under pressure from his colleagues (and from
some of the City) in 1761. But, as soon as he felt strong enough to
oppose both, as he did in 1762, he demanded Guadeloupe as well as
Canada. For he argued that their trade connection would continue
even if Guadeloupe remained French, and that, therefore, she should
be British.
The classic discussion as to whether Guadeloupe was more im-
portant than Canada occupied the pens of many pamphleteers from
1760 onwards.3 One pamphlet suggested that America might revolt,
once it was safe from the French. Others with equal foresight
suggested that the peopling of Canada would mean that they would
produce manufactures, and that this would not be to England's
1 The meagre evidence as to Pitt's City influence is well summarised by Hotblack,
Chatham's Colonial Policy, pp. iz-J. , ., n rrm ,„„„„
54 For texts of this speech, 13 Nov. 1761, see Yorke, Harduncke, m, 338; hist. MSS Com-
mission, Stopford-Sackmlle MSS, i, 86-7.
5 See Grant, W. L., "Canada v. Guadeloupe", Am. tf.fl.July 1912, pp. 735 seqq.
504 THE PEACE OF PARIS
interests. As we know in later years, Pitt declared he would not
allow "a nail or a horseshoe " to be manufactured in North America.
But he also suggested with pride and prophetic insight that Canada
would contain 15,000,000 men "when fully peopled". And this
shows that he appreciated the advantages of population as well as of
trade, and in this sense went farther than some of his friends in the City.
Over the German war Pitt seems to have had the City with him
throughout, but he did not alwavs carry all the public. An extremely
able pamphlet by Mauduit — Considerations on the present German war —
appeared in 1760. It was an anti-Pitt pamphlet, said to have been
written under the influence of Lord Hardwicke,1 which ran into
many editions. It attacked Pitt's famous dictum of "conquering
America in Germany", arguing that the continental war drained
our resources, while the colonial increased them. The argument was
specious, for it assumed that the German war could be isolated from
the colonial struggle, and that our containing operations in Europe
did not assist our aggressive operations in America. But it shook Pitt
considerably, and at the beginning of 1 761 he seemed to be willing to
discuss with the King, and with others, the abandoning of the German
war. This concession could only have been because of its unpopularity.
Towards the end of 1 761, however, Pitt strenuously argued for the con-
tinuance of war in Europe, and in this attitude the City was with him.
Prohibition of manufactures in the colonies, prohibition of New-
foundland fisheries to France, were imperatively demanded by the
popular and City connections of Pitt. And it was this system of
complete monopoly which was fatal both to his internal and external
policy. For Pitt could not have substantially modified either demand
and retained either his power or his popularity. As regards the West
Indies and the German war he saw deeper and further than any
contemporary, and took a more independent course. He was alone
in understanding how strategic and commercial aims subserved one
another.
Far the most powerful defence of the Government was made by
Lord Shelburne, who had become President of the Board of Trade in
the Government,2 though he was afterwards to take Pitt as a political
model. He began by arguing that territory was "secondary" and
"subservient to the interests of commerce, which is now the great
object of ambition". In proportion as exports and imports increased
in a country, so would the number of sailors and ships, and thus
wealth was the best defence of a nation. France and Spain could not
1 This is Horace Walpole's assertion, but it seems doubtful.
2 Shelburne MSS, vol. CLXV, Lord Shelburne's Speech 1762 (evidently on 9 Dec.). It
seems to be the notes rather than the text of the speech, and is not signed by Shelburne.
It is not given in Hansard, and was not found by Lord Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, I, 137.
There can, however, be no doubt of its authenticity, for it is similar in substance to the
"Report of the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations on Division of ceded Provinces and
Islands ' signed by Shelburne as President of the Board, 8 June 1763. See Brit. Mus., Add.
MSS, 35913, ff. 230 seqq.
SHELBURNE'S DEFENCE OF THE PEACE 505
well apprehend more evil than they have already sustained, for the
capitals of Paris and Madrid were not threatened. So we must make
concessions "to make Peace tolerable to our Enemies".
The first object we had obtained was America. "The total ex-
clusion of the French from Canada and of the Spaniards from Florida
gives Great Britain the universal empire of that extended coast."1
We had gained also "new fields of commerce" with the Indians, and
supplies of manufactures to 70,000 "Acadians" (French Canadians),
we had likewise obtained security for the immense white population
of our own colonists. The British exports to the American mainland
had greatly increased of late, and the import of naval stores from
thence was of great importance, for it might be developed so as to
supersede the materials previously obtained from the Baltic, and
thereby add to our security. The concessions made by France in the
Newfoundland fisheries would enable us to maintain 4000 more
seamen than before. Thus the possession of the whole continent of
North America assured us an abundance of population and com-
merce— and therefore of sailors and of ships.
On the other hand, even if we acquired more of the West Indian
isles, we should not gain. We exported only £1,000,000 to them at
present, and imported £2,000,000, thus losing on the balance. In
this view Guadeloupe was a "trifling object", particularly as more
sugar could be grown in British islands, and the benefit of such
cultivation was doubtful. "Wherever sugar grows population de-
creases", and therefore "our sugar isles weaken and depopulate our
Mother Country, sugar requiring moist[ure] and heat [which] are the
causes of putrefaction. " "On the contrary the Northern Colonies
increase population and of course the consumption of our manu-
factures, pay us by their trade with foreigners. . .thereby giving em-
ployment to millions of inhabitants in Great Britain and Ireland,
and are of the utmost consequence to the wealth, safety and inde-
pendence of these Kingdoms, and must continue so for ages to come."
There was more than one flaw in this vigorously reasoned and able
apology. Thus security disappeared on the mainland if some of the
Northern Colonies revolted, as more than one pamphlet had hinted
they might do. Shelburne's only suggestion in that direction was that
the possession of Florida would enable descents to be made on the
Spanish fleet from Vera Cruz or on the Spanish islands. In this
respect Pitt's insight cut deeper. It was difficult to formulate or
apply schemes of defence on the mainland, and so possession of
strategic points in the West Indies was really more important. In the
islands, defence rested mainly on the fleet of the mother country;
on colonial legislatures which could at need be coerced; and on a
1 He explained later that the French settlement of New Orleans was so unwholesome,
and the navigation of the Mississippi so difficult, that no danger was to be apprehended
in that quarter.
5o6 THE PEACE OF PARIS
general defence policy which could be absolutely controlled by the
Admiralty in London. Further concessions could in fact have been
extorted from Spain and France. The maladroitness and haste of
Bute had made the whole question of compensation for new captures
very difficult. For Havana we did not receive full value. For the
brilliant capture of Manila, which took place after the Preliminaries
of Peace were arranged, no equivalent or compensation was ulti-
mately given. Its occupation, if known in time, would have been a
formidable card in British hands to demand the retention either of
Cuba or of St Lucia. Here again the haste to make peace injured
England's interests. The demand for more strategic security in the
West Indies was Pitt's method of meeting the menace offered by the
union of the Bourbons. Against this alliance in the future no pro-
vision had been made, as Cumberland pointed out to the King.
Had Pitt's advice been followed, and St Lucia or Cuba secured, it
is certain that the task of the French fleet in the American War of
Independence would have been rendered more difficult. It is even
arguable whether the naval disasters, which led to the surrender of
Yorktown, could have occurred. Thus strategic security in the West
Indies was sacrificed to the interests of the American mainland. And
diplomatic security was equally sacrificed in Europe, for Bute
abandoned his allies in Germany in order to make peace. Pitt saw
the danger of such isolation in Europe and strove, directly he re-
turned to power in 1766, to renew our alliance with Prussia and also
with Russia. His efforts were vain, and one cause of British disasters
in the War of Independence was the fact that Bute's policy had left
us without a single ally in Europe. It is a curious reflection on the
Peace of Paris that it was assailed by the greatest of all our colonial
statesmen on the ground that it sacrificed British interests, both in
the West Indies and in Germany, to those of the American mainland.
Such a policy implied indeed an abiding trust in the loyalty of British
settlers in North America. And the man who had this confidence,
the man who cared nothing for Hanover, who gloried in the name of
Briton, who gambled on the loyalty of America, was His Majesty,
King George III.
CHAPTER XVIII
SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
LJ NDER the manifestations of national energy and growth hitherto
considered there is one factor fundamental to all. Sea power alone
could enable the race first to spread overseas and then to uphold
vital connection with the new settlements. The former of these pro-
cesses is brought about mainly by victorious war. The second raises
questions of commerce, finance, law and naval and international
policy, all of which, however, rest finally on the former. But sea
power also depends on national spirit, good organisation and skill
in leadership. With these essentials we are here chiefly concerned, so
far as they ^conduced to the spread and the maintenance of the
British Empire.
Under the Commonwealth and Protectorate, England had re-
discovered her naval strength. Like other revolutionary govern-
ments, that of Cromwell had to exploit all possible resources, and was
the first to develop a national and professional ocean-going Navy.
Well-found, well-manned, well-armed, homogeneous in design, and
handled with a view to a vigorous offensive, that Navy had worsted
the larger but heterogeneous and half-mercantile fleets of the Dutch
Republic. Already the English admirals were feeling their way
towards the line-ahead formation, for which uniformity in design
and drill was essential; and behind this tactical advantage lay that
invaluable strategic asset, England's position athwart the chief lines
of Dutch commerce, which enabled her to enforce a strangling
economic blockade. Thus, the final issue could not be doubtful. The
almost self-contained island, possessing a professional Navy, could
wear down, first the fleets, then the commerce, then the vital strength
even of a brave maritime people too dependent on the sea. Equally
clear were the imperial issues. The same force, exerted against the
wide-flung and ill-cohering dominions of Spain, easily won Jamaica,
establishing a base in the heart of Spain's jealously guarded
Caribbean preserve. Thus the English, having won security at home
and vantage posts overseas, could view without grave anxiety the
rapid growth of the French marine.
Is it surprising that Charles II and James II set great store by the
Navy, and that Parliament, at the beginning of the Second Dutch
War, granted a royal aid "for the preservation of His Majesty's
ancient and undoubted sovereignty and dominion in the seas " ? The
range of action of the King's ships was also extended by the acquisi-
tion of Tangier and Bombay as part of the dowry of Charles IPs
bride, Catherine of Braganza; for the former place, when protected
508 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
by a mole, commanded the entrance to the Mediterranean and
countered the efforts of Louis XIV to make of that sea a French lake;1
while the fine natural harbour of Bombay promised support both for
the neighbouring British posts and for the East India Company's
commerce in those waters. The pretensions of France and, still more,
the arrogant exclusiveness of the Dutch in the East Indies brought
about acute friction; and in 1663 Charles was applauded when,
without declaring war, he ordered Sir Robert Holmes to attack
Dutch posts in West Africa and on the Hudson River. The success
of this raid, and the ease with which New Amsterdam (New York)
and other posts were not only conquered but held, revealed the
fragility of the Dutch colonial fabric, reared on a narrow trade mono-
poly and little real colonisation. The Second Dutch War (1665-7)
also proved again the strategic and economic weakness of the United
Provinces, whose oceanic trade and North Sea fisheries could readily
be cut off by the British Navy. For all their stout attacks on us in
home waters and almost complete renunciation of oceanic trade, the
Dutch could not gain maritime supremacy; and meanwhile they
were drained of their life-blood.
Very different was the strategy of the French, now for a time allied
to the United Provinces; for while the Dutch pressed us hard in the
North Sea and did little elsewhere, the French held back in the major
operations but urged on la guerre de course, especially in the West
Indies, where they drove English settlers from St Christopher.
Finally Harman's powerful relieving squadron beat the French under
the guns of Martinique and then raided French and Dutch colonies;
but that diversion offeree weakened our home defence; and, still
more, the rottenness of Charles's administration exposed us to de
Ruyter's telling blow at the Thames and Medway. Even so, the
exhaustion of the Dutch led to the Peace of Breda (July 1667) which,
besides restoring the English part of St Christopher, assured Surinam
to the Dutch and New York and New Jersey to the British — a proof
that even amidst Caroline decadence, our people could hold their
own against the Dutch and French united. The disgrace came in the
Third Dutch War when Charles II and Louis XIV in unscrupulous
alliance failed to overcome the heroic Dutch.
Meanwhile, individuals had shown that English spirit had not
decayed. In 1668-9 two explorers, Radisson and Groseillers, em-
ployed for the time by Prince Rupert, with Gillam of Boston as their
navigator, renewed the old quest for the North-West Passage, and
during the search for it around Hudson Bay established the post of
Fort Charles. Thereupon their patrons, including Prince Rupert, ob-
tained a charter founding the Hudson's Bay Company (2 May 1670),
1 Harris, F. R., Life of E. Afountague, first Earl of Sandwich, i, 197, 204, n, 82,
154-9: 165-9; Routh, E. M. G., Tangier, passim; Tedder, A. W., Jfavy of the Restoration,
chap. iv.
NEW ERA OF NATIONAL POLICY AND EXPANSION 509
primarily for the discovery of a passage into the South Sea, but also for
trading in furs and minerals in "Prince Rupert's Land". It was "to
have the sole trade and commerce of and to all the seas, bays, straits,
creeks, rivers and sounds in whatsoever latitude they shall be that lie
within the entrance of the streight commonly called Hudson's
Streights together with all neighbouring lands not possessed by any
Christian prince".1 The first decade of Charles IFs reign, when King
and people were still united, witnessed by far the greatest colonial
acquisitions yet effected; but the miserable schism which followed
well nigh wrecked the whole fabric of empire. Very significant was
the fate of Tangier. In 1680 Parliament refused the annual vote for
its maintenance because "the supplies sent thither have been in
great measure made up of Popish officers and soldiers95.2 England's
Mediterranean watch-tower was, therefore, abandoned; and its ruin
lay as a sign of the paralysing disunion of King and people. The Rock
of Gibraltar was soon to be the symbol of a reunion, fruitful not only
in Mediterranean, but also in oceanic and imperial strategy.
The accession of William, Prince of Orange, to the throne opened
up a new era of national policy and expansion, for he allied the
British Isles with the Protestant and Maritime Powers against the
threatening might of Louis XIV, thus inaugurating the series of wars
with the "natural enemy" which reached their climax at Trafalgar
and Waterloo. At the start of the race for empire, France had ad-
vantages in her absolute monarchy, then at the height of splendour;
in her matchless army; and in her navy, now rivalling those of Eng-
land and Holland combined. Spain seemed decadent, Italy was a
mere mosaic, Germany a prey to disunion, while the Dutch were
past the zenith of their energy, and the British Isles felt the troubles of
a disputed succession. Thus, with foresight and discretion, Louis XIV
should have dominated both the Old World and the New. But, like land
power, sea power possesses no infallible magic: its successful working
depends chiefly on sound judgment; and here le grand monarque was
lacking. A long career of success had nurtured his besetting political
sin, grandiosity, and its progeny, difluseness of aim. William, on the
contrary, trained to Dutch economy of effort, made the utmost use of
his far scantier resources, saw when to strike, and then struck hard.
At once the contrast was startling. While the legions of France
devastated the Palatinate and her Navy lay idle, William with an
Anglo-Dutch fleet made for Torbay and achieved a bloodless Revo-
lution in England.8 Next, while he was gaining over allies, the
exacting policy of Versailles drove Spain and other Powers into his
arms. The higher strategy of the ensuing war (1689-97) also called
for clear thinking; and here William's choice of aims was simple and
1 Schooling, W., The Hudson's Bay Co., chap. i.
* C.J. K, 665; Tanner, J. R., Cat. of the Persian MSS (N.R.S.), iv, 558.
5 For details see Powley, E. B., The English Naoy in the Revolution of 1688, chaps, ii-v.
510 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
telling. Louis, on the contrary, toyed with many schemes, whereas
prudence counselled concentration either on the continental or the
maritime war; that is, either on Amsterdam and Cologne, or on
London, Dublin and New York. Fortunately for his neighbours,
he attempted all five enterprises. Therefore, while gaining initial
successes in all quarters (save that the New York design withered for
lack of ships and men) he could nowhere push them home. True, in
1690, the French fleets gained off the Irish coast and Beachy Head
victories which promised triumph to the Jacobite cause, yet the
skilful retreat of Torrington and his retention of a "fleet in being"
off the Essex coast thwarted the threatened invasion of England;1
while William, crossing the Irish Sea with an adequate army under
light escort, scattered James IPs forces and drove him from Ireland.
Thus, by the end of 1690 the unity of the British Isles was restored —
an essential preliminary to the establishment of naval supremacy and
colonial security. James having strengthened the Navy and well
"stocked the dockyards, 100 sail of the line were ready, or completing
for sea in that year.2
Meanwhile, the British Empire had been in grave danger, alike
through internal dissensions and French aggressions. That William
appreciated the crisis appears in an Order in Council (2 May 1689)
planning the fortification of St John's as a sure base for our New-
foundland fishermen, and operations against the adjoining French
ports in Newfoundland, which became nests of privateers in wartime.
The importance attached to the West Indies appears in his order to
despatch a fleet to the Leeward Isles; "for the party superior at sea
in those parts will probably prevail on land".8 Before the departure
of this force (March 1690), bad news poured in from all quarters.
The Hudson's Bay Company bemoaned the destruction of its forts
by the French Canadians, who flaunted their design of capturing
New York, fortifying its harbour and dominating America by sea
and land. Never was there a better opportunity; for the disputed
succession in England increased the spirit of dissidence in the Planta-
tions. The rabble of New York deposed the governor, and the Bos-
tonians — a "giddy and enraged mob" — imprisoned theirs, besides
capturing the King's guardship. Governor Randolph from the
common gaol smuggled to England a warning letter (29 May) that
the French were everywhere encroaching, while the Jesuit fathers
were winning over some of our Iroquois allies with tales of the 4000
Canadians ready to descend on the weak and distracted English.
By the end of July Massachusetts had lost its fisheries and the frontier
forts.
1 Golomb, P. H., Naval Warfare, pp. 110-22; Thursfield, J. R., Nelson and other Naval
Studies, pp. 113-6-
2 Camden Society, XLVI, 26-36; Burchett, J., Transactions at Sea, 1688-97 (1703),
pp. 3-19; Lavisse, Hist, de France, vol. vm, chap, ii; Charnock, J., Naval Architecture, vol.
n, chap. xvi. » Col. St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, pp. 22, 32.
THE STRUGGLE FOR NORTH AMERICA 511
From the middle and southern colonies came reports scarcely less
gloomy. All the coast settlements beg for naval succours, even
Virginia and Maryland declaring that frigates are their best pro-
tection, i The merchants trading to New York set forth that the French,
if not stoutly opposed, will capture that city "which is the centre of
all the American colonies", make it a privateering centre and over-
run all the mainland colonies, "which will be the ruin of our West
India islands". To avert this disaster they urge the fortifying of
New York. Nothing so far-seeing appears in the proceedings of the
colonial Assemblies, whose mutual rivalries sapped every effort. Yet
at that time Count Frontenac, returning to the scene of his former
triumphs in Canada, was maturing a plan for a double attack on
New York by sea, as also by land down the Champlain-Hudson rift.
Insufficient support from France and the inherent difficulty of co-
ordinating the two expeditions marred the project; but with the aid
of Indian allies he organised frontier raids which terrorised New
England and New York. If his object was to pin their militia to
frontier defence while he prepared a blow at New York or Boston,
he failed; for the Indian outrages aroused a resolve to procure
assistance from England, and by means of her fleet strike at Quebec,
their militia meanwhile threatening Montreal.2 As supremacy in
North America depended on sea power, the New Englanders sent
home requests for help, they themselves undertaking to supply 500
troops with transports. Meanwhile the militia (which on paper
numbered 13,279 men) would attack Montreal and Quebec by way
of Lake Champlain.3
The plan was the first of several which were tried without success
until the year 1759. The same causes of failure generally appear:
the reluctance of the colonies to send their quotas ; desertions, delays,
and quarrels as to leadership; the slowness of the Home Government
to supply ships and troops,4 and dislocation between the maritime
and land expeditions; for the former, sailing by a devious route for
Quebec, was completely out of touch with the latter, aimed directly
by land at Montreal; whereas the French defenders, acting on in-
terior lines and on a fine waterway, could rally promptly at either
place. In this first effort, a Boston advemurer, Sir William Phipps,
collected there a force of eight vessels and 446 volunteers, with which
he reduced Port Royal in Acadia (n May 1690), but this success
was soon reversed by a single French warship, which carried off the
English governor. Meanwhile with a larger force of five armed ships
and twenty-nine unarmed transports, manned by New Englanders,
Phipps prepared to ascend the St Lawrence, while 2000 men
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, pp. 45-7, 66, 82, 101, 3!
2 Lorin, H.f*I* Comte de Frontenai^. 356-62; OsgooS, H. L., The American Colonies in
the iQth Century, vol. i, chap, in; Garneau, fi., Hist, du Canada feth edn, 1913), pp. 379-82.
3 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, pp. 240-1, 261.
4 Guttridge, G. H., Colomal Policy of WiHucn ///, pp. 103-6, 184.
512 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
advanced on Montreal by the Hudson-Richelieu route. The latter
effort miscarried owing to smallpox and transport difficulties; and
Phipps, though reaching Quebec with ease, there failed still more
egregiously, his men finally rushing to the boats and abandoning
their cannon and stores (21 October). Thereafter, storms completed
their discomfiture, the venture altogether costing the Boston "under-
takers" £50,000. 1 This conclusion is characteristic of the age. Men,
money and resources being very limited, each side sought to harry
the other in order to spread out and thin the opposing forces. Neither
could strike heavily both by sea and land; and the interdependence
of the naval and military efforts, important even at the time of Wolfe,
is the paramount factor at the time of Phipps. In 1690, lar more than
in 1759, these young communities, in war as in peace, depended
absolutely on the mother countries, without whose help their
sparrings were almost puerile.
Similar scenes of sporadic indecisive warfare occurred in the West
Indies. As the Greeks had long ago discovered, an extensive archi-
pelago inclines men to raiding habits, which demoralise commerce
and degrade warfare. Rich islets invite assault, and are the despair
of their defenders. Even a weak frigate squadron overpowered isle
after isle before the motherland could effectively intervene. A fleet
decided everything. Further the British strategic position there was
weak, our Leeward Islands, from St Christopher on the north-west
to Barbados on the south-east, having no good harbour or naval base,
while the French base, Fort Royal in Martinique, occupied a central
position, whence even a great fleet, after shelter and repairs, could
run down before the constant easterly trade winds and overpower
either those islands or Jamaica. That island, again, had at Port Royal
no adequate protection or docking facilities, and lay to leeward of
the many French ports in the western half of Hispaniola (San
Domingo), whence raiders easily swooped down on a coast hard to
defend. What wonder that the colonists sent home bitter complaints?
The merchants of Jamaica beg for three frigates, good sailers, to ply
to windward and protect the coasts and the trade. St Christopher
is in a worse case; for there the strong Irish element defiantly holds
to King James and joins the numerous French settlers. The Irish in
Nevis and Montserrat are also turbulent. Antigua, the seat of govern-
ment of the Leeward Isles, complains of neglect; for during three
years it has seen not a frigate "to protect from pilfering pickeroons " ;
it begs for a squadron "to turn our mourning into joy". Even the
populous and wealthy island of Barbados lives under a cloud. "If
(writes home the governor on 30 May 1689) you could spare me a
few men of war, I could, with the men I could raise here, capture the
French Islands"; but the French "make their greatest advantage
1 CaL St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, pp. 338, 368, 376, 415; Parkman, F., Fronknac, chap, xiii;
Garneau, pp. 385-91 j Osgood, i, 87-92.
OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES 513
by surprise". Others point out that if we take Guadeloupe and
Martinique the French fleet will soon be helpless; but this enterprise
demands a large naval and military force from England. Instead
there comes a French fleet, which, landing troops in St Christopher,
devastates all the British portion, whereupon Count de Btenac,
Governor of Martinique, threatens to sweep bare all the British
islands.1 Sickness, however, soon thins the French crews, and palsies
their efforts.
Not until May 1690 did the long-expected British expedition under
Captain Wright reach Barbados. With his nine vessels and a few
armed merchantmen, he soon set sail for St Christopher, there
effecting a junction with the local forces commanded by Codrington,
Governor of the Leeward Islands. Alike in thought and action
Codrington stands forth as the ablest leader in the West Indies —
witness his despatch of i March 1690: "Had we a fleet to make us
masters of the sea, 2000 soldiers from England would amply suffice
to make us so on land in all the French islands, if Barbados be ordered
to help us, as she is in a position to do A fleet and suitable in-
structions to the Governors would suffice to drive the French out of
America, and I heartily hope this war may see it done".2 Landing
his men secretly in a cove near Basse Terre, the capital of St Christo-
pher, Codrington took the French lines in reverse; then, constructing
a battery on Brimstone Hill, overpowered their chief fort, and with
naval assistance compelled the French and Irish to surrender (July
1690). These were shipped away to French islands; whereupon he
reinstated most of the former British inhabitants. Marie Galante and
St Eustatius were also reduced. Next he urged Jamaica and Barbados
to seize the present opportunity and with united forces drive the
French from all their islands. But the Jamaicans were too scared by
French raids and by a negro rising, and Barbados by fears of one, to
send reinforcements.3 Sickness and lack of provisions hampered the
fleet, which effected nothing of note. After the hurricane months,
Codrington urged an attack on Guadeloupe or Martinique, adding,
"I shall try to pick up a month's subsistence for it [the fleet] even
if we should half starve ourselves".4 Again, after the failure of the
attack on Guadeloupe, he wrote: "All turns on mastery of the sea.
If we have, it, our islands are safe, however thinly peopled; if the
French have it, we cannot, after the recent mortality, raise enough
men in all the islands to hold one of them'9.5
This maxim was applicable to the naval war as a whole. For while
the French controlled the English Channel, the allied fleets could
not prevent them from sending out expeditions at will. The only
effective defence of all the colonies was to beat the enemy's main
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, pp. 27, 49, 65, 73, 79, 85, 95, 1 13.
1 Ibid. pp. 113, 121, 147, 229. 8 Ibid. pp. 291, 303-5, 316.
4 Ibid. pp. 327, 369. 5 Ibid. pp. 536-40.
CHBEI 33
514 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
fleet and then blockade or observe his chief ports-^-an ideal im-
possible of attainment until after the victories of Barfleur and La
Hogue (May 1692). Earlier, the French had sent out to Martinique
a powerful squadron, whose efforts were foiled by the British except
in Jamaica, the north of which was ravaged. The miseries of the
colony were completed at midsummer by a terrible earthquake,
fatal to two-thirds of Port Royal and all the forts. "Till we can fortify59,
came the demand, "we want five men-of-war, four or five hundred
soldiers, arms and ammunition.'51 These ships could not be spared;
for by now the Admiralty was deluged by demands for convoys to
meet the privateering methods which the French had adopted. In
fact, the colonies were for a time sacrificed to commerce protection
and to the generally futile efforts against the French coasts. Hence
also the long delays in the equipment of Sir Francis Wheler's West
India expedition, consisting of seven sail and two frigates, which did
not leave Gowes Road until 9 January 1693, four months too late.
Further difficulties detained Wheler two months at Barbados where
the crews contracted fever. At last, on 30 March, he set sail for
Martinique. After landing troops on that island he received rein-
forcements brought by Codrington and resolved to attack St Pierre.
The delays having enabled the French to strengthen that place, it
defied assailants who were half-paralysed by the fever brought from
Barbados and the disaffection of the Irish troops. Wheler therefore
called a council of war in which he alone advised an assault. Yielding
to* the majority, he re-embarked the troops (20 April). Similar
councils deterred him from attacking Guadeloupe, and, as his in-
structions bade him leave the West Indies in May, he returned to
Barbados after losing 668 men from fever. As Codrington pointed
out, the failure was due, first to his not arriving before the rainy
season, and secondly to his instructions, which required the capture
in one month of two fortified islands which needed four times as long.
Ill fortune dogged Wheler throughout. Arriving off Boston late in
July, he urged Phipps to raise 400 men for an attack on Placentia,
that nest of French privateers in Newfoundland., but Phipps, having
prorogued the Massachusetts Assembly, pleaded inability. Conse-
quently the fleet, still being sickly, was too weak to attack Placentia
and returned to England.2
There the outlook was gloomy. In 1693 t*16 1QSS of most of the
valuable Smyrna convoy and the failure of the attack on Brest
aroused furious protests. In July Liverpool merchants complained
that of thirty-two ships sent to the West Indies in 1693 only four had
returned. The strain told on the finances and therefore on the two
services, Godolphin having to bargain- with the Jews for money for
urgent needs.8 In April 1695 Dublin bemoaned the fall in Irish trade
• "£• £*' ££ ?£??"§*?_?• ^S; a°wcs» w- M- L., The Royal Jfavy, n, 467-9.
n *\ * **i T f* ** X ' * **' — * ' »«w^«*w VIMV^J *», *f«/ y»
. St. Pap. Col. 1693-6, pp. 13, 79, 87, 100-2, 133. * Ibid. pp. 217, 237.
PERILOUS SITUATION OF THE COLONIES 515
and revenue, due to the activities of French privateers.1 Worst sign
of all was the incompetence of the Admiralty, as was seen in the
just grievances of the seamen, and the advancement of "many of
your loose gentry", who are "not bred tarpawlins", and therefore
lose their ships. As to warships they are "over-built, over-gunned,
and over-masted, built too broad aloft and too narrow below",
besides being often foul and therefore slow.2 What wonder, then, that
the Empire suffered? When New England and Jamaica begged for
naval protection, the Admiralty replied (20 August 1694) that, of
the sixty-three warships available, forty-three were by a recent Act
of Parliament told off for the protection of trade. The needs of the
service in the Mediterranean, where William's offensive strategy
sorely hampered French efforts, disposed of nearly all the remaining
twenty.8
A frequent cause of failure in the colonial expeditions being
friction between the two services, the King designed a scale for sharing
the prize money, and on one occasion inculcated the need of concord.
Nevertheless violent discords wrecked the West India expedition of
Commodore Wilmott and Colonel Lillingston. The crews sickened
on the outward voyage, the conjoint operations with our Spanish
allies in Hispaniola against the Port de Paix were marred by con-
stant disputes, and trifling successes there and at Cap Francois, in
the summer of 1695, involved so much loss and hardship that finally
the weakened crews could scarcely work the ships home. Very
apposite was the warning of the Agents for Jamaica that West India
expeditions must arrive in the healthy season, November to March.4
Farther north, the greatest danger arose from the disunion and
apathy of the British colonies, which enabled Frontenac to cow the
Iroquois, capture the border forts, and harry the New England
coasts, with the result that many settlers fled southwards. Even New
York was in grave peril; and in November 1696 the citizens petitioned
the Crown to fortify that "barrier of all the colonies in America3*.
Requests also came to send out a viceroy who would compel union
for defence.5 The French, clogging us in home waters by threats of
invasion, now prepared to capture Boston, and then, if possible, New
York. As a preliminary, they struck at the British settlements in
Newfoundland, in order thence to prey on New England commerce
and ruin English fisheries on the Bank.6 Brouillan with a warship
and eight armed fishing vessels of St Malo laid waste the smaller
English settlements, and, when joined by a daring Canadian seaman,
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1693-6, p. 441.
, 118-20,320; Charnock,vol.n,
chap, xviii.
8 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1693-6, pp. 325-34; Gorbett, chap, xxvii.
* Col. St. Pap. Col. 1696-7, pp. 179-81, 208-10; Burchett, pp. 354-74; Lillingston, L.,
Reflections on Mr Bwrchetfs Memoirs (1704), passim', Clowes, n, 492-4.
6 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1696-7, pp. 189, 212; Burchett, pp. 334, 347, 353.
* Garneau, i, 402-6.
516 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
d'Iberville, with a small force, overwhelmed the brave defenders of
St John's, which surrendered along with the remaining settlements
(December 1696). The passivity of the British warships off the North
American coast at this time is discreditable. But for the vain attempt
of a small squadron on the Acadian coast, no sign of activity is
observable. The London traders with Newfoundland petitioned
Parliament for an expedition in the spring to rescue the surviving
settlers and preserve the British fishing fleet of some 140 vessels, which
bring home 200,000 quintals of fish.1 Similar requests came from
Barnstaple, Bristol, Weymouth, Exeter, Plymouth, Bideford and
Poole, Bristol demanding the annual despatch of ten warships and
the fortification of St John's, Harbour Grace and Ferryland. Exeter
emphasised the training in seamanship furnished by the Bank fishing,
and the need of permanent settlements in Newfoundland to succour
the crews.2 The mishaps overseas strengthened the Tory claims that
William was wasting the strength of England in land campaigns for
establishing a barrier for the Dutch against the French, whereas her
true policy required vigorous concentration on maritime efforts.
The recovery of Newfoundland was delayed by news of de Pointis'
raiding expedition to the West Indies, in pursuit of which Vice-
Admiral Neville was sent off, too late, however, to save Cartagena
from capture and plunder. His arrival in those waters hurried off
de Pointis and checked French privateering, but otherwise achieved
little. On his way back de Pointis touched at Newfoundland, and
should have been worsted by Commodore Norris's expedition, which,
reaching St John's on 7 June, had begun to re-establish the British
settlements. Unluckily, his land officers mistook de Pointis' squadron
for another lately out of Brest and refused to leave St John's, de Pointis
therefore escaped to Brest, while Norris restored the British ports.8
Our severe losses in merchantmen4 caused great discontent both
at home and in the colonies, which were on the brink of ruin. The
mishaps at sea often arose from the disaffection of officers, though
the crews seem to have been thoroughly loyal.5 Nevertheless, the
British Navy, latterly with little help from the Dutch and none from
the Spaniards, had inflicted on that of France losses of warships
mounting 2244 guns, while suffering losses of only 1112 guns;6 and
its net gain during the war had been twenty sail and forty frigates.7
But the widespread colonies and commerce of the allies had suffered
far more severely than those of France. Her main fleets (held in
reserve after 1692) were still strong enough to compel the allies to
retain fleet formation, which told against their efforts to check her
raiding squadrons. In the colonial sphere la guerre de course was highly
* CJ. xi, 681. « Col. St. Pap. Col. 1696-7, pp. 206-309.
* Rnrrfi«*t nn »•,*-». Tif. nf r>-** o a,*--*:- -A u.. o Markham (N.R.S. 1895),
9 Burcnett, pp. 374-7; Life of Copt. S. Martin, cd. by G. Markham (NJR..S. 1895),
PP- 27-33; A/5 of Sir J. Leak (N.R.S. 1920), i, 90-9.
* See Clark, G. N., The Dutch Alhance and the War against French Trade, pp. 123-8, 132-5.
* CJ. xi, 578. « Burchett, pp. 407, 408. 7 Charaock, n, 465.
WILLIAM DAMPIER 517
effective. Further the decline in the efficiency of the French Navy
has probably been exaggerated by Mahan.1 In 1697 it held the
Mediterranean and could probably have disputed the Channel with
the allied fleets, had not Louis XIV's exchequer been exhausted by
multiple efforts far beyond his strength. Peace was, therefore, patched
up by the Treaty of Ryswick (September 1697), which stipulated the
mutual restitution of conquests and the recognition of William III
as King of England. Thus ended a struggle which in 1690 threatened
disruption to the kingdom and the Empire. The skilful strategy of
Torrington after Beachy Head, the indecision of Tourville, and,
above all, the fundamental errors of French policy saved England
and her colonies from dire danger. After La Hogue, abandoning the
defensive, she could by degrees take the offensive, with results which
compensated for defeats in Flanders and several mishaps overseas.
Some secondary results of these struggles now claim attention.
War breeds privateers;2 and they breed buccaneers and pirates.
Amidst the turmoil of war, so-called honest traders, notably slavers
and logwood-cutters, after strokes of ill luck, take up the "profession
of the seas", which undoubtedly has fostered smart sailing and the
daring exploration of risky waters and snug retreats. Of British
sailors who made trial of all these shifts, William Dampier (1652-
1713) stands forth chief. Man-of-war's man, seaman in a West India
ketch, logwood-cutter among the many Englishmen on the Moskito
Coast, buccaneer, pirate and explorer, he ran the whole gamut of
tropical adventure, ranging from Jamaica and Panama to Juan
Fernandez, and east to Sierra Leone, the Philippines, China, New
Holland and Bencoolen. Thanks to good natural gifts, an observant
eye and a ready pen, he contrived, amidst all the piracies and black-
guardism in which he unwillingly took part, to keep a diary recording
his impressions of peoples, lands and facts of natural history. Thus
he figures as a link between the times of Captain Kidd and those of
Captain Cook. On his return he worked up his diary into a Voyage
round the World (1697), the popularity of which induced him to write
a supplement. His feline faculty for survival, and marked gifts of
observation (specially notable in his Discourse of Winds) attracted the
attention of the Admiralty, which accepted his offer of voyaging to
New Holland and thence to New Guinea and the neighbouring
islands in search of spices or other products. His voyage in the Roebuck
(1699-1700) was a failure. The landfall near Shark's Bay in western
Australia was in a forbidding region (the natives are "the miserablest
people in the world"), and his coastwise trip to the district he named
Dampier Land brought equally small hope of gain. Thence, coasting
past Timor and New Guinea, he named New Britain, but found
nothing to assuage the growing discontent of his crew. Finally, his
1 Mahan, The influence of sea power upon history 9 pp. 192-6.
' See Clark, G.N., chap. iii.
5i8 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
battered ship barely reached Ascension on the return; and the venture
did not encourage voyages to Terra Australia incognita.
Men like Dampier kept alive the spirit of adventure and interest
in the Navy, whose late services silenced all opposition to William's
programme of new construction. Consequently, on the resumption
of hostilities with Louis XIV and his Spanish allies, England possessed
some 130 sail ready or completing for sea as against about fifty
French sail,1 so that she was able at once to take the offensive at sea.
Such action alone could meet the need of the crisis, which was not
only European but world-wide. For if Louis XIV, through his
grandson, now styled Philip V of Spain, controlled the policy of
Madrid, he would control also the Mediterranean, wealthy domains
in Italy, and the larger part of the New World. William and his
Austrian, Dutch and German allies regarded the straggle mainly as
one for the preservation of the balance of power in Europe. But it
also involved the ownership of the new lands overseas, by the resources
of which Louis would overwhelm all rivals. Therefore, in supporting
"Charles IIP5, the Habsburg claimant to the Spanish throne, the
allies sought to rescue Antwerp, Ostend, Cadiz, Barcelona and half
of America from the power of France, which else would threaten the
Thames, close the Mediterranean, drain the wealth of America and
bestride the world like a Colossus. Such was the menace which over-
came the scruples of the Tories and enabled William III in his last
months to rebuild the Grand Alliance and embark England in a
continental war. Anne at her accession adopted his policy and rallied
English and Scots around her in sentiments of loyalty, which were
to be clinched by the Act of Union (1707). On the other hand,
Spain, torn by internal strife and with a rotting marine and decadent
army, offered a ready target to the allied efforts; and from the dash
on her galleons in Vigo Bay (i 702)2 to the capture of Gibraltar (i 704)
and of Minorca (1708) the chief blows of the British Navy fell on her.
The prospects of "Charles III59 in Catalonia and the accession of
Portugal and Savoy to the Grand Alliance turned the naval war
largely towards the Mediterranean. Control of its waters, the domi-
nant note of William's naval strategy, now sounded forth clearly in
the despatches of his great pupil, Marlborough.8 And for the first
time the fate of lands far beyond the ocean was to be determined in
that ancient womb of empire.
Now, as always, France struck first at our most valued and vulner-
able point, the West Indies. As has been seen, she was there at her
strongest, we at our weakest. Therefore, long before the outbreak of
war, she despatched under CMteaurenaut to Martinique forces
which early in January 1702 consisted of forty-two warships with
1 Gharnock, m, 8-10, 41.
* Journal qfSir Geo. Rooke, ed. by O. Browning (N.R.S. 1897), pp. 227-35.
8 Corbett, chaps, xxvii, xxviii.
A TYPICAL WEST INDIA EXPEDITION 519
i QOO troops on board. A letter of one of his officers stated that, If
assured of the safety of the Spanish treasure galleons, they would at
once attack our colonies — as usual ill prepared and now panic-
stricken. But the curses of West India warfare soon blighted these
lofty designs. Sickness ravaged the French crews; uncertainty about
the galleons clogged those ships which could move; and finally the
Spanish commander declined French escort. While some hovered
about uncertain, others watched Vice-Admiral Benbow's squadron
protecting Jamaica. He, too, fared ill. Stout "old tarpaulin", while
struggling desperately for four days against a French section, was
thwarted by the cowardice of two captains who were justly con-
demned to death, while on 4 November he himself died at Port Royal
of a wound exacerbated by anger and melancholy.1
Owing to an epidemic his successor, Rear-Admiral Whetstone,
could effect little. The French losses, however, being as heavy, the
major operations petered out. Except at St Christopher where
Codrington from Antigua outwitted the enemy (thereupon expelling
the French settlers) no conjoint expedition succeeded. Nay! his
success was of doubtful value; for the French refugees, resorting to
Martinique, where food was very scarce (salt fish sold at j^d. a lb.),
took up privateering with the zest of Dunkirkers and swept the seas of
unprotected British merchantmen. Hence the diversion of many British
warships to convoying or coast protection. A more vigorous plan was
to aim a blow at Martinique, which then would recall its privateers.2
A typical West India expedition was that designed for Lord Peter-
borough, which devolved finally on Codrington. That experienced
officer hoped the force would arrive in November 1702 and capture
Martinique, "which we might have had for the asking last year".
Its instructions, not drafted until January 1703, pointed vaguely to
the French Windward Isles, then to a rendezvous at Jamaica for
consultation as to a blow, first at the Spanish Main, then at Placentia
and the French Newfoundland fishing fleet, or at Quebec for the
expulsion of the French from Canada. Thus all Codrington's warn-
ings as to seasons and the danger of delay were ignored; and the
sequel ran the natural course. The fleet which Commodore Walker
brought to Barbados in February 1703 lost heavily during his long
stay owing to spirituous hospitality, and was thereafter too weak
for an attempt on Martinique; but, landing in and devastating the
chief places of Guadeloupe, found itself in the heats and rains of May
unable to hold that island, still less to attack the Spaniards. After
causing great discontent in Jamaica by impressing men, Walker sailed
away for Newfoundland, where the French had meanwhile so
strengthened the forts of Placentia as to render an attack imprudent.
Codrington passed the verdict — "Delays cost more men than the
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1702, pp. 47, 71, no, 216-18, 368, 460, 673-9, 744.
» Ibid. pp. 713, 744.
520 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 166(^1763
warmest actions". In truth, the net result was the devastation of
parts of Guadeloupe, whose inhabitants thereupon took to privateer-
ing and reduced tie settlers of our Leeward Isles to such straits that
several fled to Pennsylvania.1
The Spaniards and French gained other privateering centres by
taking and laying waste the Bahamas (1703), whence they preyed
upon West Indian and American commerce. In the spring of 1706
Nevis and St Christopher were raided by d'Iberville, until an English
squadron drove him off. Thereupon Codrington's successor, Parke,
urged the Government to capture the source of all evil, Martinique,
adding derisively — "Send me over 10,000 Scotch, with oatmeal
enough to keep them for three or four months". With them he will
do much (or see them knocked on the head) : he will take and settle
Porto Rico — "a better settlement than their beloved Darien". He
received the equally tart rebuke that after the Act of Union all
Britons were to enjoy equal privileges.2 Though in 1707-8 some
twenty-four British warships cruised in those waters, yet privateering
devastated commerce. In January 1708 a Jamaican reports: "Trade
in general seems at a stand and nothing on foot but privateering",
which tempted away so many seamen that the warships had to fill
up from the troops or stay rotting in port. He foretells that the war
will "leave to the world a brood of pirates to infest it". Commodore
Wager might take or destroy near Cartagena Spanish galleons worth
£15,000,000, and buccaneers might bring in much spoil to King-
ston; but it is clear that the war impoverished all the West Indies.3
Meanwhile, the fate of the colonies was being decided largely in
the Mediterranean. To that sea Louis had despatched his main force
in the hope that so far from home the British and Dutch would be
at a serious disadvantage. He erred; for that same consideration led
them to conquer Gibraltar and Minorca. Their diffuse operations
on the coasts of Spain having induced her to parcel out her feeble
army, Admirals Rooke and Vanderdussen struck at Gibraltar with
incisive effect. That fortress was being repaired by the Spaniards,4
and was not so weak as has often been stated; but the garrison did
not exceed 500 men, four-fifths of them militia. The place, therefore,
invited attack by a great combined fleet; and, when cut off from main-
land succours by a landing party at the isthmus and overpowered
in front by the ships' broadsides and boats' crews, the small garrison
surrendered. At the cost of 60 killed and 216 wounded, the dream of
Cromwell and the design of William were thus fulfilled (22 July
1704). To keep the key of the Mediterranean was another matter;
for Louis XIV and Philip V, realising their mistake, now strove hard
for its recapture. Louis hurried off the Comte de Toulouse with the
• S^; ^tm p&* Colt 17°a"3» PP.- ?9» JI7> 127, 132, 150, 213, 439-50, 571, 750, 817.
J Ibid. 1706-8, pp. 358, 420; ibid. 1708-9, pp. 191, 432.
• Rid. pp. 40, 191, 202, 270, 320, 402.
4 Letters published in The Times of 17 Feb. 1926, by Morshead, O. F.
GIBRALTAR AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE 521
Toulon fleet of fifty sail, which off Malaga fought an even fight with
the allies9 fifty-three (13 August). The Count, for all his boasts of
victory, admitted a strategic reverse by retiring to Toulon, thereby
leaving the allies free to strengthen their hold on Gibraltar. Rooke's
battered fleet having to retire to Lisbon or Portsmouth for repairs,
the French and Spaniards again assailed the place, only to be
worsted by the prompt approach of Admiral Leake's succouring
squadron from Lisbon (29 October). Again, in 1705, his support
from Lisbon as base enabled our little garrison to hold at bay and
wear down ten times their number of assailants.1
In fact imperial expansion was to be based on the Rock of Gib-
raltar. No place in die world offered greater strategic and tactical
advantages. First, as a base to a British fleet, it enabled us to sever
the French and Spanish Mediterranean forces from those in the
Atlantic. After 1704, Toulon and Cartagena were, in a strategic
sense, wasted enterprises; for the enemy's favourite gambit against
England or her colonies from one or both of those ports was now
countered at the start; and his endeavour to doff the Gibraltar in-
cubus generally led to a battle with part of his Navy, which favoured
the British war plan. Further, our frigates based on Gibraltar nearly
always sighted and tracked a squadron working out to the open, and
thus ended the uncertainty which had often paralysed naval opera-
tions. The tactical advantages of Gibraltar were also great. A small
garrison there, supported by but few warships, could repel the attacks
of a considerable army — a state of things exasperating to the enemy,
who must attack that post in order to assure naval reunion, yet lost
heavily in so doing, because a small force afloat or ashore at Gibraltar
was a match for a far greater force of assailants. Therefore British
colonies had comparative rest because the French and Spanish forces
needed for conquest in the New World were hurled in vain at the Rock.
These effects were gradual and cumulative. At first Gibraltar was
ill fortified and had so few docking facilities that our Mediterranean
fleet perforce returned home for the winter. The need of a more
spacious base farther east becoming urgent, Minorca was captured
in September 1708; and its land-locked harbour of Port Mahon
proved to be a far better base for the observation of Toulon.2 Thence-
forth the British fleet, operating on the Gibraltar-Minorca base line,
acted as a central force, linking up the allies' moves on and near the
coasts of Italy and Spain, while France found the flank and rear of her
armies insecure andfeltthe throbofherLevantinecommercedieaway.3
Meanwhile, as the prospects of "Charles III" brightened, the
allies began to trade with the Spanish colonies in his name, with
results favourable to commerce as far as New York.4 There and in
1 Torruigton Memoirs., pp. 138-45; Life qfSirJ. Ltake, by Leake, S. M. (ed. Calender, G.
for N.R.S.), vol. i, chap, iv; Corbett, chap. xxxi. * Leake, i. 267-9.
» Colomb, P. H., Naval Warfare, p. 367; Callender, G., Naoal Side of British History,
chap. x. * Col. St. Pap. Col. 1704-5. PP- 24, 44> 49. 69, 140.
522 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
New England the new treaty of alliance with the Iroquois secured the
frontier except in New Hampshire and Maine, now reduced to misery
by border outrages. The coast and the fisheries suffering almost as
much from the raids of Quebec, Placentia and Port Royal privateers
(the last "is become another Dunkirk"), Governor Dudley of Mas-
sachusetts besought Great Britain for 3000 troops and adequate
shipping to strike at the root of the evil.1
Equally insistent was a Bostonian, Captain Vetch, who, in July
1708, presented to Mr Secretary Boyle a memorial, "Canada Sur-
veyed59, describing the hardship's of die Plantations, which spent
£97,000 a year on defence, yet lost much of their shipping. For the
half of one year's losses, they could conquer Nova Scotia and Canada
— the only way of ending their ills. England should supply eight war-
ships and two battalions of regulars, the colonists furnishing 1000
militia and transports for the blow at Quebec, also 1500 militia and
Iroquois for that at Montreal. The New England attempts on Canada
in 1707 had failed "only through want of officers and conduct".
After the conquest the Indians will soon be loyal subjects "when
they have no priests to poison them"; and Canada, with a climate
far better than Darien, will become "a noble colony, exactly cal-
culated for the constitutions and genius of the most northern of
North Britons".2
The French reinforced his arguments by raiding St John's at
Christmas 1708; but, apart from sending a small force to recover it,
the Whig ministers sent little or no help. Their preoccupation in con-
tinental campaigns caused increasing annoyance, not only in the
colonies but at home. Swift bidding them remember that for the
Maritime Powers the true way to get at Spain was, not through
Flanders, but the West Indies8. Other reasons for neglect of the
colonies were bad naval administration and the failure of the Dutch
to supply the stipulated naval quotas, the deficiencies in 1708-10
amounting to eighteen, thirty-one and twenty-four sail of the line
respectively. An undue strain was, therefore, thrown upon the British
Navy, many of our ships having to remain "in remote seas and at
unseasonable times, to the great damage and decay of the British
Navy".4 For these reasons, apparently, only three British warships
with a regiment on board and several vessels with local levies sailed
from Boston. They easily captured Port Royal, now renamed Anna-
polis Royal (September 1710); but, as the hold on Acadia was
precarious while Canada remained French, requests were sent to
London for an expedition to expel the enemy. Late in 1 7 1 o the Tories,
recently come to power, prepared an expeditionary force of some
5000 troops in fifteen warships and forty-six transports, under the
» Col. St. Pop. Col. 1706-$, pp. 31, 260, 438, 587-915
\ tort. pp. 41-51.
* See infra, chapter xx.
4 C.J. 1711, pp. 49, 120, which correct Mahan, pp. 6i-«.
THE PEACE OF UTRECHT
command of Rear-Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker and General Hill.
Picking up 2000 New Englanders under Vetch at Boston in July 1711,
the force proceeded up the St Lawrence, where Walker and his pilots
during gales and mist neglected the most rudimentary precautions,
and ran eight transports on the reefs of Egg Island, some thirty miles
out of the course. Hill and he then resolved to return home, without
attacking the petty forts of Placentia.1 This disgraceful failure scarcely
affected the main issue, which was determined in Europe. Already,
in 1709, the first overtures for peace came from exhausted France.2
They elicited from colonial circles various petitions, e.g. from Jamaica
merchants for the removal of the French settlements from Hispaniola,
"a sad and grievous thorn in our side59; a general demand for the
annexation of St Lucia, Dominica and Tobago, to which we had
good claim, and the retention of the whole of St Christopher; also
for the expulsion of the French from Newfoundland and Hudson
Bay. Massachusetts urged the retention of Nova Scotia, whose priva-
teers had ruined New England trade and fisheries.3
Though the French and Spanish Navies had been reduced to
impotence, yet the losses of British merchants contributed to the war
weariness and partisan intrigues which led to the Peace of Utrecht
(1713). France had to cede Nova Scotia ("the key of all the eastern
colonies"4) and her settlements in Newfoundland, Hudson Bay and
St Christopher. But the Tory ministry made no effort either to
secure the cession of Cape Breton Island or to delimit the southern
and eastern limits of Canada. Both omissions soon bred constant
strifes. From distracted Spain ministers extorted only Gibraltar and
Minorca (already in our hands), and they abandoned the cause of
"Charles III" and the Catalans, besides leaving Spain to Philip V,
that is, to the French connection. Discontent with this compromise
was general; it appears in the protest of North American merchants
against leaving to France Cape Breton Island, a certain menace to
Nova Scotia and British shipping. The criticism was soon to be
justified; for from its port, Louisbourg, as base, France pressed for-
ward her schemes for the conquest of North America. Yet at Utrecht
trade interests had been protected, especially in the Asiento clause
of the treaty.5
Such was the profitable but inglorious ending to a war waged at
sea neither with foresight nor efficiency. Marlborough it was who
prompted the nearly successful conjoint expedition against Toulon
in 1 707° and the capture of Minorca in 1708. In naval strategy and
tactics the war was singularly barren: but the plodding ways of
British seamen, the exhaustion of France and the inevitable pre-
Morgan, W. T., Art. in Trans. R. Hist. Soc. 1027.
Torcy, Journal de 1709-11 (ed. Masson), pp. 86-168.
Col. St. Pap. Col. 170&-9, pp. 304-39-
Corresp. of William Shirliy fed. Lincoln, G. H.), n, 149.
Col. St. Pap. Col. 1711-12, p. 256.
524 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
occupation of the Dutch in land defence, now yielded to the islanders
undisputed maritime and therefore commercial supremacy. Further,
a struggle originating in the maintenance of the balance of power in
Europe became in its course markedly colonial, and determined largely
the future of the British nation. Canada was now outflanked by our
new acquisitions, Nova Scotia and Hudson Bay; in Europe our trade
communications with the Levant were safeguarded, and in Africa
the hunt for slaves received a portentous stimulus. Above all, the
Empire was strengthened strategically by naval bases in the Medi-
terranean, the first of those far-spread links which knit together the
whole. Accordingly, commerce now leaped ahead, the shipping of
London being double that of Amsterdam by I73Q.1 Colonies,
wilting in nearly a quarter of a century of semi-piratical strife, now
filled out rapidly in the almost unbroken time of peace (1713-39);
and wealth rapidly increased in Georgian England, prompting the will
to break through the irksome restraints of Spain on West India
trade.
Walpole, the champion of our mercantilist and colonial policy,
winked at the illicit trade in the Caribbean but sought to keep at
peace with Spain until the clamour of mercantile circles compelled
him reluctantly to declare war (October 1739). The First Lord,
Admiral Sir Charles Wager, stated in the House of Commons that
England was ill prepared for it. That was true. Naval construction
lagged behind that of France and Spain both in quality and quantity,
and the feeble attempts to fortify some of the West Indies left them
in a weak, naked and miserable condition.2 Therefore, apart from
Vernon's brilliant dash at Portobello and Anson's semi-predatory
voyage in the Pacific, the British Navy cut a poor figure until Anson's
influence at the Admiralty in and after 1745 gradually worked a
salutary change. It was high time; for in March 1744 (a month after
the indecisive battle off Toulon), France exchanged her guileful
neutrality for open war; she had already pledged herself secretly to
Spain by the second Family Compact to win back for her Gibraltar
and Minorca, and blot out the new English colony of Georgia, Spain
transferring to the French the Asiento and other trading privileges.
Thus the trade war with Spain was linked with a complicated
European war, which overtaxed the activities of mid-Georgian
England and the finances of Pompadour-ridden France. In 1745 the
throne of George II shook under the defeats inflicted by the Mar6chal
de Saxe in the Netherlands and by Prince Charles in Scotland. Yet
even in that dark year, when our hold on the Mediterranean and both
the Indies was weakened, a well-concerted effort wrested from the
French their chief stronghold and naval base in North America. On
1 Anderson, Origins of Commerce, in, 224.
8 Temperley, H. W. V., arts, in Trans. JR. Hist. Soc. Ser. m, vol. m, and in Annual Report
of the American Hist. Assoc. for 191 1 ; Hertz, G. B., Brit. Imperialism in iBth century, pp. 1-59:
Parl. Hist, x, 720, xr, 223-33.
THE FIRST CAPTURE OF LOUISBOURG 525
Louisbourg the French had spent about £1,000,000; that fortress
guarded the St Lawrence, dominated the fisheries of the Bank and
the trade route to New England, besides threatening Nova Scotia,
where the British barely held Annapolis against French and Indian
raids. The plan of capturing Louisbourg was suggested early in 1743
by Commodore Sir Peter Warren,1 and later by William Shirley, an
English lawyer who had come to the front at Boston. Now Governor
of Massachusetts, he urged the Duke of Newcastle to send naval
support for a New England attack on Louisbourg, the capture of
which would entail "the destruction of Canada".2 With praise-
worthy energy he succeeded in inducing the New England Assemblies
to raise some 4000 troops who were led by Lieut-General Pepperell ; but
he failed to stir New York and other colonies to action. Meanwhile
Warren, commanding the Leeward Islands squadron, received from
home discretionary powers to proceed with all available ships to
Nova Scotia, and despite local protests he did so with four sail,
meeting later two sent from England, the most that could be spared
at that crisis. Before joining the New England force off Canso in
Nova Scotia, he heard of the arrival of a strong French squadron in
the West Indies, but resolved to settle with Louisbourg first. That
place was sealed up by thirteen New England privateers until the
whole force appeared and covered the landing in a cove two miles
to the south-west. The garrison being small, ill-provisioned and half
mutinous, surrender was certain unless succours came. Ten French
storeships and, finally, a sail of the line with powerful succours were
taken by Warren's ships. The land attacks made little impression,
but on the threat of forcing the harbour, the governor surrendered
(16 June)3. A large French squadron, sent to recover the place in
1746, was shattered by storm and decimated by plague.4 The French
squadron sent out to the West Indies did comparatively little harm.5
Meanwhile a rupture had occurred between the British and French
East India Companies. Rivals in trade, they for financial reasons
abstained from hostilities until after the arrival of decisive news from
Europe. Already competition for a good naval base en route had pro-
duced acute tension. As a retort to the British base at Bombay, La
Bourdonnais, an enterprising adventurer of St Malo,Ahad worked
hard to fortify and construct a dock at Port Louis in lie de France
(now Mauritius), which became a centre of French power and com-
merce. After a visit to France in 1741 he returned with sealed orders
in case of war. In 1742 Dupleix, formerly Governor of Chander-
nagore on the Hooghly, became Governor of Pondicherry and of
other French settlements in India. Cherishing designs of supremacy,
1 Richmond, H. W., The Navy in the War ^1739-48, n, 202.
* Corresp. of Shirley, i, 161-77. _ ^
8 /Wrf. i, 2 15-79; Richmond, n, 200-16; Wood, W., The Great Fortress, pp. i-€6; Beatson,
R., Naval and Mil. Memoirs (1790), i, 260-6.
* Troude, Batailles naoales de la France, i, 310. 6 Richmond, vol. n, chap. x.
528 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
remained neutral; so did Spain until January 1762. Thus, England
had to cover Hanover and the west front of Prussia — a task less
arduous than that of protecting Belgian, Dutch and Italian lands in
1744-8. As France and her allies met their match in Frederick the
Great and Ferdinand of Brunswick, Pitt, on coming into power in
June 1757, was able to throw his chief weight into maritime and
colonial enterprises. Moreover, France was burdened by the expense
of distant campaigns in Germany, where successes were Pyrrhic and
defeats catastrophic. As the vices of the Pompadour regime had de-
pleted her exchequer, she could ill support vast military and naval
efforts, and, as usual, her Navy suffered first.1
Across the Channel the Anson regime made for efficiency, as was
seen in the launch of that paragon of ships, the Royal George (100),
and the general improvement in construction. In 1756 the Navy
List comprised 142 sail of the line, if fifty-gun ships be included,
as against eighty-two French. But, the crews being raw or scanty,
the first two campaigns lagged, Pitt's scheme of a dash at Rochefort
failed owing to the reluctance of General Mordaunt to land
troops betimes (September 1757); and subsequent coastal opera-
tions against St Malo, Cherbourg and St Cast probably had little
effect in holding French regulars to the coasts. Sailors and soldiers
alike detested these raids, the importance of which the French soon
discounted.2
The loss of Minorca has sometimes been declared beneficial be-
cause the war was to be mainly a colonial war;3 but, by increasing
the difficulty of checking the Toulon fleet, it enabled that force to
initiate operations in the ocean. An example was seen in the escape
of a Toulon squadron to the West Indies early in 1757, where it beat
Townshend's inferior force, thereafter harrying British commerce.
Finally it proceeded to Louisbourg, and there reinforced the French
concentration fatal to our attempt against that place in August 1757.
By this time Pitt and Anson were in office (with Hardwicke as sage
counsellor) ;4 but much leeway had to be made good; and up to the
spring of 1758 British war efforts presented a dismal record every-
where except in India.
There, as has appeared, British successes in home waters had
assured the recovery of Madras; and peace was restored by the com-
promise of 1754 between the two Companies. But the flame kindled
in Canada, passing into Europe, now spread a conflagration in
southern India. In 1756-7 it flared up in Bengal. The preparations
for the defence of Fort William (Calcutta) against an expected French
fleet infuriated Siraj-ud-daula, Nawab of that province, who,
1 Waddington, R., La Guerre ds Sept Ans9 iv, 392.
1 Chatham MSS (P.R.O.), no. 85, printed in EJI.R. Oct. 1913; Gorbett, J., England in
the Seven Tears* War, vol. i, chaps, viii-xii.
8 Ibid. I, 135. * Yorke, chap. xxv.
THE NAVY IN THE EAST INDIES 529
swearing to expel the British, easily captured that place. Thus the
war spread quickly from the Coromandel coast, whose harbourless
expanse swept by the north-east autumnal monsoon hindered fleet
action, to the vast and fertile delta of the Ganges, favourable to the
exercise of sea power. Fortunately at Madras were two leaders equal
to the emergency. Admiral Watson, with four sail of the line and
three smaller craft, was under orders to go home; but on receipt of
the black news, he decided to disobey orders and remain. Nay, more,
at the request of the Madras council, he finally resolved to venture
with his warships and transports into the Hooghly, conveying all the
Madras troops under Glive for the recovery of Calcutta.1
Under the imminent menace of the arrival of a French fleet, and
braving the blasts of the autumnal monsoon, the little force beat up
deviously towards the Hooghly. There it rescued the survivors from
Calcutta, and at Christmas 1 756 neared the Nawab's forts. The ships'
broadsides, aiding decisively the moves of Clive's troops on land,
made short work of these defences and finally recaptured Fort
William, our losses there being negligible. Far more serious was the
next operation, against Chandernagore, the French stronghold up-
stream, which mounted some sixty guns. The defenders having partly
blocked the river, the flagship Kent (70) was badly raked by the guns
of the citadel; but the Tiger (60), almost alone, overpowered the
defence, and the place surrendered (23 March 1757). Clive now had
a sure base in case of hostilities with the Nawab, which soon re-
opened. For operations higher up the river the ships could not be
used; but their armed boats supported his northward march, and
enabled him to cross the river at Plassey and there win his dramatic
triumph, thereafter covering the flank of the pursuers as far as Patna
(26 July).2 This conquest of Bengal offers the first example of a
systematic and brilliantly successful co-operation of fleet (or flotilla)
with army. It foreshadowed that in the St Lawrence.
Unlike the later effort of Saunders and Wolfe, the Ganges campaign
was carried out under the threat of the advent of a great French fleet,
which, after capturing defenceless Madras, should have bottled up
Watson's fleet in the Hooghly. These chances the French lost by nine
months. Sailing finally in April 1757 (still the time of lax control by
Pitt's predecessors) the French fleet, after further delays, did not ap-
proach Pondicherry until 28 April 1758. Pocock, Watson's successor,
awaited them near that port, for all was quiet in Bengal. With a
slightly inferior force he beat them off, but could not prevent their
commodore, Comted'Ache, landing his troops. These, under General
Lally, won success after success, and threatened to overrun the
Carnatic. Lally's hopes of triumph were, however, dashed by the
1 Forrest. Sir G. W., Uft of Clive, i, 269-78.
2 Ibid. vol. i, chaps, xvii-xix, vol. n, chap, i; Rose, J. H., The Indecisiveness of Modern War
and other Essays (Essay 5).
CHBEI 34
530 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
retreat of Ache, who, after another indecisive action with Pocock,
retired to tie de France for repairs. During his absence (prolonged
to a year by the lack of the usual food supplies from the Hooghly) two
mishaps befell the French in India. Lally's close leaguer of Madras
was broken by the arrival of Captain Kempenfelt's light squadron
with reinforcements and stores (16 February 1758); and French
control of the Circars district was overthrown by Olive's opportune
despatch from Bengal of a force under Colonel Forde, which, landing
on that coast, took the enemy by surprise, and finally, with naval
help, captured Masulipatam (8 April 1759). British control was thus
extended over a fertile coastal district which had nourished Pondi-
cherry.1 Ache's reappearance off that port was brief. On 10 Septem-
ber 1759 with eleven ships he failed to beat Pocock's nine, and,
distressed by his damages, again made for lie de France, not to
return. Consequently under Eyre Coote the British troops gradually
gained the upper hand, the campaign ending early in 1761 by close
naval and military co-operation that ensured the capture of Pondi-
cherry.2 Events thus justified Olive's forecast of 7 January 1759 that
our naval supremacy, if rightly used, must lead to supremacy in
India.8
Meanwhile the vigour of Pitt and Anson had retrieved the situation
in Europe and America. By degrees the covering operations in home
waters (the key to the whole overseas problem) were more efficiently
conducted. In February 1758 Vice- Admiral Osborn with an
efficient fleet, based on Gibraltar, thwarted the efforts of La Clue
and the Toulon force to pass out to Louisbourg. Another blow,
struck by Hawke in April 1758 at the Rochefort convoy, for the same
destination, virtually sealed the doom of the fortress. At the end of
1757, Pitt prepared a triple attack on Canada. The chief force was
to sail early in 1758 against Louisbourg and thence against Quebec,
the French being distracted by attacks on Montreal and their western
forts. The thirteen colonies were urged to do their utmost, England
supplying pay, arms and artillery. In May Boscawen mustered at
Halifax twenty-three sail, eighteen frigates or sloops and 150 trans-
ports, with 1 1, 600 regulars under General Amherst and about 3000
colonial levies. Several French warships having gone to protect
Quebec, there lay at Louisbourg only six sail, seven frigates and about
3000 regulars, with as many seamen and irregulars.4 The landing of
the British through high surf in Gabarus Bay on 8 June was deemed
by Colonel James Wolfe "a rash and ill-advised attempt"; but,
owing to the passivity of the French main force, it succeeded. With
™ ]ferrest'n» 7g-84» 104-116; Cambridge, R. O., War in India (1750-61), 1762, pp. 256,
268-86; Beatson, n, 118-26.
, . , . ., , Corbett, vol. i,
chaps, xv, xvi, vol. n, chap. vii.
CHOISEUL'S PLAN OF INVASION 531
Boscawen's close blockade the siege could have but one result; and
a dashing boat attack by night on the French warships in the harbour
brought about the surrender on 26 July, though too late for the pro-
jected attack on Quebec, lie St Jean (renamed Prince Edward Island)
was also reduced. Pitt soon decided to dismantle Louisbourg and
partly block the harbour-mouth so that thenceforth Halifax became
the sole naval base in those waters.1
A new phase of the war opened at the end of 1758, with the advent
to power at Versailles of a statesman rivalling Pitt in foresight and
firmness. Like him the Due de Choiseul resolved to snatch victory
from defeat. "The war is not lost", he burst out, "nothing is lost
but your heads."2 He now resolved to concentrate on the maritime
and American war much of the strength which France had devoted
to the German campaigns. Instead of throttling Frederick, he would
invade England, recover Louisbourg and save Canada. To this end
Prince Charles would land in the Firth of Clyde with 20,000 French-
men, and at Edinburgh meet 10,000 Swedes (perhaps also 10,000
Russians) landed at Leith. A league of the neutrals was further to
fluster the islanders and compel them to centripetal moves fatal to
their world projects. On the surface the scheme looked well; for the
chief neutrals, especially Spain and Sweden, chafed at the new
"Rule of 1756"* and at high-handed seizures of ships by British
privateers.4 A general maritime league against England seeming
imminent, Pitt acted cautiously, as was indeed necessary; for not
until the conquest of Canada could the Navy dispense with the naval
stores coining mainly from the Baltic.5 Therefore, at his instance,
Parliament forbade harsh and unjust action by the privateers (June
1 759)> but maintained the rule as fair and just. Above all Anson,
Hardwicke and he knew that Choiseul's terrorising mechanism could
not move so long as Hawke and Boscawen countered the Brest and
Toulon fleets, thereby nullifying the vast apparatus of French trans-
ports and troops at Quiberon, the flotilla at Havre, Jacobite schemes,
and Swedish and Russian invading armies. Anson and his compeers
had not lived through the years 1745 and 1746 for naught. They saw
through the landsman's bluff, and their experience now added to
the sound body of naval doctrine which was to save England and her
Empire in 1805 and 1914-16.
When, on 4 June 1759, Pitt assured the British ambassador at
Madrid that the French plans would make no difference to His
Majesty's conduct of the war,6 a great fleet, convoying some 8500
troops under General Wolfe, was nearing the St Lawrence. Vice-
8 Vide^
iforke,n, 312— 14; Je
Conduct of (ft. Britain to Neutral Nations (1758).
5 Albion, R. G., Forests and Sea Power, chaps, iv, vi.
• P.O., Spain, 160, Pitt to Earl of Bristol, 4 June 1759.
34-2
532 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
Admiral Saunders, skilfully threading the dreaded Traverse, anchored
off lie d'Orleans, below Quebec, and on 27 June began to land the
troops. His twenty-two sail of line, five frigates and sixteen sloops
at once dominated the lower river; but Montcalm mustered at
Quebec and on the Beauport cliffs some 4000 regulars, 11,000
Canadian militia, and seamen from the French light craft withdrawn
far upstream. Besides, owing to an inadequate watch kept on the
estuary he had received stores from France. Wolfe's task therefore
seemed impossible. His chief hope was that Amherst, who with the
main force had gone to Lake George to repair the disaster at
Ticonderoga in July 1758, would now drive the French down the
Richelieu River and threaten Montreal. Amherst, however, could not
keep troth until a year later. There remained the fleet and flotilla,
which, operating on a great tidal river, could endow Wolfe's scanty
numbers with mobility and power of sudden attack.
Yet only by degrees were these advantages utilised to the full. In
order to safeguard the ships when lying in the best berth, Quebec
Basin, troops were landed on the south shore and soon occupied and
fortified Pointe Levis, opposite Quebec. Under cover of the new
batteries light craft began on 18 July to pass above Quebec and
harass Montcalm's communications.1 Nevertheless on the 3ist Wolfe
attacked the French left flank resting on the Montmorency River,
where the ships could not help him effectively, and suffered a sharp
reverse. Thereafter he fell ill and was discouraged at hearing from
the upstream flotilla no news of Amherst. Still, that flotilla, under
Rear- Admiral Holmes, was at work, thinning out, luring to and fro,
and wearying the French forces, so that Wolfe's three brigadiers
finally brought him to the resolve (previously considered and re-
jected) to transport the troops and attack the city from above. This
he did early in September, and, modifying their plan of a landing
above Cap Rouge, he prepared to land before dawn of 13 September
at a cove only two miles above Quebec.2 Holmes skilfiilly carried
out this operation, which he termed "the most hazardous and
difficult I was ever engaged in".8 The troops, 4800 strong, began to
ascend the gulley, surprised the guard, and formed on die Heights
of Abraham before Bougainville with a watching force of 2100 men
upstream knew what was happening; and his men and his horses
were too wearied by marching to menace the British rear (or perhaps
were lured away by Holmes's boats running up with the tide).4
Below the city the fleet paralysed the defence; for, early on the 1361,
Saunders with the heavy ships began to threaten a landing in force
below Quebec, thereby holding back at Beauport French troops that
should have turned the scales of war on the Heights. Wolfe, at the
1 Kimball, n, 150-2; Wood, W., Logs of the Conquest of Canada, pp. 238-40.
2 Kimball, n, 151, 157; Doughty, A., Siege of Quebec, vol. n, chaps, xii, i; Mahon, Life of
General Murray, pp. 140-60; Waddington, m, 310-33.
5 Wood, W., Logs, p. 158. * Doughty, in, 96, 107.
BRITISH NAVAL SUCCESSES IN 1759-60 533
hour of death, gained a glorious success, soon to be followed by the
surrender of the city. Essentially, the triumph was due to the loyal
co-operation of Navy and Army. Indeed military historians admit
that the "credit for the fall of Quebec belongs rather to the Navy
than to the Army",1 and "the strategic issue of the entire campaign,
and of the battle itself, depended on the Navy".2
Successes overseas availed little unless clinched by triumph in
Europe. This was assured in 1759 by the victories of Minden
(i August), Lagos (19 August) and Quiberon (20 November). The two
last were the only tangible results of ChoiseuFs invasion schemes;
for he ordered out the Toulon fleet to start them and the Brest fleet
to complete them. Boscawen, completing his refit at Gibraltar, was
warned by his outlook frigate of the approach of twelve French sail
from the east. Hurrying out, he caught them next day scattered, and
in a running fight to Lagos captured three sail and drove two ashore.
The rest, after sheltering in Cadiz, finally crept back to Toulon.
Undaunted, Choiseul ordered out the Brest fleet. "Sweden is
waiting for us", he wrote, "I fear she will not wait long." With a
foreboding of disaster, Admiral Conflans put out while Hawke was
driven off by a gale; but the latter, flying back from Torbay, sighted
the enemy off Quiberon; and a wild chase into the bay ended at
nightfall in the destruction or disabling of half the French fleet
(20 November).8
Such was the news which greeted the new Spanish monarch,
Charles III, after his arrival from Naples at Madrid. On hearing
of the fall of Quebec, he had felt gloomy forebodings, and resolved
to offer his mediation for re-establishing the balance of power in
North America, Quiberon shattered that resolve and strengthened
Pitt's resolve to reject any such mediation. Charles, accepting the
rebuff, pressed on naval construction.4 Pitt and Anson met his
efforts by redoubled efforts. Thus in and after 1760 British fleets
surveyed not only Brest and Toulon, but also Rochefort, thereby
starving all French attempts to relieve Canada, the Carnatic and the
West Indies.6 The results were successively the loss of Montreal,
Pondicherry, Dominica, Martinique and St Lucia.
After the fall of Montcalm, most of his troops fled from Quebec
towards Three Rivers near which were three French frigates well
guarded. With these and transports General de Levis in April 1760
sailed downstream, and, in the absence of a covering fleet, defeated
General Murray's depleted British garrison. Quebec would probably
have fallen but for the opportune arrival of British warships from
Halifax (9-15 May). These soon disposed of the three frigates, where-
1 Fortescue, J. W., Hist, of the British Army, n, 387.
8 Wood, W,, Fight for Canada, p. 263.
3 Gorbett, voUn, chap, i; Callender, pp. 164-5; Beatson, n, 400-22.
4 F.O., Spain, 160, 161, Bristol to Pitt, 10 Dec. 1759, Jan.-Feb. 1760; Bourguet,
Choiseul et I9 Alliance espagnole, pp. 64-94. 5 Grenville Papers, i, 349.
534 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
upon Murray with reinforcements proceeded up the river, compelling
L6vis "to abandon all the [military] frontiers", and fall back on
Montreal. On that island converged also the main force of Amherst
from the south-west and Havilland's column from the south. The
British flotilla facilitated landings of this overwhelming force to which
Governor Vaudreuil and about 2400 regulars at once surrendered,
thus ending French rule in Canada (8 September 1760). 1
Despite the accession of the more pacific George III (October
1760), Pitt now resumed his former plan of reducing the French
West Indies as the readiest means of forcing on a satisfactory peace.
Guadeloupe having fallen in 1759, he now ordered the victors of
Canada to take ship at New York and attack the "neutral9' isles of
Dominica and St Lucia, and thereafter Martinique.2 Admiral Sir
James Douglas and Lord Rollo easily succeeded in capturing the
two first. The reduction of Martinique was postponed owing to the
diversion of large forces against Belleisle. The two expeditions were
connected; for Pitt had resolved that at the ensuing peace negotiations
Martinique or Belleisle (preferably the latter) should serve as a
pledge for recovering Minorca. After a stubborn defence Belleisle
fell to Captain KeppePs squadron and a landing force in June 1761,
an event highly injurious to the commerce and the pride of France.8
Still, Choiseul struggled on, breaking off peace negotiations in
September 1761 because Pitt demanded St Lucia and the exclusion
of the French from the Newfoundland fishery.4 Choiseul (equally
intent on naval interests) now hoped by the (third) Family Compact
with Spain to bring in that Power and distract British efforts by a
Franco-Spanish attack on our ally, Portugal, while, at the worst,
"the losses of Spain might lighten those which France might incur".5
Pitt, suspecting some such design, urged open war with Spain; but
George III replaced him by Bute, who, however, carried on the naval
part of Pitt's war policy, especially against Martinique. Accordingly,
Rear-Admiral Rodney's squadron sailed in October to reinforce that
of Sir James Douglas. The combined British forces overpowered the
French posts in succession and on 10 February 1762 captured Fort
Royal. The fall of St Lucia and Grenada soon followed. These
successes resulted from the naval triumphs of 1759, which enabled
our squadrons in 1760-61 to seal up the French Biscay ports and
prevent succours sailing even from Rochefort or La Rochelle to the
West or East Indies.6
By the year 1762 the British Navy could easily cope with those of
1 Capt. Knox's Journal, ed. Doughty, n, 484-6; Kimball, n, 305-41 ; Wood, W., The Fight
for Canada, chap, x; Wrong, E. M., The Fall of Canada, pp. 165-79, 206-25.
Kimball, n, 384, 408, 425, 454, 458.
F.O., Spain, 163, Bristol to Pitt, 29 June 1761.
F.O., France, 252, Pitt to Stanley, 26 June, 25 July, 27 Aug., 15 Sept., 1761; Stanley
to Pitt, 4, 6, 18, 26 Aug., A, 19 Sept. 1761 ; Bussy to Pitt, 10 Aug. 1761
87; Renaut, F.,
M&ns. de ChoiseuL, p. 387; Renaut, F., Pacte de Farmtte et I'Amerique, chap. i.
Grenville Papers, I, 349.
INCREASE OF BRITISH COMMERCE 535
France and Spain combined; and when the rupture occurred the
latter fared ill, the reduction of Havana and Manila in that summer
being the heaviest blows yet dealt her in the New World. Even
Charles III felt the need of an accommodation, in accord with the
Spanish proverb— " War with all the world, but peace with England ".
A last effort of Choiseul to seize Newfoundland met with only a
passing success, the captors of St John's soon being captured by a
squadron under Lord Colville (September 1762). The need for peace
in France became imperative. It led to the Peace of Paris.
On the contrary England's naval supremacy enabled her com-
merce to increase rapidly during this war, especially with the North
American Colonies. Her exports thither in 1744-48 had risen from
£640,000 to £830,000; but in 1754-58 they rose from £1,246,000
to £1^832,000. Those to the West Indies in 1744-48 declined from
£796,000 to £734,000; but in 1754-58 rose from £685,000 to
£877,000. The increases were equally remarkable in 1759-62, and
enabled the Government to spend larger sums on the Navy. Thus,
whereas Choiseul in 1 759 had hoped to exhaust England, he found
France much more exhausted; and when, during the first peace
discussions at Paris in June 1761, he stated that after all the longest
purse would win the war, our diplomat, Hans Stanley, retorted that,
however doubtful the issue in Germany, yet "a maritime war, with
expeditions against the French colonies, lays within (sic} 6 or 7
millions per annum, which Great Britain, fed with your trade and
her own, together with that of many neutral nations . . . can for many
years support95.1 The forecast was just; for Great Britain ended the
struggle with undisputed supremacy at sea.
As happened after other victorious wars, keen interest was now
taken in the discovery of new lands. Curiosity centred chiefly in the
unveiling of the mysterious Terra Australia incognita, and after the Peace
of Paris the Admiralty despatched Commodore Byron to the South
Sea. On his way he annexed the Falkland Islands, but in the South
Sea discovered nothing. More successful was Captain Wallis, R.N.,
who in 1 767 sighted and stayed long at Tahiti, which he named George
III Island. Spain meanwhile had fortified Juan Fernandez, the usual
place of call after Cape Horn — a sign that she intended to keep her
Pacific preserve closed. France however now pressed in, sending her
great sailor Bougainville. He touched at the Falklands and Tahiti,
then discovered the Samoan, New Hebrides and Solomon groups,
thence sailing for Batavia, and finally reaching St.Malo in March
1769. News of French activities in the Pacific spurred on the Ad-
miralty to solve the mystery of the legendary Southern Continent;
and it resolved to act with the Royal Society which was about to send
an expedition to Tahiti to observe the transit of Venus. Selecting
Lieutenant James Cook, R.N., and the Whitby-built barque
1 F.O., France, 251, Stanley to Pitt, 12 June 1761.
536 SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763
Endeavour > it issued to him secret instructions (dated 30 July 1768)
which have lately been published. After fulfilling his duty at Tahiti,
he will "proceed to the southward in order to make discovery of the
Continent above mentioned until you arrive in the latitude of 40° ",
and if he fails to find it, he is to sail westwards between lat. 40° and
lat. 35° "until you discover it or fall in with the eastern side of the
land discovered by Tasman and now called New Zealand.. . .You
are also with the consent of the natives to take possession of con-
venient situations in the country in the name of the King of Great
Britain; or, if you find the country uninhabited, take possession for
His Majesty by setting up proper marks and inscriptions, as first
discoverers and possessors". Finally, he will thoroughly explore the
coast of New Zealand, will annex other islands "that have not
hitherto been discovered by any Europeans", enjoining secrecy on
the crew as to his discoveries until permission is given to divulge
them.1
These instructions were signed by Hawke, Peircy Brett and
G. Spencer. Brett had served as lieutenant under Anson in H.M.S.
Centurion in her famous circumnavigation and probably was the
directing spirit prompting our Pacific enterprises of 1764-79, which
prepared the way for Britain's new colonial Empire in the very years
when the Old Empire was slipping away. Thus Anson's voyage was
destined to lead on to efforts aiming primarily at the discovery of
the great Southern Continent which was believed to balance the
Northern Continents. This, not New Zealand or New Holland, was
Cook's chief objective. After demonstrating the feasibility of the
voyage round Cape Horn and thus completing the work of Drake,
he performed his duties at Tahiti and then sailed far to the south
without success. Then he sighted, thoroughly explored and finally
annexed New Zealand, and later (22 August 1770) the east coast of
New Holland, which he was sure the Dutch had not visited.2 Again9
in his second voyage (1772-5), the elusive continent foiled even his
dogged perseverance. The chief object of the third voyage (1776-9)
was to find the equally elusive North-West Passage from the Pacific
coast, and after baffling many stout voyagers from Drake and Fro-
bisher onwards, it baffled even Cook. Nevertheless, before his
lamented death in Hawaii, he had prepared the way for the Nootka
Sound trade, and had secured for his country prior claims to New
Zealand and Australia.8
Thus, in peace as in war, Great Britain had now won a decided
naval supremacy, which brought with it possibilities of expansion in
the west, east and south. Her rise to supremacy had been rapid.
1 Admiralty, 2/1332 (Secret Orders), printed in the Naval Miscellany (N.RS ), m.
343-64-
• Thi Journal of Copt. Cook (ed. Wharton, W. J L., 1893), p. 312.
8 For details see voL vn, chap. n.
RESULTS OF BRITISH NAVAL SUPREMACY 537
Scarcely able in 1690, even with powerful help from the Dutch, to
fend off a French invasion in force, she had at first to play a waiting
game, striking hard in 1692 when occasion offered. Then she bided
her time while the French guerre de course gradually demoralised that
navy. In this war, as in that of 1702-13, Louis XIV dissipated his
resources on land; William and Anne used their armies wisely and
sparingly, but steadily built up their navies. Thus, by 1713, England
had gained a clear superiority in force and in strategic position, which
enabled her to surpass the Dutch in the carrying trade. The merchant
service proved an invaluable reserve for the Royal Navy when war
came; and this advantage carried her on the whole successfully
through the tortuous shifts of the next struggle (1739-48); but not
until the genius of Pitt roused her spirit and guided her policy did
she gain a marked superiority over her chief rival.
Commerce, the vital sap of the Empire, registered the increasing
efficiency of naval protection, as appears from the tonnage of British
ships cleared outwards in the following years — in 1688, 190,000;
1697, i44>°o°; J?01* 273,000; 1738, 476,000; 1755, 451*000; J.763>
561,000; 1777, 736,ooo.1 Thus, while the Navy was comparatively
weak, commerce declined during war: but in that of 1702-13 it
increased by one-fifth and in the Seven Years' War by one-fourth,
thereafter rising by leaps and bounds. These statistics also illustrate
the growth of the Empire. In 1689-97 it was almost nil; in 1702-13
the accessions were Gibraltar, Minorca, Nova Scotia and Hudson
Bay. As the naval successes of the third war only balanced the
military failures, the result was little better than stalemate. The com-
bined naval and military triumphs of the Seven Years' War brought
acquisitions unexampled both for extent and solidity. By unique
good fortune, they occurred just before the vast accession to human
energies due to the Industrial Revolution. In these facts lies the
secret of the rapid growth and astounding vitality of the Old Empire.
1 Cunningham, W., Growth of English Industry, n, 696.
CHAPTER XIX
THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
MARITIME RIGHTS AND COLONIAL TITLES
1648-1763
1 HE Peace of Westphalia, 1648, may be described as the door
leading from the Middle Ages to the modern world. It terminated
the wars which for thirty years had been ravaging Europe and placed
all independent States whether Protestant or Catholic upon a footing
of equality. It formed the basis of the treaty law of Europe for the next
century, and though there were important changes in the political
geography of Europe, there were but few that sprang from the divisions
resulting from the acceptance of the doctrines of the Reformation.
The period from 1648 to 1763 is of vital importance in the growth
of the British Empire, it is also a period in which international
law, especially that relating to maritime affairs, was developing.
The struggle for the freedom of the seas continued, and England
and other European States still had difficulties with Spain who
endeavoured to keep the vast riches of her American possessions
for herself, and to prohibit other States from trade with them. The
influence of sea power on history and on law is strikingly emphasised
during this period, and English policy had important effects on the
rules of international maritime intercourse. In sea warfare especially,
rules of international law, which were to receive more definite shape
in later days, were being formed, and in the process the influence of
British policy and British Prize Courts was very powerful. Though
some British practices called forth strong neutral protests, the
foundations were being laid of those rules regarding enemy property
and neutral rights which were developed and applied by great judges
during the wars of the Napoleonic era when Great Britain's second
colonial Empire was won.
The rivalry of the Dutch, and their growing reluctance to render
any respect to the English flag, precipitated the First Dutch War in
1652. Both republics, the English Commonwealth and the States-
General of Holland, were sensitive as to their dignity, but the former
was more insistent and effective than Charles I had been in asserting
sovereignty over the English seas. Van Tromp, the Dutch Admiral,
was left without definite instructions from his Government in relation
to the salute to the flag, but he was ordered to prevent Dutch vessels
from being visited and searched by English ships in the narrow seas.
Having met a Dutch vessel which reported that a Dutch convoy had
been recently attacked for not striking their flags and that homeward
bound vessels with valuable cargoes had been captured, he turned
ENGLISH PRETENSIONS TO SOVEREIGNTY OF SEAS 539
his squadron towards the English coast. He met Admiral Blake with
his fleet, and the latter fired a gun across Tromp's bows to make him
strike his flag. Thereupon a fight ensued in which Tromp was de-
feated and withdrew with a loss of two vessels.1 The First Dutch War
was the result of this encounter. As has often been the case the actual
cause of the war was not the immediate incident which led to its
outbreak. The real cause was commercial rivalry.
The war continued with varying fortunes and fierce battles for two
years, and in its course attacks were made on Holland's most vulnerable
and most valuable possessions, its commerce and fishing. The English
Parliament meantime reasserted and popularised the claim to the
sovereignty of the seas by publishing an English translation of Selden's
Mare Clausum. Holland was not behind in the revival of the con-
troversy, and books appeared there assailing the English claims.
Dutch commerce, the life-blood of the nation, found the English fleet
across its path. Negotiations were opened for a settlement and finally
the Dutch agreed, in 1654, to render homage to any English warship
in the narrow seas. Cromwell gained but little by this war; the
Dutch maintained their rights of fishery on the British coasts while
their agreement as to the striking of the flag conceded nothing more
than they had already done in the past, and could not be taken as
an acknowledgment of England's sovereignty of the seas.
Under Charles II the pretensions to the sovereignty of the seas
were maintained, the wars of 1664 and 1672 ensued, and in the peace
of 1674 Holland was compelled to "honour" the King's flag from
Gape Finisterre to Van Staten in Norway but still without acknow-
ledging his sovereignty over the seas. This claim of Britain was losing
its importance, and Holland's commercial rivalry was diminishing,
but instructions ordering the enforcement of the salute continued to
be issued and enforced.2 Circumstances were changing and the
. freedom of commerce in peace time on the sea was progressing in
Europe. Claims over straits persisted much longer; thus Danish
claims to levy tolls in the Sound continued till the middle of the
nineteenth century and the Dardanelles and Bosphorus have re-
mained subject to important restrictions until modern times.
By the end of the seventeenth century English claims to jurisdiction
over large portions of the sea were becoming less rigorous. States
were moving in the direction of fixing definite limits over the portions
of the sea adjacent to their territories. Holland, which had fought
English pretensions, was equally vigorous in repelling the claims of
Denmark over the northern and Arctic seas, but by the end of the
seventeenth century Denmark also began to fix limits to the areas
in which she claimed exclusive jurisdiction.8
1 Fulton, T. W., The Sovereignty of the Sea, pp. 770, 771.
2 Marsden, R. G., Law and Custom of the Sea, n, 86, 165.
8 Fulton, p. 528.
540 GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1648-1763
Grotius, writing in 1625, had putjforward the view that " the empire
of a portion of the sea is, it would seem, acquired in the same way as
other lordship; that is, as above stated, as belonging to a person, or
as belonging to a territory; belonging to a person, when he has a
fleet which commands that part of the sea; belonging to a territory,
in so far as those who sail in that part of the sea can be compelled
from the shore as if they were on land".1 But this doctrine had, at
first, little influence on the practice of States in the seventeenth
century, nor was it adopted by jurists. States asserted their rights to
inviolability of their territory when they were neutral, and for the
purpose of better defining them they issued proclamations warning
belligerents not to engage in hostilities within certain vaguely
described areas around their coasts. James I issued, in 1604, a
proclamation forbidding belligerent acts within any places in his
dominions or "so near to any of our said ports and havens as may
be reasonably construed to be within that title, limit or precinct".
He further defined the lines of neutrality at sea as "a straight line
drawn from one point to another within the realm of England". The
areas so enclosed by lines drawn from headland to headland round
the coasts were called the "King's Chambers" and tables and charts
showing their positions were prepared under the direction of Trinity
House.2 Proclamations in similar terms made by Charles II in 1668
and 1683 vaguely specified maritime areas adjacent to the English
shores within which hostilities were prohibited, and the decisions of
the English Admiralty Court restricted jurisdiction to their terms.
Vessels captured within the "place or tract at sea that may be reason-
ably construed to be within any of these denominations, limits or
precincts" outside the limits of the Bang's Chambers were restored
to the owners "if they came within the jurisdiction of the King's
Court".3 These decisions, which were in contrast with previous
English claims, were of importance as showing the direction in which
opinion was moving. One of the chief reasons for the recognition by
England of greater freedom of navigation even on the seas surround-
ing the British Islands must be found in her increasing commerce.
The greater that became, the more irksome all restrictions on the
free navigation of the high seas were felt to be until ultimately they
were abandoned, leaving only a shadowy claim to the salute of the
flag. Holland had led the way, England and nearly all other mari-
time States were now prepared to follow. Grotius's "natural law"
doctrine on the subject of freedom of intercourse was beginning to
bear fruit, and another Dutchman, Cornelius van Bynkershoek, in
1703,* and I737,5 turned his attention to the delimitation of the
maritime areas adjacent to the territories of States over which, for
1 Dejure belli ac pacts (tr. Whewell), lib. n, cap. iii, s. xiii, a.
2 Fulton, pp. 120, 553.
8 Wynne, W., Lift of Sir Leoline Jenkins, n, 727, 732, 755, 780, 783.
* De Dondmo Moris. 5 Quaestiones juris publict.
THE THREE MILE LIMIT 541
purposes of defence, fishing and revenue, protection was required.
Bartolus, an Italian jurist who died in 1357, declared that a State's
jurisdiction extended to 100 miles from the coast,1 while Baldus
Ubaldus, who died in 1400, while limiting the extent to sixty miles, or
one day's journey, included sovereignty as well as jurisdiction among
the rights of the neighbouring prince.2 Grotius had enunciated the
principle of control over such waters so far as it could be exercised
from the land,3 and Bynkershoek applied it to the use of artillery:
Qttare omnino videtur rectius, eo potestatem terrae extendi, quousque tormenta
exploduntur, extenus quippe cum imperare, turn possidere videmurf Imperium
terrae finitur ubi armorum potestas.5 The practice regulating the salute of
a vessel coming within range of a battery on a foreign coast had pre-
pared the way for the acceptance of the doctrine of cannon-range;
it was the rule in England that " the sea should salute the land", and
the range of guns determined the limit within which the salute ought
to be rendered. Thus it was largely through English action regarding
the salute that the acceptance of cannon-range limit was facilitated.6
The same limit had for a long time been accepted in connection with
visit and search at sea, and many treaties stipulated that the visiting
warship should not approach nearer than within cannon-shot and
should stay there while a boat was sent for the purpose of examining
the merchant ship. Bynkershoek's views were by no means immedi-
ately adopted by States, though subsequent writers generally followed
them. Vattel, whose Droit des gens, published in 1759, exercised a
great influence on international law for a century, contended that
a nation might acquire exclusive right to navigation and fishery in
certain tracts of the sea by treaties, and he did not limit the area to
that which might be protected from shore. As regards neutrality,
he adopted the cannon-shot principle. The fixing of a definite limit
as the range of cannon-shot at one marine league, or three sea miles,
appears to be due to an Italian jurist, Galiani, in 1782, though King
Adolf Frederik of Sweden had asserted the three mile limit in con-
nection with the restriction of privateering off the coast of Sweden
as early as I758.7 So during the period under examination the
practice of States bore witness to the diminishing claims to sovereignty
over large areas of the ocean; Admiralty Courts were recognising
limited areas in which their jurisdiction was exercisable in relation
to neutrality, and national ordinances were beginning to be issued
recognising the marine league as the extent of neutral waters.8
England's claim to trade with the Spanish colonies in the West
1 Fenn, P. T., The origin ofiht right of fishery in territorial waters.
8 Fulton, pp. 539, 540.
3 DC jure belli ac pacts, lib. n, cap. iii, s. xiii, 2.
* De Dom. Moris, cap. ii. 8 Quaestiones, lib. i, cap. viii.
0 Fulton, p. 557.
7 Jessup, P. C., The law of territorial waters, pp. 6, 36; Roestad, A., La mer territoriale,
p. 132. 8 Fulton, p. 568.
542 GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1648-1763
Indies continued to be pressed during this period. There was con-
stant fighting against Spanish ships and forts and this was encouraged
by the issue of letters of marque to privateers who were instructed
to force trade on the Spaniard. From instructions issued by Charles II
in 1662 we can see how and why this was to be done, since the
Spaniards "were engrossing to themselves the riches of the Indies
contrary to the use and custom of all governments and the laws of
nations".1 France was similarly engaged in endeavouring to obtain
freedom of commerce and in 1701 received from Spain the monopoly
of the supply of slaves or Asiento.2 By the Peace of Utrecht, 1713,
this privilege was transferred to an English company.3 In passing
judgment on the claims of Great Britain to trade freely in the Spanish
colonies it is well to recall that the policy of Spain was not dissimilar
from that of other European Powers at the time, including England,
whose Navigation Acts were passed with the object of retaining her
colonial trade. "C'est encore une loi fondamentale de PEurope, que
tout commerce avec une colonie etrang&re est regarde comme un pur
monopole."4 After the secession of the American colonies Great
Britain found herself in much the same position as Spain had been,
as the Americans continued to claim the rights to trade with British
colonies which they had enjoyed before the War of Independence.
The disputes with the Dutch over the fisheries in the North Sea
and off the British coasts gradually died down, and in the eighteenth
century, largely owing to the wars in which Holland was engaged,
the Dutch fishing fleets diminished while those of Great Britain in-
creased till they have become to-day larger than those of all the other
States combined.
Interest in fishing rights was removed to North America. Disputes
were raised between England and France in the latter part of the
seventeenth century, and, by a treaty of 16 November 1686 between
James II and Louis XIV called "A Treaty of Peace, Good corre-
spondence and Neutrality in America", British and French subjects
were required to abstain from fishing or trading "in the havens,
bays, creeks, roads, shoals or places" belonging to the other, though
the freedom of innocent navigation was not to be disturbed. There
was an attempt at definition of boundaries, which though vague in
terms corresponded to the principles applicable to neutral waters
laid down in the English proclamations of 1668 and 1683, in which
the definition was "within our ports, havens, roads and creeks, as
also in every other place or tract at sea that may be reasonably con-
strued to be within any of these denominations, limits or precincts".5
By the same treaty French subjects received permission to fish for
turtles in the islands of Cayman.
1 Marsden, R. G., n, 41. * Dumont, Corps diplomatique, vm, i, 83.
8 See chapter XL « Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, bk xxi, chap.
* Fulton, p. 553.
FISHING RIGHTS 543
The beginning of grants of fishing off the coasts of North America
is found in the Treaty of Utrecht, whose interpretation and operation
were the sources of fruitful dispute until the Anglo-French settle-
ment in 1 904. By this treaty, which ceded Nova Scotia and Newfound-
land to Great Britain, French subjects obtained the right to fish in
the seas, bays and other places to thirty leagues from tie south-east
coast of Nova Scotia and to have certain privileges as to landing
and drying fish.1 By the Treaty of Paris, 1763, these rights were
reaffirmed, though Canada and Cape Breton Island were ceded to
Great Britain. In addition the right of fishing was also granted to
French subjects in the Gulf of St Lawrence on condition that they
did "not exercise the said fishery, except at a distance of three leagues
from all the coasts belonging to Great Britain, as well those of the con-
tinent as those of the islands situate in the said Gulf of St Lawrence".
The Islands of St Pierre and Miquelon were ceded to France for the
use of the French fishermen.2 The grant of rights of this nature both
to the French and subsequently to the Americans in 1 783 is quite
exceptional, and can only be explained by the peculiarity of the
circumstances in each case. The British Government successfully
contended before the Hague Tribunal in 1910, in the North Atlantic
Fisheries Arbitration, that the claim of a State for its citizens to fish
in the territorial waters of another can rest only on a special agree-
ment. Its further contention that, on the separation of one State from
another, the inhabitants of the former cannot continue to be entitled
to exercise rights formerly enjoyed by them was also upheld by the
Award.8 It must be remembered that at the time of the grants both
to France and to the United States the limits of territorial waters
had not been settled.
The struggle between the English and French in North America
ended with the termination of the Seven Years' War and the final
expulsion of the French power from Canada in 1763. Disputes as to
boundaries, as to interpretation of treaties, and the absence of the
observance of such rules of international law as were gradually
emerging in Europe in relation to the laws of war, appear to be the
chief characteristics of this important fight for predominance on the
North American continent.
French settlements in Canada in the middle of the seventeenth
century had made but slow advance. This was partly due to the
methods of colonisation which were largely based on military
principles, partly to the rigours of the winter climate and partly to
the hostility of the Indian nations under the leadership of the Iroquois.
But from 1669 onward the French spirit of enterprise was brilliantly
exemplified in the expedition of La Salle, who finally navigated the
1 Dumont, vin, i, 341.
2 Martens, RecueU, i, 109.
8 Wilson, G. G., The Hague Arbitration Treaties, pp. 134-805.
544 GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1648-1763
Illinois River and thence the Mississippi to its mouth in 1683. He
took possession of the country from the Ohio to the sea and Rio
Grande and named it Louisiana after his king, Louis XIV. He based
his title to this great expanse of territory on discovery, claiming to
have been the first European to have ascended or descended the
Mississippi, being ignorant, apparently, of earlier Spanish explora-
tions.1 The territory between the Mississippi and the Ohio, which
extended eastwards to the fringe of the English settlements on the
coast, was inhabited by large and important tribes of Indians,
particularly in the region from the mountains of western New
England to Lake Erie. The league of the Iroquois, or the Five Nations,
was the key to this position, and so long as they were unsubdued the
effective possession of the region north of the Potomac and the Ohio
and east of the Mississippi could not be attributed to either English
or French. In the main the Iroquois sided with the Dutch and the
English against the French and after the cession of the Dutch settle-
ments to England by the Treaty of Breda, 1667, they formed a useful
barrier to the French claims. This was strengthened in 1684, when,
after a conference with the Five Nations, they acknowledged them-
selves as subjects of England, and the arms of the Duke of York were
placed on the walls of the Iroquois fortified towns.2 French claims
to sovereignty over the areas in which these tribes lived were no
longer tenable after effective possession had been taken.
The legal position of the Indian tribes has in modern times received
a considerable amount of attention, as numerous cases involving their
status have come before the courts of the United States. In the early
days, however, proprietary and sovereign rights were never clearly
differentiated, and, although Spanish publicists8 at the time of the
conquest of America upheld the claims of the Indians and condemned
the treatment they were receiving at the hands of their conquerors,
European nations continued to assert rights acquired by discovery
against the rest of the world, but they made treaties from time to
time with the Indian nations inhabiting the lands in the territories
which they claimed. In all the territories in North America which
were included in the earliest charters to colonisers the soil was
occupied by Indians. In many cases the colonists purchased their
lands from the Indians, and protected them in the possession of those
which were left in their occupation. Penn's treaty in 1681 was a
remarkable example of such a purchase. The general position of the
Indian tribes was regarded by England in much the same way as
at a later date the United States regarded their relation to these
nations, namely, as domestic dependent nations; the relationship
being analogous to that of guardian and ward.4 The general
1 See Ghanning, E., History of UJS. vol. n, chap. v.
8 Ibid. p. 146.
8 E.g. Bishop Las Gasas. See Helps, Sir Arthur, The Spanish Conquest of America.
* The Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 5 Peters, i.
STATUS OF INDIAN TRIBES 545
position was set forth by Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Johnson and Graham's Lessees v. Mclntosh, in 1822: "The relations
which were to exist between the discoverers and the natives were to
be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive,
no other power could interpose between them Their rights to
complete sovereignty as independent nations were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will
to whomsoever they pleased was denied by the original fundamental
principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.*'1
Throughout this period, down to the War of Independence, the
British Government did not interfere with the internal affairs of the
Indian tribes, except where it was necessary to keep out the agents
of foreign Powers who were attempting to seduce them from their
allegiance. Their alliance and dependence were purchased by
subsidies, and the Indian nations were considered as nations who
had come under the protection of the British Crown.2 The Indian
tribe, as a nation, was considered as a legal unit, and, before the
Revolution, all the lands of the Six Nations in New York had been
put under the Crown as "appendant to the Colony of New York",
and that colony had dealt with those tribes exclusively as under its
protection.8
Meantime the northerly and to some extent the westerly expansion
of French Canada was checked by the establishment under a charter
of Charles II in 1670 of the Hudson's Bay Company. The area south
of Hudson Bay was approached by a line of communication between
Lake Superior and Hudson Bay, and a voyage from London to
Hudson Bay was successfully made by a company of traders in 1668.
Englishmen thus secured a footing on the southern and western
shores of this great inland sea with a series of trading stations from
Lake Superior northwards. Annexation under the charter and
settlement by the traders, the two essentials now recognised by in-
ternational law as giving a valid title by occupation, were thus com-
bined. This possession was soon disputed, and the French under the
energetic D'Iberville were able to oust the English traders, until by
the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713 (Art. x), France restored to Great Britain
and recognised her sovereignty over Hudson Bay and Strait with all
dependent lands, seas, banks, rivers and places. Territory then in
French possession was to be restored together with all forts, artillery
and ammunition. The boundary between the English and French
possessions was to be settled by a joint commission.
1 8 \Vheaton, Reports, 543, 573, 574. * Wheaton, H., International Law, § 38.
8 The case of the Gayuga TnHifm Haimg before the American and British Claims Arbi-
tration Tribunal, 1926 (American Journal of International Law, xx, 574.) ; see also Halleck,
H. W.9 International Law, 4th edn, I, 80; Lmdley, M. F., The Acquisition and Government of
Backward Territory, chaps, xxxvi and xxxvii; Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. i,
Snow, A. H., The question of aborigines in the law and practice of nations; Westlake, J.,
ted Papers, chap. ix.
GHBEI 35
546 GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1648-1763
Great areas were still uninhabited and undiscovered by white men,
and the only test which could be applied to claims to sovereignty was
that of effective possession. The French did not penetrate the Ap-
palachian range of mountains which formed a natural boundary
for the English settlements. But from New Orleans to the southern
shores of Lakes Michigan, Erie and Ontario the French had
isolated forts on the great rivers. It was the obvious aim of
France to confine the English colonists to the east of the mountainous
ranges extending in a north-easterly direction from the higher reaches
of the Alabama to Lake Champlain, and France was slowly making
good her claim by occupation to the whole basin of the Mississippi.
During a period of nominal peace in Europe between England and
France the struggle continued with varying fortunes on the American
continent. It was felt, as Benjamin Franklin said, that there could
be no peace in the thirteen colonies so long as France was mistress
of Canada. French forts were erected on debatable ground and there
was constant friction, and open fighting on various portions of the
frontiers. Meantime a boundary commission had been set up in 1750
by the two governments to delimit the frontiers between British
and French territory in North America and to settle the question of
the ownership of the islands of St Vincent, Tobago and St Lucia.
Nothing of practical value resulted from their labours and in 1754
the governments entered into direct negotiations on the boundary
question.
The line between peace and war was still very undefined as it had
been in the time of the struggle between England and Spain in the
sixteenth century. Acts of violence took place at sea between States
before any formal declaration or breach of diplomatic relations,
though these sometimes followed. General reprisals, indistinguish-
able from war in practice, were frequently decreed lor wrongs or
alleged wrongs, though a state of war was not desired.1 The destruc-
tion by Sir George Byng (afterwards Lord Torrington) of the Spanish
fleet off Cape Passaro in Sicily in August 1718 occurred under
peculiar circumstances, Great Britain and Spain being at the time
at peace (war was not formally declared until the following December) .
The proposed modifications of the Treaty of Utrecht (elsewhere
explained) were hateful to the King of Spain, who to prevent Sicily
from being transferred to the Emperor prepared to attack it. Sir
George Byng was British Gommander-in-Ghief in the Mediterranean
with general instructions to prevent Spain from interfering with the
arrangements which had been made by the Powers of the Quadruple
Alliance. In July the Spaniards had landed in Sicily and taken the
whole of the island except Messina. Byng wrote to the Spanish com-
mander, the Marquis de Lede, proposing a suspension of arms for
two months. This was refused. Byng went in search of the Spanish
1 Marsden, R. G., n, 373, 1279, 283.
PACIFIC BLOCKADE 547
fleet, which was sighted off Cape Passaro. A Spanish ship opened
fire on the British fleet, which then bore down on the Spaniards and
*6made an end of them" (n August). Very few escaped. Spain at
once ordered reprisals on British ships and merchandise in Spanish
ports ; Byng retaliated on Spanish shipping, but a formal declaration
of war was delayed till the end of the year (28 December).1 Twenty
years later, in 1739, when again England and Spain were on the
verge of war and negotiations were on foot to stave it off, England,
as part of a compromise, agreed to allow Spain to set off against the
indemnity demanded for the wrongful exercise of the rights of visit
and search in the Spanish Main, the damage done to her fleet at Cape
Passaro, a recognition by England of the doubtful legality of that
action.2 In February 1744 a great sea fight between the British and
combined French and Spanish fleets took place off Toulon, before
war was actually declared.8
Again, in 1725, British policy was directed towards preventing
Spain from joining Russia and Austria, and in furtherance thereof
Walpole gave orders for the pacific blockade of Porto Rico, giving
strict injunctions against fighting. Walpole's manoeuvres, cutting off
for the time being supplies on board the Spanish ships assembled
there, were successful in preserving the peace; though the action
was one of high-handed power, it is an interesting example of
Pacific Blockade against a Great Power. Spain, in retaliation, made
an unsuccessful land attack on Gibraltar, but did not declare war
till 1727. The continued struggle between England and France in
America in time of peace has already been mentioned. In 1755,
nearly a year before war broke out, Hawke was sent to sea to seize
all French ships between Ushant and Finisterre, and later to send
in all French ships. So before the end of the year and six months
before war came there were 300 French merchant ships and 6000
French sailors in England. France retaliated in April 1756 by the
attadk on Minorca which cost Admiral John Byng his life. English
and French warships fought each other in the Channel and in the
West Indies though war was not officially declared until May 1756.*
A curious situation was caused in India in 1744 when war had
actually broken out between England and France. La Bourdonnais
who was in command of the islands received orders from the French
East India Company not to attack the English Company if the latter
consented to refrain from hostilities. The English Company accepted
the French proposal on the understanding that it did not bind the
Home Government. But as the latter sent naval forces into the Indian
Ocean and was capturing French shipping, the French acted on the
1 Clowes, W. M. L., The British Navy, m, 32; Mahan, A. T., The influence of sea powet
upon history, p.
35-a
CJlf.Vi,i57.
8 Mahan, p. 265; CM Jf. vi, 239.
4 Mahan, p. 284; Clowes, m, 291.
548 GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1648-1763
offensive and in September 1745 La Bourdonnais captured Madras.
In the terms of the capitulation the governor was allowed to ransom
it for £420,000, which was paid. Dupleix, however, subsequently
refused to observe the capitulation as being made without his superior
authority and kept Madras till it was restored to England by the
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.
There are few subjects in international law which have occasioned
more controversy than the position in time of war of enemy goods
carried in neutral ships, and of neutral goods carried in enemy ships.
From the middle of the seventeenth century onwards until the middle
of the nineteenth there was a constant endeavour on the part of
neutral States to obtain the most favourable treatment of their ships
and goods. The controversy was pre-eminently one in which carrying
States desirous of remaining neutral wished to obtain the greatest
possible advantages for their commerce, and, as was natural, the
Dutch, a great carrying power, were the foremost in pressing for the
acceptance of a rule which their position rendered most desirable.
The law and practice of the Middle Ages undoubtedly gave the
belligerent the right to capture the privately owned property of his
enemy, though in process of time this right was modified as regards
private property on land. Reasons of expediency and military
discipline were those which told in favour of this mitigation, but
similar arguments did not avail as regards property carried in ships
at sea. We have already seen that neutral rights were of such slight
importance in the early part of the seventeenth century that Grotius
devoted to them only one short chapter in his Dejure belli ac pads.
After the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, the claims of neutral States for
protection of their trade increased. Taking the position that they
were not concerned in the contest, they claimed for their subjects
the right to carry on their commerce with all the belligerents as if no
war existed. The belligerents' attitude was that any interference by
a neutral in the trade with the enemy was an advantage to him by
releasing his sailors for military operations, and so enabling him to
obtain fresh supplies of money and commodities. England early
apprehended the principle that the destruction of the commerce of the
enemy isoneof the chief aims ofnaval warfare, and was consistentin con-
tending for the maintenance of the rules of capture of enemy property,
not only on board enemy ships, but also on board those of neutrals.
The earliest rules on the subject are contained in the Gonsolato del
Mare,1 a code of maritime law drawn up at Barcelona in the four-
teenth century, but embodying older usages. The principles enunciated
are that enemy property whether ship or cargo is capturable, while
neutral property whether ship or cargo is free. The Black Book of the
Admiralty which contains the decisions of the English Courts on
1 For text see Twiss, Sir Travers, Black Book of the Admiralty, vol. m; Pardessus, Collection
da Lois maritime*, vol. n.
"FREE SHIPS, FREE GOODS' 549
Admiralty matters during the fourteenth century shows that the rule
of the Consolato del Mare as regards the liability to capture of enemy
property on a neutral ship was adopted in the middle of the four-
teenth century, but the freedom of neutral goods on an enemy ship
was not adopted till later. French Ordonnances of 1533 and 1543 con-
demned neutral ships carrying enemy goods, and the English Court
observed the same rule against the French by way of retaliation, but
after the middle of the century the freedom of neutral goods on enemy
ships was admitted, and thereafter it became the rule of the English
Prize Courts until the Declaration of Paris, 1856.* In 1646 the Dutch
obtained from France the acceptance of die rule of "free ships, free
goods", and the same concession was made by Spain in i65O,2 but in
1654, in their treaty with England, the old rule was maintained. In
the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) France and Spain agreed to "free
ships, free goods" with the corollary "enemy ships, enemy goods",
but France formally enunciated her older custom of confiscating
neutral ships carrying enemy goods and neutral goods in enemy ships
in the Ordomance of 1681 ; the enemy character of ship or goods was
held to infect neutral goods or ships. Under this doctrine neutral
ships could safely carry only neutral goods. In this severe treatment
of neutrals she stood alone till Spain, by Ordinances of 1702 and
1718, adopted the same rule.3 On the same day as the Treaty of
Utrecht was signed between Great Britain and France, the same
Powers signed a treaty of navigation and commerce4 containing
the "most favoured nation" clause; it also dealt with the thorny
subject of "free ships". The doctrine of Louis XIV, enunciated in
the pride of his naval power in 1681, had been extended to attach
an enemy character to the produce of enemy territory in neutral
ships, a doctrine subsequently adopted by the Prize Courts of Great
Britain and the United States.6 The severity of the French rule was
seen in the fact that neutral ships loaded in an enemy port, and going
to a neutral port, were liable to condemnation under the doctrine of
"infection", laid down in the Ordonnance. Article xvn of the treaty
of navigation and commerce adopted the doctrine of "free ships,
free goods" (except contraband) and also gave freedom from seizure
of enemy persons on board neutral ships unless such persons were
actually in the service of the enemy. By Article xxvn the doctrine
of "enemy ships, enemy goods" was also adopted, except for goods
laden for specified times before and after the outbreak of war. This
was the only treaty signed at Utrecht by Great Britain in which she
accepted a variation of her traditional doctrine. Louis XV in 1744
1 See Wesdake, J., International Law, vol. n, chap, vi and authorities cited; also Hall,
W. £., International Law, § 255; Manning, W. O., Law of Nations, chap. vi.
1 Duxnont, vi, i, 57.
8 Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, n, 108; Wheaton, H., History of the Modern Law of Nations*
107, 1 14. * Strupp, K., Documents pour sermr a rtestovre du droit des gens, i, 34.
* The Phoenix^ 5 G. Rob. 201 ; Bcnt&n v. Boyle, 9 Granch. 191.
550 GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1648-1763
modified the Ordonnance of 1681 by releasing neutral ships carrying
enemy goods, though the latter were still condemned. The Dutch
were able between 1650 and 1700 to obtain from Spain, Portugal,
France, England and Sweden the acceptance of the "free ships, free
goods" doctrine. Except where bound by treaty England continued
to maintain the rule of the Consolato which remained the common
law of nations in the absence of special stipulation, and down to the
middle of the eighteenth century no writer of repute claimed for
neutrals greater privilege. An attempt was made by Prussia in the
controversy with Great Britain in 1 752 on the Silesian Loan question1
to establish the doctrine "free ships, free goods" as the rule of inter-
national law, but it is generally recognised that the British Report
of the law officers in 1753 on the action of Frederick II in with-
holding payment of interest on the Silesian Loan,2 being a reply to the
Prussian "Exposition des motiis fond^s sur le droit des gens", was in
Montesquieu's words a "r6ponse sans r£plique". The French rules
from 1681 to 1744 were peculiar to their Prize Courts, and to those of
Spain; the practice of other states was to confiscate the goods of the
enemy alone. The key to the changes which took place in the treat-
ment of belligerent goods under the neutral flag was the anxiety
of States to secure the carrying trade of belligerents. The price
which Holland was prepared to pay for the freedom of goods under
her flag was that of suffering the loss of her own goods entrusted to
belligerent merchant ships; by the various treaties by which she
secured the immunity of goods under her flag she left her own goods
to share the fate of the vessel.8 In her various treaties "free ships,
free goods" involved the corollary "enemy ships, enemy goods".
States which pursued a definite policy of neutrality realised that in
time of war goods of their own subjects would seldom be carried by
belligerent ships, therefore the acceptance of "enemy ships, enemy
goods " in practice was a small price to pay for the concession of "free
ships, free goods". The rule of the Consolato del Mare, which was that
of England, retained the right to capture enemy goods under the
neutral flag, but left immune neutral goods under the enemy flag.
England by maintaining this principle was furthering her policy of
attacking enemy trade whenever she was belligerent, whether enemy
merchandise was found on enemy or neutral ships.
It is not necessary to examine in detail the history of the struggle of
neutral States for greater freedom of trade in time of war ; no State was
continuously consistent in its policy. The period from the accession of
Williamlll to theend of the Seven Years' Warwasnotable for the great
development of the use of sea power against commerce. The struggle
1 de Martens, Gh., Causes ceUbres du droit des gens, vol. n, cause premiere; Manning, W. O.,
p. 202 ; Satow, Sir £., The Silesian Loan, and Frederick the Great.
2 Marsden, R. G., Law and Custom of the Sea.
« Manning p. 319; Hall, §§ 255, 267; Clark, G. N., The Dutch alliance and the war
against French trade, chap. i.
THE "RULE OF THE WAR OF 1756" 551
between the English and Dutch emphasised principles which wereagain
brought into prominence in the wars at the end of the eighteenth
century, and also in the World War of 1914-18. The Dutch policy
of "free ships, free goods*' permitted their vessels to cany the com-
merce of both belligerents; the only limitations on this "freedom of
the seas" which they were prepared to acknowledge were those
connected with contraband and blockade, both of which were and
still remain fruitful sources of friction between belligerents and
neutrals. The British view was that the freedom of the enemy to carry
on his trade in time of war enabled him to prolong the struggle, and
that by increasing the list of contraband goods, and capturing enemy
property under neutral flags, economic pressure could effectually be
brought to bear on him. For a short time during the early days of
the Anglo-Dutch alliance against France from 1 689 to 1 697, the Dutch
fell in with the British views, but the policies of the two countries
ultimately diverged, and France and Holland agreed to the rule of
"free ships, free goods" in the Treaty of Ryswick.1
At the opening of the Seven Years' War the British Government
took an important step in relation to the treatment of neutral ships.
The trade between European countries and their colonies was the
monopoly of the mother country, though it was frequently invaded
by others who ran the risk of losing their ventures. Sir William
Scott (Lord Stowell) thus spoke of the colonial trade in 1799 : "What
is the colonial trade, generally speaking? It is a trade generally shut
up to the exclusive use of the mother country to which the colony
belongs, and this to a double use, that of supplying a market for the
consumption of native commodities, and the other of furnishing to
the mother country the peculiar commodities of the colonial regions ".a
When the mother country could maintain a regular service of shipping
with the colonies, and provide them with all they required, the
colonists had little to complain of, but this system of excluding the
ships of other nations which was embodied in the Navigation Acts,
while it encouraged shipbuilding and the growth of a mercantile
marine, was naturally viewed with jealousy by other maritime States
who were in a less favourable position, and a large amount of illicit
trade sprang up, especially by Dutch traders, in the Spanish colonies
who were badly supplied by the mother country. But on the outbreak
of war in 1756, the French, owing to the power of the British Navy,
were no longer able to carry on the colonial trade, and therefore
announced that licences would be issued to Dutch vessels to take it
up.8 The British minister at the Hague was instructed to inform the
Government of the Netherlands that neutral vessels engaged in a
trade which was opened up to them in time of war but which was closed
1 Vide Clark, G.N., passim.
1 The Immamul, 2 G. Rob. 186.
3 Whfiaton, H., History of the Modern Law of Nations, p. 217.
552 GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1648-1763
to them in time of peace would be treated as enemy ships, and cap-
tured and condemned. This warning was unheeded and Dutch
vessels engaged in trade between French colonies and the mother
country were condemned under the principle subsequently known
as the "Rule of the War of 1756". This was bitterly resented then,
and subsequently during the French Revolutionary wars, when the
rule was extended to the coasting trade of belligerents. The British
Prize Courts were firm in their execution of the principle which was
a sound application of the basic principle of naval war; neutral
vessels by carrying the produce of enemy colonies to the mother
country afforded great relief and succour to the enemy's trade, doing
for him what he could not do for himself. The Dutch remonstrated
against the English practice and based their protest on the ground
that it was a violation of a treaty with England in 1674 whereby the
two Powers had adopted the rule of "free ships, free goods", as well
as the explanatory declaration of 1675 which declared that neutral
navigation extended to the trade from one enemy's port to another.1
The British Government denied that it was applicable to the circum-
stances, which, they contended, constituted in effect a grant of French
nationality to the Dutch ships. Denmark also protested and sent a
mission to England headed by Hiibner, and this was the occasion for
the publication, in 1759, of his important work on the seizure of
neutral ships.2
The principle of the "Rule of the War of 1 756 " was not new, and
the earliest case in which it appears to have been enforced was by the
Dutch who, in 1604, condemned two Venetian vessels trading south
of the "line", the tropic of Cancer, with licence from Spain, with
whom the Netherlands were then at war. The Dutch took the position
that the Venetian shipowners had, by accepting Spanish licences to
engage in the closed colonial trade, made themselves the allies of
Spain. Charles I applied the same principle in 1630 to neutrals
engaged in the Spanish coasting trade.3
It was in vain that neutral vessels engaged in the colonial trade of
the enemy attempted to evade the application of this rule by break-
ing their voyage from the colony to the mother country, by stopping
at a neutral port and making a colourable importation at that port
and then re-exporting the colonial produce to the mother country.
Vessels captured on their voyage from such port with colonial cargoes
were condemned on the ground that the whole voyage was one, under
the doctrine of "Continuous Voyage".4 The doctrine of "Con-
tinuous Voyage" appears to have been applied by the English Prize
1 Wheaton, p. ai8; Dumont, vol. n, pt i, p. 342; Lord Liverpool (Mr Jenkinson), A
Discourse on the conduct of Great Britain in respect to neutral nations during the present war ( 1 757) .
* De la saisie des batimms neutres; see also Wheaton, H.9 p. 219.
8 Marsden, R. G., Law and Custom of the Sea, i, 345; ibid. EJIJt. (1910), xxv,
* SeeHi$gins,A.Pearce, War and the private ci&wil^W
A DOCTRINE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553
Court as early as I7561, and it seems probable that the Court had in
mind the fact that the goods in question were engaged in a prohibited
course of commerce. There are other cases during the same war, but
the fuller exposition and application of the doctrine does not appear
till Lord Stowell's (Sir William Scott) decisions during the Napoleonic
wars.2 It is noteworthy that the Dutch appear to have been the first
naval Power to attach due importance to the intermingling of neutral
traders in a belligerent's trade, and to visit it with the natural con-
sequences. It was a position which could only be assumed by a strong
naval Power; when the Dutch naval strength diminished and her
position was chiefly that of a neutral engaged in the carrying trade,
her interests changed, and her policy was consequently in favour of
the greatestlatitudeforthe neutral trader. Sir Christopher Robinson, a
famous Law Reporter, stated in 1808 that the doctrine of" Continuous
Voyage" was in the first instance introduced as a rule of equitable
construction in favour of neutral trade,3 but earlier cases do not bear
out this view. It was applied as an equitable construction by Lord
Stowell in one case at least, but in the period of the Seven Years5
War and afterwards its chief aim was to put a stop to the evasion by
neutrals of belligerent rights.
During the period which elapsed between the Peace of Westphalia,
1648, and the Treaty of Paris, 1763, neutrality as a doctrine of inter-
national law may be said to have definitely taken shape. The funda-
mental idea of modern neutrality is that States which are not parties
to a war must refrain from giving any assistance to the belligerents,
and must observe complete impartiality. Neutral States, however,
are under no obligation to prevent their subjects from engaging in
acts of a commercial nature which may be detrimental to the interests
of one of the belligerents, such as carriage of contraband goods and
attempting to enter blockaded ports. For such operations the neutral
State is free from liability, but belligerents have maintained the right
to control and deal with neutral merchant vessels engaged in these
operations to their disadvantage. Capture and condemnation by
Prize Courts of the offending vessels and cargoes have been the
consequences for several centuries of such intermingling of neutral
merchants in a war.
The doctrine and practice of the early part of the seventeenth
century were reflected in Grotius's treatment of the subject. " It is the
duty of those who stand apart from a war to do nothing which may
strengthen the side whose cause is unjust, or which may hinder the
movements of him who is carrying on a just war; and on a doubtful
case, to act alike to both sides in permitting transit, in supplying
provisions to the respective armies and in not assisting persons
1 The Jesus, BurreWs Reports (ed. Marsden, 1885), 178.
Of Continuous
554 GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1648-1763
besieged."1 Violation of neutral territorial waters long remained
common, though during the eighteenth century neutral States which
refrained from making protests and obtaining redress for such attacks
on their sovereignty were liable to be and not infrequently were
treated as allies of the State so doing, and as professing a sham
neutrality. Treaties were still being entered into for the preservation
of strict neutrality, as it was recognised that it was not unneutral for
States to lend assistance to a belligerent if bound to do so by treaty
before the outbreak of war. Thus Holland, by the Treaty of Nymegen,
1678, promised Louis XIV henceforth to preserve a strict neutrality
and not to assist either directly or indirectly the enemies of France.
Bynkershoek (1737) and Vattel (1759) both formulated ideas of
neutrality, though the former writer did not use the word. Bynkers-
hoek abandoned the Grotian principle of the justice of the cause
being the measure of the neutral's duties, but it was retained by
Vattd as regards the right to allow the passage of troops through
belligerent territory. Practice was still far behind the teaching of the
publicists and examples of violation of neutral waters were not in-
frequent. These were especially noticeable in the seventeenth century.
In 1666 the Dutch captured English vessels in the Elbe, an English
fleet attempted to capture Dutch ships in Bergen in 1665, and the
French attempted to cut out some Dutch ships in Lisbon in 1693.
Neutral sovereignty was better respected in the eighteenth century,
but in 1742 a British captain chased some Spanish galleys and drove
them into the French port of St Tropez, and burned them there,
though France was officially neutral.2 In 1759 Admiral Boscawen
captured two French vessels in Portuguese waters, and France made
the non-compliance by Great Britain with the Portuguese claims for
reparation a ground of her declaration of war against Portugal in
1762, alleging that Portuguese neutrality was fraudulent.8 Re-
cruiting in neutral States was not considered improper down to the
middle of the eighteenth century and in 1677 England granted to
both France and Holland, then at war, the right to enrol Englishmen
in their armies. Letters of marque to neutral privateers were also
granted by belligerents.
The subject of contraband has always been one on which nations
have taken divergent views, and even to-day it cannot be said
that a really unanimous custom is established. The principle that a
belligerent always had the right to prevent access to his enemy of
commodities immediately of use to him in the prosecution of the
hostilities has always been received; the difficulty has turned on
the articles to be included under this head. The word " Contraband"
means "in defiance of an injunction35 (Contra bannum), and belligerents
issued lists of articles or made treaties enumerating those which
1 De jure beUi ac pacts (1628), Kb. ra, cap. xvii.
a Mahan, p. 263. » Hall, § 209.
CONTRABAND 555
came under this head. Grotius distinguished three classes of articles:
"There are some objects which are of use in war alone, as arms ; there
are others which are useless in war, and which serve only for purposes
of luxury; and there are others which can be employed both in war
and in peace, as money, provisions, ships and articles of naval equip-
ment".1 There was a general agreement among States that the first
class was liable to capture when destined for an enemy country, fleet
or army ; the dispute, which has not even yet been ended, turned
on those which came under the third heading (res ancipitis usus).
Numerous treaties enumerating contraband articles were made
between States with the object of saving disputes when war arose,
but these treaties are not consistent with each other, and vary from
generation to generation.2 The English doctrine of treating goods of
the third class as contraband only according to special circumstances
such as a clear destination to the armed forces of the enemy gave rise
to the class of contraband known as "conditional53, but these by
treaty were often dealt with less severely than the first class, called
absolute contraband, and when captured they were brought in for
pre-emption not for condemnation.8 The law was uncertain, and
treaties by no means uniform; these facts must be remembered in
considering international disputes on the subject during this period.
The use of blockade as a means of depriving a belligerent of all
commercial relations with neutrals appears in the latter part of the
sixteenth century. It seems possible that an earlier attempt to in-
troduce blockade may be attributed to Edward III in 1346, who
ordained that every foreign ship which should attempt to enter a
French port should be taken and burned. The Dutch in the war of
liberation from Spain in 1584 and 1586 declared that the coasts
of Flanders then in Spain's possession were under blockade, and that
ships endeavouring to enter the ports would be captured. Such a
declaration was merely one on paper ; the Dutch had not the means
to make it effective in the sense in which that word came to be under-
stood subsequently, that is, dangerous for any ship to attempt to
contravene. They issued similar decrees in 1622 and 1624 and again
in June 1630. The latter appears to be the first public document
determining the conditions of blockade and was the subject of
a learned commentary by Bynkershoek.4 The doctrines therein
enunciated were afterwards incorporated into English Prize law. The
edict laid down that not only would ships and cargoes which were
seized when actually attempting to break blockade be condemned,
but that a ship was liable to capture from the moment it started on
its voyage with intent to break the blockade. It was further provided
1 Dehare belli ac pacts, lib. m, cap. i, s. 5.
_ j lib. i, cap. iv; Fauchifle, P., Traitt de droit international public,
§ 1596; Wcsdake, J.* Collected Papers, p. 3226.
556 GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1648-1763
that vessels that had entered a port under blockade were liable to
capture on their return voyage until they had reached a neutral port.
When Holland was at war with England in 1652 and 1666 the States-
General declared a blockade not only of all the ports of Great Britain
but of all her possessions in other parts of the world. In these cases
any real investment was obviously impossible. When Holland was
at war with France in 1672 and 1673 a similar blockade was declared
against France and French possessions. The Treaty of Whitehall1
between England and Holland (22 August 1689) contains an im-
portant preamble setting forth the principles of naval warfare which
the Powers would adopt. The greatest damage was to be done to the
enemy and particularly all commerce and traffic with him was to be
broken off so that he should not be able to obtain the means of carry-
ing on his war. "Le but de toute guerre maritime est la mine du
commerce ennemi", said a French admiral in 1874, a^d the Treaty
of Whitehall in providing "qu'on fasse en sorte que tout le commerce
et trafic avec les sujets du Roi Tr&s-Chretien soit effectivement rompu
et interdit" enunciated a similar doctrine. The treaty forbade the
subjects of both of the allies to trade with the enemy under penalty
of condemnation of ship and cargo, while as regards neutrals they
were to be informed that vessels which sailed for French ports before
notification would be diverted, and that those which sailed after such
notification would be captured and condemned as good prize. In
the treaty the word "blockade" is not used, and it has been stated by
a great international lawyer2 that the document did not profess to
exercise a belligerent right against neutrals, but in effect to forbid
neutrality. Whether this be so, or whether it may be taken as another
instance of paper blockade, it is an example of the use which naval
Powers were prepared to make of their strength so long as neutrals
were not sufficiently powerful to assert themselves. The blockade of
1689, says Westlake, was the first appearance of England as a block-
ading Power, except in case of siege, and probably the first appear-
ance of any Power other than Holland in this r61e.8 There are other
treaties of the period which deal with blockade as a species of siege
by investment by sea, and the wider extension of the idea to exclude
neutrals from all commerce with the enemy, not merely to prohibit
trade in contraband, alarmed neutral States such as Sweden and
Denmark. These two States in 1693 resorted to reprisals to obtain
relief from the belligerent burdens and succeeded in obtaining the
release of several of their ships by both England and Holland and
a recognition of the necessity of blockades being effective. The
struggle between belligerent claims to decree "paper" blockades
(btocus du cabinet) and neutral insistence on close and effective
1 Dumont, vol. vm, pt n, p. 238; Strupp, i, 22; Calvo, Droit international theorique et
atique, v, 180. ^
« Wesdake, J., International Law, War, p. 261; cf. Clark, G. N., p. 33.
8 WcsdaJcc, J., Collected Papers, p. 332.
BLOCKADE AND THE RIGHT OF SEARCH 557
blockades continued, and treaties were entered into in the early part
of the eighteenth century declaring that blockades were only effective
when vessels attempting to enter were exposed to the fire of ships of
the blockading squadron,1 and some went so far as to fix the number
of ships necessary to constitute the blockade.2
It does not appear that blockade had definitely acquired the
meaning of lawful exclusion of all commerce from an invested place,
leaving open the question of what might be a real investment. The
claims of belligerents by a mere declaration to exclude all neutral
commerce from enemy ports without any attempt at making the
declaration effective caused neutrals increasingly to claim the right
to maintain freedom of commerce with the belligerents, and by the
middle of the eighteenth century the preponderating opinion and
practice were against the validity of paper blockades.
In order to ascertain whether a merchant ship was enemy or neutral,
and if neutral carrying contraband or attempting to break blockade,
belligerent warships asserted a right to visit and search all merchant
ships in time of war. The right is one of considerable antiquity, and
codes of maritime law, ordinances and treaties had recognised it by
the sixteenth century.3 During the seventeenth century there were
numerous treaties regulating the formalities to be observed, one of
the most important being the Treaty of the Pyrenees (17 November
1 659)* between France and Spain, the principles of which were em-
bodied in the treaty of commerce made between Great Britain and
France on n April 1714 (Arts, xxiv-xxvi).5 The question whether
neutral merchant vessels sailing under the convoy of one or more of
these national warships were liable to be visited was raised in 1653
when Qjieen Christina of Sweden ordered convoying ships to "decline
that they or any of those that belonged to them be searched". By
sailing under the protection of their warships neutral merchant
vessels, if free from search, would be encouraged to engage in un-
neutral trade and thus inflict considerable damage on belligerents.
The question raised by Queen Christina was left untouched by the
settlement in the Treaty of Westminster (1654). In the same year
the Dutch, who were now neutral, put forward arguments in favour
of the right of convoy, without, however, denying the right of bellig-
erent search. They laid stress on the inconveniences to neutral trade
which it involved. Two years later Admiral de Ruyter successfully
resisted an attempt to visit a convoy under his command, and after
some discussion a compromise was reached whereby the papers of
the convoyed ships were produced to the captain of the visiting ship,
1 Dumont, vra, 62, 113.
1 Wenck, F. A. G., Codex juris gentium, i, 591 ; n, 753.
8 Kg$^9A.Pttcetl4<froit<kvisiteetdecaptwed^ Recuett des Cours de
I'Acadttme de droit international, 1926, i, 74.
4 Dumont, vol. vi, pt n, p. 264 (Art. xvn).
6 Strupp, K.j Documents pour sermr d FMstoire du droit des gens, i, 40.
558 GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1648-1763
and if sufficient grounds for seizure appeared, the protection of the
convoying ship was withdrawn. The Dutch, when belligerents, did
not hesitate to exercise the right of visit and search over convoyed
neutral ships and there is no evidence of resistance until 1759 when
the Dutch again claimed to withdraw their convoyed ships from the
right of visit. Their purpose was to avoid the application by Great
Britain of the "Rule of the War of 1756" in regard to the French
colonial trade, but it would seem that their claim was unheeded by
Great Britain. In the latter part of the eighteenth century and during
the Napoleonic wars claims by neutrals for their convoys to resist
visit and search became more frequent, but until 1781 the practice
of visiting convoyed neutral vessels was general.1 Great Britain has
been consistent in maintaining the exercise of the right to visit neutral
convoys, the introduction of which she contended showed prima facie
intention to carry on an illicit commerce. The whole subject came into
great prominence during the American War of Independence and
. the Napoleonic wars.
It has already been pointed out2 that letters of reprisal to private
individuals to obtain redress of their grievances ceased about the
middle of the seventeenth century. But the issue of letters of marque
for the purpose of general reprisals was common and in time of war
they were granted to large numbers of private persons whose ships
greatly increased the fighting forces of the belligerents. The name
"privateer" is given in the early part of the eighteenth century to
such ships. The motives of the holders of letters of marque were
plunder and self-enrichment: there was an absence of proper control
Dver the crews, and their operations constantly called for regulation.
The fact that the owners had to give security and were given special
instructions8 does not seem to have reduced the evils. The vessels
were frequently employed in trade in addition to their warlike
operations and every maritime nation, especially those with small
regular navies, relied on privateers who wrought great havoc amongst
their adversary's merchant ships. General regulations as regards
prizes began in England by an Act of William and Mary, 1693,*
which was the first of a series of Prize Acts passed at the beginning
of nearly all subsequent wars. Under these Acts captors, whether
ships of the Royal Navy or privateers, took their tide to their prizes
after they had been condemned in the Prize Court.
During this period there was little difference in construction or
design between ships of the Royal Navy and merchant ships, and the
Admiralty frequently hired or bought merchant ships for incorpora-
tion temporarily or permanently into the Navy. The pay in the Navy
was poor, though it was increased by the capture of prizes. In the
1 Hall, § 272; Dupuis, C., Le droit de la guerre maritime, § 944.
2 See chapter vn. 3 Marsden, R. G., n, xvi, 403-35.
4 4 & 5 Will, and Mary, cap. 25.
LETTERS OF MARQJLJE 559
time of the Commonwealth a farther reward was introduced in
"gun-money", a payment to the officers and men on board
H.M.'s ships of war of so much per gun on board enemy ships
of war captured or destroyed. This was changed in 1693 to "head-
money", a payment of so much per head for every man who was
on board the enemy warship at the beginning of the action in which
the ship was taken. This rule still holds good, but the money so
granted is called Prize Bounty.1
A distinction at one time existed between privateers and private
ships furnished with letters of marque, the former only being en-
titled to gun or head money, but the distinction was abandoned by
the time of the Napoleonic wars.2 East Indiamen commonly carried
letters of marque authorising them to capture pirates who were still
a scourge to navigation, and on one occasion commissions were
issued to assist the East India Company in its war against the King
of Bantam.8 The crews of these vessels thus became entitled to prize
money and head money in case they captured their assailant.
Merchant ships were frequently armed in self-defence and this
practice was a very old one. Pirates and privateers were likely to be
met and merchant ships were forced to arm or to sail in convoys.
An Order in Council of 4 December 1672 ordered masters of merchant
vessels going on foreign voyages to sail in convoys and to keep together
and mutually assist and defend each other and for this purpose to
be well provided with "muskets, small-shots, hand grenades and
other sorts of ammunition and military provisions".4 Such defen-
sively-armed ships frequently took part in engagements, and this was
the rule not only with British ships, but with ships of other nations.
In the case of the capture of the San Domingo convoy on 20 June
1747, nearly all the merchant ships were armed, and in the battle off
Cape Finisterre in the same year four armed French East India
merchant ships took part.5 Captures which such non-commissioned
ships made were condemned to the Crown, as in fact were all captures,
but these captures were termed "Droits of Admiralty" and only
portions of the proceeds of the prizes were given ex gratia to the private
captors. On the other hand, the holders of letters of marque, the
privateersmen, were entitled to the prizes they captured after con-
demnation, such prizes as well as those captured by ships of war being
called "Droits of the Crown".
Naval operations during this period, especially those of privateers,
were often characterised by brutality. Cruelty in the West Indies
was not confined to the Spanish seamen. Rear-Admiral Stewart,
1 Higgins, A. Pearce, " Ships of War as Prize " in Studies in International Law and Relations,
pp. 205-8.
1 The Fanny, i Dods. Rep. 443. 8 Marsden, n, 105.
4 Higgins, A. Pearce, "Defensively-armed merchant ships" in Studies in International
Law and Relations, p. 247.
5 Beatson, R., Rowland Military Memoirs, i, 341, 343.
560 GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1648-1763
writing to the Admiralty on 12 October 1731 in reference to orders
he had received to make reprisals, said : "We have fifty trading ships
to one of the Spaniards in these seas; so in this way of making re-
prisals we must in the end be losers. We are the aggressors by our
illicit trade, carried on by armed sloops or with convoy, in defiance
of law. The Spaniards retaliate by robbing such of ours as they can
master. Our illicit traders are as cruel to the Spaniards, murdered
seven or eight of them on their own shore".1 Smugglers, unlicensed
-traders and privateers were engaged in the work of plunder in various
parts of the ocean, piracy was common and the exercise by vessels
under letters of marque of the belligerent right of visit and search
of neutral ships, in which a high degree of character and forbearance
on the part of the visiting officers is of especial importance, was
frequently carried out in such a manner as to produce serious
complaints by neutral States.
1 Marsden, n, 278.
CHAPTER XX
MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
JVlERCANTILISM was the economic expression of the militant
nationalism which sprang out of the social and political changes of
the sixteenth century. Its exponents assumed that it was the business
of the State to promote the economic interests of the country. They
also supposed that the normal way of doing so was to encourage
foreign trade. Since they did not conceive of trade between one
country and another as of mutual advantage, they were particularly
concerned with measures calculated to secure a favourable balance
for their own country. To this end it seemed vitally important that
the value of exports should exceed the value of imports. "For as a
pair of scales '% says Misselden,1 "is an invention to show us the
weight of things, whereby we may discern the heavy from the light. . .
so is also this balance of trade an excellent and politique invention
to show us the difference of weight in the commerce of one kingdom
with another: that is, whether the native commodities exported, and
all the foreign commodities imported do balance or over-balance one
another in the scale of commerce. ... If the native commodities ex-
ported do weigh down and exceed in value the foreign commodities
imported, it is a rule that never fails that then the kingdom grows
rich and prospers in estate and stock: because the overplus thereof
must needs come in in treasure.. . .But if the foreign commodities
imported do exceed in value the native commodities exported, it is
a manifest sign that the trade decayeth, and the stock of the kingdom
wasteth apace; because the overplus must needs go out in treasure."
This passage expresses very clearly the simple form of the theory. Only
commodities, i.e. material things, are taken into consideration; it
is assumed that their values can be ascertained; and a favourable
balance is one that imposes on another country an obligation to send
" treasure ", by which is understood the precious rnetals in the form of
coin or bullion. For the mercantilists attached great importance to
the accumulation of gold and silver within the country. While they
did not usually fall into the crude error of confusing money with
wealth, they did believe that it was necessary to adopt measures to
attract it into the country. Scarcity of money seemed to them to lead
to stagnation of trade, and lack of treasure might in the event of war
involve disaster; they were often not clear whether they wanted a
large volume of active currency or a considerable hoard only to be
used in an emergency. In the second half of the seventeenth cen-
tury, when Louis XIV's minister, Colbert, was vigorously applying
1 Misselden, Edward, The Circle qf Commerce (1623), pp. 116-17.
36
562 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
mercantile principles in France, it was natural to put particular
stress on the importance of the accumulating of money as the sinews
of war. Public policy, therefore, should be directed to the main-
taining of favourable balances, and to the extent it succeeded in doing
so, national wealth was necessarily augmented and national safety
guaranteed.
The* practical conclusions which the mercantilists drew from the
theory that foreign trade was the chief means of increasing national
wealth and that a favourable balance was an essential condition are
abundantly illustrated in the trade policy of the period. Since trade
was understood to mean the exchange of commodities, their assump-
tions defined their attitude towards imports, exports and re-exports.
All imports had to be carefully scrutinised. If they were luxuries they
threatened to drain away treasure without affording any compen-
sating advantage. Hence there was a presumption in favour of
sumptuary legislation which would discourage the use of non-
necessaries. If they were manufactured goods, they were thought
to prejudice the employment of labour at home. For this reason
there was a growing tendency to restrict, or even to prohibit, the im-
portation of such goods. If they were the necessary raw materials
of native industries, they had to be admitted; but the consequent
dependence on foreign countries for supplies was always regarded
with some uneasiness. A good example is that of "naval stores", a
general term which covered such articles as masts, ship timber, tar,
pitch, resin and hemp. In the seventeenth century England had to
secure these from the Baltic countries.1 But it was considered highly
unsatisfactory that she should have to rely on foreign countries for
commodities indispensable for naval defence, and that the extent of
the dependence should involve a constant unfavourable balance of
trade with them. With regard to exports, it was thought desirable
that they should as far as possible be manufactured goods, both
because manufactured goods were of greater value than raw materials
(it being supposed that labour had necessarily added to their value),
and because the export of raw materials provided rivals with the
means of competing in production. The export of "white", or
unfinished, cloth was a subject of constant complaint against the
Merchant Adventurers and the export of raw wool was actually
prohibited. With the extension of trade to the East and West, tropical
and sub-tropical products offered great possibilities for the profitable
exploitation of re-exports. It was to eliminate the dependence on the
Dutch for spices that certain London merchants sought a charter
for a company to- trade to the East. The early voyages of the East
India Company were all directed to the Spice Islands. Since there
was no considerable demand for English goods there, the Company
was from its inception allowed to export a certain amount of silver,
1 See Albion, R. G., Forests and Sea Power, chap. iv.
THE BALANCE OF TRADE 563
a privilege which invited attack because it ran counter to the pre-
vailing doctrine. The Company was accused of undermining the
strength of the country and of being "enemies of Christendom", for
"they carried away the treasure of Europe to enrich the heathen5*.1
It was to meet these criticisms that Thomas Mun developed the
argument which he later incorporated in England's Treasure by
Forraign Trade2 — long recognised as a classical exposition of mer-
cantilism— that it was quite permissible to export bullion if it
was used to purchase commodities which could be subsequently
re-exported and sold at a profit. This was a notable advance in the
discussion of the mechanism of the balance of trade. Mercantilists
had hitherto virtually confined their attention to the simple import
and export relations between two given countries. The complexities
of foreign trade were now somewhat grudgingly recognised, and the
restrictions on the export of bullion were ultimately abandoned. In-
creasing importance was attached to re-exports, the mercantilists
setting particular value on the enfrepdt trade in such commodities as
spices, sugar and tobacco.
By the end of the seventeenth century the stress had come to be-
laid on the promotion of employment within the country, rather than
on the import of the precious metals, as the aim of mercantilist policy.
It was held that a country was necessarily prosperous if it had a large
population fully employed in the making of goods for foreign markets.
Employment which did not lead to increased exports was not thought
to be advantageous. "By what is consumed at home", Davenant
asserts, "one loseth only what another gets, and the nation in general
is not at all the richer; but all foreign consumption is a clear and
certain profit."3 The desideratum was a population as large as
possible, as fully occupied as possible, and living as near as possible
to the margin of subsistence. Since output was not increased to any
appreciable extent by the use of machinery or power, and since no
particular stress was laid on the principle of the efficiency of labour,
contemporaries were apt to regard the contribution of one worker
to the total of national production as much the same as that of
another. Consequently to increase the total production it seemed
necessary to add to the number of the workers. Some writers speak
as though mere size of population should be considered, but it was
generally recognised that it was not purely a question of numbers;
the people had to be properly employed. The general impression at
the end of the seventeenth century was that England was under-
populated. It was computed that owing to lack of men the country
was losing large sums annually. She was at a disadvantage, it
was alleged, in competition with Holland and France, her chief
1 The Trades Increase (1615) in Harleian Miscellany (1809), rv, 223.
* Published posthumously in 1664.
3 Davenant, Charles, Political and Commercial Works, collected by Sir Charles Whit-
worth (1771), i, 102.
36-2
564 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
commercial rivals, for they had a greater output at lower costs because
they were well populated.
But to invade foreign markets it was necessary to undersell com-
petitors, and to undersell competitors low costs of production were
essential. The best way of obtaining low costs, it was generally
assumed, was by paying low wages, and this a large population tended
to ensure. The population— large and industrious — was to remain,
therefore, at the bare level of subsistence to gain advantage in the
foreign market and thereby promote national prosperity. Ajay factor
which contributed to the increase of the working population, e.g. the
immigration of workers from the continent, was to be welcomed.
The labouring classes were sometimes spoken of as the wealth of the
country, their value being computed as equivalent to the difference
between the price of the raw materials on which they worked plus the
wages they were paid and the price obtained for the finished articles
when exported. This difference was also regarded by the mercan-
tilists as an addition to national wealth — as indeed the only addition
worth troubling about — and, therefore, size of population, its employ-
ment and the export of manufactured articles, were of fundamental
importance in their system.
The economic problems involved in colonisation were approached
by the statesmen of the late seventeenth century in the light of these
general principles. Obviously the planting of colonies was a drain
on the population of the mother country. This was a matter of much
concern after the Revolution of 1688. Popular ideas on the question
of population are always empirical. During the social dislocation of
the sixteenth century the impression had grown that England was
overpopulated, and that it would be good policy to find new homes
for the surplus in Plantations in Ireland or the New World.1 This
view, however, gave place about the middle of the seventeenth
century to the belief that the country was underpopulated. The losses
of the Civil War and the growing intensity of commercial rivalry in
Europe aroused alarm. Sir William Petty thought it would be as
well if the inhabitants of New England would return.2 Roger Coke
alleged that it was because so many had emigrated to Amerita that
the Dutch had been able to compete with us in the trade with Russia
and the Levant. The essential condition of colonisation — emigration
from the mother country— therefore ran counter to the principle that
national interest demanded a large population at home.
But just as Mun found arguments in favour of the export of bullion
when such export was required by circumstances, so mercantilists
had to consider whether emigration could be justified when it was
an accomplished fact. The attitude of Sir Josiah Child is instructive.
1 Vide supra, p. 69.
» Economic Writings cfSir William Petty, ed. HuH, i, 301 ; cf. Coke, Roger, A Discourse of
Trade (1670), pp. 7-9.
IMPORTANCE OF A LARGE POPULATION 565
He has to accept the proposition that "whatever tends to the
depopulating of a kingdom tends to the impoverishment of it".1 But
he denies that emigration to the American Plantations has had any
marked effect on the population of the mother country. In this view
he admits that he was in a minority of possibly one in a thousand.2
That many had gone to the colonies, he submits, is not a proof that
they would have stayed in the country had there been no colonies to
go to. The " sort of people called Puritans " had gone to New England ;
but if that way had not been opened up to them they would probably
have gone to Holland or Germany. The "sort of loose vagrant
people5* who had gone to Virginia and Barbados would have been
hanged or would have died of starvation or disease had they stayed
at home.3 These considerations seemed to him greatly to minimise
the damage done to the mother country. Still, loss of people is a loss
even if it is inevitable. But their departure to the colonies need not
involve the complete loss which their settlement in a foreign country
would. If the colonists were forced to confine their trade to the mother
country, they would create a demand for home manufactures and
therefore promote employment. In consideration of the initial loss
and in order to secure ultimate compensation, the trade of the colonies,
therefore, should be "confined by severe laws, and good execution
of those laws, to the mother-kingdom".4
It may be admitted that if trade relations between the colonies and
the mother country were controlled, a new market for manufactured
goods would be created, and the demand would stimulate employ-
ment. Sir Josiah Child adduces the case of the West Indies where he
says "one Englishman with the ten blacks that work with him,
accounting what they eat, use and wear, would make employment
for four itoen in England".5 But it may be asked, granted the country
was underpopulated, how could such an increased demand be met?
Emigration would seem to accentuate the difficulty. Child's answer
is "sueli as our employment is for people, so many will our people
be".6 If there is abundant employment, wages will rise and aliens
will *be encouraged to settle in the country. Davenant definitely
suggests that aliens should be attracted so that immigration should
compensate for emigration.7 This view is insisted upon by William
Wood, who as late as 1718 repeats Davenant's contention that "a
country, which takes no care to encourage an accession of strangers,
in the course of time will find Plantations of pernicious consequence".8
A Bristol merchant, John Gary, sums up the discussion very well.
Against the Plantations, he says, may be set the fact that "they have
drained us of multitudes of our people who might have been ser-
viceable at home and advanced improvements in husbandry and
1 Child, Sir Josiah, A JV«0 Discourse of Trade (1693), p. 165. a Ibid. p. 169.
8 Ibid. p. 170. * Ibid. p. 183. * Aid. p. 179. e Ibid. p. 174.
7 Davenant, n, 187.
8 Wood, William, A Survey of Trade (1718), p. 134,
566 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
manufactures59.1 Butwhile "people are the wealth of a nation" they
can only be so "where we find employment for them, otherwise they
must be a burthen to it". He concludes that the Plantations are an
advantage "tho5 not all alike, but every one more or less, as they
take off our product and manufactures, supply us with commodities
which may either be wrought up here or exported again, or prevent
fetching things of the same nature from other places for our home
consumption, employ our poor and encourage our navigation".2
The practical conclusion drawn by contemporaries, whether they
were impressed by the supposed loss inflicted on the country by
emigration or by the opportunities for increasing home employment
afforded by the colonies, was that every consideration of prudence
and policy required that their trade should be restricted to the mother
country. To allow foreign countries free access to the colonies or the
colonies free access to foreign countries was out of the question. The
problem for the mercantilists was to find how the colonies could be
used as a means of strengthening national power. They were in the
making and should be so fashioned that they would be of service to the
mother country in her contest widi her formidable commercial rivals. It
took time to explore the possible ways in which the colonies could be
made economic assets. Under the stress of competition, first with the
Dutch and then with the French, England developed a system within
which the colonies were to play an important part. The broad founda-
tions were laid in the reign of Charles I J. During the Commonwealth
the Navigation Act of 1651 s had attempted to set restrictions on the
carrying-trade which were designed to damage the Dutch. - At the
Restoration influences were brought to bear to induce the Govern-
ment to continue this measure. The Navigation Act of 1660* con-
fined the trade of England and her possessions in Asia, Africa and
America to vessels belonging "to the people of England or Ireland"
or to those built in and belonging to the Plantations. The mister and
three-quarters of the crew had to be English, i.e. subjects "of the
English Crown. One obvious effect of these regulations was to limit
the amount of shipping available for colonial trade and consequently
to raise the freights. But this restriction was an encouragements to
the building of ships in such Plantations as were favourably placed
for the development of the industry. There is no doubt that it did'
stimulate shipbuilding in the New England colonies. Contempo-^
raries regarded the Navigation Acts as justified because they increased
English shipping, and they vied with one another in praising the
wisdom which inspired the legislation. The multiplication of shipping
and the training of a large number of sailors were ends which mer-
cantilists considered of such importance that they were willing to
1 Gary, John, An Essay towards Regulating the Trade and Emptying the Poor of tins Kingdom
Jf t^ r
Ordinances of ike Interregnum, n, 559-62.
4 12 Car. II, cap. 18. For the details of this and subsequent legislation see chapter DC.
ECONOMIC SUBJECTION OF COLONIES 567
make sacrifices to attain them. Ships were necessary for the defence
and extension of trade, they represented one of the chief forms of
feed capital, and the Navigation Acts offered an indirect subsidy
to the builders and owners of them. Capital might have been more
profitably invested in other directions, but it was desirable in the
national interest to divert it to shipping. The colonial trade, on
account of the long voyages and the bulky nature of the cargoes, de-
manded more ships for the handling of commodities of a given value
than the European trade did. This was thought to be in its favour.
Private enterprise would have avoided such a trade had it not been
able to secure adequate returns. The Navigation Acts by limiting
competition offered such returns. Thus the colonists had little of
which to complain. If the restrictions were a benefit to the Thames
shipbuilders, they were also a benefit to the New England ship-
builders ; if they increased the freights which the Virginia tobacco
exporters had to pay, they also increased the freights which some
English merchants had to pay. Special interests reaped advantages
at the expense of other interests; but the mercantilists were satisfied
if the upshot was that the amount of shipping — English and colonial
— was augmented.
The Navigation Act of 1660, however, gave definite expression to
the principle of "enumeration", which obviously involved the sub-
ordination of the colonies to the mother country. The intention was
to make sure that the commodities enumerated, if sent to Europe,
should in the first instance be shipped to England. The mother
country was thus to become the entrepdt for important colonial staples,
viz. sugar, tobacco, cotton-wool, indigo, ginger, fustic or other dyeing
woods. She was herself to be independent of supplies from foreign
countries, and what she did not require for her own use she was to
re-export. This would mean that to the extent that hopes were
realised the balance of trade would be redressed in her favour. The
colonies, for their part, were limited to a single market, which tended
to reduce the price they received for the commodities. A supple-
mentary Act was passed in 1663 which forbade direct trade between
the continent of Europe and the colonies, and constituted England
"a staple, not only of the commodities of those Plantations, but also
of the commodities of other countries and places for the supplying
of them". A few exceptions were made to this general rule — salt
could be sent direct from the continent for the fisheries of New
England and Newfoundland, and wines could be shipped from
Madeira and the Azores.1
Since the colonies were not included within the fiscal system of the
mother country, all commodities they sent to England and all com-
modities shipped from England to them paid import and export
duties respectively, unless special provision was made in specific
1 15 Gar. II, cap. 7.
568 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
cases, e.g. enumerated articles enjoyed a preferential rate. The trade
regulations, therefore, were the source of a direct contribution to the
State, apart from the indirect advantages the entrepdt trade afforded.
Contemporaries were apt to exaggerate the fiscal benefits of the
staple system. The main imports from the colonies were sugar and
tobacco; if these were re-exported, one-half of the duty in the case
of sugar and three-quarters in the case of tobacco was refunded,
and, although these duties became much more complicated later,
the principle of preference was maintained. The Government re-
ceived the difference between the tax and the drawback, less the
costs of collection, as well as the whole duty on the sugar and tobacco
consumed within the country. It was frequently supposed that the
colonies paid the duty on the sugar and tobacco consumed in England,
a naive piece of economic analysis which tended to strengthen the
impression that the mother country was gaining more than she
actually was. The export duties paid on goods sent to the colonies
fell on the colonial consumers, but they were generally light. An
anomaly of the original system of enumeration was that goods ex-
ported from the colonies to England paid import duties, while those
which were sent to another colony dSd not necessarily do so; if the
importing colony levied no duties on the goods, or levied lighter
duties than the mother country did, it was in effect offering prefer-
ence. This was met by the Act of 1673* which imposed export duties
on enumerated articles if they were shipped to another colony. While
the import duties on colonial goods landed in England and the
export duties levied on goods sent to the colonies were collected by
the Custom House officers in this country, provision had to be made
for the collection of the export duties under this Act in the colonies
themselves. As already explained, collectors were appointed for this
purpose by the Commissioners of Customs, and many difficulties
arose.2
After the Revolution of 1688-9 ^ constant preoccupation with
the European war and difficulties at home prevented William III
from taking any definite steps with regard to trade affairs until
the spring of 1696. By that time considerable outcry had arisen
among merchants, for they were suffering from many embarrass-
ments owing to the continuance of the war. It was freely said that
the country's economic interests were being neglected. Suggestions
were put forward that a council of merchants should be appointed
and charged under the terms of an Act of Parliament with the super-
vision and furtherance of the trade interests of the country. The
agitation was met by the establishment of a new Committee for Trade
and Plantations subsequently known as the "Board of Trade".8 The
commission issued to this body in May 1696 illustrates very clearly
the mercantilist conception of the duties that the State should
1 25 Gar. II, cap. 7, sec. a. * Vide supra, p. a68. * Vuk supra, pp. 269, 413.
CONSOLIDATION OF THE COLONIAL SYSTEM 569
undertake and of the place that colonies should occupy in a national
scheme. The Committee was to enquire what trades were advan-
tageous and what disadvantageous to the country, and it was to
explore means of fostering the former and of correcting the latter.
It was to consider the "setting on work and employing the poor"
of the country. Special attention had to be paid to the colonies, for
in the successful development of these new areas might well be found
the solution of some of the mother country's more difficult problems.
Commodities for which she had hitherto been dependent on foreign
countries might be secured from the colonies if the proper steps were
taken. This might involve the giving of special encouragement to
certain activities in the colonies and the definite discouragement of
others. The Committee was in fact expected to work out a complete
mercantilist programme; and throughout the period of its existence
it certainly attempted to do so, though not with uniform persistency.
Its functions were limited to enquiry and report, a fact which largely
explains its later ineffectiveness; for the compilation of reports and
recommendations, which were either completely ignored or only
accepted with serious modifications, did not supply a sufficient
stimulus for continuous activity.
The main principles of the colonial system had been defined
in the laws of trade and navigation, but it was already quite
clear that the enforcement of this code presented considerable diffi-
culties. Evasion was undoubtedly common enough when it offered
any advantage. It was impossible to supervise all the shipping along
the miles of coast of the mainland of North America and among the
intricacies of the West Indies. The war with France made the task
more arduous than it would otherwise have been. Further, the
Customs officers found that the privileges enjoyed by the charter and
proprietary colonies hampered them at every turn. As has been men-
tioned, Edward Randolph, who had already had much experience
as an official in the colonies, was in 1691 appointed surveyor-general
of the customs in America. After an extensive tour of inspection he
drew up a long indictment against the colonists for breaches of the
trade laws. He declared that it was practically impossible to get the
juries in the common law courts to return a verdict against those
charged with breaking the law.1 In some cases advantage was taken
of omissions from or ambiguities in the existing legislation. Many of
these difficulties were removed by the comprehensive Navigation Act
of i6g6,2 the main purpose of which was to define so precisely the
application of principles already enunciated that evasion would be
more difficult.
The establishment of the new Committee for Trade and Plantations
and the passing of the comprehensive Navigation Act coincided with
1 St. Pap. Col., Board of Trade, Plantations GenL, iv, 57; cf. Toppan, R. N., Edward
Randolph, v, 1 17-24. f 7 and 8 WilL III, cap. 32.
570 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
the making of definite provision for the assessing of the volume of
trade. In 1696 William Culliford was appointed Inspector-General
of Exports and Imports in order that he "might make a balance of
the trade between this kingdom and the other parts of the world".
He was required to submit regular returns to the House of Commons.
From the year of his appointment there is a continuous series of these
returns which gave the mercantilists in general and the Board of
Trade in particular an indication of the state of trade and guidance
as to the policy it was necessary to pursue to correct adverse balances.
It is easy to criticise the general idea underlying these compilations
and the form in which the figures are presented. The values expressed,
for instance, are based on official values as given in the current book
of rates and consequently they bear no definite relation to real values.
Strictly speaking they are not values at all but quantitative terms
(tons, cwts., Ibs., yards, feet, etc.) multiplied by the official monetary
value for the time being attached to the unit of weight or measure in
the case of each commodity. Since the balance of trade was to be
found by setting the real value of exports against the real value of
imports these figures are not a true means of measuring it. These
criticisms, however, are beside the point. The mercantilists had no
other statistical method of judging whether commercial policy was
or was not achieving the ends at which they aimed. The returns were
generally regarded as an "abundant source of parliamentary in-
formation ". l The significance of the figures is, not that they accurately
represented the true state of affairs, but that they were generally
supposed to be reliable enough for practical purposes.
If the figures for a series of years be taken, a fairly clear conception
can be formed of the relative importance contemporaries would
attach to trade with the various colonies. The favourite distinction
made by mercantilist writers was between Plantations which pro-
duced commodities of a different nature from those of the mother
country and those which did not; a distinction which was ultimately
based on climatic conditions. Tropical and sub-tropical colonies were
highly valued. The original system of enumeration was designed to
secure the fullest possible benefit from them. In the first place in
order of importance according to this theory were Barbados and
Jamaica, together with Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis and St Christo-
pher. These Plantations mainly exported sugar and other enumerated
articles such as indigo and ginger.
Since sugar cultivation was carried on by means of slave labour,
it was intimately connected with the African trade. It is, therefore,
necessary to consider the exports from England to Africa as related
to and consequent upon the development of the West Indies. The
heavy exports to Africa were largely paid for by the purchasers of
slaves in the West Indies, and in the circumstances the contention
1 Burke, Edmund, Speeches in the House of Commons, i, 280 /
MERCANTILIST EVALUATION OF THE COLONIES 571
that the institution of slavery was essential to the maintenance of the
colonial system could hardly be challenged. Eighteenth-century
mercantilists, such as William Wood, Joshua Gee and Malachy
Postlethwayt, quite frankly state that the most profitable Plantation
trade — that of the West Indies — could not be carried on without slave
labour.
Of the continental colonies Virginia and Maryland were regarded
as the most valuable because they supplied tobacco. In the earlier
part of the seventeenth century attempts had been made to diversify
the products of the southern colonies, but the tobacco crop had
established itself. By the end of the century it was generally raised on
large holdings worked by slave labour. Tobacco was the only im-
portant product of the mainland which was included in the original
list of enumerated articles. It was not quite in the same category
as sugar and other exotics. Alone of the enumerated articles it
could be grown in England, but it was felt that the advantages
of getting the supply from America — the amount of shipping em-
ployed, the market for English manufactures in the colonies, and
the heavy yield of the customs duties levied on its importation —
justified the step of forbidding the cultivation of the plant in England.
The Government took drastic measures to enforce this prohibition,
and though English farmers made persistent efforts to evade the
regulation, a virtual monopoly for colonial tobacco in the English
market was ultimately secured.
Trade with Carolina was as yet of slight importance. The settle-
ments in this area had been promoted with very definite ends in
view. They were to produce commodities for which England was then
dependent on the countries of southern Europe. For seven years they
were to be exempt from the payment of English customs duties on
silks, wines, currants, raisins, capers, wax, almonds and olives. If
the settlers produced these commodities, they would not find them-
selves in competition with the existing Plantations, either West
Indian or continental, and they would contribute to correct the
adverse balance of trade between England and the Mediterranean
countries. But the idea that they could fit themselves into such a
preconceived scheme is typical of the crude notions which were
entertained about the possibilities of colonisation. It is scarcely
necessary to say that Carolina fulfilled none of these high expecta-
tions, but mercantilists continued to draw attention to her supposed
potentialities. In 1 729 Joshua Gee is still calling for special measures
to induce the colonists to supply what the mother country counted
desirable.1 Carolina, however, found a staple crop by a mere acci-
dent. A captain of a ship from Madagascar happened to give a
settler a bag of seed-rice, and experiment proved that the climate
and soil were suitable for its cultivation. It was soon grown in large
1 Gee, Joshua, Trade and Namgation of Great Britain considered (1729), pp. ai-a.
572 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
quantities and found a ready market in Spain and Portugal. It was
added to the list of enumerated articles in 1706,* with the result that
the freight charges involved in first shipping it to England so in-
creased the price that it could not compete with Egyptian and Italian
rice. But this grievance of Carolina was removed in 1730 when the
colony was allowed to export rice direct to any country in Europe
south of Cape Finisterre.2
The mercantilists were much exercised by the question whether
the mother country derived any real advantage from the northern
continental colonies. They had most serious doubts about New
England. None of its products had been enumerated because its
climate was such that what could be grown there would enter into
direct competition with English agriculture if imported to this
country. "New England", Josiah Child asserted,8 "is the most
prejudicial Plantation to this kingdom." The trouble was that New
England was a replica of Old England and not its complement. It
sold corn and cattle to the West Indies and the southern colonies, thus
depriving the mother country of possible markets for these goods.
Part of the sugar, tobacco and other commodities it secured in
payment it shipped to England in order to purchase manufactured
articles. But lie difficulty of finding sufficient means to make ex-
changes with the mother country was so great that the colonists had
a strong inducement to endeavour to supply their own requirements.
The mercantilists were suspicious of incipient industries, the develop-
ment of which would in their opinion be of serious consequence to
the mother country. So they were anxious to discover some com-
modities that New England could produce which would enable her
to be of service. The most hopeful suggestion seemed to be that she
should concentrate on the production of naval stores, for these were
required in England. Dependence on the supplies from the Baltic
countries was a matter of much concern, and to eliminate the con-
sequent adverse balances was highly desirable. But, although New
England did produce the articles included under the head of naval
stores and they were used by the local shipbuilders, they could not
gain a footing in the English market in competition with the Baltic
supplies owing to higher cost of production and heavy freight charges.
At the end of the seventeenth century the exports of New England
included few products of the region except train-oil and furs, and the
problem of making the settlements beneficial to the mother country
remained unsolved. But Child's description of New England as "the
most prejudicial Plantation" was not accepted without qualification
by subsequent writers. William Wood stressed the fact that in peace
time the northern colonies could sell provisions in the other Planta-
tions at a lower rate than the mother country could, and that in time
of war the interdependence of the colonies was of first importance.
1 3 and 4 Anne, cap. 5. * 3 Geo. II, cap. 28. 8 Child, p. 204.
OPPOSITION TO COLONIAL MANUFACTURES 573
He counted the general result advantageous to the mother country;
for, if the northern colonies found markets for their provisions, they
would not be tempted to set up manufactures but would expend the
profits of their trade in buying from England. His general conclusion
was that the northern colonies were a benefit so long as the country
possessed the sugar islands. If by any chance the islands in the West
Indies were lost they would become "prejudicial colonies to their
mother country59.1 He carried the discussion a step further than
Child did ; but he still gave to the northern colonies a secondary place
in the colonial system.
The attempt to prescribe what the colonies should produce, based
as it was on what was considered desirable rather than on an
enquiry as to what was possible, was bound to meet with disappoint-
ments. Natural development of the resources which the colonists
found to hand did not fit in with what the mercantilists conceived
to be the interests of the mother country. Nor was it possible to
restrict them to the extractive industries. Their needs as pioneers
opening up a new country, their knowledge of industrial processes
as emigrants from an old country, the potentialities of their new
environment, were all factors likely to create opposing interests,
which could not be reconciled within the narrow limits of any pre-
conceived system. To clothe themselves the colonists were forced to
make homespuns; but the transition from supplying the wants of
the household to those of a local market was easy when production,
even in the mother country, still depended on the use of the spinning-
wheel and the hand-loom. It is true that England could hold her
own in quality. For rough use, however, colonial woollens had the
advantage of immediate access to the purchasers with the economies
that involved.
In view of the importance attached to the woollen industry as the
staple industry of England it is not remarkable that the Board of
Trade should have made an enquiry into its position one of its first
tasks. That it apprehended a danger from Irish competition and
recommended the restrictions which were imposed in 1699 is well
known. The Board of Trade had represented to the House of Commons
at the same time that "Notwithstanding it was the intent in settling
our Plantations in America that the people there should be only
employed in such things as are not the product of this kingdom. . .
yet New England and other Northern Colonies have applied them-
selves too much, besides other things, to the improvement of woollen
manufactures amongst themselves, which in its proportion is as
prejudicial to this kingdom as the working of those manufactures in
Ireland; wherefore it is submitted the like prohibition be made with
relation to them".2 Powers were accordingly taken to prevent the
1 Wood, pp. 145-9 (cf. Davenant, n, 24).
1 Col. St. Pap. GoL, Addenda, 1621-98, pp. 17-18.
574 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
export of wool and woollens from the colonies to the British Isles or
foreign countries or even from one colony to another.1 Probably the
prohibition was no particular hardship at the time, even if it was
enforced, for the individual colonies wished to retain the wool they
grew for their own use, and the local manufacture of woollens had
not made much progress. In the next year the more sensible step
was taken of trying to discourage the development of the industry in
the colonies by removing the heavy export duties which had been
levied in England on wooUens shipped to America. The manufacturers,
however, still remained uneasy about possibilities in the colonies. The
Board of Trade reported in 1703 that skilled English workers were
being induced to emigrate, and there is evidence that during the War
of the Spanish Succession the northern colonies had to supply their
own requirements and that their manufacture of woollens made some
progress. Joseph Dudley, Governor of Massachusetts, reported to
the Board of Trade in March 1709 that "the woollen trade from
England is in a great measure abated, the people here clothing
themselves with their own wool".2 The reasons he ascribed for this
were the high price of English woollens and the difficulty of securing
return cargoes to pay for imports.
The members of the Board of Trade realised, indeed, that the
growth of manufactures in the northern colonies could only be pre-
vented if the colonists had a market for their provisions, and if they
could discover some commodities which might be produced for export
to themother country. For while their provisions might advantageously
be sold in the other Plantations, they could not be allowed to enter
England. Ships sometimes waited in the northern ports for months
before they could secure a return cargo. In these circumstances the
Board of Trade took up again the old suggestion of giving encourage-
ment to the production of naval stores. They had the advantage of
the active support of Richard Coote, Earl of Bellomont, who as
Governor of New York, Massachusetts and New Hampshire was
convinced that the resources of the colonies could be exploited. He
saw that, if the colonial commodities were to compete with the Baltic
supplies, it was a question of working out very carefully the costs
of production — particularly the labour costs — and of facilitating
transport. Bellomont died in office before he could do much, but
his efforts would probably have been fruitless had not the outbreak
of the War of the Spanish Succession raised a new issue. Sweden had
formed a company — the Stockholm Tar Company — which was to
enjoy a monopoly of the trade in tar and pitch. The Company
regulated the quantities to be sold and thereby controlled prices, and
it was also provided that the export of the tar and pitch should be
confined to Swedish shipping. This action greatly strengthened
the hands of the advocates of the scheme to encourage the
1 10 and ii WilL III, cap. 10. a Col. St. Pap. Col. 1708-9, p. 236.
PRODUCTION OF NAVAL STORES ENCOURAGED 575
production of naval stores in the British colonies. The Board of
Trade recommended that subsidies should be offered for an initial
period at least.1 In 1705, therefore, an Act was passed which was
to remain in force for nine years in the first instance. Naval stores
were included among the enumerated articles. Bounties were to be
given on the importation into England of naval stores, £4 a ton on
tar and pitch, £3 on resin and turpentine, £6 a ton on hemp and £i
a ton on masts, yards and bowsprits.2 The premium was to be paid
on the receipt of the proper certificate by the Commissioners of the
Navy. The attitude of Sweden and the payment of bounties gave the
colonists the opportunity of establishing the industry, for they could
now meet the high costs of production.
Lord Bellomont had entertained the idea of getting cheap labour
by employing soldiers to prepare naval stores, giving them a small
addition to their regular pay. In 1 7 1 o a project of this kind was actually
taken up by the Government in interesting circumstances. Three
thousand Germans, who had sought refuge in England from the war-
devastated Palatinate, were shipped to New York at the expense of
the Government. They were to be indentured servants until they had
repaid the capital advanced for their passage and settlement. During
this period they were to produce tar, pitch, turpentine and resin
from the trees on the banks of the Hudson River. The scheme proved
a failure. The white pines of New York were not suited for the purpose ;
the Germans had no knowledge of the work they were expected to
do and became discontented; and in the end the Government ceased
to give any further financial support.3
Suspicion of the economic tendencies in the northern colonies was
somewhat allayed by the course of events during the War of the
Spanish Succession. It had to be acknowledged that as a source of
supplies for the West Indian colonies they had played an important
part. The Board of Trade itself reported in 1709 that the West Indies
"would not be able to carry on their trade, or even to subsist (especi-
ally in time of war) without the necessary supplies from the northern
Plantations of bread, drink, fish and flesh of cattle, and horses for
cultivating their plantations, of lumber and staves for casks for their
sugar, rum and molasses, and of timber for building their houses
and sugar works".4 In addition, the advocates of the production of
naval stores had, through favouring circumstances, been able to get
the payment of bounties on them. In these two directions it might
be possible to solve the problem of giving the growing population of
the northern colonies the means of exchanging their natural products
either indirectly or directly for the manufactures of the mother
country.
1 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1704-5, p. 177.
2 3 and ± Anne, cap. 10. 3 Gobb, S. H., The Story of the Palatines, ch. iv, v.
4 Quoted by Andrews, G. M., The Colonial Background of the American Revolution, p. 90.
576 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
But the prospects were not altogether reassuring. If the northern
colonies devoted much attention to the supplying of the West Indies
with provisions, they would probably arrive at a point when the
British islands there would not afford a sufficiently extensive market.
The temptation then would be to trade with the foreign islands, par-
ticularly with those belonging to France. With respect to naval stores
it was already fairly clear that the bounties would be more successful
in evoking supplies of tar and pitch than in encouraging the pro-
duction of hemp and timber. Tar and pitch, however, came mainly
from Carolina where the existence of suitable pine forests contributed
the support of natural resources to the assistance of the bounty policy.
Nor could the mercantilists overlook the fact that the Government
had been induced to pay bounties not so much by their arguments
as by the special circumstances of the moment. There might be a
reaction against the policy when it proved expensive in peace time.
The terms of the Treaty of Utrecht influenced colonial history for
the next generation. Not that Great Britain's acquisitions in America
were particularly important in themselves. The abandonment by
France of her territorial claims in Newfoundland must be set against
the acknowledgment of her right to dry fish on a defined part of the
coast about which disputes inevitably arose. The cession of Acadia
and the recognition of British claims in the Hudson Bay territory also
carried with them the seeds of future trouble because in neither case
were definite boundaries established. Contemporary opinion, indeed,
did not set much store on territorial expansion as such, the mercan-
tilist view being that new land might be a source of weakness unless
it were peopled, and the drain on the home population was already
considerable enough. "Number of men", writes Wood, "are to be
preferred to the largeness of dominion."1 The only acquisition which
was obviously a gain was that of the French half of the island of St
Christopher because it made it possible to reduce the British garrison
in the island, and it added some 20,000 acres of land for sugar
plantation.
From the commercial point of view the most important result of
the peace negotiations with France was a negative one, namely, that
they did not lead to the placing of trade relations between the two
countries on a more liberal basis. The Tories, to whom the task of
making the peace fell, proposed that Great Britain should adopt a
low tariff on French commodities, and that each country should
accord the other most favoured nation treatment. The Whigs,
strongly supported by the merchants and manufacturers who
profited from the existing system of high tariffs, and appealing to
the bugbear of the balance, succeeded in defeating these proposals.
While the Tories professed a belief in the ability of British manu-
factures to hold their own against French goods and insisted on the
1 Wood, p, 163.
THE BOUNTY POLICY 577
benefits which would arise from greater freedom of trade, their
opponents were wedded to the idea of regulation. There was, they
alleged, a certainty of a heavy adverse balance if the suggested com-
mercial treaty was ratified. Joshua Gee, who was prominent in
supporting the opposition, afterwards restated his conviction that
"France, above all other nations, is the worst for England to trade
with: it produces most things necessary for life, and wants very little
either for luxury or convenience. . .";x supplying her own require-
ments and having a large population and therefore cheap labour,
she could, it was insisted, successfully invade the British market and
deprive the country of its treasure. Consequently it was essential in
the national interest to restrict trade with France and to find outlets
elsewhere.
The desire to avoid unfavourable balances with particular coun-
tries led to the conception of a self-contained Empire, each part
making its contribution to the development of the whole. The course
of trade was to be turned to the British colonies in America and
diverted from the natural channels which caused it to flow towards
the Baltic, France and other foreign countries. In this way it was
supposed that all the advantages of trade would be conserved, no
foreign country being able to gain any advantages on the balance.
The defeat of the Tory policy in 1 7 1 3 placed upon the Board of Trade
the responsibility of working out the details of such a scheme. It was
a formidable task. The merchants who had become prominent in
the controversy regarding the proposed commercial treaty were
constantly consulted about the best course to take. They naturally
recommended that the encouragement given to the production of naval
storesshould be maintained. In 1 713 the principle of granting bounties
on colonial produce was extended for a further period,2 but the
enthusiasts found that the policy was not generally acceptable. The
Admiralty criticised the quality of the colonial products, the Treasury
was alarmed at the expense involved, and the Eastland merchants
were naturally anxious to maintain the Baltic trade. To meet the
attacks on the quality it was agreed that the Custom House officers
should have the right to open and test barrels of tar and pitch before
granting the certificate for the payment of the bounty.8 As to the
cost to the Treasury, William Wood argued "we ought not to regard
the expense of any present encouragement at first, when we consider
the future advantages and security, not only of our trade and navi-
gation, but of all His Majesty's dominions: and 'tis most certain,
whatever shall be paid the northern colonies as a bounty at first to
enter heartily and cheerfully upon the doing of this will not be lost
to the nation, but still -remain with us; which cannot be said of what
we pay to the East Country (over and above what they take from us
in manufactures) which. . .amounts to about £200,000 a year, and
1 Gee, p. 14. * 12 Anne, cap. 9. s 5 Geo. I, cap. 2, sees. 16 and 17.
37
578 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
would be so much saved to the nation, could we have the same from
our own people".1 Joshua Gee in his Trade and Navigation of Great
Britain considered gives some account of the enquiries conducted by
the Board of Trade immediately after the Peace of 1713. He was
consulted and asked to commit his recommendations to writing; and
in the memorandum he prepared he sketched an ambitious pro-
gramme. He wished to see the production of tar and pitch further
encouraged, iron obtained from .the colonies, and large ships built
suitable for the timber trade.2 The members of the Board, he says,
were favourable to his proposals, but he was disappointed with the
attitude of the House of Commons, where "very few gentlemen
seemed to have any notion of the difficulty we were under for naval
stores, nor of the great advantage of being independent of all foreign
powers for those commodities, nor apprehensive of the difference of
purchasing every thing we wanted with our ready money from
foreigners, and raising them in our own Plantations, nor of the ad-
vantages of raising materials for employing and setting to work more
than a million of vagrant indolent wretches, whose time is spentTET
corrupting the industrious, or roving about the kingdom, or begging
from door to door".3 It is quite clear from this and other indications
that the landed interest in the House of Commons could not easily
be aroused to support the schemes of the mercantilists. Gee's con-
tention that new enterprises will always be subject to accidents and
discouragements too difficult for private persons to surmount without
the assistance of the public4 probably struck them as a doctrine
which might involve heavy financial liabilities. Nor were they likely
to accept his conclusion that, because bounties on corn had proved
advantageous, other bounties would, therefore, necessarily be of
benefit to the nation, though here he would seem to be addressing
himself to their prejudices.5
The Board of Trade, however, continued to press the case for
naval stores. In a comprehensive review made in 1721 the Board
declared that supplies of tar and pitch from the colonies had
been so abundant that home prices had been reduced and much
money had been saved on the balance of trade with the Baltic. The
Kong's speech at the opening of Parliament in October of the same
year made special reference to the subject. This was followed by an
Act which continued the bounty on hemp and also removed the
customs duty on clean hemp entering this country from the colonies.
It had been complained that the colonial tar was too hot and burned
the cordage, and provision was made that the bounty should not be
paid unless the governor of the colony gave a certificate that the tar
had been prepared in the prescribed manner.6
1 Wood, A Survey qf Trad*, p. 150.
1 Gee, Trade and Navigation (new ed. 1767), pp. 210-1 1. * Ibid. pp. au-ia.
* Ibid. p. 224. . * Aid. p. 226. ° 8 Geo. I, cap. 12.
COLONIAL PROVISION TRADE 579
All this concern about naval stores was partly due to the growing
recognition of the fact that in the years following the Peace of
Utrecht it was becoming more and more difficult to maintain that
commercial equilibrium in the colonies which mercantilist principles
demandedj The northern colonies were not responding to the policy
of the Board of Trade, and that through no fault of their own. They
were developing rapidly, and yet their direct trade with the mother
country was comparatively small because, as already shown, they
could not produce commodities which Great Britain would admit.
The temptation to set up their own industries in order to limit the
demand for British manufactures was particularly strong. To bribe
them not to do so by spending large sums of money on stimulating
the production of naval stores was really beyond the means of the
mother country; and in view of the resources of the colonies it would
have been wasteful. There remained the possibility of allowing them
to concentrate on the provision trade. As far as they supplied the
needs of the southern colonies and the British West Indies this was
compatible with the mercantile system. It was better that Great
Britain should send manufactured goods to the colonies than
that she should send provisions. Cheap and abundant supplies of
provisions were as important to the sugar and tobacco colonies as
cheap labour; in fact, they gave the same result when costs of pro-
duction came to be estimated. There was, however, a limit to this
policy. The northern colonies would not continue to send cattle,
timber and provisions to the others if they found that the market was
over-supplied, and if there were opportunities of sale elsewhere at
a higher price. Such opportunities did in fact offer themselves.
"Soon after the Peace of Utrecht", according to Postlethwayt,1
"a pernicious commerce began to show itself, between the British
northern colonies and the French sugar colonies, which began with
bartering the lumber of the former for French sugar and molasses. "
In theory, the British and French colonies should have been of
exclusive advantage to their respective mother countries, but the only
way to make sure of this would have been to prevent one group from
dealing with the other. Both Great Britain and France had con-
tinental and island colonies, and each country would have preferred
a system of self-sufficiency* A treaty of neutrality had in fact been
agreed to by England and France in i6862 under the terms of which
neither Power was to trade with the other's possessions. As matters
stood, however, it was impossible ior the French settlements in
Canada and Louisiana to supply what the French West Indies re-
quired: it was also becoming increasingly obvious that the British
northern colonies could produce more than the British West Indies
1 Postlethwayt, Malachy, Britain9 s Commercial Interest explained and improved (1757),
* a Dumont, J., Corps universel diplomatique) vol. vn, pt n, pp. 141 seqq.
580 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
wanted. The natural course was for the northern colonies to send
what they could not profitably dispose of within the British system
to supply what was lacking in the French system. To this the British
mercantilists opposed a twofold objection. It would assist in the
economic development of the French sugar colonies, and it would
hamper that of the British, giving the former the means to increase
the area under cultivation and depriving the latter of cheap cattle,
timber and provisions.
The problems which the Board of Trade had to face owing to the
development in the sugar trade were sufficiently bewildering. In
the closing decades of the seventeenth century England had enjoyed
the leading place as the purveyor of sugar to the European countries.
She greatly valued the benefits arising from the import and re-export
of raw and refined sugar. As an enumerated article it had to be ex-
ported in the first instance either to England or to one of her colonies;
in the one case it paid import duties and in the other the Plantation
duties on export. The yield of these duties was a direct contribution
to the revenue which the State did not want to forgo. But it was
strongly represented in the years immediately following the Peace of
Utrecht that sugar was so burdened by these charges that it was losing
the foreign market. That there had been a steady decline in the re-
export of sugar was beyond question. The Board of Trade had to
explore the causes of this decline. The merchants who were consulted
pointed out that there had been a great increase of home consump-
tion of sugar and consequently there was not the same surplus avail-
able for re-export. This was undoubtedly true; but it did not explain
why European countries were not offering high prices for what they
could get. Sugar was not dear on the continent because foreign
sugar plantations — Dutch, French and Portuguese — were now pro-
ducing it at lower cost than the British could. Their main advantage
would seem to have been that the soil they were using was less ex-
hausted. The West Indian interest contended that British sugar bore
heavier charges than foreign, and demanded the right of direct
export to the continent, i.e. the removal of sugar from the list of
enumerated articles. To this the Board of Trade was opposed, and
in 1724 it recommended that the principle of enumeration should
be maintained. The arguments in favour of this seemed conclusive
from the British point of view. Direct export from the West Indies
to the continent, if it took place on a large scale, would mean that
less sugar would enter this country, and since the British demand
was unlikely to decline — for the consumption of tea and coffee was
increasing year by year — consumers would have to pay more for their
sugar and the revenue would also suffer. There was the additional
danger that, if sugar were shipped direct to the continent, it would
be impossible to prevent the influx of foreign manufactures into the
West Indies as return cargoes.
WEST INDIAN SUGAR— BRITISH AND FOREIGN 581
Now that the British West Indies had serious competitors, it be-
came of some significance that the principle of enumeration merely
governed the question of the first destination of exported sugar. Great
Britain had as a matter of fact bestowed substantial preference on
British West Indian sugar, but no general law restricted either the
mother country or the colonies as to what sugar they should import.
Each colony was free to adopt what course it pleased. There was,
indeed, the general bar on trade with French Plantations contained
in the treaty of neutrality of i6863 which has already been noticed.
When the West Indian planters in 1714 complained of the effects
of the trade between the northern colonies and foreign possessions,
the Board of Trade drew attention to this treaty. Three years later
it advised the colonial governors that such trade was illegal and
that the terms of the treaty ought to be observed. But legal opinion
was sought and gave an interpretation of the treaty which made
it practically useless as an instrument for suppressing trade be-
tween British and French colonies. The treaty, it was held, did not
empower either of the contracting parties to seize and confiscate
the ships and goods of their own subjects for contravening its
articles; had it been intended to do this, confirmation of the treaty
either by Act of Parliament in Great Britain or by acts of Assembly
in the colonies would have been necessary. Before this ruling the
treaty had not been seriously regarded; it now became a virtual
dead-letter, because the French, who wished to take advantage of
such trade, were not likely to seize British ships for trading with their
Plantations in defiance of the treaty. The British planters asserted
indeed that it was "a traffic not taken up casually or by chance but
the result of a well weighed plan formed or at least approved by
the Court of France. , .and intended to be steadily and regularly
pursued".1 In any case the treaty of neutrality did not apply to
trade between the British Plantations and those of European countries
other than France, though the supply of provisions to the Dutch and
Danish islands gave rise to the same objections.
The position was complicated by the fact that the practice of im-
porting foreign sugar was not confined to the continental colonies.
The British West Indies bought sugar in the foreign Plantations and
sent it to Great Britain as though it were their own production.
Barbados, for instance, carried on a considerable trade for this
purpose with Martinique prior to 1715, when a local act was passed
which placed prohibitive duties on the importation of French goods.
Merchants were buying French sugar cheaply and getting it into
Great Britain at half rates as a British product, thus defrauding the
revenue and augmenting the supply to such an extent as to lower
prices. This tendency naturally alarmed the planters, and the policy
1 Memorial of Sugar Planters, Merchants and others.. . . See Pitman, F. W., The Development
of the British Westln£es9 1700-1763, App. XL
582 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
of prohibition was adopted in their interest.1 But they gained little
from it, because the Act of 1 715, in so far as it was enforced, raised the
price of Barbados sugar and consequently made it less attractive
to buyers in the continental colonies. Still the planters clung to the
policy of maintaining prices, and there was a demand that similar
prohibitive legislation should be adopted in the Leeward Islands.
Antigua passed an act in 1716 which prohibited the importation of
any foreign sugar, rum or molasses. The planters did not realise that
it was futile to attempt to keep up prices unless they could control the
supply of sugar. The exclusion of French sugar from the British West
Indies merely drove it to other markets where it had easy access
because it was cheap. Taking all the circumstances into consideration
the Board of Trade advised the Privy Council that the Antigua law
should be disallowed. This was done by Order in Council of 26 May
lyiQ.2 Two years later an act of the Jamaica legislature to prohibit
trade between that island and San Domingo was similarly set aside.
If it was difficult to reconcile the interests of merchants and
planters in the West Indies, it was still more difficult to deal with the
problems raised by the growing trade between the northern colonies
and the foreign sugar islands. On the one hand, there were factors
which tended to make British sugar dear — the increasing costs of
production, the restrictive policy of the planters, and the Plantation
duties which had to be paid on an enumerated article if shipped to
another British colony. On the other hand, foreign sugar was pro-
duced at low costs, the area under cultivation was rapidly extending,
and foreign planters were anxious to secure provisions and other
supplies from the mainland. In particular the French Plantations
were able to offer molasses at a low price because its export to France
was discouraged in the interests of the home production of brandy.
It was natural, therefore, that the British colonies, where the distilla-
tion of molasses into rum was a rising industry, should be ready to
buy up these supplies, and this meant that the continental colonies
found a market for their timber, provisions and live-stock outside the
British system. The economic bonds between New England, New
York and Pennsylvania and Guadeloupe and Martinique in particular
were drawn close in the decade following the Treaty of Utrecht; the
political boundaries to which both British and French mercantilists
attached so much importance were overstepped and a great con-
traband trade sprang up. This trade was to the mutual advantage of
the continental colonies and the foreign Plantations, but it was a
clear challenge to the principles on which the colonial system was
based. The British West Indies appealed to the mother country to
intervene in their behalf, and the Board of Trade recognised that the
1 See report of Charles Dunbar, surveyor-general of customs for Barbados and the
Leeward Islands, 24 Dec. 1717, Pitman, op. cit. pp. 229-30.
* AJ>.C., CbL n, 387.
COMPETITIVE WEAKNESS OF BRITISH SUGAR 583
trade was a very great discouragement to the sugar planters in the
British islands. But it had also to be admitted that the northern
colonies could not find an adequate market for their goods within
the Empire. The Board of Trade had no better solution to offer than
the old one of encouraging the production of naval stores, because
"the northern colonies would be thereby enabled to pay their
balance to England without lying under the necessity of carrying on
a trade to foreign ports in some respect detrimental to their mother
country".1
The case against the trade between the continental colonies and
the French West Indies was politico-economic. The mercantilists
could not reconcile themselves to the fact that it contributed to the
development of the French Plantations and to that extent was what
they would designate as pernicious. They also set a high value on
the sugar trade and were greatly concerned about the relative
decline of the British interest in it. In the earlier phase of the colonial
system Great Britain had hnported enough sugar to meet her re-
quirements and to maintain a dominant position on the continent
by the re-export of the surplus. Re-export, however, depended on
monopoly or the underselling of competitors. In the face of cheap
foreign supplies monopoly was out of the question, and competition
was admittedly difficult. There seemed to be three possible ways of
strengthening the competitive power of British sugar, (i) The duties
on the commodity could be reduced; (ii) sugar could be removed
from the list of enumerated articles and its direct export to foreign
countries permitted; or (iii) costs of production could be lowered by
enabling the British West Indies to secure necessaries at a cheaper
rate. The first proposal involved a probable loss to the Exchequer,
the second would jeopardise the gains from shipping, and the third
meant the imposing of restrictions on the trade of the continental
colonies- Barbados endeavoured to bring matters to an issue in 1730
by sending two petitions to the King on the question of inter-colonial
trade. These were referred by the Privy Council to the Board of Trade.
Counter petitions were received from the northern colonies. In the
following year, however, the West Indian interest adopted an inter-
esting change in tactics; they asked for leave to withdraw their
petitions and placed their case before the House of Commons. The
members of the Board of Trade had already shown that they ap-
preciated the contentions of the northern colonists and recognised that
it was their duty to consider the interests of the Empire as a whole.
But in the House of Commons a strongly organised party could
employ methods which might secure the victory for a sectional
interest. Moreover, if an Act of Parliament restricting trade with
the foreign Plantations were passed, it would be a weapon much
1 Representation to H.M. on the State of the Plantations in America, 8 Sept. 1721,
printed in New York Col. Docs, v, 591-630.
584 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
superior to any orders issued by the Privy Council and much less
likely to be modified in the immediate future. A Committee of the
House of Commons heard evidence on the extent of the trade with
the French Plantations, comparative prices and fiscal burdens. It
was well calculated to arouse prejudices. One witness, for instance,
asserted that it was the sale which the French had for molasses in
the northern colonies that enabled them to produce sugar on such
a large scale and sell it cheaply in Europe.1
As a result of the enquiry a bill was drafted which incorporated
all that the West Indian interest demanded. The importation of
foreign sugar, molasses or rum into Great Britain, Ireland or any
British dominion was to be forbidden, and foreign sugar Plantations
were not to be supplied with horses or timber. The representatives
of the continental colonies sent in strong protests against the bill,
and all the old arguments for and against it were restated in the
controversy between the opposing interests. On the one side, de-
pression in the British sugar islands and the development of the
foreign Plantations were patent facts; on the other, the value of the
foreign West Indian market to the northern colonies could not be
denied. It was a question whether the British planters were to be
given protection at the expense of the northern colonists. The House
of Commons decided in favour of doing so; but the opposition
succeeded in getting the House of Lords to delay a decision. In the
following session the bill was reintroduced in the Commons and
passed by a substantial majority of seventy-three, but again the
House of Lords adjourned without taking definite action. In 1733,
however, the bill passed the two Houses and became law. The Act* —
commonly known as the Molasses Act — is entitled "An Act for the
better securing and encouraging the Trade of his Majesty's Sugar
Colonies in America". Duties were imposed on sugar, molasses and
rum imported into the continental colonies from foreign Plantations
— five shillings a hundred-weight on sugar, sixpence a gallon on
molasses and ninepence a gallon on rum. These heavy duties would
have ruined the trade had they been rigorously imposed, but, despite
the penalties laid down in the Act, enforcement was impossible. In
its final form the Act did not forbid the sending of cargoes to the
foreign islands, the duties charged on return cargoes of sugar and
molasses evidently being considered a sufficient discouragement to
such trade. Consequently if the payment of duties could be evaded
— as it largely could be— profitable intercourse between the northern
colonies and the foreign West Indies could still be maintained.
The British planters were forced to be content with other con-
cessions which were designed to assist them to recover the European
markets. One section of the Act granted them a drawback of the
whole duty on sugar re-exported from Great Britain within a year
. xxi, 685-9. * 6 Gco. II, cap. 13.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOLASSES ACT 585
of its importation. The bounty on refined sugar exported from Great
Britain was also raised. They continued to agitate, however, for
permission to export sugar directly to the continent, and in 1739
they at last secured this privilege.1 An attempt was made to safe-
guard British shipping interests by requiring that all ships laden with
sugar and bound for northern Europe should touch at a British port,
while ships going to ports south of Cape Finisterre had to call at
a British port before returning across the Atlantic. It would seem
that comparatively little direct trade was actually established, for
British West Indian sugar was not able to compete with rival supplies
in the European market. Still the planters now had the power to
divert cargoes to the continent if they were not satisfied with the
prices offered in Great Britain.
The strength of the West Indian interest had become a dominant
factor in the control of colonial policy. This is to be explained partly
by the survival of the older conceptions of the purposes to be served
by colonies, and partly by the emergence of an organised group in
the House of Commons. The presumption was still in favour of
tropical colonies. Their exploitation naturally called into being
interests which were prepared to support their claims by incessant
argument, and did not disdain the judicious expenditure of money
in quarters where it might be effective. The extent of British invest-
ment in the sugar colonies is difficult to ascertain, but there is good
reason to believe that in the eighteenth century more capital was
attracted from Great Britain to this enterprise than to any other. The
advances usually took the form of affording long credits on goods
exported to the West Indies. It was, therefore, a matter of considerable
importance that the planters should be able to meet their obligations
punctually. Depression of trade, from whatever cause, would make
it impossible for them to do so; and investors would naturally demand
such measures as they supposed necessary to restore the prosperity of
the islands. There are many indications that those who were in-
terested in the West Indies enjoyed positions of social prestige and
political influence at home. They were able to promote a vigorous
pamphleteering campaign when they wished, and they could count
on strong support in the House of Commons. The West Indian
interest tended to stereotype the colonial system. It lent the full
weight of its prejudices to perpetuating the mercantilist view of the
value of colonies, when the developments in the continental colonies
urgently demanded the modification of policy. To attempt to arrest
development by protecting the interests of the sugar planters was
merely to court disaster. Colonisation was too accidental in its in-
ception and too uncertain in its consequences to fit into a hard and
fast system. Colonial policy required to be adaptable. To be rigid
in changing circumstances is often to be rendered ridiculous by the
1 12 Geo. II, cap. 30.
586 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
event. The Molasses Act might be justified by the maxims of mer-
cantilism and might accord with the interests of the West Indian
planters; but the fact remained that it made an important part of
the trade of the northern colonies virtually impossible if the pro-
visions of the Act were obeyed, or illicit if they were disregarded. The
New England colonies had shown themselves unceasingly active in
political opposition to the Imperial Government ever since their
foundation, and the addition of flagrant economic grievances to their
many political complaints was bound to make their opposition much
more dangerous. The difficulty was possibly unavoidable, but the
situation was rapidly proving itself beyond the competence of the
mercantile theorists, and manifestly contained the germs of serious
trouble to the Empire.
The problems raised by the production of sugar are the best
illustration of the conflict of economic interests in the colonies them-
selves. For an example of the difficulty of reconciling the interests
of the colonies with those of the mother country reference must be
made to the iron industry. In the first part of the eighteenth century
the output of iron in England was restricted by the shortage of fuel.
Large quantities of bar iron had to be imported, mostly from Sweden.
This naturally raised the twofold question of the possible danger of
dependence on a source of supply which might be cut off at any time,
and the adverse effect on the balance of trade even if the supply was
assured. It was known that there were extensive deposits of iron ore
in the colonies and the forests were an abundant source of timber for
the making of charcoal. Experiments had been made in Virginia and
Maryland, and the New England colonies had attempted to supply
the requirements of their shipyards. The English ironmasters, how-
ever, viewed these developments with suspicion. They were anxious
to keep the colonial markets, particularly for wrought iron and hard-
ware, for themselves. At the beginning of the century they had
petitioned against the giving of a drawback on foreign wrought iron
goods re-exported from England to the colonies, and Parliament
acceded to their petition. They quite realised, however, that the
attempt to monopolise the colonial markets might tend to promote
iron manufactures there. The problem was how to subordinate iron
production in the colonies to the interests of the industry in the mother
country. Could pig and bar iron be regarded as the raw materials of
British industries? This question was raised as a practical issue in
1717 when strained relations with Sweden led to the prohibition by
proclamation of all trade with that country. The prices of iron soared
to the dismay of merchants and hardware manufacturers. It was
therefore proposed to find a new source of supply by including bar
and pig iron in the list of goods the production of which was to be
encouraged in the colonies under the head of naval stores. A bill
to give effect to these suggestions was strongly opposed by the iron-
COLONIAL IRON MANUFACTURE 587
masters ; and it did not become law, for the crisis caused by the strained
relations with Sweden ended with the death of Charles XI L
In the following twenty years the production of iron made steady
progress in the American colonies, and the export from Virginia and
Maryland slowly increased. Great Britain itself still depended on
Sweden and to a growing extent on Russia for considerable supplies
of bar iron.1 It was computed that England imported annually
about 20,000 tons of foreign iron, of which 15,000 tons came from
Sweden and 5000 tons from Russia. Between 1729 and 1735 the
annual import of iron from the American Colonies was 2111 tons.
"It is strange", Gee says ruefully, "that this great charge to the
nation should not be thought of, and encouragement given to the
subjects of this kingdom to set up iron works in the Plantations, and
there employ the national stock, rather than let foreigners run away
with so great a sum."2 A number of merchants did raise the question
of encouraging the importation of pig and bar iron from the colonies
in 1 737 ; but they found the opposition as powerful as ever. The Com-
mittee of the House of Commons, to which the matter was referred,
reported that any encouragement would be prejudicial to iron
smelting at home, and the House itself so far from sympathising with
the petitioners was prepared to impose restrictions on the colonial
industry. Again the question was allowed to drop. In the presence
of the divergent interests legislation was impossible until 1 750 when
the French orientation of Swedish policy induced the House of
Commons to attempt to find a solution. A compromise was em-
bodied in the Act then passed.8 Colonial bar iron was to be imported
to London — and London only — duty free, for since the London
craftsmen normally used Swedish iron, the English ironmasters had
no strong objection to this concession. It was, however, laid down that
colonial bar iron should not be sent coastwise or more than ten miles
by land from London. These limitations, which were removed in
1757, were based on apprehensions which had little foundation, for
the importation of bar iron from America remained small during the
whole colonial period. Before the passing of the Act large quantities
of pig iron were being imported on the payment of a duty ofy. Q^d.
a ton, and the removal of this charge together with the growth of the
industry in the colonies was followed by an increase in importation.
But colonial iron — pig and bar — was never more than about a tenth
of the total import of Great Britain, and dependence on Sweden and
Russia was ultimately removed by technical changes in the industry
itself. The removal of duties on the import of colonial iron, since the
duty on pig iron was small and bar iron could only enter through the
port of London, was a slight concession to the colonies; yet it was
counterbalanced in the Act by clauses which forbade the colonists to
1 Scrivenor, H., History of the Iron Trade, pp, 72 and 81.
a Gee (ed. of 1767), pp- 116-17. 8 23 Gco. II, cap. 29.
588 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
establish mills for rolling and slitting iron, or to set up plating forges
and steel furnaces. These restrictions, so far as they were enforced,
affected the northern colonies rather than the southern, for in the
latter it was pig iron that was usually produced. The extent of the
hardship they involved is impossible to assess. In some cases they
were seriously regarded, in others they were not; but the colonial iron
industry as a whole was as yet in too primitive a condition to feel the
full effect of such prohibitions. It is significant, however, that with
iron as with sugar, colonial policy threatened to bear heavily on the
northern colonies.
By the middle of the century circumstances were calling for a
revision of opinion on the relative importance of the colonies. The
fact could not be disguised that the potentialities of the West Indies
had been over-estimated. Jamaica, which had been declared "the
most valuable Plantation belonging to the Crown", the loss of which
would "probably be followed with the ruin of our interest in America",1
had proved a disappointment. Despite the variety of its soil and the
diversity of its crops — sugar, coffee, cotton, ginger and pimento —
its white population was only about 12,000. There and elsewhere in
the West Indies the growth of the white population seemed to be
arrested. This was due to a number of causes. White settlers were
ignorant of the nature of tropical diseases; their diet, with an ex-
cessive consumption of meat and rum, made them easy victims to the
frequent epidemics. The mortality among children was high. Con-
sequently any increase in population depended on immigration, and
this was discouraged by the prevailing economic system. Planters
found it profitable to cultivate large areas by means of slave labour,
and there was little opening for poor whites. Attempts were made
indeed by means of "deficiency laws " to insist that a certain propor-
tion should be maintained between the number of blacks and whites
employed; but these were unsuccessful because planters preferred
paying the fine for breaking the law to incurring the expense of ob-
serving it. In fact, the fines became a recognised source of local
revenue. In Barbados, which was the most flourishing island in the
first part of the eighteenth century, the white population never
reached 20,000, while the number of slaves is said to have amounted
to 70,000 in 1762. Such figures as can be obtained reveal a similar
position in the Leeward Islands — a stationary or even declining white
and an increasing slave population. While the white population of
the British West Indies was possibly 40,000 and showed no tendency
to a natural increase, the population of the continental colonies ex-
hibited that capacity for doubling itself in a generation which after-
wards attracted the attention of Malthus. By the middle of the
century there were well over a million white inhabitants in these
colonies and something like 300,000 negroes, mostly in the tobacco
1 Wood, A Survey of Trade, pp. 173-4.
IMPORTANCE OF THE CONTINENTAL COLONIES 589
plantations of Virginia and Maryland and the rice fields of Carolina.
This growth of population — mostly by natural increase — had its
effect on trade. In the first part of the century the export of tobacco,
rice, etc., from the southern colonies had made the value of goods
sent to Great Britain from the continental colonies taken as a whole
exceed that of the imports from the mother country, i.e. the balance
was unfavourable to the mother country. But by the middle of the
century the development of the northern and middle colonies not
only greatly increased the demand for British goods, but so changed
the relative position of north and south that the trade with the con-
tinental colonies as a whole became favourable to Great Britain.
Since this American demand was largely for manufactured articles,
and industrial development in Great Britain was tending to give
greater weight to home manufactures than to trade in tropical
staples, a new value was set on the northern colonies.
Suspicion of the objectives of French policy on the mainland also
provoked thought on the question of the future of the British colonies.
During the years following the War of the Austrian Succession the
French pursued a policy of building forts with the apparent intention
of connecting their settlements in Canada with those in Louisiana.
The methodical way in which they set about their work aroused
considerable alarm. Contemporaries contrasted the French unity
of purpose with the suspicion existing between one British colony and
another, the constant dissensions between governors and councils
in particular colonies, and the illicit trade which was carried on with
foreign Plantations. The French were at once enemies to be countered
and models to be copied. In the West Indies they encouraged the
settlement of white servants; they advanced capital in the form of
stock and implements and made it repayable by instalments; and
they limited the amount of land an individual could acquire.1 By
the work of missionaries and by intermarriage, the French, it was
said, had bound the Indians to their interest, and in the event of war
they might unite with the French to drive the British into the sea.2
The defence of the continental colonies was indeed becoming a
pressing issue. It meant expense, and the mercantilist conception of
the colonial system did not include any clear view as to how the
expense should be met. Colonies, it was supposed, should pay their
way and by means of commercial regulations should be made to
contribute something to the mother country. The possession of
colonies ought to confer benefits and not involve liabilities. The sea
might be policed by the Navy at the expense of the mother country,
for this made trade possible and helped to enforce the rules that
governed it; but colonies should in time of peace provide for their
own defence against Indians and in time of war should assist the
1 Tucker, Josiah, Essay on the Advantages and Disadvantages which respectively attend France
and Great Britain with regard to Trade (1753), pp. 23-3. * Postlethwayt, i, 432.
5QO MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
mother country if local difficulties arose. Imperial defence was a
new problem. The mother country could neither assume full re-
sponsibility for it, nor could she induce the colonies to enter into a
union among themselves. With the outbreak of the Seven Years'
War the question became acute and the attempt to solve it was
at the root of the subsequent misunderstandings. By her exertions
Great Britain succeeded in expelling the French from Canada; but the
effort had involved heavy expenditure, without, as was felt, proper
support by the colonists. From the moment that war began between
Great Britain and France the trade between British and French
colonies should have ceased, no matter what the sacrifice might be.
The very fact that the French depended on British supplies provided
a weapon by which they could be easily reduced. In the course of the
war, however, trade with the enemy, either direct or indirect, con-
tinued, much to the embarrassment of the British Navy. An attempt
was made to suppress the brisk trade that developed with the Dutch
ports of Cura§oa and St Eustatius by placing an embargo on the
export of provisions. This was strengthened by an Act in I7571 which
prohibited the export of all provisions, except fish and roots and rice
under the existing rules, from all colonies to any destination other
than Great Britain or a British colony. Still the temptations of the
trade were so strong that ways and means for carrying it on were
discovered. Under the "Rule of 1756", which laid down the prin-
ciple that a trade prohibited in peace time cannot be thrown open
during war,2 Dutch ships trading with French Plantations were
seized by the Navy. But the rule did not apply to free ports. Monte
Ghristi, an insignificant place actually in Spanish San Domingo but
near the border of the French part of the island, developed an ex-
tensive trade. The irritation of the Home Government with these
subterfuges was strongly expressed by Pitt in his despatch of August
1760, when he asserted that owing to the continuance of the trade
France was "principally, if not alone, enabled to sustain, and pro-
tract, this long and expensive war".3 Since the French mainly ex-
changed sugar and molasses for the provisions supplied by the
northern colonies the mother country proposed rigorously to enforce
the Molasses Act of 1733. But the capture of the French islands — of
Guadeloupe in 1759 and of Martinique in 1762 — somewhat relieved
the situation in the later phases of the struggle.
The conclusion of the war precipitated a question which, it has
been shown, was becoming more insistent as die respective colonies
developed their resources. Did the true economic interests of Great
Britain lie in the West Indies or on the American continent? The
conquests which had been made at the expense of the French forced
politicians to answer this question; for it was recognised that if a
1 30 Geo. II, cap. o. 8 Vide supra, p. 551.
* Kamball, G. S., Corresp. of Pitt with Col. Governors, n, 320.
GUADELOUPE VERSUS CANADA 591
peace was to be arranged by the new Bute administration it would
be necessary to restore some of the French possessions. The problem
was what should be retained and what returned. There were those
who still contended that it was desirable that colonies should produce
commodities different from those of the mother country. Great
Britain, they pointed out, needed more sugar plantations. The com-
parative exhaustion of the old soils, with the consequent high price
of sugar in the home market, the loss of European markets and the
persistent trade between the British and foreign colonies in sugar and
molasses, could be adduced as an argument in favour of this view.1
If Guadeloupe — and possibly Martinique — were retained, the whole
position would be changed. The advocates of this plan could show
how valuable the trade of Guadeloupe had proved to be since its
capture in 1759, and how its temporary incorporation in the British
system had eased the position for the northern colonies. The island
gave immediate promise of returns which would assist to meet the
heavy costs of the war. From the mercantilist point of view the case
for its retention was overwhelming. It seems practically certain that
public opinion was opposed to returning it to France. But the
British West Indian interest strenuously resisted this course. They
realised that the acquisition of any of the French islands would
mean the relative decline of the older British possessions because
they would not be able to compete in costs of production. Monopoly
of the market of the mother country was necessary to maintain
their prosperity. The West Indian interest, therefore, supported the
restoration of the sugar islands to France; and they gained their
point, despite the fact that it meant dear sugar in Great Britain and
that it limited the British market to which the northern colonies had
access. Thus the creation of a vested interest by mercantilist policy
engendered an opposition to the further extension of the very
principle on which it was grounded.
The chief consideration in favour of keeping Canada was that so
long as France was able to pursue her designs on the mainland the
continental colonies would not enjoy security. Imperial defence
could be advanced as a reason for new territorial commitments. But
no obvious and immediate commercial "advantage could be alleged.
The value of the trade of Canada was not to be compared with that
of Guadeloupe. It was somewhat cynically pointed out, too, that
to give the continental colonies a sense of security was to run the risk
that they would become even less submissive to the mother country
than they had been.2 It was to give them opportunities of indefinite
expansion in a climate in which crops could be grown and cattle
raised for which a market could most easily be found in the West
Indies. The British area in the West Indies had been restricted by
1 Vide supra, p. 503.
8 [Burke, William], Remarks on the Letter Addressed to Two Great Men (i 760), p. 50.
592 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
the restoration of the islands to France. If the colonists, therefore,
returned to their old practice of disregarding the Acts of Trade, the
French Plantations would again reap the advantages of adequate
supplies of provisions and a good market for sugar and fnolasses. If
the mother country used her experience during the war to suppress
illicit trading, she would be countering the natural development of
the colonies and provoking opposition. Now that the French menace
in Canada had been removed, opposition might well take a new form.
Injustice to the colonial system as it worked before 1763 it ought
to be judged without reference to subsequent events. But it is difficult
to do so. The older writers were inclined to seize upon the details of
the commercial policy as a deep-rooted cause of and ample justifica-
tion for the ultimate revolt of the continental colonies. A reaction
against this view has almost gone to the extreme of denying that
commercial regulations caused any friction. The truth is that there
are no means of establishing any simple generalisation. It has been
contended that the attitude of the mother country towards the
colonies was dictated by the political exigencies of the moment and
was not based on any intelligible economic principles. On the con-
trary, it has been argued that a clear conception of a well-knit
system guided successive governments in attempting to realise the
ideal of a self-contained empire. The first view makes it possible to
approve or disapprove of isolated cases of interference with the normal
economic development of the colonies, or even to applaud a certain
amount of "salutary neglect." The latter admits that there was a
system against which an indictment might be drawn. But the discussion
as to whether there was or was not a system is hardly a fruitful one.
A survey of the period as a whole points to the conclusion that the
opportunities opened up by colonisation suggested to an age obsessed
by mercantilist ideas that the movement could be employed to pro-
mote national prosperity, particularly by eliminating adverse balances
of trade. In practice, however, the material proved to be intractable.
Schemes miscarried and compromises had to be effected. "Some-
times indeed there is a mighty enquiry into trade", complained
Joshua Gee, "and persons are called upon to give their thoughts, but
commonly those enquiries die."2 The advocates of a thorough-going
application of principles were apt to overlook the difficulty of recon-
ciling opposing interests, and they were too often unmindful of
Matthew Decker's warning that "in endeavouring to force nature
the expense is certain but the success is doubtful".
There are no means of assessing at all precisely the balance of
advantage and disadvantage of such measures as were adopted. The
principle of enumeration was undoubtedly designed to bring profit
1 Beer, G. L., Commercial Polity of England towards the American Colonies 9 p. 89.
a Gee (ed. of 1767),?. 115.
8 Decker, Matthew, Essay on the Causes of the Decline of Foreign Trade (1749), p. vi.
EFFECTS OF COMMERCIAL REGULATIONS 593
to the mother country. This applied especially to the two important
staples, tobacco and sugar. The results in these two cases were quite
different, though this could not have been foreseen. The supply of
tobacco so greatly increased that the price fell and a larger pro-
portion was re-exported. Whether the price would have been higher
had the planters been free to export to any market is problematical.
The countries of southern Europe would almost certainly have con-
tinued to exclude it in favour of other sources of supply, and there is
much force in the contention that for northern Europe Great Britain
was the natural entrepSt for the trade.1 The sugar planters had a
monopoly of the British market, and there is good evidence that they
exploited it to their own advantage. When they secured the right of
direct export to Europe in 17313 they were not able to make much
use of it. The enumeration of copper, beavers and furs in 1722 was
of slight importance. Permission was given to export rice to southern
Europe when it was shown that its strict enumeration damaged the
interests of Carolina. The policy of paying bounties on the production
of certain commodities in the colonies was of course a benefit to
particular colonial interests. It was mostly unsuccessful with respect
to hemp and timber, but large sums were paid out for tar and pitch
throughout the colonial period. The CaroKnas profited from this ex-
penditure, for they possessed great pine forests; so, although the
mother country did not succeed in the original intention of inducing
the northern colonies to produce naval stores, she did stimulate a
development in the south which was a benefit to the shipbuilding
industry in the north. The payment of a bounty on indigo in 1748
promoted the cultivation of it to such an extent that the older trade
with India suffered an eclipse.2 The Carolinas, and to a lesser extent
Jamaica and Barbados, benefited from this expenditure. As to the
northern colonies the Navigation Acts operated as a bounty on ship-
building in so far as they restricted the carrying-trade to British
ships. The Thames shipbuilders found that the New England colonies
with their great supplies of cheap timber could undersell them in the
home market. American-built ships were sent either direct to Great
Britain for sale or with cargoes to the West Indies, where they un-
loaded and took freights consigned to British merchants. This sale
of ships was a considerable means of making remittances to the mother
country. The restrictions on the manufacture of woollens, on the
export of hats and on the development of the iron industry were
objectionable in principle and to some degree appear to have been
oppressive in practice.
Contemporaries were satisfied that the colonial system attained its
purpose of promoting the prosperity of the mother country. Statistics
1 Ashley, Sir Wm., "The Commercial Legislation of England and the American
Colonies, 1660-1760" in Surveys Historic and Economic, pp. 317-18.
2 Econ. Journal, xxn, 237.
CRBEX
594 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
showed that the total volume of British imports and exports had
greatly increased and that colonial trade accounted for more than
a proportionate share of this increase. Whether this was due to
fostering legislation may be doubted. It is known that the Acts of
Trade were extensively evaded. When they were observed it does
not follow that they turned trade in a direction it would not have
taken in the absence of positive enactment. The fact that provision
of capital by private investors and the granting of credit facilities may
have exercised a greater influence than State regulation was not
generally appreciated. The capital available for investment was
growing rapidly in Great Britain in the eighteenth century, and in so
far as it found its way overseas it went to develop the trade of British
settlements in the East and West. Adam Smith was of opinion that
mercantilist principles diverted an undue amount of capital to such
enterprises, but he probably under-estimated the difficulties of finding
outlets elsewhere. Once it was invested it naturally assumed a con-
trolling position, as is amply illustrated by the increasing influence
exercised by financial interests in the political life of Great Britain
during the period.
The colonies had always suffered from chronic lack of credit. In
time of war bills of credit were issued as a simple means of raising
supplies, it being provided that they should be redeemed by colonial
taxation within a specified period. This device proved so useful that
a demand arose for issues in peace time; for such "banks of money"
seemed an excellent way of stimulating trade. The suggestion was
that the colonial governments should issue paper, not to meet the
exigencies of government, but to loan it out to private persons for
a term of years on mortgage security. There was a danger that such
paper would be over-issued and would therefore depreciate in value.
Merchants who were usually creditors were naturally apprehensive
of the consequences, and their representations kept the members of
the Board of Trade firm in their opposition to the issue of bills of
credit except during war and under strict provision for redemption.
A disastrous experiment with paper money in the New England
colonies led Parliament to pass an Act in I75I1 which forbade issues
in future unless sanctioned by the Crown. Paper money was not
necessarily confined to Government issues. Projects for founding land
banks were actively discussed in Massachusetts, Connecticut and
New Hampshire, but the application of the Joint Stock Companies
Act of 1720* to the colonies made it impossible to float a banking
company without a special charter. The upshot was that the colonists
largely depended on British merchants for financial accommodation
in the form of long credits. Although individual merchants may
have denounced the "pernicious practice",8 it served the purpose,
1 24Geo II, cap. 53. * 14 Geo. II, cap. 37.
8 "The Letter-book of a Quaker Merchant, 1756-8", in EJH.R. Jan. 1916, p. 142.
THE R6LE OF CREDIT 595
particularly in the southern colonies, of giving the creditors the
economic advantage in business transactions. The planters, it was said,
were "a species of property annexed to certain mercantile houses in
London". They sent cargoes to Great Britain not because it was
illegal to send them elsewhere, but because they could best reduce
the burden of their debts by doing so. Although they might grumble
now and again about the inconveniences occasioned by the Acts of
Trade, they were more generally aware of Great Britain as a great
creditor nation than as a domineering mother country.
The years immediately following the conclusion of the Seven Years'
War were to put the colonial system to the test. The mercantilists,
it has been shown, believed that the commercial restrictions caused
the profits of colonial trade to flow to Great Britain. Few of Adam
Smith's contemporaries would have accepted his contention that the
whole system was a great illusion under the influence of which
capital was forced into a distant trade where it earned a smaller
return than it otherwise would have done. They were more impressed
by concrete instances than by abstract analysis. There was the growth
of the chief western ports. A single house in Bristol was said to buy
3000 pieces of stuff for export every spring.1 In 1764, 188 vessels
arrived in Liverpool from and 141 departed to the colonies.2 For
several years prior to 1770 the annual import of tobacco to the Clyde
was between 35,000 and 45,000 hogsheads, the greater part of which
was re-exported to the continent of Europe.3 It was assumed, indeed,
that the Acts of Trade promoted the general prosperity of the
country to such an extent that the Government necessarily gained
from its greater taxable capacity. For the direct contribution to the
Exchequer was inconsiderable. What was received was due to the
fact that the mechanism of customs duties was employed as a simple
and obvious way of enforcing the commercial restrictions. No one
would have argued for a moment that the yield of these duties was
in any degree an indication of the value of the colonies to the mother
country. In general, as Burke put it, England pursued trade and
forgot revenue; the fiscal was practically always sacrificed to the
commercial point of view.
Difficulties were bound to arise if the question was asked whether
the total advantages derived from the operation of the Acts of Trade
were sufficient to cover the charges to which Great Britain was put
for the defence of the colonies. With a national debt the service of
which absorbed half the annual yield of the staple taxes, with the
powerful landed interest demanding a lightening of the burden they
were bearing, and with the financial commitments involved in the
organisation of the newly acquired territory, the Chancellor of the
1 Latimer, J., Annals of Bristol^ in the Eighteenth Century, p. 414.
1 Smithers, Henry, Liverpool, its Commerce, Statistics and Institutions, p. 112.
8 Clcland, James, Rise and Progress of the City of Glasgow, p. 89.
38-2
596 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
Exchequer had to face this issue. It is significant that the Board of
Trade was invited to report, among other things, on "what mode,
least burthensome and most palatable to the colonists can they con-
tribute towards the support of the additional expense which must
attend their civil and military establishments".1 The Board, which
was the repository of mercantilist precedents, had no observations to
offer on this subject. The subsequent attempts to raise revenue by en-
forcing the Laws of Trade and by imposing new taxes were inspired
by motives which were political rather than commercial, imperial
rather than mercantile. Incidentally much light was thrown on the
nature of the colonial trade and particularly on those aspects of it
which were obnoxious to the mother country. It would appear that
the chief articles imported directly from the continent of Europe, or
concealed when a British port was touched, were linens from Ham-
burg, tea and gunpowder from Holland and wines and fruits from
Spain. The offenders were usually the merchants of Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Pennsylvania and New York, for such smuggling
could be successfully carried on only by those whose ostensible
business was the import of other goods. More stringent enforcement
of the Laws of Trade would probably have prevented some of these
breaches of the code; but it is unlikely that it would have entirely
suppressed such practices. The declared intention of the mother
country to enforce the principle of the Molasses Act was generally
recognised as a much more serious issue. It seemed to preclude the
possibility of relieving the acute trade depression which had followed
the conclusion of the war.
In Boston as early as November 1763 the merchants were considering
joint action in favour of a petition that the duties on foreign molasses
and sugar should be removed or reduced. New York merchants
decided to support this appeal towards the end of January 1 764, and
they also persuaded those of Pennsylvania to take action. Rhode
Island was even more closely concerned. A remonstrance was drawn
up at a meeting convened at South Kingston on 24 January and
forwarded to the Board of Trade.2 The colony, it was pointed out,
had a population of 40,000, of which nearly a third lived in the two
towns of Newport and Providence and depended on commercial
activities. Having no staple commodity for export they had to get
the means of paying for the manufactures they imported from Great
Britain by a three-cornered trade. There was a market for their
timber, provisions and horses in the West Indies, and consequently
that trade was the necessary foundation of their commerce. Appeal-
ing to the testimony of the Custom House books at Newport they
asserted that in the year 1763, 184 vessels had cleared for Europe,
1 Basye, A. H., The Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, pp. 128-31.
8 Records oftiu Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New England, vi, 378-83,
and Callender, G. S., Selections from the Economic History of the United States, 1765-1860,
pp. 56-63.
CURRENCY DIFFICULTIES 597
Africa and the West Indies; of these about 150 were bound for the
West Indies and returned thence with about 14,000 hogsheads of
molasses, of which not more than 2500 hogsheads came from the
British islands. In fact, it was estimated that all the British islands
taken together could not supply two-thirds of the quantity required
by Rhode Island alone. There were upwards of thirty distilleries
engaged in making rum. At the ruling price — about izd. a gallon —
it was possible to export this rum at a profit, but if a duty was imposed
it would greatly add to the price and seriously restrict the demand.
The rum was largely exported to the coast of Africa — about 1800
hogsheads annually — where it was exchanged for slaves, gold dust
and ivory. The slaves were disposed of in the British West Indies and
the southern colonies in return for bills of exchange by means of
which remittances were made to Great Britain in payment for the
colony's imports. In view of these facts it was submitted that the
renewal of the Act would be "highly injurious to the interest both of
Great Britain and the northern colonies".
The American Revenue Bill of 1764 is a measure of the greatest
significance. The northern colonies wanted the free importation of
foreign molasses, but might have acquiesced in a duty of a penny a
gallon. The British West Indian planters wanted a prohibitive duty
against molasses from foreign islands entering the continental colonies,
or alternatively as high a duty as possible. The British Exchequer
wanted a duty which would yield a substantial revenue. This last
consideration was allowed to overrule the others and thereby the
mercantilist point of view with regard to the vexed question of the
trade in molasses was abandoned. The prohibitive rate of 6d. a gallon
was reduced to 3^. with the avowed intention of making it remunera-
tive. Mercantilism was certainly losing its hold. The complexities of
the post-war situation exposed its weaknesses. In a sense the trade
between the colonies and the mother country, which it set out to
foster, had never been on a satisfactory basis. It had always been
difficult, if not impossible, for the northern colonies to find means of
paying for their purchases from Great Britain without infringing
the Acts of Trade. This difficulty was the greater because the
colonies had no proper currency system. Apart from the pine-tree
shillings, minted by Massachusetts in the third quarter of the seven-
teenth century, the colonies had no coinage of their own. They were
almost entirely dependent for a supply of specie on coins, mainly
Spanish pieces of eight, secured in the course of trade with foreign
Plantations. The rate at which these were to be current was fixed by
proclamation in 1704, and confirmed by statute in I7O8.1 It was laid
down that the Spanish piece of eight, or dollar, was to be accepted as
equivalent to six shillings, which was 33^ more than the sterling rate
(4?. 6d.}. As a matter of fact the piece of eight was not, even when
1 6 Anne, cap. 10.
598 MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
minted, of the standard assumed by this legislation, for the coins in
circulation had been sweated and clipped.1 Still it was an advantage
to have some standard of reference even if it was defective. Prices
were stated in pounds, shillings and pence (though the British coins
for these amounts were not common), it being understood that when
a colony observed proclamation rate six shillings were equivalent
to a piece of eight. In practice the rate varied despite the law,
ranging from eight shillings in New York, seven and sixpence in
Pennsylvania and Maryland to six shillings — the proclamation rate —
in New England.2 Business transactions in the colonies themselves
were consequently complicated by these variations of rates, even
when they were not rendered difficult by the actual shortage of
coins. Payments to the mother country were made when possible
by means of bills of exchange; the par of exchange being based on
the relation of sterling and colonial currency to the piece of eight.
Owing to the indebtedness of the colonists the rate of exchange was
normally unfavourable to them. It often reached a point when pay-
ment in specie was desirable and this led the merchants to do their
utmost to withdraw coins from circulation in order to ship them to
Great Britain. This only accentuated the difficulties arising from the
shortage of a circulating medium and consequently strengthened the
demand for the issue of paper money.
It was difficult for a colony to supply an adequate circulating
medium in the form of paper money — apart from the attitude of the
mother country on this subject — because of the attractions of in-
flation. During the Seven Years' War, Virginia, which had a good
record in this respect, indulged in an over-issue of bills of credit which
were declared legal tender for any amount. Under the existing law
sterling debts could be discharged in Virginia if £125 current money
was paid for every £100 due. It was possible for the courts to change
this rate provided it could be shown that the current money had
suffered a greater degree of depreciation, but the British merchants
pointed out that before a judgment in their favour could be executed
further depreciation might have occurred. Opportunities existed
therefore for the debtors to discharge their obligations by paying less
than they had contracted to pay. Memorials on the subject were
sent to the Board of Trade by the merchants of London, Liverpool
and Bristol in 1764, and they were sympathetically received. The
Board declared that "the practice of making paper bills of credit a
legal tender is absurd, unjust and impolitic59.8 The application of
the principle of the Act of 1751 to all the colonies was recommended
and legislation to this effect was at once promoted. This meant that
debtors in Virginia had to discharge their debts at standard rates.
1 Sumner, W. G., "The Spanish Dollar and the Colonial Shilling" in Am. HJl. ra,
°a7 Am. HJl. x, 666. * A.P.C., Col. iv, 628.
INDEBTEDNESS OF THE COLONISTS 599
The planters were seriously embarrassed in 1764 owing to bad
harvests and the burden of the war debt. Rapid depreciation of the
currency would have relieved the situation. The alternative of going
through the bankruptcy courts was subject to formidable restrictions,
as a Virginia act for the relief of insolvent debtors had been dis-
allowed by the mother country. The principal merchants of London,
Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow had convinced the Board of Trade
that a debtor's voluntary surrender of his assets in order that they
might be realised and distributed among his creditors would in-
evitably involve injustices since nine-tenths of the creditors lived in
Great Britain.1
The extent of the indebtedness of the colonists and the difficulties
in the way of reducing it now became issues of first-class importance.
In the northern colonies the trade depression forced the question
upon the attention of the merchants. They were already so indebted
to their correspondents in Great Britain and the purchasing power
in the colonies was so restricted that they had to curtail their orders.
A number of merchants in Boston entered into an agreement in
August 1764 to reduce their importation of English cloth, and the
idea of resorting to non-consumption as a palliative led to the
adoption of non-importation as a weapon in the conflict with
the mother country on the question of taxation. To lessen the de-
pendence on Great Britain it was also suggested that home industries
should be fostered. A Society for the Promotion of Arts, Agriculture
and Economy was launched in New York and it offered premiums
for excellence in local manufactures. Statistics show that during the
operation of the non-importation agreements the volume of trade
between Great Britain and the chief ports — Boston, New York and
Philadelphia— fell heavily. Colonial merchants were able to dispose
of their old stocks and to call in their outstanding debts while they
were strictly limiting their future orders. Many of them were thus
in a position to take advantage of a considerable fall in the exchange
rates and remit payments to their correspondents in Great Britain.
But these were temporary expedients. The question was whether
the northern colonies could develop their industrial resources on a
permanent basis. When the Board of Trade called for a report on
colonial manufactures in 1766 the accounts sent by the respective
governors probably belittled what had been effected.2 If allowance
is made for this, however, subsequent events proved that little pro-
gress had been made. What capital there was found its way into
foreign trade and the fisheries, and the appeal of the frontier main-
tained the scarcity of labour for manufactures. The economic
structure of the southern colonies was different. No relief could be
found in industry, for the existence of slavery meant concentration
1 A .P.C., Col. iv, 641-2.
* See Clark, Victor S., History of Manufactures in the United States, 1607-1860, pp. 307- 10.
6oo MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
on the staple crops of tobacco and rice. The planters had mortgaged
their estates to the fall, and much of the land was so exhausted that
it seemed that some form of debt repudiation accompanied by resort
to the new lands to the west was the only remedy. In Virginia there
was an insistent cry for paper money to ease the pressure of debt and
also a demand that the boundaries of the colony should be extended
on the west; but to these two claims the policy of the mother country
was strongly opposed. It was difficult to restrict imports, for the
greater part of the commerce in the south was in the hands of English
and Scottish merchants. These were said to number some two
thousand and the planters were heavily indebted to them. Non-
importation, as George Washington pointed out, could only be
effected by going over the heads of the merchants and persuading
the people not to buy imported goods.1 As a matter of fact importa-
tions were heavy in the south during the years of resistance to the
Stamp Act and the Townshend duties. The merchants seem to have
remained fairly confident that the debts would be ultimately paid,
for they did not discourage their customers from purchasing imported
goods. They had so long gone on the principle that debtors cannot
drive hard bargains in selling their crops that they were not prepared
to abandon it.
The British merchants, however, made great play with the extent
of colonial indebtedness in the agitation for the repeal of the Stamp
Act. It was alleged that the outstanding debts amounted to between
four and five millions . 2 Witnesses examined by the House of Commons
obviously attempted to set the figure as high as possible and Gren-
ville did what he could to discredit their evidence.3 The main purpose
of the committee of merchants, of which Barlow Trecothick was the
leader, was to restore the old relations with the colonies. They did
not like the recent innovations, partly because they caused disturbance
in America, and partly because the collection of taxes in specie would
make it more difficult for their customers to make remittances in that
form. They regarded the debt itself with complacency and were
co-operating with colonial merchants in trying to convict the
Government of placing obstacles in the way of its liquidation. The
merchants also brought manufacturers into line by withholding
orders, to induce them to send up petitions to the House of Commons
in which the extent of unemployment was emphasised.4 It is inter-
esting to find that in this campaign the West Indian merchants made
common cause with the merchants who traded with the northern
1 The Writings of George Washington, ed. by W. G. Ford, n, 263-7.
2 The figure of £4,000,000 is usually quoted from the Annual Register. The Newcastle
Papers give details of the estimate and a higher total. The amount of the debt was
undoubtedly exaggerated.
8 Henry Gruger, jr., to his Father, Bristol, 14 Feb. 1766, Commerce of Rhode Island, I,
140.
4 Henry Gruger, jr., to Aaron Lopez, Bristol, i March 1766, ibid, i, 145.
WEAK POINTS OF TRADE WITH THE COLONIES 60 1
colonies. Together they drew up a programme which was virtually
put into operation by the Rockingham administration.1 For the
moment mercantile opinion reasserted itself against the new imperial
policy. In the face of the danger to trade the West Indies joined
hands with the continental colonies. The duties levied on the export
of sugar, pimento and coffee from the West Indies were repealed and
an inroad was made on the Navigation Laws by declaring the chief
ports of Jamaica and Dominica free to foreign vessels. The colonial
merchants expressed their thanks to the committee of merchants in
London for their good services in securing the repeal of the Stamp
Act and "for strenuous efforts and unremitted application in favour
of the liberties and trade of America".2
Subsequent events proved that the success of the merchants'
agitation in 1766 was due to the special circumstances of the moment.
The settlement which they had commended to the Rockingham
administration was short-lived. The continued trade depression in
the northern colonies enabled the more radical elements to keep the
opposition to the mother country alive. In Virginia and Maryland
the twofold problem of land hunger and indebtedness was becoming
more urgent. The struggle was renewed when the Boston town
meeting initiated a campaign against the Townshend duties in the
form of non-consumption pledges in October 1767; the merchants
of the port adopting the principle of non-importation in the following
spring. The Quaker merchants of Philadelphia, however, refused to
come in until opportunity had been afforded the British merchants
to exert pressure on the Government. But the London merchants did
not think it prudent to move in the matter. Their attitude is to be
explained by the fact that they did not consider that the success of
1 766 could be repeated. The economic situation at home was much
easier. There had been a good harvest; the demand for English cloth
on the continent was firm; there was no extensive unemployment
which could be exploited. Barlow Trecothick himself acknowledged,
when pleading for the total repeal of the Townshend duties in the
House of Commons,8 that British trade had not seriously suffered
from the renewal of the non-importation movement.
The British merchants were also aware that the Americans had
raised wide constitutional issues which prejudiced their case. It was
obviously no longer a quarrel to be settled by commercial adjustments.
Probably they were also coming to see that the colonial trade was
not all it had been assumed to be. The years of dislocation caused
by the adoption of non-importation agreements in America must
have revealed to British trading-houses some of the long-standing
Adams, J. T., Revolutionary New England, p. 340, note i, prints part of the agreement
arrived at by the Committees of the West Indian and North American Merchants on
10 March 1766, from Bril. Mus., Add. MSS, 8133 G.
* Letter in Massachusetts HistoricaUSoaety Transactions, Feb. 1924.
3 Schlesinger, A. M., Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, p. 238.
6oa MERCANTILISM AND THE COLONIES
disadvantages of colonial business. Much capital was tied up in it
because long term credit had to be given. There are definite indi-
cations of attempts to reduce the time allowed for payment. Eighteen
months, it appears, were usually given by Glasgow merchants in the
middle of the century.1 Later, twelve months seem the normal time,
but some merchants were trying to insist on nine. They asserted that
the shorter period represented the utmost extent of credit they could
themselves secure.2 Commercial correspondence is full of complaints
about outstanding debts and merchants engaged in the American
trade were certainly often seriously pressed by their own creditors at
home. Sometimes they had the bills of exchange sent them by their
American customers protested when presented for payment, and
sometimes they found it impossible to sell a vessel which they were
instructed to dispose of in liquidation of debt at anything like the
price which the debtor expected. It is not surprising, therefore, that
they preferred a nearer market in which shorter credit was asked
and in which the risks of trade were not so considerable. Industrial
developments were providing new outlets for capital at home and
colonial markets were beginning to occupy a less important place in
British commerce. When the merchants of London came to consider
the position created by the recognition of the independence of the
United States in 1783 they arrived at the conclusion that the superi-
ority of British manufactures would ensure them a preference over
those of other countries, and if the future trade was conducted on a
liberal system it was not likely that the Americans would make
attempts to set up manufactures of their own. They would be of
necessity mainly occupied in the clearing and cultivating of the land.8
This sensible conclusion was largely justified by the event.
1 Renwick, Robert, Records of the Burgh, of Glasgow 9 vi.
2 Letter of Hayley and Hopkins, London, 24 June 1769, in Commerce of Rhode Island.
I, 282-3.
3 Observations of London Merchants on American Trade, 22 July 1783; Am. HJt.
July 1913* PP- 773-80-
CHAPTER XXI
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE—
FROM BACON TO BLACKSTONE
JLN the moulding of modern thought no factor exercises a more
potent influence than the idea of evolution. It predisposes the mind
when confronted with an array of facts to seek for some connecting
principle by which they are related and to prove that there is an
orderly development of idea. Governed by this conception, historians
have been able to demonstrate the continuity of English history and
to show how one age has prepared the ground for the work of its
successor. The long range of England's history exhibits only one
violent break from tradition, the Puritan Revolution, which proved
to be but a short episode in the flowing tale of the national life. The
concept of evolution, with the expectant, critical attitude of mind
which is its offspring, was unknown to the people of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. Had the idea of growth and development
been as strongly rooted in their minds as it is in those of their succes-
sors, then the possibility of friction between the mother country and
the colonies might have been generally anticipated. But even the
ablest writers and thinkers before the eighteenth century seldom en-
deavoured to trace any connecting principle amid the facts with
which they were confronted; for their view of history was a static
one. Apart from a few exceptions they seemed unaware of the power-
ful forces by which the actions of men are inspired, took no account
of the influence of environment on human development, and regarded
government as a piece of machinery rather than a natural growth.
Action preceded thought, and political theories were not formulated
until events had suggested the need for them. Contemporary
historians of the Empire, such as Sir Dalby Thomas1 and Oldmixon,2
contented themselves with presenting a collection of facts, for it
never occurred to them that the relationship between the mother
country and the colonies raised any difficulties, and their attitude
faithfully mirrored that of the mass of the people.
Until men had progressed beyond the stage of regarding history
statically, it was impossible for them to appreciate at its true value
the importance of events which are now recognised as beacon lights
in British colonial history. In the development of English colonial
policy few events have had more significance than the Restoration
and tibe Revolution. With the Restoration England turned her back
on Puritanism, the Empire was augmented by the acquisition of new
1 Thomas, Dalby, Hist. Account of the Rise and Growth of the West India Colonies and of the
Great Advantage tiiey are to England in respect of Trade, Lond. 1690.
* Oldmixon, John, The British Empire in America, Load. 1708.
604 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
territories, and the colonial system at last assumed coherent form.
In many respects the most interesting of these developments was
the national rejection of Puritan ideas, possibly because these were
largely derived from Holland.1 But though the movement was
subordinated, it remained a potent influence in America, where its
ideas were worked out more fully and with less restraint than had
been possible in England. In the nature of things differences were
bound to develop between those who crossed the Atlantic and those
who stayed at home, but these were undoubtedly accentuated by the
fact that the American point of view, partially shaped by ideas which
England had rejected, had begun to diverge from that of England.
The unhappy potentialities, however, of the Restoration in this respect
were overlooked by contemporaries. Similarly the Revolution was
regarded by Englishmen as merely a national affair, and its imperial
bearings were not appreciated at their true worth.
In considering English views on the colonies during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries it is vital, therefore, to keep in mind that
these were not illumined by any idea of growth. Moreover domestic
matters, particularly during the seventeenth century, were so en-
grossing that the colonies dropped out of public notice until the issue
between Crown and Parliament had been settled. During the forma-
tive period of English colonisation, which we may take as extending
to the Restoration, no large problems of colonial government arose;
for the establishment of the first English settlements beyond the seas
was nothing more than an extension of English commerce. Planta-
tions, in fact, were the only means by which the national instinct for
commerce could be satisfied, and the State was required merely to
give a legal sanction to settlements formed by private enterprise.
Settlements of this type were too weak at first to be treated as
political communities; they were, in truth, private estates and
were regarded as such. Consequently they were put on the
same legal status as the guilds, boroughs, and trading companies
of England. The movement, however, which resulted in the
colonisation of New England, was of a totally different character;
for it represented, in the minds of its founders, a schism from the
State rather than a trading enterprise. The extent to which the
expansion of England is linked up with commerce is amply proven
by the tone of pamphlets issued not merely during the formative
stage but throughout the whole period. Plantations were criticised
on the ground that they were unprofitable to the kingdom, while
supporters of the colonising movement sought to show that the settle-
ments were of benefit to England. This commercial aspect is dearly
brought out in the references of Bacon to the colonies.
Bacon, whose great fault was that he had no faith in his own maxim
that knowledge is power, was too practical-minded to draft any
1 Campbell, D., Th* Puritan in Holland, England, and America (first ed.
BACON AND THE PLANTATIONS 605
Utopian schemes of government. He was too conscious of his
own defects to pasture on illusions, and he knew that the process
of transporting a man to a new world would not change his nature.
His scientific mind, however, revolted at the thought of missed
opportunities, and he realised that the new world could not be used
to the greatest advantage unless it was peopled by the best of the old.
Few statements are better known than the oft-quoted remark in his
essay "Of Plantations": "It is a shameful and unblessed thing to
take the scum of people and wicked condemned men, to be the people
with whom you plant". This was a noble protest against the practice
of sending English gaol-birds to Virginia, and he repeated it in a
letter of advice to George Villiers in 1616, in which he recommended
"that if any transplant themselves into Plantations abroad, who are
known schismaticks, outlaws, or criminal persons, that they may be
sent for back upon the first notice: such persons are not fit to lay the
foundation of a new colony".1 But his protest passed unheeded. The
Government could not resist the temptation to use the colonies as
receptacles for superfluous malefactors, and this degrading practice
was continued beyond the middle of the nineteenth century.
But while Bacon paid due tribute to the commercial aims of
Plantations, he saw that these oversea communities differed enor-
mously from ordinary trading concerns. Some sort of government had
to be devised to maintain law and order in the settlements, and with
the experience of the Virginia Company in his mind he advised that
government should be "in the hands of one, assisted with some
counsel". Such advice was suited to the needs of his own age, and
it would be unfair to assume that it represented his final word on
colonial government. He was anxious that the utmost care should
be taken to appoint suitable governors, and while he advocated the
employment of the settlers in trades and manufactures, "such as may
be useful to this Kingdom", he was opposed to the Plantations being
managed solely in the interests of English merchants and tradesmen.
Indeed he wished merchants to be restricted from taking part in
government as far as possible since "they look ever to the present
gain", while the long perspective is essential to the statesman. The
colonies were but puny in Bacon's day, but his prediction of the
development of the Plantations into "new kingdoms" suggests that
he had envisaged the possibility of England becoming the mother
of nations.
While commerce was the true origin of English colonisation, the
invincible tendency of the Englishman to idealise everything in which
he is concerned disclosed itself in the emphasis which was placed upon
the movement as a counter-blow against the national foe. Bacon
entertained no apprehensions about the result of a duel with Spain,
for "the wealth of both Indies seems, in great part, but an accessory
1 Bacon, F., Works, cd. Spedding, vi, 21.
606 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
to the command of the seas", and Spain's pretensions to maritime
supremacy had been dispelled by the capture of Cadiz in 1596.
National sentiment as expressed through Parliament remained
faithful to the Elizabethan tradition and on the renewal of war with
Spain in 1624 condemned "the diverting of his Majesty's course of
wars from the West Indies, which was the most facile and hopeful
way for this kingdom to prevail against the Spaniard, to an expence-
ful and successless attempt upon Cadiz".1 Parliament was as vigilant
as the Crown in its regard for the welfare of the Plantations, and after
the outbreak of the Civil War a Commission was appointed under
the Earl of Warwick to supervise the colonies.2 After the establish-
ment of the Commonwealth, when the first need of England was to
frame a new constitution, even the dispassionate James Harrington,
in the preface to his Oceana (1656), allowed himself to exult in the
imperial destiny awaiting his country "upon the mightiest foundation
that any has been laid from the beginning of the World to this day".
Even Venice took rank below Oceana, for "the Sea gives law to the
growth of Venice, but the growth of Oceana gives law to the Sea".
The spirit of imperialism is contained in his statement that "to ask
whether it be lawful for a Commonwealth to aspire to the Empire of
the World, it is to ask whether it be lawful for it to do its duty, or to
put the World into a better condition than it was before". But when
he descended to particulars he struck a less confident note. " If you
have subdued a nation that is capable of Liberty", he declared, "you
shall make them a present of it"; while his well-known words that
the colonies " are yetBabes that cannot live without sucking the breasts
of the Mother Cities, but such as I mistake if when they come of
age they do not wean themselves " seem prophetic of the disruption.
In truth, his imperial aspirations were at variance with his
intellectual convictions, and possibly Harrington was the first English-
man to realise that the government of England and the government
of an Empire were two very different things. Engaged in an attempt
to solve the difficulty of England only, he saw that his solution, how-
ever satisfactory it might be to his countrymen, could not but prove
irksome to the colonists. This recognition of the fact that the govern-
ment of the Empire had to be considered apart from the government
of the nation marks Harrington off from all other Englishmen of his
age, and it was unfortunate that the difficulty which he discerned,
though he refused to explore it, was not realised as clearly by the
thinkers of the Revolution period, when the time was opportune for
a reconsideration of the whole field of colonial government. His
system of government expounded in Oceana had never any real chance
of becoming operative, but it attracted considerable attention among
his contemporaries by reason of the novelty of the devices which were
* Stock, L. F., Proceedings and Debates of British Parliaments respecting North America, i, 128.
8 Ibid, i, 146.
PROPERTY AND POLITICAL POWER 607
necessary for its working, and the ideas underlying it were destined
to exercise a substantial influence both at home and in America.
His analysis of the history of England had driven him to the con-
viction that the country owed its troubles partly to the fact that
political power did not correspond with the balance of property and
partly to defects in the English parliamentary system. The existing
Parliament was not truly representative of the nation, and with the
vast increase that had taken place in the number of landowners a
monarchic system was no longer suitable for the country. Govern-
ment had to be altered so as to fit in with the changed conditions.
Property in land was to be stated "at such a balance that the power
can never swerve out of the hands of the many". Harrington possibly
weakened his case by regarding property in land as the most worthy
and influential form of wealth, but his views in this respect were so
completely in accordance with those of the English governing class
that they were afterwards accepted and applied, but in a manner of
which he would not have approved. His exposition of the doctrine
of the balance of property was intended to show that a stable govern-
ment could be formed only on a republican basis, and for this reason
he proposed that no person should own an estate worth more than
£2000 per annum, whereas after the Restoration monarchy came
to be esteemed as the principal safeguard of property against the
encroachments of the landless. Political power largely depended
upon property in land, and the connection of the two in die minds of
Englishmen was at least partly responsible for the Whig monopoly
of political office during the eighteenth century. The Anglo-Saxon
race has always been conspicuous for its reverence for property, and
only an Englishman could have elevated it to the dignity of a natural
law. This was the work of John Locke, whose second treatise on Civil
Government confirmed Englishmen in their conviction that there was
a natural connection between government and property. But the
idea was really inherent in the race, and Americans were as quick as
Englishmen to resent attacks on property. Thus in 1771 the Assembly
of Massachusetts in complaining against British taxation said that it
formed "a tribute levied and extorted from those, who, if they have
a property, have a right to the absolute disposal of it".
While Harrington was a democrat, he was no friend of mob-rule,
and he introduced four devices to prevent government from falling
under the control of the rabble. These devices consisted of the use
of the ballot, indirect election, rotation, and a system of two chambers,
of which one was only to debate and the other only to vote. Harring-
ton was typically Puritan in his belief that "Government is the
Empire of Laws, and not of Men". He looked on government as a
piece of machinery which could be kept in good running order
provided that the laws of which it was composed were shrewdly ex-
cogitated. From this type of mind sprouted the fundamental law
6o8 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
and the rigid constitution, which Puritanism failed to establish in
England but succeeded in setting up in America. All Englishmen
of the Puritan cast, however, had not the unwavering faith of Harring-
ton that laws alone would keep government pure and wholesome;
Penn, for example, realised that "governments, like clocks, go from
the motion men give them", but belief in legal devices and checks
to prevent corruption has always been a feature of the American
political creed.
All the particular contrivances advocated by Harrington had been
tested. The ballot, suggested by the practice of Venice, had been
experimented with in Massachusetts and Connecticut. But the
secrecy which recommended it to Harrington was displeasing to
Englishmen, and we learn from Oldmixon that the Pennsylvanians
refused to make use of the ballot because "they were Englishmen
and not bound to give their Votes in Huggermother: their Faces and
their Voices should always go together". The method of indirect
election was employed in Dutch and Italian cities and also in com-
mercial and ecclesiastical corporate bodies. The "Agitators" of the
New Model Army were appointed by a process of indirect election
in 1647. The principle of rotation was designed to prevent magis-
trates from entrenching themselves in office and had been already
suggested by George Wither in The Perpetual Parliament, a political
poem published either in 1650 or 1653. Harrington, then, simply
pressed into his service devices with which his contemporaries were
familiar, but gave them an added significance by applying them on a
national scale.
Chosen by the aid of these precautions against corruption, the
Parliament of Oceana was to consist of a Senate and an Assembly, the
Senate proposing and the Assembly resolving; for he held that an
Assembly without a Senate could not be wise and that a Senate
without an Assembly would not be honest. Since power could not
be safely confined to any one man or one class, the Legislature,
Executive, and Judiciary were to be kept apart. In common with
Milton and Cromwell, Harrington pleaded for religious toleration,
and he gave it a fresh importance by showing that where there was
no liberty of conscience there could be no democracy.
The attempt to define the relations of England to Scotland and
Ireland evidently gave Harrington much food for reflection. At one
time he suggested that Scotland and Ireland should be represented
in Parliament, but should be governed by Councils of State, elected
from retiring Senators, with the assistance of provincial armies.
Ultimately he drifted to the sound position that union based on
compulsion could never be effective, and in 1659 he appealed for
a "just league" which would leave Scotland and Ireland with their
own laws and their own government.
It was even more difficult to decide on the treatment to be accorded
"FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS" OF CAROLINA 609
to communities so remote from the mother country as the American
settlements. Their very distance from England made it impossible
for their inhabitants to enjoy the same privileges as Englishmen, and
unless they were kept in a position of subordination the colonies could
have no value for the parent State. " Provincial or dependent Em-
pire5', wrote Harrington, "is not to be exercised by them that have
the balance of Dominion in the Province, because they would bring
the Government from Provincial and Dependent to National and
Independent,95 He recognised that imperialism, as it was under-
stood in his day, could not be accommodated to his theory of the
balance of property, and that settlers inheriting the Anglo-Saxon
passion for freedom could not permanently be maintained in a sub-
ordinate status. These considerations led him to pen his prophetic
warning of the dissolution of the Empire.
The remote possibility of the Oceana system of government being
adopted by England vanished with the Puritan regime, but the
establishment of new settlements in America furnished an admirable
opportunity for testing the value of Harrington's ideas. At least two
of the new settlements, Carolina and Pennsylvania, were honoured
by the application of Oceana principles, and it is worth noting that
aU the transatlantic communities followed a practice which was
implicit in the principle of the equal agrarian, by which the amount
of land that one person could acquire was to be strictly limited. The
adoption of this involved the doom of the English system of primo-
geniture, which had never been imitated by the English settlers in
America, where circumstances led them to follow the rule of equal
division of property among heirs.
The Carolina version of Oceana, as expounded in the "Funda-
mental Constitutions", distorted Harrington's ideas by giving them
an anti-democratic bias. The settlers were divided into categories
according to the proportion of land they owned, and the whole
system was so arranged that no office could be held without a property
qualification. Executive power was monopolised by the proprietors,
and legislative power was divided between a Grand Council of fifty,
of whom only fourteen could be said to represent the people in any
way, and a Parliament, the function of which was to vote on the
measures referred to it by the Council. Other recommendations of
Harrington, the ballot, religious toleration, universal military train-
ing, were embodied in the Constitutions, which were to be read and
sworn in every Parliament, while Harrington's suspicion of lawyers
was echoed in the provision that no man might plead a cause for
money. But in following the letter of Harrington's suggestions, those
who drafted the "Fundamental Constitutions" departed from the
spirit which had inspired their author by making no provision for
the equal division of property among children and by safeguarding
the integrity of estates. Every attempt, however, of the Carolina
CHBEI 39
6io THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
proprietors to induce the settlers to accept this scheme of government
proved unsuccessful.
More in the line of succession to Harrington's leading thoughts
was the method of application attempted by William Penn. This
great Quaker had probably a hand in drafting the schemes of govern-
ment for the Jerseys, where principles suggestive of Oceana were in-
corporated in the constitutions of 1676 and 1683, but it was in his
own colony of Pennsylvania that he had the greatest opportunity of
testing his most cherished ideas. His "Holy Experiment" savours
too strongly of Harrington's devices not to have been influenced by
him. The Legislature consisted of a provincial council of 72 and an
Assembly of 200. The principle of rotation was applied to the former,
one-third of the council being elected annually, and its function was
to propose measures on which the Assembly was to vote. In the choice
of the Assembly a process of indirect election apd the ballot were
employed. The importance of land was shown in the requirement
that only landowners could share in the government of the colony,
but the constitution was much more democratic than that of Carolina.
Nevertheless this democratic version of Oceana was no more success-
ful than the Carolina variation. The ballot was objected to, the
Assembly refused to confine itself to the function of voting, and by
1701 it had established its right to debate and initiate legislation.
The direct influence of Harrington in America ceased with the
reign of Charles II. During the revolutionary period he hardly
attained the status of even a minor prophet of insurrection, but when
the fighting was over and the Americans were confronted with the
task of framing constitutions for themselves, he once more exercised
some influence through the medium of John Adams, who had a share
in the drafting of several State constitutions. The principle of a property
qualification and the system of checks and balances, with which the
name of Harrington is associated, are particularly conspicuous in the
constitution of Massachusetts, where the influence of Adams naturally
counted for most.
So many of the devices with which Harrington has made us
familiar have been incorporated in the constitution of the United
States that it would be easy to exaggerate his influence. The explana-
tion is to be found in the fact that his writings have presented us with
the most comprehensive exposition of Puritan political thought in the
first half of the seventeenth century, so that many of the features of
the American constitution are to be attributed rather to the general
influence of Puritanism than to the particular championship of
Harrington. The written constitution, for example, was a common-
place of Puritan thought. But the notion of a fixed law was one with
which few Englishmen of the seventeenth century would have
quarrelled; for the concept had been created by the need of repeUing
the pretences of the Divine Right theory of monarchy. Magna Carta,
INFLUENCE OF HARRINGTON IN AMERICA 611
in particular, stood upon a pinnacle which could not be reached by
the will of any ruler. " In every government", said Cromwell, "there
must be somewhat fundamental, somewhat like a Magna Carta,
that should be standing and be unalterable."1 The Puritans, as the
opponents of the Crown in the great constitutional quarrel of the
century, inevitably became the principal champions of the idea of
a fundamental law which they carried over to America.
The other practices of America which suggest the influence of
Harrington are the ballot, indirect election, the multiplication of
offices and the principle that they should be held only for a limited
period, rotation, the use of petitions, the separation of powers, the
popular ratification of constitutional legislation, and the employ-
ment of special machinery for assuring the preservation of the
constitution. Popular education, the spread of which has been honour-
ably associated with Puritanism, also found a niche in his thesis,
while the doctrine of religious freedom, if not inherent in Puritanism,
was assuredly advanced by the championship which it received from
writers like Milton and Harrington. The device of the referendum,
too, which is employed in America, was implicit in the Oceana, for
in Valerius and Publicola (1659) the author describes his Assembly as
"nothing else but an Instrument or Method whereby to receive the
Result of the whole Nation with order and expedition, and without
any manner of tumult and confusion". The doctrine of the separa-
tion of powers, which forms a cardinal point in the Oceana system
of government, has received its fullest application in America; but
though the idea dates back to the period of the Commonwealth, it
was through Montesquieu that it exerted its most constructive
influence on American thought.
The fundamental reason why Puritanism lost its hold on England
was that it was associated with elements hostile to the national
tradition. This is exemplified even in the case of Harrington, although
he stands apart from his contemporaries by the fact that he made no
use of the social compact as a peg on which to hang his theories but
appealed to experience. Yet the recourse to history, unillumined by
the notion of continuity, led him to introduce into his scheme of
government a hotch-potch of foreign elements, and he missed the
point of Dr Gauden's criticism that "Models of new government heal
not, Government must fit the genius of a people".2 This was the true
lesson of history, and the failure to read it aright was the cause of
the downfall of the Puritans.
Against the mounting sentiment in favour of monarchic govern-
ment the despairing vehemence of John Milton spent itself in vain.
The proposals set forth in his pamphlet, The Ready and Easy Way to
establish a Free Commonwealth (1659), were hardly of the nature to win
1 Carlyle, T., Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell (ed. Lomas), Speech III, n, 382.
* Kaieovpyoi size Mcdicastri: slight healers qfpublique hurts (Brit. Miu., £. 1019).
39-2
612 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
the favour of an England which remembered with distaste the
exclusiveness of the Rump. The Grand Council suggested by Milton
bore too close a resemblance to that body to be popular, particularly
as it was further proposed that its members should be chosen for
life. Suspecting that few Englishmen would tolerate a "perpetual
Council", Milton was prepared to accept a "partial rotation" whereby
one-third of the Council would be renewed at stated intervals. Com-
posed of the "ablest men", and vested with a sovereignty that was
"not transferred, but delegated only", the Council would "consult
of public affairs from time to time for the common good", and for
the execution of such matters as demanded "secrecy and expedition"
would act through a Council of State. The security of liberty was to
be provided by a system of local government in which every unit was
to be made "a kind of subordinate commonalty or commonwealth".
"The good old Cause" had lost its hold on England, as Milton
himself recognised, and the pamphlet was never seriously considered
by those who were in a position to control the destinies of the nation.
But it contained ideas which must have commended it to the colonies,
especially in New England, where the works of Milton were familiar
in every household of standing. To communities ever jealous of their
local independence Milton's proposal for the delegation of local
affairs to local assemblies must have made congenial reading. The
commonwealth described by him amounted in effect to a federal
system of government, and the future was to show that the Miltonic
scheme as a whole was more adapted to the needs and desires of
America than the elaborate and cumbrous devices of Oceana, for the
United States approximated more closely than any other State to
Milton's grand dream of "many commonwealths under one united
and intrusted sovereignty".
While Harrington and Milton were drafting constitutions for
England, merchants connected with the West Indian trade, of whom
the most prominent were Thomas Povey and Martin Noell, were
engaged in formulating a more effective system of colonial govern-
ment. The Spanish Council of the Indies offered itself as an attractive
model. Bacon had suggested the establishment of a special council
to "regulate what concerns the colonies", and in Oceana Harrington
proposed the institution of four councils to carry on the work of the
State. The scheme put forward by Povey and his associates was of
a more detailed and comprehensive character. It was their aim to
reduce the number of governments in America and bring them under
the control of a council, acting through governors whose salaries
were to be paid from the English exchequer. Such a system was well
designed to make the Plantations really, as well as legally, a part of
the realm.
It was on the lines suggested by Povey and his companions that
colonial government was organised after the Restoration. The
ORGANISATION OF ENGLISH COLONIAL SYSTEM 613
council appeared as the Council for Trade and Plantations, without,
however, the comprehensive powers which Povey had assigned to
his organisation. And while it continued to be one of the main
objects of the Council to render the governors independent of their
Assemblies, the only feasible method by which this could have been
accomplished, that of paying their salaries from England, was not
adopted. The plea of Povey for the reduction of the number of
governments in America was echoed by Samuel Maverick in his
Account of New England, published in 1660, wherein he urged the
consolidation of the New England colonies under the Crown and the
seizure of the New Netherland from the Dutch. These measures seem
to have been in the minds of English officials at the time of the
Restoration, and the acquisition of New York was followed by an
effort, culminating in the reign of James II, to bring the New England
settlements under one government.1
After 1660 further additions to the Empire engendered a great
activity in colonial affairs. The formulation of the colonial system
was in itself a sign of developing interest in imperial matters, but it
was an interest almost entirely confined to courtiers, merchants
and officials, each class having a peculiar outlook of its own,
but none having the capacity to appreciate the significance of
factors which could not be estimated in terms of profit. None
comprehended, for example, that the Puritan ideals rejected by
England were pursuing an unimpeded course in New England
and that local government which was declining in vigour and in
importance at home was one of the most vital elements in American
life. The mercantile and official vision is always more concerned
with the near horizon than with the long perspective. The fact
is that the commercial instinct of the race was so overwhelming
that it canalised the national thought, so that Englishmen found it
all but impossible to think of the colonies except in terms of trade.
It has always been the weakness as well as the virtue of English
common sense that it concerns itself with the immediately practical
and dismisses every other matter from thought. The idea of empire
as a congeries of nations did not exist; the various factories, planta-
tions, and colonies simply formed part of the English realm.
It followed from the ideas prevalent in England with regard to the
colonies that the colonial system embodied a rigidly nationalist
policy, shaped primarily to extend the trade of the nation, and largely
justified by the political conditions of the seventeenth century, when
commerce was almost regarded as a weapon of war. Under its aegis
England successfully challenged the maritime supremacy of Holland,
and the Revolution, which so far as the nation was concerned settled
all the outstanding constitutional issues, prepared her for the wider
career that awaited her in the eighteenth century.
1 Vide supra, p. 260.
614 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
Satisfactory however as the Revolution was nationally, its effect on
the Empire was anomalous; for while it marked the consummation
of England's struggle for liberty it resulted in a depreciation of the
status of the colonists. Hitherto the relationship of colonist and
Englishman towards the Crown had been similar, but this was changed
by the Revolution. The development of responsible government
enabled the people at home to control the national policy through
Parliament, whereas in the rest of the Empire relations between the
colonial executives and the colonial Assemblies continued irrespon-
sible. Commercial subordination had been for the colonies the legacy
of the Restoration; the sequel of the Revolution was their political
subordination. There was something illogical and incongruous in the
fact that Englishmen should deny to their oversea kinsmen the kind
of liberty which they had claimed and won for themselves, but in
truth there were few who were really acquainted with the facts of the
situation.
The natural outcome of the commercial origin of the colonies was
that they were never thought of as political entities, "but as areas
of occupied and cultivated land belonging to Great Britain".1 England
had not advanced to the majesty of that imperial ideal in which
nation-building forms the chief care of the statesman. Commerce
continued to tyrannise over every other consideration, and its
capacity for mischief was vastly enhanced by the fact that since 1660
it had become more and more intimately connected with politics. Such
pride as was displayed in the Empire near the end of the seventeenth
century was that of a man whose investments were turning out well.
It is necessary to remember, however, that the Revolution tempor-
arily harmonised relations between the mother country and the
colonies by substituting a constitutional for an autocratic monarchy.
Moreover, in point of fact, the American colonists enjoyed more
freedom in the direction of their local affairs than did the people of
England. But there was the potentiality of tyranny in the power
of intervening in the internal affairs of the colonies which the English
definition of the colonial position gave to the mother country.
Theory and practice no longer conformed and tended less and less
to do so as the years rolled on. For though legally the colonies were
no better than English municipal corporations or county councils,
they politically belonged to a higher grade. They were exercising
powers which were beyond the competence of any mere local body,
and they claimed that their Assemblies were to be compared with
the English Parliament. Thus in 1700 Sir William Beeston wrote
that the Jamaica Assembly believed that "what the House of
Commons could do in England they could do here, and that during
their sitting, all power and authority was only in their hands".2 It
1 Andrews, C. M.9 Tht Colonial Background of the American Revolution, p. 122.
8 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1701, no. 749.
APPLICATION OF ENGLISH LAW TO THE COLONIES 615
was, Benjamin Franklin claimed, "an undoubted right of English-
men not to be taxed but by their own consent, given through their
representatives59.1 The American Colonies, as Governor Bernard
wrote, "believed themselves to be perfect States, no otherwise de-
pendent upon Great Britain than by having the same King".2 They
could legislate on any subject provided that they did not pass any
act which was incompatible with the laws of the parent State affect-
ing the colonies, whereas English local organisations were not merely
prohibited from passing measures inconsistent with the national
law, but were forbidden to legislate except in so far as they had
been empowered by the national Government to do so. Moreover
it was not as easy to specify in the case of the colonies as in that of
local corporations the particular laws of England that were binding
on the colonies. The Plantations lay so far from the mother country
that they inevitably came to be entrusted with the regulation of their
own internal affairs. So while every Act of Parliament bound every
local body in the kingdom there were few Acts of that Legislature
which applied to the oversea communities save as regards the struc-
ture or powers of their governments. The rules affecting the applica-
bility of English law to the colonies were so ill-defined that colonial
courts were given a large discretion in deciding to what extent
English law prevailed in the colonies.
The whole system indeed of colonial law was in urgent need of
investigation, as was realised by Charles Davenant at the beginning
of the eighteenth century. By a clause in the first Virginia charter
it had been laid down that colonists were entitled to the privileges
of Englishmen, but so far as this conveyed a right to live under the
laws of England the -concession was impracticable. Conditions at
the circumference of the Empire differed so greatly from those at the
centre that laws suitable for the mother country might not be con-
venient for the colonies. It was therefore a sound opinion of Richard
West, Counsel of the Board of Trade, given in 1720, which stated:
"Let an Englishman go where he will, he carries as much of law and
liberty with him, as the nature of things will bear".8 This opinion
was later confirmed by a judgment of Lord Mansfield, who remarked :
"It is absurd that in the colonies they should carry all the laws of
England with them. They carry such only as are applicable to their
situation. I remember it has been determined in this council. There
was a question whether the statute of charitable uses operated on the
island of Nevis. It was determined it did not; and no laws but such
as were applicable to their condition, unless expressly enacted".4
In England the leading jurists were agreed that the only laws
which could be said with certainty to apply to the colonies were those
1 Franklin, B., Works (cd. Sparks), m, 60.
2 Bernard, F-, Select Letters on the Trade and Government of America (1774)* P- 32.
8 Chalmers, G., Opinions (1814), i, 195.
4 HoweU, T. B., State Trials (1814), xx, 289.
616 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
in which there was a definite reference to them. The opinion of
Richard West, to which allusion has already been made, summed up
the position thus: "The common law of England is the common law
of the Plantations, and all statutes in affirmance of the common law
passed in England antecedent to the settlement of any colony, are
in force in that colony, unless there is some private act to the con-
trary; though no statutes made since those settlements are there in
force, unless the colonies are particularly mentioned". In the same
manner colonies were not affected by an Act of Parliament passed
after their foundation, unless they were mentioned in it or unless it
was adopted by their Assemblies or was accepted and acted on by
them. But there was no authoritative pronouncement to be had on
these points, and in fact different portions of the common and statute
law of England were in force in different settlements, while such
alterations as were made either in common or in statute law after
the foundation of a colony were not received in that colony. Accord-
ingly it followed that most of the new laws affecting a colony were
passed by its own local government, so that each colony tended to
acquire a peculiar system of law of its own which signally distinguished
it from any of the local English bodies which were regarded as its
legal equivalent. Of these differences many English lawyers must
have been aware, but the tendency of even the most liberal legal
mind is rather to stand by the forms which the legal phraseology
covers than to change the latter in the light of the facts. Thus on the
eve of the American Revolution Lord Mansfield explained that the
colonial governments in America were all on the same footing as
our great corporations in London.1 In fact though not in law, in
practice though not in principle, there had grown up a vital distinc-
tion between the colonial governments and the local English bodies
with which they were formally graded, which showed die need of
a fresh legal definition of the relationship between the colonies and
the parent State.
The remoteness of the colonies was at once the cause and the ex-
planation of these differences, which were known to the English
officials and lawyers connected with colonial administration. Members
of the Board of Trade and Plantations, especially, were aware that
by the end of the seventeenth century "the centre of gravity of
colonial administration had been shifted from England to America",2
but instead of acquiescing in this it was their constant object to
diminish the powers of the colonial legislatures. Particularly in
America the various settlements were so completely equipped with
legal systems and institutions that they were capable of carrying on
their own government should the bond that tied them to England
be broken. All these points of vast significance needed only
1 Par/. Hist, xvi, 195-7.
2 Dickerson, O. AL, American Colonial Government, 1696-1765, p. 173.
JOHN LOCKE 617
investigation to disclose the fact that the Revolution settlement, so
satisfactory nationally, was inadequate imperially. But as the idea of
growth, familiar enough in the case of individuals, had not yet been
thought of as extending to communities, and as there was no open
demand from the colonies for a reconsideration of their status in
relation to the kingdom, it did not occur to Englishmen that there
was any need for an imperial stocktaking.
The great political thinker of the period was John Locke, who
was exalted to an especial eminence in the minds of his countrymen
because of the ability with which he defended the Revolution. His
writings caused him to be associated in a peculiar way with the con-
stitution, as may be seen from the frequency with which his name
was quoted by the political pamphleteers of the eighteenth century.
The national judgment accepted him as the high priest of a con-
stitution which Englishmen felt was wellnigh perfect. Even a man
of so radical a temperament as John Toland (1670-1722) ventured
to claim that the English system of government was "the most free
and best constituted in all the world".1
Locke's two treatises on Civil Government, in which he set forth the
principles of the Revolution, though ostensibly treating of govern-
ment in general, were inspired by events in has own country. Yet
while his reasoning covered adequately the case of Great Britain, it
failed to solve the problems of the Empire, though of that Empire
few possessed a fuller knowledge than Locke himself. The friend and
secretary of Shaftesbury, he had assisted in drawing up the Carolina
constitution and knew the difficulties that beset newly formed com-
munities. After the Revolution he became one of the leading officials
of the Board of Trade and Plantations and was noted as an authority
on economics. But he never seems to have divined that the govern-
ment of England and thegovernment of the Empire were two different
matters.
This was due to the fact that his works on Civil Government, though
abstract in form, were essentially a defence of the Revolution. They
were political pamphlets in the guise of general treatises on govern-
ment, and consequently had only a national application. His re-
searches did not extend beyond England, so that he did not realise
that what was primarily a national settlement had inaugurated new
problems for the Empire. Had Locke cared to stretch his survey so
as to take in the colonies, he would have discovered in America ample
material to throw light on the minds and temper of the colonists.
The first action of New England, on hearing of the Revolution, had
been to overthrow the government of Sir Edmund Andros, an action
which indicated in unmistakable fashion the detestation with which
the colonists regarded English regulation of their affairs. It was
fundamentally a protest, not against the tyranny of Andros or of
1 Harrington, J., Works, ed. Toland (1747), p. viii.
6i8 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
James II, but against the principle of government from a distance.
This was the significant lesson to be gleaned from America; but the
importance of the proceedings at Boston was not discerned by the
leading Englishmen of the Revolution period. This possibly may have
been because in the eyes of Englishmen New England counted for
little in comparison with the West Indies. But the day of Caribbean
supremacy was passing, and the Revolution, by bringing Great
Britain to grips with France, was to reveal that the centre of gravity
in colonial matters was shifting from the West Indies to the Hudson.
Locke could not have gained his high reputation in England as
a political thinker by writing merely on government in the abstract;
his works owed their peculiar merit to their association with the
Revolution. Many Englishmen felt that the constitution had re-
ceived its final form in 1689, and Locke was appealed to as its most
authoritative interpreter. His influence was most actively beneficent
in the support which his reasoning lent to the cause of religious
toleration. In some respects, however, it was harmful, as his adop-
tion of the doctrine of the separation of powers caused many of his
countrymen to oppose the development of Cabinet government. But
whereas Englishmen honoured Locke as the foremost defender of
their national system of government, Americans valued him 35 the
ureacher of general truths. His writings furnished an arsenal of the
abstractions that have an irresistible fascination for unsophisticated
people and are at the same time difficult to deal with dialectically.
Thus it was chiefly as the apostle of liberty that he found favour in
American eyes, and during the controversy stirred up by the Stamp
Act the colonial pamphleteers underlined their arguments with
copious quotations from Locke's works.
Pride of place among the abstractions was held by the idea of
natural right, an idea so illusory as to lack the support of any historical
argument. Locke did not confine himself to the legitimate sense in
which that conception might be employed, namely, that national laws
ought to conform to man's innate regard for what is fair and just,
but he implied that over and above all national laws there existed
a code which all men instinctively recognised and obeyed. Similarly
he pressed into his service the equally unhistorical idea of the social
compact. It had appeared almost spontaneously in political thought
because it seemed to offer a simple and adequate explanation of the
relations of men in a political and social organisation, since it laid
down an intelligible hypothesis by which law could be reconciled
with liberty and freedom with discipline. It proved an effective reply
to the theory of the Divine Right of Kings and formed the natural basis
of a democratic conception of government. Even the champions of
prerogative did not challenge it. It had been accepted by Hooker
and it found a place in the works of the most eminent jurists from
Grotius to Blackstone,
CHARLES DAVENANT 619
Borrowing these abstractions from Locke, the Americans employed
them to rebut the claims of the British Parliament, as Englishmen in
the previous century had used them to combat the pretensions of the
Crown. Locke's influence was strongest during the destructive phase
of the American Revolution; during the constructive phase it was
displaced by that of Montesquieu. For though the 'doctrine of
separated powers was English in inception and had been glorified
by the writings of Locke, it was through the medium of the great
French thinker that it made its deepest impression on the mind of
America.
Considering his eminence as a thinker and his practical knowledge
of colonial affairs, Locke threw surprisingly little light on the nature
of the problems of the British Empire, and more useful guidance with
respect to imperial matters can be obtained from several of his con-
temporaries, notably Charles Davenant, who by reason of his position
as Inspector-General of Imports and Exports from 1705 till his death
in 1714 was one of the chief authorities on the trade and revenue of
the kingdom. The contradictions which appear in his writings on some
important points are themselves of interest as reflecting the conflict
between old practice and new tendencies which forms one of the
most significant chapters in the history of the eighteenth century.
Economists were beginning to value colonies as markets for home
manufactures as well as sources of supply, and an opinion was gradu-
ally developing that commerce would flourish most where restriction
was least. While Davenant showed that he was receptive to the new
ideas, he was too much under the influence of routine and official
duties to advocate any practical change; and, liberal though his
views were, he insisted on that intimate connection between trade
and politics which had been the most constant feature of English
colonial administration since 1660. He was no victim of the fallacy
so prevalent among his contemporaries that money and wealth were
synonymous, and he inferred that high duties and prohibitive regula-
tions would retard rather than develop trade, but when he came to deal
with these matters in practice he succumbed to the influence of the pre-
vailing view. Thus he accepted the protectionist policy upon which
English administration of the colonial system was based, for he
approved of the colonies being forbidden to trade directly with other
countries than England. His praise of the colonies as useful receptacles
for English malcontents could have been written only by one to whom
the interests of the mother country were almost the sole consideration.
The subordination of the colonies in the imperial system was insisted
on. "Colonies", he wrote, "are a strength to their mother kingdom,
while they are under good discipline, while they are strictly made
to observe the fundamental laws of their original country, and while
they are kept dependent on it."1 An intuition that such a system
1 Davenant, C., Works (1771), n, 10.
620 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
would be repugnant to high-spirited men is evident in his admonition
not to teach colonists the art of war, though he conceded that Planta-
tions remote from the mother country might be allowed arms and
shipping for their protection.
Like many other officials he recognised that the general affairs of
America could never be satisfactorily dealt with until the barriers
erected by colonial particularism had been pulled down, and he
outlined a liberally conceived scheme of American union. It is
instructive to note that his diagnosis of the situation drove him, like
Bacon and Harrington, to accept the possibility of the colonies be-
coming "great nations". He realised the wisdom of conceding them
a generous measure of self-government, and in this connection one
of his sentences has a ring of Lord Durham about it: "Without doubt,
it would be a great incitement to their industry, and render them
more pertinacious in their defence, upon any invasion which may
happen, to find themselves a free people and governed by constitu-
tions of their own mating".1 But the idea of growth crept into his
mind rather as a particular instance than as a general principle, for
he held it as axiomatic that the potential "great nations" should
always be kept "dependent upon their mother country". Conse-
quently there is a striking contrast between his acquiescence in
colonial self-management and his proposals to rearrange the colonies
to suit the convenience of Great Britain. The settlers in America had
spread over more land than could be cultivated or easily defended,
and he was strongly in favour of grouping them all in a more compact
area.
Touching on the question of the privileges enjoyed by colonists,
Davenant stated: "We shall not pretend to determine whether the
people in the Plantations have a right to all the privileges of English
subjects", and he was anxious that a declaratory law should be made
stating that "Englishmen have right to all the laws of England,
while they remain in countries subject to the dominion of this king-
dom".2 How far the privileges of English subjects could be recon-
ciled with the dependence which was the fate of colonies Davenant
did not stop to examine, but he was strongly of opinion that the
legal relationship between the colonies and the kingdom should be
properly investigated. He was particularly sound in demonstrating
the need of stimulating a love of England among the colonists, for
there did not exist either in Great Britain or in the Plantations any
sentiment of imperial patriotism.
More consistent, but at the same time more narrow, were the views
of William Paterson on colonial questions. Trade was his passion,
and his dream of a grand free emporium of commerce ultimately
took shape in the Darien scheme, which revealed the necessity of a
firmer bond between England and Scotland than that provided by
1 Davenant, G., Works (1771), n, 53. a Ibid, n, 35, 36.
WILLIAM PATERSON 621
the union of the Crowns. Even more than Davenant he insisted on
the connection between trade and politics, and he strongly favoured
the institution of a Council of Trade, for which he was a most perti-
nacious pleader. Sir Dalby Thomas, the historian of the West Indies,
had advocated the establishment of an advisory Council of Trade
in the hope of remedying the customs grievances of the colonists,1
but Paterson designed for his Council a much wider sphere than that.
The project was mooted in his Darien proposals, and in 1700 he
suggested the institution of such a body to carry on the government
of Scotland. After the Union of 1 707 he pressed the need of a Council
of Trade on the notice of the British Government, but without avail.
The essence of his creed was that the rule of merchants would mean
good government, because in the interests of trade they would be
careful to keep their subjects contented. A trader himself, he enter-
tained the most exalted idea of the beneficent influence of merchants.
From their knowledge of the several countries of the world they
naturally tended to become "zealous promoters of free and open
trade, and consequently of liberty of conscience, general naturalisa-
tions, unions, and annexions".2
But few shared his faith in merchant princes, in whose ranks there
was none more free from the prejudices of the age than Paterson
himself. He attacked the restrictions on the colonies and championed
the principles of free trade with great clarity and force. He com-
plained that "the navigation and trade of Great Britain only lies now
under greater hardships than that of any other country",3 and he
was in favour of granting "a permission trade to the people of all
nations upon easy and reasonable terms". With regard to the
colonies, he urged that, apart from trade duties, "no impositions may
for ever be laid upon the inhabitants without their own consent, and
that neither, excepting only toward securing and maintaining their
respective governments".4 But his liberalism was selfishly dictated
by the interests of commerce, and his ideals were those of the counting-
house.
The dominion which the influence of commerce exercised over his
mind led him to deprecate Great Britain's military commitments in
the War of the Spanish Succession. The naval efforts5 that were made
did not satisfy him, and he felt that a proper application of maritime
power might well have ousted Spain from the West Indies. The same
idea was pungently expressed by Swift, who "wondered how it came
to pass that die style of maritime powers. . .did never put us in mind
of the sea; and while some politicians were showing us the way to
1 Thomas, D., An Historical Account of the Rise and Growth of the Westlndia Cohnies (1690)
(Harleian Miscellany), n, 365-6.
8 Paterson, W., Writings (ed. Bannister), i, 247.
3 Ibid, n, 170. * Ibid, i, 149.
6 See chapter xvm.
622 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
Spain by Flanders, others to Savoy or Naples, that the West Indies
should never come into their heads".1
Davenant, Paterson and John Law of Lauriston were the most
liberal representatives of the school which emphasised the associa-
tion of trade with politics. If under Law's magnificently conceived
system commerce was to be at once the chief aim and principal prop
of the State, it was at the same time intended to be the handmaid of
the interests of the people. The views of such men, however, were
probably less representative of the opinion of the mass of the people
than those of such rigid mercantilists as Sir Josiah Child, John Gary
and Sir William Petty, who had no sympathy whatever with the
idea of colonisation as a process of nation-building and wished to
confine Plantations to the tropical and semi-tropical regions of the
earth.
From the beginning of the eighteenth century new ideas began to
permeate the mercantile system. The craze for stock-jobbing, of
which Law's Mississippi scheme and the South Sea Company were
the most conspicuous examples, was an indication of changing
economic ideas. Land was no longer esteemed as the only source of
wealth, and the development of commerce brought into prominence
a new class of men who were despised by the landed gentry as up-
starts. The domination of commerce was accompanied by a lowering
of moral standards, which roused the terrible wrath of Swift against
all stock-jobbers. The most influential writer on the Tory side, he
yet stood above all parties, so that his judgments are personal rather
than partisan. Particularly he resented the aggressiveness of the
commercial spirit and the cunning of the Whigs in associating them-
selves peculiarly with the Protestant succession. "We have carried
on wars", he wrote, "that we might fill the pockets of stock-jobbers.
We have revised our Constitution, and by a great and national effort
have secured our Protestant succession, only that we may become
the tools of a faction who arrogate to themselves the whole merit of
what was a national act." Stock-jobbers he detested as men "who
find their profit in our woes", and he believed that the Whigs were
hostile to the landed interest. The influence of the commercial
element on government he regarded as deplorable, since under its
inspiration men came "with the spirit of shopkeepers to frame rules
for the administration of kingdoms". He deprecated the tendency
of the age to send every living soul either into "the warehouse or the
workhouse". Government, he warned his countrymen, consisted of
something more than " the importation of nutmegs and the curing
of herrings".
The trend of constitutional development, with its diminution of
the power of the monarch, was little to his taste, and it was his con-
stant plea to bring back the constitution to "the old form". But
5 Swift, J., Works, cd. Scott, W., v, 28.
SWIFT ON COLONISATION 623
though his view of history was static, he recognised that Magna Garta
was not indefeasible but might be changed by Act of Parliament.
The position of the colonies under the constitution he never dis-
cussed, but like the majority of his countrymen he probably regarded
them as mere possessions. If he had had the power, he would have
installed the Anglican Church in a more prominent position in the
colonies, and it was one of his complaints against the War of the
Spanish Succession that it prevented Queen Anne from extending
her care of religion to her American Plantations. Swift was an
imperialist in the sense that he recognised the need of Great Britain
to plant colonies, but he stripped colonisation of its veil of humani-
tarianism and exposed the sordid motives and brutality with which
it was accompanied. Literature contains no more stinging descrip-
tion of the founding of a modern colony than that given in the last
chapter of Gulliver's Travels. "A crew of pirates are driven by a storm,
they know not whither; at length a boy discovers land from the top-
mast; they go on shore to rob and plunder; they see a harmless
people, are entertained with kindness; they give the country a new
name; they take formal possession of it for their king; they set up a
rotten plank or a stone for a memorial; they murder two or three
dozen of the natives, bring away a couple more by force for a sample,
return home, and get their pardon. Here commences a new dominion,
acquired with a title by divine right. Ships are sent with the first
opportunity; the natives driven out or destroyed; their princes
tortured to discover their gold; a free licence given to all acts of in-
humanity and lust; the earth reeking with the blood of its inhabitants:
and this execrable crew of butchers employed in so pious an expedi-
tion is a modern colony sent to convert and civilise an idolatrous and
barbarous people."1 At a time when material considerations were
in the ascendant there was little of .exaggeration in such an indict-
ment.
Swift's contempt of traders predisposed him against the mercantile
system, and his own experience in Ireland of the working of that
system made him irrevocably hostile to it. The ruin of the Irish
woollen industry in the interests of Britain aroused his bitter ani-
mosity, and in a pamphlet published in 1720* he recommended the
Irish people to retaliate on the restrictions on their commerce by a
policy of non-importation, a device which was later adopted with
some success by the American colonists. He supported Molyneux in
his claim that the Irish Parliament possessed the full and sole com-
petence to legislate for Ireland, and the general line he took in
opposing British domination was substantially the same as that
adopted by the Americans after the passing of the Stamp Act. Thus
his advice to the Irish people to use only Irish goods anticipated a
1 Swift,.}., Works, ed. Scott, W., xn, 378-9.
2 A Modest Proposal for the Universal Use of Irish Manufactures,
1720.
624 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
policy actually carried out by the Americans. Had he been aware
of the parallel between Ireland and the American colonies, he would
presumably have claimed for the latter what he did for the former.
It is at any rate significant that British regulation of Irish affairs drove
him to assume the position that the only link between Britain and
the country of his birth was provided by the Crown.
The accession of George I ushered in the era of Walpole with its
motif of quieta non movere. It was a period of political stagnation during
which the one positive contribution to the national welfare was the
enrichment of the kingdom as the result of the peace policy of the
great minister. The increasing opulence of the nation and the absence
of vital domestic issues hastened the lowering of standards which had
begun with the Restoration. Corruption in politics was paralleled
by spiritual dyspepsia in the sphere of religion, but as is not un-
common with such periods stagnation bred a complacency which
accepted the existing order of things as entirely admirable. Thus the
British constitution was extolled as the model of what a constitution
should be. The prevalent idea was that it had been fixed for all time,
and the pious wish expressed later by George III that the British
constitution would continue "unimpaired to the latest posterity as
a proof of the wisdom of the nation"1 simply reflected the views of
the great majority of his subjects. A static attitude, in fact, character-
ised the national outlook in every direction. There was no advance
in the national conception of the colonies. For though the Journals
of the Lords and Commons furnish ample proof of a deep and sustained
interest in them, it is plain that this interest was nurtured on com-
mercial, not imperial motives. The comparatively liberal ideas of
Tory writers and economists such as Defoe and Davenant with regard
to trade in general, which found expression in the abortive attempt
of the Tory statesmen, Oxford and Bolingbroke, to arrange a com-
mercial treaty with France on free-trade principles, were repugnant
to the merchant class as a whole and to the Whigs who, under
Walpole, directed the fortunes of the nation. The extent to which com-
merce aspired to sway national policy may be discerned in the Whig
exposition of principles as contained in the British Merchant and the
writings of Joshua Gee. The ideas therein laid down are those of the
mercantile system as it had been formulated in the time of Charles II,
a theory of trade which was alike hostile to commercial dealings with
France and unfavourable to our northern colonies in America. Gee
was anxious that the Acts of Trade should be administered with the
utmost rigour and, realising how similar were the positions of Ireland
and the colonies in the British commercial system, suggested that
this end could be most quickly attained by applying the principle
of Poynings's Law to the colonies.2 Similarly there was no advance in
1 Earl Stanhope, lAfe of William Pitt, n, xyiii.
* Gee, J., Trade and Navigation of Great Britain considered (and ed., 1730), p. 108.
THE CRAFTSMAN ON COLONIAL APPOINTMENTS 625
the legal estimate of the colonies which were still denied the status
of political communities, though most of these possessed Assemblies,
many of which had absorbed powers that were supposed to be
exercised by the governors alone.
Nevertheless, despite the prevailing fixity of view at the beginning
of the Hanoverian regime, important changes in the form and spirit
of the constitution were gradually unfolding themselves, though there
were few who recognised that the constitution was in a state of
perennial flux. Since 1714 the independence of the Crown in political
action had come to an end, a result hastened by George I's ignorance
of the English language, and the system of Cabinet development was
in process. The importance of these changes was soon to be obvious
in colonial affairs. Until 1714 the executive had been the chief agency
of British control in the colonies, and its efforts to effect a reduction
in the number of governments in America had frequently been
thwarted by the refusal of Parliament to sanction in the colonies the
extension of a power which it was diminishing in England. But this
frustration of English action in the Plantations continued only until
Parliament had assured its complete control over the Crown in
every field, when it as resolutely denied the claims of the colonists
to liberties which challenged its own omni-competence. Against the
invasions of the Crown up to the middle of the eighteenth century
the colonies could often count on the effective aid of the Legislature;
but when American liberties were menaced by Parliament itself
there was no power above it to which appeal could be made.
Of these vital changes in form and spirit which were taking place
the nation was but dimly aware, and even a man like Bolingbroke
scarcely appreciated their significance. Debarred by the Whigs from
a parliamentary career, he used his pen through the medium of the
Craftsman for the purpose of bringing about the downfall of Walpole,
whom he accused of usurping the functions of the Crown. With
masterly skill he seized on the opening for attack presented by the
organised corruption with the help of which Walpole consolidated
his position. The subject of colonial appointments was the theme of
some of the most stirring articles of the Craftsman. The people sent
"to king it abroad15 were selected for the most scandalous reasons.
"One was an excellent buffoon", another had distinguished himself
"in the profession of pimping", and "few of these gaunt and hungry
Vicegerents set out with a purpose to learn the language or to consult
the interest of the Plantations they are sent to govern". It was
common talk that many colonial appointments were bought by
people who could only reimburse themselves "by fleecing the people
whom they are sent to cherish and protect". Never was a time when
such protests were more necessary, for corrupt practices had come
almost to be accepted as part and parcel of political life. Colonial
appointments continued to be given to unsuitable persons, and Junius
GHBEI 4°
626 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
could exclaim without straining the truth: "It was not Virginia that
wanted a Governor, but a court favourite that wanted the salary95.1
The jealous exclusion of Tories from political power naturally
evoked indignant protests from Bolingbroke, who showed that by
the time of George II the differences between the Whigs and Tories
were only make-believe. Party had degenerated into faction, so that
politics had become merely a contest between the "ins" and the
"outs", a struggle for office rather than for principles. Seeking to
disparage the idea of a first minister, he stigmatised party as a
corroding element in the constitution. The great need of the country
was a patriot king who, dedicated to the service of the nation, would
select his ministers irrespective of party. Bolingbroke did not realise
that he had planned for his patriot king two incompatible roles, that
of monarch and that of chief minister, and the disastrous attempt of
George III to establish his system, though in a distorted fashion,
exposed the danger as well as the impracticability of Bolingbroke's
teaching. The King in his determination to govern as well as reign
could meet Bolingbroke's appeal to rise above party only by organising
a more sinister party of his own, and the turmoil which his intrigues
excited caused the American question for a time to become sub-
ordinate to domestic politics. The influence of Bolingbroke, in so far
as it was responsible for encouraging George III to seek to control
the machinery of parliamentary corruption and to destroy all sense
of collective responsibility in his ministers, proved a most unhappy
one for his country, which, in the stir provoked by the manoeuvres
of the monarch, was diverted from paying the close attention they
deserved to the vital questions that followed the conclusion of the
Seven Years9 War. His conception of history was entirely a static one,
and his reflections being neither deep nor original, his reputation as
a philosopher was confined to his own age. He could offer no secure
guidance to the nation in the difficulties which lay ahead of it.
The religious philosopher, Berkeley, intruded an uncommon and
nobler feature in his view of the Empire. The conception of it as a
gigantic commercial agency was repellent to his mind, and he hoped
to harness it to a higher use than the furtherance of British commerce.
He was overcome by a sense of the degeneracy of Europe and he had
been appalled by the widespread evidences of spiritual desiccation
and the mania for gambling which had shaken France and Great
Britain. Despairing of the Old World he looked to the New to save
humanity and preserve a Christian civilisation. In England, where
"infidels have passed for fine gentlemen and venal traitors for men
of sense", it was hopeless to undertake any generous enterprise, and
so he conceived his grand imperial project of founding a university
at Bermuda, which was to form the centre of a Christian civilisation.
Berkeley, like Swift, felt that it was a grave reproach to Britain that
1 Junius, Letters, cd. Good, J. M. (1812), ra, 103.
BERKELEY'S BERMUDA PROJECT 627
she had done nothing to protect from ill-treatment and injustice the
races with which her settlers had come into contact, and his Bermuda
scheme was designed to accomplish by private means what had been
neglected as a public duty. It was, however, ill-adapted for the pur-
pose that he had in view; for 600 miles separated Bermuda from the
coast of America in whose bosom resided the Indians who were to
be converted and civilised. In itself the particular scheme was not
practicable, while it was incompatible with the all-pervading com-
mercial spirit of the times. In an age when Great Britain still lacked
a genuine imperial consciousness, the remarkable degree of support
which the solicitations of Berkeley received, culminating in a grant
from George I of a charter for his college in 1726 and a vote by the
House of Commons of £20,000 towards its establishment, was rather
a tribute to the gracious personality of Berkeley than a public
realisation of a neglected duty. The money voted by the Commons
was never paid, and the scheme was allowed to sink into oblivion.
In emphasising care of the backward races as one of the obligations
of empire Berkeley was in advance of his age, and in other respects,
too, he showed a divergence from the ordinary standpoint. That he
was not in favour of sending British criminals to the Plantations may
be gathered from his suggestion in the Querist (1735) that they might
be more usefully employed in public works at home than in being
transported to America. As a political economist he anticipated in
some respects the judgments of Adam Smith, and the tendency of his
thought, as expressed in the Querist, was inimical to the school that
thought of the balance of trade as the highest aim. He did not share
the common delusion which confounded money and wealth, for he
realised that "industry not gold causeth a nation to flourish", and one
wishes that he had vouchsafed a more definite idea of what was in his
mind when he suggested that Great Britain "ought to promote the
prosperity of her colonies by all methods consistent with her own".1
As the eighteenth century progressed, interest in the colonies in-
creased, and though most of it was coloured by the prejudices of the
counting-house, traces of a loftier conception began to make their
appearance. The wars in which Britain found herself engaged from
1 739, and the realisation that their issue largely depended upon events
in India and in America, made the mother country anxious on the
one hand to improve the organisation for defence in America and on
the other to keep the colonies in good humour. The effort to organise
a union of the American colonies for defence which was made on
the eve of the Seven Years' War, failed by reason of colonial
jealousies and a fear of irritating the colonies whose goodwill the
mother country needed during the critical struggle with France. At
home people were beginning to grasp the fact that there was an
imperial problem. Thus in 1741 the historian Oldmixon raised a
1 Berkeley, G., Works (ed. Fraser, A. G.), iv, 475.
40-2
628 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
question which he did not attempt to answer: "The Portuguese have
so true a notion of the advantage of such colonies, that, to encourage
them, they admit the citizens of Goa to send Deputies to sit in the
Assembly of the Cortez ; and if it were asked why our colonies have not
their representatives, who could presently give a satisfactory answer?"1
In the same year very liberal views on colonial government were ex-
pressed by a writer in the Craftsman of 22 August 1741. The views
therein laid down were in many respects contrary to the policy of the
Government. In the first place all the colonies might be allowed the
privilege of choosing their own governors like Connecticut and Rhode
Island. The consequence of such a concession would be "no ill one",
for in their own interest the colonies would choose good governors,
while the mother country would gain from the fact that they would
"rather fear than seek or wish a change" which would put them
under another Power than Great Britain. Generous treatment was
the only magic wand by which colonial loyalty could be won and
would be vastly more effective than "troops, garrisons, armies,
Governors, and Bashaws". So much trust had the essayist in this
policy that he believed it would be more potent than force in bringing
about the downfall of the Spanish Empire. "When our fleet and
force comes to the American continent, now in the possession of
Spain, must they not be irresistible, if they make this declaration to
the Indians, to the Spaniards, and all people there, viz., 'You shall
be henceforward governed by laws of your own making, enacted by
a free, equal representative, that shall be annually chosen by you,
or, if you will, removeable by their constituents at pleasure. The
representative shall consist either of one House, or else of two Houses,
the one like a committee to form and propose the laws, the other to
confirm; it shall be which is thought best, by the best judges of such
matters, or as you yourselves shall fix. Your laws shall be put in
execution by magistrates of your own chusing, and chosen annually.
You shall be protected by our fleets; defended by our garrisons: that
is, so far, and so far only, and so long only, as you yourselves shall
desire'."2
But when the essayist criticised the official policy of creating "a
new topping place", "a Viceroy or a General Governor over all our
colonies ", he showed that what he really relied on to keep the colonies
faithful to Great Britain was their disunion. The policy of divide et
impera, which was never adopted officially, conformed to a very great
extent with the national instinct, for there were many people in Great
Britain who agreed with the essayist that the colonies were bound to
the mother country by the fact that it was not in their power to revolt,
since "what may discontent one of them, may not at the same time
in the least affect the other". There were many who found the chief
1 Oldnoixon, J., The British Empire in America (1741), i, xxvii.
2 Quoted in the Scots Magazine (1741), m, 363-4.
HUME ON THE INFLUENCE OF CLIMATE 629
assurance of British supremacy in their "distinctness and independ-
ency of one another", and the official policy of centralisation was
consequently held in suspicion, since it might result in a "general
discontent all at once throughout all" the colonies. The strength of
this sentiment became most apparent after the American question
was raised, and the following quotation sounded a note echoed in
many pamphlets on the British side : " Our greatest security and power
over them must consist in their disunion. . .we should rather make
them rivals for our favour, than united friends in opposing us".1
Such utterances can be countered by those of other writers with a
truer vision, but they undoubtedly expressed a section of opinion.
The liberal concessions advocated by this essayist must be further
discounted; they were all conditional on colonial commercial sub-
ordination. His interest in the Empire lay in the fact that "whatever
is in any way got by the colonists there, does finally centre here in
the superior or mother country". The sheet anchor of the Empire
consisted of "our Act of Navigation, whereby they are obliged to
traffick wholly with us; so that all their superfluous wealth, gained by
the industrious, dissipated again by the luxurious, terminates here
in the purchase of our costly manufactures". The apparent generosity
of this writer, then, was fed on strictly business and selfish motives.
Colonial loyalty was but a species of investment, not so safe, however,
as colonial disunion.
More liberal in character were the views expressed by David Hume
in his Essays. He was not inspired by the reverential regard for the
Glorious Revolution which characterised the earlier writers of the
century, and he broke away from the static method of treating
history in his recognition that it was "on opinion only that govern-
ment is founded",2 and that opinion was in a state of perpetual flux
through "the progress of learning and of liberty". In his exposure
of unhistorical abstractions and in his respect for expediency he was
the forerunner of Burke, and in his plea for the abolition of restric-
tions on trade he prepared the ground for Adam Smith. But while
the general views of Hume manifested a real grasp of historical
method, he was sometimes betrayed into rash conclusions. Thus in
his essay Of National Characters (1742) he rejected the doctrine of
Montesquieu that "the empire of the climate is the first, the most
powerful of all empires",8 and sought to demonstrate that men did
not "owe anything of their temper or genius to the air, food, or
climate".4 This rejection of the theory of the eminent French thinker
is particularly noteworthy, because the difficulty of adjusting re-
lations between the mother country and the colonies was very greatly
increased by the differences that had developed between the American
character and that of England. When a cool and dispassionate
1 Scots Magazine (1765), xxvn, 636-8. * Hume, D., Essays and Treatises (1788),!, 37.
8 Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, Bk. xvn (ed. of 1793), i, 334. * Hume, D., op. cit. i, 179.
630 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
thinker like Hume failed to discern the rise of a new nation, it is not
surprising that most of his countrymen were equally at fault.
Meanwhile an imperial consciousness was being fostered in Britain
by the challenge of France, and the shifting of interest from the West
Indies to the Hudson, which war involved, brought into greater
prominence the hitherto neglected northern continental colonies.
Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts had long been uneasily
aware of the military weakness occasioned by the lack of co-operation
among the British colonies which threatened to be fatal in face of the
centralised power wielded by the Governor of New France, and his
persistent advocacy of a plan of union for purposes of defence was
responsible for the conference which with the approval of Lord
Halifax assembled at Albany in 1754 and for making the subject of
colonial union the most important issue before it. The scheme which
was discussed and approved by the conference was the work of
Benjamin Franklin. The colonies, however, objected to it on the
ground that it infringed too much on their liberties, and Shirley
disliked it because "the Prerogative is so much relaxed in the Albany
Plan, that it doth not appear well calculated to strengthen the
dependency of the Colonies upon the Crown, which seems a very
important Article in the consideration of this Affair59.1 Shirley
proposed to keep the colonies in dependence by debarring them
from any voice in the choice of the Grand Council and by taxing
the colonies through the British Parliament. These suggestions were
submitted to Franklin who at once took exception to them on the
score that they violated the principle of "No taxation without
representation". Though the colonies may be fairly criticised for
having by their jealousies defeated a measure which was widely
admitted to be an urgent reform, it is tolerably certain that a plan
which failed to secure the approval of Franklin, who was a friend
of union, would have excited active discontent throughout America
at a time when the Government could not afford to sacrifice the
goodwill of the colonies.
Apart from the question of union the facts of the situation caused
political and territorial problems to assume pre-eminence over mere
matters of commerce, for in the course of the Seven Years' War
British statesmen found themselves confronted with issues wherein
the simple tenets of the mercantilists offered them no adequate
guidance. Consequently the war closed amid an atmosphere of
disturbing potentialities; for the Peace of Paris, by providing for the
retention of Canada and the Ohio basin in preference to the French
West Indian islands, marked the first serious departure of the British
Government from the principles of the politico-economic school which
had hitherto dominated colonial administration, and the assumption
of a genuinely imperial policy.
1 Shirley, W., Correspondence (cd. Lincoln), n, 96, 1 1 1-16; Franklin, B., Works, m, 57-68.
THE AMERICAN QUESTION 631
Nation-building, however, predicated an idea for which the nation
was as yet hardly prepared. It is true, as is shown elsewhere, that the
so-called mercantile system existed rather as a doctrine than as a
matter of practice, yet the nature of the pamphlets poured out from
1755 onwards testifies to the bondage of the national mind to com-
mercial motives, and while there can be no question that there was
a genuine national interest in the Empire, it was too much inspired
by considerations of the convenience of the mother country. Time as
well as knowledge was needed for the blossoming of a wider and more
sympathetic feeling, and in the middle of the eighteenth century there
were few qualified to follow Pitt. Among these few was Thomas Pownall
who had captured something of the splendour of the true imperial
idea. His plea for the application of the mercantile system on an
imperial instead of a national basis by the development of a "grand
marine dominion" was the fruit of a sentiment of imperial patriotism,
which for him was lord and sovereign over every other consideration.
The sentiment was one in which many Britons and colonists were
lacking, but it was capable of being inspired by such a personality
as Pitt's. During the critical years following the passing of the Stamp
Act Pownall was quick to catch the first murmurs of the rising tide
of American nationalism and he was anxious to keep the new American
nation within the British Empire.1
The colonial protests evoked by the Stamp Act were a warning that
the colonial system was in need of overhauling, and in 1765 Governor
Bernard wrote to Lord Barrington that all the political evils in
America arose "from the Want of Ascertaining the Relation between
Great Britain and the American Colonies".2 The American question
formed, in truth, the strongest possible test of the capacity of the British
constitution to fulfil an imperial as well as a national function. In
such a crisis, when at last the facts of the situation were being laid
bare and analysed, everything depended on the manner in which
the question was approached. Nothing could have been more
disastrous for the Empire than that legalism should have taken the
prominent place it did in the dispute.
Prior to 1763 the colonies had not denied the right of the British
Parliament to legislate for them, but that was because up to that
time the function of Parliament in colonial matters had been regu-
lative rather than administrative.8 The Stamp Act, however, seemed
to foreshadow the more active and sustained intervention of Parlia-
ment in their internal affairs, and the colonists, thoroughly alarmed,
attacked the measure as unconstitutional. The controversy revealed
a wide cleavage of idea between the Americans and the people of
Britain.
1 Pownall, T., Administration of the Colonies (1774), pt n, pp. 84-6.
2 Bernard, F., op. cit. pp. 32-3.
8 Osgood, H. L., The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, m, 12.
632 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMPIRE
The omni-competence of Parliament was now accepted by English-
men as the salient feature of the constitution. They had come to
realise that the constitution, in the words of Lord Mansfield, "has
always been in a moving state, either gaining or losing something",1
an idea which would have seemed as preposterous to most English-
men a generation back as it did to the Americans, whose view was
summed up in a sentence by Samuel Adams: "In all free states the
constitution is fixed". Similarly the concepts of natural law and the
contractual theory of government, which formed the chief dialectic
weapons of the Americans, had become for most Englishmen ex-
ploded superstitions to which they could hardly listen with patience.
It was, therefore, difficult to find a plane where the disputants could
meet without misunderstanding each other's position.
Once the controversy was suffered to topple into the mire of
legalism, the last no less than the first refuge of the narrow-minded,
then the issue seemed in British eyes to whittle down to one of right.
What were the powers of Parliament? In such guise the issue assumed
a form particularly congenial to minds insensitive to the pressure of
facts and the solicitation of new ideas. To such, all that was necessary
was to obtain the most authoritative legal opinion. This line, which
was followed in many pamphlets, was little calculated to assuage
political passions, in the atmosphere of which the shafts of Samuel
Adams, feathered by the determination to extort independence,
could be discharged with most telling effect. It was a foregone con-
clusion that legal opinion would be overwhelmingly in favour of
the claims of Parliament. Juridically there had been no advance in
the status of the colonies since the seventeenth century, and Lord
Mansfield's dictum that the American governments were " all on the
same footing as our great corporations in London" was according to
the letter of the law. Among British jurists the only one of eminence
to befriend the American cause was Lord Camden, who took up the
position, unsupported by history or jurisprudence, that the constitu-
tion was "grounded on the eternal and immutable laws of nature".2
This legal definition naturally resulted from the constitutional
points raised in the course of the debates on the repeal of the Stamp
Act, and need not have been dangerous had the relation of the con-
stitutional issue to the demands of imperial unity been kept in mind.
There developed, however, an unfortunate tendency in Great
Britain to base all claims on what the law allowed without sufficiently
examining the extent to which legal definition accurately interpreted
the realities of the situation. Possibly the influence of Sir William
Blackstone contributed to fix British attention too closely on what
were deemed to be legal rights at the expense of what was expedient.
His lectures at Oxford, which in their published form as Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England (1765) were widely read in Great
1 Parl. Hist, xvi, 197. « Ibid, xvi, 178*
INFLUENCE OF BLAGKSTONE 633
Britain and America, had revived interest in the study of English
law. He supported in the most explicit terms the omni-competence
of Parliament: "What Parliament doth no authority upon earth can
undo5'.1 It would be unjust to charge Blackstone with being hostile
to reform — in fact, his exposition prepared the ground for the legal
reforms that were accomplished in the nineteenth century — but he
expressed such satisfaction with the constitution as to convey the
impression that it required no amendment, and so confirmed the
minds of his readers in the legalistic habits of thought that were
politically so disastrous.
1 Blackstone, W., Commentaries on the Laws of England (ed. of 1773), i, 161.
CHAPTER XXII
(I) IMPERIAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1763-5
AN Empire of vast extent had been won. Its acquisition brought
with it new problems of expenditure, of administration, and defence.
Attempts to solve those problems provoked a constitutional struggle
with the American colonies which ended in the loss of a great part
of the Empire in the West. At first the sun shone in an almost un-
clouded sky. The expulsion of the French from Canada and of the
Spaniards from Florida had at last almost wholly freed the Americans
from the threat which had so long haunted them. They had taken
their share in the effort to achieve their deliverance, but they were
well aware that they owed it and the bright future which now seemed
to open before them to the British fleet and the British army, and the
minister whose name they celebrated in Pittsburg, the successor of
Fort Duquesne. In an Address to the King the Assembly of Massachu-
setts Bay fully acknowledged this debt. The People, they declared,
would show their gratitude by every possible testimony of duty and
gratitude.1
Whilst the eloquence and idealism of Chatham had stimulated in
the British race a sense of pride in their Empire, the necessity of
remodelling the administrative machinery of the colonies in the
direction of imperial co-ordination had for some time been apparent.
The defects of the loose control of the colonies, arising out of the
period of so-called "salutary neglect", were emphasised by the
problems created by the issue of the Seven Years' War. The pre-
paration of measures calculated to meet the new requirements of
imperial administration was largely the work of one man, Lord
Halifax. He was gifted with considerable imagination and ability.
His interest in colonial affairs was intense, and he clearly perceived
their ever-growing importance. From 1748 to 1765, except for a
brief interval, he held positions in successive ministries which gave
him the chief responsibility for the development of the overseas
dependencies.
The most urgent of imperial problems was that of defence. That a
combination among the American colonies for that purpose was
necessary, was the view long held by every intelligent colonist.2 It
was in this connection, when both French and British were preparing
for the hostilities which broke out in 1 755, that Lord Halifax made
his first proposal for altering the imperial machinery. At the con-
ference at Albany, 1754, called at his suggestion to confirm the
1 Hutchinson, T., Hist. Mass. Bay, in, 101.
8 See Kimball, G. S., Corresp. of Pitt with Colonial Governors, passim.
PLANS FOR DEFENCE 635
alliance with the Iroquois Indians, the Americans themselves
formulated a plan of union by means of which they would be able
to tax their whole body for the purpose of carrying on war. Nothing
came of that proposal. But at the same time the subject was being
considered by the Board of Trade. Halifax's immediate purpose was
to stop the encroachment of the French upon territory claimed by
the British. With this object in view, it was recommended that a
royal military officer should be appointed, to be responsible both for
colonial defence and the management of the Indians. His salary as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Commissary-General of the
Indian Department was to be paid by the colonies, which were to
remain responsible for the frontier forts and the usual presents to the
Indians, each contributing a quota of the expense in proportion to
its wealth and population.1 If this scheme had been adopted, the
financial burden of the war in America would have been borne
mainly by the colonies. But there was no time to put it into opera-
tion. War was imminent. One important part of this plan, however,
was adopted. As an answer to the despatch of a large military force
by France, General Braddock was sent to America in 1 755 as Com-
mander-in-Chief of all land forces, regular and colonial. The ex-
periences of the war of 1 744-8 had shown that this step was a strategic
necessity in order to meet the more centralised military system of the
French in Canada. From that time onwards there was always
stationed in America an imperial military officer, whose authority
extended over all the colonies. His presence put some check on local
autonomy and was not seldom the cause of friction.2
Braddock was also instructed to inaugurate an important political
reform. Hitherto, all relations with the Indians had been under the
jurisdiction of the provincial officials.3 That system had not proved
successful. From the earliest times fur-traders and land-speculators
had cheated and imposed upon the natives. Time and again Indian
chiefs were plied with rum, and, when rendered sufficiently drunk,
were induced to sign away huge concessions of land, without knowing
what they were doing. Goods were bartered at outrageous prices by
traders using all the chicanery of false weights and other devices
familiar to the petty swindler. No proper control was exercised
over these Indian traders. Governors like Spotswood of Virginia
or Burnet of New York might endeavour to establish a system of
monopolies, trading-posts and licences; but for the most part, pro-
tected by the mountains and forests of the wilderness, the traders
continued to defraud the Redskin without scruple and without re-
straint. Impartial observers declared again and again that it was
1 O'Callaghan, E. B., JV.r. Col Docs, vi, 903; Alvord, G. W., Mississippi Valley in
British Politics, r, 1 17.
8 Garter, G. E., Great Britain and the Illinois Country ', pp. 17-20, 49-72-
8 See Osgood, H. L., American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, iv, 299 scqq.
636 IMPERIAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1763-5
such abuses, and such abuses only, that occasioned the terrible
Indian wars and outrages on the frontiers.1 The protection of the
natives had long exercised the Home Government. It was, besides,
important from a military point of view to secure the friendship and
alliance of the Indians, who were already regarding with dismay the
advance of the Pale-faces into their territory in the Mississippi Valley.
Braddock was, therefore, instructed to appoint officers to control all
political transactions with the natives. The jurisdiction of these
superintendents of Indian affairs was divided between northern and
southern districts, with a boundary line south of the Ohio River.
Charge of the northern district was given to Sir William Johnson, a man
of great ability, skill and experience in dealing with the Indians. The
best known superintendent in the south was John Stuart. Both these
agents gradually extended their power over political relations with
the Indians so as to include control of purchases of land and the fur
trade.
As soon as peace was signed, one of the first duties of the Govern-
ment was to reduce the establishment of the Army and Navy to a
peace footing, whilst providing adequate protection for the greatly
extended Empire. The large issue of the Seven Years' War had been
the expansion of the British race in the British Empire. But the war
had originated in America, and most directly it had been waged in
the interests of the American colonies. Though the Americans as
a whole had done their share of fighting, the experience of the war had
shownhowimpossibleitstill was to relyupontheseveral colonies to com-
bine in a scheme for their own defence. It was naturally expected that
the Americans should contribute handsomely towards its successful
conduct both in money and in man power. But as the contributory
scheme suggested in 1 754 had not been adopted, it became necessary
to fall back on the old method, which had so often before proved
unsatisfactory, of sending requisitions for troops to the separate
colonies. The response to such requisitions had varied in proportion
to the goodwill or self-interest of the respective provinces. Virginians
and Pennsylvanians were acutely interested in the dispute with
France over the forks of the Ohio; the Northerners were not. The
Southerners, on the other hand, objected to sending their troops into
Canada. But neither Virginia nor Pennsylvania, in which colony
Quakers, opposed to all warfare, predominated, contributed the
quota expected from them. A quarrel between the governor and
the Legislature had the same result in Maryland. The situation im-
proved when, under Pitt, grants of money were regularly made by
Parliament towards the military expenses of the colonies. But even
so, only Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York came near to
supplying the desired quotas. With a population numbering no
1 Sec Cd. St. Pap. CoL 1714-15, no. 521, etc.; 1716, no. 146, etc.
THE CONSPIRACY OF PONTIAC 637
more than one-third of the total, they provided about seven-tenths
of all colonial troops.1
It seemed evident, then, that the defence of the colonies must
depend upon the energy and initiative of the mother country, and
that for this purpose a standing army must be kept in America. It
was decided, therefore, to maintain twenty battalions (10,000 men)
in that service. The mother country was to pay the whole expense of
this establishment for the first year. After that, it was understood,
the cost of the army was to be paid, in part at least, by the colonies
it was intended to protect, "as is reasonable" was the comment of
Edmund Burke.2 Such a step was regarded by Benjamin Franklin
also at this time as reasonable and, indeed, desirable. He saw in the
possible establishment by Parliament of "some revenue arising out
of the American trade to be applied towards supporting troops" in
America a source of protection from foreign enemies and internal
disorder "without the expense and trouble of a militia".3 The
proposed establishment had indeed been denounced by Burke and
the Opposition as excessive and unnecessary. But they were silenced
by Pitt, and the measure passed the House of Commons in March
1763. It was, in truth, a small Enough force for guarding an Empire
which now extended from the Bahamas to Tobago, and from Pensa-
cola to Quebec, apart altogether from the task of garrisoning the
chain of forts which stretched along a line of 3000 miles from the
St Lawrence to the Mississippi. The distribution of troops on the
continent had been entrusted to General Amherst, who had been
appointed to the American command by Pitt. He had divided them
among the frontier forts, of which the most western centres were
Niagara, Detroit, commanding the passage from Lake Erie to Lake
Huron, and Pittsburg. Detachments from these centres garrisoned
the smaller forts. Michillimackinac (Macinac) commanded com-
munications between Lakes Huron and Michigan. Fort St Joseph,
near the foot of the latter lake, Fort Ouatanon, on the Wabash River,
and Fort Miami, on the Maumee, were links in the chain between the
southern points of Lake Michigan and Lake Erie. Thence, along the
southern shore of Lake Erie to Niagara, the line was held by the Forts
Sandusky, Le Boeuf and Presqu'ile. On the line from Pennsylvania
to the Ohio stood Forts Cumberland, Bedford, Ligonier and Pitt,
whilst northwards to Niagara Fort Venango linked Forts Pitt and
Presqu'ile. This arrangement proved very expensive on account of
the cost of transporting supplies through the wilderness. But Amherst
defended his dispositions on the ground that these scattered and
advanced posts would encourage settlers to occupy the frontier in
their vicinity and so act as a barrier against the French and Spaniards.
The need for maintaining a regular army in America was amply
1 Cf. Beer, G. L., Brit. Col. Policy, p. 68.
a Annual Register, 1763, p. 21. 8 Franklin, B., Works, rv, 89.
638 IMPERIAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1763-5
demonstrated in this very year, 1763. After the fall of Montreal, the
Indians had appeared to acquiesce in the handing over of the French
posts on the Great Lakes and at the back of Canada, and even in the
transference of the whole country, which they regarded as their own,
to another white nation without their being consulted. But the
smouldering fires of discontent lit by this grievance were fanned by
the French traders and agents who lived amongst them, and at length
burst out into flames. Under the leadership of an Ottawa chief named
Pontiac, a confederation of all the Indian tribes from Michigan to
Mobile was formed, on a grander and more successful scale than that
which had desolated Carolina in 1 7 15. The Six Nations, indeed, under
the influence of Sir William Johnson, for the most part remained
loyal. But the Senecas joined the confederacy. Pontiac planned a
simultaneous attack upon the whole line of forts in the hope of driving
the British into the sea.1 Nor was the design without some prospect
of success. For those distant forts, isolated in the frontier-wildernesses,
were now garrisoned by the wretched remnants of a motley regiment,
who were left, as had so often been the case with colonial garrisons,
short of clothes, provisions, arms and pay.2 On 10 May the Indians
under Pontiac suddenly attacked Fort Detroit. It was gallantly
defended by Captain Gladwyn. But before the middle of June all
the other posts above mentioned, except those between Pennsylvania
and the Ohio, had been captured and their garrisons massacred. All
those settlers who escaped torture and death fled in panic. Their
farms were laid waste. Only the few thinly garrisoned forts from
Niagara to Pittsburg and Detroit, tenaciously blockaded, saved
Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia from devastation. After some
delay, Amherst organised a relieving column to march under the
command of Colonel Bouquet along the line of these forts. Being in
great straits for want of regular troops, he applied to Pennsylvania
for help. The Quaker province refused to provide a man. Nor would
the refugee settlers themselves take arms to defend the forts or face
the Indians. Of the 500 regular troops who set out under Bouquet,
no fewer than sixty were Highlanders who ought to have been in
hospital. Too weak to march, they were carried in waggons to re-
inforce the garrisons on the way. It was with this force, augmented
by a few backwoodsmen, that Bouquet, after a long march, fought
a desperate battle with the Indians near a stream called Bushey's
Run, some twenty miles from Fort Ligonier. The heroic endurance
and disciplined steadiness of his troops, combined with a stratagem
inspired by his experience of Indian warfare, at last enabled him,
after twenty-four hours of critical fighting, to put the enemy to flight
(6 August 1763).
Amherst, after again appealing to the Americans to call up local
1 See Parkman, F., Conspiracy of Pontiac.
2 Fortescue, J. W., Hut. of the British Army, m, 13.
NEED OF A STANDING ARMY 639
levies for their own defence, returned to England, leaving the final
suppression of the rising to his successor, General Gage. The Virginian
militia had already taken the field; but the New England colonies
evinced extreme reluctance to comply with Amherst's appeal for aid.
Everywhere there was evasion or delay. New Jersey and New York,
whose frontiers were being ravaged by the Senecas, stipulated that
two-thirds of their men should be employed on their own borders.
Massachusetts and Connecticut made similar conditions. The Quaker
Assembly of Philadelphia refused to vote its contingent until a body
of Pennsylvanian borderers marching upon Philadelphia compelled
it, after first calling upon the King's troops for protection against
its own people, to consent to take steps to defend them. When
raised, 300 of the Pennsylvanian contingent deserted within a month.
But at length, after a war of extreme horror lasting fourteen months,
the confederacy was shattered by columns operating under Colonels
Bradstreet and Bouquet, and peace was signed in September 1 764.
The brunt of this arduous warfare was borne by British troops. The
reluctance of the colonists to co-operate or even to contribute men
for their own preservation had again been clearly demonstrated.
But the problem of imperial defence was not confined to danger from
the Indians. France, it was thought, would endeavour to regain
Canada, and might be helped by an insurrection of her former
subjects. In any such war the presence of British troops in America
would prove a vital factor. Otherwise French forces massed in the
West Indies might be moved to the continent, whilst the arrival of
transports from distant England would be left to the hazard of the
winds and waves. Moreover, the Spaniards still held New Orleans
and the Mississippi.
A standing army, then, was to be kept in America. There remained
the problem of paying for its maintenance. Great Britain had been
left with an enormous bill of costs to pay. Her debt was double what
it had been before the war, and now amounted to over £130,000,000.
She was faced, too, with the prospect of greatly increased expenditure
in holding and settling her new possessions all over the world. The
land tax stood at four shillings in the pound. Since, in America, the
advantages to be derived from this great imperial expenditure would
to a large extent accrue to the colonies, it was generally agreed that
they ought to shoulder some part of the financial burden now laid
upon the mother country. It was in these circumstances that Bute's
Government had begun to contemplate a change in colonial adminis-
tration, which should include the establishment in America of a
uniform system of government, and of regular troops supported by
taxes levied in the colonies by Act of Parliament.1
When Bute suddenly insisted upon resigning after peace was made,
the direction of affairs passed into the hands of three men, popularly
1 Knox, W., Extra-Official Papers (1789), n, ag.
640 IMPERIAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1763-5
designated "The Triumvirate". These were George Grenville, First
Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, whom Bute
had named as his successor, Lord Egremont and Lord Halifax,
Secretaries of State (April 1763). During his brief Presidency of the
Board of Trade, Charles Townshend had proposed a scheme for
taxing the colonies by the authority of Parliament. In this he was
following the policy of Halifax, who had suggested the imposition
of a stamp tax to Pitt,1 and he was strongly supported by Lord Mans-
field and George Grenville, Townshend, however, resigned before he
could proceed with his measure in the House (March 1763). To Lord
Shelburne, who succeeded him as President of the Board of Trade
and Plantations, Egremont now addressed three questions on behalf
of the Government (5 May 1 763) : (i) What new governments should
be established in North America, and in what form, etc.? (2) What
military establishment would be sufficient? and (3) In what way, least
burthensome and most palatable to the colonies, could they contribute
towards the additional expense which must attend their civil and
military establishments upon the arrangements to be proposed?
The expediency of such contribution, it will be observed, was
assumed. In considering the first question, Lord Egremont laid
stress upon the importance of deciding two points: "By what regula-
tions the most extensive commercial advantages may be derived
from those cessions, and how those advantages may be rendered
most permanent and secure to His Majesty's trading subjects?" The
newly acquired territory in America had been divided in the past
into three districts. To the north lay Canada with some 70,000 French
inhabitants; at the extreme south were the Floridas, the land along
the Gulf of Mexico, with a few Spaniards living in small and un-
important villages. Between these stretched an immense wilderness
around the Great Lakes and in the eastern half of the Mississippi
Valley, the home of Indians, wherein were only a few small French
settlements such as Detroit and Kaskaskia. It was evidently under-
stood that these districts, so different in themselves, would require
different treatment. The representation of the Board of Trade in
answer to Egremont's enquiries was dated 8 June 1763. Shelburne
proposed that three new colonial governments should be formed.
One was to consist of the newly acquired islands in the West Indies,
the others of Florida and the province of Quebec. The question of
what to do with the region west of the mountains was complicated
by Indian rights and rival colonial claims. The opening of that
territory for settlement had been deferred during the war. For not
only was it a question which must be decided in connection with the
rights and protection of the Indians, but the Imperial Government
very properly held, then as on future occasions, that land speculation
on debatable borders was not permissible in time of war. Not a little
1 Williams, Basil, Lafe of William Pitt, i, 299.
THE PROCLAMATION OF 1763 641
to the disgust of speculators in furs and lands, colonial governors
were instructed in 1761 to prohibit all land purchases beyond the
Alleghany Mountains. Several colonies, however, including Mas-
sachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia and North Carolina, had received
by royal grants extensive titles reaching to the Pacific, and their
citizens were looking forward to immensely profitable developments
in that direction. Other colonies, on the other hand, such as Penn-
sylvania, whose western boundaries were defined, held now that the
trans-Appalachian region having been conquered by the imperial
army, its ownership was vested in the Crown.
Regarding the protection of the Indians as an imperial trust,
Shelburne proposed to reserve "a* large tract of country round the
Great Lakes as an Indian country, open to trade, but not to grants
and settlements", and that the governors of the existing colonies
should be instructed not to make any new grants of lands beyond
certain fixed limits. The boundary between the Indian hunting
grounds and the region open to immediate settlement should be
determined by the superintendents of Indian affairs, who were to satisfy
the Virginians by immediately opening for occupation the lands in
the upper Ohio Valley. The protection of the vast territory west of
the Appalachian Mountains and the Great Lakes was to be secured
by the existing forts and such garrisons as the commander-in-chief
might find necessary. The proposed restriction of the bounds of
Canada so as not to include the newly acquired western territory
Shelburne deemed desirable, because it would prevent settlers from
moving to remote places where "they neither could be so conveni-
ently made amenable to the jurisdiction of any colony nor made
subservient to the interest of the trade and commerce of this
kingdom by an easy communication with and vicinity to the
great River of St Lawrence". As to contributions from the
colonies towards the expense of their civil and military establish-
ment, "on this point of the highest importance" the Board
of Trade declined to give an opinion on the information then
at its disposal.
Shelburne soon found himself in disagreement with his colleagues
not only as to taxing the colonies, but also as to the conduct of colonial
business and the arrest of Wilkes. When, upon the death of Egre-
mont, an attempt was made to induce Pitt to join the ministry, Shel-
burne acted as intermediary. The negotiations failed. Shelburne
resigned and, enlisting under the banner of Pitt, became the most
intimate and weighty of his supporters. He was succeeded at the
Board of Trade by Lord Hillsborough. The Duke of Bedford joined
the Government, and a mixed ministry of Whigs was formed of his
followers and those of Grenville, with Lord Halifax and Lord Sand-
wich as Secretaries of State (September 1763). So it came about that
the famous Proclamation of 7 October 1763, which was founded
GHBEI 41
642 IMPERIAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1763-5
mainly upon Shelburne's proposals, was issued by his successors. In
this matter Halifax was, no doubt, the directing genius.
The publication of the Proclamation was hastened by the con-
spiracy of Pontiac. The dangers of that rising, as we have seen, were
great, but ministers feared even more the French intrigues to which
they were attributed. The confidence of the Indians, it was felt,
would be restored by the immediate announcement of the real and
friendly intentions of the British Empire. Shelburne had proposed
that the boundary line of the Indian territory should be run by the
superintendents of Indian affairs. But the present crisis would not
await the slow procedure of surveyors. The Appalachian divide was
therefore adopted as a convenient*and conspicuous natural boundary.
By the Proclamation the " extensive and valuable acquisitions secured
to the Grown by the late Treaty" were erected into four separate
governments — Grenada, Quebec, East Florida and West Florida. The
boundaries of the latter provinces were defined.1 The coast of Labra-
dor, with the adjacent islands, from the River St John to Hudson
Straits, was assigned to the Government of Newfoundland; Gape
Breton and the adjoining islands to Nova Scotia. The Government of
Grenada, with representative institutions, embraced all the British
Windward Islands, Dominica, St Vincent, the Grenadines, Grenada
and Tobago. The Grown lands in all three islands were put up for
sale. In St Vincent the division of lands roused the resentment of
the natives. These were nearly all "Black Caribs", who had ousted
the original natives, and now numbered about 2000. They refused
to acknowledge allegiance to any European king or to accept any
scheme for the settling of the disputed lands. Only after troops had
been brought from North America were they compelled to acknow-
ledge British supremacy, and to accept the reserves of land assigned
to them in the north of the island.
The governors of the three new colonies upon the continent were
empowered to make grants to settlers upon the usual terms as to
quit-rents, etc., and free grants to soldiers and sailors who had served
in North America during the late war, and were actually resident
there. For the protection of the Indians in the hunting grounds re-
served to them, the Governors of Quebec and the two Floridas were
forbidden to issue any warrants of survey or patents for lands beyond
the bounds of their respective governments, or beyond the "sources
of any of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from the West
or North West", or upon any lands reserved to the Indians. All the
land not included within the territory granted to the Hudson's Bay
Company was reserved under British sovereignty for the use of the
Indians, as also the land lying to the westward of the sources of
the rivers which fall into the sea from the west or north-west. The
purchase or settlement of such lands, without special leave, was
1 See chapter xxv, p. 776.
PROTECTION OF INDIANS 643
prohibited, and settlers there were ordered to remove. To prevent the
great frauds and abuses which had formerly been committed in
obtaining lands from the Indians, all purchase by private persons of
lands reserved for the Indians was forbidden. For the future, the
sale of such lands was to be negotiated only by governors at a public
meeting with the Indians. Trade with them was declared free, but
all Indian traders must take out a licence from the governor and
give security for observing the regulations imposed. Henceforth the
Indian subjects of the King were to be protected by the Grown from
exploitation by unscrupulous traders and settlers. Such intervention
by the Home Government was in harmony with the best traditions
of British colonial government.1 But the boundary so set between the
colonies and the Indian territory, limiting as it did speculation in the
western lands, and involving a denial of the claims of the existing
colonies to a right of indefinite expansion in that direction, caused
bitter resentment and suspicion. It was represented as a selfish
attempt to curtail their liberties for the benefit of the British Ex-
chequer. It was, in fact, an endeavour to substitute for the haphazard
methods of land settlement which prevailed in many colonies an
organised system under the supervision of imperial agents. Subject
to the observance of the considered regulations and the rights of the
Indians, the Government was anxious to encourage honest settlers
to move westwards beyond the mountains.
The haste with which in the end the Proclamation was issued re-
sulted in some unfortunate blunders. Canada, in particular, was
affected by the hurried imposition of the ideas of Halifax upon those
of Shelburne. For whilst the latter had intended to permit the French
inhabitants to enjoy their own laws and customs, Halifax decided at
the last moment to include in the Proclamation the decisions affecting
all the new colonies, emphasising, in order to attract immigrants, the
advantages of English law and representative institutions. Shortly
afterwards, instructions were sent to the Governor of Quebec to
the same effect as those normally issued to governors of other colonies.
English law was thereby substituted for French law in Canada. This
was a blunder which was to prove the source of much trouble for
some years.2
When Grenville succeeded Bute, he was at once confronted, as
Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the pressing problem of finance.
A man of great industry and ability, and guided by a stern sense of
duty, he was a master of detail, but lacked that quality of statesman-
ship which can see beyond the legal aspect of a question and forecast
the ultimate reactions of a measure upon society. He was, as we have
seen, already disposed to call upon the several parts of the new Empire
to contribute towards its expenses. To the heavy burden of debt and
1 Gf. Kingsford, W., Hist, of Canada, v, 127 seqq.; Alvord, G. W., Genesis of the Proclamation
^1763. * C3". GrenznUe Papers, n, 476.
41-3
644 IMPERIAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1763-5
taxation which the mother country had to bear, was now added the
cost of suppressing the conspiracy of Pontiac. Looking about for new
sources of revenue, Grenville could not fail to be impressed by the
enormous extent to which the Acts of Trade were being evaded in
America. It has been computed that nine-tenths of the tea, wine,
fruit, sugar and molasses consumed in the colonies were being
smuggled.1 The chief Custom House officers resided in Great Britain,
and so consistently did their poorly paid deputies in the colonies wink
at breaches of the Acts of Trade that the whole revenue collected by
them did not amount to £2000. This sum it cost the British Exchequer
over £7000 to collect. The matter had been brought into prominence
during the war by the flagrant treachery of American merchants in
trading with the enemy. The French armies in Canada and Louisiana
had been plenteously provided with stores by the colonists, who had
also supplied goods and provisions for the enemy's expedition to the
Ohio Valley. Thus the price of produce required for the British army
had been enhanced by the competition of the enemy's commissariat.
The wrath of Pitt had been roused by the callousness of this illegal
and unpatriotic traffic, by which the resistance of the French was
prolonged "principally if not alone,... in this long and expensive
war". He gave the strictest orders to governors to bring "all such
heinous offenders ... to the most exemplary and condign punish-
ment", and, after the fall of Quebec, employed the Navy to bring it
temporarily to an end.2 Grenville, in order to increase the revenue,
decided to do likewise. The Custom House officers were ordered to
their posts, and governors were instructed to help them in suppressing
illicit trade. Warships were moved to the coast with orders to
intercept smugglers. At the same time the Molasses Act of 1733,
which had expired in 1763, was renewed, in spite of the urgent repre-
sentation of the Americans. Several important modifications were,
however, introduced. The duty on molasses was reduced from 6d. to
3<£ per gallon. But new duties were laid upon coffee, pimento,
French and East India goods, white sugar and indigo from foreign
colonies, and upon Spanish and Portuguese wines. Stringent measures
were taken to enforce the law. Bonds were exacted from exporters;
the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts, which tried smuggling cases
without a jury, was enlarged; and naval officers were required to act
as revenue officers. The pill was gilded by the granting of bounties upon
flax and hemp; Georgia and Carolina were permitted to export their
rice to the French West Indies; and the duty on the whale fishery was
taken off, an important concession to New England. Whilst these
measures struck a most serious blow at the trade of the northern
colonies, the preamble to the Revenue Act, in which they were em-
bodied, proclaimed that the reason for it was that "it is just and
necessary that a revenue be raised in your Majesty's dominions in
1 Sabine, L., American Loyalists, I, 12. a Kimball, n, 320.
THE STAMP ACT 645
America for defraying the expenses of defending, protecting, and
securing the same".1
It was not expected that these new measures would produce the
revenue of £100,000 which Grenville thought a fair contribution
from the dependencies. When, therefore, he introduced them into
Parliament, he proposed and carried a resolution in favour of im-
posing by Act of Parliament "certain stamp duties in the colonies"
for further defraying the expense of protecting them (March 1764,).
The imposition of this tax, however, he delayed for a year, in order
to give the colonies an opportunity of proposing any alternative
method they might prefer of raising the sum required. To their agents
in London he explained that he was by no means wedded to the
stamp tax, though he thought it a convenient method, because it
was easy to collect, it fell exclusively on property, and would be
spread equally over America and the West Indies. However, any
other method of raising the required revenue which they might
propose would satisfy him. But some contribution from the colonies
must be forthcoming towards the additional expenses incurred on
their account. For the annual cost of the civil and military establish-
ment in America alone had risen from £70,000 after the Peace of
Aix-la-Chapelle to £350,000.
With the exception of the representatives of Rhode Island, the
agents did not at first offer any objection. But when, a year later,
they had become aware of the opposition it was rousing in America,
they made attempts, in conjunction with the London merchants, to
dissuade Grenville from proceeding with his scheme. He then again
invited them to propose an alternative method of raising money,
since none as yet had been suggested. Franklin, as agent for Penn-
sylvania, then urged that the demand for money should be made in
the old constitutional way in the form of a requisition by the governor
to the several Assemblies. But that method had certainly proved in-
effective in the past, and Grenville put his finger on the weak spot
when he asked whether they could agree on the proportions each
colony should raise. They were obliged to confess that they could not.
Connecticut, having no direct interest in the fur and slave trade,
thought that a tax on these might serve the purpose. The agent for
this colony, Jared Ingersoll, bore witness to the kindly disposition and
open mind displayed by Grenville in his discussions with them. "He
gave us", he reported, "a full hearing."2 In order to reconcile the
Americans to imperial taxation, the admission of colonial repre-
sentatives into Parliament had been suggested. Grenville declared
himself ready to support such a scheme if there was any serious
demand for it.3
The details of the stamp tax had been the subject of long and
1 4 Geo. Ill, cap. 15. * Gipson, L. H., Jared Ingersoll, p. 128.
8 Knox, Extra-Official Papers, n, 24-33; Hutchinson, T., Hist. Mass. Bay, m, 112.
646 IMPERIAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1763-5
careful preparation. A similar tax was already in operation in
England, and the advice of the British Stamp Commissioners was
sought in the autumn of 1763. Henry McCulloh, a former American
official and the author of a previous proposal for such a measure, was
consulted, but Thomas Whateley, of the Treasury, was mainly
responsible for the scheme as finally adopted. He had been in
constant communication with the colonial agents and accepted
several modifications suggested by Franklin and Ingersoll. The
revenue arising from the bill as finally drafted was estimated at from
£60,000 to £100,000. Perhaps one-half of this amount would be paid
by the West Indian colonies. There was little opposition to the bill
when Grenville introduced it into the House of Commons (February
1765). Ingersoll reported that "the point of the authority of Parlia-
ment to impose such tax. . .was fully and universally yielded". One
outburst of eloquent protest came from Colonel Barr£. He spoke of
the colonists as the "Sons of Liberty", and in answer to the argu-
ment that they had been planted and nurtured by the mother country,
exclaimed, "Children planted by your care? No ! Your oppression
planted them in America They nourished by your indulgence?
They grew by your neglect ! " The bill passed the House of Commons
by 205 to 49 votes. Many of the latter were cast by representatives
of the West Indian interest. "I never", said Burke, "heard a more
languid debate."1 "There has been nothing of note in Parliament",
wrote that close observer Horace Walpole, "but one slight day on
the American taxes."2
The Stamp Act received the royal assent on 22 March 1765. It
was to come into operation on i November. At the same time some
small relaxation was made in the restrictions upon trade, and a
bounty was granted upon timber imported into England from the
colonies, which were also permitted to export it freely to Ireland,
Madeira, the Azores and any part of Europe south of Cape Finisterre.
A measure was also passed — "the Mutiny Act" — obliging the
colonists to provide British troops stationed amongst them with
quarters, and also with fire, candles, beds, vinegar and salt.
(II) THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE WITH
THE AMERICAN COLONIES, 1765-1776
By the middle of the eighteenth century the American colonies had
reached a stage of development when even loyal members of such
communities must become aware of a dual patriotism. The Americans
were fast developing into a distinct race. The emigrant who had fled
from political and religious persecution or economic misery, and had
1 Burke, Edmund, Speech on American Taxation, 19 April 1774.
» Walpole, H., Letters (cd. Toynbee), vi, 187.
EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN SENTIMENT 647
helped to make a new and prosperous country out of a wilderness,
could not remain precisely of the same type either in mental outlook
or even in physical qualities as those who stayed in Europe. The long,
lean frontiersman, who, axe and gun in hand, was clearing and settling
the western lands without perhaps ever seeing a British ship or a
British soldier; the New Englander, eager, forceful and self-sufficient,
with a mind well educated to grasp an essential principle and with
the moral training and tradition to cling tenaciously to it, had
developed recognisable individualities of physique as well as definite
mental characteristics, born of climate and environment. The
Americans had begun to be themselves and to think for themselves.
They had many officers who had been trained in the colonial wars;
many merchants whose only wish was to push an untrammelled
trade; many backwoodsmen and pioneers who drew their learning
from the freedom of the open spaces ; many lawyers and politicians
who were looking hungrily for colonial careers, " ready", as Burke put
it, "to snuff the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze". Like
the Germans after 1866, only the shock of war was needed to galvanise
them into a separate and united people. The majority were conscious
of a profound double loyalty to America and Great Britain.1 Re-
leased from the menace of the French, they looked forward to
becoming the centre of an Empire in which they should advance on
equal terms with the branch of their race at home. They had become
so rich and populous — they numbered now one and a half million
freemen — that they believed themselves as necessary to Great Britain
as Great Britain was to them. They clung, above all, to the principles
which they regarded as common to themselves and the race from
which they had mainly sprung, the principles of liberty and self-
government. But though the native-born and loyal Americans were
largely in the ascendant, there were others who had emigrated with
a burning sense of grievance against Europe in general and Great
Britain in particular. Nor was the idea of separation and independ-
ence unfamiliar. The Swedish traveller Kalm, for instance, described
in 1748 the effects of the commercial oppression from which the
colonists were suffering: "I have been told not only by native
Americans, but by English emigrants publicly, that within thirty or
fifty years the English colonies in North America may constitute a
separate State entirely independent of England".2 And it has been
seen8 that during the first half of the eighteenth century an obstinate
effort had been made to acquire complete control of the legislative
and executive functions of government.
But though there was considerable jealousy of British rule, and,
especially at Boston, a determination to reduce it to a mere fiction,
there was no general conscious desire for separation. Even the most
1 Becker, Carl, The Spirit of '76. * Kalm, Pehr, Travels into JV. America, i, 265.
8 See chapter xiv.
648 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
radical Bostonians had not yet formulated any scheme for obtaining
it. In their addresses the Assemblies during the years of the coming
crisis never ceased to deny any such wish; even after acts of rebellion
had been committed, honest and moderate men like George Washing-
ton still disclaimed it. Yet it is perfectly plain that they would not be
satisfied with anything short of the virtual independence for which
they had so long been contending, and the liberty to work their own
lands, dispose of their own produce and conduct their own affairs for
and by themselves. They would, if they could, be true to their two-
fold loyalty. But the majority would not long continue to accept
subservience to the British Parliament, though they wished to remain
a part of the Empire and to preserve their allegiance to the Crown.
With at least a large minority, however, that allegiance was para-
mount. But in the background were extremists who had no such
loyalty and no such desire. And there were plenty of French agents
in their midst, all very anxious to point out their true interests and
to paint the motives of the British Government in the blackest colours.
Already, of the several ties by which States are usually held together
— community of race, of religion, of culture and political institutions,
and community of interest — the first and last were considerably
weakened and the second was growing daily of less importance.
Reaction from the excitement and excesses of the " Great Awakening "
had loosened the hold of religion on the colonists. At the same time
the activity of the Church of England had increased the dread of
ecclesiasticism. The fear lest taxation should be used for the establish-
ment of an American episcopacy was a lively one and not without
some justification.1
In New England a violent controversy had arisen over the activities
of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, which was charged
with promoting Episcopaliamsm, and in so doing was regarded as
pursuing the policy of the State. Political tension, too, had been
created by the action of the Custom House officers, who, in order to
suppress the smuggling trade with the enemy, had applied in 1761
to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts for writs of assistance. These
were general writs authorising the search of any house where smuggled
goods were suspected to be. They were perfectly legal, but open to
the same objection as the general warrants which presently excited
so much controversy in England. Their issue was opposed without
success by the Boston merchants. Speaking on their behalf, James
Otis, a youthful lawyer and son of a rich merchant, delivered a
violent attack upon the whole commercial system. Parliament, he
declared, had no authority whatever over the colonies. Acts ex-
tending the writs to America, as well as the Acts of Trade and Navi-
gation themselves, were therefore null and void there. These views
were considerably in advance of his time and he subsequently
1 Gf. Chamberlain, Mellen, John Adams, pp. 1 7-45.
OTIS AND HENRY 649
modified them. But they created a tremendous impression, and were
described by John Adams as the first step on the road to revolution.1
In Virginia, also, a recent episode had brought odium upon Church
and State. Resentment against the exercise of the royal prerogative
had been stirred by the exciting rhetoric of a great orator, who having
failed in business had taken to the law. Patrick Henry, destined to
be the force which drove Virginia into rebellion, now first revealed
his powers and his detestation of British rule. He had not a good
case. The stipends of the clergy had hitherto been paid in fixed
quantities of tobacco. In 1755, when tobacco was scarce and the
price therefore high, the Assembly enacted that they should be paid
in money. When the price was low, they had received no com-
pensation. The act was very justly annulled. But the tithe-payers
ignored the royal veto. The clergy brought actions to recover the
sums out of which they had been defrauded. They were defeated by
the eloquence of Henry, who denied the validity of the veto and told
the juries that the action of the British Government was an instance
of tyranny which dissolved the political compact.
Clearly the time was at hand when the prophecies of Turgot and
Vergennes might be realised. "Colonies", the former had declared,
"are like fruits which remain on the tree only till they are ripe.
America, as soon as she can take care of herself, will do as Carthage
did. " Vergennes, after the Peace of Paris, foretold that Great Britain
would call upon the colonies to share the burden she had incurred
on their behalf, and that they, no longer needing her protection,
would answer by declaring their independence.2 In these circum-
stances it was the business of good statesmanship to see to it that the
calls of the two loyalties of which we have spoken did not clash, and
that the bonds of the old home and the new home across the seas
should not be subjected to the strain of a crisis, in which economical
self-interest was joined to the defence of a vital constitutional principle.
It is obvious enough now that the time had come for a relaxation
of trade restrictions and a withdrawal of political interference, or for
giving to the colonies a share in the regulation of the common
concerns of the Empire as many people, including practical ad-
ministrators like Governor Pownall and political philosophers like
Adam Smith, thought possible. The Americans had reached a stage
of growth which involved a change of relationship. In the light of
experience which was not theirs, it is easy to see that it was imperative
that statesmen should find a new formula for their new age, and
provide an escape from tutelage without forcing the adolescent to
leave home. Unfortunately the idea of an empire held together by
a federal union of States and united by freedom was wholly strange
to the imperial nations of the eighteenth century. Devolution of
1 Tudor, William, Life of Janus Otis, chaps, v-vii.
1 Bancroft, G., Hist. U.S. i, 525.
650 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
sovereignty was almost inconceivable to them. Dr Johnson's dictum
that "in sovereignty there are no gradations" was deemed indis-
putable. Logically and historically perhaps it was. For the modern
compromise on the point — the conception of a gradual development
of self-governing to practically independent sovereign States within
an empire — had not been formulated, and possibly but for the lesson
taught by the revolt of the American colonies might never have been
reached. Thomas Pownall, indeed, an ex-colonial governor of large
experience, had glimpses of the modern imperial ideal when he urged
the conception of Great Britain, "not as a Kingdom of this Isle only"
with colonial appendages, but "as a grand marine dominion...
united into one Empire";1 and Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations
projected an empire wherein the colonies would enjoy equality in
status, burden and opportunity with the mother country. That ideal
is implicit in all the demands of the colonies during the ensuing period.
But they themselves did not realise it. As late as 1775 they were
declaring that they would be content with a return to the status quo
of 176s.2 Shelburne at the last hoped for a federal union.
The alternative seemed to be the enforcement of subservience.
Parliament was as jealous of its honour and as tenacious of its
authority as the King. A long stride in political understanding had
to be taken before the British people could look upon their country-
men in the colonies as one with themselves in rights as in race; as
equal fellow-subjects of the Grown across the seas. As it was, in the
words of Benjamin Franklin, "every man in England seems to
consider himself as a piece of a sovereign over America; seems to
jostle himself into the throne with the King, and talks of our subjects
in the Colonies".
In spite of the domination of the mercantile theory and the policy
of restricting the Plantations to the production of raw materials for
British manufactures, the mother country cannot be regarded as
treating them merely as milch cows kept for her profit. In return for
the restraints imposed upon their trade and manufactures, Great
Britain gave freely in exchange. She provided naval and military
protection and military stores; she fought for their preservation and
extension; she gave bounties to encourage the industries included
under the heading of naval stores ; she supplied money for religious
establishments and in aid of Protestant emigrants ; she presented the
tobacco colonies with a monopoly in tobacco at the expense of the
home farmer. She had incurred a great burden of debt as the result
of her efforts largely on their behalf. Politically and commercially
she gave her colonies greater freedom than did any other imperial
nation. The elder Mirabeau wrote of the English as "the most en-
lightened of the people of Europe in their conduct in the New World".
The fundamental error Great Britain now made was not so much
1 Pownall, Thomas, Administration of the Colonies, pp. xv, 19.
8 Franklin, Works, iv, 432; Washington, Works, n, 501.
COLONIAL SEPARATISM 651
that she did what was done by all other empires of the period, nor
even that she asserted a sovereignty to which all British people alike
were subject. It lay in the assertion of that sovereignty in a way
which put the colonies in a state of inferiority, whilst their trade was
controlled for the benefit of their fellow-subjects in England. The
colonies were placed in the position "not so much of a State in
federation as of a conquered State'9.1 The very liberality of the
institutions to which the mother country had accustomed them
prepared them to rebel against that condition. Naturally, too, the
wholesale evasion of commercial laws which ran counter to the feeling
and interests of the country, had accustomed the people to the defiance
of British authority.
The really critical part of the Revenue Act of 1764 lay in the steps
taken for enforcing it and the observance of the Acts of Trade. The
right of the mother country to control colonial trade was universally
admitted. But restrictions of trade were bound to cause irritation,
producing sooner or later political reactions. No political reaction of
the first magnitude could take place so long as only the might of
Great Britain stood between the colonists and absorption or expulsion
by the aggressive power of France. By the irony of fate, the results
of the prodigious effort made by Great Britain to remove that menace
led directly to the measures which called into active being the latent
demand of the American colonies for practical independence, and
drove them first into resistance and then into unity.
For as yet the spirit of colonial separatism reigned supreme.
Franklin himself emphasised their mutual jealousy and their re-
sistance to the idea of a union even for their common defence against
the French and Indians. He ridiculed, therefore, the idea of their
uniting against their own nation, which "they all love much more
than they love one another".2 "Nothing", wrote the traveller
Burnaby, " can exceed the jealousy and emulation which they possess
in regard to each other."3 Both he and Otis expressed their con-
victions that, if left to themselves, civil war would rage from one end
of the continent to the other.
We have seen that the Government's policy embraced three
measures: the strict enforcement of the trade laws, and, in the absence
of quotas of men and money raised by the colonies for their own pro-
tection, the establishment of British troops in America, and the raising
of a revenue there by an imperial tax to contribute towards their
support. So long, however, as the Acts of Trade were enforced, the
Americans could reasonably maintain that their contribution to im-
perial defence was to be found in the advantage derived by Great
Britain from control of the colonial trade. There the matter might
well have been left.
Unfortunately, the idea of a standing army was naturally
1 Sedey, J. R., Expansion of England, chap. iv. * Franklin, Works, rv, 41.
8 Burnaby, A., Travels in JV". America, Pinker ton, Voyages, xra, 752.
652 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
repugnant to the colonists, not only because they retained the tradi-
tional English objection to anything of the sort, but also because they
feared, probably with reason, that it might be used for enforcing
closer British control over their affairs. Unfortunately, too, the tax
imposed, although it was intended, not to produce a revenue for
Great Britain, but solely to be a contribution towards necessary
colonial objects, gave grounds for raising the great constitutional
principle of "no taxation without representation", a principle so
dear to the hearts of Englishmen that even Lord Gamden, in a
moment of aberration, described it as a "law of nature55.1 It pro-
vided the opponents of British rule and all who were feeling the pinch
of that baleful system of commercial restrictions, which aimed at
securing a monopoly of manufactures and of colonial trade to the
mother country, with an opportunity of joining issue on the ideal
ground of a battle for freedom against oppression. The ground was
the same as that upon which the struggle against the Stuarts had
been fought— the struggle in which the American colonies had been
cradled. "What we did5', wrote Jefferson on a subsequent occasion,
"was with the help of Rushworth, whom we rummaged over for the
Revolutionary precedents of those days.532 The burden of the stamp
tax was grossly exaggerated in America. Actually the amount
expected to be raised was very small, and it was partly offset by the
concessions mentioned above. But Hampden was imprisoned for
refusing to pay a 20^. tax. If the stamp tax was an insignificant im-
position, that was a good reason for not imposing it; it was not a
reason for submitting to it.
There was nothing new in the idea of taxing the colonies for their
own defence and the support of their civil government. It had been
proposed, for instance, by George Vaughan, a native of New Hampshire
andagentfor that province, as early as 1715. 8 In 1717 and 1722 Archi-
bald Cumings, customs officer at Boston, had submitted a plan which
included a stamp tax,4 and in 1728 Sir William Keith, ex-Lieutenant-
Governor of Pennsylvania, had made a similar suggestion.5 What
was new, was its adoption. Walpole, in 1 739, had dismissed such a
project with the observation that it had always been the object of
his administration to encourage the commercial prosperity of the
colonies, and that the greater their prosperity, the greater would be
the demand for English manufactures.6 He showed a wisdom in
advance of his generation. Indeed, it is possible that if the Wealth of
Nations had appeared thirty years before it was actually published — in
1746 instead of in 1776 — the argument of Adam Smith might have
borne fruit in time. The argument, that is, that Great Britain derived
nothing but loss from the monopoly of trade, to maintain which was
1 Par/. Hist, xvi, 178. » Jefferson, T., Memoirs, i, 6.
8 Col. St. Pap. Col. 1715, no. 389 (i). 4 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1717, no. 486.
8 Short Discourse on the present state of the Colonies. 8 Annual Register, 1 765, p. 25.
EFFECTS OF GRENVILLE'S MEASURES 653
the principal object of the dominion she exercised over her colonies.
But the fruit of that profound argument was long in ripening. Its
acceptance was rendered difficult by the attitude of all the other
nations who monopolised their colonial trade, and by the evident
success of the Trade and Navigation Acts in building up the mari-
time power both of Great Britain and her colonies, and in crippling
her commercial rivals, France and Holland. On the other hand,
Smith agreed with Grenville that each part of the British Empire
ought to support its own civil and military establishments and
shoulder its share of the burden of imperial defence.
Still more unfortunately, the proposal for the stamp tax followed
upon the reimposition of the Sugar Act and it was accompanied by
measures for stopping the wholesale smuggling by which the Acts of
Trade and Navigation had been evaded. This involved the cessation
of the illicit trade with the foreign West Indies and the Spanish
colonies of America. But that trade, besides providing a market for
their superfluous lumber and provisions, was the main source from
which the Americans had obtained the ready money needed for
payments to England in order to make good the adverse balance
of trade normal with young colonies, which are necessarily large
importers, and in their case augmented by those very Acts of Trade,
Stimulated by long-term credits and inflated issues of paper currency,
there had recently been an orgy of importation, so that British
merchants were owed some five millions of pounds by 1775. This
indebtedness was mentioned by Jonathan Boucher as an incentive to
rebellion.1 At the same time it was enacted that the money raised
by the duties in America should be paid in hard cash into the British
Exchequer.2 By another Act3 the issue of paper money was pro-
hibited. The effect of all these measures, taken together, was to deal
a severe blow to American trade, and to create a greater demand for
ready money whilst drying up the sources from which it could be
obtained. Combined with the sugar tax, they were sufficient in
themselves to create grave discontent and to raise in the minds of
many the question "By what constitutional right can the British
Parliament so restrain the American people?" The imposition of
the stamp tax and the declaration in the preamble of the Revenue
Act that it was "just and necessary to raise a revenue in His Majesty's
Dominions in America for defraying the expenses of defending, pro-
tecting, and securing the same", presented them with a constitutional
grievance which could be used as a stalking horse for opposition to
all those irksome measures and British rule itself. For it was not taxa-
tion without representation which stirred the national conscience to
the defence of smuggling, but the suppression of smuggling which
1 Boucher, Jonathan, Views of the causes and consequences of the American Revolution (1797);
Van Tyne, G. H., England and America, p. 55; cf. Chalmers, G., Hist, of Colonial Currency,
pp. 18, 416.
8 4 Geo. Ill, cap. 34. 3 5 Geo. Ill, cap. 12.
654 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
reminded it of the iniquity of taxation without representation.
Neither the principle nor the practice was new. The charter of
Pennsylvania expressly reserved to Parliament the right of taxing
that province. By the Act of 25 Car. II, cap. 7, Parliament had
taxed the colonies for the purpose of revenue without granting them
representation and without arousing protest, and that statute—/0r the
encouragement of the Greenland trade— had been continually renewed.1
The delay granted by Grenville before passing the Stamp Act
was kindly meant, but very foolish. It merely gave the colonists time
to experience the results of the anti-smuggling measures and to
prepare their resistance on constitutional grounds. Echoes of Colonel
Barry's rhetoric floated across the Atlantic. The right of the Imperial
Government to regulate trade and navigation was, as has been said,
universally conceded. The duties levied at the Custom House were
generally regarded as the necessary corollary of such regulation. They
might be disagreeable; they had hitherto been largely evaded; even
now, when they were to be rigidly enforced, there was no question
of challenging their validity. But a distinction was observed in the
Stamp Act. Here was a tax to be imposed on the planter or mer-
chant without the consent of his representative, and also a tax to be
levied in the interior as well as at the seaports.
The provision by which offences against the Stamp Act were to
be cognisable by the Admiralty Courts roused further resentment.
The colonies, it was proclaimed, were to be deprived of the right of
trial by jury. The Virginians wrote to their agent in London that no
British subject could be made subservient to laws without his consent
or that of his representatives, and that "no man or body of men could
. . .have a right to do anything contrary to reason or justice, or that
can lead to the destruction of the Constitution".2 Ignoring the re-
quest of the "Gentle Shepherd", that they should propose alterna-
tive methods of raising the required revenue, the colonists demanded
that taxes should only be imposed by the votes of their own Assemblies.
Petitions to that effect from the Assemblies of six colonies were for-
warded to the Council of Trade, and were denounced as exhibiting
"the most indecent disrespect to the Legislature of Great Britain".3
The Commons refused to allow them to be presented, and the Stamp
Act received the royal assent on 22 March 1765.
There was not the slightest expectation in England of the storm of
opposition which was about to break forth in the colonies, where the
long delay granted by Grenville had been utilised by agitators to
organise resistance. An ominous incident occurred at Philadelphia.
Before the ships bringing the news of the passing of the Act arrived,
it was found that the guns of the battery had been spiked (14 April).
At Boston the news was received with demonstrations of mourning.
1 2 and 7 Wm. and Mary; i and 9 Anne; 3 Geo. I, cap. 7.
* Va. Mag. Hist, xn, 13. 3 Parl. Hist, xvi, 121.
RESISTANCE TO THE STAMP ACT 655
Flags were flown at the half mast; muffled peals were rung from the
church towers, and copies of the Act, with a death's head printed
where the stamps should be, were hawked about the streets to the cry
of "England's Folly and America's Ruin !"
In the constitutional opposition to the " black Act", as it was called,
Virginia took the lead. The Address of the Massachusetts Assembly
had taken the line that whatever the right of Parliament to impose
the tax, its imposition was inexpedient. But now, in Virginia,
resolutions submitted by Henry were passed (29 May), which asserted
that the colonists possessed the rights of Englishmen; that taxation
by themselves or their chosen representatives was the distinguishing
characteristic of British freedom; and that the Virginians retained
the right, constantly recognised by the British Government, to tax
themselves through their own Assembly. Any invs^ion of that right
was an invasion of British and American liberty. The Pennsylvania!!
Assembly went further. It declared that its government being
"founded on the natural right of mankind and the noble principle
of English liberty is and ought to be perfectly free". The "Virginia
resolves" sounded throughout the land "like an alarm bell to the
disaffected".1 Rioting broke out all over the country. At Boston,
the effigy of the stamp distributor was hung upon a tree; his house,
the Stamp Office and the records of the Admiralty Court were
destroyed. The house of Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson was sacked
and a bonfire made of the records he had collected for his history of
the province. In New York the effigy of Lieutenant-Governor Golden
was carried round the city in his coach and then burnt. Mob leaders,
such as John Lamb and Isaac Sears, formed radical associations,
chiefly composed of mechanics, and, adopting Barre's phrase, styled
themselves "Sons of Liberty". Merchants bound themselves to order
no goods from England. Societies were formed for encouraging
domestic manufactures. Patriotic citizens wore homespun, and
abstinence from lamb was enjoined, in order to provide the necessary
wool. By the end of the year trade with England had practically
ceased. The stamp distributors, upon Grenville's suggestion, had
been chosen by the American agents from the colonists themselves.
But in Philadelphia, as in Boston, the stamp master was compelled to
resign. Their example was everywhere followed. The stamps, when
they arrived in September, were seized and destroyed. In North
Carolina the inhabitants compelled the commander of H.M.S. Viper
to surrender two vessels which he had seized for sailing without
stamped clearances. From Carolina to Halifax the distribution of
the stamps was practically suspended. All legal business was brought
to a standstill. Such was the weakness of the executive that the
governors, left without military or other support, were unable to
check rioting or enforce the law. With surprising unanimity — for the
1 Governor Bernard to Lord Halifax, 15 Aug. 1765.
656 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
clash between the two loyalties was not yet apparent to many— the
people combined to render the Stamp Act a dead letter. Business
was then resumed by ignoring it.
The Massachusetts General Court suggested that a Congress of
Delegates should meet at New York to condemn the Stamp Act.1
Nine colonies sent representatives (7 October). A petition to the King
and a memorial to Parliament were drawn up, wherein, whilst
acknowledging "all due subordination" to Parliament, protest was
entered against the extension of the jurisdiction of the Admiralty
Court and the sole right of taxing themselves was claimed by the
colonists. Their main contention was that Parliament could not tax
them internally unless they were represented in that body, and repre-
sentation was an impossibility. The idea of representation had quickly
been dropped, not because it was impossible, but from fear of its being
accepted, as Governor Bernard suggested, and that the colonial
representatives would then be outvoted. The colonists claimed that
they owed the same allegiance and had the same inherent rights as
Englishmen born within the realm. It was, of course, possible to
reply that in that case they must be bound by the Acts of the British
Parliament, and could not claim exemption from any particular one
of the obligations under which all British subjects lay.2 The Council
of Trade denounced the Stamp Act Congress as forming a precedent
of "dangerous tendency".3 It was indeed, like the associations of the
"Sons of Liberty", a first step towards united action by colonies
which hitherto had been at least as jealous of each other as of the
mother country.
The American Revolution, like most others, was largely the work
of an influential minority. Planters, merchants and lawyers led the
masses into the movement. Subsequently it was mainly carried out
by the middle and lower classes. But the constitutional and legal
reasoning on which the Revolution was based, and the application
of the doctrines of the "rights of man", were necessarily the work of
highly educated men.4 The political theory which inspired such
leaders as Otis, Henry, John and Samuel Adams, James Warren,
John Dickinson and Thomas Jefferson, was derived mainly from the
writings of John Locke, reinforced by those of Harrington, Grotius,
Hume, Selden, Puffendorf, Montesquieu, Beccaria, Burlamaqui and
Rousseau. Cradled in the Protestant and democratic tradition of
the Reformation, they readily accepted Locke's argument that "men
being by nature all free, equal and independent. . .instituted a
government by consent to protect them in their rights to life, liberty,
and property"; and drew from it the practical corollary that the
1 Journal of House of Representatives, Massachusetts, 1765.
8 Gf. Knox, William, The claim of the Colonies, etc. examined ( 1 765) ; Hutchinson, Thomas,
Diary and Letters, i, 21. a ParL Hist, xvi, 122.
* Wirt, Wm., Life of Patrick Henry; Fisher, S. G., The struggle for American Independence, i,
243.
THE THEORY OF THE REVOLUTION 657
colonies were equally entitled with Great Britain to govern themselves.
They readily accepted his conclusion that if such government should
act contrary to the general good, the compact is broken and the
government dissolved. Burlamaqui's argument that "natural society
is a state of [political] equality and liberty" fired the imagination of
many a reader in Massachusetts and Virginia. The doctrines of natural
law absorbed from these books filtered through the minds of men like
Alexander Hamilton and Dickinson, and, translated by Jefferson,
were to be epitomised in the Declaration of Independence. But
political theorists would have had no influential following had not
a definite issue forced into opposition such men as George Washing-
ton, who felt that their property* and their personal liberty as free-
born citizens were at stake, and, having once taken their stand,
adhered to it with all the stubborn determination of their race.
In this first stage, the position taken by the Assemblies was radically
illogical. Whilst admitting the right of the British Parliament to an
unrestricted power of legislation over the colonies, and whilst ad-
mitting that Parliament could tax them externally, they claimed that
internal taxation was their own exclusive province. But there would
appear to be no essential difference between the right to legislate and
the right to impose taxes by legislation, or between internal and
external taxation. If Parliament had a right to impose a customs duty
and to regulate trade, it had a right to raise an inland revenue. More-
over, the admission of a right to tax externally destroyed the argu-
ment of "No taxation without representation". "What a pother",
said an Irish member of Parliament, "whether money is to be taken
out of their coat pocket or their waistcoat pocket." But if the position
of the colonists was illogical, practically it offered scope for a com-
promise which might have been accepted as a preparatory step for
further relaxation of British control and the Acts of Trade. That,
however, would have involved a reversal of the whole considered
policy of the British Government. No proposal, moreover, for
relaxing the trade laws would have found any support among the
mercantile and moneyed classes who were the chief opponents of
the policy of taxing the colonies.
The argument could not rest there. The distinction between in-
ternal and external taxation was soon to be abandoned. The denial
of the one right had involved the denial of the other. Hopkins was
already arguing that the people of Britain had no sovereign authority
over their fellow-subjects in America, and that therefore their repre-
sentatives could not derive from them any power to tax them.1
Hitherto, it had been admitted that Parliament could enact a law by
which the life of a colonist was forfeit for a crime; that it could take
away his property by taxes levied on goods coining into his seaports ;
that by the Act of 1732 it could make property in the colonies liable
1 Hopkins, Stephen, Rights of Colonies examined (1765).
GHBEI 42
658 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
for debts to British merchants; that it could establish a General Post
Office in the colonies, fixing the rates of postage. Some of these Acts
were admittedly beneficial. But what was the essential distinction
between them and the Stamp Act, and what was the authority for
either? Once that question had been raised in practical form, theory
advanced, logically and inevitably, to a more momentous conclusion.
Without representation in Parliament, the new argument ran, Parlia-
ment had no right to tax the colonies in any form, or indeed to govern
them at all.
Before the day on which the Stamp Act was to come into force
(i November), Grenville had been dismissed. The fall of his ministry
had no connection with the Act by which his name is remembered.
Pitt, indeed, when approached by the King, named the question of
taxing America as one of the points of his policy. But he refused to
take office. George III himself seems to have been one of the first
to grasp the magnitude of the principle at stake. "Where this spirit
will end", he wrote on 5 December, "is not to be said. It is un-
doubtedly the most serious matter that ever came before Parliament. " l
The young King was in no way responsible for Grenville's policy,
nor did he approve of it. "Mr Grenville's conduct", he wrote in
1767, "is as abundant in absurditys as in the affair of the Stamp Act;
for he first deprived the Americans by restraining their trade, from
the means of acquiring wealth, and taxed them "2 But once the
question had been raised, he was determined to maintain the principle
of the right of the mother country to tax the colonies. In the present
juncture, however, according to his own account, he preferred modi-
fication of the Stamp Act to repeal, as the wisest and most efficacious
method of " restoring order and obedience in the American colonys . . .
because any part remaining sufficiently ascertained the right of die
mother country to tax its colonys and next that it would show a
desire to redress any just grievances". But since "the unhappy
factions that divide this country would not permit this equitable plan
to be followed", he preferred repeal to enforcement, for enforcement
would only tend to "widen the breach between this country and
America". For these reasons, whilst declaring to Lord Rockingham
that "modification was his own constant opinion", he authorised
him to state that he preferred repeal to enforcement. On the funda-
mental principle he never wavered — the principle approved by
Parliament on 3 February 1766 — that "the King's Majesty, by and
with the advice and consent of Parliament, had, hath, and of right
ought to have, full power and authority to make laws and statutes
of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonys... in all cases
whatsoever".8 All yielding on that point he held to be weakness and
1 George III to General Gonway, 5 Dec. 1765.
* GMT. ofGeo. Ill (ed. Fortescue), i, 471.
8 Ibid, i, nos. 246-8; Grawlle Papers 9 m, 353.
REPEAL OF THE STAMP ACT 659
liggery — a thing he detested — and consistently maintained that
but for the vacillations and factiousness of parties, it would never
have been allowed to be seriously challenged.
Grenville was succeeded by the Marquess of Rockingham, a man
of good sense and integrity, and a sound Whig. The Rockingham
Whigs drew their inspiration mainly from his secretary, Edmund
Burke, who had made a diligent and sympathetic study of the
colonies. In the new ministry, General Conway, who had been one
of the few to oppose the Stamp Act, was one Secretary of State, the
Duke of Grafton the other. The Duke of Newcastle took the Privy
Seal. But the ministry was weakened by the abstention of Pitt, the
distrust of the King, and the inclusion of such strong advocates of
taxing the colonies as Charles Townshend, Lord Barrington, and
Lord Northington.
The disturbances in America had caused surprise and annoyance
in England, and considerable distress owing to the interruption of
trade. Merchants and manufacturers began to petition Parliament
to repeal the Acts of 1 764 and 1 765, representing that the colonists,
who owed them two or three millions, were declaring themselves
unable to pay owing to the new taxes and restrictions, which had so
interrupted "the most fruitful branches of their commerce, that the
former means of remittance were utterly taken from them".1 Mean-
time the violence of the Americans made the task of the Government
more difficult.3 In January 1766 the American question was raised
in the House of Commons. Led by Grenville and the Duke of Bedford,
a powerful opposition argued vehemently against concession. The
right of taxation, they contended, was an essential part of the sovereign
power. If Parliament yielded to intimidation, its authority was gone,
and only its authority could hold the Empire together. Law and
logic, perhaps, were on their side. All the majesty of eloquence and
statesmanship were on the other. Pitt answered Grenville in a series
of magnificent speeches whose thunder reverberated across the At-
lantic. Whilst asserting that the authority of the mother country was
"sovereign and supreme in every circumstance of government and
legislation whatsoever", he maintained that taxation was no part of
the governing or legislative power. He upheld the distinction be-
tween internal and external taxation. The right of self-taxation was
essential to freedom. Without it, the Americans would have been
slaves. In an immortal passage he unfurled the flag of freedom and
gave utterance to his life-long hatred of despotic power. " I rejoice ",
he cried, " that America has resisted. Three millions of people so dead
to all feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would
have been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest. " He urged the
absolute repeal of the Stamp Act, as having been founded on an
1 Petition to House of Commons, 17 Jan. 1766.
8 Walpole, H., Memoirs of George III, n, 221.
42-2
660 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
erroneous principle. "At the same time," he concluded, "let the
sovereign authority of this country be asserted in as strong terms as
can be devised, and be made to extend to every point of legislation
whatsoever; that we may bind their trade, confine their manufac-
tures, and exercise every power whatsoever— except that of taking
their money out of their pockets without their consent."1 Pitt was
supported by Lord Gamden, but by Camden alone of the legal
authorities. Neither Lord Lyttleton, nor Lord Northington, nor Lord
Mansfield would listen to the idea of concession, or to the suggestion
that exercise of the legislative power might be inexpedient. The
colonists, Mansfield urged, were subjects of Great Britain, and the
British Parliament, representing the whole British Empire, had
authority to bind every subject, whether within or without the
realm.2 The question was debated with zeal on both sides. The
examination of Franklin, Agent for Pennsylvania and Massachusetts,
at the bar of the House, indicates a genuine desire to understand the
colonial point of view. Franklin was a somewhat disingenuous
witness, but he made clear the distinction that was drawn by the
colonies between internal and external taxation, and that they would
never rescind their resolutions against the right of Great Britain to
tax them, "unless compelled by force of arms".3
Pitt's advocacy enabled the Government to repeal the Stamp Act
(22 February). This was done on the grounds of expediency and the
damage inflicted on British trade. The Revenue Act was modified
by converting the import duty on textiles into an export duty from
England; reducing import duties on coffee and pimento from British
Plantations and on foreign cambrics and lawns, and the 3^. per gallon
on foreign molasses to id. on British and foreign molasses alike. The
West Indies were compensated by the creation of free ports at
Dominica and Jamaica. The sugar duty then ceased to be a real
commercial grievance. The penny tax raised £17,000 a year, for it
had made smuggling not worth while. Grenville's threepence had
yielded only £2000. This readjustment, however, altered the whole
character of the impost. It ceased to be a regulation of trade and a
protective duty for the Sugar Colonies, and became an external tax
levied for revenue purposes. It was passed by Rockingham Whigs
and the followers of Pitt; by a ministry of which Charles Townshend
was a member. One may see in it the beginning of a new chapter in
colonial policy,4 and the forerunner of Townshend's disastrous
budget in the following year.
These measures were accompanied by a Declaratory Act "for
securing the dependency of the colonies". It went far beyond what
Pitt had suggested, and was strenuously opposed by him. But in view
1 Chatham Correspondence, n, 363 seqq.
* ParL Hist, xvi, 172. * * Franklin, Works, TV, 176.
'Gf. Charming, E., History of the UJS. m, 78.
THE DECLARATORY ACT 661
of the strength of the Opposition and the boldness of the American
challenge to parliamentary authority, the repeal of the Stamp Act
could not have been carried without it.1 The Declaratory Act did,
indeed, merely repeat what Parliament had affirmed on 3 February
I766.2 It asserted that the colonies were "subordinate and dependent
upon the Imperial Crown and Parliament5', and that Parliament had
full power and authority to make laws binding them in all cases
whatsoever. It annulled all recent proceedings which involved a
denial of parliamentary supremacy. The constitutional right of
taxing the colonies was thus asserted.3 Yet the criticism of history
must be that of Shelburne: "The British Government ought to have
enforced the Stamp Act with its whole power, or to have acknow-
ledged its error with ingenuousness and candour, which would have
showed a frankness and condescension which must have been in-
terpreted into true dignity; but unhappily the British Parliament
did neither. It affirmed its own right of enacting, whilst it repealed
the Act itself in visible compliance to the clamour of America, and
thereby naturally suggested to die Provinces, that the timidity of the
British Parliament kept pace with its ill dispositions towards them".4
The repeal of the Stamp Act was received in America with trans-
ports of joy and gratitude. Statues were erected of King George and
Pitt. Moderate men were delighted at the triumph of their cause and
at the removal of excuse for agitation and mob violence. They were
ready to accept the resolutions of right, so long as no attempt was
made to enforce them, regarding the Declaratory Act as a mere
device for securing an honourable retreat from a position which had
been rendered untenable.5 Many, on the other hand, looked upon
the Act with suspicion, as a prelude to a renewed attempt at taxation.6
The demand that compensation should be paid to sufferers from the
late riots was resented and resisted, notably by Massachusetts. When
a Compensation Act was at length agreed to there, it included a
clause indemnifying the rioters, and was on that account repealed.
Inevitably the prestige of a country which had failed to protect its
officials in the execution of their duty and had repealed a law at the
dictation of rioters suffered in the eyes of many. The abandonment
of the Stamp Act was at once interpreted by Otis and other extremists
as an abandonment of the trade laws. If no other occasion had been
given for exciting that "irritable and umbrageous people", as Pitt de-
scribed the Americans, the Whig policy of conciliation might indeed
have succeeded for a while. But only permanently, if the enforce-
ment of the Acts of Trade and Navigation had been abandoned
1 Albemarle, Life of Rockingham, i, 305.
2 Corr. ofGeo. HI (ed. Fortescue), I, 262.
3 Todd, A , Parliamentary Government in British Colonies, p. 241.
4 Fitzmaurice, Life of S/ielburne, i, 316.
5 Franklin, Works, iv, 176; Adams, J , Works, n, 203; Hutchinson, Hist. Mass, in, 147.
0 Shelburne to Chatham, 6 Feb. 1767; Fitzmaurice, Life ofShelburne, i, 309.
662 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
together with the whole policy of closer control of the colonies.
But the need for retaining the Acts of Trade, for remodelling and
consolidating the Empire, and preventing the colonies from escaping
from control was held as strongly by their Whig champions, Shel-
burne and Conway for instance, as by Tories.1 Francis Bernard,
Governor of Massachusetts Bay, was now continually urging it, and,
as a first step towards settling the whole colonial system on a new
uniform type, the resumption of all the charters. He had begun by
opposing the Stamp Act and advocating freer trade; but his ex-
perience of the agitation in Boston and the weakness of the executive
changed his attitude. He was convinced that there was a powerful
party which intended to break away from Great Britain if it could.
It soon found occasion for blowing up the dying embers of discontent.
The Mutiny Act, extended to the colonies in 1765, was annually
renewed. It was strenuously resisted in Massachusetts, and positively
rejected by New York. It was denounced as an attempt to establish
a precedent for a Tax Act, and as a step towards dragooning the
colonies into the acceptance of the "new sovereignty".2 For since
it directed the Assemblies to enact, without debate, that certain
articles should be provided, it implied the principle that Parliament
could tax the colonies internally through the medium of their
Assemblies, leaving to them only the choice of means.3 New York,
especially, felt aggrieved, because as the military headquarters of the
two provinces it was disproportionately burdened. General Gage
reported some dangerous rioting in July 1766. New York merchants
presently petitioned for a relaxation of the Acts of Trade, and
especially of the Sugar Act.
The hostile attitude of New York, deplored by Pitt himself, caused
great irritation in England.4 It played into the hands of the court
party, who echoed the sentiments of the King in regarding the repeal
of the Stamp Act as a humiliation,5 and strengthened those who had
never abandoned its principle. Nor could the idea of a standing army
in America be shelved. The threatening aspect of foreign affairs, the
direct menace of France under Ghoiseul, and the burden of taxation
kept alive the temptation to insist upon a direct contribution from
the colonies to imperial expenditure. Even Shelburne held "that it
was highly reasonable that an American fund should be formed to
support the exigencies of government". He thought that such a
fund might be obtained from the quit-rents and grants of land in
America.6 If this scheme had come to fruition, the necessity for im-
perial taxation would have been avoided, and the American crisis
would have ended, at least for the time.
1 Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, i, 304-7, 318.
* Dickinson, John, Address to Philadelphia Meeting, 1 768.
8 Fitzmaurice, I, 309, 316, 317.
4 Chatham to Shelburne, Corr. m, 189.
6 Burke, E., Speech on American Taxation, 1774. fl Fitzmaurice, I, 306.
TOWNSHEND'S IMPORT DUTIES 663
On the fall of the Rockingham ministry, Pitt, taking the tide of
Earl of Chatham, joined the King in an attempt to govern without
party. The "mosaic" Government, as Burke dubbed it, was formed,
with Grafton as its nominal head and Gamden as Lord Chancellor.
Shelburne as Secretary of State for the Southern Department took
charge of colonial affairs, whilst General Conway remained as
Secretary of State for the Northern Department. All of these, with
the exception of Conway, were Pittites, and Conway was a Rocking-
hamite, who had moved the rejection of the Stamp Act. A political
prophet, scanning such a ministry, might well have scouted the idea
that within a few months it would be imposing taxes on the colonies.
If so, he would have forgotten Townshend. Townshend was Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer. That brilliant but erratic genius had
experience, industry, wit, ambition, and an unrivalled power of
charming the House of Commons. He was soon to show that, like
Grenville, he still clung to the policy matured under Halifax. The
illness of Chatham gave him his opportunity.
In a debate on the army estimates, Grenville raised the question
of making the colonists pay for the troops stationed in America
(26 January 1 767). Great Britain, he declared, must be relieved from
the burden, which now amounted to £400,000 a year, almost the
sum produced by a shilling in the pound land tax. Townshend in
reply announced to a delighted House that he knew a mode by which
a revenue could be drawn from America without offence, and he
intended to do it. His colleagues listened in indignant silence as he
pledged himself to a policy wholly at variance with their wishes. They
did not resign, for the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility had not yet
been matured; and no one, in Chatham's absence, had the authority
to insist upon Townshend's dismissal. Shelburne wrote in alarm to
Chatham, but Chatham, in the throes of suppressed gout, was in-
capable of attending to business. Townshend, therefore, had his way.
On 19 February Grenville and Dowdeswell followed up the attack.
Championing the cause of the heavily taxed "Country Party", and
supported on this occasion by most of the Rockingham Whigs, they
outvoted the Government proposal for a 4?. in the pound land tax,
and secured its reduction by one shilling. Townshend was left to
make good the resulting deficit of half a million in his estimates. On
15 April he opened his budget. He announced that the distinction
drawn by the Americans between internal and external taxation was,
in his opinion, "perfect nonsense". But since they admitted the
right of Parliament to regulate their trade, so long as it raised no
internal revenue, he would humour them. By laying an "external"
or port duty upon glass, paper, painters' colours, and tea imported
into the colonies, he proposed to raise a revenue of £40,000. Tea,
coffee, and cocoa exported to the colonies were allowed a drawback
of the duties paid on their importation into England. In the case of
664 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
tea this indulgence was granted for five years only. It amounted to
larf. a pound, and the colonists were to pay ^d. a pound on the tea
they imported. This was a considerable concession. For it meant that
tea which cost English people 6s. a pound could be bought in the
colonies for 3J.1 It was a Grecian gift, perhaps, but it is absurd to
represent it as an extortion. The proceeds of these taxes were to be
devoted to maintaining an American civil list, and the surplus, if
any, was to be applied to the support of the army. Herein it challenged
a vital principle, for which, rightly or wrongly, the colonial Assemblies
had been fighting for generations. Colonial officials, governors,
judges and the rest, would at length be withdrawn from their
influence, and the executive strengthened accordingly.
Two other important Acts were passed at the same time. The New
York Assembly was suspended from its legislative functions until it
should fulfil the requirements of the Mutiny Act (15 June). After a
long period of tension it submitted (1769), only to be denounced
as traitor to the common cause for which Massachusetts and South
Carolina stood firm in this particular. The third measure provided
the irritant which led once more to rioting and violence. A Board of
Commissioners of Customs was appointed for America, with head-
quarters at Boston; revenue cutters were stationed at Philadelphia
and other ports; and the whole system of the Customs service was
reorganised and rendered thoroughly efficient. Writs of assistance
were formally legalised.
For forms of government let fools contest,
Whate'er is best administered, is best.
The Acts of Trade and Navigation had been best administered by
allowing them to become partly obsolete. Where the shoe pinched
worst, smuggling had been permitted to ease it. Now Townshend,
like Grenville, after presenting the agitators in press and pulpit with
a political grievance, presented business men with a practical one,
by the efficient enforcement of the trade laws.
If mere cleverness were the criterion of statesmanship, Townshend
is entitled to admiration. The colonists were fairly caught in their
own argument. The new taxes were external, and therefore admittedly
constitutional. The prevention of smuggling could hardly be advanced
as an infringement of the rights of man. Whilst the leaders considered
their position, the new taxation was received without any of the
riotous demonstrations which had been prepared for the stamp tax.
The central and southern provinces, indeed, seemed inclined to
accept the situation, and de Kalb, one of the French agents busily
engaged in fomenting rebellion, came to the sad conclusion that, if the
taxes were kept within these moderate limits, England would succeed
in maintaining her authority.2 For it was becoming plain whither
resistance, if continued, must lead. Opposition to the new taxes could
1 Hutchinson, Hut. Mass, m, 351. » Bancroft, G., Hist. US. ui, 1 16, 140.
DICKINSON'S LETTERS FROM A FARMER 665
only be maintained if parliamentary authority were denied in all
matters whatsoever. The distinction between internal and external
taxation must be dropped. Perceiving that a new argument was
needed, the leaders shifted their ground to the rights of man. Laws
of Nature, it was found, precluded all legislation in the colonies by
Parliament. Though a shadowy allegiance to the Crown might be
proclaimed, so long as protection from foreign enemies was required,
and though the idea of separation was far from being entertained as
yet by the great majority of Americans, clear-sighted men could not
fail to see that this claim would necessarily involve, sooner or later,
a declaration of independence.
The fiery zeal of Massachusetts led the way in resistance to the
new Acts. The Assembly petitioned the King for relief from the new
taxes (January 1 768). Whilst expressing perfect loyalty and declaring
that it had no desire for independency, it acknowledged the
superintending authority of Parliament only in cases " that can consist
with the fundamental rights of nature and the constitution". Too
much attention is sometimes paid to addresses of this kind, which
were skilfully drawn up in order to influence English opinion. They
ought to be read in connection with the violent language and
arguments of the agitators in the American press. What the New Eng-
landers now meant was that they were willing to remain within the
Empire, but would not tolerate any imperial interference with their
affairs. In a circular letter addressed to the other Assemblies (n
February), calling upon them to join in petitioning against the Paint,
paper, and glass Act, they explained that these duties infringed those
"rights of nature and the constitution" because they took away their
property without their consent.
The new position was clearly stated by John Dickinson, a Quaker
lawyer of Philadelphia, in his popular Letters from a Farmer ^ He
denied that Parliament had any authority in the colonies at all, but
admitted its right to regulate external trade by duties. Such duties,
however, must not be intended to raise a revenue. For in that case
they would constitute a tax, and Parliament had no power to tax
them. The framers of the Tea Act had expressly declared that its
purpose was to raise a revenue. It will be seen that this position went
just far enough to exclude Townshend's duties, and to appeal to
moderate "patriots" who did not wish to go any further. The argu-
ment was illogical in admitting the right of Parliament to impose
duties on trade at all, if it had no power to tax. Dickinson's Letters
also indicated a growing movement towards union. He declared that
the American colonies formed one political body, of which each
colony was a member. He concluded an address at Philadelphia
(25 April 1768) with the phrase "Our strength depends on our union.
United we conquer, divided we die". In the presence of a common
1 Pennsylvania Chronicle, Dec. 1767, Feb. 1768.
666 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
danger, and of what they regarded as an attack upon their common
rights and common interests, the colonies were indeed being driven
towards union among themselves and separation from what was
beginning to be regarded as a foreign and oppressive Power.
Associations were again formed for boycotting British goods,
especially those upon which the new duties had been laid. Attempts
to run cargoes of madeira led to conflicts between smugglers and
customs officers. The Boston mob rescued from their hands the sloop
Liberty, belonging to John Hancock, a wealthy merchant and smuggler,
and one of the most ardent of the advanced "patriots". The pressing
of a seaman by H.M.S. Romney caused another riot. The rioters were
left unpunished. Customs officials were tarred and feathered, and
a revenue cutter burned at Rhode Island. At the urgent request of
Governor Bernard two regiments and seven men-of-war were sent
to Boston to enable the Government to enforce the law. They were
received with demonstrations of almost open rebellion. In those days
there was no police. The only resource of authority in the presence of
a turbulent mob, whether of weavers in London, or " Sons of Liberty "
in Boston, was to call upon troops to disperse the rioters and protect
the unpopular. Before the arrival of the regiments (i October), a
mass meeting, led by Otis and Samuel Adams, resolved that a
"standing army" could not be kept in the province without its
consent. A day of fasting was appointed; muskets were brought out.
The inhabitants were invited to arm, on the transparent plea of an
approaching war with France, and, if Adams could have had his
way, they would have attacked the troops on landing.
Townshend died prematurely in September 1767. His brief
ascendancy, and the American question which had been reopened
in it, had a large share in determining the character of the succeeding
ministry. Those members of the Rockingham administration who
had remained with Chatham in 1 766 earned a reputation for weak-
ness by their failure to resist Townshend's impetuous ambition. After
his death, Northington and Conway resigned, and Shclburne wished
to do so, but as Chatham's representative in the Cabinet, he felt
obliged to remain.1 Their resignations came too late for their reputa-
tions. During the summer, when it was evident that, with Chatham
still incapacitated, the mosaic Government must fall to pieces, the
King had invited almost everybody but Grenville to form a ministry.
The alternative of taking back that statesman, whom he loathed,
almost compelled him to accept a return of the Rockingham party
to power. For it seemed at one moment as if they might form a com-
bination with the Bedford and Newcastle sections. But Bedford stood
for coercing the colonies, Rockingham for reconciliation. On that
rock negotiations split. The stars in their courses seemed to be fighting
for a Townshend administration. His sudden death removed that
1 Shdburne to Lady Chatham, 9 Oct. 1767.
HILLSBOROUGH AND THE COLONISTS 667
danger. The coercive policy of the Bedfords, who now joined the
Government and in a great measure controlled the party, led
presently to the resignation of Shelburne, which was followed by that
of Chatham.1 Before this, Grafton (9 October 1767), as a concession
to the Bedfords, had removed Shelburne from the control of colonial
affairs which he had hitherto exercised as Secretary of State for the
Southern Department, and instituted a third Secretaryship of State
for the Colonies, to which Lord Hillsborough was appointed (January
1768). Shelburne still believed that it was unnecessary to send a
single soldier to America, and that the colonies would "return to the
Mother-country of themselves from affection and from interest, when
once the form of their contribution should be agreed upon5*.2 His
retirement involved the laying aside of the scheme which he had
elaborated for settling the several problems arising out of the newly
acquired lands beyond the Alleghanies.
Hillsborough at once instructed Governor Bernard to call upon
the Massachusetts Assembly to rescind its resolutions for the
Circular Letter, and to dissolve it if it refused. The governors of the
other provinces were directed to dissolve their Assemblies if they
favoured the Massachusetts appeal. The several Assemblies were
dissolved accordingly, but only to return with increased majorities
against the governments. After the dissolution of the Massachusetts
Assembly, the Selectmen of Bostonsummoned a convention of delegates
from the province to meet at Faneuil Hall. Thus once more a move-
ment was begun for revolutionary organisation. When the new
Assembly met, it refused, with strict legal justification, to provide
quarters for the troops in the town, arguing that there were barracks
available on Castle Island. These were almost useless for the purpose
in hand, since they were two or three miles outside the city. The
Assembly then refused to do business whilst surrounded by an armed
force, and when the governor adjourned it to Cambridge, passed
resolutions protesting against his right to do so, and against the
establishment of "a standing army" in a colony in time of peace. A
violent agitation was begun against the soldiers whose presence was
denounced by the Assembly as a foreign invasion. The melancholy
example of Ireland was quoted as a warning against British
tyranny, and found no doubt an echo in the heart of many an Irish
emigrant.
When Parliament met in the autumn of 1768, both Houses passed
resolutions condemning the disloyal spirit of Massachusetts, the non-
importation agreements, and the Boston Convention. Led by the
Duke of Bedford, they addressed the King, praying that the promoters
of rebellion should be brought to London and tried under an Act of
Henry VIII "for the trial of treasons committed outside the realm".
Under this Act the murderers of Governor Parke had been brought
1 Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburru, i, 387, 393. a Ibid, i, 384.
668 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
home for trial in 171 1.1 This measure was never put into execution,
but it provided an additional source of irritation to the Americans,
who saw in it yet one more instance of British determination to
restrict their liberties. It helped to inspire the " Resolves of 1769",
by which Virginia once more led the way in constitutional opposition.
A series of resolutions drawn up by George Mason was introduced
into the House of Burgesses by Washington. The military distinction
and high character of that wealthy planter had already secured him
a position of great authority in the Old Dominion. The Virginia
Resolves, which were presently circulated amongst the other Assemblies
and adopted by them, claimed that the sole right of imposing taxes lay
in the General Assembly with the assent of the King or his governor;
that the colonists had the right to petition the Crown for redress of
grievances, and that taking any person from the colony for trial beyond
the seas was highly derogatory to the rights of British subjects.
The Cabinet was divided over its American policy. The tea tax
had produced less than £300, and the effect of the non-importation
agreements was beginning to be felt. Relations with France were
very strained, and already Americans had talked of appealing to her.2
The repeal of Townshend's Act as foolish and imprudent was in-
creasingly urged. Grafton and Camden were in favour of repealing
all the new taxes. But Lord North, the Bedford section, and the
representatives of the King were in favour of retaining the tax upon
tea for the purpose of "keeping up the right".3 By a majority of one,
the Cabinet decided to retain it (i May). The governors were in-
formed of the Cabinet's intention, and Hillsborough added an official
assurance that it entertained no design to propose any further
taxes on America for the purpose of raising a revenue. The idea of
making the colonies pay for their own defence was thus at length
abandoned.
Grafton, although in a minority in his own Cabinet, did not resign
till January 1770. The suppression of Wilkes and the Middlesex
election were agitating the country. The King's Speech had de-
nounced the action of the Americans as unwarrantable. Chatham,
who had returned to public life, vigorously attacked the measures
which had driven the colonists into excesses, and pleaded for the
removal of the cause which had occasioned the discontent of two
millions of people. He was followed by Camden, Barrc and Burke.
But the King sent, not for Chatham as the nation expected, but for
North. At last he had discovered and secured the minister for whom
he had been seeking ever since the retirement of Bute, a minister who,
with the aid of the court party, a divided Opposition, and his own
skilful address, was both able and content to manage Parliament in
1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1710-11, p. \-lv, nos. 764-806; 1711-13, p. xl.
8 E.g. Boston Ga&tte, 20 Sept. 1768; Holmes, A., Annals, 11, 177.
3 George III to Lord North, May 1769, and n Sept. 1774.
REPEAL OF THE REVENUE ACT 669
accordance with the will of the Grown. North was a Tory, shrewd
and capable, a man of imperturbable temper, and an excellent
debater. But his chief merit in the eyes of George III was his pro-
found devotion to his sovereign. Unhappily he placed it above his
duty to his country and his own convictions.
North soon seized the opportunity offered by a petition of London
merchants to introduce the promised bill for repealing all Towns-
hend's duties, except the $d. on tea (15 March-is April 1770). The
retention of the tea duty he defended on the grounds that it differed
from the others in that they were laid on English manufactures and had
proved harmful to trade, whilst the duty on tea was in perfect harmony
with commercial precedents. But in fact it had precisely the same
intention and effect as the Declaratory Act. The tea tax was retained
for the purpose of asserting the authority of Parliament in answer
to the opposition of the Americans.1 As a source of revenue it was
ridiculous. Had revenue been aimed at, the substitution of the old
tax of izd. on tea when imported into England would, according to
both Hutchinson and Franklin, have raised the sum required and
provoked no opposition whatever. As it was, the repeal of the rest
of Townshend's Act gave the agitators in America the stimulus of a
triumph, and the retention of the tea tax left them with a grievance
over a principle. The duties levied by the older laws on tobacco, wine,
sugar and molasses were also retained, as well as the whole new and
efficient machinery for enforcing them. But the Mutiny Act was
quietly allowed to lapse, and no attempt was made to punish Mas-
sachusetts or South Carolina for refusing to furnish supplies for the
troops. Permission was also granted for an issue of paper currency,
which was urgently needed in a time of rising prices.
The conciliatory nature of these measures, combined with the
promise in Hillsborough's circular, might well have saved the situa-
tion for the time being, had there been a general willingness to accept
it as an earnest gesture of compromise and good-will. That it did not
do so demonstrates that nothing short of some ample and generous
measure for revising the whole status of the colonies, urged and
granted in the grand manner of which the genius of Chatham was
capable, would in the long run have satisfied the "patriots" of 1770.
The introduction of the repeal of the Revenue Act coincided with
an ugly incident at Boston. The two regiments sent to support the
Commissioners of Customs had been quartered within the town. They
behaved with great self-restraint and good discipline, but their
presence was resented as a symbol of British authority and an in-
fringement of the new doctrine that no regular troops should be kept
in a colony and no fortification built there without its consent. In
January there had been a clash between insulting patriots and irri-
tated soldiers in New York. In Boston the populace had grown more
1 Pearl. Hist, xvi, 854; Mass. State Papers, 161.
670 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
and more intractable, and rumours of an attack to be made by the
troops were maliciously circulated. On 5 March a crowd gathered
threateningly about a solitary sentinel in front of the Custom House
and began to insult him. He called for aid, and the guard of six men
and a corporal under Captain Preston came to his rescue. The crowd
refused to disperse, but shouted abuse at the "lobsters". Snowballs
were thrown. A soldier was knocked down. With or without orders,
the guard fired and four men were killed. Hutchinson, who had
succeeded Bernard as Governor of Massachusetts, agreed to withdraw
the troops from Boston to Fort William. The soldiers concerned were
tried for their lives. They were bravely defended by John Adams and
acquitted, to the lasting honour of all concerned. But the "horrid
massacre at Boston", as it was excitedly described, was seized upon
by orators throughout the country, grossly exaggerated and assidu-
ously used to influence the masses. Then and long afterwards it was
represented as an unprovoked and murderous assault by brutal
soldiers upon innocent and peaceful citizens, and as an example of
the bloody tyranny typical of British rule.1 Its anniversary was
celebrated in the chief towns of America with signs of mourning for
the "martyred" citizens and floods of revolutionary rhetoric. So
great was the impression produced, that John Adams was to some
extent justified in describing the incident as "laying the foundation
of American Independence".
The conciliatory policy of the British Government had, however,
temporarily deprived the extremists of any other rousing cry. It also
widened the breach between them and the moderate patriots, and
those who, faced by the conflicting calls of loyalty to the new country
and the old, chose that which bound them to the King and Empire.
Loyalists no longer saw any reason against the re-establishment of
harmony. But since many held that, so long as the tea tax was main-
tained, the menace to their liberties was as dangerous as ever, the
non-importation Associations decided to admit all British goods ex-
cept tea and any article on which import duties might be imposed.
Those who had been thriving on a smuggling trade in Dutch tea
were particularly insistent upon this exception.
Moderate patriots, like Franklin, Gushing and Dickinson, were now
content to wait until American independence should be peacefully
brought about by "our natural increase in wealth and population".2
But the extreme Radicals, of whom Samuel Adams was the deter-
mined and unrelenting leader, inspired by intense hatred alike of
monarchy and Church, had no wish that the conciliatory policy of
Great Britain should succeed. They saw in it merely a device to lull
the people into acquiescence in dependency.3 They believed that
1 See e.g. Bancroft, G., Hist, of U.S., and Kidder, F., Evidence on the Boston Massacre.
8 Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll., Ser. iv., rv, 360; Franklin, B., Works, VIH, 30, 78.
8 Boston Ga&tte, 13 Sept. 1773.
THE GASPJSE AFFAIR 671
England would never grant them absolute independence unless com-
pelled. They believed that now was the time to fight for it, before the
ardour of the people cooled, whilst their sense of grievance was still
acute and bad trade still rendered them restless, and whilst England
was still weak from the French war and threatened by foreign
enemies. "It is now or never" wrote Joseph Hawley.
The irritant of the Acts of Trade helped them to keep alive the
smouldering spirit of discontent. When, in 1771, the Governor of
Massachusetts refused his consent to an act by which the salaries of
the Commissioners of Customs were to be taxed, the Assembly re-
monstrated in these words: "We know of no Commissioner of H.M.
Customs nor of any revenue H.M. has a right to establish in North
America: we know and we feel a tribute levied and extorted from
those who, if they have property, have a right to the absolute dis-
posal of it . . . ". Here was the denial absolute of the right of the Crown
to levy duties on trade.
The Government, on the other hand, had never faltered in its
conviction that somehow or other a civil list must be established, by
which the salaries of governors and judges should be withdrawn from
the control of the Assemblies. Since parliamentary legislation and
taxation for that purpose had failed, it now resorted to the device of
an executive order of the Crown, simply directing that such salaries
should be paid by warrants drawn upon the revenue collected by the
Commissioners of Customs. This was denounced as an outrageous
usurpation by the Crown. The Boston Gazette declared (2 November
1772), that unless the liberties of the Colonists were immediately re-
stored, they would form an independent Commonwealth. To stimulate
opposition, Samuel Adams and Joseph Warren established a system
of Committees of Correspondence in every town in Massachusetts,
with a central committee at Boston.1 This system was presently
adopted by the other colonies, and soon became, in John Adams's
phrase, a very efficient "political engine" for the dissemination of
propaganda, the suppression of Loyalists, and the organisation of
resistance at the opportune moment. It was not long before the
enforcement of the Acts of Trade brought about another serious
collision. Rhode Island, enjoying, as we have seen, practically in-
dependent government, had long been a centre of illicit trade, and
its rum distilleries had flourished accordingly. Attempts to repress
smuggling were now answered by the destruction of revenue cutters2
and by serving writs on naval officers for seizures of smuggling
vessels which the Newport Admiralty Court refused to condemn. On
9 June 1772, H.M.S. Gaspte, whilst in pursuit of a suspected ship, ran
aground off Providence. A party of Rhode Islanders assembled
publicly and during the night boarded the Gaspte and set her on fire.
Captain Duddingston was wounded. He and his men were taken
1 Hutchinson, Hist. Mass, m, 295-345. " &J- &>l- *&»• vi and vn.
672 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
ashore. A writ was served on him and he was mulcted in damages
for alleged unlawful seizures of rum and sugar.1
This barefaced defiance of authority and outrage on the British
flag not unnaturally caused the utmost indignation at home. By an
Act which had recently been passed for the protection of H.M. dock-
yards, prisoners accused of such treasonable offence might be brought
to England for trial. A commission consisting of colonial officials,
including the Governor of Rhode Island, was appointed to obtain
evidence, in order that the civil magistrates of Rhode Island might
have the offenders arrested and sent to England for trial under this
law. But though they were perfectly well known, no evidence could
be obtained against them. Colonial opinion expressed itself in an
outburst of "universal abhorrence" of the idea, not of burning H.M.
ships, but of sending those accused of the outrage for trial in England.
The loudest protest came once more from Virginia. There Patrick
Henry, Jefferson and Richard Henry Lee secured the appointment
of a standing Committee of the Assembly (March 1773), the first
business of which was to inform itself upon what authority the
Gaspee court of enquiry had been established. At its invitation, other
Assemblies presently set up similar committees for airing their
grievances and corresponding with each other. They formed im-
portant links in the chain of growing inter-colonial union. Combined
with Adams's local committees, they constituted the basis of a formid-
able revolutionary organisation.
Resentment on both sides was increased by the untoward affair
of the Whateley letters. Hutchinson and Oliver, the Governor and
Lieutenant-Governor of Massachusetts Bay, had written a series of
confidential letters to Thomas Whateley, member of Parliament,
who shared the responsibility for the policy of the Stamp Act.
Both maintained that in view of the rebellious attitude of Boston and
the weakness of the executive, the government must be strengthened,
and that some curtailment of the privileges of the province was
essential. These letters were stolen and brought to Franklin, who, as
Agent of the province, forwarded them to the leading men in
Massachusetts for their information. Though he had promised that
they should not be copied or printed, it was not long before they were
published. Only after Whateley's brother and executor had been
wounded in a duel with the supposed purloiner of the letters did
Franklin avow his responsibility. As soon as their contents were
known, the councij and Assembly petitioned for the removal of
Hutchinson and Oliver. The petition was referred to the Committee
of the Privy Council (January 1774). Franklin's conduct was fairly
open to criticism. But Wedderburn, the Solicitor-General, in a
brilliant and bitter speech, exceeded all limits. He described
Franklin as unfit for civilised society; in an ugly gibe he pilloried him
1 Arnold, S. G., History of Rhode Island, n, 309 seqq.
THE WHATELEY LETTERS 673
as a literary man who, having stolen this correspondence, would hence-
forth esteem it a libel to be called a man of letters — homo trium
literarum (fur). With indecent levity Privy Councillors laughed and
applauded. The petition was declared "false, groundless, scandalous,
and calculated only for the seditious purpose of keeping up a spirit
of clamour and discontent". Franklin was dismissed from his office
of Postmaster-General. Though his views had advanced as the
situation developed, he had propounded many schemes for the
defence of the colonies and the opening of trade which, if they had
been adopted, might have saved the situation. He had worked for
union with Great Britain. He left the room its bitter and determined
foe. The colonists resented the insults which had been heaped upon
their distinguished representative. In England his conduct was
judged abominable.
Whilst temper was rising over the Gaspee affair and the Whateley
letters, the boycott of tea in America had helped to produce a crisis
in the affairs of the East India Company which indirectly inaugurated
the American Revolution. Huge stocks of tea lay unsold in its
warehouses. Exports to America had dropped from 900,000 Ibs. in
1769 to 237,000 in 1772. By the Act of 1772 a drawback of three-
fifths of the duty on tea imported into England was allowed when it
was exported to the Plantations. The Company was obliged to sell
such tea to dealers at a public sale. To relieve the Company, but also
with the intention of benefiting the colonies, North introduced a bill
(April 1773) by which the Company was permitted to export a
portion of its tea direct from its warehouses without public sale,
and a drawback was granted of the whole duty paid upon impor-
tation into England. Whilst the dealers were thus eliminated, the
cost of tea was reduced, so that the Company would be able to sell
in the colonies at a price much below that at which even smuggled
foreign tea could be retailed. Very unwisely, the Company appointed
as its agents at Boston, not the reputable merchants who had usually
handled the London tea trade, but men who had refused to take a
share in the boycott of British goods and had earned thereby large
profits and great unpopularity, or those who were identified with the
administration.
Opposition was at once organised. Patriots were determined to
prevent the landing of the tea, because, once landed, its cheapness
would have ensured its sale and the consequent collection of the $d.
duty. The cry of monopoly was raised. The new measure was repre-
sented as part of the general attack upon colonial liberties ; as a
scheme of taxation intended to provide funds for the civil list, for
taking away control over colonial officials, and providing means for
establishing an episcopate. From Philadelphia and New York tea
ships were compelled to return without landing their cargoes. At
Charleston a cargo was landed, but the consignee did not dare to
GHBEI 43
674 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
handle it. At Boston three shiploads arrived in December. They
were heralded by placards announcing to the inhabitants that "the
hour of destruction stares you in the face". Public meetings were
held under the direction of Samuel Adams to bring pressure on the
governor. Arrogating to themselves the authority of a government,
they prohibited the landing of the tea. Hutchinson, however, stood
firm and insisted upon its being landed. On 16 December 1773 a
band of men disguised as Indians boarded the ships and flung every
chest of tea into the harbour. Nobody was punished for this act of
violence. It had the desired result. It committed the patriot party
all over the country to a more violent and radical position, and forced
an open contest over the great question which lay beneath all these
years of wrangling.1 It was followed by an equally significant action
on the part of the Assembly. After declaring that all judges who re-
ceived salaries from the Grown were unworthy of public confidence,
it proceeded to impeach Chief Justice Oliver on those grounds
(14 February 1774). It was determined to maintain the dependence
of the judges on the Assembly.
The repercussion in England was strong and immediate. The
"Boston tea-party", as it is called, was admitted by Franklin to be
an outrage which called for voluntary reparation. Chatham de-
nounced it as a crime. Lord North asked Parliament to provide the
means for putting down such disorders and securing the dependence
of the colonies. On 14 March he proposed the closing of the Port of
Boston and the removal of the Custom House to Salem until com-
pensation should be paid to the East India Company. This was ac-
cepted as a fitting punishment even by such ardent Whigs and friends
of the Americans as Barr6 and Conway. But Chatham, like Washing-
ton, held that reparation should have been demanded first, and that
only on refusal should a bill of pains and penalties have been intro-
duced. Acts were also passed legalising the quartering of troops on
the inhabitants of Boston, and providing that persons indicted for
murder in the suppression of riots might be brought to England
for trial. Finally, the charter of Massachusetts was modified. The
council hitherto chosen by the representatives was henceforth to
be appointed by the Crown, as in other colonies. Judges, sheriffs,
and all executive officers were to be appointed by the governor and
be removable at pleasure. Judges' salaries were to be paid by the
Crown. Town meetings, unless sanctioned by the governor, were
prohibited. Juries were to be selected by the sheriffs.
All through the sessions of 1774 Chatham and Burke argued in
speeches of unsurpassed splendour on behalf of the Americans. The
vigour of their advocacy, indeed, might almost seem to justify the
contention that the colonies were sufficiently represented in Parlia-
ment by British members in their aspect of imperial representatives.
1 Fisher, S. G., The Struggle for American Independence, i, pp. 162-77.
THE BOSTON TEA-PARTY 675
Burke in his great speech on American taxation argued for concilia-
tion by complete repeal of the tea tax and all the aggressive Acts
since 1763. Addresses from the Assemblies had declared that this
would content them. "Revert", he said, "to your old principles
I am not going into distinctions of right Leave America to tax
herself. Leave the Americans as they anciently stood, and these
distinctions, born of our unhappy contest, will die along with it
Be content to bind America by laws of trade; you have always done
it. Let this be your reason for binding their trade. Do not burden
them with taxes; you were not used to do so from the beginning. Let
this be your reason for not taxing." Chatham, whilst glorifying
American love of liberty and urging conciliatory measures, pro-
claimed that if he thought the colonies entertained the most distant
idea of throwing off the legislative supremacy of Parliament, he
would be the first to enforce that power by every means.
To others it seemed evident that even now nothing but force would
subdue the agitation in America. Governor Hutchinson from Mas-
sachusetts, Governor Tryon from New York were urging the necessity
of spirited measures. The Government made the fatal mistake of
passing penal measures without providing the means to enforce
them and to prevent the cause of Boston being taken up as the cause
of the thirteen colonies. In this they were misled by General Gage,
who was sent as military and civil governor with a fleet and four
regiments to succeed Hutchinson and dose the port of Boston. Four
regiments, he had assured the King, would suffice; the Bostonians
would only be lions so long as we were lambs.1 The assumption was
that resistance would be confined to Boston. The policy of punishing
one colony whilst doing nothing to exasperate the others and drive
them into a confederacy had been advocated by Shelburne.2 It mis-
conceived the universality of the issue at stake, which touched
Virginia, for instance, as closely as New England. The conflict of
ideals represented by Samuel Adams and North could not be
settled by ignoring those of Jefferson and Mason. Radical views
were not confined to Massachusetts. The clamour that arose from
the wharves of Boston was echoed by the mechanics of New York and
on the quays of Charleston.
The coercive measures brought the quarrel to a head. General
Gage closed the harbour of Boston on i June. Within a few weeks
thousands were thrown out of work and threatened with starvation.
But the unanimity of the colonies was demonstrated not only by
words of encouragement, but by contributions of money and pro-
visions which poured along the roads even from Carolina, and by
the decision of Virginia and Maryland to cease exporting tobacco.
A "solemn league and covenant" was formed to stop all commercial
relations with Great Britain. Though hampered by the opposition of
1 Letters of George III to Lord North (ed. Donne), i, 164. * Fitzmaurice, i, 318, 320.
676 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
the people, Gage built camps and barracks for his troops, and
strengthened his position in Boston by fortifying the isthmus which
connected it with the mainland. On i September, in view of the
annual muster of the militia, he seized the powder in the arsenal at
Charleston. A rumour was spread that the troops and fleet were
firing on Boston, and a large body of New Englanders sprang to arms,
but was dissuaded from marching on the town. Gage promptly
abandoned the new seat of government which had been established
at Salem, and shut himself up with all his troops in Boston. Already
he had begun to ask for reinforcements and the suspension of the
punitive Acts. When he endeavoured to put the Act for regulating
the government of Massachusetts into force, the new councillors
were mobbed.1 Jurors refused to serve at the assizes, and judges were
compelled to abandon their courts.
The efforts of moderate men to secure peace by paying for the
damaged tea were defeated. But the leaders of the revolutionary
party were well aware that only support from the other provinces
could save them from collapse. For some time Samuel Adams had
been openly advocating the institution of an annual "Congress of
States", and the formation of an "Independent State or American
Commonwealth".2 Now, in response to the appeal of the Boston
patriots, a Congress of Delegates from all the colonies was summoned
to meet at Philadelphia and to consider the case of Massachusetts
as one that concerned them all. To this Continental Congress, as it
was called, for the term national could not yet be applied, all the
colonies save Canada, Florida and Georgia sent delegates (5 Septem-
ber 1774).
Practically no attempt was made to prevent its meeting. This was
partly because, with Gage shut up in Boston, there was no sufficient
military force available; partly because it was desired not to provoke
rioting; and partly because it was thought that a genuine attempt to
settle the Boston trouble would be made. It was probably expected
that matters would be conducted upon the basis on which the dele-
gates of most of the colonies were instructed to proceed, namely, to
demand redress of grievances and to restore union and harmony with
Great Britain.3 Some such conciliatory proposal as that made by
Joseph Galloway would, it might be hoped, show the way to a settle-
ment. Galloway, a Pennsylvanian, proposed that a Grand Council
elected by the provincial Assemblies should legislate for the colonies
on matters affecting more than one; and that its acts should be revised
by Parliament, whilst the Council should have the right of vetoing
any Act of Parliament relating to the colonies. Moderates and
extremists were at first evenly matched,4 and this suggestion met
1 Mass. Hist. Soc,9 Proceedings, Ser. n, xvi, 287.
2 Boston Ga&tte, 1773; Hosmer, J. K., Life of Samuel Adams, p. 238.
3 Jones, Thomas, New York in Revolution, I, 34; Journal of Proceedings of Congress, i.
* Adams, J., Works, n, 350; and Journal of Congress, i.
SUPPRESSION OF LOYALISTS 677
with strong support. But the extremists gained their way and
presently dominated Congress. For the Loyalists had been allowed
little or no share in the election of the delegates, who were for the
most part chosen either by the Committees of Correspondence or by
Assemblies under the control of extremists.1 American revolution-
aries, like their French successors, quickly realised that the rights of
man are not like the rains of Heaven, which descend upon the just
and unjust, but that by some perhaps divine dispensation they are
withheld from one's opponents. All over the country, but especially
in New England, a reign of terror was being directed against sup-
porters of the British Government. Loyal farmers were tarred and
feathered and driven off their lands.2
Meanwhile, in Massachusetts independence had practically been
proclaimed by the "Suffolk Resolves-". At a meeting held at that
place resolutions were passed which, after describing England as a
parricide, declared that no obedience was due to the recent Acts of
Parliament; that no taxes should be paid, and that government
officials should be seized if any attempt at arrests were made. The
Quebec Act was denounced as threatening American liberties and
the Protestant religion. These resolves were submitted to the Con-
tinental Congress. By accepting them, approving the resistance of
Massachusetts, and declaring that, if force were used against her, "all
America ought to support her", Congress proclaimed the solidarity
of the colonies, but also identified itself with a definite act of rebellion.
The documents finally drawn up by Congress made an appeal to
arms inevitable. The Declaration of Rights was in the nature of an
ultimatum. It demanded the repeal of thirteen Acts of Parliament
to which exception had been taken since 1763. This was to demand,
in effect, the abolition of the old colonial system and the laying down
of the sovereign authority of Parliament. Exception was made,
however, to Acts "bonafide restrained to the regulation of our ex-
ternal commerce,. . .excluding every idea of raising a revenue on
the subjects in America". This exception was insisted upon by the
New York delegates. Like the reiteration in the addresses of a heart-
felt desire for union and harmony, it represented the views of those
who were still averse from separation, and was intended also to
appeal to supporters in England, whose strength was greatly over-
estimated. For in Parliament the opponents of the American policy
of the Government, though they now included Fox as well as Burke
and Richmond, were small in numbers, divided in policy, and dis-
credited in reputation. When Grafton resigned office and joined the
Opposition in August 1775, he did not take with him half a dozen
votes.8 Conway*s resignation exercised even less influence. The
1 Journal of Congress, i, 2-7. * Am. Archives, 4th Ser. i-vi, passim.
8 Walpole, H., Last Jovmds9 m, 3; Lecky, W. E. H., Hist. ofEng. in Eighteenth Cent, iv,
678 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
conciliatory proposals of Burke in March of that year were defeated
by 270 to 78 votes. In the country it was the same story. According
to Burke himself, the landed interest, the mercantile community
and the people were now alike in favour of the coercive measures of
the ministry.1 The Established Church was firmly anti-American;
literary opinion for the most part, and legal opinion almost unani-
mously, supported the Government. "I never remember", says Burke,
"the opposition so totally abandoned",2 and a little later he added,
"the good people of England seem to partake every day more and
more of the character of the administration". Opposition, he com-
plained, had to face a torrent, not merely of ministerial and court
power, but also of almost general opinion.8
Among the Acts which Congress required to be repealed was the
Quebec Act of 1774. That measure, so admirable in other respects,
was a source of annoyance and suspicion to the Americans for two
reasons. On the one hand it sanctioned the Roman Catholic faith
as held by the enormous majority of the inhabitants of Canada.
Thereby it aroused the fierce resentment of Protestant New Eng-
landers. On the other hand, it reversed the decision of Shelburne
in 1763, and extended the boundaries of Canada in the direction of
the back settlements, so as to include all the lands which had not
previously been granted or comprised in any charter in the regions,
stretching southwards to the Ohio and westwards to the Mississippi,
represented by the modern States of Michigan, Indiana, Illinois,
Ohio and Wisconsin. At the same time it placed this whole enlarged
province of Quebec under a military governor and nominated council.
But settlers from Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Con-
necticut had been moving on towards the Ohio and Mississippi, and
several provinces held that they had claims in that direction. They
saw in the new ordinance an intention on the part of the British
Government to check their development westwards, and in the
establishment of a military governorship merely a step towards whole-
sale reconstruction of colonial administration and the prohibition
of new settlements under free institutions. Congress, therefore, with
somewhat short-sighted finesse, despatched two Addresses, one to the
people of Great Britain, denouncing the establishment of Roman
Catholicism in Canada, and the other to the Canadians, inciting
them to rebel against the tyranny of Great Britain. For it was
supposed that the Canadians were fretting under despotic restrictions
on their liberty.4 But in fact, while providing additional irritants to
the Americans, the Quebec Act had secured the loyalty of Canada.
Still more significant was the adoption of an agreement, or
"Association", for enforcing a complete cessation of commercial
1 Burke, Corresp. n, 2 (Jan. 1775).
• Ibid, n, 48 (Aug.) . a Ibid, n, 68 (Sept.) .
* Josiah Quincey to Franklin, Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc. 1863, p. 119; Warren-Adams,
Corresp. i, 358, Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc. 1917.
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 679
relations with Great Britain. By thus assuming legislative functions
and arrogating to itself the right to compel citizens to obey its
decrees, Congress was beginning to act as though it were a legal
national Convention. Loyalists, with reason, recognised in this act
an usurpation and the threat of a republic.1 From this moment their
numbers increased; many of the moderate patriots, like Dickinson,
joined them, breaking away from the extremists. They criticised
freely the acts and tendencies of Congress. Separation, they foresaw,
must be the result; and that, they foretold with accuracy, would end
not only in war with Great Britain, but in civil wars, in anarchy and
mob rule, and financial chaos. They protested; and the patriots
answered by suppressing freedom of speech, and driving many of
them from their farms and from the country.
Probably many of those who voted for these measures of Congress
did not perceive their full significance, and believed that Great
Britain would yield to threats and demonstrations of force, as she had
yielded before, first over the question of governors' salaries, then over
the Stamp Act, and lastly over the Townshend duties. Only so, can
their protestations of allegiance to the Crown be reconciled with
their actions; only so, and by realising that in many minds union
with Great Britain had come to mean independence within the
Empire, with the King for head. They had read by this time Jeffer-
son's Summary View,2 in which he described the King as "the Chief
Magistrate of the Empire", claimed free trade as a natural right, and
denied the legislative supremacy of Parliament. All the Acts which
it had imposed upon the colonists were therefore null and void. Thus
the argument reached the last stage but one. To the King himself,
the reverse side of the medal alone was visible. "All men", he wrote
at this time to Lord North, "seem now to feel that the fatal com-
pliance in 1766 has encouraged the Americans annually to increase
their pretensions to that independency which one state has of
another, but which is quite subversive of the obedience which a
colony owes to its mother country." And on 18 November he wrote
to Lord North "The New England Governments are in rebellion
Blows must decide".
Congress broke up on 29 October after appointing 10 May for
its next meeting. Whilst it was sitting, Massachusetts had taken a
further step. The spirit displayed by the Assembly had left Gage no
choice but to dissolve it. He issued writs for another to meet at
Salem; then, finding that so many of the councillors had been forced
to resign, he countermanded them. But the delegates met none the
less (5 October). Calling themselves a Provincial Congress, they
began to act as a revolutionary government. A "Committee of
Safety" was appointed from their number. They denounced the
1 The Congress canvassed (1774)? p» 14.
1 A Summary View of the Rights of British America, Williamsburg, 1774.
68o THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
steps taken by Gage to fortify Boston against attacks from the main-
land, and at the same time justified him by issuing bills of credit,
calling upon the people to arm and drill, and by taking steps to
accumulate military stores at Concord, and to secure the aid of the
Mohawks.1 A company was recruited from the Stockbridge Indians.
The other colonies followed their example and began to arm.
In England a new Parliament met on i November 1774. The
elections had shown that the feeling of the country was clearly on the
side of the ministry. Conciliation, it was felt, had been tried and had
failed; the rebellious spirit of Massachusetts must be quelled. The
challenge from America to the supremacy of Parliament was indeed
too definite to have any other possible reaction. As the King was
opposed to any further negotiation, North brought in further coercive
measures. The military forces were to be strengthened and all the
colonies except New York, Delaware, Georgia and North Carolina
were cut off from the use of the fisheries and trade with Great Britain.
All who resisted were proclaimed rebels and traitors. In the House
of Lords (i February 1775), Chatham continued his championship
of the American cause. He brought in a bill which, whilst affirming
the right of Parliament to control trade and quarter soldiers, would
have established an annual Congress, charged with making a free
grant to the imperial Exchequer. The bill was rejected on the first
reading. Similar resolutions moved by Burke and David Hartley
met with a similar fate (March), Attempts to obtain the repeal of
the Quebec Act were also rejected by enormous majorities. But
North was fully aware that the Rubicon had been reached. With the
approval of the King, but to the disgust of the "King's Friends" and
the Bedford Whigs, who nearly brought about his downfall, he made
a sudden last gesture of reconciliation. On 20 February he proposed
that any colony which should make an acceptable offer for the support
of the civil and military government should be exempt from im-
perial taxation for the purpose of revenue. Il was too late. The con-
cession granted did not go far enough. It was open to the suspicion
that it was merely intended to create division among the colonies.
But it was, at least, an olive branch held out, which could be rejected
only by those who had ceased to desire to negotiate. Yet it was
spurned by the Opposition, and contemptuously rejected by every
one of the colonial Assemblies. Indeed, by the time it reached
America, the situation had passed beyond all possibility of recon-
ciliation.
Gage had decided to seize the arms and ammunition which had been
collected at Concord on 19 April. The troops sent from Boston found
an armed force drawn up near Lexington to resist them. These they
dispersed. But lantern signals, the firing of guns, and tolling of
church bells had called the whole country-side to arms. On their
1 4 April 1775; Washington, Works, ra, 495.
LEXINGTON AND BUNKER HILL 681
way home, after destroying the stores at Concord, the troops were
attacked. A rain of bullets was poured into them from behind farm-
houses, stone walls and hedgerows. When they reached Boston at
sunset, they had lost some 65 killed and 208 wounded and prisoners.
The Americans lost 93 in all. The Rubicon had been crossed. Three
weeks later the important forts of Ticonderoga and Grown Point
commanding the approach to Canada were surprised and captured
by a party of volunteers from Connecticut.
On the same day, 10 May, the second Continental Congress,
though prohibited by the British Government, assembled in the
Quaker city of Philadelphia. New York, which had held aloof after
the first Congress, rallied to the cause. Georgia, after the news of
Lexington, threw in its lot with the others. In Virginia, the old
aristocracy of planters and men of property were taking alarm. But
the forceful eloquence of Patrick Henry secured by one vote a de-
cision to elect delegates. When the governor, the Earl of Dunmore,
began to transfer the powder from the magazine at Williamsburg
to a man-of-war, he was compelled to return it. At the news of
Lexington, Henry placed himself at the head of the Hanover Militia.
Dunmore subsequently made an ineffectual endeavour to raise a
royalist force and suppress the rebels. But he was forced to seek
refuge on board H.M.S. Fowey. After burning Norfolk, which had
fired on the King's ships, he sailed for New York (November-Decem-
ber). He had gone to the length of declaring all negroes of rebels
free. The third Revolutionary Convention (July) declared that he
had deserted his post; authorised a large issue of paper bills, and
appropriated the coveted western lands. In most of the other
colonies, where the governor had no military support, the King's
rule ceased, and governments were administered by Provincial
Congresses.
In Massachusetts, immediately after Lexington, the Provincial
Congress decided to raise its army to 30,000 men and to seize the
arms of all Loyalists. Gage, after remaining for some time on the
defensive in Boston, at length determined to occupy a small eminence
commanding the city, called Bunker Hill, which he had omitted to
include within his lines. Learning of his intention the colonists, on
the night of 1 6 June 1775, entrenched themselves on the neighbouring
height of Breed's Hill. When the British troops advanced, they were
met by a withering fire from behind entrenchments. Twice they were
flung back, and yet a third time they advanced and won the position,
but with the loss of over 1000 men out of some 2500. The Americans
had numbered little more than 1500. Not only did their losses very
seriously weaken the small British force in America, but the effect'
upon the military spirit of the colonists was incalculable. The courage
and coolness displayed by the raw levies of militiamen had demon-
strated for the first time their power to engage regular troops, and
682 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
provided a triumphant answer to those who, like Lord Sandwich,
echoing the verdict of Wolfe, had sneered at the cowardice and
incompetence of the Americans.
In the meantime Congress had taken fateful steps. North's con-
ciliatory resolution was dismissed as "unseasonable and insidious".
The British Government was denounced. Appeals for support were
addressed to the people of Ireland and Jamaica. A declaration was
published "on the causes and necessity for taking up arms", and
resolutions were passed for raising and regulating a Continental army
under the authority of Congress. The most important step, how-
ever, was the appointment of Washington as Commander-in-Chief
(February). At the instance of Dickinson, a second petition was
addressed to the King, declaring the fundamental loyalty of the
colonies. This petition, known as the "Olive Branch55, was entrusted
to Richard Penn, one of the proprietors of Pennsylvania, where, as in
New York, Maryland and South Carolina, the conservative party was
particularly strong. The King, failing to see how professions of loyalty
could be consistent with armed rebellion, refused to receive it on the
ground that it was drawn up by an illegal and self-constituted body.
This was in September. In the same month the Americans began
their unsuccessful invasion of Canada, which had been decided upon
in June.1 Emissaries had already been despatched to stir up sedition
in the West Indies. Though the islands depended for their protection
entirely upon the British fleet, they depended for their provisions
upon their trade with America. They had had, too, their share in
the smuggling trade on the American coast, and in the long struggle
with governors and councils for the supremacy of the Assemblies.
Now, as so often before, addresses from the Assemblies of Jamaica
and Barbados echoed the language of Boston. From Bermuda
delegates were sent to the Congress at Philadelphia. The Bahamas
openly supported the Americans, and permitted them to carry off
the guns and ammunition from their forts, which they had refused
to the ships sent by Gage (August).
Parliament met on 26 October. The King's Speech announced the
intention of dealing vigorously with the colonists, and the ill-judged
decision to engage foreign troops. Difficulty was already being
experienced in obtaining recruits to fight their fellow-subjects. The
English army was small and the demands from America were already
large. The hiring of Hessian troops for this purpose was none the less
a blunder of the first magnitude. It "made reconciliation hopeless
and the Declaration of Independence inevitable".2 The presence
of foreign troops made the Americans feel that they were being
treated as a foreign foe; the misconduct of the troops exasperated
them and brought discredit upon British arms. Their employment
prepared the colonists to enlist the aid of foreigners themselves. The
1 Washington, Works> m, 41. * Lecky, rv, 244.
PAINE'S COMMON SENSE 683
Duke of Grafton, when shown a draft of the King's Speech, resigned
on those grounds. His post of Privy Seal was filled by Lord Dart-
mouth, a well-intentioned and religiously-minded man and a former
member of die Rockingham ministry, who had succeeded the blunder-
ing Hillsborough as Secretary for the Colonies in 1772. Lord George
Germain succeeded him, and Lord Weymouth succeeded Lord
Rochford as Secretary of State. Lord Lyttleton, Chief Justice, was
added to the Cabinet. These changes reflected the strengthening of
the determination to bring the colonists to their knees. Grafton, after
resigning, threw himself into vigorous opposition, endeavouring, not
without success, to unite the warring factions of the Whig party. His
aim was speedy reconciliation with the thirteen colonies, for he re-
garded even their loss as a lesser evil than an attempt to hold them
by force.1 But though Barr6 and Shelburne and Camden and Dun-
ning added their eloquence to that of Burke, the division between the
old-fashioned Whigs and the Rockingham party remained, and
weakened the effect of their onslaughts on the Government programme.
In November 1775 Lord North introduced a bill to prohibit all
trade and intercourse with the Thirteen Colonies. So dispirited was
the Opposition that the bill was passed on 1 1 December by a majority
of 112 to 1 6. In November, too, Congress issued letters of marque
and appointed a Committee of Foreign Affairs to correspond "with
friends of America in other countries". Early in 1776 Silas Deane
was despatched to France.2 For in the background of this dispute
there was always France, that proud, imperial nation which had been
worsted in the unceasing struggle for expansion waged with Great
Britain for a hundred years at home and across the seas; France,
eagerly and inexorably determined to exact vengeance for the loss of
Canada and India, by helping to wrest the American colonies from
the hated English.
Money, arms, ammunition, ships were essential for the success of
the Americans. But they could not hope to obtain these from France
without a declaration of their complete separation from Great
Britain. French agents were at hand to make this clear. Both steps
were distasteful to many, and to the southern colonies in particular
the idea of a republican government was hardly acceptable. The
struggle in Congress was long and bitter. By the inexorable logic of
events arising from action and reaction on either side, from mis-
handling, misjudgment, and the inevitable clash of principles whose
significance and solution were not perceived, colonial opinion was
brought up to the last fence. It was helped to take it by the timely
publication of Thomas Paine's Common Sense. That pamphlet, written
by an Englishman, attacked England and monarchy in terse and
violent phrases, and proclaimed in sledge-hammer style that the
1 Duke of Grafton, Autobiography, p. 318.
8 Vide infra, pp. 705-12.
eo THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, 1765-1776
604
tjine had come to part. The tract sold by tens of thousands, and had
a profound influence upon popular feeling.1
When the question of independence was first debated in Congress,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, New York and South Carolina refused to
vote in its favour. But on 2 July twelve colonies, New York still
abstaining, decided that they "were absolved from all allegiance to
the British Crown". On 4 July the Declaration of Independence,
drawn up by Thomas Jefferson and revised by Franklin and John
Adams, was voted, and presently signed and accepted by all. Pre-
mising that "all men are created equal", and attacking with great
bitterness "the repeated injuries and usurpations" not of Parliament,
the enlargement of whose control had hitherto been denounced, but
of "the present King", to whom so much devotion had been ex-
pressed, it declared that "these united Colonies are, and of right
ought to be, free and independent States " . " The American Colonies ",
exclaimed Lord Camden, "are gone for ever!" Gone, indeed, they
were; but in their going taught a lesson of profound importance to
the Empire they quitted, whilst they themselves, out of the old
British ideas of liberty, law, and constitutional government, de-
veloped a new and epoch-making form of political life.
1 Washington, Works, m, 276.
CHAPTER XXIII
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE
COLONIAL SPHERE, 1763-1783
XJUTE had made peace in a hurry. The history of the next twenty
years is in many ways a justification of Pitt's denunciation of it.
Spain, retaining all her South American possessions and receiving
from France New Orleans and all that remained to her of Louisiana,
in compensation for the cession of Florida, was now possessed of the
greatest colonial Empire that had ever fallen to the lot of a modern
nation. She held three-quarters of the habitable parts of North and
South America. The richest and greatest of the West Indian islands
were hers. Her Empire stretched from frozen North to frozen South
through 1 10 degrees of latitude, and it contained the richest mines in
the world. But this great estate was in hands powerless to use it. Even
the gift of half a continent by France was looked upon askance,
since it brought Spain into direct contact with the British traders.1
Louisiana, thus grudgingly accepted, was never strongly held. A
Spanish governor was sent there in 1766, but it needed an army from
Havana to induce the French colonists to accept him (1769). Many
of the rich proprietors withdrew to British territory; the prosperity
of the country dwindled, and Spain, it was said, had only added
another desert to her Empire.2
Amongst her gains in the West Indies, Great Britain had acquired
in Tobago an island which was strategically of importance, not only
to Barbados, but also as a base from which a squadron co-operating
with another off Porto Rico could command all vessels bound for the
West Indies.3 But there had been restored to France, in Martinique
and Guadeloupe, two bases from which she could, as hitherto,
organise hostile raids, send out privateers, and prosecute contraband
trade with the British West Indian islands. The sum of the matter
is, that not only were many valuable conquests sacrificed without
adequate return, but France was left with starting points in every
quarter of the globe — Goree, the West Indies, India, and Newfound-
land— from which she might begin to recover her naval, commercial
and colonial Empire, so soon as her strength was equal to her
determination.
The House of Bourbon, then, had not been crushed as Chatham
would have crushed it. It was firmly seated on the thrones of France
and Spain, united by the Family Compact, and guided for the most
686 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
part by men whose ruling passion was hatred of Great Britain, desire
for revenge, and longing to regain what had been lost in the colonies
and at sea. In France the long views, the ambitious imperialism and
the unscrupulous intrigues of the Due de Choiseul were counter-
balanced by the sluggish nature of Louis XV, and the exhaustion,
military and financial, of his kingdom. For war, as one Minister of
Finance after another was at pains to explain, must mean bank-
ruptcy. Having made that explanation, one Minister of Finance
after another was dismissed.
In Spain, the Marquis de Grimaldi was little more than the shadow
of ChoiseuFs sun, and, as is the way of shadows, grew smaller as the
sun reached its zenith. His policy is described by acute English
observers as absolutely French.1 But the Spanish monarch was in-
spired by keener emotions than Louis. Hatred of Great Britain was
with Charles III almost an obsession. To personal pique was added
jealousy of British naval supremacy, desire to regain Gibraltar and
Minorca, and dread of British competition in the South Seas. For
apart from the maintenance of the dignity of the Crown, the pre-
servation of the territorial integrity of Spain "Ultramar95 and of the
commercial exclusiveness of her colonial Empire was the guiding
principle of his policy. Moreover, apart from revenge, there was one
abiding factor which compelled persistence in the commercial and
colonial rivalry of France and Spain with Great Britain, and which
Chatham's policy would only have rendered more important. For
by all three Governments alike commerce was at once fostered and
confined by means of prohibitory systems which limited trade with
the colonies to the mother countries. Their object was to secure a
favourable balance of trade; a monopoly of the colonial markets for
the home manufactures and of the raw materials produced by the
colonies; and to stimulate the building up of great mercantile marines
and of fisheries as nurseries of seamen for protecting navies. The
tighter the system and the greater the preponderance of one country,
the fiercer became the necessity for others to recapture their lost
colonies.
The scene, then, was set for a drama of * revanche. After many alarums
and excursions, the denouement was destined to be brought about by
the very means which many French observers, from Montesquieu
to Choiseul and Vergennes, from Montcalm on the Heights of
Abraham to Turgot in his study, had predicted and hoped, namely,
the revolt of the American colonies.
Whatever may have been the political and economical wisdom or
unwisdom of Pitt's ideal of destroying France as a maritime, com-
mercial and colonial rival, loyal fulfilment of the conditions of the
peace was no part of French policy. Pitt rightly held that those
1 Harris, Jaines, Diaries, 1770; Lord Rochford to Lord Halifax, 1764, cf. Goxe, W.,
Memoirs of the Bwrboi Kings <f Spain* vol. m.
POLICY OF CHOISEUL 687
conditions were not severe enough to prevent France from entering
at once upon the task of upsetting them. As early as April 1763,
Louis XV sanctioned the scheme of the Gomte de Broglie, who,
acting as the minister of his secret diplomacy, commissioned the pre-
paration of plans for the invasion of England. This was to be the first
blow struck at the commencement of a new war, instead of wasting
strength, as hitherto, upon distant expeditions. "Officers", says the
Due de Broglie, "were sent to England who reconnoitred the possi-
bilities of invasion, the points of disembarkation, the means of obtain-
ing supplies, and the roads, camping grounds, etc., as far as London.
On the French side of the Channel, all means of executing the project
were exactly calculated."1 The two chief agents chosen for this
purpose were a young officer of Engineers, the Marquis de la Roziere,
and the Chevalier d'fion de Beaumont, first secretary of the French
Embassy at London, whose subsequent career is one of the minor
curiosities of history.2 All this was done without the privity of Louis9
ministers. But it was quite in keeping with ChoiseuPs policy. That
policy throughout this period remained the same. It was to secure
France on land by alliances on the continent, whilst making France
and Spain strong and prosperous enough to wage a successful war
abroad against Great Britain and Portugal. Choiseul's hopes were
perpetually cheated. As the crises arose which demanded the action
he had prepared for, he was forced to hesitate and hang back,
realising that neither France nor Spain was capable of carrying on
war successfully. When the moment came to act, therefore, his
policy involved him in endless obscurities and contradictions.
The peace preliminaries were no sooner signed than Choiseul
applied himself to reforming the army. He rendered it capable of
being rapidly increased and promptly used. As Minister of Marine
(1761-6), he organised the reconstruction of the fleet. Empty dock-
yards were stirred to life; money flowed where before there was not
a sou of credit. He found a force of forty-four ships of the line and ten
frigates. He left, at the time of his fall, sixty-four ships of the line and
fifty frigates, or grosses corvettes,* ready for sea. These and the re-
habilitation of French finances, a task in which he was less successful,
were necessary preliminary steps towards the accomplishment of his
great scheme. His ambition was, briefly, to establish French supremacy
in the "two Mediterraneans" — that of Europe and that of the Gulf
of Mexico.
Before the first year of the peace was out, Lord Egmont, First Lord
of the Admiralty, was aware that the activity in French naval dock-
yards was great and alarming. In Toulon alone, twenty-six ships were
reported to be more ready for sea than the twenty "intended" guard-
1 Boutaric, £., Correspondence ini&te de Louis XV, I, 291 ; Due de Broglie, The King's Secret,
n, 8 1 seqq.
* Gaillardet, F., Memoire sur le Chevalier^ 6?Eon\ d'Eon, Mf moires et negotiations.
8 Chevalier, £douard, La marine frangttise, p. 63.
688 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
ships in all the English ports. A sudden and decisive blow by twenty
sail of the line was feared, aimed at the ports and docks of England
or Ireland. Secret intelligence revealed that "one of the principal
Ministers of France" had stated that the French marine would
certainly be re-established by the ensuing year, and that, the moment
this was accomplished, France was resolved to wipe off the stains of
defeat. Newfoundland was to furnish the pretext for the intended
rupture. The point at issue there was whether the English had re-
tained a right to share in the cod fishery about St Pierre and Miquelon,
and it was the source of prolonged controversy (1764-83). In the
meantime, the development of the Sugar Islands ceded by France
was to be encouraged, rather than opposed, "because France was
resolved to re-possess them very soon".1
In the colonial sphere Ghoiseul endeavoured to develop France's
possessions overseas by substituting colonisation by bureau for
colonisation by companies. The Compagnie des Indes, which was
practically bankrupt,2 was suppressed, and the settlements made
under its aegis were transferred to the immediate administration
of the Crown. One company alone, the Compagnie de Barbarie,
which enjoyed the monopoly of trade on the north coast of Africa,
was allowed to retain its privileges. Elsewhere the State now assumed
the task of provisioning the colonies and supplying them with
negroes and settlers. With Choiseul colonisation was not so much
an end in itself as a step towards that war of revenge against Great
Britain for which he was always preparing. To this end he never
ceased to urge Spain to "increase her naval and colonial power".
And at San Ildefonso, he boasted, his influence was more power-
ful than at Versailles.3 One result of his advice was an attempt to
reform the financial administration of the Spanish colonies, be-
ginning with Mexico. The attempt was answered by insurrections at
Los Angeles, Cuba and Quito.4 Plans, too, were drawn up by the
Spaniards for the naval and military defence of their colonies.
Choiseul insisted that improvement of the Navy was more vital than
the preparation of plans. With this object, French engineers were
introduced into the Spanish dockyards.
During the Seven Years' War Choiseul had conducted an enquiry
into the Spanish West Indian trade through the agency of the Abbe
B61iardi.5 After the Peace of Paris he turned these investigations to
account with a view to promoting the prosperity of French and
Spanish colonial trade. A convention was signed in January 1768.
But Choiseul was not given time to complete his scheme of a far-
reaching commercial union between the two countries directed
1 Egmont to Grenville, 3 Dec. 1763, Grensille Papers, n, 172.
8 Weber, H., La compagnufrarqaise des Indes, pp. 591 seqq.
8 Beserwal Memoires, n, 15; Renaut, F., Le Pacte de FamilU.
4 Lord Rochford, Dispatches, March 1766.
6 B61iardi, Abb6, Correspondance, Biblioth£que Nationale.
LA FRANCE &QJJINOXIALE 689
against Great Britain. Meanwhile negotiations for opening the door
of the Spanish Indies to the products of France resulted in the re-
duction of the duties on goods exported from Spain to America (i 765).
As such exports were mainly French in origin, France benefited by
being thus enabled to undersell the British contraband goods which
had hitherto commanded the market.1 Jamaica was the chief centre
of the British interloping trade with the Spanish colonies. From
that emporium were shipped the cargoes which British interlopers
ran to the Spanish West Indies and the Gulf of Mexico. From
Havana, too, they continued to conduct with Vera Cruz a contra-
band trade which the brief British occupation of that port had
enabled them to establish. To Panama, to Louisiana and the Bay of
Honduras British goods found their way and, with the connivance of
the Portuguese, even to Uruguay and Buenos Aires. For the energy
and individuality of British manufacturers and shippers enabled them
to compete successfully with the Spanish merchants who, hampered
at every step by formalities and taxes, were compelled to ship then-
goods by slowflotas and convoyed galleons.2
Grand as were the ideas of Ghoiseul and great as were his reforms,
it was really in vain for him to fortify and enlarge ports, or to set up
Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture for the colonies, so long
as the stream of population, weakened by the loss of the Huguenots
and diffused over too large an area, was fed only by soldiers, mission-
aries, and the riff-raff of the towns, shipped off against their will by
order of the State and forbidden to return. A glaring instance of
political and strategical ideas thus ignoring practical provision for
gradual colonisation was furnished at this time by the disaster of
Kourou. For now that Canada had gone the way of Nova Scotia,
ChoiseuTs eager and scheming brain had set in motion a daring
design intended to retrieve that loss. Out of the colonies remaining
to France in the West Indies and Guiana, he proposed to create a
new colonial empire, La France fiquinoxiale, in the Gulf of Mexico
and the West Indies. In conjunction with his Spanish allies he hoped
thereby to develop a market for French goods in Spanish America
and to destroy British trade with the South. His attempt to plant
a strong colony in French Guiana (Valley of Kourou and Cayenne)
was the logical outcome of this far-seeing scheme. The district had
been surveyed by his agents in the preceding year. Now shipload after
shipload of French settlers, drawn from Nova Scotia and Louisbourg,
and reinforced by the sweepings of France and the Mediterranean
ports, was sent thither. Unhappily, the colonists were dumped upon
a barren, fever-stricken coast, without shelter or adequate prepara-
tion for their reception. An epidemic broke out. Within a year, of
9000 colonists 3000 were dead; presently, hardly one remained (June
1 Blart, L., Rapports de la France et de I'Espagne, p. 7.
3 Rousseau, F., ftegne de Charles III, t. n.
44
690 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
1 763-4). x Two years later another attempt to colonise the country
was made and with ChoiseuTs support a company was formed for
that purpose. But this second attempt proved only less expensive in
lives and money than the first.
Thus ChoiseuTs fine conception of calling in the South of America
to redress the balance of the North ended in disaster, and the grand
idea of La France fiquinoxiale went the way of that of La France Septen-
trionde. The loss of so many settlers and thirty million limes was bad
enough. But still worse for France, perhaps, at this critical era of
overseas development, was the paralysing influence which such losses
and failures were bound to exert upon French colonial enterprise.
One instance of this may be found in the refusal of official en-
couragement which helped to render abortive an attempt to colonise
Madagascar made by the donate de Maudave in 1 768.
These were but the last of a long series of disasters, military and
financial, which had befallen France overseas. Yet these very
disasters would seem to have opened up a new and remarkable era
of prosperity for her remaining colonies in the western hemisphere.
All the energy and trade which had been absorbed by Canada and
Louisiana were now directed to the West India islands. The golden
age of the French West Indies began. For a time it seemed that the
French would drive the British out of the sugar trade. They were
greatly helped by the large smuggling trade carried on by the British
American colonies. Aided by the Spanish alliance and the reduction
of restrictions upon colonial trade, the prosperity of San Domingo,
"the Pearl of the Antilles", advanced at a prodigious rate. By 1788
it had absorbed two-thirds of the whole foreign trade of France. It
was estimated that the total value of the French West Indian trade
in 1766 was one hundred million livres, as against sixty-six for the
British trade, twenty-four for the Dutch and ten for the Spanish.2
Martinique, the seat of government of the French Windward
Islands, remained the chief market and shipping station. Rodney
had pointed out the great strategic value of the island he had cap-
tured, since it lay in the centre of the crescent formed by the Caribbee
Islands, its arch to windward. This happy situation, its numerous
harbours, safe roads and fertility of soil gave it, in his opinion, the
preference over all the other islands.3 It was calculated that, if
occupied by the British, its production of sugar could be more than
doubled within a few years. It had, however, suffered severely from
the British maritime supremacy during* the Seven Years3 War, and
had not recovered from the disastrous bankruptcy which followed
upon the huge commercial speculations of the Jesuits. Its commercial
1 See D'Aubigny, £., Choiseul et la France d'otUre-mer, Marcus, W., Choiseul und die
/Catastrophe an Kowouflusse.
3 Raynal, G., Hist. pkdosophique...des / tab lusements... dans les deux Indes.
a Rodney to Grenvillej Grenuilb Papers, u, 10.
THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 691
supremacy, indeed, was now eclipsed both by San Domingo and by
its neighbour in the Windward group, Guadeloupe. The latter, since
it lay to leeward, was of less importance strategically than Martinique,
but four years of British occupation, during which 40,000 negroes had
been imported, had enormously increased the productivity of this
fine and fertile island.1 So profitable, indeed, had it already become,
that it had been argued that it might be wiser to retain it rather than
Canada at the Peace of Paris, more especially as the threat of the
French in Canada would help to remind the colonists of their debt
to the British Empire.2 Apart, then, from the comparative decline
of Martinique, the French, as the issue of their long-drawn out
rivalry with the British in the West Indies, held at this period a
position of commercial supremacy. It was a supremacy which
slowly but surely waned, and was destined to receive at the close
a crushing blow from Rodney.
When Bute retired in April 1763, his successor, George Grenville,
was soon made aware of the incessant activity with which Choiseul
and Grimaldi were intriguing to recover lost possessions. Settlement
of points arising out of the treaty was avoided. Among the questions
thus kept open by France were those of the demolition of the seaward
fortifications of Dunkirk, the liquidation of the bills of credit issued
by the French in Canada, and the payment of the sum due for the
maintenance of French prisoners of wax. The latter point was pressed
by Grenville in July 1 764, as a test of France's intentions to fulfil the
stipulations of the treaty.3 At this juncture, a French squadron had,
under Comte d'Estaing, seized Turk's Island, which was claimed and
partly settled by the English. Grenville decided to deal with this and
the other matters in dispute with France "by firm and temperate
measures, before the fire is lighted in so many parts, and fed with so
much fuel, as to make it impossible to extinguish it".4 Reinforce-
ments were ordered to the West Indies and "preparatory orders"
were got ready to be sent to Admiral Burnaby in those parts. The
French refused to recall Estaing, but Grenville's firmness compelled
them to disavow his action and to promise reparation for damages
(August-September 1764). At this very moment ChoiseuFs agents
were investigating the military position in America and reporting
that the British troops were so few and scattered as to be of little
account, whilst the colonies refused to take steps to protect themselves.5
And at the same time despatches from Lord Rochford, the British
ambassador at Madrid, were revealing traces of a plot, concocted by
the ministers of the Family Compact, to burn the dockyards of Ports-
mouth and Plymouth6 (September 1764 and 25 February 1765).
1 Rodney to Grenville, Grenville Papers, n, u, 12.
2 See Grant, W. L., " Canada versus Guadeloupe", Am. HJR..9 July 1912, pp. 735 seqq.
8 Grenville Paters, n, 380, 409-12. * Ibid, n, 418-38.
5 Bancroft, 6., Hist. U.S. in, 28; Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelbitrne, n, 3-5.
8 Printed by Coxe, W., Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings of Spain, m, 298,
44-2
692 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
Similar firmness shown by Grenville in dealing with Spain re-
sulted in a similar conclusion to an incident in the Bay of Honduras.
There the vagueness of the treaty induced frequent violation of
Spanish territory by British settlers, who pushed their contraband
trade into the interior, even as far as Mexico. Acting upon instruc-
tions from home, the Governor of Yucatan and Commandant of
Bacalar endeavoured to curb this trade and expelled British settlers
from those points on the coast which were deemed beyond the limits
indicated by the treaty. They ordered them to retire from Rio Hondo,
and to confine themselves to the right bank of Rio Nuevo and Rio
Wallis. By these aggressions 500 settlers lost their homes and property
worth £2 7,000. l Vigorous remonstrances were made by the British
Government, and pressed in spite of military demonstrations by
Spain. At last an order was obtained for restoring the settlers and
censuring the Spanish officers concerned, but demands for punish-
ment and reparation were dropped.2 During these negotiations
Grimaldi, instigated by Ghoiseul, almost caused a rupture with
Portugal by delay in restoring Sacramento, complaints as to contra-
band trade with Buenos Aires and Paraguay, and disputes as to the
limits of the two colonies. The Marquis de Pombal, the Portuguese
minister, appealed to Great Britain for the assistance due to Portugal
from her ally. The British Government warned Spain that any
attack upon the dominions of an ally would be accepted as a declara-
tion of war. Rochford bluntly told the Spanish chargt d'affaires that
he knew Spain wished to conquer Brazil, but England would not
permit it.8 As a matter of fact Choiseul had prepared an expedition
against Brazil in October 1762, instructing the admiral to capture
Rao de Janeiro at all costs.4 Beliardi, in discussing with him the
advantages of a war with Portugal, urged the necessity of first con-
quering Brazil, lest the King of Portugal should take refuge there and
presently make himself master of South America and hand over its
trade to the English. Choiseul remarked that he thought the Portu-
guese were more ready to march to Madrid than the Spaniards to
Lisbon.6 Taken in conjunction with Ghoiseul's plan of campaign
outlined in the previous year, one may suppose that these incidents
were intended as a combination of moves in the tentative opening of
a game which could be pressed or abandoned according to the energy
or weakness displayed by the British ministry, or the success or failure
of the dockyard plot intended to paralyse the British Navy.6
Grenville was less successful in his attempt to secure the payment
1 Coxe, m, 29-7.
* Gretmlle Papers, n, 409-12; Rochford to Halifax, quoted by Coxe, ni,
Rcnaut, F., Le Pacts de Fanulle, etc.
. ..-, (4), pp. 106 _ , -
6 Cf. Rochford to Halifax, 12 Nov. 1704; Coxe, m, 306.
THE MANILA RANSOM 693
of the Manila ransom. When the capital of the Philippine Islands
had surrendered to Colonel Draper, the archbishop-governor pur-
chased the exemption of private property from plunder by a payment
of two million dollars in cash and of two more in bills drawn upon
the Spanish Treasury. These bills Spanish ministers flatly refused to
honour. The archbishop, Grimaldi declared, might as well have
agreed to deliver up the city of Madrid. In subsequent negotiations
it was urged that the agreement had been extorted by force, and
broken by some looting previous to the capitulation.1
The circumstances which led to Grenville's imposition of the Stamp
Act were in large measure due to our rivalry with France and Spain in
the colonial sphere. For the burden of the British taxpayer, which it
was meant to relieve, had been incurred by the previous war, and the
maintenance of a standing army, towards which it was intended that
the colonies should thereby contribute, was rendered necessary by
the hostility of France. That hostility was traced in the intrigues of
GhoiseuPs agents with the Indians, whose murderous rising in 1763-4
was partly due to their influence.2 It was generally believed, too,
that France would soon endeavour to regain Canada, and would be
aided by her former subjects. The possessions in the West Indies,
which Bute had allowed her to retain in spite of Chatham's warnings,
rendered the American colonies strategically of vital importance
both for defence and attack. This is not mere theorising, for Choiseul
explained to Louis in 1769 how Martinique and Guadeloupe had
been prepared as bases of supplies and operations. It would have
been plainly unwise, then, not to keep British troops in readiness in
the continental colonies, and to rely for protection upon the hazardous
arrival of transports from England. Resistance to the Stamp Act was
fomented by ChoiseuPs agents in America, and the spirit of rebellion
largely kept alive by them after its repeal by the Rockingham
ministry. The successful issue of the revolt of the American colonies
was rendered possible, first by supplies of money and munitions from
France and Spain, and finally by naval and military aid without
which it must have collapsed.
Pitt's resignation in 1761 had been hailed in France as equivalent
to two victories.8 His return to power in 1766 had an equal and
opposite effect. "Their panic", Horace Walpole observed, "at the
mention of Mr Pitt's name is not to be described."* Choiseul, after
repairing the losses of the navy and reforming the army, had now
resumed the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The two
protagonists of French and British imperialism were soon at grips.
Pitt, who now took the title of the Earl of Chatham, was under no
illusion as to the enmity of the House of Bourbon and the ambitious
1 Coxe, m, 272, 307; Lord Mahon, Hist, of Eng. v, 57; Annual Register, Statement by
Sir W. Draper.
2 Vide supra, p. 60,7. s Diderot, Corresfiondanct, n, 80.
4 Walpole to Sir H. Mann, 23 July 1 766; of. Macaulay, Essay on Chatham.
694 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
schemes of Ghoiseul and Grimaldi. "France", he wrote, "is still the
object of my mind." Her preparations for a coming war were
sufficiently evident and alarming. On quitting office Chatham had
left a Navy superior to the united fleets of France and Spain, the
standard he laid down as necessary. On resuming it, he found that
Great Britain had sixty-two ships as against eighty-three of the
Bourbon allies, who had eighteen more upon the stocks. He at once
took measures for improving the personnel of the Army and Navy, and
increasing the number of ships of the line. With his unerring strategic
foresight he decided to maintain a British garrison in the Falkland
Islands (August 1766) ; Pensacola, the port in Florida, he ordered to
be fortified as a base of operations against France and Spain.1 The
question of reinforcing the Mediterranean fleet in view of French
designs upon Corsica was also considered. Corsica in French hands
would be a threat to the British possession of Minorca and affect the
balance of power in the Mediterranean.
To parry the hostile intentions of France and Spain, Chatham now
endeavoured to bring into being a scheme which he had long con-
templated. This was the formation of a great Northern Alliance,
which should unite Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden and the
United Provinces in a defensive confederacy against the House of
Bourbon. But foreign governments were adversely affected by the
frequent changes of ministry in England. Chatham's popularity was
temporarily diminished by his acceptance of a peerage, and Frederick
of Prussia was still sore at having been left in the lurch at the Peace
of Paris. For these and other reasons the scheme failed.2
In the meantime Chatham instructed Lord Shelburne, the
Secretary of State, to insist upon an immediate settlement of the
outstanding claims against France and Spain, which his predecessors
had failed to secure. He was well aware that the claims and delays
of the Spaniards were inspired by the French minister. Spain was
still refusing to pay the Manila ransom; she was still claiming a
monopoly of the South Seas, and objecting to the right of British
ships to sail in the Pacific. Rockingham in the previous June had
offered to renounce the Manila claim in return for the concession of
the right bank of the Mississippi, but this had been rejected on the
ground that it was "the key to Mexico".8
Shelburne was a statesman of broad mind and liberal views often
far in advance of his era. He set his heart upon conciliating the
American colonies. Misunderstood and mistrusted by his con-
temporaries, with whom his manner rendered him intensely un-
popular, he has been described by Disraeli as one of the suppressed
characters of English history. The loyal and intimate friend of
1 P.R.O., Chatham MSS, 79, 85, etc.
2 Chatham Correspondence, m, 82-7; (Euvres de Fr£dSrir9 vi, u, 33, r ??• Winstanley, D.,
Chatham and the Whig Opposition, pp. 39, 55.
8 Aff. Etr. Angl., Durand to Ghoiseul. %
SPAIN AND THE SOUTH SEAS 695
Chatham, his conduct of foreign affairs shows him to have been his
able and devoted disciple. In pursuance of Chatham's instructions,
he now began to press Prince de Masserano for the payment of the
Manila ransom. He took the opportunity to add that " if the Spaniards
in talking of their possessions included the American and South Seas,
and our navigating there gave occasion to them to suspect a war, he
had no hesitation to say that he would advise one, if they insisted
on renewing such a vague and strange pretension long since worn
out" (22 Aug. 1766). 1 Thus the claim of the Spaniards to include
the South Seas in their colonial Empire was definitely opposed.
M. de Guerchy, the French ambassador in London, received a
similar intimation from Shelburne that the time had come to put
an end to delay in fulfilling the stipulations of the peace, including the
demolition of the seaward fortifications of Dunkirk.2 Choiseul took
alarm. The financial condition of France and the domestic troubles
of Spain, occasioned by the expulsion of the Jesuits and the reforms
of Squillaci, rendered overt action at present out of the question,
although at this time Shelburne makes mention of a plot to seize
Gibraltar.3 Guerchy was, therefore, instructed to gain time by giving
assurances of the ardent desire of the French King for peace. For
ChoiseuPs policy was now to delay the settlement of outstanding
questions with Great Britain and to manager Us esprits en Angletem
until the Bourbon allies should be strong enough to challenge a
rupture. In a letter to Merci, dated 22 December 1766, which came
to the knowledge of British ministers,4 he congratulated himself that
he had persuaded Spain to fall in with his plans. He believed that
by the year 1770 — the date is memorable — France would be in the
desired position, with the finest army, a respectable navy, and money
in the Treasury. His chief fear was that Chatham might precipitate
matters and endeavour to retrieve failing popularity by plunging into
another great and popular war with the House of Bourbon.5
Influenced by these ideas Choiseul busily conducted negotiations
on behalf of Spain. By November they had reached a point at which
Chatham deemed it necessary to interview the French and Spanish
ambassadors himself. When Guerchy assured him (20 November
1766) that the Family Compact desired peace, he demanded why,
in that case, France did not induce her partner to honour her obliga-
tions, and to withdraw her objections to the British right of sailing
in the South Seas. "England", he declared, "would sooner consent
to give up the Tower of London than abandon that right." In a subse-
quent interview (23 November), when he had learned that Choiseul
was suggesting that, if Great Britain would abandon the idea of
settling the Falkland Islands, the Manila ransom might be paid
1 Fitzmaurice, i, 287. * Koch et Scholl, Traitfs, T, 315.
8 Shelburne to De Visme, 20 Dec. 1766; Fitzmaurice, i, 285.
4 Lord Rochford to Lord Shelburne, see Fitzmaurice, i, 286.
5 Choiseul to Guerchy, n Aug. 1766, etc., quoted by Fitzmaurice, i, 282, 283, 288.
696 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
subject to the arbitration of France as to the amount, he plainly declared
that he regarded all idea of accommodation by France as absolument
tvanouie. But he made it clear to both parties that, if the Manila
ransom were paid and the claim of England to sail the Southern Seas
were admitted, he was prepared to desist from settling on the Falkland
Islands.1 Circumstances, however, combined to enable the Bourbon
Powers to continue their policy of delay until the chosen moment came. 2
The illness of Chatham and his consequent withdrawal from public
affairs left the stage vacant for the brilliant and irresponsible genius
of Charles Townshend. Changes in the Cabinet, including the
partial eclipse of Lord Shelburne, now marked the preponderance
of the Bedford party. Their ascendancy was interpreted abroad as
indicating a policy of peace with France and Spain and of vigorous
action against the colonies. With Chatham out of action and the
colonies exasperated by the new import duties, the moment had
come for Choiseul to move. He could not flatter himself that the
time was ripe for a rupture with Great Britain. But he still clearly
foresaw and prepared for that eventuality, and made haste to fish in
troubled waters and to keep them stirred. He sent French agents
in disguise to North America to foment disaffection amongst the
colonists, and to prepare schemes for helping them when the rebellion
should break out which he plainly foretold. He carefully scanned the
American newspapers, the resolutions of Assemblies and even the
sermons of Puritan clergy. He learned with satisfaction that the
English had no cavalry and barely ten thousand infantry in America.
Meanwhile plans were again being prepared for the invasion of
England, and French spies were again surveying the English coast.
Their instructions as well as their minute reports presently found
their way into Chatham's hands (i 767-8). 8 Confident that Great
Britain had her hands full and that the Bedford party were for peace
at any price, and praying with Grimaldi that the divisions among
the Whigs and anarchy in England might last for ever, Choiseul
turned his attention to the aggrandisement of France in the south of
Europe.4 Whilst he redoubled his assurances of friendship to Great
Britain, he put a stop to naval preparations in the dockyards and
arsenals of France, hoping thereby to strengthen the tottering
finances of the kingdom. Then, availing himself of the action of the
Pope upon the expulsion of the Jesuits, he seized Avignon and the
Comtat Venaissin. Next, he turned his attention to Corsica.
Taking advantage of the weakness and dissensions of the British
1 Fitzmaurice, i, 200-3; Lansdowne House MSS, vol. 30 (Shelburne to Rochford,
29 Nov., 12 Dec. 1766) and Aff. fitr. Angl. 471, Gorr. Pol. CDI.XXI.
8 Grimaldi to Masserano, 23 March 1767; Rochford to Shelburne, 7 March 1767.
8 Quoted by Lord Mahon, Hist. Eng. Appendix, vol. v; cf. Chatham MSS, 86;
Morison, M. G., Trans. R. Hist. Soc. 3rd Ser. rv, 82-1 15; and Bancroft, G., Hist. US. ra,
100-200.
4 Fitzmaurice, I, 320-33, 361 ; Durand to Choiseul, ap. Bancroft, vi, 31,
FRANCE AND CORSICA 697
Cabinet, now nominally led by the Duke of Grafton, he landed an
army and overwhelmed the islanders. It had been open to Great
Britain to declare that the occupation of Corsica by France would
be regarded as a casus belli.1 Chatham would certainly have done so,
and a timely movement of the British fleet in the Mediterranean
would doubtless have secured the independence of the island. But
opinion in England was divided. Many felt a generous sympathy
for a nation gallantly struggling for freedom. Many, like Burke,
dreaded the effect of a French occupation upon the maritime position
of Great Britain in the Mediterranean. " Corsica a French province
is terrible to me", he declared.2 Others agreed with Dr Johnson that
England should mind her own affairs, and leave the Corsicans to
mind theirs.3 This division of opinion was reflected in the Cabinet,
where Lord Weymouth and the Bedford party were strictly pacificist
and held the view expressed by Dr Johnson. Shelburne, the Duke of
Grafton and others of the school of Chatham, on the other hand, were
for making a firm diplomatic stand. They believed that any weak-
ness on the part of Great Britain would encourage France and Spain
to make further aggressions — a view shared by Frederick the Great* —
and that at the present juncture they were financially incapable of
waging war. The annual accounts of France showed a deficit of
thirty million livres, and war, it was realised, would mean national
bankruptcy. The bellicose attitude of Choiseul was therefore render-
ing his political position somewhat precarious.5
Though the British Government finally acquiesced in the annexa-
tion of Corsica by France, the incident fanned the flames of popular
dislike for that country. It was hinted by Burke that Shelburne was
forced to resign on account of the warmth of his remonstrances, but
this would seem to have been incorrect.6 The fears of Burke and Shel-
burne were destined to be confirmed in a curious way, and to make
the acquisition of this new colony by France an event of paramount
importance in the history of the world. For it happened just in time
for Napoleon Buonaparte to be born a French subject.
The annexation of Corsica (15 September 1770) was a step towards
the assertion of French supremacy in the Mediterranean, which,
as we have seen, formed one part of ChoiseuPs grandiose scheme.
Another move in the same direction was the extension into Egypt of
French trade and influence, already predominant in the Levant. This
penetration was ardently encouraged by Choiseul, who thus antici-
pated, and probably inspired, the policy and campaigns of Napoleon.
The next move was on the part of Spain. As the date approached
Lans. Ho. MSS, quoted by Fitzmaurice, i, 362. a Cavendish, Debates, i, 40.
Boswcll, Life of Johnson (eel. Birkbeck Hill), n, 22.
Frederick II to Comte de Maltzan, 7 June 1768.
Rochford to Shelburne, 6 June and 4 July 1768.
Burke, Thoughts on the present discontents', Mahon, v, 203; Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne,
i. 386.
698 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
to which Ghoiseul had looked forward, the weakness of the British
Government became daily more evident. The affair of Wilkes and
the Middlesex election was followed by the outbreak in America over
the tea tax. Lord North had succeeded the Duke of Grafton. Relying
upon the support of France, Spain took up the question of the Falk-
land Islands and acted there in a manner so high-handed that it had
all the appearance of a manoeuvre intended to force a war. The
strategical value of these islands, and their fertility, had been recently
insisted upon by Anson. He had not visited them in his voyage
(1740-4), but reported enthusiastically upon them to the Admiralty.
It was neither as a whaling station nor as a plantation that this
archipelago was of importance. But by reason of its proximity to the
Straits of Magellan, Buenos Aires and Brazil it offered strategical
advantages of position as a naval base in case of war with Spain,
and as a place of refreshment for ships sailing the South Seas and
opening up the trade which the Spaniards so jealously guarded.
First sighted by John Davis in 1592 and probably by Sir Richard
Hawkins in 1594, who named them "Hawkins5 Maiden Land", the
islands were afterwards called "Falkland Islands" by the English.
The first recorded landing was made by Captain John Strong of the
privateer Farewell in 1690. By the French, whose ships from St Malo
visited them in the course of trading to South America, they were
called "ties Malouines".1 No attempt to colonise them was made
till after the publication of Anson's Voyage in 1748. A British ex-
pedition was then designed. In April 1749 the Duke of Bedford
instructed the British ambassador at Madrid to explain that it was
intended to send some sloops in order to make a full discovery of
them, but not to settle there. Such a move, however, especially in
the light of Anson's recently published praise of the islands as a fertile
and strategic post, could only be regarded by Spain as a threatened
invasion of the territorial integrity and commercial exclusiveness of
her colonial Empire, which was a cardinal point in her national policy.
The Spanish minister, therefore, firmly expressed his dissent.2 The
South Seas, declared General Wall, were the exclusive dominion of
Spain. Any intrusion such as was contemplated would be regarded
as an act of war. Without admitting the Spanish right, the British
Government abandoned their scheme for the present. Soon after the
Peace of Paris Ghoiseul despatched Monsieur de Bougainville to make
a settlement there. Whilst he was establishing himself at Port
St Louis on East Falkland (1764), Commodore Byron, as the result
of Anson's recommendations, was secretly despatched by Lord
Egmont, First Lord of the Admiralty, to survey the islands. He
entered the harbour of West Falkland, named it Port Egmont (15
January 1 765) and continued his voyage. His report being favourable,
1 Brit. Mus., Harleian MSS, 5101; Sloane MSS, 86, 3295.
2 Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 35503, f. 188, etc.
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 699
Captain Macbride was sent out to take formal possession of the
islands. A blockhouse was erected and a small British garrison
established (January 1766), to support which another vessel was sent
outjwith stores. In the same year, as the result of Spanish protests
against the presence of the French, Choiseul handed over Port
St Louis to the Spaniards, who renamed it Port Soledad (October
1 766) . They appear to have held it mainly with the idea of expansion
in the direction of the Magellan Straits. The presence of the English
on West Falkland was apparently not yet known to them. But the
existence of an English settlement somewhere in the South Seas was
vaguely rumoured. The Spanish Minister of Marine accordingly in-
structed Don Francisco Bucarelli, the Governor of Buenos Aires, to
expel any such settlement, by force if necessary, when it should be
located (February I768).1 In December 1769 a Spanish schooner,
sent out to reconnoitre from Soledad, met H.M.S. Tamar (Captain
Hunt) on a similar cruise from Port Egmont. Hunt ordered the
Spaniard to return, and threatened to fire upon her if she continued
to approach Port Egmont. The Spanish Governor of Soledad there-
upon called upon the British to evacuate the island. Hunt returned
the compliment, and asserted the British title by both discovery and
settlement. On hearing of this incident, the Governor of Buenos Aires
sent two ships with troops to Soledad, which put into Port Egmont
for water (February 1770). Hunt then sailed for England, and on
his arrival in June gave the British Government their first intimation
of the Spanish protest. After Hunt had left, Bucarelli proceeded to
put his instructions into execution. He sent from Buenos Aires an
expeditionary force consisting of five frigates and sixteen hundred
men to turn the British out of Port Egmont. Resistance to a force
so overwhelming was out of the question. After a few shots had been
fired, the British garrison capitulated (10 June I77o).2 The Spanish
commander then removed the rudder of H.M. sloop-of-war Favourite.
He thus made certain that the news of the affair should reach Madrid
before it could be known in London. It was announced to the British
ministers in London in a somewhat truculent tone by the Spanish
ambassador, Prince de Masserano.
The news of this insult to the British flag aroused intense indig-
nation in England.3 Instructions were at once sent to James Harris,
afterwards Earl of Malmesbury, who was acting as chargi d'affaires at
Madrid, to demand in peremptory terms the restitution of the Falk-
land Islands and the disavowal of Bucarelli's action. A fleet was
assembled at Spithead.4 Harris formed a very clear idea of the man
he had to deal with. He saw in Grimaldi a statesman of no very
1 Angelis, Pedro de, Memoria Historica, pp. 19-27.
* Ibid.; Harris, J., Diancs, etc.
8 Duke of Grafton, Autobiography, i, 254.
4 Col. Home Office Papers, nos. 63, 64, 104-6.
700 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
extraordinary talents, but dexterous in chicanery, whose principle
was "never to do but what he is obliged to conform to, and not even
then till he has had recourse to every kind of subterfuge "-1 With such
a minister it was necessary to act with great firmness and accordingly,
on 28 September, Harris told him that the only way of preventing
the most fatal consequences was to accept the British demands.
Grimaldi replied that Spain had so little to gain and so much to lose
by war, that nothing but the last necessity would drive her to it. But
whilst denying that Bucarelli had received any particular instructions
to dispossess the English, he admitted that he had acted agreeably
to his general instructions. He presently accepted the British pro-
posals, but Masserano was instructed to negotiate about the terms.2
Harris on the same day assured Lord Weymouth that there was not
the least reason to doubt the sincere desire of the Spaniards for peace,
" as well from their inability to support a war, as from the dread they
have of its consequences". The Spanish Government, he represented,
were afraid of a popular rising if the troops were removed. The army
was ill-equipped and ill-disciplined. The navy, though improved by
the Frenchman Gaultier, was discontented and lacked seamen, and
the financial position was never worse.3 But if these were the views
of the King and several of his ministers, there was nevertheless a strong
war party among Spanish statesmen, who shared the designs of
Ghoiseul and were eager to attack Great Britain. Among these were
Gonde d'Aranda and General O'Reilly. This party gradually gained
the ascendancy.
The pride and obstinacy of Charles III were roused by British
insistence that he should own himself in the wrong and throw over
his governor. In the meantime Grimaldi had been seeking support
from France. He reminded the Spanish ambassador in Paris of a
plan concerted with Choiseul in 1766 for concentrating a force at
San Domingo, and proposed that Jamaica should now be seized by
a coup de main (10 September 1770). The French replies, however,
were highly discouraging. Choiseul said he could do nothing. He
urged Grimaldi to gain time, even if he secretly did intend to make
war, for France needed at least three months for the return of her
trade fleets and sailors employed in the Newfoundland fishery.4
The course pursued by Choiseul is exceedingly difficult to under-
stand. His correspondence shows that when Grimaldi was at first
apologetic, and Spain, as Harris said, obviously afraid of war, he
denounced him as too timid. When, later, the insistence of Great
Britain began to rouse the temper of Charles, and Grimaldi himself
became infected with the war spirit of Aranda, Choiseul rebuked his
tone as too military. At the beginning of the incident he had shown
1 Harris, Dianes, etc.
2 Ibid, i, 63 seqq.; Col. H.O. Pap. nos. 242, 390, 391, 485, 493.
8 Harris, Diaries, I, 63 seqq.
4 Aff. £tr. Esp. DLX, DLXI.
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 701
that he was ready to make trouble by raising questions about the
French right of fishing at Newfoundland, and the action of the British
in India, who had stopped an attempt to fortify Chandernagore in
contravention of the Treaty of Paris. On 7 July he had written to the
French ambassador at Madrid that he had instructed the ambassador
in England to present a memorial on the Chandernagore affair,
demanding reparation for the insult to the French flag.1 If satisfac-
tion were refused, France would know how to obtain it. He enquired
what Spain was going to do. Charles III and Grimaldi, came the
reply, were infinitely anxious for peace, because Spain needed at
least two more years before she could be in a position to go to war.
But now, when the Spaniards were making active naval and military
preparations and the danger of a rupture increased, he expressed
his dread of it, and even went so far as to suggest to Masserano that
he should throw over his instructions from Madrid and act under his
own pacific directions.2 Was he playing a double game, as has been
alleged, and, whilst ostensibly striving for peace, secretly stimulating
the obstinacy of Charles through the agency of the Marquis d'Ossun?
Most probably he was shaken by his information of the unprepared-
ness of Spain, or by the sudden realisation of the strength of the
opposition to himself in France. Although Grimaldi had not received
the encouragement he had expected from France, the issue long hung
in the balance. He continued to make offers of reparation while
haggling over the terms. Much play was made over the insult
offered to Spain by Captain Hunt in threatening to fire upon the
Spanish schooner.
When Parliament met (13 November 1770), the Government
prided itself on the firmness with which it had handled the situation.
Chatham, however, who had recovered his health, and the Opposi-
tion poured scorn upon its vacillation and pusillanimity. Lord
Weymouth resigned in December, in response to this clamour, and
was succeeded by Lord Rochford. It is to be remembered that
ministers were secretive as to what was happening. Chatham was
indignant with their "little policy of concealments", and denounced
our utter unreadiness for the war which on both sides of the Channel
was now deemed to be inevitable. Ministers hardly made a pretence
of answering his questions, and he complained that his eloquence fell
dead against the faded hangings on which Flemish art had portrayed
the defeat of the Armada — that tapestry which, "mute as Ministers,
still told more than all the Cabinet on the subject of Spain, and the
manner of treating with a haughty and insidious power".8 The
French envoy hastened to assure Choiseul that Chatham was correct
1 It was presented 26 Sept. 1770; see Col. St Paul of Ewart, Correspondence (ed. G. G.
Butler), n, gSseqq.
2 Aff. fitr. Esp. DLXI, 14 Dec. 1770; Carre*, H., Le regne de Lotas XV, pp. 388-90.
3 Chatham, Speecties, Nov. i77O-Feb. 1771; Johnson, Falkland's Islands; Rochford,
Conespondence; Williams, B., Life of Chatham; Trevelyan, G. O., Life qfC. J. Fox, p. 327.
702 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
in saying that Great Britain had only twelve ships of the line ready
for sea, and urged him on that account to maintain a firm attitude.1
For by the end of November the situation had hardened. Spanish
pride was roused; Charles stiffened; Grimaldi predicted a riot. The
crisis was suddenly and dramatically resolved by the fall of Choiseul.
At last it had seemed certain that Spain was committed to war,
and that the moment for which he had so long been scheming was
at hand. He announced to Louis and his Council the preparations
he was making for war with Great Britain. This was the occasion for
which his rivals, Maupeou and Terray, had been waiting. He had
made matters easier for his enemies by provoking the hostility of the
King's new and low-born mistress, Madame du Barry. On 6 Decem-
ber Terray declared that the Treasury was empty and that French
credit did not exist. ChoiseuFs restless intrigues against England
were denounced to the King, and his insensate thirst for war, at a time
when war meant financial ruin, and when by his foreign policy France
was placed in a very unfavourable position upon the European chess-
board. The whole affair of the Falkland Islands was said to have
originated with him, and to have been encouraged by his unauthor-
ised promises to Spain. Louis took alarm. On the 2ist he insisted
that the King of Spain should be urged to do his utmost to maintain
peace and submit to the British terms. "My Minister wishes for
war", he wrote to Charles, "but I do not."a On 24 December
Choiseul was dismissed. Spain and Great Britain remained on the
brink of war. The Spanish court had already decided to refuse the
British demands.3 In answer to the high language held by Masscrano
in London, Lord North despatched a courier (18 January 1771) to
recall Harris from Madrid. Harris quitted the capital, but he had
not gone twenty leagues before he was met by a second courier, sent
off by Rochford four days later, who informed him that Spain had
conceded all the British demands.4 The expedition of Bucarclli was
disavowed. The British garrison was restored to Port Egmont. The
King of Spain did not, however, withdraw his claim to the territory
in question. The terms of the convention were bitterly attacked by
Chatham and the Opposition.5 Furious at being foiled in their appeal
to the country for increased naval power and territorial and com-
mercial expansion, and aided by the invective of Junius, they pointed
out that the demand for the Manila ransom had been dropped, and
that the reservation of the Spanish claim to the Falkland Islands was
unnecessary and unprecedented. It was moreover alleged that by
a secret article or verbal assurance the Government had pledged
themselves either to a speedy withdrawal or to a surrender of the
FALL OF GHOISEUL 703
islands to the Spaniards. The despatches of Harris make it plain that
there was no such article, and that the restitution was demanded and
conceded by Spain without reserve. The existence of any such agree-
ment "made directly or indirectly by H.M. Ministers", was flatly
and indignantly denied by Rochford when the point was raised by
M. d'Aiguillon on behalf of Spain in December 1771, and November
1 773. M. de Guisnes, however, the French ambassador, asserted that
some such solution was spoken of by English ministers, though
without Rochford's knowledge. This may have been the origin of
the rumour, or possibly it was circulated by Grimaldi, to lessen the
loss of his personal credit in France, to foil the attacks made upon him
by Aranda and his faction for his feeble handling of the affair, and
to be used in the future.1
Whatever the truth of the rumour, Port Egmont was certainly
abandoned by the British shortly afterwards (1774). But the flag was
left flying and sheets of lead were affixed to the rocks on which was
engraved the declaration of the sole right and property of the Grown
of Great Britain to the Falkland Islands. It had, no doubt, been
found that Anson had much exaggerated the fertility of the soil,
which is for the most part only suitable for sheep-farming. The
strategical value of the islands has been fully demonstrated of recent
years.
The fall of Ghoiseul, according to the considered opinion of Lord
Shelburne, came in the nick of time to save Great Britain, distracted
by American affairs, from the attack of a hostile combination. He
had proofs he said, speaking six years later, that Gibraltar, Minorca,
Jamaica, and the greater part of our possessions in the East and West
Indies would have been among the first sacrifices that would have
befallen us, but for that "miraculous interposition of Providence".2
The Falkland affair had some important results. On the one hand,
it compelled a strengthening of British naval forces and was the
occasion of Nelson's entering the Navy. On the other hand, it re-
moved the most determined enemy of Great Britain from power, and
it demonstrated the weakness of France and the lack of co-ordination
between the members of the Family Compact.3
Thus was war, arising from French and Spanish rivalry in the
colonial sphere, narrowly averted for the time being. France, under
the guidance of Madame du Barry and the Triumvirate, Maupeou,
Terray and Aiguillon, passed for the next few years into eclipse. The
only official incidents worth mentioning in this period were the
surreptitious strengthening of Dunkirk and the trespass of some
1 Harris, Diaries, I, 77, 78; Williams, Life of Chatham, n, 272; St Paul of Ewart, Corre-
spondence, i, 276-91, n, 75, 129, 133, 134; Down, W. G., "The Falkland Islands Dispute",
an unpublished thesis in the University Library, Cambridge.
2 Par/. Hist, xvin, 675.
3 Cf. Hertz, G. B., British Imperialism in the eighteenth century, pp. 1 10-53, and Winstanley,
D., Chatham and the Whig Opposition, pp. 391-6, 408-13; Goebel, J., Ttie Struggle for the
Falkland Islands.
704 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763 1783
French traders in Senegal. The latter encroachment was regarded
in England as the beginning of a sinister attempt to "worm us out
of the most beneficial part of that trade". It was disavowed by
M. de Boynes, Minister of Marine, 13 June I773-1 But the whole
question as to what was meant in the Treaty of Paris by the cession
of the River of Senegal "with all its rights and dependencies", was
raised again in 1774 and 1775, by the action of French traders and
the claims of the French Governor of Goree on their behalf. Firm
instructions, backed by a couple of frigates, were sent to Governor
O'Hara to enforce British claims (April I776).2 In this Aiguillon
acquiesced. Mention should perhaps be made of the extraordinary
"unofficial" memorial presented by him on India. Lord Rochford
returned it with the comment that if it had been "ministerial", it
must have been regarded as a prelude to war.8 For the rest, the
French minister was continually reproached by Spain for his lack of
hostility to Great Britain.4 Expeditions to make settlements on the
Niger and in Formosa were also taken in hand by the French (1772,
I773).6
In Spain, the position of Grimaldi, shaken by the fall of Choiseul,
was further weakened by the disastrous defeat of an expedition against
Algiers planned by him (June I775).6 This circumstance, combined
with the forbearance of the British Government, whose hands were
full with American affairs, led to the speedy settlement of an incident
in the West Indies, where a landing from an English vessel on Grab
Island, to which both Spain and Great Britain laid claim, created a
situation which might otherwise have assumed a more threatening
aspect.7 About the same time, a lively discussion raised by Spain
over the concession of the island of Balambangan in the Philippine
group to the East India Company ended in the acknowledgment of
the British claim, whilst Spanish influence over Sulu and the neigh-
bouring island was recognised (August 1775).*
After the death of Louis XV, the ideas of Ghoiseul began once
more to dominate French policy. They found an able exponent in
the clear-sighted and vigorous Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Gomte
de Vergennes. The revolt of the Thirteen American Colonies gave
France the opportunity for which she had so long been waiting.
Chatham, in a famous speech (20 January 1775), described France
as a "vulture hovering over the British Empire, and hungrily watch-
ing the prey that she is only waiting for the right moment to pounce
upon ". His prophecy that a prolonged struggle with America would
lead to the intervention of France and Spain was repeated in the
BEAUMARCHAIS' MISSION 705
following year by Colonel Barre and Charles Fox to an incredulous
House of Commons. One of the arguments adduced in the House in
favour of repealing the Stamp Act had been that if it were persisted
in, America might place herself under the protection of France and
Spain. These might, indeed, at first sight well be deemed strange
allies. But the colonists had long enjoyed a brisk inter-colonial trade
with them, a trade forbidden, indeed, but engaged in by all the
Powers alike, and rendered, financially and commercially, a necessity
to the colonies, by the very treaties and Acts of Trade and Navi-
gation which forbade it. The rigid enforcement of these Acts had
brought vividly home to the Americans that their interests were
closely bound up with those of the French and Spaniards. George
Johnstone, Governor of West Florida, for instance, wrote to the
Secretary of the Board of Trade that he despaired of seeing that
settlement flourish unless Spanish commerce was permitted. He
could not conceive why it had been stopped.1 More recently the
boycott of British goods by the colonists, following upon the imposition
of the tea and other duties, had resulted in the diversion of a large
amount of trade to France.2 Commercial relations of this sort
naturally drew the colonists closer to their erstwhile enemies, especially
now that they were relieved from the danger of their immediate
neighbourhood.
Relations with the representatives of the insurgent colonists appear
to have been first established in England by Caron de Beaumarchais.
Son of a clockmaker of Paris, known at that time chiefly for the
romantic incidents of his youth and his trial before the Maurepas
Parlement, remembered now almost wholly as the witty author of
The Marriage of Figaro and The Barber of Seville, Beaumarchais himself
attached most importance to his career as a busy agent in the under-
world of politics. As such, he had been sent to England by Vergennes
to procure the suppression of a pamphlet directed against Marie
Antoinette, which had been printed in London. Here he came into
touch with the notorious Chevalier d'Eon, and succeeded in purchas-
ing from him the State papers and plans for an invasion of England
which he had secreted since 1763. Here, too, at the house of Wilkes,
he met Arthur Lee, a young Virginian student of law.3 This was
towards the end of 1775.
In America, John Adams, at the head of the New England party,
had already urged that the revolutionary leaders should enter into
negotiations with France and Spain. In November a Committee of
Secret Correspondence "with the friends of America" was appointed.
Congress was in urgent need of money, arms and clothing for the
army. In the following spring Silas Deane was sent to Paris as
1 Hist. MSS Comm., Report XIV, App. x (American Papers).
2 See Benjamin Franklin to Gushing, 5 Jan. 1773.
3 Broghe, u, 500 seqq.; Lomenie, L. de, Beaumarchais et son Umps9 n, 113; Vergennes,
Correspondancc.
CHBEI 45
706 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
Commercial Commissioner and Agent for the Thirteen United
Colonies. His instructions, dated 3 March 1776, directed him to
acquaint Vergennes that, in the probable event of separation from
Great Britain, France would be the Power whose friendship they
would most desire. It had been hinted by Rochford to M. de Guisnes
in July 1 774 that many people in England felt that a war with France
might prove the solution of the American problem. The colonists, it
was thought^ might then settle their quarrel with the mother country,
from fear that France might recover Canada. Guisnes informed
Vergennes, and a message was conveyed to the Americans, assuring
them that France sympathised with them in their struggle, and that,
for herself, she had no desire to regain Canada. The mission of Deane
was in some sort a reply.
When he arrived in Paris (July 1776) the policy of France had
already been determined. At the beginning of the year, Vergennes
had presented a memorial to the King, in which he urged that it was
the interest of France and Spain to seize the opportunity marked out
for them by Providence for the humiliation of England and to strike
decisive blows at a chosen moment. He argued that, if Britain
effected a reconciliation with her colonies, she would probably
utilise the forces she had concentrated in America to seize the French
and Spanish possessions in the West Indies. Or again, if the colonies
achieved their independence, Britain might endeavour to compensate .
herself for her loss by taking the West Indian islands belonging to France
and Spain, The military and financial position, however, was not
sufficiently good to tempt the Bourbon Kings to adopt so bold a policy.
Vergennes, therefore, submitted an alternative proposal to the King
and his Council. Since the exhaustion produced by the civil war
must be infinitely advantageous to France and Spain, that war must
be encouraged by secretly assisting the Americans whilst "dexterously
tranquillising" the English ministry by professions of friendship. The
insurgents must be supplied with the money and military stores
without which they could not continue their resistance. France in
the meantime must strengthen her navy and prepare for intervention
should occasion arise. Louis referred this proposal to Turgot, the
Comptroller-General of Finance, in April 1776. He answered in a
remarkable memoir, forecasting the probable economic effect of the
independence of the British colonies. As for France, he insisted that
nothing but prolonged peace and economy could prevent a financial
breakdown. To that end she must avoid any course which might lead
to war, though ministers might perhaps be excused if they shut their
eyes to either of the contending parties making purchases in French
harbours.1 Maurepas and Malesherbes agreed. But Malesherbes
shortly afterwards retired and Turgot was dismissed. The policy of
Vergennes triumphed. Under Sartines at the Ministry of Marine
1 Turgot, A., Reflexions rtdigfcs d ly occasion [du mfmoirc de Vergennes].
BEAUMARCHAIS AND DEANE 707
money was spent freely on naval preparations and the defence of the
French colonies. Repeated assurances of strict neutrality were made
to Great Britain, whilst means were devised for furnishing the Ameri-
cans with supplies. Two months before the arrival of Deane, Vergennes
obtained Louis' reluctant sanction to a loan in the form of a private
transaction, which did not commit the Government. The agent
selected for this purpose was Beaumarchais. In order to conceal this
transaction against a Power to which he was daily pledging his
honour that perfect neutrality was being observed, Vergennes em-
ployed his son, a lad of fifteen, to write to the author of Figaro.1 When
Deane arrived, therefore, he found that he was cast for the part of
a merchant doing business with Beaumarchais under an assumed
name. The Government had provided the latter with a million limes
to found a commercial house and supply the Americans with the
munitions of war vital to their cause. The public arsenals were placed
at his disposal for the purchase of stores of war. Other commercial
houses were similarly supplied with money for a similar purpose.
Beaumarchais also obtained, on the recommendation of the French
Government, another million limes from the Spanish Treasury.2
Deane, therefore, was soon able to ship large supplies of munitions.8
Nor was this all. Restrictions upon trade were relaxed in favour of
American vessels; American privateers were harboured and fitted
.out, and their prizes sold in French ports; the construction of ships
of war for America was carried on under the superintendence of
French naval officers. All this was done with the connivance of
ministers. The protests of the English ambassador, Lord Stormont,
were met with cynical denials of complicity and pretended efforts
to prevent the exportation of stores. Vessels laden with arms were
stopped and then allowed to escape. Officers who were making their
way to America, with the aid of Deane, to fight against the hereditary
enemy were formally recalled, but not obliged to return to their
regiments. Some prizes brought into French ports were, indeed,
restored to the English, but their captors were compensated for their
loss. Some who had too openly broken the law were thrown into
prison, but they were soon allowed to escape. One of Deane's
achievements was to send over from France James Aitken, or "John
the Painter" as he was called, a Scottish deserter from the British
army in America, to set fire to Portsmouth and other dockyards.
Aitken nearly succeeded, but was caught and hanged. The incident
recalls the schemes of French and Spanish agents in 1764.
The prolonged successes of the British and the unsatisfactory state
of the American army induced Congress to press more urgently for
1 Flassan, vi, 143; American Diplomatic Correspondence, i, 272 seqq.; Lom^nie, Beau-
marchais, n, 93 scqq.; Adolphus, J., Hisl. Eng. n, 309, 429, 439.
2 Vergennes to the King, 2 May 1776 (in Flassan, vn, 149).
8 Am.Dipl. Corr.i, 131.
45-2
7o8 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
foreign aid. Immediately after the Declaration of Independence,
therefore, Benjamin Franklin, the Philadelphia printer who had
gained high repute for his scientific discoveries, and had already acted
as agent for the colonies in England, was commissioned to join Silas
Deane as a secret envoy to France.1 After an adventurous voyage
he reached Paris at the end of the year. He was there joined by
Arthur Lee from London. The simplicity of their dress and manners,
concealing an acute knowledge of men and affairs, the cause of
liberty which they invoked, and their enmity to Great Britain caused
them to be received with the utmost enthusiasm. But French opinion
remained divided as to the advisability of intervention. The desire
to tear up the Treaty of Paris and to recover lost possessions was
national. But Louis XVI objected to the principle of helping rebels
against a Grown, and shrank from the war with England which a
recognition of their independence must involve. He was supported
by Maurepas and Necker, for the finances of the State were still in
a state of chaos. Marie Antoinette, on the contrary, with the Austrian
party in France, ardently espoused the cause of American liberty
which was one day to recoil upon her own fair head. The idea of
liberty had been brought into fashion by the Encyclopaedists. En-
thusiasts for religious liberty, like the followers of Voltaire, and en-
thusiasts for political liberty and equality, who had drunk deep of the
heady wine of Rousseau, were eager to fight for a people struggling
against an oppressor. Their generous ardour was not cooled by the
reflection that the people in question, who had recently declared in
such resounding terms that all men were endowed by the Creator
with an inalienable right to freedom, were now offering to assist in
placing Portugal and the West Indies under a foreign yoke in return
for French and Spanish aid, or that their own plantations were
cultivated by slaves. French officers, soldiers of fortune and amateurs
of liberty, encouraged by the promises of Deane, crowded the ships
that sailed for America, and even caused Washington some em-
barrassment by their very numbers and the high rank to which they
were promoted in spite of their ignorance of the language in which
they must address their troops.2
Though French intrigue, and subsequently French and Spanish
arms, finally succeeded in defeating the British in the contest with
the united colonies, it is remarkable that they did not succeed in re-
covering Canada, that rich jewel which had so recently been torn
from the French Crown. The reason is doubtless to be found in the
wise provisions of the famous Quebec Act (May 1774). The British
Government eschewed the temptation to subject some 70,000 French
Roman Catholics to the rule of a few hundred English Protestant
settlers. It was thought "more humane" to allow the French to keep
the old laws of the province, which they understood, even though in
1 Am, Dipl. Con. i, 233. 2 Washington, Works, iv, 146 (Oct. 1776).
THE QUEBEC ACT 709
civil cases that involved trial without jury, and not to force upon them
the democratic system which obtained in New England. Religious
liberty beyond the mere toleration which had been promised in the
Capitulation was granted. Great indignation was caused by these
measures among the Whigs at home and the Puritans of New England.
Congress protested (September 1774) that this Act, "establishing
despotic Government and the Popish religion", must be repealed.
In effect it gave greater liberty, better administration and ampler
prosperity than the ultra-military form of government which it sup-
planted. The result was that, when the Americans invaded Canada
in 1775, the Canadians remained loyal to Great Britain. They had
no sympathy with New England republicanism, the New England
creed, or the New England character. The invasion of Canada under
Montgomery and Benedict Arnold ended in complete failure.
Eager to wound, and yet afraid to strike, the French Government
continued to supply the Americans with money and munitions, whilst
Vergennes assured Lord Stormont of their peaceful intentions, as
sincerely as Cardinal Fleury had been wont to make the same assur-
ances to Lord Waldegrave, and Choiseul to Lord Shelburne. He
added — and possibly with truth — that he was far from wishing for
the independence of the colonies, because that would end in their not
permitting any European Power to occupy a foot of land in America.
Franklin was soon able to announce that large supplies of guns and
other military stores were being shipped under convoy of a French
man-of-war.1 Means were also provided for supplying and refitting
American cruisers in French ports. But the American commissioners
were not content with such surreptitious aid. They urged the acknow-
ledgment of the United States and the conclusion of treaties of com-
merce and alliance between the old Monarchy and the new Republic,
offering in return to assist in the conquest of the British Sugar Islands.
Nothing, it was felt, could save their cause at this critical
juncture but foreign intervention. Foreign intervention, however,
could not be vouchsafed until some striking military success had
lessened the probability of the defeat or reconciliation of the colonies.
In November Vergennes informed the commissioners that perhaps
the King would lend Congress another million limes and try to per-
suade his brother of Spain to do the same. He might take off their
hands the ship which they had ordered in Holland, but could not
pay for or get safely to France. More than this they must not expect
until the colonists had obtained some important victory.
The attitude of Spain was even less encouraging. Lee was sent
thither to raise the wind and to tempt the Spaniards into the war by
offering to assist them in obtaining Pensacola, and also in their war
with Portugal. This war was already causing embarrassment to Great
Britain as the ally of Portugal, and was accordingly encouraged by
1 Franklin, B., Letter to Congress, 8 Dec. 1776.
7io INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
the French. It was occasioned by the ill-defined boundaries of the
South American colonies about the Rio Grande de San Pedro ; by
Spanish delays in fulfilling the treaty of 1763, by which the status quo
of the Portuguese colonies in America was to be restored; and by the
vicinity of the settlements of the two nations on the Rio de la Plata.
Aggressions by the government of Buenos Aires answered and pro-
voked aggressions by the government of the Brazils. Open hostilities
were begun by the Portuguese on the Rio Grande. Both parties
appealed to their allies, Spain to France, Portugal to Great Britain.
But while negotiations were proceeding through them, an expedition
sailed from Cadiz, which first seized the island of Sta Catherina on
the coast of Brazil (February 1777) and then St Gabriel and the colony
of Sacramento. These operations, being followed by the fall of Pombal
on the death of Joseph I, King of Portugal, enabled Florida Blanca
to negotiate the Treaty of San Ildefonso (1777). l Byit the limits of Peru,
Paraguay and Brazil were fixed. Spain not only gained Sacramento
and great advantages for the military and commercial development of
Buenos Aires, but also secured the valuable friendship of Portugal in the
coming war with Great Britain. The Spanish court, however, was not
as yet prepared for such a war, nor had it the least sympathy with
republican ideas. It saw no attraction in fighting to establish a
homogeneous, independent Power which would constitute a threat
to Spanish possessions beyond the Mississippi. Nor was it obvious
why a country which retained so large a colonial empire and was the
chief exponent of that system of commercial monopoly, which the
triumph of the United States seemed likely to break down, should
encourage colonists to revolt. Lee, therefore, met with a cool re-
ception in Spain, though he was granted a sum of money for the
purchase of military stores which were shipped from Bilbao.2
General Burgoyne's early successes had filled the American envoys
with anxiety almost amounting to despair. But on i December 1777
came the news of the capture of his army at Saratoga. It was, said
Deane, like a cordial to the dying. That resounding success at once
removed all hesitation at Versailles. On 17 December the American
commissioners were officially informed that the King was prepared
to recognise the independence of the United States and to enter into
a treaty of commerce with them. If such recognition should involve
war with Great Britain, no compensation would be asked. Any re-
action in favour of the British which might have been aroused by fear
of France regaining Canada was thereby avoided.
After seven weeks of negotiation a treaty of commerce was signed,
6 February 1778, and on the same day a treaty of alliance, the pro-
visions of which were to come into force if, as was inevitable, Great
1 Coxe, m, 381-95; Martens, RecueU des traifr, i, 634; Silva, Historia de Portugal;
Becatmi, F., Storia del regno <K Carlo III, p. 289 ; St Paul of Ewart, Correspondence, n, 330-97.
2 Franklin, Works, vm, 209; Lecky, Hist. ojEng. in Eighteenth Century, rv, 5.
FRANCO-AMERICAN TREATY, 1778
Britain should break the peace. The latter treaty provided that any
of the remaining British territories on the continent of America, of
which the Americans should gain possession, should be retained by
them, whilst France should keep any of the British islands in or near
the Gulf of Mexico which she might conquer.1 The treaties were kept
secret for some weeks in the hope that Spain might join in them. But
it was, indeed, wholly contrary to the wishes and counsels of Spain
that France had committed herself and it was only in June of the
following year that the naval and military position tempted her to
declare war.
Lord Stormont had kept ministers well informed of what was
happening. On 28 December 1777 he had announced secret comings
and goings between Franklin, Deane and M. Gerard. "I have not a
shadow of doubt", he wrote, "that this Court and that of Madrid
are combined against us and have long been preparing for the execu-
tion of some invidious design. I look upon the assistance they give
the rebels as but a small part of their plan Their naval force is
already more than sufficient for every purpose of defence, and yet
they are continually increasing it. Mr Necker's last arrlt expressly
avows an intended augmentation Where the first blow will be
aimed I cannot say, but am inclined to think it will be in the West
Indies."2 It was his view that French and Spanish support of the
Americans was given in the hope of exhausting Great Britain and
that they would be enabled to strike some sudden, unexpected blow
at her colonial Empire. On the night of 6 February he wrote that the
treaty "between this Court and the rebels was actually signed",
though the fact was stoutly denied by both Maurepas and Vergennes.
On 13 March, however, negotiations with Spain having failed, the
Marquis de Noailles announced to Lord Weymouth the signature of
the treaties, acknowledging the full independence of the United States
and, with scarcely veiled insolence, inviting His Britannic Majesty
to prevent their commerce with France from being interrupted.
Stormont was promptly recalled from Paris, and the war began.
Steps were now taken in France to put into execution those plans
for the invasion of England which, as we have seen, had been pre-
pared on the morrow of the Peace of Paris.8 The retirement of the
Comte d'Estaing from Rhode Island, and his campaigns in the West
Indies, seemed to show that the eyes of France were naturally directed
towards those sugar islands which, if captured, were to remain hers.
It was probably no part of her plan to bring the war to a conclusion
before some such conquests had been made. Estaing's indiscreet
appeal to the Canadians not "to bear the arms of parricides against
their mother-country"4 also heightened the suspicion of the Americans
1 Flassan, vii, 149, 167; Martens, n, 701; Lom<$nie, Beatanarchds, n, 158-60, 559-66.
3 Mahon, Lord, Hist. Engl. vi, Appendix, p. xxi.
3 Due de Broglie, The King's Secret, n, 518. 4 Annual Re&ster, 1779, p. 355.
7i2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
that France was preparing to disregard the terms of the treaty, and
to recoup herself for the cost of the war by the recovery of Canada.
Lafayette, indeed, proposed to Congress a second invasion of Canada
in concert with France, and only a very outspoken protest from
Washington secured the abandonment of the project (14 November
1778). If once the French regained possession of Canada, he argued,
they could easily stay there, holding it as security for their large
loans to the United States. Then, in control of Canada and the New-
foundland fishery in the north, with the Indians as their allies in the
rear and the Spaniards in the south, and with control of the sea and
the West Indies in the west, France would be able to dictate not only
to the United States, but to the whole world. Such was the outcome
of French and Spanish rivalry with Great Britain which Washington
now saw reason to dread. Vergennes, however, was looking at the
situation from a very different point of view. He had no desire to see
a single, all-embracing United State of America, and instructed
Gdrard, the French minister in America, to discourage any attempt
upon Canada. He informed the French ambassador at Madrid that
he was willing to guarantee to Britain her dominion over Canada
and Nova Scotia. His view was that, if Spain could be maintained in
possession of Florida, then the American States would be kept in a
condition of uneasiness by the proximity of foreign neighbours to the
north and south, and would therefore place a higher value upon the
continued friendship of France. It was not, he believed, to the in-
terest of the French to destroy this principe utile ^inquietude by seizing
Canada.
As Stormont had foretold, then, and the action of Estaing proved,
the immediate interest of the French lay in the West Indies, and in
combining with Spain to destroy the naval supremacy of Great
Britain.1 They were not to have it all their own way. Though
Dominica was captured by the Marquis de Bouille, Governor of
Martinique, Admiral Montague destroyed the French settlements on
Miquelon and St Pierre, and St Lucia was taken by a campaign as
brilliant as it was fortunate.
In India, as Clive had declared, the French had only suspended
their views, not given them up.2 Surreptitious aid was lent to the
enemies of Great Britain. There had been an attempt, as we have
seen, to fortify Chandernagore in defiance of the treaty. In 1773
schemes were discussed in Council for the formation of a new East
India Company, and for an attack upon the British in Bengal in
conjunction with the Mogul, as proposed by the Commandant of
Chandernagore, or by putting into execution ChoiseuPs plan of con-
centrating an expeditionary force on the lie de Bourbon and Mauri-
1 Bancroft, G., Hist. U.S., trans, by Gircourt (De Faction commune de la France et de
FAmtrique), m, 259-312; Lecky, Hist. Eng. TV, 480 seqq.
1 Speech before Select Committee, 1772.
BRITISH SUCCESSES OVERSEAS 713
tius.1 Ever since 1 777 a French agent and adventurer, M. de St Lubin,
had been at Poona intriguing with the Maratha principalities. He
had a clandestine commission from the Minister of Marine to negotiate
the establishment of a factory at Poona, supported by military force,
and the acquisition of a seaport near Bombay. The welcome he re-
ceived alarmqjj the British. Warren Hastings, realising the danger
of a combined attack from the Marathas and the French, determined
to strike the first blow. He despatched a force under Colonel Leslie
to march across India to the aid of a Pretender to the Peishwa-ship
who was favoured by some of the Maratha nation. At this juncture
(July) news arrived that war had been proclaimed in London and
Paris. Hastings acted without a moment's delay. Chandernagore
and the French factories at Masulipatam and Karikal were seized.
With the aid of a naval squadron, siege was laid to Pondicherry, which
surrendered after seventy days (17 October 1778). Fort Mahe, on
the coast of Malabar, fell in the following March, and the French flag
was swept out of India.2
On the high seas, when all the force of the increased French navy
was added to the number of American privateers, heavy losses were
expected in the mercantile marine. Evidence given in the House of
Lords in February 1778 showed that 173 sail of American privateers
had taken or destroyed 559 British ships by that date. Yet even now
enterprise and good seamanship continued to bring safely into port
large fleets of merchantmen from the Leeward Islands, Jamaica and
the East Indies.8 If the rate of insurance against capture rose higher
and higher, British privateers were no less successful on both sides of
the Atlantic. By the end of 1778, it has been stated, the Americans
had lost no less than 900 vessels. And even as the day drew near
when Great Britain was to be compelled to acknowledge that she had
lost the thirteen colonies in America, daring navigators were dis-
covering a new world for the expansion of the British race.4 At the
beginning of 1779, a French squadron captured the British forts and
factories on the River Gambia and at Senegal. The British retaliated
by seizing Goree, which the French had denuded of troops and guns
in order to strengthen Senegal. But in Europe the outlook for Great
Britain was becoming increasingly black. The entry of Spain into
the war had been foreseen, but when it actually came it took the
Cabinet by surprise, for they had been lulled into a false sense of
security by Spanish diplomacy.5 In Florida Blanca Charles III had
chosen a successor to Grimaldi whose conciliatory manner cloaked
a character of great energy and determination. Unceasingly he
1 St Paul of Ewart, Correspondence, i, 55, 129 seqq., 287-99.
2 Forrest, Sir G. W., Administration of Warren Hastings, pp. 146-7; Selections jrom Bombay
State Papers, pp. 291, 296.
3 Hildreth, R., Hist. U.S. m, 241 ; New York Col. Docs.-, Con. ofGco. Ill (ed. Fortescue),
n, 275.
* Vide supra, chapter xvm. 5 Correspondence of George III with Lord J^orth, 0,209,243.
7i4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
endeavoured to engage the King of Prussia and Catharine of Russia in
co-operation against Great Britain. In conjunction with France he
continued negotiations with Hyder All against the British power in
the East. The alliance of the Emperor of Morocco was secured as
a valuable aid in the projected attempt to recover Gibraltar. New
war taxes were laid, and the alliance with Portugal was used in
preparing for the event.1
In the meantime Charles made an offer of mediation to the British
Government. The reply was inevitable that it was inconsistent with
national honour to solicit the interference of a foreign Power till the
views of France were known. Charles then proposed that each
Government should transmit its conditions to Madrid, and offered
to deduce therefrom a definite proposal for peace. Great Britain
replied that, whilst reserving her right to treat with her own colonies
without foreign intervention, she would concur in establishing
harmony between the two Crowns whenever France would withdraw
her assistance from the Americans. On the other hand, the French
Crown explained that it could not desist from its engagements. It is
evident from the tone and substance of these proposals that their
acceptance was impossible and could not have been expected. They
were merely intended to gain time, and to put the British off their
guard whilst keeping the French satisfied. They served their purpose.
By the spring of 1779 France had seventy-eight ships of the line, Spain
over forty.2 The situation seemed to justify the Spanish court in
entering the war. Inspired by the motives outlined in the beginning
of this chapter, and spurred more than ever by jealousy of Britain's
empire of the seas, and irritation at her exercise of the right of search
and contraband trade on the Spanish Main, Charles now threw off
the mask of mediator. A convention was signed with France in which
each party declared the advantages it wished to secure. No peace
was to be concluded till Gibraltar was restored to Spain (April r 779) .8
On 3 April Charles issued an ultimatum calling for a general dis-
armament and a Peace Congress to be held at Madrid. A truce was
to be granted to the American colonies through the mediation of His
Catholic Majesty, and not to be broken without a year's notice. In
the meantime they were to be treated as independent, and com-
missioners from America and Great Britain were to meet at Madrid.
"Such a plan of peace", as British ministers observed, "seemed to
proceed on every principle which had been disclaimed, and to contain
every term which had been rejected." But before their final refusal
reached Madrid, Charles had recalled his ambassador, and written a
long and violent letter to Lord Weymouth, charging the British
Government with having prolonged negotiations for eight months
1 Florida Blanca, Remew and Apology of his Administration to Charles III, 1788, quoted by
Goxe, Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings of Spain, in, 394, 409.
8 Lavissc, E., Hist, de France, EK, 63-5. 3 Lecky, v, 6.
WAR WITH SPAIN AND HOLLAND 715
whilst continuing to search and plunder Spanish vessels and violate
Spanish territory in Honduras Bay (16 June I779).1 This Spanish
rescript and a similar manifesto of wrongs published by Beau-
marchais in Paris were answered by Gibbon in his Justifying Memorial,
after ministers had replied in Parliament. But the arbitrament had
passed from the pen to the sword.
Before the home fleet could get ready for sea, the French slipped
out of Brest and, joining the Spanish fleet, appeared in overwhelming
force off Plymouth. Siege was at once laid to Gibraltar by land and
sea. Spaniards from Louisiana crossed the Mississippi, and took
possession of West Florida. The English logwood-cutters in the Bay
of Honduras were once more attacked and expelled. But a British
force despatched by the Governor of Jamaica took ample revenge
by capturing the Fort of Omoa and rich booty in Spanish ships which
had sought refuge there.2 A raid on Jersey by the French was frus-
trated, but had a serious effect upon the American war, in that it
delayed the sailing of an important convoy of stores and reinforce-
ments for New York. In India Hyder Ali was desolating the Garnatic
and menacing Madras. In the West Indies Estaing captured St Vin-
cent and Grenada (June and July), but was defeated in an attack
upon Savannah in the autumn. So far the part taken by France and
Spain in the southern campaign in America had proved ineffective,
and had failed to prevent General Clinton from re-establishing British
supremacy in the southern colonies.
The following year saw Rodney's victory off Gape St Vincent and
the relief of Gibraltar, but also the addition of Holland to the long
list of Great Britain's enemies. France had for some time been putting
pressure upon the Dutch to enter the war,3 whilst Florida Blanca
dangled before them the bait of succeeding to the commercial privi-
leges hitherto enjoyed by the British in Spain.4 Dutch merchants
also began to look forward to a share in the future commerce of
America. The country was divided between two parties. That of the
stadholder favoured the British, but was opposed by a French faction
which was particularly strong at Amsterdam. In spite of the three
treaties which bound Holland to alliance with Great Britain, Dutch
merchants were carrying on an immense trade with her enemies.
Holland supplied France largely with naval stores, whilst the Dutch
island of St Eustatius was the centre of an enormous traffic in military
and other stores for the American colonies. American privateers
found shelter in the Dutch West Indian islands, and when the British
Government demanded the surrender of Paul Jones as a pirate and
a rebel, the States-General refused. The depredations of American
privateers on British commerce had proved more harmful than the
1 Adolphus, J., Hist, of George III, n, 162-72; Mahon, vi, 255seqq.
* Stedman, C., Hist, of origin, progress, etc. of the American War, n, 266-71 ; Lecky, v, 19.
3 Am. Dipl. Corr. n, 335. * Goxc, m, 409.
716 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
French and Spanish fleets. Jones was the most famous of these pri-
vateers. A Scottish slave trader who had settled in Virginia, he took
command of a letter of marque, and was bold enough to harry the
English coast, sailing into the Firth of Forth and raiding White-
haven.1 Then he had attacked the Baltic convoy and carried some
prizes into Holland. On the other hand, the Dutch were aggrieved by
the high-handed way in which the British exercised the right of
search. Their anger rose when their merchantmen were searched
and seized under the guns of convoying men-of-war. The breaking
point, however, was not reached till papers captured in a vessel in
which was Henry Laurens, late President of the American Congress,
provided evidence that Amsterdam had been negotiating a treaty
with the Americans ever since August I778.2 On 10 December 1780
Holland joined the Armed Neutrality, the League of the Baltic
kingdoms founded by Catharine of Russia to enforce the new
doctrine that neutral bottoms made neutral goods. On 20 December
Great Britain declared war. The whole maritime power of Europe
was now arrayed against her, whilst she was endeavouring, without
an ally, to subdue a continent on the opposite side of the Atlantic.
1 Shelburne, J. H., life of Paul Jones.
2 Parl. Hist, xxx; Am. Dipt. Corr. n, 335 seqq.; Annual Register, 1780, 1781 ; Renaut, F. P.,
Les Provinces Unies et la Guerre d'Ametriqite9 chaps, vii-xv.
CHAPTER XXIV
THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
1775-1782
AT was no simple strategical situation which confronted King
George's ministers when at last the opposition in the North American
Colonies developed into armed rebellion. The mother country's
superiority in population and resources was virtually neutralised by
the geographical conditions. To maintain an army in so distant and
difficult a theatre of war was well calculated to tax the most efficient
administration, let alone the cumbrous, complicated, haphazard
machinery by which the British Army of 1775 was controlled.1 The
country was vast in extent, thinly populated, cultivated only in
patches, ill-supplied with roads and in large degree forest-clad. Far
from being able to "live on the country", the British forces were
largely dependent on home for provisions2 as well as for military
stores and equipment. At every turn the British generals were
hampered by administrative difficulties, arising from the delays and
uncertainties then inevitably attending upon the transport of re-
inforcements and supplies across 3000 miles of stormy seas, while the
consequent obstacles to framing and pursuing a sound strategy were
considerably increased by the rudimentary political and economic
development of the thirteen colonies. If it made them weak for
offensive purposes their very want of political union made them hard
to hit effectively. Military objectives would have been easier to find
and victories in the field more effective against a more centralised
and highly organised community. To conquer Canada it had
sufficed for Wolfe to defeat Montcalm's regulars on the Plains of
Abraham and for Amherst's converging columns to corner Mont-
calm's successor at Montreal, but Washington's defeats at Brooklyn
and the Brandywine mattered little to communities of hardy and
self-reliant farmers and fishermen economically independent of each
other, on whose stubborn wills the small forces of King George found
any lasting impression exceedingly hard to produce.
For the difficult task before it the British army had no advantage
in point of numbers, except in the campaign of 1776, or in equip-
ment and arms, or in superior mobility, except so far as the Navy
could enable it to move freely along the coast and in tidal waters. Its
establishment was low, there was no provision for rapid expansion,
1 Fortescue, J. W., History of the British Army, vol. raj Curtis, Organization of the British
Army in the American Revolution, esp. chap. ii. a Curtis, p. 81.
7i8 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
it had to rely on improvised transport, and its weapons differed but
little from those of its adversaries, who if they sometimes lacked
bayonets could equally often oppose "Brown Bess" with a rifled
flint-lock. If it included many who had seen active service in the
Seven Years' War, the Americans enjoyed this advantage also; and
of higher organisation or settled military policy there was no trace.
It was "an army of regiments" only, though many of its regiments
were well trained and disciplined, and in their discipline, their
traditions and their spirit the British army possessed invaluable
assets, as the record of the pitched battles of the war was to show.
Still die odds against it were heavy, and not the least charge against
North and his fellow-ministers is that, while they were not prepared
to avoid the otherwise inevitable contest by conceding the colonists*
demands, they failed altogether to make adequate preparation
for war either by land or sea. Even in September 1774 Gage had
at Boston only four battalions, barely 2000 men, not nearly enough
to enforce the coercive Acts directed against Massachusetts or to
maintain the royal authority which was openly defied that autumn
by the seizure at Newport of the cannon mounted to protect the
harbour and by the authorisation by Congress of the collection and
manufacture of arms.1 Gage had warned Dartmouth plainly that to
make New England submit would require 20,000 men, but the
Government's measures for asserting its challenged authority fell far
short of the requirements, and though during the winter his force was
raised to nearly 6000, it lacked transport and camp equipment.2
Hostilities actually began when, on 17 April 1775, 800 men whom
Gage had despatched to destroy stores which the Provincial Congress
had collected at Concord, twenty miles away, encountered armed
resistance at Lexington, Overcoming this, the detachment pushed
on to Concord, discharged its errand despite further opposition,
and then started its return journey to find the whole countryside up
in arms. Harassed by superior numbers of sharp-shooters the party
only escaped annihilation because Gage had sent four battalions to
Lexington to assist it; these, though suffering severely themselves,
extricated the survivors of the first detachment.3 Nearly 300 officers
and men were casualties, and the Americans, elated by their first
encounter with British regulars, flocked to arms so eagerly that Gage
soon found himself beleaguered in Boston by 20,000 men. Moreover,
a party of New Englanders under Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold
had surprised the weakly-held posts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point,
thereby securing control of Lake Champlain and the direct route to
Canada, while from the other colonies the royal governors were driven
out headlong, Lord Dunmore in Virginia, where a few regulars were
available, alone offering any resistance. Canada, however, though
1 Correspondence of George III (ed. Fortescue), in, 158-61. a Ibid, in, 216.
3 Mackenzie, F., A British Fusilier in Revolutionary Boston.
BUNKER'S HILL
719
weakly garrisoned, did not join the insurgents, and in Nova Scotia
and the Floridas British authority remained unshaken.
Gage's situation was highly unsatisfactory.1 Though his communi-
cations by sea were open, the inadequacy of the squadron on the
station and the inertness of its admiral, Samuel Graves,2 allowed the
privateers who soon swarmed out from every New England fishing
village to become a serious menace, while he had let the Americans
anticipate him in fortifying the dominating heights south and west
of Boston harbour. To the north, the Charleston peninsula pro-
jected into the harbour and from it artillery could command both
town and anchorage. Gage, therefore, decided to seize it, but the
Americans discovered his intention and during the night of 16-17
June they occupied the peninsula and started entrenching themselves
on Breed's Hill. This rash venture should have been signally punished
had Gage only landed troops in rear of the entrenchment and used
his light-draught warships to co-operate in intercepting the American
retreat. But he plunged headlong into a frontal attack, which gave
every chance to the already well-entrenched American marksmen,
and only succeeded at a third attempt after two had been bloodily
repulsed, with 1200 British casualties, amounting to nearly half the
force engaged.8 "Bunker's Hill", as the action is usually known,
ranks among the finest achievements of British infantry and largely
explains the Americans' reluctance to endeavour to dislodge the
garrison of Boston by direct attack. Nevertheless it showed clearly
that any attempt to raise the blockade by assaulting the investing
lines would be prohibitively costly, and Gage resigned himself to an
inert defensive which depressed and disgusted the troops.4 Howe,
who replaced him in September, realised that even if he could storm
the enemy's lines, want of land transport would render that success
barren. The true road to the repression of the rebellion was to him
the capture of New York as a preliminary to isolating New England,
the heart of the insurrection, by securing the line of the Hudson. This
he thought would be greatly facilitated if combined with an advance
from Canada by Lake Champlain.5 But at the moment it was doubt-
ful whether Canada, like New York, would not first need to be
recaptured.
The Canadians, though little disposed to bestir themselves for the
Crown, had no sympathy for the thirteen colonies and their attitude
had- emboldened Sir Guy Carleton, the governor, to spare several
battalions to reinforce Gage. Canada was ill-prepared, therefore, for
the vigorous attack delivered in the autumn of 1775 along the Lake
Corresp. of George III, m, 215 scqq.
Hist. AfSS Comm., Stopford-Sackvilk MSS, n, 2, 6; cf. James, W. M., The British
Naqy in Adversity, p. 27.
Hist. MSS Comm.9 Rutland MSS, m, 2; Corresp. of George III, m, 220-5.
Stuart, A Prime Minister and his Son, pp. 68 seqq. (quoted as "Stuart").
Stopford-SackvilU MSS, n, 9; Corresp. of George III, m, 242-4.
720 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Ghamplain route by a force under Richard Montgomery.1 Though
held up by the stout defence of St John's, by capturing Ghambly
Montgomery obtained enough ammunition and supplies to reduce St
John's also (3 November) ; whereupon he pushed on to Montreal which
Carleton had hastily to evacuate. Quebec, meanwhile, was seriously
threatened by another force under Arnold which had appeared
before its walls on 13 November after an adventurous march through
a wilderness of mountains and forests in Maine, though fortunately
for Carleton a regiment recently raised from Highland settlers had
arrived at Quebec just before Arnold. Montgomery joined Arnold
early in December, but on 31 December their assault on Quebec was
decisively repulsed, Montgomery being killed and Arnold disabled.
The Americans maintained a blockade till May, but disease and
desertion so thinned their ranks that Carleton had little cause for
further anxiety.2
The year 1775 had gone better for the insurgents than for the
British because the ministry, being quite unprepared for war, could
not despatch a really strong force to America direcdy they heard of
Lexington, and thereby missed all chance of nipping the insurrection
in the bud, besides giving the Americans a year for their preparations.
With a home establishment, including Ireland, of 30,000, from
which the Boston garrison had already been drawn, and recruiting
none too good3 except in Scotland, North had to fall back on hiring
mercenaries. An effort to obtain Russians failed,4 but treaties were
concluded with Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, Waldeck and Anspach for
18,000 men, though none of these contingents could start till the
spring of 1776.
Had Gage had 20,000 men by August 1775 success would have
been within his reach. If the most persistent error of North's ministry
was to base its plans on expectations of help from Loyalists who were
never as numerous or as ready to run risks for the royal cause as
Whitehall imagined, the zealous partisans of independence were in
a minority outside New England and Virginia, and the New England
militia, though formidable when fighting under conditions that
favoured them, had the defects of their qualities and entirely lacked
discipline and organisation. George Washington, who was appointed
to command the "Continental Army" on 15 June, had a gigantic
task in making an efficient army out of some excellent but very raw
material. He had to contend against ridiculously short terms of
enlistment, inter-colonial jealousies — the New Englanders criticised
his partiality for Virginians5 — deficiencies of equipment, insub-
ordination both of officers and men, and indifferent administrative
arrangements. Supplies were cheap and plentiful, but the troops
1 Hist. MSS Comm., Dartmouth MSS, i, 395.
8 Ibid, i, 405-7. •* Corresp. of George III, m, 249.
* Ibid, ra, 268, 276; Hist. MSS Comm., Royal Institution MSS, I, 7.
5 Stopford-SackvtUe MSSt n, 13-16.
BOSTON EVACUATED 721
suffered nearly as much from eating too much meat as from bad
sanitation and the want of camp discipline.1 Men came and went
practically as they liked, showed little readiness to re-enlist when
time-expired and resented all efforts to establish proper subordin-
ation. If Ticonderoga had provided the insurgents with ample
artillery, ammunition was exceedingly scarce, hardly any was manu-
factured in the country, and a vigorous attack could hardly have been
withstood for want of cartridges.2 The royal troops, however, were
in scarcely better case, and the ubiquitous American privateers
assisted Washington appreciably by intercepting Howe's storeships.
The critical situation at Quebec had been accentuated by the capture
of a brig carrying ordnance stores8 and the troops suffered severely
from the loss of a ship laden with warm clothing. For these losses
and for failing to prevent the importation of munitions from the
French West Indies Graves was generally blamed,4 but it was difficult
to suppress the privateers without troops to attack their bases,5 and
troops Howe did not feel able to provide. Moreover, the Admiralty's
failure to reinforce his squadron handicapped him severely, and was
the more serious error because the fishing and trading interests of the
colonies rendered them peculiarly susceptible to vigorous and syste-
matic naval action. Some people, indeed, including Lord Harrington,
the Secretary at War, were so impressed with this idea that they
would have relied mainly on naval pressure to reduce the colonists
to obedience, though an effective naval blockade would have re-
quired the assistance of troops not only against the harbours which
served the colonists as bases, but for the protection of the Navy's own
bases along the coast.
The winter thus passed away without material change at Boston,
but on 5 March 1776 the Americans secured a commanding position
by occupying Dorchester Neck. Bad weather prevented an im-
mediate counter-attack and allowed them to complete their en-
trenchments,6 so there was no alternative to evacuating the city forth-
with. This was the more difficult through shortage of tonnage7 and
the necessity for removing Loyalists, but it was accomplished without
molestation (17 March). Howe would have preferred to attack New
York at once, but shortage of supplies and the crowding of his trans-
ports forced him to make for Halifax, where his troops had to remain
from 2 April till 1 1 June, awaiting supplies8 and reinforcements. Of
the latter six battalions had been diverted, despite Howe's vigorous
protests,9 to North Carolina to co-operate with the local Loyalists,
1 Stopford-Sackville MSSt n, 13-16.
2 Stephenson, O. W., "Ammunition in 1776", Am. HJt. xxx.
3 Evelyn, W. G., Memoir and Letters, p. 74; Stopford-SachoUle MSS9 n, 20.
4 Ibid, n, 10; Hist. MSS Comm.9 Knox MSS, p. 121.
6 Howe to Dartmouth, 13 Dec. 1775, G.O. v, 93.
6 Stuart, pp. 76-80. 7 Howe, Narrative, p. 3.
8 Howe to Germain, 7 Mav, G.O. v, 93.
8 Howe to Dartmouth, 16 Jan., C.O. v, 93.
CHBEI
722 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
of whose assistance great hopes were held out by Martin, the former
governor.1 However, storms delayed the arrival of the transports
till long after the Loyalists had risen prematurely and been dispersed,
and when the commanders, General Clinton and Admiral Parker,
attacked Charleston (28 June), rather than come away without
attempting anything, the squadron was repulsed with considerable
loss, an unexpectedly unfordable creek preventing the troops from
co-operating. Ultimately (i August) the discomfited force joined
Howe at New York, where he would have had them concentrated
at the outset as the point of chief strategic importance.2
Howe had brought from Halifax 10,000 men. Finding Manhattan
Island strongly fortified and the enemy prepared to oppose his in-
tended landing on Long Island, he began by passing the Narrows
(2 July) and landed on Staten Island almost unopposed. But August
was well advanced before the arrival of the Hessians enabled him to
start his attack with 25,000 men. Washington had under 20,000 men,
the largest detachment being on Long Island, holding strong en-
trenchments at Brooklyn but in a precarious situation. With the
British squadron, now under Lord Howe, the general's brother, con-
trolling the navigable waters, its retreat was liable to be intercepted,
even if the narrowness of the East River forbade ships to remain at
anchor between the batteries on its banks.8
The attack began by the British landing on Long Island on 22
August. Five days later Howe attacked the wooded heights which
covered the approaches to the Brooklyn lines, his main body making
a wide turning movement round the American left, while his centre
and left attacked in front. The outflanking movement succeeded
completely and the Americans had some difficulty in regaining the
lines. Some of Howe's infantry indeed pressed the retreat so closely
that they were with difficulty called off from storming the lines.4
Howe's caution is easier to understand than to justify. Memories of
Bunker's Hill probably made him reluctant to try rushing American
entrenchments, but a prompt attack on defenders still disordered
by retreat might well have succeeded. Certainly Howe should never
have allowed Washington to withdraw his whole force across the
East River on the night of 29-30 August unmolested. Adverse and
unusual winds may account for the Navy's failure to profit by the
defencelessness of the troops when in transit, but nothing can extenuate
General Howe's lethargy, for, though warned of the move in time
to catch the rear-guard, he never stirred, and Washington's temerity
escaped the punishment it had merited.5
Brooklyn had cost the British under 400 casualties, the Americans
Corresp. of George IIL in, 266-7.
Howe to Germain, 24 April, G.O. v, 93.
Duncan, H., Journals, N.R.S. xx, 1 17 seqq.
Howe to Germain, 9 Sept., G.O. v, 93; Rutland MSS, HI, 6.
Adams, G. F., "The Battle of Long Island", Am. H.R. i.
HOWE CAPTURES NEW YORK 723
over 1000 besides 1 100 prisoners and thirty guns, but far more might
have been achieved. Howe's subsequent operations did little to re-
trieve the lost chance, although Washington offered him another
golden opportunity. New York, standing at the southern end of a
long and narrow island with navigable channels on both sides and
the narrowest egress to the north, was indefensible against troops who
might land anywhere, but again Washington held on dangerously
long. After a fortnight's delay Howe passed his troops across the
East River to Kipp's Bay, three miles above the city (15 September),
having distracted his opponents by naval demonstrations elsewhere.1
Covered by ships' guns the landing was successfully effected, the
defenders being completely surprised. To corner the 4000 men in
New York Howe had only to plant himself astride the narrow island,
but he waited for a second trip by his flotilla and thereby allowed
them to escape with the trifling loss of 400 men and the seventy guns
in the riverside batteries. Next day (16 September) a sharp action
between the British light troops and an American reconnoitring party
ended with the retreat of the Americans to their entrenchments on
Haarlem Heights. These Howe reconnoitred but found too strong
to be forced by a frontal attack, while water covered both their flanks.2
For the next three weeks he did nothing but fortify his position and
write despondently to Dartmouth's successor, Germain, of the im-
possibility of doing anything more that year, of the improbability
of Carleton approaching near enough to assist him, and of the large
reinforcements, especially of warships and extra sailors for manning
boats, needed for the next year's campaign. Then, however, he
apparently realised that by transferring his troops by water to the
country east of the Bronx River he could sever Washington's
communications with Connecticut and turn his position.
On 1 2 October the new move began, the troops passing through the
dangerous Hell Gate channel.8 Valuable time was wasted by landing
at a point from which no advance was possible, and when the troops
finally landed (18 October) at Pell's Point and advanced slowly
northward all surprise was gone : Washington had shifted his main body
to White Plains, where he entrenched a strong position to bar Howe's
progress. Still, the American troops were much spread out, for 3000
men were left to hold Fort Washington near King's Bridge and deny
the use of the Hudson to the British, and Howe could concentrate
superior numbers against the White Plains force. However, though
his despatches are full of the necessity for forcing on a decisive battle, he
was unaccountably unenterprising.4 Despite an initial success against
the American right (28 October) he failed to press his advantage,
and by waiting for reinforcements from New York let Washington
1 Duncan, H., Journals, N.R.S. xx, 127-9, *ko N.R.S. vi, 28-32.
2 Howe to Germain, 15 Sept., G.O. v, 93. 3 N.R.S. xx, 131.
4 Stuart, p. 88.
46-2
724 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
decamp into the hills farther north (i November). Howe did not
even try to engage his rear-guard, declaring that as the Americans
were plainly determined to avoid battle, pursuit was useless.1 Instead
he moved westward to the Hudson (6 November), thereby isolating
Fort Washington which he intended to attack in order to secure direct
communication with New York and open the navigation of the
Hudson. A naturally strong position had been well fortified, but its
retention risked the loss of die whole garrison, which succumbed on
1 6 November to a threefold attack from north, east and south, the
British casualties being under 500. A division under Cornwallis was
so promptly pushed across the Hudson to attack Fort Lee (just opposite
Fort Washington) that Greene only just extricated his garrison and
had to leave 100 guns behind (18 November), whereupon Corn-
wallis advanced rapidly through New Jersey, driving Washington
before him.
The Americans were now much discouraged by their inability to
withstand the British advance, desertion was thinning their ranks,
and Cornwallis encountered little serious resistance. At the Raritan
River the fatigue of his troops, who had outmarched their supplies,
compelled him to halt (i December). However, seeing the enemy's
plight Howe decided to push for Philadelphia, and Cornwallis, ad-
vancing again on 7 December, reached the Delaware at Trenton
next day to find once more that Washington had just escaped across
the river. Could Cornwallis have crossed, Philadelphia must have
fallen, but the river was unfordable, every boat within reach had
been removed, and the usual season for active operations was long
past. Accordingly, Howe decided (14 December) to take up winter
quarters. In selecting these he admittedly dispersed his troops unduly :
as he himself wrote,2 "the chain is rather too extensive, but I was
induced to occupy Burlington to cover the county of Monmouth in
which there are many loyal inhabitants". In this he was indicating
one of his chief difficulties: the Loyalists whom the ministry regarded
as an asset, more often needed protection. To enter a district pro-
mising protection to all who would take the oath of allegiance often
meant that, if military exigencies subsequently required its evacua-
tion, the unprotected Loyalists either abandoned the royal cause in
disgust or were subjected to a savage persecution which effectually
deterred others from adopting it.
Howe's neglect of military precautions was more culpable because
he had detached two British and two Hessian brigades to occupy
Rhode Island. Quite unwarrantable from the military standpoint,
this weakening of his main force could be justified on naval grounds:
Narragansett Bay was the best harbour on the coast, flanked the
route from Halifax to New York and provided the troublesome
1 Howe to Germain, 30 Nov., C.O. v, 93.
2 Howe to Germain, ao Dec., C,O, v, 94.
ARNOLD DELAYS CARLETON'S ADVANCE 725
American privateers with a splendid base. Moreover, Howe's scheme
for the next year included, besides the main advance up the Hudson
to meet Garleton, an attack on Boston by a column from Rhode
Island. When on 20 November he propounded this scheme to Ger-
main, he could congratulate himself on having secured his end of
the Hudson — Lake Ghamplain line. He was, however, far from
satisfied with Carleton's progress.
The force destined for Canada, eight British battalions with the
Brunswick and Hanau contingents, should have sailed in March
1 776 but did not start till 7 April, and May was well advanced before
the main body entered the St Lawrence. Directly the first reinforce-
ments reached Quebec (6 May), Carleton had taken the offensive1
and driven Arnold back to Sorel. Thither, when further reinforce-
ments arrived, he followed, winning a sharp action at Three Rivers
(8 June),2 and by the end of June Canada had been cleared of the
invaders. Burgoyne, now Carleton's second in command, suggested
that, if the governor had shown greater enterprise or given him a
freer hand, none of the Americans would have escaped, but, even as
it was, their discomfiture was complete and costly, and with it all
signs of disloyalty in Canada vanished. Unluckily for the British
Arnold himself had escaped and with characteristic energy had
started to construct a flotilla to dispute the command of Lake
Champlain, control of which was indispensable to any advance to
the Hudson. To combat this Carleton had to provide a similar force;
it was October before Arnold's control of the lake could be challenged,
and though his whole flotilla was then taken or destroyed he had
achieved his object and delayed the British advance. Carleton
reached Crown Point on 14 October, but instead of pushing on to
Ticonderoga, only fifteen miles away, he retraced his steps to
St John's. The administrative difficulties of pressing on so late in the
season were certainly serious, but the failure to take Ticonderoga8
prejudiced the prospects of the next campaign. Arnold's fight for
Lake Ghamplain, aptly described by Admiral Mahan as "the strife
of pygmies for the prize of a continent", had had far-reaching effects.
But for Arnold, Carleton should have reached Ticonderoga in July and
might have been pushing on towards Albany just as Howe's attack on
New York was taxing all Washington's energies, and so have been in
readiness to complete the isolation of New England early in 1777. As
it was, the prospect of the long delay before "the Northern Army"
could reach Albany contributed largely to Howe's changing his
original plan for 1777, which change led directly to Saratoga and
all its vital consequences. On 30 November Howe had still been
meaning to make the advance on Albany his main operation, leaving
a defensive force "to cover Jersey and keep the rebels' Southern Army
1 Dartmouth MSS9 1, 407.
* Corresp. of George III, in, 382-6. » Stopford-Sackville MSS, n, 44.
7*6 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
in check by giving a jealousy to Philadelphia".1 Three weeks later
he was contemplating converting this detachment into the principal
force to "act offensively against Philadelphia where the enemy's
chief strength will certainly be collected", leaving only 7000 men on
the Lower Hudson to cover New York and "facilitate in some degree
the approach of the army from Canada".2 This he did not expect to
reach Albany before September, and he clearly anticipated that by
attacking Pennsylvania he would so effectually divert the enemy
thither that Burgoyne would have little more than the natural
difficulties to encounter.8
Howe's optimistic hopes of finishing the war in another campaign
were to receive a sudden shock. The dispersion of the British canton-
ments inspired Washington to fall upon the left of Howe's line where
Donop's and Rail's Hessians were holding Bordentown and Trenton.
Ice had rendered the Delaware no longer a barrier, and on the night
of 25-26 December Washington crossed, calculating on catching the
Hessians off their guard. At Trenton he was completely successful:
Rail, though warned, had taken no precautions, and the Hessians'
outpost work and discipline were seriously at fault, for they were
completely surprised, and over 1000 men surrendered tamely, having
suffered barely fifty casualties, including Rail, whose negligence cost
him his life. About 300 men escaped to Bordentown, the attack on
which had miscarried, but Donop, instead of attempting to succour
Trenton, retired precipitately to Princeton.4
Cornwallis did his best to repair the mishap and hurried to
Trenton, arriving late on 2 January to find Washington very strongly
posted. As two of his brigades were not yet up, Cornwallis deferred
attacking till morning, and Washington, who had been rather rash in
lingering east of the Delaware, slipped away by night, marching wide
round Cornwallis's left and across his rear, and thrusting aside one of
the belated British brigades which he encountered near Princeton.
Cornwallis, hearing the firing, promptly marched to the sound of the
guns, but could not prevent Washington gaining the New Jersey
hills, into which Cornwallis could not follow him without unduly
exposing his troops to the very inclement weather. Indeed Howe now
drew back his troops behind the Raritan, abandoning most of New
Jersey. This withdrawal, though probably expedient, was politically
disastrous, as it meant abandoning the Jersey Loyalists to their
enemies, and Howe had to admit5 that the reverse at Trenton, which
had greatly encouraged the enemy, had had more serious results
than he had at first supposed: moreover, the rapidity with which
1 Howe to Germain, 30 Nov. 1776, C.O. v, 94.
1 Howe to Germain, 20 Dec. 1776, ibid.
8 Howe to Germain, 1 6 July 1777, ibid.
4 Heister to Germain, 5 Jan., G.O. v, 94; Stokford-Sackville MSS, n, 53, 55; Garreip. of
George III9 ra, 421.
6 Howe to Germain, 20 Jan. 1777, G.O. v, 94.
HOWE'S CHANGE OF PLAN 727
the Americans could move made it very difficult to force on
Washington the indispensable general action.
It was partly because he believed Washington would risk a pitched
battle for Philadelphia1 that Howe wished to make his main effort
against that city, but neither Philadelphia nor New York nor Boston
was of such vital importance economically or politically as to warrant
the colonists staking their all for its retention. An agricultural
population, scattered over a wide expanse with indifferent communi-
cations, was not to be touched by capturing cities, as the British were
to find in very similar circumstances in South Africa between 1900
and 1902. The problem before the British generals strikingly re-
sembles that which Napoleon's marshals faced in the Peninsula thirty
years later when to defeat Spanish regulars in pitched battles was
child's play, but the elusive and irrepressible guerrillas offered a
determined and effective opposition impervious to normal forms of
pressure. In America it was not the "continental" troops who were
the dangerous enemy, but the irregulars who swarmed round the
British encampments, impeding the collection of supplies and raiding
isolated posts. They scattered directly a push was made against them,
posed as peaceful farmers if the British occupied their district in
force, but took arms again whenever they moved on. As in Spain
between 1808 and 1813, a conquered district only remained quiescent
while effectively occupied, and the size of the colonies made their
effective occupation even more impracticable than that of Spain,
while the British commanders never disposed of a fifth of the French
force in the Peninsula.
A long pause followed Trenton. Howe endeavoured, not without
success, to increase his force by recruiting Loyalists, over a dozen corps
being raised. Minor operations were frequent and the British gained
many successes. In April, for example, Cornwallis surprised a post
at Boundsbrook, killing and taking 120 enemy with only seven
casualties,2 while Tryon, the ex-Governor of New York, despite
vigorous opposition, successfully raided an important depot at Dan-
bury.3 Still this minor warfare gave the Americans experience,
inured them to war and cost the British more than a pitched battle.4
But the main interest of the period lies in the despatches which were
passing between America and Whitehall. Howe's letter of 30 Novem-
ber reached Germain on 30 December, that of 20 December with
its all-important change of plan was twice as long in transit and only
arrived on 23 February.5 For the original plan Howe had demanded
35,000 men, exclusive of those in Canada, and to complete that
number he needed 15,000 reinforcements. Germain, while declaring
that he could provide barely half this number, apparently assumed
1 Howe's speech of 22 April 1 779; Parl. Hist, xx, 692.
2 Corresp. of George III, ra, 441.
» N.R.S. xx, 143; Howe to Germain, 22 May, G.O. v, 94.
4 Stuart, p. 102. 6 Stopford-Sackville MSS, n, 32.
728 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
that the balance could be found by recruiting Loyalists and then,
despite Howe's letter of 20 December, drew up a detailed plan for
the force from Canada which Burgoyne was to command. This
assumed definitely that Burgoyne's main object was to unite with
Howe, and the letter of 26 March, which communicated it to Carle-
ton, spoke definitely of Burgoyne's placing himself under Howe's
orders on reaching Albany. Yet three weeks earlier Germain had
written to Howe approving of the changes proposed in his letter of
20 December.1
The scheme for the advance from Canada was partly Burgoyne's.
He had returned to England on winter leave and had urged upon
Germain that the main body should move by Lake George or
Skenesborough to the Hudson while a small column advanced from
Oswego down the Mohawk River as a diversion. The plan looked
better on a small scale map than on the ground, where the practical
difficulties of traversing the almost trackless forests were more obvious
than at Whitehall. But Burgoyne had served in Canada, if Germain
had not, and he should have appreciated the obstacles better, even
if he may be excused for not realising how formidable the New Eng-
land militia would prove in their native woods. Still the physical
difficulties, though enormous, were not insuperable, and, had the
original plan been followed, the line of the Hudson might have been
secured. Howe cannot by pleading ignorance of Burgoyne's instruc-
tions avoid responsibility for leaving the force from Canada to
advance unsupported, for on 24 May he had received from Whitehall
a copy of Carleton's orders, though Germain would have neglected to
send it had not his subordinates taken steps to secure its despatch.2 At
that moment Howe had already decided to attack Philadelphia by
sea, but he was still at New York and could have changed his plans
and proceeded up the Hudson. He continued his preparations, how-
ever, unmoved, apparently absolving himself of responsibility by the
thought that he had already (5 April) written to acquaint Carleton
with his intentions and warn him that he could not do much to
assist Burgoyne, though he would "endeavour to have a corps on
the lower part of Hudson's River sufficient to open the communi-
cations by shipping through the Highlands . . . which corps may
afterwards act in favour of the Northern Army". Germain, replying
on 1 8 May3 to Howe's letter of 2 April, approved the proposed move
by sea, but added that he hoped whatever Howe "meditated against
Philadelphia" might be executed in time for him "to co-operate
with the army ordered to proceed from Canada", a suggestion which
betrays conclusively Germain's inability to grasp the bearing of
Howe's proposals and displays his limitations as a practical strategist.
Actually July came before Howe was off to Philadelphia. His
1 Stopford-Sackvill* MSS3 n, 50-60. • Knot MSS, p. 276,
* G.O. v, 94.
HOWE'S MOVE AGAINST PHILADELPHIA 729
start had been delayed by difficulties in providing transport and
by want of camp equipment which only arrived at the end of May.1
Before sailing he had advanced (12 June) towards Quibbletown,
hoping that Washington might fight, but the Americans would not
abandon their defensive, and Howe, thinking their position too strong
to attack, withdrew towards Amboy. The move lured Washington
from the security of his hills, and Howe, turning about, marched
rapidly back in hopes of a battle. He narrowly missed success: Gorn-
wallis routed Stirling's division, taking three guns, but Washington
managed to evade an outflanking movement and the great heat soon
forced Howe to abandon the pursuit, whereupon, withdrawing to
Staten Island, he started embarking (29 June).2 For all the enuncia-
tions of sound doctrine which fill his despatches he had again failed
to follow his own precepts and force on a general action, though by
obliging Washington to concentrate he had prevented him from
detaching troops to oppose Burgoyne or to impede a landing in
Pennsylvania.3 The claim that Washington had outmanoeuvred
Howe and prevented an overland march to Philadelphia is refuted
by the documentary evidence that Howe had notified Germain in
April that he would move by sea.
It was not till 25 August, however, that Howe disembarked at the
Head of Elk in Chesapeake Bay. He had left 9000 troops at New
York and 3000 at Rhode Island, and had 16,000 men with him.4
Foul winds had delayed the transports and then the naval officers
pronounced Delaware Bay, where Howe had intended landing, un-
suitable for disembarkation, whereupon the fleet spent nearly three
weeks working against unfavourable winds to make the Chesapeake.
All the advantage of surprise which an "amphibious" operation
should have given was thus lost: Washington, whom Howe's move-
ments had greatly puzzled, had ample time to reach Pennsylvania,
much relieved by the direction Howe had taken and confident in New
England's ability to cope with Burgoyne.
That general had some 7000 regulars, half British, half German,
but his hopes of substantial support from the Canadians had been
disappointed, for barely 250 presented themselves. He had also the
questionable advantage of the assistance of a large Indian contingent.
He had himself written characteristically of "desiring to keep up
their terror and avoid their cruelties9',5 and it is doubtful whether
either side ever derived the least benefit from their services. In a
pitched battle they were useless, in partisan warfare they met their
match in the backwoodsmen, while the atrocities they could not be
prevented from perpetrating inflamed feeling and provoked retaliation.
1 Howe to Germain, 3 June, G.O. v, 94; Cornsp. of George III, ra, 451.
8 Howe to Germain, 5 July, G.O. v, 94.
3 Knox MSS, p. 132; Correip. of George HI, m, 462.
* "States" given in C.O. v, 94.
5 Burgoyne to Howe, 6 Aug. 1777, G.O. v, 94.
730 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Burgoyne's appointment was a virtual censure on Garleton. If
criticisms of Carleton's want of enterprise had not been confined
to Germain and his friends,1 personal hostility of old-standing
undoubtedly made the Secretary of State exaggerate Carleton's cul-
pability for the disappointing results achieved in 1776 and make it
an excuse for giving him instructions almost insultingly precise and
detailed.2 He was left with under 4000 men and confined to the task
of supporting Burgoyne. This duty, however, he performed with such
energy and zeal8 that Burgoyne could start operations on 20 June
and reach Ticonderoga ten days later. That place had been strongly
garrisoned, but Phillips, one of Burgoyne's brigadiers, detected a
weak spot in the position and by planting guns on it he rendered the
place untenable. On 6 July the garrison evacuated it, but retiring
hastily on Castleton were overtaken and routed by Burgoyne's
advance guard in a sharp-fought action at Hubbardtown (7 July),
while the British flotilla caught up and destroyed the boats in which
they were trying to remove their stores. By 10 July Burgoyne's main
body had reached Skenesborough, little over twenty miles from the
Hudson. On the map success seemed almost assured : Germain wrote
exultantly of " Burgoyne's rapid progress" and "the fair prospect of
an earlier junction": in practice these twenty miles were miles of
trackless forest, intersected by numerous watercourses which needed
bridging before Burgoyne's boats and heavy guns could be got
forward, and it took three weeks' incessant toil to reach the Hudson
at Fort Edward (30 July), forty miles above Albany.4
In face of such difficulties this was no mean achievement, but
before Burgoyne could push on he must collect adequate supplies,
and an attempt to raid an American depot at Bennington, twenty
miles south-east of Saratoga, ended in disaster (16 August), attributed
by many to the employment on this errand of Germans, whose equip-
ment and training were ill-suited to forest warfare. Shortly after-
wards news came in of the failure of St Leger's diversion in the
Mohawk Valley, mainly due to the misconduct of the Indians who
provided half his force. Burgoyne could now appreciate the diffi-
culties of his task more accurately than when in Germain's optimistic
company, and, as he declared later, had his orders been less precise,
he would not have ventured on a forward movement and might even
have retired. However, feeling convinced that his orders, "both in
the letter and spirit", left him "no latitude", and that his corps was
"intended to be hazarded for the purpose of forcing a junction or at
least of making a powerful diversion" in Howe's favour by making
Washington detach troops,5 he advanced on 19 September against
1 Corresp. of George III, ra, 403, 406.
2 Knox MSS9 p. 132; George Ill's Letters to ford North (cd. Donne), n, 45.
3 StopJord-Sackwlle MSS, n, 1 10; Anbury, Travels in N. America, I, 30.
4 Stedman, G., History of the American War, i, 353.
6 Royal Institution MSS, i, 140.
BURGOYNE IN DIFFICULTIES 731
the well-entrenched American position at Stillwater, ten miles south
of Saratoga.
Burgoyne had little over 5000 effectives while his opponent Gates,
who had recently secured the command by intrigue rather than
merit, had nearer 14,000, for as Burgoyne advanced, the New
England militia hastened to turn out to oppose him, and the militia
of the Green Mountain and the "Hampshire Grants" (which later
became Vermont) were "as good as any of their troops".1 More-
over, in Arnold, Gates had a subordinate far abler than himself, but
for whose leadership and tactical skill Burgoyne's attack might have
turned his position. Thus, although the gallantry and devotion of
Burgoyne's British battalions, who bore the brant of the fighting, left
them in possession of the stubbornly-defended Bemis Heights, it was
a Pyrrhic victory and increased Burgoyne's difficulties by saddling
him with wounded.2 The Americans could far better afford their
1200 casualties than Burgoyne his 400,3 and he could only entrench
himself on Bemis Heights and hold on. Germain's comment was
"the best wish I can form is that he may have returned to Ticon-
deroga. What alarms me is that he thinks that his orders to go to
Albany to force a junction with Sir W. Howe are so positive that he
must attempt it at all costs".4 Burgoyne had certainly notified
Germain that he knew of Howe's departure for Philadelphia,6 but
apparently he was nevertheless relying unduly on Howe's guarded
promise of 5 April to try to have a corps on the Lower Hudson which
"might act in favour of the Northern Army". But Howe had left
Clinton too weak to respond effectively to Burgoyne's urgent appeals,
though directly the arrival of drafts from England (at the end of
September) let him he collected 3000 men to attack Forts Clinton
and Montgomery which commanded the passage of the Hudson. The
attack was well conducted and highly successful (7 October) ; both
forts were taken, the American flotilla was destroyed, their casualties
came to over 400, and the British ships ascended the Hudson to
Esopus, sixty miles below Albany, where more batteries were
stormed and more shipping and stores destroyed.6
These operations were too late and on too small a scale for Bur-
goyne's needs. On 9 October Clinton received a message stating that
Burgoyne could retain his position till the middle of October if certain
of being in touch with Clinton by then: otherwise he must retire
before the ice set in. Even at this last Burgoyne was too optimistic.
As Clinton's men were storming Fort Montgomery, Burgoyne's were
moving out in the forlorn hope of extricating themselves by dis-
lodging Gates. The odds against them were stupendous ; they were
forced back to their entrenchments and after desperate fighting had
1 Royal Institution MSS, i, 143. 2 Howe to Germain, 31 Oct., G.O. v, 94.
3 Burgoyne to Clinton, 27 Sept. ibid.
* Knox MSS, p. 140. 6 Ibid.
c Clinton to Howe, 9 Oct., C.O. v, 94; and his letters in Rockingham Memoirs, n, 334 seqq.
734 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
been highly praised,1 but the lack of co-ordination between Knyp-
hausen's appearance and that of Cornwallis was the main reason
for the incompleteness of the victory.
Brandywine was followed by a move to the left which perplexed
Washington greatly2 and resulted in the British crossing the Schuylkill
near Valley Forge on 22 September, whereupon Washington, not
prepared to risk destruction for Philadelphia, retired into the hills
farther north, leaving the British to occupy the town (26 September).
Their immediate need was to re-open direct communications with
the fleet by capturing the forts which covered the obstacles to the
navigation of the Delaware. The next week saw this begun and the
American flotilla driven off up river; but Washington, recently re-
inforced by 1500 men from the Hudson and 1000 from Virginia,
ventured a night attack on Howe's main body at Germantown, now
reduced by various detachments to about 8000 men. His plan, which
involved the co-operation of four converging columns, was too
elaborate for the training, discipline and organisation of his men; a
thick fog, which developed soon after sunrise on 4 October, added
complications, and finally Sullivan's column in the right centre over-
lapped the left centre column, which fired into it from behind. The
British outposts offered a stubborn resistance, especially at a stone
house just north of the village where six companies held up nearly
3000 Americans, and the delay they imposed allowed the main body
to prepare its counter-stroke. This was delivered with complete
success, the American right being routed, whereupon the left, which
had gained some initial advantage, retired also, only just in time to
evade pursuit by Cornwallis, who arrived from Philadelphia with
reinforcements. Washington's venturesomeness had cost over 1000
men, including 450 prisoners, but his readiness to take the offensive
again did something to cancel the effects of the defeat at Brandywine
and made no small impression on Howe. There seems little substance,
however, in Washington's complaint that the Americans had re-
treated at the moment of victory: had they stood their ground much
longer, Howe might have been presented with his decisive battle.
He had had 550 casualties — more, relatively to the forces engaged,
than at Brandywine— but his troops had fully retained their ascend-
ancy in battle.
After Germantown Howe resumed his operations for opening the
Delaware. A Hessian attempt on Red Bank (22 October) was re-
pulsed with heavy loss, but a fresh attack in which ships co-operated3
captured Mud Island (16 November), whereupon Cornwallis crossed
the Delaware and cleared Red Bank. On this the Americans dis-
mantled and burned their shipping and abandoned further opposition.
Howe had established himself solidly in Pennsylvania, but he had
soon to realise that Burgoyne's disaster had neutralised his own
1 Fortescue, m, 216. * Washington, Works, v, 69. 3 N.R.S. xx, 154.
THE EFFECTS OF SARATOGA 735
success. He had already written on 30 August1 that he must have
more troops : in the previous year he had had enough because he had
then no conquests to guard — a telling criticism of his own recent
proceedings — but as things stood, he could not hope to conclude the
war with his present force: on 23 October2 his demand became one
for 10,000 additional men besides drafts. If operations were to be ex-
tended to the southern colonies, as Germain, trusting blindly as usual
to over-confident Loyalist refugees, had already suggested,8 15,000
men would be needed besides garrisons for New York, Rhode Island
and Philadelphia. He concluded by requesting his relief in view of
the "little attention given to his recommendations". Germain, who
received this letter early in December, replied (11 December) that
no answer was possible till Howe's own campaign was finished and
particulars of Burgoyne's fate had arrived, but that enough was
already known to show the need for material alterations in the plan
of campaign.
This necessity did not really arise out of the military situation in
America. Saratoga had been but a negative success and might have
been retrieved had the general situation remained unchanged. It
had merely foiled Burgoyne's attempt to secure the Hudson line; it
was not followed, or likely to be, by an attack on Canada or New
York, and though Gates reinforced Washington with 4000 men, their
arrival only emboldened him to advance to Whitemarsh, fourteen
miles from Philadelphia; he did not venture another German-
town, nor could Howe draw him into fighting. Howe moved out to
Whitemarsh (4 December), captured some advanced posts, repulsed
a reconnaissance in force, sought for a weak spot to attack, and, finding
none, withdrew to Philadelphia, letting Washington establish himself
at Valley Forge in quarters far less comfortable than Howe's but
which allowed him to restrict considerably the area from which the
British could draw supplies and forage.
Outside America, however, Saratoga had decided the doubts of
France and brought her into the war. This was hardly unexpected;
as far back as 14 August Germain had warned Howe that France and
Spain would probably be drawn in "if this rebellion continues much
longer". North's ministry is therefore doubly culpable that when
France signed the treaty acknowledging American independence
(6 February 1778) the British Navy was found unready for war
against its old enemy. Sandwich cannot plead absence of warning or
escape the main responsibility for the administrative shortcomings
which largely explain the British fleet's failure to repeat its successes
of the Seven Years' War and to keep the ring as clear for the army's
operations overseas as when Anson inspired the Admiralty. The
abandonment of the strategy of Anson and Hawke was at the bottom
of naval failures on the American coast and in the West Indies, but
1 G.O. v, 94. * Ibid. 3 Germain to Howe, 3 Sept. ibid.
736 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
the chaos in the dockyards and administrative services was mainly
responsible for the Navy's inability to keep the French cooped up in
their home ports.
Till 1778 the Navy's part, though essential, had been secondary.
After Lord Howe replaced Graves and a more adequate squadron
was detailed for the work, the naval situation in America had im-
proved appreciably. The privateers, though still troublesome, had
been checked, and much damage inflicted on American commerce:
one frigate alone, the Orpheus, captured thirty-three American priva-
teers or merchantmen in two months between Rhode Island and the
Bay of Fundy.1 The fleet had kept open the army's communications
and had carried General Howe wherever he wished to go: if he had
failed to reap full advantage of the mobility with which his troops
were thus invested, Admiral Howe was blameless. Now the case was
altered. Choiseul and Maurepas had made the French Navy of 1778
far more formidable than in the Seven Years' War.2 It was certainly
imbued with dubious strategical and tactical doctrines, but, if its
improvement must not be exaggerated, in training, administration
and numbers it had never so nearly equalled the British, and it was
in the happy position of having much less to guard, much more to
attack. The Navy's ability to secure freedom of transit might at any
moment be challenged by the appearance in American waters of a
squadron equal or even superior to that on which the army's mobility
depended.
The despatches clearly reflect the altered situation. On 30 Novem-
ber 1777 Howe emphasised3 the vital need for large reinforcements:
to find an offensive corps for 1778 he must evacuate either New York
or Philadelphia or Rhode Island, though he could preserve all three
by remaining on the defensive if a substantial reinforcement could
not be produced till 1779. There was more prospect of such a re-
inforcement as the news of Saratoga had roused patriotic feeling in
England: ordinary recruiting had greatly improved, and new regi-
ments were being raised by public subscription, Liverpool, Manches-
ter, Edinburgh and Glasgow and several leading noblemen under-
taking the task.4 North's ministry also resolved to attempt again
reconciliation and appointed commissioners to proceed to America
for that purpose, but Germain specially warned Clinton, who had
been selected to replace Howe (February 1778), not to relax military
precautions on that account. He held out hopes of large reinforce-
ments, but the war was now to be prosecuted on different lines. After
securing the places in his possession Clinton was to confine himself
to systematic coastal attacks on New England, to be followed by
1 Rear-Admiral James's Journal, N.R.S. vi, 42 seqq.
* Lacour-Gayet, La Marine Militaxre sous Ijotds XVI; Chevalier, Histoire de la Marine
Franfaise, bk i. 3 C.O. v, 95.
4 George Hi's Letters (ed. Donne), n, 98 seqq.; Corresp. of George III, ni, 51 1 seqq. and
iv, 1-35-
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO CLINTON 737
operations against the southern colonies. 1 A fortnight later Germain's
tone was greatly changed;2 the French treaty had altered the situa-
tion, the recruits destined for North America must be diverted else-
where and only three battalions could be spared from the United
Kingdom. Offensive operations in North America must be aban-
doned and after providing 3000 men to defend Florida, Clinton was
to despatch 5000 more to attack St Lucia, strategically about the
most important of the French West Indies. These reductions would
entail evacuating Philadelphia, and Clinton was to proceed forthwith
to New York, there to "await the issue of the treaty which we have
authorised our commissioners to propose". Should the negotiations
fail Clinton was at liberty to evacuate New York for Rhode Island
and to secure that post and Halifax, sending any surplus troops to
Canada, where Haldimand was replacing Carleton.
These official "instructions" differ somewhat from Germain's
private covering letter,3 which contemplates retaining New York as
the base for coastal expeditions against New England, of which the
instructions say nothing. The main upshot, however, is clear. Clinton
was thrown back on the defensive, and any serious offensive would be
directed against the French West Indies, indispensable to them as
bases for carrying on the naval war. Since the King would not hear
of frankly admitting American independence, even to concentrate
against France, there was no better alternative. Provided that Sand-
wich's administration enabled the Navy to maintain local maritime
superiority by preventing the French fleets quitting their ports un-
observed and unfought, Canada, Rhode Island and New York need
not fear the unassisted efforts of the Americans. Moreover, coastal
expeditions against New England, if inglorious, were more likely to
prove effective than capturing cities for which the Americans would
not risk a decisive battle. In their farms and shipping they were
vulnerable, and in advocating the extension of operations to the south,
because its resources and trade were the financial mainstay of the
rebellion, Germain was using an argument to which the peculiar
circumstances lent some support.4
It was a severe winter; indeed the hardships endured at Valley
Forge have become proverbial and Washington did wonders in
keeping any army together. Howe has been severely criticised for
leaving his enemy unmolested.6 Had he known the plight to which
Washington was reduced, he might well have risked an attack.
Wellington's mid-winter pounce upon Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812 was
accomplished despite very similar difficulties, but Howe lacked
Wellington's readiness to run big risks for a big prize and fell far
1 Germain to Clinton, 8 March 1 777, G.O. v, 95 ; George IIPs Letters (ed. Donne), n, 148.
2 Germain to Clinton, 21 March, ibid.
» Stopford-SackmlU MSS, n, 132. .
* Hist. MSS Comm., Castle Howard MSS, p. 393; Amherst's letter m Corresp. of George
///, rv, 249. * Ibid, rv, 345.
CHBEI 47
738 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
short of him as an organiser, while the practical difficulties of supply
and transport involved in moving out in winter to Valley Forge and
provisioning and sheltering the troops during the reduction of a
naturally strong and well-entrenched position must not be over-
looked. His inactivity would be easier to defend had he taken the
field directly the weather permitted. But his failure to do this1 and his
notorious neglect of discipline suggest that he merely let things slide,
Clinton, who relieved Howe on n May, was hardly the man to
redeem the situation. Not without capacity, though a better critic
than leader, he was querulous, lacked decision and never inspired
confidence in officers or men.a The immediate problem, complicated
by the presence, as at Boston, of many Loyalists who could not be
abandoned to their fellow-countrymen's tender mercies, was the
evacuation of Philadelphia. Howe's inaction had allowed Washing-
ton, admirably assisted by a competent German officer, Steuben, to
make great strides towards disciplining and improving his army, and
with the spring its numbers also had increased enormously. But
Washington had adhered rigidly to the defensive, though minor
activities, mainly collisions between parties who were collecting
supplies or raids on outposts and depots, had been frequent. He was
likely to be offered a chance of taking his enemy at a disadvantage,
as Clinton had decided to return to New York by land and would
be encumbered by a great accumulation of baggage, "in which",
he wrote, "I was vulnerable". The fleet was "so much dispersed
upon other necessary services " that Lord Howe could not say when
an escort could he collected, and anyhow there were not enough
transports for all the troops and the Loyalists.8 Moreover, if winds
were unfavourable, the move by sea might take many weeks, and
with the British main body immobilised while in transit, New York,
which was none too strongly held, would be exposed to Washington.
Whereas the march across the Jerseys should not take over ten days
and would meanwhile protect New York.4
Clinton, having embarked the Loyalists and all the stores he could,
left Philadelphia on 1 8 June, and advanced steadily despite occasional
opposition, making for Amboy. At Allen's Town he learned that
Washington was over the Delaware and moving towards him while
Gates would probably dispute the passage of the Raritan. Clinton
accordingly swerved aside towards Sandy Hook, sending Knyphausen
ahead with four brigades to escort his twelve miles of baggage. After
allowing Knyphausen a good start Clinton had just reached Mon-
mouth Court House when the American advanced guard under Lee
appeared and opened artillery fire (27 June) . Clinton promptly faced
about and attacked vigorously, quickly driving Lee's men in some
1 Corresp. of George III, iv, 352.
8 Stuart, passim; Biddulph/' Letters 1779- i-]Z$",Am. H.R. xxix; Corresp. of George IIL
iv> 367- » Castle Howard MSS, p. 380.
4 Clinton to Germain, 23 May and 5 June, G.O. v, 96; Castle Howard MSS, pp. 379-83.
LORD HOWE THWARTS D'ESTAING 739
disorder from two successive positions. Reinforcements from their main
body enabled them to rally on rising ground behind a marsh and as his
troops were exhausted by the great heat— more men died from heat-
stroke than from wounds — Clinton decided not to press the attack.
Accordingly he drew back to the first position captured, where he
maintained himself with little difficulty till 10 p.m. when he marched
off by moonlight unmolested to rejoin Knyphausen, who had made
practically unimpeded progress.1 Both sides returned about 350
casualties, the British losses including sixty deaths from heat-stroke,
but Clinton, who had achieved his object and secured his retreat to
Sandy Hook, had better reason for satisfaction than Washington,
who had missed a promising chance. Washington was furious with
Lee, accusing him of cowardice and incompetence, but Lee had at
least detained Clinton and given the American main body time to
get into action.
Clinton reached New York only just in time. That very day
(8 July) thirteen ships of the line from Toulon under d'Estaing had
arrived in the Delaware. The British Government had had warnings
of the preparations in time to have intercepted d'Estaing at Gibral-
tar,2 but though in March Sandwich had alleged that thirty-five of
the line were ready, not even twelve could be got to sea in time, even
by stripping the others,8 and on 18 May d'Estaing passed the Straits
unhindered. Delayed by the bad sailing of his ships and the need for
practising manoeuvres,4 he spent another seven weeks crossing the
Atlantic, and Howe had cleared the Delaware with ten days to spare.
D'Estaing followed promptly to Sandy Hook, arriving on 22 July.
He was greatly superior to Howe, whose squadron, being intended
for service in the shallow coastal waters, contained nothing larger
than sixty-four-gun ships.5 "On our side all was at stake", wrote one
Englishman. "Had the men-of-war been defeated, the transports
and victuallers must have been destroyed and the Army of course
must have fallen with us." Had d'Estaing dared to risk the difficulties
of the navigation, he might have anticipated by three years what
de Grasse achieved at Yorktown.6 But though personally brave,
d'Estaing lacked enterprise and resolution, and Howe's masterly
dispositions increased the risks of an attack. The tradition in the
French Navy discouraged risking ships and incurring losses to gain
a decision, and d'Estaing sheered off to Rhode Island where 6000 men
under Pigot were facing 10,000 Americans under Sullivan. Pigot
had delayed Sullivan's preparations by several successful raids,7 but
could not prevent d'Estaing from passing into the Bay to support the
1 Clinton to Germain, 5 July, G.O. v, 96.
2 Corresp. of George ///, m, 380 seqq. and iv, 90, 113.
wc.»j/. v, George JM.I, m, gou scqu. ami iv, yu, 113.
8 N.R.S. xxxn, p. xxvii; George Ill's Letters (ed. Donne), n, 173, 176; ParL Hist. XK,
ii 53 seqq. 4 JLacour-Gayet, pp. 149 seqq. 5 Castle Howard MSS, pp. 383 seqq.
c Castex, Les Idles Militaires de la Marine Franfaise au XVIIIme Siecle, p. 238.
7 Pigot to Clinton, 27 May, C.O. v, 96.
47-2
740 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
attack (8 August). Realising that Rhode Island would make^the
French a splendid base, Howe, though still weaker than d'Estaing,
despite reinforcements, hastened to Pigot's help. His appearance
brought the French out of the Bay at once (10 August). By clever
manoeuvres he avoided an unequal action but lured d'Estaing out to
sea, hoping to catch him between himself and Byron's squadron, then
daily expected from England.
On ii August, however, a gale scattered both fleets, dismasting
several vessels and preventing a battle.1 Howe returned to Sandy
Hook for repairs; d'Estaing, whose crippled flagship narrowly escaped
capture by a British "fifty", regained Newport (19 August), but only
to inform Sullivan, who had meanwhile begun siege operations
against Pigot's lines, that he must retire to Boston to refit. His
departure (22 August) compelled Sullivan to quit the island, not
without some difficulty in keeping off Pigot's pursuit (29 August),2
and two days later Howe arrived, bringing Clinton and 5000 men.
Having missed catching Sullivan, Clinton raided the noted privateer
rendezvous of Bedford successfully, destroying sixteen ships, while
Howe followed d'Estaing to Boston. A fortnight later Byron re-
inforced the blockading squadron: notorious for his bad luck as
"Foul weather Jack5*, Byron must have caught d'Estaing off New-
port had not the gale of n August dispersed his fleet, and in
November another gale drove him away from Boston.8 This allowed
d'Estaing to leave for the West Indies, for which 5000 British troops
under Grant sailed the same day (4 November) escorted by a
squadron under Commodore Hotham.
D'Estaing left his allies disappointed and furious. The honours
certainly were with Howe, whose achievement in foiling every move
of d'Estaing's much superior force is "unsurpassed in the annals of
naval defensive warfare".4 The credit is wholly his, for the Admiralty
had neither reinforced him adequately nor penned the French up in
their home ports. Mainly through administrative shortcomings6
Byron's start had been delayed till 9 June, while the Channel Fleet,
which Keppel took to sea on 12 June, only mustered twenty of the
line and had to put back for reinforcements on discovering that
d'Orvilliers at Brest had nearer thirty. D'Orvilliers, therefore, got to
sea unwatched (8 July), but was still within 100 miles of Ushant when
Keppel, making for the "Western Squadron's" traditional cruising
grounds, sighted him (23 July). Several days of clever fencing ended
with an encounter (27 July) in which the fleets passed on opposite
tacks, the French to windward. Much damage was done: the British
firing at the hulls inflicted heavy casualties,6 the French firing at
Hist. MSS Comm., Cornwallis MSS, p. 317.
Kgot to Clinton, 31 Aug., G.O. v, 96.
Castle Howard MS$9 p. 388.
Mahan, in Clowes, W. L., History of the British Nay, m, 41 1 ; Cornwallis MSS, p. 317.
Corresp. of George III, iv, 130 seqq. « Ibid. TV, 206.
KEPPEL'S ACTION OFF USHANT 741
the masts crippled their enemy's power of movement. After passing
cTOrvilliers wore, hoping to cut off some disabled British ships, but
thereby surrendered the weather gage to Keppel who interposed to
cover his cripples and would have closed with the French had not his
rear division under Palliser failed to support him. D'Orvilliers, how-
ever, made no attempt to renew the action, drawing off in the night
and regaining Brest, rather pleased to have fought the old enemy and
escaped a Quiberon. Keppel raged against Palliser's backwardness
which had spoilt his chance of a victory, and a court martial followed.1
This, to the general surprise, resulted in Palliser's acquittal,2 for if
Palliser justified himself by alleging that Keppel's orders were in-
consistent with the necessity for keeping "the line", personal and
party rancour evidently had their share in his inactivity. But Ushant,
if usually reckoned "indecisive", was negatively important for the
British failure to establish naval supremacy. Six of d'Orvilliers' ships
were with de Grasse off Yorktown. Had Sandwich and Palliser
allowed Keppel to make Ushant a victory, would the war have lasted
till September 1781?
Both fleets were at sea again within a month but did not meet,8
and with the winter the chief centre of activity shifted to the West
Indies. That archipelago's great economic importance made the
mastery of its waters a vital issue, and while the Americans were
determined not to let the French recover Canada, their treaty
stipulated that France might acquire any of the British West Indies.
France had begun well by capturing the weakly-garrisoned Dominica
(September 1778), Barrington and the small British squadron on the
station being expressly tied down to the defence of Barbados. It was
not because Barrington lacked enterprise that Dominica had gone :
directly Grant and Hotham arrived from New York (10 December)
he dashed at St Lucia and landed the troops who stormed the hills
which overlook the main anchorages (12 December). It was a risky
stroke, for d'Estaing, who had reached Martinique on 9 December,
promptly hastened to St Lucia but found Barrington's seven battle-
ships so skilfully posted across the harbour mouth that after what
Grant called a "flimsy" attack he bore off.4 Then, landing his 9000
troops, he hurled them at Grant's positions covering the harbours
(18 December). Success would have involved Barrington's capture,
but Grant's troops triumphantly repulsed the assault, inflicting 1600
casualties to their own 170. D'Estaing thereupon retired discomfited
to Martinique leaving St Lucia in British keeping. Its capture was a
model of naval and military co-operation and had considerable value,
as from St Lucia the British could "look into the harbour of
Martinique",5 the French naval headquarters.
1 Ibid, iv, 22 f, scqq.
* Hist. MSS Comm., Pembroke MSSy p. 382.
3 Castle Howard MSS, pp. 370-1.
4 Grant to Germain, G.O. v, 318. 6 Ibid.
742 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
ifr brilliant stroke was not, however, followed up. The French
islands were more strongly garrisoned than Germain's information
showed and the naval superiority so indispensable to further activities
against them was less well assured than Grant had been told to cal-
culate. Byron reached St Lucia on 6 January 1 779 with ten of the
line, but d'Estaing avoided action till reinforced (19 February) by
an equal number, while two smaller detachments arrived later, one
in April, one in June. Byron's failure to intercept them was severely
criticised,1 but the calls on his squadron were heavy, and he was
greatly handicapped by lack of men through sickness. He is described2
as having "met with every neglect from home", having "a fleet to
equip without stores, to victual without provisions, to man without
men": indeed, he had to seek Grant's help in manning his ships.8
Grant had been obdurate in refusing demands to detach battalions
to different islands, feeling convinced that the true policy was to
concentrate his troops at St Lucia in readiness to strike: he wrote to
Governor Burt of St Christopher, "while we remain together we are
formidable to our neighbours, but, once divided, we should be weak
in every part". Byron's request was another thing: "assisting the
fleet", he wrote to Germain (10 October), "was the most effectual
method I could think of for protecting the islands".
In June Byron had to escort to St Christopher a great homeward-
bound convoy which he could not detain longer, "both for the sake of
public credit "and to avoid complaints from the merchants.4 D'Estaing
took the opportunity to capture St Vincent (i 8 June) and then on
2 July appeared off Georgetown, Grenada, with twenty-five of the
line and 6000 troops, forcing the little garrison to capitulate just
before Byron could arrive (6 July). Byron had only twenty-one of
the line, but, seeing the French clustered together in the harbour he
promptly attacked, hoping to catch them while still disordered. The
French stood out to sea, forming line as they went, and Byron's
attack, delivered precipitately and piece-meal, resulted in his leading
ships engaging d'Estaing's whole fleet unsupported, so that four of
them were crippled and might have been cut off. However, several
ships had been beaten out of d'Estaing's line by the British gunnery
and instead of pressing his advantage he stood away to rejoin them,
breaking off the fight. He had 950 casualties to Byron's 550 but had
secured his captures. Further operations were impossible as the
"hurricane season" was approaching, indeed d'Estaing was pre-
paring to sail for France when an urgent appeal reached him from
America.
D'Estaing's departure from the American coast had left the
British free to move anywhere along it, and, besides sending Grant to
St Lucia, Clinton had despatched 3500 men under Colonel Archibald
1 N.R.S. xxxn, 47. * Pembroke MSS, p. 384.
8 C.O. v, 318. * Ibid.
THE CAPTURE AND DEFENCE OF SAVANNAH 743
Campbell to Georgia where, as usual, Germain expected wonders from
Loyalist assistance. Since the failure against Charleston in 1776 the
only fighting in the south had been a desultory warfare along the
borders of East Florida, where the British cause was being successfully
maintained by Colonel Prevost. Germain had originally ordered
Campbell's force to the south because he feared for Florida in the
likely event of Spanish intervention, but if detachments must be
made, it was better to use them offensively than to lock them up in
a passive defence. Campbell, a capable and enterprising officer, got
quickly to work. Without waiting for Prevost he promptly attacked
and took Savannah (29 December), capturing 500 of the defenders
and inflicting heavy losses with under thirty casualties, while on
Preyost's arrival with noo men all Georgia was soon reduced to
subjection.1 Lincoln with 6000 men attempted its recovery but
was repulsed, being cleverly beaten at Briar's Creek (3 March).
Prevost countered a second advance by a daring move against
Charleston (May) which brought Lincoln back post haste, though
Prevost evaded him and inflicted a sharp reverse on him at Stono
Ferry (20 June).
Prevost's success and his own fears for South Carolina drove
Washington to appeal to d'Estaing, who reached the coast early in
September bringing with him 6000 troops. With these and Lincoln's
men he proceeded to attack Savannah. His superiority to the British
squadron in American waters rendered Clinton impotent to help, but
Prevost and his garrison defended themselves splendidly, finally
repulsing a vigorous assault so decisively (9 October) that d'Estaing
raised the siege and, detaching ten of the line to the West Indies,
returned home. Suffren said, " Had he only been as good a sailor as he
was brave ! "2 but it was lack of resolution and enterprise rather than
of seamanship which made his campaign so ineffective.
In another quarter the same hesitation and reluctance to run risks
had been even more conspicuous. In June 1779 Spain had definitely
ranged herself against England, and her intervention decidedly in-
creased the strain on the already well-burdened British Navy, for the
Spanish Navy, though inferior to the French in organisation and
efficiency, was formidable in numbers, mustering sixty sail of the line.
Gibraltar and Minorca, for whose recovery Spain had mainly
entered the war, were sure to be attacked, and their defence would
ultimately depend on the Navy's ability to maintain communications
with them. Moreover, with most of the British army already overseas,
the incentive to attempt an invasion of Great Britain was stronger than
usual. In the summer of 1779 there were at home, including eight
in Ireland, only twenty-one old battalions of the line, many of them
recently back as skeletons from foreign service and still ineffective.
1 Campbell to Carlisle, Castle Howard MSS, p. 413.
8 Lacour-Gayet, p. 129.
744 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
The Guards, however, who had found two provisional battalions for
service in America, provided a solid body of infantry, and only two
of the twenty-seven cavalry regiments were overseas, while the twenty
battalions whose formation had been authorised after Saratoga could
now be reckoned effective, and most of the militia had been embodied
in 1778 and had been some months under arms. Germain indeed
informed Clinton that home defence had never been "so well pro-
vided for5',1 but the fear of invasion had already caused the detention
at home of most of the reinforcements Clinton was expecting and
thereby kept him inactive in the summer of 1 779.
Warding off invasion was primarily a naval problem. Could the
French and Spanish fleets be prevented from uniting, the French
would hardly risk in the Channel the 50,000 troops who had been
collected between Havre and St Malo, especially as a British squadron
was cruising off Cherbourg and Havre and greatly impeding coast-
wise traffic.2 To prevent the junction the Channel fleet must be at
sea early in the year and off Brest before the Brest fleet could get out.
The situation called clearly for the maintenance, during the summer
at least, of Hawke's "close blockade59 of Brest, for the objection that
by keeping the enemy in port this system reduced the chances of
victory in battle did not apply when to prevent his putting to sea was
the chief need. But Sandwich's administration was unequal to getting
the Channel fleet to sea in time, and, to make things worse, the
Keppel-Palliser controversy had so accentuated party feeling that
no prominent admiral would take command. Ultimately the veteran
Sir Charles Hardy was persuaded, but he was quite unequal to the
task:8 Kempenfelt, his flag-captain, described him as one "who
never thinks beforehand55 and who had in him "not one grain of the
commander-in-chief ". Fortunately for England Hardy had Kempen-
felt to assist him and confronted septuagenarians in d'Orvilliers and
Cordova.
Hardy with thirty-five of the line left Spithead on 16 June, a
fortnight after d'Orvilliers with twenty-eight had left Brest for the
Sisargas Islands, twenty miles west of Corunna. At this rendezvous
the French spent six inactive weeks waiting for the Spaniards.4 The
haste with which the fleet had been hurried to sea and the drain
which this delay imposed on its supplies did not improve its efficiency,
and when Cordova at last arrived (23 July) the Spaniards5 unfamili-
arity with the French signals and manoeuvres complicated matters.5
Contrary winds then retarded their progress northward, and not till
14 August were they off the Lizard, where they interposed between
Plymouth and Hardy who was cruising in "the Soundings55, south-
west of the Scillies.
1 StopJord-Sackville MSS, n, 143. 2 Lacour-Gayet, p. 264.
» Pembroke MSS, p. 382; Cornwall* MSS, p. 322.
4 Corresp. of George ///, iv, 378. s LaCOUr-Gayct, p. 260.
THE ALLIED FLEET IN THE CHANNEL 745
Could Hardy have known how long d'Orvilliers would have to
await Cordova, he might well have followed him to the Sisargas and
forced battle on him: now, when facing double his numbers, it was
essential to avoid close action yet keep near enough to the enemy to
prevent them detaching ships up Channel to cover the passage of the
transports. The situation resembled that which Torrington had faced
in 1690, and Kempenfelt's correspondence1 shows clearly that he had
grasped Torrington's idea of the preventive possibilities of a "fleet in
being". The allies' proceedings were marked by indecision. Never
again were they to have such a chance of invading England, but their
aged admirals were timid and sluggish and dominated by unsound
strategical doctrines.2 They made no serious effort to seek out Hardy
and crush him or drive him right away: they did not venture to
detach a covering squadron, and after an easterly gale had driven
them out of the Channel, they let Hardy, whom they sighted off the
Scillies (31 August), slip past them up Channel to Spithead,3 thereby
placing himself in position to watch the transports. Thereupon they
abandoned the enterprise, the French and twenty-one Spaniards
retiring into Brest (14 September) , the remaining Spaniards returning
to blockade Gibraltar, an occupation they would all along have pre-
ferred.4 Spanish lukewarmness was only one cause of the combined
fleet's ineffectiveness : too large and heterogeneous to be manageable,
its internal condition had been deplorable. Epidemics, due to bad
sanitation and provisions, had ravaged it; indeed North said after-
wards that had Hardy known his enemy's plight he would have
sought an action : there were men in his fleet like Jervis and Duncan,
who were longing to fight and confident of success,5 but the British
fleet's condition was none too good. Worn-out vessels had been
hastily commissioned when fitter to be condemned, four which
joined Hardy in September were nicknamed the "Provincial ships",
because it was said that one could only reach the Hampshire coast,
another that of Dorset.6 If England escaped invasion in 1779, Sand-
wich can claim little credit.
The attack on Gibraltar had virtually begun in June when a
blockade was established by sea and land. No attack was attempted,
but supplies soon began to fail, and Rodney, who had been selected
for the West Indian command, was ordered to relieve Gibraltar on
his way thither. He was given twenty-two of the line, and, though
burdened with large "trades" for Portugal and the West Indies
besides convoys for Gibraltar and Minorca, discharged his task with
conspicuous success. Sailing on 29 December, after encountering
vexatious delays and obstructions,7 he captured off Cape Finis terre
several Spanish store-ships with their escort, including a battleship
1 N.R.S. xxxn, 290-313. 2 Castcx, passim, csp. p. 65.
8 Corresp. of George III, rv, 419 seqq. * Lacour-Gayet, p. 3^6.
6 Corresp. of George III, iv, 424. 6 Ibid. p. 439; Pembroke MSS, p. 381.
7 Stopford-Sackvillc MSS, n, 150.
746 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(8 January): a week later (16 January) off Cape St Vincent he
sighted eleven of the line who promptly made for Cadiz. Rodney
signalled a "general chase", ordering his captains to engage to lee-
ward as they got up, regardless of "the line", and by 4 p.m. the
leading pursuers, foremost among them Duncan, were in action.
Neither night nor bad weather stopped the fight: by 2 a.m. five
Spaniards had struck and three others had sunk. "The Moonlight
Battle" was the first real victory of the war at sea, and, if the odds
had greatly favoured Rodney, it was a useful success, much enhanced
by the promptness and resolution of the chase.
Rodney could thus revictual both Gibraltar and Minorca, Cor-
dova's twenty-four sail lying inactive in Cadiz. On 13 February he
started for the West Indies with four of the line, Digby taking the
rest back to the Channel, capturing on the way part of a French
convoy bound for Mauritius. For the rest of the year little happened
in home waters. Half the Brest fleet, under de Guichen, an abler and
more experienced officer than d'Estaing, had sailed on 3 February
for the West Indies, the rest, fifteen of the line, remained
mostly quiescent, while the Spaniards concentrated their forces and
their attention on Gibraltar. The British Channel fleet, about thirty
strong, cruised somewhat aimlessly1 near the mouth of the Channel,
and even failed to prevent the allies capturing most of a big West
Indian convoy.
Further afield, 1780 witnessed greater activity. Clinton, after
parting reluctantly with Grant and Campbell, had asked leave to
resign rather than "remain a mournful witness of the debility of an
army at whose head, had I been unshackled by instructions, I might
have indulged expectations of rendering serious service".2 He had
complained especially of having to part with British units, "the very
nerves of this army", and had sent to Florida Germans and Pro-
vincials "whose loss will not be so much felt". Germain had refused
to let him resign, promised him reinforcements and disclaimed any
wish to shackle him (3 December), but the reinforcements were slow
to appear and without them Clinton's activities in 1779 had been
limited to making raids which achieved considerable success in
destroying stores and shipping. In May he attacked and took two
forts on the Hudson at Verplanck's Point and Stony Point, hoping
"to stir Mr Washington" and bring on a general action,3 but
without the promised reinforcements he could not follow up the
blow,4 while Washington was not to be drawn, and even surprised
and re-took Stony Point (16 July), evacuating it again at once.
Despairing of forcing battle on his cautious and elusive adversary,5
Clinton turned his thoughts towards the south, where Germain was
1 N.R.S. xxxn, 326. * Clinton to Germain, 8 Oct. 1778, G.O. v, 06.
9 Ibid. 10 June 1779, G.O. v, 98, * Ibid. 25 July 1779.
6 Ibid. 21 Aug. 1779.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTHERN COLONIES 747
as usual expecting "revolutions by means of friends to the British
Government".1 The belated reinforcements arrived on 25 August
with a new admiral, Arbuthnot, but shortly afterwards came the
news of d'Estaing's appearance off Savannah, and in face of his
superiority Clinton could only stand on the defensive. He seized the
occasion, however, to evacuate Rhode Island, a step Rodney was
to condemn next year as "the most fatal measure that could have
been taken",2 though it added 4000 men to the available field force.
In the middle of November d'Estaing's defeat and departure were
reported, and with the seas thus cleared Clinton sailed for South
Carolina on 26 December 1779 with 8000 men.
Bad weather delayed his voyage and it was February 1780 before
he landed, thirty miles from Charleston, and 29 March before he
really began his attack. Well supported by the Navy8 Clinton
pressed Charleston hard: Huger's cavalry, who were keeping open
its communications, were routed on 1 2 April by Clinton's light troops
under Tarleton, a brilliant if erratic leader; Fort Moultrie was taken
on 6 May and five days later Charleston capitulated, over 6000
combatants becoming prisoners of war.4 But Clinton could not
pursue this success; rumours that French troops were bound for
America made him nervous for New York5 and compelled his return
thither with 4000 men (5 June), leaving Cornwallis to command in
the south with 8000 men all told, none too many for his task, for as
in Spain conquests were easier to make than to retain, and the more
territory the British recovered the more their offensive power was
reduced.
At first, however, things went well. Tarleton routed the only
organised force still in the field (29 May), and when the hot season
stopped operations South Carolina seemed secured. But before
major operations could be resumed sporadic opposition had de-
veloped, and when, in August, Gates led 2000 "Continentals" whom
Washington had detached to the south into South Carolina his
advance, in Rawdon's words,6 "unveiled to us a fund of disaffection
of which we could have formed no idea" : many who had joined the
militia mainly to obtain arms and ammunition deserted and guerrilla
bands appeared everywhere. Sickness and the necessity of garrison-
ing various posts prevented Cornwallis from collecting more than
2200 men, whereas Gates had twice that force and was believed to
have 7000. Nothing daunted, Cornwallis advanced and, meeting
Gates near Camden (16 August), attacked and routed him com-
pletely, taking 1000 prisoners and seven guns and inflicting another
1000 casualties, his own loss being only 300. Two days later Tarleton
1 Germain to Clinton, 25 Aug. 1 779, G.O. v, 98.
2 Stobford-Saekville MSS9 n, 191. 8 Stuart, p. 168.
* Biddulph Papers (Am. H.R. XXK) and Russell's "Journal" (Am. H.R. iv).
6 Clinton to Germain, 14 May, 1780, C.O. v, 99.
fl Stevens, B. F., Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i, 372.
748 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
surprised and routed Sumter, the most troublesome of the guerrilla
leaders, and Cornwallis, greatly encouraged, entered North Carolina,
simultaneously urging Clinton to take its defences in the rear by a
diversion against Virginia. He had penetrated to Charlottetown,
despite considerable guerrilla opposition, when he learned that on
6 October noo of his light troops under Major Ferguson, an able
leader, in trying to cut off a party which had attacked the British
outpost at Augusta, had been routed at King's Mountain by over-
whelming numbers of riflemen from the backwoods. This reverse
drove Cornwallis back towards Camden. Not only was his invasion
of North Carolina checked, but the hostile elements in the occupied
territories were greatly encouraged, and the guerrillas redoubled
their activities. The invasion of the southern colonies seemed to be
merely increasing the demands on the army; yet in default of vital
points in the American position for which Washington must risk a
decisive action, it is hard to suggest a more effective alternative
policy: Cornwallis's operations had at least reduced the area from
which crops could be exported to Europe to maintain American
credit and purchase munitions.
So unpromising indeed were the American prospects at this junc-
ture that in May 1780 the French, believing that the American cause
was nearly collapsing for want of troops,1 decided to despatch 6000
men under Rochambeau to America. The British Admiralty, though
warned of Rochambeau's destination, failed to intercept the convoy,
which had only seven sail of the line under de Ternay as its escort,
and its safe arrival at Newport (12 July) rendered Clinton's situation
far more anxious than when New York had only Washington to fear.
However, before Rochambeau could join Washington, reinforce-
ments from England enabled Arbuthnot to blockade Newport with
ten battleships (21 July), while Clinton at once collected 6000 men
to attack Rhode Island. But Arbuthnot and Clinton were on bad
terms, delays over the transports gave Rochambeau time to secure
himself against a coup de main2 and Washington meanwhile had
concentrated his forces and was threatening Kingsbridge. But
clearly it was Arbuthnot's dilatoriness and obstruction,3 rather than
fear of Washington, that made Clinton abandon the attack on
Rochambeau and return to New York to betake himself to his
correspondence with Arnold, now in command at West Point, which
important post he was for private reasons prepared to betray. These
negotiations were still in progress when Rodney unexpectedly arrived
at New York (16 September) with ten sail of the line from the West
Indies.
Rodney had passed a disappointing summer in the West Indies.
1 Chevalier, i, 195.
* Clinton to Germain, 14 Aug. 1780, C.O. v, 100.
8 Biddulph Papers; Clinton to Germain, 25 Aug. 1780, C.O. v, 100.
RODNEY'S ACTIONS AGAINST DE GUIGHEN 749
He had reached St Lucia (28 March) only a week behind de Guichen.
On 13 April de Guichen left Martinique with twenty-three of the
line carrying 3000 troops, hoping to reach Barbados while Rodney
was still to leeward. But from St Lucia Martinique was easily
watched and Rodney promptly got to sea, and by skilful seamanship
gained the weather gage. On 17 April he was bearing down with his
whole fleet concentrated against de Guichen's rear, the latter's van
being to leeward and impotent to help. But Rodney's highly skilful
tactics were too novel for some of his subordinates, whose ideas were
fettered by the "Fighting Instructions", and their failure to under-
stand his signals spoilt a brilliant manoeuvre. The attack became
hopelessly disjointed, and de Guichen realising his danger quickly
broke off the action. His casualties were double Rodney's, but
his fleet was intact, whereas had Rodney's orders been properly
executed de Guichen must have been badly beaten. Twice more
(15 and 19 May) Rodney managed to engage him: he had drilled
his fleet now and there was no misunderstanding of orders, but de
Guichen was a wary tactician and a good seaman, and, greatly aided
on 15 May by a timely shift of wind,1 persistently evaded close
action. In June a Spanish fleet reached Guadeloupe from Cadiz
with 10,000 troops intended for the capture of Jamaica, but
the Spaniards were hopelessly ineffective owing to epidemics and
went tamely on to Havana; when the hurricane season came
de Guichen, deaf to Washington's appeals, sailed for Europe with
two-thirds of his fleet (16 August). If he had preserved his fleet,
Rodney had effectually checked his designs on the British islands.
Rodney's arrival at New York was a bitter blow to Washington
who had been hoping instead to see de Guichen appear. It established
the British naval supremacy solidly on the American coast and put
an end to any danger to New York.2 It shows Rodney at his best as
a strategist: looking beyond the local needs of his own command,
and rightly disregarding its technical limits, he had carried his ships
to the place where he judged that they were most needed. Un-
fortunately for England, when it came to being ready to sacrifice
ships in forcing the passage into Newport Harbour in order to destroy
de Ternay, Rodney flinched. Rochambeau had made Newport so
strong that Young, Rodney's flag captain, wrote, "The favourable
opportunity has been lost. I am heartily sorry we were not on the
coast a fortnight sooner".8 Still, the passage had been wide enough
for d'Estaing, while de Ternay's destruction must have involved
Rochambeau's surrender and was well worth the loss of several ships.4
A successful combined naval and military attack might have changed
the fate of the war, but Rodney would not risk it, and Clinton was
always too weak to afford heavy casualties.
* N.R.S. xxxn, 58. • Ibid, xxxn, 79.
a Ibid. 4 Lacour-Gayct, p. 354.
750 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Rodney returned to the West Indies (November 1780) to find that
an unusually violent hurricane season had cost both British and
French three battleships and swept the islands bare, greatly delaying
any resumption of active operations. In December, however, news
arrived of the British declaration of war against Holland (December).
This was the chief outcome of the recent formation of the Armed
Neutrality to oppose the British doctrines as to the right of search,
contraband of war and other disputed points. Holland, no longer
formidable at sea, was less troublesome as a declared enemy than as
a very nominal neutral.1 For months past the Dutch island of St
Eustatius had been the centre from which both French and Americans
had conducted an extensive trade under cover of the Dutch flag, and
its capture (3 February 1781) yielded an enormous booty and re-
vealed how flagrantly Dutch neutrality had been abused.2 Rodney
exulted over " the severest blow that could have been given America",8
but St Eustatius led him to his most serious professional blunder.4
De Grasse was known to be coming out with reinforcements, and had
Rodney concentrated all his twenty-one sail of the line to windward
of Martinique, where the French would probably make their landfall,
he might have beaten them before they could join their small squadron
in Fort Royal. But instead, Rodney remained at St Eustatius with
several ships and kept the remainder under Hood off Fort Royal5 to
prevent the Fort Royal ships from descending on St Eustatius.
"Never", wrote Hood, "was squadron so unmeaningly stationed."
Outnumbered and to leeward he could do little when on 28 April
de Grasse appeared.6 De Grasse might have crushed Hood's inferior
force but avoided close action and contented himself with reaching
Fort Royal, whereupon Hood drew off to rejoin Rodney.
De Grasse had been lucky already. As he was leaving Brest (22
March 1781) with twenty-six sail of the line, Darby with twenty-eight
was on his way to Gibraltar, now in serious straits for food,7 while the
Spaniards had recently converted their blockade on the landward
side into a definite attack. Darby and de Grasse passed within 100
miles without either attempting to seek the other out, when a victory
might have decided far more than the fate of their immediate
errands.8 Darby indeed apparently deliberately avoided meeting
de Grasse lest he should drive him to join Cordova, then covering the
attack on Gibraltar from Cadiz9 with thirty-six of the line. Cordova,
however, remained inert while Darby brought his victuallers and
store-ships into Gibraltar on 1 2 April, returning thereafter uneventfully
to England. Meanwhile de Grasse, who had detached a squadron
1 Dartmouth MSS, m, 246; Renaut, F. P., Lei Provinces Umes et la Guerre d'Amtrique ( 1 924) ,
chaps, vii-xv.
2 Stopford-Sackville MSS, n, 202. » Ibid.
4 Mahan, Types of Naval Officers, pp. 217 seqq. 6 N.R.S. xxxn, 93.
6 Ibid, ni, 24. 7 Drinkwater, Siege of Gibraltar* chaps, iv and v.
8 Gastex, p. 290. • N.R.S. xxxn, 33.
CORNWALLIS'S OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH 751
under Suffren to the Gape and East Indies (29 March), made an
unusually rapid passage to Martinique, where his safe arrival not
merely challenged Rodney's supremacy in West Indian waters but
was to prove a turning point in the war.
The crisis in America was indeed at hand. Washington was hard
pressed to keep his army together and maintain the struggle. There
had been two serious mutinies among his "Continentals", whose pay
was many months in arrears and whose clothing and equipment were
in a deplorable state. He had no money, he was short of supplies and
ammunition; desertion had thinned his ranks. Rochambeau's in-
activity had caused disappointment and grumbling, though his
presence at Newport had imposed a severe restraint on Clinton and
prevented him from profiting by Washington's difficulties, while the
position of de Ternay's squadron justified Arbuthnot in disobeying
Rodney's orders to detach ships to the West Indies, Clinton insisting
that the army's situation would not allow of it.1 Even so Washington
wrote, in April 1781, "we are at the end of our tether, now or never
our deliverance must come".2
The movement from which the decision resulted started in the
south. After his retreat in October 1780 Cornwallis remained in-
active for some weeks, considerably harassed by the guerrillas whom
success at King's Mountain had greatly emboldened. Moreover
Greene, Washington's ablest subordinate, had superseded the dis-
credited Gates, had rallied and reorganised the remains of his army,
and, while avoiding action, had prevented Cornwallis from setting
systematically about suppressing the guerrillas. In December Corn-
wallis was joined by 2500 men under Leslie whom Clinton had sent
to the Chesapeake in October to serve as a diversion to favour Corn-
wallis and to carry on the policy, already proving effective, of
destroying the enemy's resources.8 Cornwallis had, however, sum-
moned Leslie to Carolina, intending on his arrival to resume the
offensive. Clinton, meanwhile, having abandoned hopes of decisive
action in the north, after Major Andre's capture had disclosed the
plot with Arnold, spared no effort to assist Cornwallis, and not only
approved Leslie's transfer,4 but further diminished the New York
garrison by sending 1600 men under Arnold to the Chesapeake.
Arnold landed at Jamestown on 20 December, raided Richmond and
did so much damage generally that Washington sent Lafayette with
1 200 men to tackle him and persuaded Rochambeau to detach 1200
Frenchmen to support Lafayette. To carry them thither Destouches,
who had succeeded de Ternay, left Newport (8 March), but was
followed and overtaken by Arbuthnot. Tactically, their encounter off
the Chesapeake (16 March) was indecisive, for Destouches, who was
being worsted, managed to break off, but his retreat to Newport left
1 Cf. Clinton to Germain, 16 Dec., G.O. v, 101. a Works, vm, 7.
» Stevens, i, 270. 4 /W. i» 294-
752 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
the British in control of the coastal communications and allowed
another 2500 men to be sent to Virginia. Still Clinton was deter-
mined not to embark on "solid59 operations in Virginia, unless
assured of naval supremacy and strongly reinforced,1 and his in-
structions definitely limited the raiding and produce-destroying
detachments he had already sent there2 to occupying a station in the
Chesapeake as a local base for the Navy.
But it was to "solid" operations in Virginia that the British were
to be committed. Cornwallis had advanced northwards in January
to intercept a force under Morgan which was threatening the British
posts west of Camden. Morgan promptly retreated, closely pursued
by Tarleton and the light troops, who overtook him at Cowpens (17
January 1781) and seemed to have beaten him when an unexpected
counter-stroke caught the British troops disordered by success and
changed their victory into defeat. Cornwallis narrowly missed re-
trieving Cowpens by catching Morgan, who just evaded him and
rejoined Greene. Though thus deprived of his light troops, Cornwallis
nevertheless continued his projected invasion of North Carolina and,
forcing the passage of the Catawba (i February), advanced boldly
north-east, Greene conducting a skilful retreat into Virginia without
being brought to action. Cornwallis, his men exhausted by their
exertions, retired to Hillsborough and endeavoured rather unsuccess-
fully to gather recruits from the local Loyalists. Greene meanwhile
collected large reinforcements from Virginia and ventured to ad-
vance, thinking to catch Cornwallis at a disadvantage.3 His challenge
was promptly accepted and on 15 March a desperately contested
action at Guildford saw Greene well beaten, though he had been
strongly posted and had double Cornwallis's numbers. Greene's
defeat was a great achievement, but left Cornwallis so crippled
by casualties that he had reluctantly to retreat. Rather, however, than
admit failure by retiring into South Carolina he moved south-east
to Wilmington, exposing South Carolina to Greene who instead of
pursuing him marched promptly into that province.
Cornwallis had been specifically instructed to do nothing to imperil
Charleston4 and in deciding, despite Greene's invasion of South
Carolina, to push on into Virginia he was incurring a grave responsi-
bility. He had come to the conclusion5 that Virginia was the key to
the final subjugation of the Carolinas and that to invade it would be
the best parry to Greene's move: while Germain, over-confident as
usual, assumed that Cornwallis had quite secured the Carolinas and
could safely proceed to Virginia, from the reduction of which he
anticipated decisive results.6 Accordingly, on 25 April, Cornwallis
* Stevens, i, 341, 373, 390. » Ibid, i, 347.
8 Rawdon to Clinton, 23 March 1780, Royal Institution MSS, n, 260.
4 Stevens, i, 215.
6 Cornwallis to Clinton, 10 April, to Germain, 18 April, Stevens, i, 395, 414.
6 Germain to Gornwallis, 7 March, Stevens, i, 334.
CORNWALLIS'S MOVE TO VIRGINIA 753
left Wilmington and on 20 May joined Arnold at Petersburg. But
having reached Virginia he hardly made the most of his chances. He
considerably outnumbered his immediate opponent, Lafayette, for
Clinton, though strongly disapproving of Cornwallis's leaving the
Carolinas,1 had sent another 1700 men to Virginia, increasing Corn-
wallis's force to over 7000* However, Cornwallis neither brought
Lafayette to action nor intercepted 1000 men who reinforced him
early in June. He had sneered at Clinton's policy of destroying
hogsheads of tobacco and bales of cotton, but he himself accom-
plished little more. His operations certainly had no effect on Greene
who, though defeated by Rawdon in a desperate struggle at Hobkirk's
Hill near Camden (25 April), made steady progress in South Carolina
where many inhabitants joined him, while Rawdon, whose scanty
force was quite unequal to protecting so extensive an area, could not
prevent the fall of post after post and was hard pressed to cover
Charleston.2
Clinton had always realised that operations in the Chesapeake
could "no longer be secure than whilst we are superior at sea",8 but
in June letters from Washington to Lafayette were intercepted4 which
showed that Washington was contemplating an attack on New York
to profit by the large detachments Clinton had made. Clinton there-
upon ordered Cornwallis to send him back all the troops he could
spare after securing the post in the Chesapeake which the Navy con-
sidered essential.6 Cornwallis accordingly retired towards Ports-
mouth, but managed to trap Lafayette into attacking his rear-
guard (6 July), and beat him soundly, though Lafayette escaped
destruction by retreating. After reaching Portsmouth Cornwallis
received further letters from Clinton which permitted him to
retain his whole force in Virginia and left him quite free to select a
defensive position.6 In making this change Clinton was influenced
by Germain's definite instructions of 2 May, which he had just re-
ceived, not to withdraw any troops from Virginia: he therefore
acquiesced in Cornwallis's remaining there during the sickly season,
after which he intended going to Virginia himself with every avail-
able man.7 Accordingly, Cornwallis, preferring Yorktown to any
other station, moved thither and by 22 August was preparing a
defensive position. A week later twenty-eight French sail of the line
entered the Chesapeake and anchored in Lynnhaven Bay, promptly
disembarking 3000 troops to reinforce Lafayette.
The new-comers were de Grasse's fleet- He had spent the summer
in foiling Rodney's efforts to bring him to action, and, though re-
pulsed from St Lucia, had snapped up the less important Tobago
1 Clinton to Germain, 22 May, Stevens, i, 478.
* Stevens, i, 480-6; Biddulph Papers. 8 Stevens, i, 497.
* Ibid, i, 500, 505- * Had. n, 63. 6 Ibid, n, 77.
7 Ibid, ii, 53.
GHBEI 4**
754 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(2 June) . Rodney, through ill-health and undue care for St Eustatius,
was below his best: a prompter move to Tobago must have caught
the French troops unprotected,1 and he failed to keep close touch
with de Grasse who sailed early in July to Gap Fran§ois in San
Domingo to find emphatic and urgent appeals for immediate help
awaiting him from Washington. De Grasse, who had been deliber-
ately refusing battle to keep his fleet intact for some such occasion as
this, started promptly for the American coast with every available
ship and soldier, refusing to detach any ships to convoy the homeward-
bound "trade" which he ordered to remain at Gap Frangois, a step
on which no British admiral would have ventured for political reasons.
His move was not unexpected, but both Clinton and Germain
looked for Rodney to follow de Grasse closely enough to make the
British position secure.2 Still, it was for New York Clinton expected
de Grasse to make,3 and Washington had at first intended attacking
there. He moved down from the Highlands to Dobb's Ferry, was
joined by Rochambeau (6 July), and skirmished ineffectually with
Clinton's outposts. Then, learning (14 August) that de Grasse was
making for the Chesapeake, he decided, by some accounts at Rocham-
beau's prompting, to march thither and fall on Cornwallis, whose
position and force were far weaker than Clinton's. On 21 August
the allies started their southward march. Not for a fortnight could
Clinton discover (2 September) their destination, and as yet he had
no news of de Grasse. A French squadron was known to be at sea
but it was only the Newport ships under de Barras, who, taking with
him the French siege-train, had slipped out (27 August), because
Graves, Arbuthnot's successor, had gone to Boston to intercept a
French convoy. To deal with de Barras Graves sailed again from
Sandy Hook for the Chesapeake (31 August) with nineteen of the
line, including Hood's squadron, which had arrived three days
earlier from the West Indies. Hood had brought only fourteen ships
against de Grasse's twenty-eight, because Rodney, who had gone
home sick, had taken four ships with him to escort "the trade" and
sent two on convoy duty to Jamaica, where Sir Peter Parker detained
them.
When, on 5 September, Graves arrived off Gape Henry he at first
mistook de Grasse, of whose arrival he was ignorant, for de Barras.
However, despite de Grasse's numbers, he never hesitated but bore
down to engage. He had the wind ; the French, who were in no order,
had to stand out to sea to form line ahead, and had he immediately
attacked their leading ships, using his centre and rear to fend off
those still to leeward, de Grasse might have found it hard to utilise
his superiority. But Graves not only failed to close promptly with
the French van, he hove to, so that the two fleets might get into line
opposite each other, and when he attacked he hoisted conflicting
1 N.R.S. m, 20, xxxn, 98. * Stevens, u, 43 and 55. 3 Ibid. 11, 122.
THE CHESAPEAKE AND YORKTOWN 755
signals which completely puzzled Hood and the rear division.1
Graves had recently served in the Channel fleet wheie, under
Kempenfelt's auspices, new signals and new tactics were being tried2
with which his subordinates were unfamiliar, and the result was mis-
understanding; ultimately after a partial engagement the French
drew off, leaving Graves with several cripples.
For some days both fleets remained outside the Chesapeake, de
Grasse despite his superiority making no attempt to attack when he
had the wind. Hood begged Graves to enter the Chesapeake and
occupy de Grasse's anchorage, thereby opening communications
with Cornwallis who might have been embarked if necessary. Hood
was to accomplish a similar feat against the same opponent a few
months later and might well have baffled de Grasse now, but Graves
would not risk it; on 12 September de Grasse, having successfully
covered de Barras3 entry, went into the Chesapeake, and Graves
could only retire to New York to refit and obtain reinforcements.
Three days later Washington joined Lafayette at Williamsburg and
on 21 September Cornwallis and his 7000 men, including 2000 sick,
were invested in Yorktown by 8000 Frenchmen and rather more
Americans.
Cornwallis's inactivity since de Grasse's arrival is puzzling. A
prompt attack on Lafayette and the troops from the West Indies, in
which the quality and numbers of his troops would have favoured
him3, would have taken his enemies in detail: the expedient of a
retreat into Carolina, which was still open when he heard of Washing-
ton's arrival at Baltimore, would have involved sacrificing sick and
baggage, but would have been preferable to losing the whole force.
Apparently he expected speedy relief,4 though Clinton's promise
had been conditional on the naval situation.5 What is harder to
explain is his evacuation (29 September) of his outer works which
were stronger than the inner defences6 and certainly commanded
them. The French engineers and artillerymen made good use of this
ground, opened the bombardment on 9 October, and maintained it
with such effect that on 19 October Cornwallis capitulated.
That very day Clinton left Sandy Hook with 5000 men escorted
by twenty-five of the line. Arriving off the Chesapeake on 24 October
he found himself too late, so promptly returned to New York, against
which he expected Washington to turn his arms. Washington wanted
to do this, but could not persuade de Grasse to join in any further
enterprises in America:7 he was itching to return to the West Indies
to complete the conquest of the British islands. With his departure
(5 November) serious operations in America ended: Washington
dared not venture to attack New York, Canada remained unmolested,
* N.R.S. m, 32, 45-7-
3 Tarleton, p. 268. * Stevens, n, 206. 5 Ibid, n, 153.
6 Tarleton, p. 274. 7 Lacour-Gayet, p. 513.
48-2
756 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
and, even in the south, Greene, after getting slightly the worst of a
sharp encounter at Eutaw Springs (8 September) , contented himself
with confining the British to the outskirts of Charleston and Savannah
and left East Florida unmolested. West Florida had already passed
into Spanish hands, vastly superior forces having descended on
Pensacola and compelled Campbell to capitulate (May 1781).
In Europe and the East and West Indies, however, hostilities were
far from over. The East Indies indeed only became really involved in
the main war in 1782. Heavy fighting had been going on in India
since the outbreak in 1775 of war with the Marathas, but, though
Hastings had always been nervous of French intervention, the weak
French squadron in Indian waters had retired to Mauritius in August
1778, leaving their settlements to be reduced by the British. The cap-
ture of one of these, Mah6, had contributed to embroil the British
with Hyder Ali of Mysore, but in January 1781 though a French
squadron made an ineffective appearance off the Carnatic, in the
campaign in which Coote thrice defeated Hyder and restored the
situation so gravely imperilled by Baillie's disaster at Perambakam
(September 1780), the British command of the sea was unchallenged
and a potent assistance to the army. Up to the end of 1781 only one
King's regiment had as yet reinforced the Company's troops, but early
in 1781 four battalions were despatched to India, escorted by a
squadron under Commodore Johnstone. This force was to have
captured the Cape of Good Hope, but was baulked by Suffren and
the squadron which had left Brest with de Grasse that March.
Coming upon Johnstone in a neutral harbour in the Cape Verde
Islands Suffren promptly attacked (16 April) and, though beaten off,
inflicted damages which prevented Johnstone reaching the Cape
before him. Johnstone, therefore, abandoned the design but carried
his troops on to Bombay unmolested by Suffren.
Suffren's arrival in Indian waters (February 1782) altered the
situation completely. He never really defeated his stout-hearted
opponent, Hughes, in any of the severe actions which they fought,
four in 1 782, one in 1 783, but his presence seriously hampered the
British forces in the Carnatic who depended largely on the fleet for
their power to move. Still, great as were the perils through which
Hastings and Coote successfully steered the British power in India
between 1778 and 1783, the East Indies were only a backwater,
absorbing too little of the belligerents' resources to influence the mafti
struggle appreciably.
After Darby's relief of Gibraltar the French had contemplated
uniting the Dutch and Spaniards with the Brest fleet to cover an
invasion of England, but the Dutch would not risk the voyage down
Channel: their main squadron, when taking a convoy to the Baltic,
fell in off the Dogger Bank (3 August) with Hyde Parker, who with
eight worn-out ships was escorting a homeward-bound convoy. A
MINORCA AND ST CHRISTOPHER 757
desperate contest ended in Parker bringing in his charge safely while
the Dutch convoy abandoned its voyage. In August a combined
fleet of forty-nine sail including thirty-one Spaniards appeared at
the mouth of the Channel, compelling Darby who had only thirty
to take refuge in Torbay; its commander, Cordova, would not ven-
ture to attack him there and the Spaniards soon departed for Cadiz
(5 September). The sole use they had made of their naval superiority
was to despatch to Minorca an expedition from Cadiz (August 1781),
subsequently reinforced by 4000 Frenchmen. Minorca had only
a tiny garrison under Murray, one of Wolfe's Quebec brigadiers, but
it resisted stubbornly for seven months, succumbing (February 1782)
to scurvy rather than to its besiegers. Harder to relieve than Gibraltar
because farther away, Minorca might well have been evacuated when
Rodney relieved it : its retention had not served, as did that of Gibral-
tar, to distract the naval forces of France and Spain from their true
objective.
More influential than the fate of Minorca was that of a convoy
laden with troops and stores for the West Indies, which left Brest in
December 1781, escorted by de Guichen with nineteen of the line.
To intercept it Kempenfelt was sent out, though only twelve of the
line could be found for him; for the lack of timber and other naval
stores, both from New England and the Baltic lands, was by this time
severely crippling the Navy.1 However, on encountering de Guichen
(12 December), he found himself with the wind in his favour while
de Guichen, who had negligently fallen to leeward, was impotent
when Kempenfelt's prompt attack dispersed the convoy, taking
fifteen ships with 1000 soldiers. Most of the rest returned to Brest
with de Guichen, very few ever reaching their destination. It was
a masterly stroke and deprived de Grasse of urgently needed stores.
De Grasse had been back in the West Indies by 26 November, and,
finding himself in considerable superiority, started operations against
the British islands. De Bouilte had already recovered St Eustatius
and was anxious to attack Barbados, but the French found it hard
to beat to windward, so, changing their quarry, they descended upon
St Christopher (9 January 1782). The little British garrison resisted
stoutly at Brimstone Hill, and Hood, though he had only twenty-two
of the line to de Grasse's twenty-nine, hurried to its help. By brilliant
seamanship and daring tactics he drew de Grasse out of Basse Terre
roads, and, going boldly in, took up an anchorage (25 January). He
thus interposed between de Grasse and the French troops and could
land a relieving force. But although considerable reinforcements had
reached the West Indies in 1780 they had been scattered over the
islands, and an unusually sickly season had thinned their numbers:
Hood could oppose only 2400 men to de Bouill6's 6000, and they
1 N.R.S. xxxn, 351 seqq. and xxxvm, 75-6; Albion, R. G., Forests and Sea Power,
chap. vii.
758 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
were powerless to avert the garrison's surrender (23 February),
whereupon Hood, who had repulsed several attacks on his anchored
line, slipped out by night as neatly as he had got in. If he had not
saved St Christopher's, his skill and daring had restored the con-
fidence of his fleet.1
De Grasse had soon cause to regret his failure to crush Hood. On
19 February Rodney reached Barbados from England with twelve
of the line, and though he failed to prevent an important convoy
from Brest reaching Martinique with 6000 troops (20 March),2 he
maintained a close watch on Fort Royal from St Lucia. Thus when,
on 8 April, de Grasse put to sea with a large convoy for Cap Francois,
there to unite with a Spanish contingent to attack Jamaica, nearly
as much coveted by the Spaniards as Gibraltar, Rodney was after him
at once. Hampered by his transports de Grasse could not give
Rodney the slip, and on 9 April the fleets were in contact. A partial
action followed; the French had a chance of catching the British van
unsupported,3 but they played their usual game of avoiding close
action, due partly to a well-grounded respect for British gunnery.4
Two days later Rodney got his chance (12 April). To save a ship
crippled in a collision de Grasse had to close, and as the fleets were
passing on opposite tacks near the Saints, some islets near Dominica,
the British being to leeward, a sudden shift of wind enabled them to
break through the French line in two places and get to windward.
Rodney's "breaking the line" was probably unpremeditated,
indeed, the suggestion was almost certainly pressed upon him by
Douglas, his flag-captain, but it was most effective. The French were
separated into three disordered groups and suffered terribly from
the British guns. De Grasse himself was taken with four other ships,
and if Rodney's over-caution, so remorselessly criticised by Hood,5
allowed the rest to make Cap Francois with little further loss, when
another dozen prizes must have rewarded a vigorous pursuit, the
battle had shattered the nerve of the French and restored the British
reputation,6 thus achieving decisive results. By the end of May
the French had rallied twenty-five of the line at Cap Francois and
recovered touch with their convoy, while fifteen Spaniards with 1 2,000
troops had joined them: however, recollections of 12 April deterred
them from venturing to attack Jamaica, and in July the French fleet
went off to the American coast to avoid the hurricanes, the British
fleet also proceeding to New York. In November Carlcton, who had
replaced Clinton in May, decided to evacuate Charleston in order
that the garrison might secure Jamaica against the expected transfer
of Rochambeau's troops to the West Indies. Peace, however, came
N.R.S. m, 64-93. a Ibid, xxxn, 154.
Ibid, xxxn, 159.
Ibid, xxxii, 276.
N.R.S. m, isgseqq., and xxxn, 159-66, 177.
Rutland MSSt ra.
THE RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR 759
without any further activities. Rodney's victory, if not complete,
had prevented further British losses in the West Indies.
Meanwhile the allies had suffered another rebuff which went
far to secure Great Britain a satisfactory peace. Gibraltar, though
harder pressed than before, was still defying its assailants who were
preparing a special effort. But North's fall (February 1782) and the
formation of Rockingham's Whig ministry had brought Lord Howe
back to command, which led to far more skilful handling of the fleets
in home waters. The Brest fleet's activities were curbed by a squadron
under Kempenfelt: an important French convoy for the East Indies
was intercepted and two battleships and many transports taken, and
when in July the French and Spaniards from Cadiz reached the mouth
of the Channel, Howe prevented the Dutch from joining them by
a formidable demonstration off their ports. Then, sailing westward
to meet the other allies, though too weak to venture an action, he
held them skilfully in play, covering the arrival of a valuable convoy
from Jamaica and paralysing their designs till in August they bore
up for Cadiz to cover the grand attack on Gibraltar.
This was delivered on 8 September 1782. For five days the Rock
was violently bombarded, but the great floating batteries on which
the Spaniards had pinned their faith were not proof against Elliot's
red-hot shot and finally the completely baffled assailants had to
convert the attack into a blockade. Directly the allies had left the
Channel, Howe had received orders to proceed to Elliot's relief and
on 1 1 September he sailed with thirty-four of the line and a vast
convoy. His achievement in carrying his convoy into Gibraltar (19
October), despite Cordova's fifty sail which tried to bar his passage,
and despite difficulties of navigation and the handicap of the convoy,
was a masterpiece of seamanship and tactics. Having outwitted his
enemies and accomplished the relief, he could not resist heaving-to
off Cape Spartel, when clear of the narrow waters of the Straits, to
offer them a fight (20 October). So roughly was their somewhat
half-hearted attack received that they soon broke off the action,
leaving Howe to return quietly to the Channel.1
The relief of Gibraltar, with which the main struggle virtually
ended, is perhaps Howe's finest achievement and went far to restore
public confidence and to show that mere numbers could not com-
mand success when inefficiently handled by officers imbued ^vvith
false doctrines of strategy and tactics. It suggests too that, with a
more efficient administration and a better use of the forces at the
Admiralty's disposal, even the assistance of France and Spain might
not have secured independence for the thirteen colonies.
That their assistance decided the struggle is a platitude. The de-
cisive element was not Washington's generalship. If his statesmanship,
his tenacity and his power of keeping his forces together merit un-
qualified praise, his record in the field, apart from Trenton, is not
1 Hist. MSS Comm.y Le Fleming MSS, p. 360.
760 THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
impressive. Decisive victories are not won by a merely defensive
strategy, such as he followed after failing to destroy Clinton in July
17783 while the final success at Yorktown was mainly due to the
French troops whose presence in America had restrained Clinton
from attempting "solid" operations in the north during Washington's
difficulties of 1780 and 1781. It was not even Germain's futile and
credulous optimism, interference in details and undue dispersion of
inadequate forces for whom he was always multiplying tasks, nor
General Howe's lethargy and repeated failures to convert success into
victory. Clinton's policy of waiting to let the rebellion collapse has
been severely criticised, but if unenterprising it nearly succeeded,
and his forces were never proportionate to their tasks: his weakness
lay less in his head than in his heart, in his character, not in his
strategy. Cornwallis must bear much of the responsibility for York-
town, but he would have put himself within Washington's reach with
impunity had not de Grasse's arrival deprived the British of that
freedom of movement by sea which, as Clinton was always empha-
sising, superiority in naval force could alone guarantee. The corre-
spondence of Grant and other generals in the West Indies shows how
the only sound plan of operations in that theatre collapsed with the
loss of the naval supremacy on which they had been taught to count.
Failures and blunders in the British conduct of the war by land
there certainly were, but the crucial failure lay in the Navy's in-
ability to retain its challenged control of the seas. The Navy was not
beaten, neither Ushant nor the Chesapeake, nor even Grenada, can
be reckoned a victory for France, but in certain circumstances not
to win a victory almost amounts to defeat, and so long as the allied
fleets were not deprived of the initiative, the Army was liable to be
paralysed because the Navy could not guarantee it freedom of move-
ment. A signal system which was not equal to emancipating naval
tactics from the trammels of an inelastic code of Fighting Instructions
more than once robbed British admirals of victory, but graver evils
lay in the state of things which prevented some of the Navy's ablest
men from hoisting their flags with Sandwich at the Admiralty, and
in the administrative inefficiency which bred delays and deficiencies
at every turn. These, however, resulted largely from the loss of both
of our chief sources for the supply of naval stores, so that Admiral
Byam Martin declared there was not in the year 1783 "a sound ship
in the fleet. Several returning home foundered on the Banks of
Newfoundland".1 The Navy was faced by opponents more efficient
and formidable than Nelson ever encountered, and instead of a
Spencer at the Admiralty it had "Jemmy Twitcher ". " Out Twitcher
must. . .he will certainly annihilate the Navy if he stays in" was the
cry after Palliser's trial.2 It says much for the Navy that if, with
Sandwich in charge, it could not prevent the loss of America, it did
prevent the further disruption of the Empire.
1 N.R.S. XDC, 379. t Pembroke MSS, p. 380.
CHAPTER XXV
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND
BRITISH POLITICS, 1776-1783
JL HE constitutional struggle had ended in war. Motley bands of
marksmen and farmers marched to the battle-cry of "Liberty or
Death" against the greatest naval and imperial Power in the world.
Alliances with France and Spain and the blunders of British com-
manders were to help them to victory. But in truth it was not a case
of colonists unanimous in rebellion opposing a kingdom unanimous
in its determination to impose its will upon them. The conflict was
not so much a struggle between England and America as a civil war
in which the whole British race took sides. Whigs and Tories in Great
Britain, Radicals and Conservatives in America, were divided upon
the fundamental principles at stake, the relations of Parliament to
the colonial legislatures and the unity of the Empire.
The majority at home, Burke was obliged to admit, was, when war
began, in favour of coercion.1 Opinion had hardened, as the violence
and ever-increasing demands of the Americans and their rejection
of each effort at conciliation seemed to point to a determination to
throw off their allegiance. The greater part of the propertied and
educated classes was definitely in favour of the King and his ministers.
The landed interest, the Established Church and the Bar were almost
wholly anti- American.2 The majorities in the Universities and in the
great towns, except those most deeply involved in American trade,
such as London, Bristol and Glasgow, favoured the Government.8
The Corporation of London, indeed, committed to opposition on
other grounds, drew up an address strongly approving of the actions
of the Americans, and resisted the press warrants. The trading com-
munity, however, was by no means united in its opposition, and soon
found that openings in other directions more than compensated for
the loss of American business. Lord Camden claimed that "the
common people hold the war in abhorrence".4 Certainly the failure
of recruiting showed that the people were loath to fight against their
fellow-subjects and a cause identified with liberty. Many officers
threw up their commissions in the army. Dissenters generally
favoured the American cause. There were, of course, exceptions.
John Wesley's pamphlet denouncing the pretensions of the colonists
indicated the views of a large number of Methodists, whilst David
Hume's sympathy with the attitude of the Rockingham Whigs
suggests that Tories were not unanimous. The great majority of
1 Burke, E., Correspondence* n, 48. a Walpole, Horace, Last Journals, n, 90.
3 Annual Register, 1776, p. 38. 4 Chatham Corr. iv, 401.
762 AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND BRITISH POLITICS
Scots, both at home and in America, actively supported the claims
of Great Britain. "Almost to a man", according to a contemporary
writer, "they proffered life and fortune in support of the present
measures."1 The Irish Protestants were equally zealous on the other
side. "All Ireland", said Chatham, "is Whig.'5 But this was not true
of the Catholic population. And when the war was extended to
France and Spain, die feelings of the Ulster Presbyterians underwent
a notable change. Many who had refused to treat the Americans as
enemies rallied round the Government against the Catholic Powers.
The popularity of the war increased as it progressed. The spirit of the
nation was stirred by the success of British arms. Resentment grew
at the Declaration of Independence, the depredations of American
privateers, and the grossly unpatriotic speeches of Fox and his
friends.2 When the war became one with the old hereditary foes,
the fighting instincts of the country were roused to make gigantic
efforts in a combat single-handed against all the maritime Powers of
Europe.
One has, then, the impression of a nation divided against itself, in
which a majority constantly recognised the necessity of enforcing
imperial unity, but at the same time shrank from applying extreme
measures against its own flesh and blood. The same indecision
affected the generals in the field. Howe, for instance, instead of hitting
hard and then negotiating, probably let slip his military opportunities
because he inclined, for sentimental and political reasons, to fight
with an olive branch in one hand and a sword in the other. The
parliamentary Opposition, though small, was virulent and en-
thusiastic. Chatham, Burke, Shelburne, Rockingham, Richmond,
Charles James Fox, Pitt and Sheridan — seldom has a national
assembly contained a group of greater eloquence and force.
As the situation developed, the Tories rallied round the King and
his conception of the Empire, whilst the Whigs did their utmost to
encourage the colonists in their resistance and to prevent the Govern-
ment from applying the full resources of the country in the effort to
suppress them. In this they were united. But between the followers
of Chatham and Shelburne and the Rockingham Whigs a strong line
of cleavage persisted over the question of yielding independence.
Some, almost from the first, were ready to surrender British sovereignty.
As early as I776,3 the Duke of Richmond took the view that war with
America would be ruinous; that it would bring France into the war
against us, and that, even if successful, it would not be final. It
would be better then, he argued, to grant independence at once,
Whigs were moved too, Chatham as well as Fox, Horace Walpole as
1 [? Burke, E.], Annual Register, 1776, p. 39; Shelburne to Dr Price, Fitzmaunce, Life
of Shclbiarnt) n, 40.
8 Albemarle, life of Rockingham, n, 305; Burke, Works , ix, 152.
3 Richmond to Mr Connolly, Nov. 1776, in a letter quoted by Lecky, Hist, of Eng. in
Eighteenth Cent, zv, 352.
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION— A CIVIL WAR 763
well as Burke and Richmond, by the fear lest the triumph of the King
and his "Friends" in America would prove to be the death knell of
the Whig party and of English liberty. The victory of the Crown
would, it was believed, usher in a reign of despotism. To such
extremes did partisanship in this civil war go, that Fox described the
British victory at Brooklyn as "terrible news".1 Whigs toasted every
American success and every British disaster. They even spoke in
Parliament of the insurgent forces as "our army".
In America the same division of opinion recurred. The conditions
were those of civil war.2 Even in the State of New York, where the
merchant class for the most part clung to their allegiance to Great
Britain, the Provincial Convention of revolutionists decreed that all
Loyalists were guilty of treason and should suffer death. The Loyalists
were probably at least as numerous as the patriots. They included
certainly the larger half of the propertied, educated and professional
classes, as well as of the Quakers and Episcopalians. But they were
inclined to leave the fighting to the British forces, and lack of organi-
sation placed them largely at the mercy of the extremists. The early
step taken for disarming them was perhaps one of the most crucial
actions of the war.8
The paucity of numbers engaged in the battles of the Revolution
and the ever-increasing difficulty in raising recruits for the conti-
nental army indicate that the idea of an independent American
Republic did not appeal overwhelmingly to more than a fraction of
the American people.4 Even those who espoused the revolutionary
cause were lukewarm and reluctant to fight. Out of 700,000 fighting
men in the country, Washington could never muster more than 20,000
for one battle. Whilst those who fought, half-frozen, starving and in
rags, knew no limit to their heroism and endurance, many farmers
were tempted to prefer British gold to paper "not worth a con-
tinental", and to sell their supplies in the best market.
Hardly had the Declaration of Independence been proclaimed
when Admiral Lord Howe arrived off Sandy Hook. To the Pro-
hibitory Bill (20 November 1775) a conciliatory clause had been
added appointing commissioners to enquire into grievances. They
were empowered to raise the interdict of trade in the case of any
colony or part thereof which might declare its readiness to return to
its allegiance. Howe was the bearer of this conciliatory commission.
It was treated with contempt by Franklin, and General Washington,
whose title Howe would not recognise since it was not derived from
the King, refused to receive any communication from him unless he
did so. Lord Howe and his brother, General Howe, had been
1 Fox to Rockingham, 13 Oct. 1776.
• Amer. Archives, 4th Ser. i, 1046; n, 451 ; v, 2x5; vi, 984, etc.
3 Fisher, S. G., The Struggle for American Independence, I, 255 seqq.; Van Tyne, G. H.,
The Loyalists in the American Revolution, p. 163; Sabine, L., American Loyalists.
4 Van Tyne, C. H., England and America, p. 152.
764 AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND BRITISH POLITICS
appointed commissioners, and no choice could have been more tactful,
for both were earnest friends of the Americans and anxious to obtain
a peaceful settlement. But the long delay in the arrival of the Com-
mission, and the condition restricting their powers of pardon and
enquiry into grievances till after submission had been made, helped
to render it futile.
In Parliament, though the voice might be the voice of North and
his colleagues, the hand was the hand of George III. In the country
the tide of the democratic movement ebbed after the Middlesex
election.1 Popular violence during the Gordon riots caused further
reaction, and coincided unfortunately with Richmond's attempt to
introduce universal suffrage and annual parliaments. In these cir-
cumstances, fortified by the absence of Chatham and the divisions
among the Whigs, the "King's Friends" and the old followers of
Grenville were content for the most part to follow the policy dictated
by the King. How subservient ministers were to the Crown, and how
completely non-existent was the practice of ministerial responsibility,
are shown by the prolonged continuance in office of Lord Barrington
and Lord North whilst disapproving of the policy they administered.
On the American question the King's policy was clear, consistent
and determined. He held from the first that the principle at stake
was whether the colonies would continue to accept the authority of
the Crown and Parliament. He held that a policy of firmness un-
deviatingly pursued would have settled that question. The policy of
conciliation and retraction he could not endure. The splendour of
the advocacy of Burke and Chatham left him cold. In his eyes, it
merely encouraged rebellious subjects to persist in their rebellion.2
Now that vacillation had failed, as he always thought it would, he
favoured "every means of distressing the Americans" in order to
compel his recalcitrant subjects to acknowledge the sovereignty
which he had inherited and regarded as a sacred trust. If his generals
had served him with the same concentration of purpose, if his people
at home had with unanimity espoused his cause, he would almost
certainly have succeeded in quelling the rebellion for the time
being.
On 30 May 1777, after two years of seclusion, Chatham reappeared
in the House of Lords and moved an Address to the Crown for putting
an end to hostilities by removing the grievances of the Americans,
before France should enter the war. This motion and its successor
(20 November) were defeated by a large majority, for members were
elated by the recent successes of Brandywine and Gcrmantown. But
Chatham foretold the defeat of Burgoyne, and warned the country
that conquest was impossible, and, if possible, would not settle the
question. The news of Saratoga, however, only roused the country
to further exertions. Subscriptions were raised for enlisting troops.
1 Burke, E., Correspondence, u, 48. 2 George III to North, 31 May 1777. •
NORTH'S CONCILIATORY BILLS 765
The Highlands of Scotland seconded the efforts of the merchants of
London, Manchester and Liverpool, and 15,000 soldiers were re-
cruited. But whilst Fox poured abuse upon Scotland and Manchester,
the Whigs did their utmost to obstruct. It was unconstitutional, they
asserted, for private individuals to raise troops without the consent
of Parliament, and for the garrisons at Gibraltar and Minorca to be
replaced by Hanoverian troops. The impending hostility of France
and Spain compelled George III to abandon "any absurd ideas of
enforcing unconditional submission", but he would not "treat with
independents". He was determined to continue the struggle until
the country was convinced that it was in vain.1
North had already shown his appreciation of the situation by
hinting at concessions.2 Now, on 17 February 1778, he introduced
two bills, one renouncing the right to impose any tax except for
regulating trade, the net produce to be applied to the use of the
colonies, and the other appointing five commissioners to treat with
any person or body public, raising no difficulty about titles. They
were empowered to proclaim a cessation of hostilities, grant pardons,
and suspend any Act of Parliament since 1763. The States were not
to be asked to renounce independence till a treaty was ratified. The
Act remodelling the Massachusetts constitution and the tea duty
were formally repealed. Security for the debts of Congress and re-
habilitation of the American paper currency, which had depreciated
disastrously, were promised. Everything was conceded which the
Americans had demanded and Burke had been urging for three
years.
The announcement of these concessions filled the House with
dismay.3 Opposition demanded the resignation of the statesman who
had provoked the war and was unfitted to make peace. North, in
fact, had long wished to resign. After the royal assent had been
given to the Conciliatory bills and the French alliance with the
United States had been announced, he again pressed his resignation
upon the King, and advised him to send for Chatham (13 March).
The whole nation, indeed, turned to the one statesman who seemed
capable of saving it from disaster, whether by negotiating with the
Americans or conducting the war. Bute, Mansfield, Rochford, Rich-
mond even, all echoed that demand. The Rockingham party, how-
ever, could not follow their example, and any idea of agreement
between the two leaders had soon to be abandoned
But George III refused to send for Chatham, "that perfidious
man", whose recent invectives against the Throne and defence of
the Americans he could not forgive. He would only consent to admit
him "and his crew" to office if they would serve as allies of the
existing Government under North. He appealed to North not to
1 George III to North, 31 Jan. 1778. * Gibbon, E., Miscell. Warkf, p. 216.
3 Annual Register, 1778, p. 133.
766 AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND BRITISH POLITICS
desert him in the hour of danger, as Grafton had done. "No
advantage to this country", he wrote, "no present danger to myself
can ever make me address myself to Lord Chatham or any branch of
Opposition." Not to save his Crown, or his country from ruin, would
he consent to "be shackled by those desperate men". "No consider-
ation in life will make me stoop to Opposition."1 Yet he was no
longer at issue with Chatham over his American policy. He had con-
sented to North's Conciliatory bills, which yielded every point for
which Chatham had contended. Chatham was opposed, as he was
opposed, to conceding independence, and died protesting against
"the dismemberment of this ancient and most noble monarchy".
The King's own words proclaim his reason : " Opposition would make
me a slave for the remainder of my days". For Opposition, whether
he summoned Rockingham or Chatham, would insist on the abandon-
ment of that system of personal government which he had so labori-
ously established. The Whigs would insist that the government of
the country should be carried on by responsible ministers and not by
an irresponsible sovereign.2
Chatham, however, was not in the least inclined to take office
under the existing ministry. If he accepted his country's call, it must
be as "the dictator of a new administration".8 So North remained
at the Treasury, and one half of the Opposition, now including Fox,
continued to advocate American independence, and the other half
to oppose it.
Whether Chatham would or would not have been successful in
conciliating America, if he had formed a ministry, is an interesting
speculation. The answer, perhaps, is to be found in the reception
accorded by Congress to the five Commissioners of Peace. They
reached Philadelphia at an inopportune moment. The news of the
alliance with France had arrived, and Clinton, in accordance with
orders from home, was evacuating the city. Congress declined to
confer with the Commissioners until the British forces had been with-
drawn or independence had been acknowledged. In vain they
offered every privilege and concession that had been demanded,
short of independence. Congress refused to make any further reply.
These concessions came, indeed, from the suspect source of North's
ministry, but they were so generous that their rejection suggests that
the extremists who dominated Congress would have had their way,
even though Chatham had been the negotiator. Before returning to
England, the Commissioners issued a "Proclamation to the American
People", appealing to them against Congress, and offering peace to
any or every colony. A foolish threat was added. The hopes of re-
union, it was stated, had hitherto prevented the extremes of war, but
if the colonies were determined to become an apanage of France,
1 George III to North, 17 March 1778. s Gf. Leckv iv 4.^8.
* Russell, Lord John, Memorials of Fox, i, 180. *°
DEATH OF CHATHAM 767
self-preservation would compel Great Britain to see to it that the
accession was of as little avail as possible. The British Government,
of course, dissociated itself from any idea of introducing a war of
savage desolation.
Convinced that it was "totally impracticable" to retain the de-
pendence of America, the Duke of Richmond on 7 April moved an
Address to the Crown for the withdrawal of the forces and for making
peace. He was anxious to secure the Americans as allies, before war
was declared with France. Chatham, though still indisposed from
an attack of gout, dragged himself to town to protest against the
surrender of the birthright of British princes and the dismemberment
of the Empire. "Shall we", he cried, "now fall prostrate before the
throne of Bourbon?5' Richmond explained that he thought there
was no prospect of success if Great Britain was opposed to France,
Spain and America. Chatham rose to reply, staggered, and fell back
in a fit.
The death of Chatham rendered North's retention of office almost
unavoidable. Shelburne led the remaining followers of Chatham,
but they were not strong enough to form a Government, and would
neither coalesce with ministers nor join with the Rockingham party.
Before Parliament met in November 1779, the growing weakness of
the Government, the unsatisfactory condition of the Army and Navy,
and the divided state of the country, occasioned the resignation of
Lord Gower, President of the Council. The continuance of the war
with America would, he believed, end in the ruin of the country. In
announcing this event to the King, North expressed his opinion that
it would involve the downfall of the ministry, and added that for
three years he had held in his heart the same opinion as Gower. To
strengthen the ministry, overtures were once more made to Oppo-
sition. The only result was to demonstrate yet again its weakness and
dissensions. Profiting by the reaction from the Gordon riots, the King
then dissolved Parliament (i September 1780). The elections went
in favour of the Crown. Towards the end of the year, Necker made
a secret overture for peace. He proposed a truce for the purpose of
negotiations, during which each army in America was to retain the
territories it then held.1 George III rejected this advance on the
ground that France was still attempting "to effect independency,
which, whether under its apparent name or a truce, is the same in
reality".
The news of Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown reached London
on 25 November 1781. The King's Speech, two days later, still urged
a vigorous prosecution of the war. Opposition remained divided. For
though Shelburne insisted on the impossibility of continuing the
struggle, he still would not concede to America the absolute in-
dependence which Rockingham was ready to grant. The pressure
1 Necker to Lord North, i Dec. 1780.
768 AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND BRITISH POLITICS
of the naval and military situation, however, was becoming irresistible.
The country began to perceive the necessity of peace. The City
petitioned the King to put an end " to this unnatural and unfortunate
war". The West India merchants besought him to save them from
utter ruin. In the House of Commons Government majorities
dwindled before the logic of events, and the eloquence of Fox and
Burke and Dunning and Barre was reinforced now by that of the
younger Pitt and Sheridan. But the King turned a deaf ear to North's
suggestions of peace.1 He would never consent, he declared, to the
"irredeemable destruction" of the British Empire.2 But in February a
motion condemning the management of the Navy was defeated only by
nineteen votes. The confusion at the Admiralty was indeed notorious,
although Lord Sandwich had latterly done something to improve
its efficiency.8 On the syth Opposition carried an address against
further prosecution of the American War. It was coldly received by
the King. On 4 March, therefore, General Conway returned to the
attack, moving an Address declaring all who should advise continu-
ance of the war to be enemies of their country. Next day the Attorney-
general introduced a bill for enabling the Government to treat with
the colonies. Fox poured upon it the vials of his wrath, and, spurning
the idea of a coalition, proclaimed that he would be the most in-
famous of men if ever he should make terms with any one of such
ministers. A vote of censure was nearly carried on the 8th. On the
1 5th, Sir John Rous, a Tory, moved a vote of No Confidence. The
Government was saved by nine votes. Fox gave notice of a similar
motion on the 2Oth. But on that day, before the debate could begin,
North announced his resignation. Only with the utmost difficulty
had he induced George III to accept the inevitable. It was now even
whispered that Jamaica was ready to follow the example of the
Leeward Islands and surrender to the French. On 10 March the
King had at last agreed that the Chancellor should approach Rocking-
ham. Thurlow reported his terms. The royal veto was not to be
imposed upon American independence; the new Government's
policy would be peace and economy, and its measures must include
bills for prohibiting contractors from sitting in Parliament, Burke's
Establishment bill, and the Custom House bill disfranchising revenue
officers.4 The King refused these terms. He would only contemplate
an administration "on a wider bottom". Determined not to throw
himself "into the hands of Opposition", he spoke of abdication as
"the only way left" for his honour and conscience,6 The royal yacht
was prepared for his departure to Hanover. But North recognised
that the demand for a change could no longer be resisted. He
1 North to George III, 21 Jan. 1782.
* George III to Lord Stormont, 22 Dec. 1781 ; George 111 to North, 21 Jan. 1782.
3 Memorandum by Lord Sandwich, Corr. of George 111 (ed. Fortescue) .
4 Rockingham, Memoirs •, 11, 451.
6 George III to North, 17 March 1782; Walpole, Journals, n, 421.
ROCKINGHAM'S CABINET 769
reminded the Kong that the Throne could not prudently resist the
deliberate resolutions of the Commons. The example of his royal
predecessors proved that his honour was not involved. Rockingham
and Shelburne alone could form a new administration, and they
would not act with any of the present ministry, except Thurlow.1
Still North was forbidden to resign. Only on the eve of the 20th,
to save him from the vote on Fox's motion, did the King accept his
resignation.
Shelburne was sent for, and requested to form an administration
"on a broad bottom". He declined, and, in accordance with a
promise he had made to Grafton, suggested Rockingham. Rocking-
ham and his terms the King, after a vain appeal to Lord Gower, was
at last obliged to accept. But George would only negotiate with him
through Shelburne, and insisted upon retaining Thurlow as Lord
Chancellor. Buckingham's Cabinet consisted of five of his own party,
including himself, and five of Shelburne's, besides one High Tory,
Thurlow. Lord John Cavendish became Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, Lord Keppel, First Lord of the Admiralty, Richmond,
Master-General of the Ordnance, Camden, Lord President of the
Council, Grafton, Privy Seal, Dunning, raised to the Peerage as Lord
Ashburton, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Conway, Com-
mander-in-Chief. Fox was appointed First Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and Shelburne Secretary of State for Home, Irish, and
Colonial Affairs, the office of Third Secretary for the Colonies being
now abolished. Barre, Thomas Townshend, Sheridan, Burke, and
the Duke of Portland (Lord Lieutenant of Ireland) took office with-
out seats in the Cabinet. No place was found for William Pitt, who
refused to take an inferior office. "At last", wrote the King to Lord
North, " the fatal day has come",2 and he drafted a letter of abdication
in favour of the Prince of Wales, stating that the change of sentiment
in the House of Commons had "totally incapacitated him from either
conducting the War with effect or from obtaining any peace but on
conditions which would prove destructive to the commerce as well
as the essential rights of the British Nation'9.8 George III may
have been narrow-minded and obstinate, but he was faithful to the
ideas of kingship and the interests of the Empire as he conceived
them.
In addition to the difficult problems presented by the military
and naval situation, the new Government was confronted with the
necessity of pacifying Ireland. For the quarrel with America had
brought into prominence the religious and economic oppression under
which Ireland laboured. When North had passed his conciliatory
proposals to the Americans, he had been pressed to extend similar
1 North to George III, 18 March 1782.
2 27 March 1782, Con. ofGeo. HI (ed. Fortescue), i, 154.
3 Facsimile in ibid, i, 161 A.
CHBEI 49
770 AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND BRITISH POLITICS
to Ireland. Something had been done for the relief of Irish
trade; but most of the contemplated measures had to be laid aside
in deference to the protests of English merchants. Non-importation
agreements, similar to those in America, had then been adopted in
Ireland.
These problems were enough to tax the strength of the most united
ministry. But the Whigs were not united, even on those points of
parliamentary and economical reform on which they had conducted a
lively agitation in the country, and which formed an essential part
of their programme for regaining some of the power taken from them
by the successful policy of the King. Outnumbered and outvoted by
the Rockingham section, Shelburne remained in the confidence of
the King, who appealed for his support when Rockingham proceeded
with the reform of the Civil List and the Establishment bill. l Fox and
Shelburne, too, were soon at loggerheads, first over the settlement of
Irish affairs, and then over the Contractors' bill, whilst Pitt's motion
for parliamentary reform was rejected by a combination of Rocking-
ham Whigs and North's old supporters. But the most pressing and
most difficult problem was the negotiation of peace.
Satisfactory communications had already passed between Franklin
and Shelburne.2 The Cabinet therefore decided to send Richard
Oswald to open an informal negotiation. Oswald was a simple,
straightforward Scottish man of business, whose one idea was to
conclude peace and conciliate the Americans. He informed Franklin
that the new ministry desired peace, but would not consent to
humiliating terms from France (12 April). Franklin then introduced
Oswald to Vergennes (17 April).
By the Treaty of Alliance the United States were pledged not to
conclude a separate peace. Vergennes had already been perturbed
by Franklin's omission to inform him of the first approaches made to
him.3 Besides the interests of France he had also to consider the
demands of Spain. Indeed, the objects of these strangely assorted
allies were no more identical in making peace than they had been in
waging war. The divergence of their aims profoundly influenced the
course of the ensuing negotiations. Vergennes had not fought for
American independence, but for vengeance on Great Britain. The
main objects of the Spaniards had been to recapture Gibraltar and
Minorca, and to deprive the British of East and West Florida and
thus regain supremacy in the Gulf of Mexico. Flushed by ttic success
of Saratoga, Congress in 1779 had ignored the protests of M. Gerard,
the French envoy, and adopted, as the terms of peace, acknowledg-
ment of independence before negotiations, and the Mississippi as
their western boundary, with the navigation of that river to the
1 George III to Shelbuzne, 12 April 1782.
2 Franklin to Shelburne, 22 Match.
3 Franklin to Vergennes, 22 March.
NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 771
southern boundary of the States and a fort below it. They also claimed
the rights they had enjoyed, as subjects of the British Empire, in the
Newfoundland fishery. The increasing importance of French aid had
enabled Gerard to induce Congress to abandon the claim to navi-
gation of the Mississippi, after he had informed them that Spain
intended to keep both the Floridas; that the territory on the east side
of the Mississippi belonged to Great Britain; and that their own
western boundary was the line to which settlements were permitted
by the British Proclamation of 176s.1 His successor, La Luzerne, also
obtained an alteration in the instructions of John Adams who,
with Franklin, John Jay, and Henry Laurens, was appointed a
commissioner "to treat and conclude peace". He was directed to
undertake nothing in the negotiations "without the knowledge or
concurrence of the French ministers'5. Independence was to be the
sole ultimatum.
Not only was Spain determined to retain possession of the two
Floridas, to which the success of her arms in that quarter seemed to
entitle her, but she maintained that these territories extended even
to the Great Lakes. She wished to keep the Mississippi Valley for
herself,2 and as she had no desire to have republican neighbours upon
her borders, preferred to leave the lands north-west of the Ohio in
possession of Great Britain, and south-west of it to limit American
expansion in the direction of the Mississippi by a definite boundary
line. France, by the treaty, had bound herself not to recover any part
of the continent then belonging to Great Britain. Still, the lands
south of the Great Lakes and between the Mississippi and the
Alleghanies might be regarded as Indian territory and not included
in that category. Vergennes had no desire to establish the revolted
colonies as a great rival Power. Politically, his object was to place
France in the position of holding the balance between Great Britain,
Spain and the United States. He was therefore prepared to support
in some degree the Spanish claims. His intention was to assign the
Floridas to Spain, but to treat the country between West Florida and
the Cumberland River as Indian territory, placing it under the protec-
tion of Spain and the United States, and to recognise the country
north of the Ohio as British, in accordance with the Quebec Act.3
Moreover, as presently appeared, he would not support the New
England demand for fishing rights on the coast of Newfoundland,
but intended to establish the exclusive right of the French to fish on
certain portions of it, as claimed by them under the Treaties of Utrecht
and Paris.
The proposals of France and Spain amounted to a restriction of
the United States to the same strip of land on the Atlantic coast as
1 15 Feb. 1780. Cf. Jay, John, Life of John J<p, i, 124 seqq.
2 Wharton, Amcr. Dipl. Corr. vxf 23.
8 Life oj John Jay, i, 144, n, 476.
49-*
772 AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND BRITISH POLITICS
they had occupied in 1713. But not only had the Americans refused
to recognise the Act of 1774, annexing the lands north of the Ohio
to the Government of Quebec, but they had to some extent occupied
the territory in question. In the Ohio Valley, what are now Kentucky
and Tennessee had been partially settled by Scots-Irish Presby-
terians moving chiefly from Pennsylvania after 1769. This continuous
movement had been complemented by a skilfully conceived and
brilliantly executed raid, conducted by George Rogers Clarke with a
party of Virginians, on the old French settlements which had passed
into British possession by the Treaty of Paris. Clarke had surprised
the French settlement of Kaskaskia, and thereafter the whole popula-
tion of frontier settlers had joined him (1777-9). The Virginians by
an act of the legislature had appropriated these lands and incor-
porated them in their State under the name of Illinois County. Raids
and counter-raids ensued, but the Ohio Valley remained in the hands
of the Americans. Upon its possession depended the possibility of
their expansion westwards.
When Oswald approached Vergennes, he replied that France
could do nothing without consulting her allies. The treaty must be
general, but France would have several demands to make. Before
returning, Oswald obtained from Franklin, then the only American
commissioner in Paris, a paper in which he had sketched his personal
views as to a basis of negotiations. Britain, he suggested, should be
generous, and voluntarily cede Canada and Nova Scotia, on con-
dition that so much of the waste lands there should be sold "as would
raise a sum sufficient to pay for the houses burnt by the British troops
and their Indians, and also to indemnify the Royalists for the con-
fiscation of their estates".1 This paper was given by Oswald to Shel-
burne, who, regarding it as private, did not communicate it to his
colleagues.
There being evidently no hope of a separate peace, Oswald was
ordered to Paris, since Franklin had expressed a desire for his return,
to settle with him "the most convenient time for setting on foot a
negotiation for a general peace and to represent that the principal
points in contemplation are, the allowance of independence to
America upon Great Britain's being restored to the situation she was
in by the Treaty of 1763". Fox was to appoint a proper person to
make a similar communication to Vergennes (23 April).2 He chose
Thomas^Grenville, son of the author of the Stamp Act. The conduct
of negotiations by two separate Secretaries of State, the one dealing
with America and the other with the other belligerents, was perhaps
inevitable, but it was bound to be embarrassing, and proved the
more so, because Fox wished all negotiations to be conducted by his
department and disagreed on fundamental points with Shclburne.3
1 Franklin, Works, vra, 470.
2 Corr. of Ceo. Ill (ed. Fortescue), i, 244. 3 Gralton, Autobiography, pp. 318-23.
FOX AND SHELBURNE 773
Fox, regarding France as the natural enemy of England, wished to
form alliances with the northern Powers. Offers of mediation had
been made from St Petersburg and Vienna in 1779, 1780 and 1781.
Fox's first step was an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate separately
with the Dutch through the medium of Russia.1 With France, over-
estimating her anxiety for peace, he thought he could make more
favourable terms by at once granting independence to the United
States. Shelburne, on the other hand, remembered Chatham's
failure to create a great Northern Alliance. He appreciated the un-
stable character of the Empress Catharine, and even contemplated
an eventual alliance with France, to curb the aggression of those
Powers which had recently been responsible for the partition of
Poland. He believed that to commence negotiations by conceding
independence would merely encourage France to increase her de-
mands, whilst sacrificing a valuable asset in the bargain to be driven
with the United States. He preferred to keep his hands free for
negotiating a separate peace with each belligerent, and to play off
against each other the conflicting interests of France, Spain and
America. In all this he was strongly supported by the King, who did
not conceal his distrust of Fox and his methods. Shelburne instructed
Oswald to acquaint Franklin that America must be truly independent
and not bind herself in any way to France, and that no idea of re-
paration for damages, such as he had suggested, could be entertained.
A free trade to every part of America was expected and early payment
of all debts due to British subjects. No independence was to be acknow-
ledged without care being taken for the indemnification of the
Loyalists. For himself, Shelburne had come most reluctantly to the
idea of granting complete independence; what he had wished for
was a federal union between the two countries.2
Fox's instructions to Grenville indicated his line of policy. If, as
he expected, France rejected the status quo of 1763, then it would be
evident that, after having secured the independence of the colonies
which was the avowed object of the war, she was continuing it for
her own ends, in which America had no interest. In that case,
Grenville was to sound Franklin as to a separate peace, which "would
open the best road for a general peace".8 Vergennes' answer was,
that he must consult his allies, but as for independence, it was not to
be ceded to France, and would not be regarded by her as an induce-
ment for granting a favourable peace. America must negotiate for
it separately. Conde d'Aranda adopted the same attitude on behalf
of Spain.4
Grenville thereupon suggested to Fox that, with the object of
1 Malmesbwy Correspondence; Correspondence ofC. J. Fox, i, 331.
F.O. 97,157-
3 Fox to Grenvilie, 30 April 1782, P.O., France, 27/2; cf. Fox to George III, Corr.
Geo. Ill (ed. Fortescue), i, 313.
4 Grenville to Fox, 10 May 1782.
774 AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND BRITISH POLITICS
separating the allies and making a distinct treaty, independence might
be granted to America "in the first instance, instead of making it a
conditional article of general treaty3'.1 America would then be less
likely to support France and Spain in their large demands. At this
opportune moment (18 May), tidings reached England of Rodney's
victory and the capture of Dutch posts in Ceylon. Though this news
affected the popularity of ministers who had decided to recall and
disgrace Rodney, it strengthened their hands in dealing with France.
Grenville was, therefore, ordered to proceed as he had proposed.2 At
the same time, Oswald was instructed to make peace, either general
or separate, with the American commissioners at what the King
termed "the dreadful price of independence".3
When Grenville announced (15 May) that he was authorised to
acknowledge the independence of America in the first instance, and
to offer to France the Treaty of 1763 as a basis for negotiation,
Vergennes, of course, perceived the underlying intention to separate
the allies. He replied that in any new treaty he should prefer that
the Treaty of Paris be annulled "except in certain specified
articles". The vagueness of this reply showed that France intended
to create delays. The Cabinet decided to adhere to its policy, and
also instructed Fox to inform the court of St Petersburg that, without
formally admitting the Armed Neutrality, Great Britain would make
the principles of the Empress' declaration on that subject the basis
of a treaty on condition that Russia obtained the neutrality of
Holland.*
The tension between Fox and Shelburne now became acute. Fox
credited Shelburne with duplicity in concealing from him Franklin's
suggestion about Canada.5 He proposed to interpret the recognition
of independence "in the first instance" as transferring the whole
negotiation to his own department of Foreign Affairs, arguing that
the colonies thereby ceased to exist. The Cabinet decided against
him.6 Grenville, however, began to act as if he were sole negotiator,
and complained of the interference of Oswald.7 The result was to
create suspicion in Franklin's mind, whilst Vergennes plainly stated
that any attempt to separate France from America would be in vain;
that the treaties must go hand in hand; and that France was not
daunted by her defeat in the West Indies. Franklin presently pro-
posed the appointment of separate commissioners, each to deal with
each belligerent, and "then to consolidate those several settlements
into one genuine and conclusive Treaty".8
1 Grenville to Fox, 14 May 1782, P.O., France, 27/2.
" Cabinet Minute, 23 May; Grafton, Autobiography, p. 321.
Shelburne to Oswald, 21 May, F.O., France, 27/2; Shelburne to George III, 25 May,
Corr. ofGeo. Ill, i, 332, 333.
Grafton, Autobiography, p. 32 1 ; Memorials of Fox, i, 331 ; Fox to George III, 24 June 1 782.
Fox to Grenville, 10 June. • Grafton, Autobiography, p. 318.
Shelburne to Oswald, 27 July. • Oswald to Shelburne, 9 June.
SHELBURNE SUCCEEDS ROCKINGHAM 775
When the enabling Act was passed, a commission was sent to
Grenville, "to treat with France and any other Prince or State whom
it may concern". This, again, he interpreted as including the United
States.1 Fox demanded the recall of Oswald3 whom Shelburne pro-
posed as commissioner to treat separately with Franklin, as the latter
had suggested. On 30 June Fox urged the Cabinet to sanction the
granting of independence even without a treaty, and thus to place
all future negotiations in the hands of the Foreign Secretary. The
Cabinet decided against him on both points. The majority voted that
the grant of independence must be accompanied by the treaty,
though it might be admitted as the basis of negotiation. Fox
announced his intention to resign.2
The same day Rockingham died. Shelburne succeeded him, with
a Cabinet placed, as the King wished, " on a broad bottom ", but seven
out of eleven were old followers of Chatham, and two of Rockingham.
Thomas Townshend and Lord Grantham, the former ambassador
to Spain, were his Secretaries of State. Keppel remained at the
Admiralty as a matter of duty, but Grafton retired into the country.
William Pitt became Chancellor of the Exchequer. Fox, having
resigned, was followed by Lord John Cavendish, Burke, Sheridan,
and the Duke of Portland, whom they had wished to make Prime
Minister. The secession was smaller than they had hoped. Dis-
appointment stimulated the virulence with which Fox and Burke
attacked Shelburne in the House of Commons.
Shelburne-at once replaced Grenville by Alleyne Fitzherbert,
whom he brought from Brussels to negotiate with the French court,
whilst Oswald dealt with the Americans. On 9 July, Franklin stated
his ideas for the basis of a treaty. Four conditions he named as
necessary: complete independence; definition of boundaries; restric-
tion of the "Canadian boundary to at least what it was before the
Quebec Act; and freedom of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland.
Other conditions he described as desirable for promoting friendly
feeling — an indemnity of half a million for the destruction of towns;
an acknowledgment of error on the part of Great Britain; the States
to enjoy the same privileges in trade and shipping as the British; and
the cession of Canada and Nova Scotia. He withdrew his suggestion
for making provision for the Loyalists, because they were so numerous
and Congress had no authority over the particular States which had
confiscated their property.3 At this juncture much delay was caused
by the rumour spread by Grenville that Shelburne did not intend to
concede independence.4 Only with difficulty was confidence re-
stored. John Jay was now associated with Franklin in Paris. He was
1 Franklin to Shelburne, 27 June 1783.
8 Grafton, Autobiography, pp. 318-21.
8 Oswald to Shelburne, 10 July, P.O. 97/157-
4 Oswald to Shelburne, 10-12 July; Franklin to Oswald, 12 July; Shelburne to Oswald,
27 July.
776 AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND BRITISH POLITICS
convinced that France and Spain intended to use the American
alliance for extorting concessions for themselves. He therefore now
demanded that the United States should be treated with as an in-
dependent Power. In this he was supported by Vergennes, who
calculated that, the object of the alliance having thus been fulfilled,
he could leave the Americans to look after themselves and play for
his own hand.1 At present he desired delay in hopes of securing
Gibraltar and the Mississippi for Spain, and establishing French
claims in the East and West Indies and the Newfoundland fishery.
A letter intercepted by the British Government from M. de Marbois
to Vergennes, and a memorandum from M. Gerard de Rayneval,
Chief Clerk of the French Foreign Office, demonstrating that the
United States had no right to the Mississippi Valley, confirmed Jay
in his distrust of his allies,2 whilst Oswald was frightened by the hint
that the Americans were concluding a treaty of commerce with
Spain. Both sides being anxious, it was therefore at length agreed
that independence should be granted absolutely and irrevocably as
an article in the treaty, and Franklin's four "necessary" articles
were accepted as the basis of negotiations.3 Oswald had been in-
structed that the right of drying fish on the Newfoundland shore
would not be ceded, and that payment of debts before 1775 and
compensation for Loyalists must be stipulated in the treaty, but that
the British claim to the ungranted domains and territory between the
Mississippi and the Alleghanies might be waived in part to provide
such compensation.4 But when Jay produced a draft treaty on
5 October, Oswald yielded on all these points.
The delimitation of the frontiers involved prolonged discussion.
The limits of the thirteen colonies as fixed by the Proclamation of
1763 were, westwards, the Mississippi as far north as the southern
boundary of the Hudson's Bay Company, and in the south the
boundaries of Georgia and South Carolina. On the north-cast, the
Proclamation defined the Government of Quebec (Canada) as
bounded on the Labrador coast by the river St John, and from thence by a line
drawn from the head of that river, through the lake St John to the south end of
Lake Nippissim; from whence the said line crossing the river St Lawrence, and the
lake Chamglain in 45 degrees of north latitude, passes along the high lands which
divide the rivers that empty themselves into the said river St Lawrence from those
which fall into the sea, and also along the north coast of the Bay des Chalcurs, and
the coast of the Gulf of St Lawrence, to Gape Rosicrs, and from thence crossing
the mouth of the river St Lawrence, by the west end of the island of Anticosly,
terminates at the aforesaid river St John.
As to Nova Scotia, the western boundary after 1763 was defined
by the River St Croix, and a line drawn due north from the source
of that river to the southern boundary of Canada, that is, the line
1 Life of John Jay, i, 142 seqq., u, 472; Vergennes to La Luzerne.
1 Amer. Dipl. Corr. vi, 483; Life of John Jay, i, 144, 490; B. Vaughan to Shclburne,
12 Sept. 1782.
8 Townshend to Oswald, i Sept. * Shclburne to Oswald, 31 July.
THE NORTH-WEST ANGLE 777
along the highlands described in the Proclamation. The angle
formed by the junction of these two imaginary lines was known as
the North-West angle of Nova Scotia, and was believed (for the
country had never been accurately surveyed), to be near Lake
Medousa, at the head of the branch of the St John River now called
the Madawaska. That branch was then thought to be the main
stream. Taking the St John River as the eastern boundary of Massa-
chusetts which then included Maine, Jay proposed to place the
North-West angle near Lake Medousa, and thence to draw the
southern boundary of Canada, according to the Proclamation, along
the highlands to the head of the Connecticut River, and along the
middle of that river till the forty-fifth parallel was reached, following
that line to the North-West bank of the St Lawrence and from there to
the southern end of Lake Nippissim [Nipissing] and thence straight to
the source of the Mississippi, a point not then definitely ascertained.
This line, however, cut off a part of Nova Scotia to which, Jay admitted,
Massachusetts was not entitled, and it was agreed that commissioners
should be appointed to settle the eastern boundary of that State.1 A
clause was added providing for the free navigation of the Mississippi.
The improvement in the military situation owing to the relief of
Gibraltar justified a firmer attitude on the part of the British.2 Henry
Strachey, an able and experienced official, was therefore sent to Paris
to press the points which Oswald had too readily conceded.8 John
Adams had now joined his fellow-commissioners in Paris. He sup-
ported Jay against Franklin in his determination to conclude
negotiations without consulting the French, and readily conceded
the British demand that "honest debts should be honestly paid".4
The St Croix was accepted as the boundary of Maine and Nova
Scotia, and the "North-West angle" was defined as being formed by
a line drawn due north from its source to the highlands, "which
divide those rivers that empty themselves into the River St Lawrence,
from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean". The substitution of
the phrase "Atlantic Ocean" for "the sea" was a source of future
trouble. The line was to follow these highlands to the north-western-
most head of the Connecticut River, thence down the middle of that
river to the forty-fifth parallel, and from there to run through the centre
of the water communications of the Lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, and
Superior, and the Lake of the Woods, and through the centre of the
lakes themselves. From the North-West point of the Lake of the
Woods the line was to be drawn "on a due west course" to the
Mississippi, and thence down the middle of that river to Lat. 31°.
Thereafter, south, by a line drawn due east from that point to the
middle of the River Chattahoochee (or Apalachicola), and along the
1 Oswald to Townshend, 5, 7, 8, 11 Oct. 1782.
* Shelburnc to Oswald, 21 Oct.
3 Instructions to Strachey, 20 Oct.
4 Adams, John, Works, m, 301 seqq.; Life of John Joy, i, 152.
778 AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND BRITISH POLITICS
middle of that river to its junction with the Flint River, thence
straight to the head of St Mary's River and down its centre to the
Atlantic Ocean.
Strachey had thus secured an improvement upon Oswald's agree-
ment both as regards Nova Scotia and Canada.1 He also obtained
the abandonment of the American claim to dry fish on the New-
foundland shore, whilst conceding the right of fishing in the Gulf
of St Lawrence and of drying fish on the unsettled parts of Nova
Scotia. The navigation of the Mississippi was declared free to both
countries. But no provision for the Loyalists could be extorted. Shel-
burne made one last effort. The Americans were informed that the
treaty depended upon the restitution of their property. Franklin
retorted by threatening to enter a counter-claim for damages by
British troops. The situation was critical.2 At last it was agreed
that a clause should be inserted in the treaty that there should be
no further persecution of the Loyalists, and that Congress should
recommend to the respective States the restitution of their confiscated
property. The concession of the western lands was made, as Shelburne
afterwards declared, not of necessity but of choice, with the idea of
providing means for compensating the Loyalists.3 As Congress failed
to induce the State Legislatures to respect the provisions of the treaty,
the western forts were retained by Great Britain until 1 797. A series
of Acts and Treasury payments for twenty years show that Britain
was not unmindful of the claims of those who had fought and suffered
for their chosen loyalty.
To the nine Preliminary Articles of Peace signed at Paris on 30
November 1782, and embodying these agreements, a tenth and secret
clause was added. It provided that if, at the close of the war, Great
Britain should be, or should be put, in possession of West Florida, then
the southern boundary of the United States should run due cast from
the confluence of the Yazoo and the Mississippi, instead of following
the Proclamation line of Lat. 31° from the Mississippi to the Chatta-
hoochce. Scenting the danger of an agreement between France and
Spain for the division of the western lands, Jay had previously pro-
posed to Oswald that the British army should be removed from New
York to the south and used to drive the Spaniards out of Florida.4
Vergennes concealed the annoyance he felt at the signing of the
preliminary articles without the cognisance of France.6 The reser-
vation therein that peace was not to be concluded until terms were
agreed upon between France and Great Britain did not, in his
opinion, excuse the infraction of the treaty. But at the same time his
own protracted negotiations were drawing to a close. Rayneval had
been sent to England in September under an assumed name and in
1 Strachey to Townshend, 8 Nov. 1782. * Oswald to Shelburne, 29 Nov. 1782.
8 Fitzmaurice, Life ofShelburnf, n, 202.
4 Oswald to Townshcnd, 2 Oct.; Townshcnd to Oswald, 26 Oct.
5 Vergennes to La Luzerne, 19 Dec.
DEMANDS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN 779
the guise of a man of business. Both the King and Jay warned Shel-
burne against the cunning beneath this "specious garb".1 The terms
he propounded, however, were, with certain reservations, accepted
as a basis for discussion. Shelburne suggested that a commercial
treaty might be negotiated after peace was signed, aiming at a liberal
agreement and putting an end to commercial monopoly, which he
regarded as "an odious invention59, but admitted that it was still
"the catechism of the English merchants". Rayneval returned these
confidences by revealing that France was strongly opposed to the
American claims as regards both the Newfoundland fishery and the
valleys of the Mississippi and Ohio. But when the French envoy
added that there could be no peace without the surrender of Gibraltar,
Shelburne replied that only an exchange for some valuable equi-
valent in the West Indies or Minorca was possible. When Rayneval
demurred, he pointed out that in that case die responsibility for
continuing the war would rest with Spain.2
The day after Jay presented his draft treaty to Oswald, Vergennes
communicated to Fitzherbert the demands of France and Spain
(6 October). They were pitched in a higher key than the terms
offered by Rayneval. France required the cession of St Lucia and
Dominica, and of Senegal and Goree; the abrogation of all articles
relating to Dunkirk; an exclusive right of fishery off Newfoundland
from Cape St John to Cape Lahune, and one or more islands to be
fortified for the protection of her fishermen there. In India, besides
the restoration of the French factories in Bengal and Orissa, with the
right of fortifying Chandernagore and the surrender of Pondicherry,
Karikal and the comptoir at Surat, the whole of the Northern
Circars and Masulipatam were demanded. Spain required the cession
of Minorca, all Florida, the Bahamas, British possessions and rights in
Honduras, Campeachy and the Moskito coast, as well as Gibraltar,
for which she offered Oran and Mazalquiver in exchange.3 These
terms could not in any case be accepted. The failure of die French
and Spanish attack upon Gibraltar enabled the British Cabinet to
adopt a firm tone.4 France then consented to withdraw her demand
of the Circars and Masulipatam and also of an exclusive right of
fishery off a part of Newfoundland, requiring only that British
governors should be instructed to secure French fishermen from in-
terruption in their occupation. Dominica she still demanded.5 Spain,
supported by Vergennes, adhered resolutely to the cession of Gibral-
tar, but was ready, as Aranda expressed it, "to give anything
in exchange except the limbs of Spain". In the latter category he
included Cuba and Porto Rico.6
George III to Shelburne, 14 Sept. 1782.
Corr. ofGeo. IH9 1, 472; Fitzmaurice, Life ofShelburne, n, 176-84.
Fitzherbert to Grantham, 7 Oct.
Shelburne to Fitzherbert, 21 Oct.
Fitzherbert to Shelburne, 5 Nov. s Ibid. 28 Oct.
78o AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND BRITISH POLITICS
Convinced that France would not continue to fight for the sake of
Gibraltar, Shelburne threatened to break off negotiations. To Ray-
neval, who was sent to make new proposals, he outlined his views.
He accepted the suggestion as to the fishery, and offered to extend
French rights to Cape Ray instead of Cape George. ^ Dominica and
St Vincent were necessary for wood and water for British vessels, but
an exchange for Dominica might be considered. He repeated his
intention to promote free trade in the East Indies, and looked forward
to their respective sovereigns entering into a mutual guarantee of
peace and becoming the guardians of that of the whole world. In
India France should have the territory round Pondicherry as far as
Shalambar and Karikal with its ancient dependencies, and Mah6
into the bargain, but Orissa could not be ceded. As to Spain, the
King would accept no less than Porto Rico and the return of all
British territory captured by the Spaniards. British merchants would
insist upon the safeguarding of the logwood trade in Honduras and
Campeachy.1 Spain now offered West Florida in exchange for
Gibraltar, but France refused to cede Dominica.
The proposal to exchange Gibraltar provoked acute dissension in
the Cabinet. One section, headed by Richmond and Keppel, would
not hear of it. But with Shelburne and Grafton it was rather a
question of the price, and now that the treaty with America was
signed, the price could be raised.2 When alternative schemes were
presented to the King, he expressed a preference for "getting rid of
Gibraltar" in return for "as much possession in the West Indies as
possible". For it was in that direction and in the East that he saw
the only hope of recovery for British trade and the British Empire.
But if adequate compensation in the West Indies could not be ob-
tained, then, he proposed, Spain might be offered the two Floridas
in order to satisfy her for our retention of Gibraltar.3 But Fox was
thundering against the least suggestion of parting with the rock-
fortress, and the country, stirred by Elliot's heroic defence of it, was
on his side. Shelburne was obliged to inform the court of Spain that
the nation would not relinquish Gibraltar, and made the suggested
offer of the two Floridas in its stead.4
Left in the lurch by their American friends, Louis and Vergennes
with difficulty persuaded Charles III to accept. But in France, as in
England, there was a party which preferred to continue the war rather
than to make peace at the price to which it had now been raised.
Each party insisted upon the retention of Dominica. Shelburne and
Grantham at last induced the Cabinet to offer, as an ultimatum,
Tobago in exchange, and the surrender by the Dutch of Trincomalee
or Negapatam or Demerara and Essequibo. With equal difficulty
1 Shelburne to Rayneval, 13 Nov. 1782. From an unpublished letter, of which a copy
is in the possession of Dr J. Holland Rose.
1 Grafton, Autobiography, p. 347. 8 George III to Shelburne, n Dec.
4 Grantham to Fitzherbert, 18 Dec.
PRELIMINARIES SIGNED AT VERSAILLES 781
Vergennes secured the acceptance of these terms. It was further
agreed that a commission should be appointed to consider com-
mercial questions.
Preliminaries of peace were signed at Versailles between Great
Britain and France and Spain on 20 January 1783. As to the fishery,
Vergennes had fought hard to retain the word exclusive, but in the
end was obliged to be content with the conditions outlined above.
St Pierre and Miquelon and St Lucia and Tobago were ceded to the
French, who were confirmed in the right of fishing in the Gulf of
St Lawrence. Grenada and the Grenadines, St Vincent, Dominica,
St Christopher, Nevis, and Montserrat were restored to Great Britain,
whose possession of Fort James and the River Gambia was confirmed.
Senegal and its dependencies and Goree were restored to France.
In India, Great Britain restored all the establishments belonging to
France at the commencement of the war on the coast of Orissa and
in Bengal, with a liberty to surround Chandernagore with a ditch for
draining; also Pondicherry and Karikal and their dependencies, and
Mah6 and the comptoir at Surat. A safe, free and independent trade
was guaranteed to the French in those parts of India. All articles
relative to Dunkirk were abrogated. Spain obtained Minorca and
the two Floridas, and restored Providence and the Bahama Islands
and all other captured British possessions. British subjects were to
be allowed to cut logwood in a district of which the boundaries were
to be fixed. Commissioners were to be appointed to discuss a com-
mercial treaty.
At the same time, a truce was made with Holland. Dutch pleni-
potentiaries had come to Paris in October and insisted upon the
recognition of the Armed Neutrality as a preliminary to peace in
accordance with Fox's former communication, but were told that
that offer had been cancelled by their rejection of the overture for
peace which accompanied it. They also demanded restitution of all
the British conquests, and compensation for captured vessels.1 These
demands were refused.2 The States-General were offered instead a
renewal of the treaties in being before the rupture, and the return
of all places taken from them except Trincomalee. Finally, on 20 May
1 784, a definitive treaty was settled on the basis of mutual restitution,
except that Great Britain retained Negapatam, the most important
harbour on the Coromandel coast.8
as the price of the dilatory diplomacy which had left them alone upon
the field. By Article vi of the treaty the States-General agreed, most
unwillingly, not to obstruct British navigation of the Eastern Seas.
The Dutch had hitherto endeavoured to maintain an exclusive trade
1 Fitzherbert to Grantham, 28 Oct. 1782.
2 Grantham to Fitzhcrbert, 18, 20 Dec. 1782.
* Koch et Scholl, Traitts (1817 edn), m, 400-3; Martens, Rtcueil des traites, n, 457,
462, 520.
782 AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND BRITISH POLITICS
in the Far East. The surrender of this monopoly, opening up as
it did unrestricted commerce with the Spice Islands and China, was
a gain of immense value to Great Britain.
Shelburne attached the most importance to the clauses which
related, as he expressed it, "to the great principle of free trade which
inspired the treaties from beginning to end".1 But the negotiations
of the commercial treaties passed into other hands. Parliament had
been prorogued till 5 December in the hope that the signing of pre-
liminary articles with France and Spain as well as America might be
announced. The position of Shelburne had by this time become very
insecure.2 He was the most able statesman in England, but his
personal following was small. The measures of parliamentary reform
which he advocated and the curtailment of the Civil List which he
introduced brought their inevitable reward of reaction and of hostility
from placemen deposed. Moreover, he was endeavouring, like
Chatham, to govern without party and with an administration "on
a broad bottom", and, like Chatham, found that in a crisis every man
was for himself. Virulent denunciations of the Preliminaries by Fox
and Burke were convincingly answered by Pitt and Shelburne, who
revealed the strain to which the Navy and the country's finances had
been put. But by an unfortunate indiscretion Shelburne in the House
of Lords added to the distrust with which he was regarded by de-
claring that the grant of independence was not irrevocable, whilst
Pitt in the Commons admitted that it was. The country, smarting
from a peace that no man could have made pleasing, sought a scape-
goat. Resignations from the Cabinet opened the way to what Pitt
denounced as "the unprincipled Coalition", and to the alliance of
North, who had carried on the war against his personal convictions,
with Fox, who six months before had described him as worthy of im-
peachment. Shelburne resigned on 24 February 1783. The negotia-
tion of a treaty of commerce passed then into the hands of Fox. But
his emissary, David Hartley, having exceeded his instructions and
forfeited the confidence of the American commissioners, it remained
only to sign the three definitive treaties in the terms of the Prelimin-
aries (3 September 1783).
The Peace of Paris and Versailles brought to a close the long
struggle which ever since 1740 had been maintained with France for
the New World. By it France achieved her revenge for the disaster
of 1 763. Helped by the blunders of her age-long rival, she had called
"a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old".
Whether the secession of the thirteen colonies was a good thing for
them or a bad thing for Great Britain are questions upon which
historians have differed. But the subsequent development of the
United States has an inspiring lesson to offer to the second British
1 Shelburne to Morellet, 13 March 1783.
* Gibbon, E., to Holroyd, 14 Oct. 1782.
IMPERIAL EXAMPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 783
Empire which has grown up since that event. By its process its
±SVZS' ^ Sohdanty> ^ Uni°* of American StateshasSoS
he±e /L? TT If*1- n0t necessaril7 fell to pieces when it
become great It has by its growth shown that Turgot's dict
which ite birth seemed to prove, is not necessarily true: that
° °ff hCn nC
npC' ^Ut that an ***** number
CHAPTER XXVI
THE LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE
OF THE OLD EMPIRE
JLN previous chapters the political developments that followed from
the settlement of English colonies in North America have been dealt
with. It remains to say something of the social and intellectual con-
ditions of this new world. At the outset it is necessary to emphasise
that during the whole colonial period we find little or no trace of the
beginnings of a distinctly national type in the field of either social or
intellectual relations. Different forms of government, different laws,
different interests, and in some of the colonies different religious
persuasions and different manners, did not make for national unity.
Indeed, their jealousy of each other was so great that, however
necessary a union of the colonies had been for their common defence,
yet they were never able to effect such a union among themselves,
nor even to agree in requesting the mother country to establish it for
them.
During the years in question the western States were still unborn
and the types of colony with which we have to deal divide themselves
into three distinct groups: the southern, the northern and the middle.
With Virginia must be associated Maryland which was carved out of
it, the Carolinas and Georgia. The New England colonies, Massachu-
setts, Connecticut, New Hampshire and Rhode Island were as
different in character from the southern colonies as were their
respective vegetations. Lastly, the middle colonies, New York, with its
satellite New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, with its satellite Delaware,
afforded a half-way house in which the extremes of north and south
might to some extent blend owing to the power of foreign influences.
Later on we shall have something to say of the cosmopolitan
character of New York and of the manner in which German immi-
gration affected the nature of Penn's experiment. It is enough here to
note that, however New York and Pennsylvania may have differed
in character, they had still points in common unknown to the type
of northern or southern colonist.
To Virginia, the eldest of the colonies, the mother of the future
creators of the American nation, George Washington, Jefferson and
Madison, must be given the pride of place in any discussion of
American conditions. What, then, was the social and intellectual life
of the Virginia of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? A
distinguished Virginian historian1 who devoted many years to the
study of the institutional, economic and social conditions of his
native country in the seventeenth century, has insisted with much
1 Bruce, P. A., The Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century.
VIRGINIA AS AN ARISTOCRATIC SOCIETY 785
power on the degree in which the Virginia of the time was a replica
of old England; and though subsequent research seems to show that
the predominance of an aristocracy was not so great as he sug-
gested, and that the purchase of land by men who had served their
time as indentured labourers played a more important part in the
development of the colony than was reckoned by him, still the general
conclusion may be accepted ; whilst nothing can be more misleading
than the statement of a brilliant English historian that Virginia was
mainly peopled by members of the criminal classes.
There were, indeed,strong reasons why younger members of eminent
English families should seek a new home in Virginia. Under the
rule of the Parliament and Cromwell prospects at home were very
black for men of this class. As was said by one of them, Virginia
(he might have added Barbados) was "the only city of refuge left
in His Majesty's dominions in those times for distressed cavaliers".1
Such men naturally gravitated towards each other. They had, in
common, loyalty to the monarchy whose eclipse they regarded as
only temporary. Further, the cultivation of tobacco afforded oppor-
tunities for the English system of fairly large estates, indentured
labourers taking the place of the English farm hands. Lastly, for those
seriously inclined, there was the attraction of a State Church modelled
more or less — (we shall see how different it proved in its working) —
on the Church of England. In this state of things it is small wonder
that the historian can point with pride to the number of distinguished
English families that had their representatives in Virginia. The
absence of towns, which afterwards played no little part in the retarda-
tion of Virginia's economic development, appeared as an additional
attraction to men whose interests were centred in rural pursuits.
A remarkable feature in seventeenth-century Virginia, and one
which especially appealed to members of the governing classes in Eng-
land, was the way in which, as in none other of the British colonies,
old-world usages and distinctions were able to transplant themselves
into the virgin soil of a new continent. Social divisions remained as
strong as they had been in England. The size of some of the estates
was very great, the Fairfax estate in Virginia embracing at one time
6,000,000 acres. There was naturally less variety of classes. There
were no noblemen or bishops, and the mercantile element scarcely
existed. The community consisted almost exclusively of gentlemen,
yeomen and labourers; but there was at least as broad a line of de-
marcation between these classes as in England. The titles "Esquire",
"Mr" and "Gentleman" conveyed definite meanings and were not
applied loosely. The right of bearing arms was jealously prized and
any unwarranted assumption of such right would have been im-
mediately resented. Nevertheless, from the first, tendencies were at
work which in the end brought it about that aristocratic Virginia
1 Force, P., Hist. Tracts, i, 34, "Ingram's Proceedings".
GHBE I
786 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
fell under the spell of advancing democracy. It must be remembered
that the bulwarks against such advances, strong as they were, had
much less strength in Virginia than in England. The absence of a
powerful territorial nobility weakened the position of the landed pro-
prietors. Moreover, though in name the English Church in Virginia
was a replica of the Church of England, in fact it developed into some-
thing wholly different. In England the parson was appointed for
life and held a position completely independent from any inter-
ference on the part of his parishioners, although he might be in a
position of subservience to the local magnate who was very often the
patron of his living. Very different was the Church system as it
prevailed in Virginia. Here the parish was the local unit for the
administration of religious affairs, the parish being represented by
the vestry, a body elected by the free vote of the parishioners or at
a later date by the suffrage of the freeholders and householders. To
the vestry belonged the appointment of their parish clergyman,
though actual induction was placed in the hands of the governor.
Vestries, however, were able to elude the necessity of this step by
appointing their ministers only from year to year, thus avoiding the
consequences that would have followed from such induction. After
it the minister could claim a life tenure of his living, and became at
once independent of his congregation's favour or disfavour. This
state of things, under which all that concerned the Church and
religion in Virginia was delegated to the mercy of the people,1 was
naturally resented by many of the clergy and undoubtedly it in-
creased the difficulty of finding suitable Englishmen for the Virginian
ministry. There was undoubted force in these criticisms and they
were powerfully supported by the able and shrewd commissary,
James Blair.2 On the other hand, formal induction might foist upon
an unhappy parish a minister who proved incompetent or even
worthless. It was impossible for people in Virginia to obtain the same
knowledge of the character of candidates as could be obtained by a
patron in England. Moreover, Beverley, who spoke with authority,
maintained that very rarely was a minister dismissed without grave
cause, and that no qualified clergyman ever returned to England for
want of preferment in Virginia.8 With this controversy, however,
we are not here concerned; the one point that interests us is the
manner in which such a system of Church establishment favoured the
development of democratic aspirations.
It was not only in dissident New England that politics had
affixed its mark to religious controversy; in the old dominion itself,
the original home of loyalty and obedience, Church and State found
themselves at angry issue. Many causes contributed to the inefficiency
of the Virginia clergy, amongst which were the size of the parishes
1 Godwyn, Negro's and Indian's Advocate, pp. 167 seqq.
2 Present state of Virginia, 1697-8. 8 Beverley, Hist, of Va. p. a 13.
THE CHURCH IN VIRGINIA 787
and the low rate of pay, which often obliged a clergyman to embark
upon duties other than those of his calling. The treatment of the
clergy in the matter of pay was a standing grievance which embittered
the social life of Virginia and Maryland. Although glebes were
regularly provided, in many cases the land was of a worthless
character. There were continuous efforts on the part of the laity to
diminish the sums received by the clergy in estimating the worth of
tobacco. These culminated in the notorious Twopenny Act of 1755,
which provided that for ten months payments which had previously
been made in tobacco might be converted into money at zd. per Ib.
or i6s. 8d. per cwt. It was urged that this law discriminated against
the clergy by robbing them of the advantage of years when the price
of tobacco ranged high. At the moment the grievance did not turn
out to be serious, but in 1758 in anticipation of another failure in the
crop a similar law was enacted for a year. This time the Act entailed
serious losses on the clergy and it was finally disallowed. That, how-
ever, did not prevent it from taking effect until its disallowance was
publicly notified in Virginia. The attitude taken up by the clergy in
this matter was the cause of the fierce attack made by Patrick Henry
in 1762 upon the Church of England in Virginia. The enthusiasm
aroused by his diatribes shows the instability of its position.
Another influence that was bound to react upon the social life
of the people was the more or less democratic character of the House
of Assembly. It is true that during the last years 01 Berkeley's regime
the House reflected the reactionary and autocratic character of the
governor; but, taking the period as a whole, the Assembly elected by
the freeholders represented the temper of the common people far
more effectively than did the House of Commons in England. As
early as the first decade of the eighteenth century we find Spotswood,
no mean judge of men and things, deploring the tendency of the
Virginian electors to prefer for their members men who were not
gentlemen. But when such a state of things was beginning to prevail
in the political world, how was it possible that it should not also
influence social relations?
Whatever the future might have in store, at first it seemed as though
another England was to burst into bloom on the American continent.
Again and again in wills is found the use of the word "home" to
describe England. Communication was constant between the two
countries, the sea captains who made the annual voyage being willing
intermediaries. In some ways society seemed to be more exclusive
than it was in contemporary England. Thus in 1673 an unfortunate
tailor was fined 100 Ib. of tobacco for running a horse in a race, "a
sport", it was solemnly affirmed, "for gentlemen alone".1 The houses
of the leading planters were built to recall as far as possible English
1 Fork County Records, vol. i, 1671-94, p. 34, quoted in Bruce, P. A., Social life of Virginia,
P- '94-
50-8
788 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
manor houses. The cultivation of the staple crop, tobacco, promoted
the extension of landed estates, virgin soil being required for its most
successful growth. Side by side with the great landowners were the
freeholders, whose estates were small. These yeomen for the most part
belonged to an inferior class socially, but with the possession of thepoli-
tical suffrage they were destined in time to gain the ascendancy. Still, at
the beginning, they were little regarded in the social life of Virginia.
The isolation in which the planters lived ensured to the passing
guest a cordial welcome. Moreover habits of hospitality were en-
couraged by physical conditions. Most of the principal houses were
situated on the banks of navigable waters. A boat was generally the
most convenient way of approaching a friend; and when a party was
given by some leading planter, a sailing vessel would bring a large
number of guests who were picked up in the course of its voyage.
Even to strangers the hospitality of Virginians was proverbial.
"Virginia", wrote the author of Leah and Rachel* "wants not good
victual, wants not good dispositions, and as God has freely bestowed
it they as freely impart with it." Nor was it only the rich who showed
hospitality. Even "the poor planters", wrote the historian of Vir-
ginia, "who have but one bed, will very often sit up or lie upon a form
or couch all night to make room for a weary traveller to repose him-
self after his journey".2 One reason -for this generous hospitality
was the abundance of food. Game was plentiful throughout the
colony, especially partridges, wild turkey and pigeons ; whilst along
the sea coast were great flocks of wild geese and ducks. The Virginian
to a great extent lived in the saddle, and the pursuit of horses that
ran wild in the forest gave to anyone the opportunity of obtaining
a mount Popular diversions, besides horse-racing and shooting,
followed on the lines of those in England. Dancing and drinking
played a leading part, though there seems to have been less drunken-
ness than in the mother country. Among games, that of ninepins
was especially popular, as was playing with dice and cards. Betting
was a habit very prevalent; and in some circumstances it received
recognition from the law courts. At marriages and funerals English
customs were followed and exaggerated, though the distance in many
cases of the parish church led to the frequent celebration of marriages
in private houses. There was little mingling of blood with the native
Indians, and the marriage of John Rolfe with Pocahontas is the only
instance of such a marriage during the early years of the colony when
white women were few in number.
There were, however, certain public gatherings for which no pre-
cedents could be found in England. Such were the weekly meetings
of the congregations before and after the Sunday services, the general
muster and the general court day. Inasmuch as attendance at church
was compulsory, the absentees from the Sunday meeting-place were
1 Force, Hist. Tracts, vol. ra. « Beverley, Hist, of Va. p. 1258.
INTELLECTUAL LIFE 789
few and far between. The general muster held for an entire county
drew together much greater numbers, whilst its military character
compelled the attendance of all classes of the community above the
grades of servant and slave. The monthly court day was only attended
by men, and was in the nature of a business meeting, wherein political
questions such as the character of candidates for the House of Bur-
gesses were freely discussed. It appears, however, that the gathering
was often enlivened by drunken revelry, due perhaps to the absence
of the restraining influences of feminine companionship.
Such was the social life of colonial Virginia; we have now to con-
sider what place it held in the intellectual development of the
country. If its intellectual standing were to be gauged by published
output, the case would indeed be a sorry one. The distinguished
historian of American colonial literature, M. G. Tyler, sought to
enhance its dignity by crediting to Virginian inspiration the various
works by Captain John Smith, George Percy, etc., in which English-
men gave their impressions of the new world around them. But such
works can no more be counted products of Virginia than are books
of travel relating to new countries to be credited to the inhabitants
of such countries. Leah and Rachel, by J. Hammond, was the first work
that can be termed genuinely American. In sober fact colonial
Virginia produced very little in the way of literature. Beverley's
history, reflecting the best characteristics of an independent and self-
respecting community, and the younger Byrd's graphic account of
his expedition to draw the boundary line between Virginia and North
Carolina, were the most considerable of its achievements. Nor were
the reasons why a literary class failed to develop far to seek. A poet of
nature might indeed have sprung into being amidst the primeval
forests of Virginia; but none such appeared, and for every other form
of literature the soil was eminently uncongenial. The isolation of
colonial life was an obstacle, and the friendly gatherings which took
place were not of a nature to encourage the writing of books. Again
the difficulties that stood in the way of education, the absence of a
university for nearly eighty years and of a printing press for a still
longer period were factors making for literary sterility; whilst the
persecution of Quakers, Dissenters and Catholics barred the way to
the opening for intellectual controversy.
But literary output is by no means an altogether fair criterion of
a community's intellectual capacities. The interest felt in education
was made manifest in various ways. Again and again provisions in
wills are concerned with bequests for the future education of children.1
In the case of orphans the county court showed extreme solicitude
with regard to the same subject.2 No small proportion of the richer
planters sent their children overseas to receive an English education.
1 See numerous instances in Bruce, P. A., Institutional Hist, of Virginia in the seventeenth
cent, i, 296-307. 2 Ibid. I, 308-15.
790 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
Amongst these Richard Lee acquired such learning that in after life
he wrote marginal notes in his books in Latin, Greek and Hebrew.1
The younger Byrd was educated in Holland as well as in England and
well repaid in after years the trouble taken in his upbringing. By
those who were unable or unwilling to send their sons to England,
private tutors were generally employed; very often the children of
neighbouring houses joined forces to make a single class. Sometimes
the tutor made himself useful in ways outside his functions as teacher.
In some cases these tutors were imported from England; not in-
frequently they were under indentures — but in no case was there
evidence of any criminal taint such as too often was found amongst
the teachers in the early years of New South Wales. Nor were
schools wholly absent, as has been alleged. The old Field School was
an institution prevailing in many country districts, the clergyman
often adding to his income by looking after this institution; whilst
the readers who took the place of the parish clergymen in their
absence very often acted as teachers. The public authorities seem
generally to have shown their zeal "for the encouragement of learning
and instruction of youth. . .by inviting able tutors". Beside these
private schools were several free grammar schools, set on foot and
endowed by Virginian planters. There is ample evidence that
Berkeley was telling an untruth when in 1671 he thanked God that
there were no free schools in Virginia. Whether or not such "learn-
ing" in his words "had brought disobedience and heresy and sects
into the world", it seems evident that the people of Virginia did not
share his opinion.
Although the great scheme of the Virginia Company for an
Indian College canie to nothing, and the projected college of 1660-1
was also a failure, towards the close of the century the growth of the
colony in wealth and population was sufficiently great to render
possible the establishment of the College of William and Mary. Yet
without the active interest and assistance of Governor Nicholson, the
success of the project might have been further delayed. English
sympathies were enlisted by a visit of Blair to England, who emphasised
the argument that the proposed college would be a bulwark for the
English Church. The story may or may not be true which represents
the English Attorney-General, when told that the colonists had souls
to save, as making answer, " Souls ! damn their souls ! make tobacco ! "
but in any case this was not the attitude adopted by the Government.
A charter was obtained in February 1693, ^d in August 1695 the
foundation stone was laid of the new buildings, and two years later
the work of the grammar school was begun. Ten years later "the
Humanity Professor" himself confessed that the college still remained
a mere grammar school without professors in Philosophy, Physics,
Mathematics or Divinity. Still, the ball had been set rolling, and it
1 Lee, E. J., Lee qf Virginia, p. 75.
CAUSES OF ALIENATION FROM GREAT BRITAIN 791
was not long before the college was able to justify its existence,
becoming in process of time the Alma Mater of Jefferson and of
Marshall.
A further proof that the people of Virginia were not devoid of
culture is the existence of private libraries throughout the colony.
Numerous special bequests of books in wills show the value that was
attached to them from the earliest times. Research into the records
proves that there were numerous owners of books in every county;
and the whole number of volumes in the colony must have amounted
to many thousands. To possess books does not always mean the reading
of them. Still the existence of a library is a manifest recognition of
the things of the mind. Moreover a further argument can be adduced
in proof of the general culture prevalent. Except in the case of W. Fitz-
Hugh and the elder W. Byrd complete collections of letters have not
been preserved, but such 35 have come down to us point to the in-
tellectual capacities of their writers; and the State Papers issued by
the House of Burgesses are on the same level as those of the mother
of parliaments. At the time of the Revolution it was men of Virginia
who were the leading asserters of the American claims; but it was
the training received from generation to generation in their ancestral
homes that fitted them for the task. In the presence of slave labour
the haughty self-sufficiency of the Virginian planter no doubt re-
coiled from a position of subordination; but without an intellectual
training the indignation could only have found an outlet in the field
of action.
It is true that the Virginian aristocracy did not for the most part
express themselves in published writings; but their attitude is
sufficiently illustrated by what happened at the time of the Revolu-
tion. It might have been thought that the close connection between
their staple crop, tobacco, and the mother country would have been
a bond of union, but the Virginian grower always acted through the
intermediary of merchants, so that no personal communication was
involved, whilst the low price of tobacco was a continual cause of
friction.
Undoubtedly, however, the main cause of alienation was indig-
nation aroused in the Virginian aristocracy by the cavalier treatment
accorded them by the British authorities. Yet Virginia itself was no
exception to the general rule of the advance of democracy. Bacon's
rebellion in 1676 was a protest of the small landholders against the
control of Church and State being absorbed in the hands of the
wealthy planters, and when in the next generation we find Spotswood
lamenting the disinclination of the Virginian voters to return gentle-
men to the Assembly, his struggle was with a new democracy of
frontier farmers, consisting of indentured servants, who had served
their time, and of new immigrants, to whom a very extended suffrage
gave political power. Nor were the growing pains of democracy the
792 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
only trouble with which the British governor had to cope. On paper
his powers were autocratic; but in fact he had to contend with a
powerful colonial oligarchy which was able largely to keep in its own
hands the sweets of office. Unlike its Canadian successor, the Virginian
"family compact" was such literally, no less than six members of the
council being related to Ludwell, the Auditor-General. That the
governing clique was not an alien body, but one purely the production
of Virginian soil, added to its power and influence.
In this state of things British governors failed in securing adherents
to the interests of Great Britain from among the Virginian aristoc-
racy, and so, when the catastrophe came, the old dominion which
had once been a byword for loyalty to the Crown was one of the
colonies wherein loyalism was weakest. That, however, there was of
necessity no strong social antagonism between an English governor
and the colonists is shown by the fact that Spotswood, when his
period of office had come to an end, elected to found a new home in
Virginia.
The life of South Carolina was in many ways a replica of Virginian
life. There was the same love of English field sports and the same
jealous cultivation of English ideals. As in Virginia, a "plantation"
was a community in itself, with the artisans necessary for its purposes.
On the other hand, the physical circumstances of South Carolina
emphasised the necessity for the development of negro slavery, though
it seems that the slaves received their fair share of the prosperity
caused by the cultivation of the new rice fields. South Carolina,
however, possessed one great advantage over Virginia, in that it had
a capital city, Charleston, which greatly helped to develop the new
colony. For many years there was a colonial aristocracy which
grouped itself around the governor, and it was the gradual super-
session of its members in offices of trust by impecunious nominees
from England that helped to impair the loyalty of the colony to the
Crown. For a long time communication with England was constant
and frequent. The voyage took about six weeks, and it seems that
there were few gentlemen in South Carolina who had not been to
Europe. The merchants of Carolina were prosperous and the planters
were rich. These men were tolerably well contented with things as
they were, but when their sons arrived home from England their
disgust was great in finding the seats in the governor's council, in
which their fathers and grandfathers had served, no longer within
their reach. "We none of us ", Josiah Quincey quotes several of them
as saying, "when we grow old and expect the honours of the State
receive them, they are all given away to worthless poor sycophants."
The grievance was all the more felt because the social life of Charles-
ton was more developed, perhaps, than even that of Philadelphia.
Of all the American towns, Charleston is said to have approached
most nearly to the social refinement of a great European capital.
SOCIAL LIFE IN THE GAROLINAS 793
We do not associate the Garolinas with the idea of religious
enthusiasm, but, according to George Whitefield, a glorious work had
been begun and was carried on in Charleston. Many souls had been
awakened to a sense of the divine life. The alteration in the people
since his first coming had been surprising.1 But, whilst in these
critical years the canker of disunion was beginning to work, and
slowly, but surely, the ties of union between the South Carolina
aristocracy and the mother country were beginning to be unloosed,
a formidable insurrection in North Carolina showed how weak were
the bonds of union among the colonists themselves. The war of the
"regulation" was an uprising among the people of the western part
of North Carolina. They complained that they did not receive
proper representation in the colonial Assemblies, that they were
unjustly taxed, and that they were refused justice at the hands of the
provincial officers. The " Regulators " were put down by force of arms,
but little or nothing was done to remedy their just grievances. Thus
in the revolutionary war the sympathies of these men, in spite of
their democratic prejudices, were with the British authorities because
the colonial aristocracy had taken the other side. The story further
illustrates our main thesis that the most important causes working for
the change were the democratic tendencies that were everywhere
developing.
Little need be said about the social life of North Carolina. It re-
sembled that of South Carolina, though on a less civilised and in every
way rougher scale. A recently discovered manuscript in the British
Museum2 gives a singularly vivid description of what was seen by a
woman of great intelligence though of strong prejudices. Miss Schaw
arrived in North Carolina in the beginning of the Revolution and the
indignation of a perfervid loyalist at the treachery surrounding her
detracts from her value as an impartial witness; nevertheless she was
a most shrewd observer of men and nature. Her opinion of the
common people of North Carolina was not high. Nature, she main-
tained, held out to them everything that could contribute to con-
veniency or tempt to luxury, yet the inhabitants resisted both, and
if they could raise as much corn and pork as to subsist them in the
most slovenly manner they asked no more; and, as a very small pro-
portion of their time served for that purpose, the rest was spent in
sauntering through the woods with a gun, or sitting under a rustic
shade drinking New England rum made into grog, a most shocking
liquor. By this manner of living their blood was spoilt and rendered
thin beyond all proportion, so that it was constantly on the fret, like
bad small beer, and hence the constant slow fevers that wore down
their constitutions, relaxed their nerves and enfeebled the whole
frame. They were tall and lean, with sallow complexions and languid
1 Whiteficld, George, Works (i7?0> J> Z99-
8 Andrews, E. W. and C. M., Journal of a Lady of Quality, 1774-1776.
794 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
eyes, when not inflamed by spirits. Their feet were flat, their joints
loose and their walk uneven. Miss Schaw was careful to explain that
she was only speaking of the peasantry, as hitherto she had seen
nothing else, and she was sure that when she came to see the better sort
they would be far from this description. "For though there is a most
disgusting equality, yet I hope to find an American gentleman a very
different creature from an American clown. Heaven forfend else."1
A very unpleasant picture of the temper of the people of North
Carolina as reflected by their political representatives is drawn by
the despatches of Governor Dobbs to Pitt in 1760. They refused any
aid for public services except during the war against the Cherokee
Indians. For their pretended aid of men they raised no tax but ex-
pected the governor to issue £12,000 in notes without a sinking fund.
When Dobbs refused to assent to such a measure, they formed them-
selves into a Committee of the whole House, and locked their doors
and bound themselves to secrecy under the penalty that if any should
divulge their resolutions they should be expelled the House and for
ever rendered incapable of being re-elected a member of any future
Assembly.2 The fact that Lord Granville owned at least a third of the
colony may not have conduced to social content.
Interesting as was the foundation of Georgia from several points
of view, it could not be expected that a colony, started as a refuge
for men bankrupt or in extreme poverty, should add much to the
intellectual or social life of the eighteenth century. A melancholy
account of its condition is given in a despatch of Lieutenant-Governor
Ellis to Pitt of i August 1757. The colony had been settled for twenty-
five years. " It was originally intended to be a receptacle for the poor
of our parishes and gaols", and for many years the bulk of the people
had their provisions served to them out of the public store. For a long
time slaves were excluded, but even after their introduction the white
population of some 4500 were so very poor that they could barely
obtain a living.8
In striking contrast with the social conditions prevailing in Virginia
were those which took root in New England. In one respect, indeed,
there was some similarity. If among the men who settled in Mas-
sachusetts there were fewer with aristocratic connections than was
the case in Virginia, they were upon the whole of good stock, repre-
senting the squirearchy and better-most yeomen of the eastern
counties. But here the resemblance ended: whereas in Virginia the
nature of the soil and the inclinations of the immigrants had pro-
moted isolation, inNew England, on the other hand, everything centred
in the town community. It was intolerable that people should be
allowed to live "lonely and in a heathenish way, from good societie ".4
1 Andrews, E. W. and G. M., p. 153.
2 Correspondence of Pitt with Colonial Governors (ed. Kimball, G. S.), n, 297-300.
8 Kimball, i, 91-2. * Plymouth Records, v, 169.
SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN NEW ENGLAND 795
No community ever undertook with more success the work of
expansion than did the men of New England. It was not allowed
that pioneers should advance into the wilderness to lead an isolated
life. A group was organised, consisting of members whose holdings
were about the same. On application from a body of men for leave
to found a new community, the General Court appointed a committee
to view the land and report. The amount granted varied in area but
was generally about six square miles. In no case were the individual
farms of any large extent. Town lots were usually reserved for the
support of free schools and ministers. The provision of a church was
necessitated by the presence of a minister. In the seventeenth century
no sales were made to individuals or to companies with the reser-
vation of quit-rents, nor was there any system similar to the fifty-acre
grants in Virginia. The lands were given to groups under nominated
proprietors for the purpose of establishing communities. These pro-
prietors were intended to hold the lands in trust to be assigned to
inhabitants under such restraints as would secure the persistence of
Puritan ideals.
We have here the keynote to the Puritan system : the creation and
maintenance of a Bible commonwealth wherein Church and State
should be fused into a common whole. Unfortunately this ideal could
never be realised. Church-membership was necessary to obtain a
vote; but it seems that at no time under the first charter would the
numbers of voters have amounted to more than one-fourth of the
possible voting population, had this condition been enforced. With
the political consequences we have here nothing to do, but un-
doubtedly these reacted on the social life, rendering it narrow,
exclusive and arrogant, those outside the social ring being regarded
as mere hewers of wood and drawers of water, pariahs so far as the
life of the community was concerned.
The development of agriculture in Massachusetts began with the
planting of Indian corn, which had been known to the Indians, the
needed fertiliser being provided by the plentiful supply of fish.
Thus, though it was preceded in time by the fur trade, fishing became
the most important commercial interest and the corner stone of New
England prosperity, inasmuch as by its means an effective exchange
was provided for goods received from the West Indies and the Roman
Catholic countries of Europe.1 Of great importance was the in-
fluence of the fishing industry upon the development of the indepen-
dent character of the New England population, that influence being
as a rule hostile to Congregational orthodoxy.
It must always be remembered that there was at first, even in New
England, no approach in social life to democratic equality. The aim
of the new society was to maintain the English traditions of rank
and station, so far as they could be adapted to the needs of a new
1 Weeden, W. B., Economic card Social History of New England, 1620-1729, i, 88-90.
796 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
environment. But nothing in the nature of fixed ranks was recognised ;
in one case at least the five persons appointed by the court to lay out
a new town assumed the power of dividing the inhabitants into three
ranks; and committees appointed by the town continued this
practice and seem to have exercised the authority of censors,
degrading and promoting from one rank to another at their dis-
cretion.1 The absence, however, of fixity of rank did not diminish
the respect with which its holders were regarded. Seats were allotted
in church according to the social position of the holder, and so great
was the respect paid to individuals that a man was fined for saying
that the horse of a leading citizen was as lean as an Indian dog.2
When in Connecticut in 1676 a sumptuary law endeavoured to re-
strain the wearing of gold or silver lace or gold and silver buttons, etc.,
by means of high taxation, magistrates, their wives and children, and
military officers or "such whose quality or estate have been above
the ordinary degree, though now decayed", were exempted from the
operation of the law. The great majority of the inhabitants were
addressed as "goodman", only one in fourteen of the freemen in
Massachusetts, constituted before 1649, enjoying the title of "Mr".
The common application of " Mr ", " Mrs ", and " Miss " was a gradual
recognition of personal rights which was adopted very slowly.
When New England started on its way there was every promise
for its intellectual future. Its earliest divines were men of profound
learning. Its system of free schools and the establishment of Harvard
College for the pursuit of more advanced studies put it on a higher
plane than that occupied by any other English colony. How was it
then that the results obtained were so profoundly disappointing?
The answer lies in the jealous concentration on a narrow theology,
which made impossible the general development of a liberal culture.
The testing ground of this theology was intellectual opposition. Roger
Williams was the first to beard the theocracy in its den. The cause of
orthodoxy was managed with considerable skill by the divines, so
that Roger Williams was manoeuvred into the position of appearing
to hold views incompatible with the recognition of the sovereign
State, but the real cause of offence was his assertion of the principle of
religious toleration. Roger Williams underwent banishment, but the
foundation of the new colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plan-
tations was a greater triumph for his principles than could have been
any technical success for his views in the courts of Massachusetts.
But after Roger Williams a yet more dangerous enemy appeared
upon the scene. It must indeed have been aggravating for the self-
complacent elders to be told by a mere woman that, with a very few
exceptions, grace was not with them. Nothing can justify the rough
treatment accorded to Mrs Hutchinson, a woman of virtuous life
and spiritual gifts; but, given human nature, the course adopted by
1 Wceden, i, 281. a /#
RELIGIOUS REPRESSION 797
the ruling clique was natural enough. A deeper slur on the good name
of Massachusetts is the treatment accorded to the Quakers. It is true
that the Quakers had been roughly handled in England, and that
toleration was not yet recognised anywhere; but there was a special
brutality in the persecution employed by Massachusetts, involving in
several cases the punishment of death, and there was a complete
ignorance of the fact that the raison d'ltre of New England was the
assertion of the principle of religious toleration against the intolerant
attitude of the English established Church. Undoubtedly the action
of Massachusetts greatly scandalised well-wishers in England, both
Presbyterian and Independent, and some of the wisest words in
favour of toleration were spoken by Oliver Cromwell. Such, then, was
the religion of New England that dominated the social life of the
colony so far as it was articulate, a grey, grim religion, full of denun-
ciation and repression, breathing the spirit of the Old Testament in
its severest moods and wholly devoid of that spirit of Christianity
which had called into existence another world.
To understand the life of a generation no better means can be
found than to study the intimate diaries of representative men. In
the case of Samuel Sewall we are singularly fortunate. For more than
fifty years Sewall kept a diary of his daily life, and, though the light
thrown on contemporary politics is very small, for our present
purposes this does not matter. Sewall was assuredly no hypocrite;
but he had become so steeped in the prejudices of his time and place
that he was unable to notice the distinction between genuine and
conventional wrongdoing. Thus, in his belief, to wear a periwig was
to commit a heinous offence, and to keep holy the day on which
Christ was born was a serious sin. So touchy was SewalPs conscience
that he seriously proposed to abolish the names of the days of the
week. The week only, he urged, of all parts of time was of divine
institution, erected as a monumental pillar for a memorial of the
Creation perfected in so many distinct days. It must be remembered,
Sewall was no mere average New Englander. He was an M.A. of
Harvard and for a short time was a fellow and tutor of that college.
In 1684 he was chosen a magistrate. In 1692 he was appointed by
William and Mary a member of the first council under the new
charter, and was afterwards elected year by year a member of that
body until 1725, when he refused to be again elected, having outlived
all the others nominated in the fundamental constitution. In 1692
he was made a judge and in 1718 Chief Justice, remaining in that
position for ten years. On several questions he showed great sagacity.
He advocated the cause of sound money with exceptional vigour and
acumen. He was one of the earliest and most enlightened opponents
of the African slave trade, and wrote an able pamphlet against its
continuance. He showed his weakness indeed in falling a victim to
the witchcraft delusion, but his public recantation when once he had
798 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
realised his error was a singularly noble and dignified declaration
of repentance.
Such then being the man, what kind of life did he lead? In fact
the world into which he introduces us seems mainly concerned with
funerals and church meetings. On one occasion he solemnly enu-
merates the times he has acted as bearer at funerals; and he never
attends church or meeting without giving the text and generally
adding a short synopsis of the sermon. On the subject of toleration
Sewall did not rise above the level of his contemporaries. Quakerism
seemed to him "a devil worship". The merciful vagueness of the
English Church burial service seemed a blasphemy to Sewall. "The
office for burial is a lying, a very bad office; makes no difference."
And yet what was the behaviour of this man of most tender conscience
in the rough and tumble of everyday life?
If there is a question which concerns the higher side of human
nature, it is surely that of marriage. But no worldling could approach
that subject from a lower standpoint than did this devout exponent
of orthodoxy. For forty years he had lived with his first wife who had
been the mother of fourteen children, of whom only four survived.
She died in October 1717, and in the following February we find him
wondering whether to lead a single or married life; and nothing can
be more repellent than the story of his successive courtships, wherein
worldly interests always played a considerable part. The same
coarseness of fibre was still more conspicuous in his attitude towards
historical buildings. He visits England and comments on Canterbury
Cathedral that it is very lofty and magnificent but of little use. What
appealed to him in Oxford seems mainly to have been the good fare
in New College. Yet more characteristic is a conversation with
Dudley wherein Sewall maintained the necessity of the belly playing
its part in the Resurrection body. We shall note in dealing with
Cotton Mather how the absence of the spiritual was the keynote in
the development of the New England character. Not less significant
was the attitude of superiority which boded ill for the future, and the
significance of SewaU's journal is that it discloses to us in an easy
and handy form the causes of the dissonance of feeling between old
England and New England. When Englishmen appear on the scene,
roystering and behaviour scandalising the unco5 guid are sure not to
be far away. Nicholson was an excellent example of a hardworking
patriotic English official, but how he must have fluttered the dove-
cotes of precise New England. The degeneracy of Joseph Dudley
must have seemed to Sewall the direct outcome of English influences;
when Shute arrived as governor, who had been brought up under
nonconformists, the governor's going to Dudley's house made Sewall
fear that he could no longer be trusted. In spite of Sewall's cautious
and conservative temperament his speech when Dummer became
acting-governor on the departure of Shute for England shows the
COTTON MATHER 799
trend of his sympathies. "Although the unerring providence of God
has brought you to the chair of government in a cloudy and tem-
pestuous time; yet you have this for your encouragement that the
people you have to do with are a part of the Israel of God and you
may expect to hear of the patience and prudence of Moses com-
municated to you for your conduct. It is evident that our Almighty
Saviour counselled the first planters to remove hither and settle here;
and they dutifully followed His advice, and therefore He will never
leave and forsake them now. . . .Diffidlia quia pulchra." Nothing can
be plainer, England is still Egypt, the land of darkness from which
the chosen people took their flight. It was not likely that the children
of Israel should look for light and leading, for a Moses or Joshua,
from among the sons of the land of their captivity. The very moder-
ation and geniality of Sewall's nature makes more impressive the
strength of his conviction and all that such conviction implied. On
the face of it to a man of Sewall's temperament rebellion would
seem as the sin of witchcraft; and yet if the choice were to be between
religion and political obedience is there a doubt upon which side
Sewall's choice would have finally come down?
We have dealt at some length with a New Englander of more than
average ability and goodness, because in his diary we find a singularly
vivid picture of the outlook of such an one upon the social circum-
stances surrounding him. Turning to another diary of a distinguished
divine, we can look upon another aspect of the New England
character. Cotton Mather was a singular instance of a mystic whose
mysticism did not lift him to a spiritual world above that of the
senses. No doubt he injured his health by continuous fasting and
wrestling with the powers of evil. But unfortunately such wrestling
left little mark upon his moral character, and in spite of several pro-
fessions of goodwill towards all that might have injured him, we find
him in the individual cases displaying a spirit of rancour and male-
volence that showed little of the Christian character. Thus one Calef
having ventured to question Mather's views on the witchcraft
question, he breaks out in a fit of unbridled passion, the elder Mather
burning the book1 in the quadrangle of Harvard.
It must always be remembered that Cotton Mather lived at a time
of transition. The reign of the divines was coming to its close, and
though the Mathers professed to approve the new charter because
the elder Mather had been one of its creators, its effect was none the
less to subvert in the long run the dominant theocracy. Once political
power ceased to rest on theological convictions, social emancipation
was bound to follow upon political. Again and again we find Mather
lamenting the fallen estate of the clergy. After a meeting of ministers
on 15 January 1722 he maintained that (except amongst a few of his
own little remnant of a flock) religion appeared to be almost entirely
1 Calef, Robert, More Wonders of the Spiritual World (1700).
8oo LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
extinguished in Massachusetts. He would have to apply his faculties
in projects to do good in more distant places. Assuredly whatever
accusations may be brought against Cotton Mather, he cannot be
accused of idleness. There was hardly a country in Europe where
Protestants existed which did not come under his anxious ken. He
combined the character of the practical propagandist with that of the
literary man. His first studies had been in the medical line and his
scientific capacities were thought sufficient to cause him to be elected
as a Fellow of the Royal Society, but it is eminently characteristic
that Mather used the letters some time before he was formally elected.
Although he professed no fondness at all for applause and honour
in the world, even in his acknowledgment of mercies received there
is an egotistical twang which is singularly unpleasant. "My auditory
is always one of the greatest that is ordinarily given among the people
of God." He extols the serviceableness of his writings. In this con-
nection it is curious that the Erastian mother country showed often
greater readiness to publish his works than did the publishers of
Massachusetts. What, however, he considered his magnum opus, the
Biblia Americana, fortunately for conscientious students of such works,
was never published. A fair estimate of Mather's powers may be
obtained from a glance through his greatest work, Magnalia Christi
Americana. The author himself had no doubts as to its merits. He looks
forward to animadversions of calumnious writers just as poetasters
dealt with the Bucolics and the Aeneid. It never occurred to him that
his amorphous work might be neither accurate in its facts nor
distinguished for its style. As an example of his capacities as an
historian we may note the manner in which the dull and self-willed
Sir W. Phipps is given a high place in the Olympus of Massachusetts
worthies. Nothing can be more jejune or lifeless than the account of
Harvard. Harvard was in other ways a sore point with Mather. He
seems with some reason to have expected that he would be elected
President, and great was his disgust when his expectation was dis-
appointed. Yet the House of Representatives in the General Assembly
and as full a house as has been ordinarily known unanimously voted
the most unworthy man in the world as President (March 1703). Nor
was he more successful twenty-one years later, but he had then the
consolation that the affairs of the college had been so mismanaged
that to remedy things would be an almost impossible task.
Meanwhile things were not moving generally in a direction
favoured by Mather. Boston, he writes in 1721, has become a Hell
upon earth, a city full of lies, murders and blasphemies. Satan
seems to take a strange possession of it in the epidemic rage against
that notable and powerful and successful way of saving the lives of
the people from the dangers of smallpox. The gallant stand he made
on behalf of inoculation must always be entered to the credit of
Cotton Mather. In other ways he showed himself active in the ranks
BOSTON IN 1721 801
of reform. The singing had become so great a scandal in the New
England churches that an organised effort was made to set on foot
decent choirs. In Boston the change was accepted readily, but in
some of the country churches it led to scandalous scenes. The zeal
of some congregations transported them so far that they not only
used the most opprobrious terms and spoke of the singing of these
Christians as worshipping of the devil, but also they would run out
of the meeting house at the beginning of the services. As an instance
of Christian charity note the language with which Mather comments
on the illness of Dr Oliver Noyes: "Within these few days God has
in a marvellous manner and at a very critical moment smitten with
apoplexy one who has been and still would have been the greatest
hinderer of good and misleader and enchanter of the people that
there was in the whole House of Representatives." That he died the
next day was no doubt a further proof of divine interposition. The
extreme bitterness of Mather's comments makes it difficult to know
how far his staiements may be accepted as true. When the ungodly
doings in the new North Church caused the building of a new and
very large brick meeting house, the finest in the country, and when
by this a certain number of Mather's flock were lost to him, his
comment is that the religion of pews, which with a proud, vain,
formal people seemed to be now the chief religion, was the only
motive at work; and yet in a letter to a correspondent he had
written that his congregation hardly missed any of its members and
the church collections were larger than before the secession. Within
a few months another new church would be formed in the south part
of the city, and then there would be seven Congregational churches in
Boston besides a High church, a synagogue and one of the Baptists,
together with the French Church with which they lived in all decent
communion. Mather drew a melancholy picture of Christianity
outside New England.
For one must make very free with that worthy name if it be said that Christianity
is yet well introduced into the English Plantations. Our islands are indeed in-
habited by such as are called Christians. But alas ! how dissolute are their manners
and how inhuman the way of their subsistence on the sweat and blood of slaves
treated with infinite barbarities. What little worship of God they have, as it is
confined within the English liturgy, so it is too commonly performed by persons
of a very scandalous character. On the continent the colony of Carolina was in
a fair way to have been filled with a religious people until the Society for the
Propagation of Religion in Foreign Parts unhappily sent over some of their
missionaries thither, and I am informed that with them and from that time a
mighty torrent of profaneness and wickedness carried all before it.1
It would seem that this statement is wholly false. The Carolina clergy
never reached a high level of efficiency; but as between the native
product and the missioners sent out by the Society the latter seem to
have been in every way superior.
1 Letter of 6 August 1716, T/te Diary oj Cotton Mather, pt n, Mass. Hist. Coll. ser. vn,
vol. vm.
GHBBI 51
802 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
We must always remember that the ice was cracking under the
feet of the Puritan divines during the life of Cotton Mather. In every
direction the old ascendancy was being threatened. The Baptists and
Presbyterians were extending their influence, and the Church of
England itself was establishing a solid footing in sacrosanct New
England. It was a reasonable complaint of the doings of the Society
for the Propagation of the Gospel that they were too often more
interested in endeavouring to make converts of Congregationalists
than to bring the heathen into the fold of Christianity. Still, even
according to Mather himself, all was not well within the orthodox
Church. He proposes to write to one or two of the principal ministers
in Connecticut concerning the fearful circumstances into which the
love of rum had brought several even of their principal ministers and
by consequence very many of the miserable people. He understood
that even amongst the communicants of his own church were several
wicked people, some that frequently drank to excess, and some that
had enticed if not seduced others to adulteries. Yet such things seem
to have shocked him less than the apostasy of a famous French con-
fessor at New York who had actually presumed to join the Church of
England.
In this state of things there was ample room for the great awakening
which took place soon after Mather's death. If reform was to come
about, it could hardly be by the influence of the Church of England
as represented at its best by such a man as Samuel Johnson. Johnson
was the friend and disciple of Berkeley, a man of unblemished
character and singularly tactful in his dealings with other men. But
he disliked to the full "enthusiasm" in all its manifestations, especially
when it took the form of physical contortions. His attitude towards
the movement was simply one of puzzled disgust; and whatever sect
profited by the great awakening, it was assuredly not the Church of
England. The two protagonists of the movement were George White-
field and Samuel Edwards. In all ways except in that of platform
oratory the latter was by far the greater man. Whitefield's command
over the emotions of his audience was marvellous, but the intellectual
quality of his oratory was otherwise low, and he travelled again and
again over a few favourite subjects, sin, regeneration and the new
birth. Whitefield had been a clergyman of the Church of England,
but his contempt of the canons for established authority soon placed
him in open opposition and he became a virtual dissenter. It must
be remembered that Whitefield was an Englishman and that so far
as the great awakening was due to him it was not indigenous to the
American soil.
Edwards's nature was much more difficult to understand. Gradu-
ating at Yale in 1 720 and becoming for a time a tutor there he devoted
his time largely to the study of philosophy. The reading of Locke's
Essay concerning Human Understanding gave him a delight "greater than
SAMUEL EDWARDS 803
the most greedy miser finds when gathering up handfuls of silver and
gold from some new discovered treasury". But Edwards's reading
never led him in the direction of deism. The mystical and poetical
element in his nature was strong, helping to realise for him a sense
of the immediate divine presence and influence. Unfortunately the
logical and formal system of Calvinism adopted by him necessitated
a view of the Godhead which profoundly shocks the ideas of most
people in the twentieth century. In any case this powerful intellect
and inspiring character could not in those degenerate days have his
way even with his own congregation. His proposed denunciation of
young men belonging to influential families for the possession of
obscene literature aroused great indignation amongst his Northamp-
ton congregation, which was redoubled by his attempt to keep un-
converted people from taking the sacrament. The consequence was
that he was dismissed by a large majority of the congregation, and
the most distinguished of living American divines had to content
himself with the tenure ol an obscure mission station. It is true that
in 1738 he was appointed President of New Jersey College, Princeton,
but he died within a few days of his appointment.
The effects of the great awakening were, as is always the case, to
some extent ephemeral with regard to its converts; but there can be
no question of the permanence of the blow it inflicted on the policy
of the established Churches, whether Congregational or Episco-
palian. With regard to the latter it became clear that the establish-
ment must remain the Church of a cultivated minority, and that the
full breath of a national outpouring must seek some other channel
for its outcome. It was the misfortune of American history that
questions which should have remained purely religious found them-
selves whirled into the maelstrom of party politics. The Church of
England represents a type of temperament no less than a body of
doctrine. It might have been necessary in its beginning for the safety
of the Congregational Churches that they should surround themselves
with battlements that could not be scaled. But, when once it was
manifest that New England could never be absorbed by the English
established Church, it was wisdom no less than justice to tolerate
the individual expression of opinion within reasonable limits. Again,
it was obvious that there were grave inconveniences in American
candidates for orders finding it necessary to cross the ocean before
they could obtain ordination; and something more was needed than
the powers of a commissary to maintain due order and discipline
within the fold of the Church. It is significant that when once the
American colonies achieved their independence, the appointment
of an American bishop was obtained without friction or controversy.
Very different had been the past history of the question. No doubt
there were men like the saintly Berkeley who approached the subject
merely from the point of view of one zealous for the well-being ot the
51-2
804 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
Church; but from the correspondence of the time it is pretty clear
that there were others who were playing for political stakes in their
advocacy of the measure. What politicians on either side failed to
realise was the resisting force of Whig Erastianism which was not
going to burn its fingers for a denominational crusade. Moreover, the
movement in favour of an Anglican bishop had no very general
support amongst American churchmen. Many an idle and remiss
clergyman in the south dreaded the presence of a bishop who could
keep him in due order. It was impossible to make the colonists believe
that the powers entrusted to the bishops would not be greater than
those enjoyed by the commissaries. Such enthusiasm as there was,
was mainly confined to New England, and here, as has already been
hinted, the political argument, even when subconscious, was not
without its influence. It is doubtful how far John Adams deliberately
exaggerated the importance of the question as coming within the
domain of practical politics. What is certain, however, is that where
men such as Walpole and Newcastle were concerned, there was little
risk of a change being effected which would neither be popular nor
produce benefit to the British revenue. For us the significance of
the movement lies in the fact that it embittered social antagonisms
and strengthened the hold of party upon the members of the various
denominations. It was certainly a success for the cause of toleration
that the high-handed Congregational Churches found themselves
compelled to give a grudging assent to measures excusing from
taxation for Church purposes Baptists and Anglicans who were
already maintaining their own places of worship. The bitterness of
men like Mayhew on the one hand and Seabrooke on the other was
due to political as well as religious antagonisms. When the great
disruption came, the members of the Church of England were almost
to a man convinced Loyalists, and independence in religion was
followed inevitably by independence in politics. For it must be re-
membered the quarrel was no longer between differing members of
the same Church. Immigration, as we have seen, had completely
altered the whole character of Virginia. The men who flocked to the
West cared nothing for forms of Church government, so that even
Virginia had to come under the new influence. More dangerous to
Puritan orthodoxy than the growth of Baptists or even of members
of the Church of England was the development of Unitarianism
which began to show its head in the first quarter of the eighteenth
century, becoming more and more a powerful factor in New England
life.
In New York the Church of England was formally established by
law, but its position was from the first a very precarious one, having
no popular support behind its enactment. In 1714, out of a popula-
tion of 45,000, not more than 1200 attended the English service and
not more than 450 were communicants. The position of the clergy
EVIL EFFECTS OF A LAX LAND SYSTEM 805
was well stated by a clergyman writing to the Society for the Pro-
pagation of the Gospel (n April 1711): "My great business is to
plant the Church of England among prejudiced, poor and irreligious
people, who are more apt to receive than to give, who think it a
hardship to pay their dues; and we dare not use the law for fear of
bringing odium on the Church9'.1 Heathcote was an enthusiastic
churchman, who sought with much courage, if with little success, to
make converts to the Church of England among the people of Con-
necticut, but he fully realised the weakness of the position of the Church
in New York.
Between the northern and the southern colonies, which stood out
in every way differentiated from each other, lay the middle colonies.
In 1692 the population of New York was still Dutch to the extent of
about a half. The English came next in numbers; but already there
was a considerable population of Protestant Flemings, of French,
Iberian Jews, Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, Irishmen and Germans.
What stood in the way of the colony's advance were the dealings in
land which showed how speculation taking advantage of a lenient
Government could debauch a land system. It must be remembered
that before the Revolution the English system of large estates prevailed
throughout all the colonies with the exception of New England. In
Pennsylvania and Maryland as well as in New York there were
estates containing thousands of acres. The manorial grants in New
York included more than 2,500,000 acres. In 1769 it was reckoned
that at least five-sixths of the inhabitants of Westchester County lived
within the confines of its great manors — and the Van Rensselaer
Manor, a hundred miles farther up the Hudson, covered an area of
twenty-four miles by twenty-eight, being two-thirds the size of Rhode
Island.2
The proprietary governors had disposed of land with discretion and
restraint and usually made grants only to those who could settle and
improve and who would pay a proper quit-rent. But with the arrival of
Benjamin Fletcher the business took on a brisk and at times a scandalous
activity. The most extraordinary favours of former governors were
but petty grants in comparison to his. He was a generous man and
gave the King's lands by parcels of upwards of 100,000 acres, and to
some particular favourites four or five times that quantity.8
The Governors who granted these large tracts, if they knew their extent, were
guilty of a notorious breach of trust; and as it cannot be supposed that they did
this merely in the gaiety of their hearts they must have had some temptation and
this must be supposed to proceed from those that had the benefit from it. That
therefore the grantees were equally guilty with the Governor in deceiving the King
is evident, and likewise in defrauding all the adventurers or settlers in the colony
1 Fox, D. R., Caleb Heathcote, p. 209.
2 Jameson, J. Franklin, T/te American Revolution considered as a social movement, p. 47.
8 Cadwallader Golden, "The state of the lands in the Province of New York in 1732"
in New York Doc. Hist, i, 375, 390.
8o6 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
of their equal chance of obtaining the most improvable and convenient lands, and
preventing the improvement and settling of the colony, for which purpose only
the lands are suffered to be granted.1
Nor was there any readiness to break these up. In these circum-
stances the immigrants naturally refrained from occupying the posi-
tion of dependents and preferred to settle in other colonies where
they could buy good freeholds amongst neighbours equally indepen-
dent and self-reliant. The climate and soil were generally good, yet
New York failed to compete with Pennsylvania, which, though
started sixty years after New York, contained more than two and a
half times its population at the beginning of the last French and
Indian War. Still in spite of drawbacks New York increased its
population. New York harbour was an open door for all Europe,
and so there grew up a wide mixture of nationalities, a varied society,
a varied economic life and many religious sects. As the historian of
the frontier in American history has pointed out, New York embodied
that composite nationality which is represented by the United States
of to-day. It was democratic and unsectional, easy, tolerant and
contented. This absence of political bitterness accounts for the fact
which would otherwise be puzzling that in the Revolution, New
York, by no means a specially British colony, contained the greatest
number of Loyalists and did more than any other State to make
the War of Independence a genuine civil war. In Pennsylvania
the coming of foreign immigrants in great numbers caused much
anxiety. It was seriously feared that the colony might not be able
to preserve its English language.
Viewing the matter as a whole and estimating the social tenden-
cies that were at work, it was not so much the difference between
colony and colony upon which one should insist, as upon that contin-
uous cleavage between the different portions of the same colony that
was everywhere preparing the ground for a revolutionary change.
Everywhere the individualism of the frontier was promoting demo-
cracy, and everywhere democracy was unable to find a comfortable
dwelling place under the aristocratic system of government prevailing
in the England of the eighteenth century. In colonies like Con-
necticut and Rhode Island, where there was no English Government
to arouse antagonism, the old quarrel still went on between the rich
and the poor which in the end generally resolved itself into a contest
between the coast and the frontier. Thus the social conditions show
New England moving surely if slowly to an inevitable goal.
It remains now to consider what was the intellectual level of the
colonies when the first British Empire in America came to its in-
glorious end. We have seen that theology was on the wane, though
in 1717 the publication by F. Wise of his Vindication of the New
England Churches, a powerful defence of democratic government in
1 New Tork Col. Docs, rv, 391,
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 807
Church matters, seemed to strike a new note in American theology.
"The end of all good government", he maintained, "was to cultivate
humanity and promote the happiness of all, and the good of every
man in all his rights, his life, liberty, estate, honour, without injury
or abuse to any." Hitherto there had been little achievement in
the way of a literature on American soil. The first American
newspaper was started in 1690, but it was short-lived. The Boston
Newsletter followed in 1704. It would seem from the evidence of
John Dunton, a travelling bookseller who was in Boston at the
time that Andros was governor, that there were, as early as this, no
less than thirteen booksellers in Boston who seem to have prospered
very fairly in the business. In 1741 Benjamin Franklin began the
issue of his general magazine and chronicle. T. Prince's Chronological
History of New England in the form of Annals, vol. i, 1736, though it has
been called the first scientific American history, was for its author
only a failure and disappointment. The main direction in which the
colonial world was moving was political, and it was in the school of
politics that public men, especially Virginians, evolved that robust
if somewhat florid style in the manufacture of State Papers which
at a later date called forth the admiration of Chatham.
Still the humanities were not wholly neglected, and in this
direction the versatile Benjamin Franklin played a leading part.
It was he who set on foot small circles of students who should meet
together and discuss the serious problems of life and knowledge. It
is pleasant to read of him, still an obscure young printer, summoned
to a conference with Burnet, the good governor of New York, simply
to discuss literary questions. When we consider, moreover, the work
achieved by Franklin in the direction of scientific research and in its
organisation, quite apart from his work in the political field, we can-
not over-estimate his place among the builders of a new American
nationality. This work was largely unconscious, and Franklin was
no doubt honest when he insisted upon colonial particularism as
among the causes which must render impossible a disruption of the
Empire; but none the less the leaven was at work with its momentous
consequences. Franklin himself, as early as December 1754, had
protested in a letter to Shirley against the idea of the colonies
being taxed by an Act of a Parliament wherein they had no
representative. *
The attitude of the American colonists towards the British, not very
long before the final break, is shown by the experiences of the Rev.
A. Burnaby, an intelligent clergyman whose comments prove him
to have been a fairly impartial witness. His account of the quarrel
over the payment of the clergy is singularly fair and dispassionate.
Still even he was bound to confess that the public, or political,
character of the Virginians corresponded with their private one:
1 Correspondence of W. Shirley* Governor of Massachusetts, 1731-60 (ed. Lincoln), n, 103-7.
8o8 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
they were haughty and jealous of their liberties, impatient of restraint
and could scarcely bear the thought of being controlled by any
superior power. Many of them considered the colonies as independent
States, not connected with Great Britain otherwise than by having
the same common king, and being bound to her by natural affection.
The climate and external appearance of the country conspired to
make them indolent, easy, and good-natured; extremely fond of
society and much given to convivial pleasures. In consequence of
this they seldom showed any spirit of enterprise or exposed themselves
willingly to fatigue. Their authority over their slaves rendered them
vain and imperious.1 Burnaby found the character of the inhabitants
of Maryland much the same as that of the Virginians and the state
of the two colonies nearly alike.2 He was specially enthusiastic over
the progress made by Philadelphia.8 Only eighty years before its site
was a wild and uncultivated desert, inhabited by nothing but savage
beasts and men. It was now a city containing about 3000 houses and
18,000 or 20,000 inhabitants. It was built north and south upon the
banks of the Delaware, being nearly two miles in length and three-
quarters of a mile in breadth. The streets were laid out with great
regularity, in parallel lines intersected by others at right angles, with
many handsome buildings. On each side of them there was a pave-
ment of broad stones for foot passengers, and in most a causeway in the
middle for carriages. Upon dark nights the city was well lighted, and
watched by a patrol. There were more than a dozen places of religious
worship, viz. two churches, three Quaker and two Presbyterian
meeting houses, one Lutheran and one Dutch Calvinist and one
Swedish church, one Romish chapel, one Anabaptist and one
Moravian meeting house. There was also an academy or college
originally built for a tabernacle for Mr Whitefield. At the south end
of the city there was a battery mounting thirty guns, but, as was
natural in a Quaker colony, this was in a state of decay. The city was
in a very flourishing state, inhabited by merchants, artists, tradesmen
and persons of all occupations. There was a public market held
twice a week upon Wednesday and Saturday, almost equal to that of
Leadenhall. The streets were crowded with people, and the river with
vessels. Houses were so dear that they would let for £100 currency
per annum, and lots not above thirty feet in breadth and a hundred
in length sold for £1000 sterling. There were several docks upon
the river and about twenty-five vessels were built there annually.
Burnaby counted upon the stocks at one time no less than seventeen,
many of them three-masted vessels. Arts and sciences were yet in
their infancy. There were some few persons who had discovered a
taste for music and painting, and the study of philosophy seemed to
1 Burnaby, A., Travels through the Middle Settlements of North America, 1759-60, i, 714-
8 Ibid, i, 726. » ibid, i, 738-31.
PENNSYLVANIA 809
be daily gaining ground. An excellent library propagated a taste for
literature which the college helped to form and cultivate. This college
Burnaby declared to be by far the best school for learning throughout
America.
The Pennsylvanians were a frugal and industrious people; not
remarkably courteous and hospitable to strangers unless particularly
recommended to them, but, like the denizens of most commercial
cities, rather the reverse. They were great republicans and in their
ideas of independency had fallen into the same errors as most of
the other colonies. They were by far the most enterprising people
upon the continent. As they consisted of several nations and talked
several languages, they were aliens in some respects to Great Britain,
nor could it be expected that they should have the same filial attach-
ment to her as her own immediate offspring had; however, they
were quiet and concerned themselves with little except about getting
money. In Burnaby's opinion the women were much more agreeable
and accomplished than the men. He found Pennsylvania in a very
flourishing condition, the country being well cultivated. Till the last
war the people had been exempt from taxes, and it was not without
difficulty that the Quakers were prevailed upon to grant any supplies
for the defence of the frontiers which were exposed to the ravages of
Indians. It was not from principle, according to the men of the
frontiers, that they refused them, but from self-interest as they were not
themselves exposed to these incursions. The Quakers had much the
greatest influence in the Assembly and were supported there by the
Dutch and Germans, who were as adverse to taxes as themselves.
Burnaby was careful to note the long-standing quarrel between the
people and the proprietary on the question of the taxation of the
proprietors9 lands.1
According to Burnaby the inhabitants of New York in their
character very much resembled the Pennsylvanians, more than half
of them being Dutch, and almost all traders. They were habitually
frugal, industrious and parsimonious. Being however of different
nations, different languages, and different religions, it was almost
impossible to give them any precise or determinate character. The
province was flourishing, in spite of being burdened with taxes and
a large public debt. An extensive trade was carried on to many
parts of the world, particularly to the West Indies, and New York was
further enriched by being the central rendezvous for the British troops.
Burnaby gave a very low character to the Rhode Islanders, but
he admitted that owing to illness he had not been in a position to
see much of the colony. According to him the private people were
cunning, deceitful and selfish ; they lived almost entirely by unfair
and illicit trading. Their magistrates were partial and corrupt, and
he who had the greatest influence was generally found to have the
1 Burnaby, i, 731-2.
8 io LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
fairest cause. Were the governor to interpose his authority or to
refuse flags of truce he would at once lose his place.1
Burnaby was not likely to be prejudiced in favour of Massachusetts,
but he recognised that arts and sciences had made a greater progress
in Boston than in any other town in America. The influence of Har-
vard College had been great, and the arts were undeniably more
advanced in Massachusetts Bay than in Pennsylvania or New York.
The public buildings were of a higher order of architecture and there
was a more general turn for painting, music and the belles -lettres.
Burnaby found the character of the inhabitants much improved in
comparison with what it had been, but Puritanism and a spirit of
persecution were not yet totally extinguished. The gentry of both
sexes were hospitable and good-natured. There was an air of civility
in their behaviour, though it was constrained by formality and
preciseness.
Among the lower class of the people was found in an extreme degree
that inquisitiveness which according to English travellers in the first
half of the nineteenth century was characteristic of Americans
generally. "I was told", Burnaby writes, "of a gentleman of Phila-
delphia who, in travelling through the provinces of New England,
having met with many impertinences from this extraordinary turn
of character, at length fell upon an expedient almost as extraordinary
to get rid of them. He had observed, when he went into an ordinary,
that every individual of the family had a question or two to
propose to him relative to his history, and that till each was satisfied,
and they had conferred and compared together their information,
there was no possibility of procuring any refreshment. He therefore
the moment he went into any of these places enquired for the master,
the mistress, the sons, the daughters, the men servants and the maid
servants and having assembled them all together he began in this
manner: 'Worthy people, I am B.[enjamin] F.franklin] of Phila-
delphia, by trade a and a bachelor; I have some relations at
Boston, to whom I am going to make a visit; my stay will be short, and
I shall then return and follow my business, as a prudent man ought
to do. This is all I know of myself and all I can possibly inform you
of; I beg therefore that you will have pity upon me and my horse, and
give us both some refreshment.9"2
Burnaby tells an amusing story to illustrate the persistency of the
prejudice in favour of the observance of the Sabbath. A captain on
one of His Majesty's ships of war returning from a cruise on a Sunday
was welcomed at the waterside by his wife. The captain on landing
kissed her. This, as there were several spectators present, gave great
offence and was considered as an act of indecency and a flagrant
1 These flags of truce enabled merchants to go to the French West India islands in order
to exchange prisoners, the real scope and design of the voyage being to carry on a
prohibited trade with the French.
8 Burnaby, i, 747.
BURNABY'S TRAVELS THROUGH NORTH AMERICA 811
profanation of ^the Sabbath. Next day, therefore, he was summoned
before the magistrates who, with many severe rebukes and pious ex-
hortations, ordered him to be publicly whipped. The captain under-
went his punishment like a man, but on the day of his final departure
for England he invited the principal magistrates and select men to
dine with him on board his ship. They accepted the invitation and
had a most convivial entertainment. At the moment of setting sail
the captain, after taking an affectionate farewell, accompanied them
up on deck where the boatswain and crew were ready to receive
them. He there thanked them afresh for the civilities they had shown
him, of which he said he should have an eternal remembrance, and
to which he wished it had been in his power to have made a more
adequate return. One point of civility only remained to be adjusted
between them which, as it was in his power, so he meant most fully
to recompense to them. He then reminded them of what had passed,
and, ordering the crew to pinion them, had them brought one by one
to the gangway where the boatswain stripped off their shirts and
with a cat-of-nine-tails laid on the back of each forty stripes save one.
They were then amidst the shouts and acclamations of the crew
shoved into their boats ; and the captain immediately getting under
weigh sailed for England.1 This anecdote does not sound very trust-
worthy, but at least it illustrates contemporary opinion with regard
to the relations between England and Massachusetts.
In his final summing up Burnaby traverses the conclusion already
becoming popular, that empire was travelling westward, so that in
time America would give law to the rest of the world. America was
formed for happiness but not for empire. In a course of 1200 miles
he had not seen a single object that solicited charity, but he had seen
insuperable causes of weakness which would necessarily prevent it
from being a powerful State. That he was proved to be wrong did
not detract from the force of many of his arguments.
With the economic effects of the navigation laws we have here
nothing to do; still less with their influence upon political develop-
ments ; but, if the whole system was honeycombed with corruption,
the moral effects of their constant evasion must have been disastrous.
It was not merely that an illicit trade grew up when England was at
war with Holland or France; by which means trading with the enemy
developed and flourished. There was the further effect that buccaneer-
ing and piracy were winked at. A broad distinction must be drawn
between privateering and piracy. Privateers were of assistance to
the Royal Navy as late as Saunders's expedition against Quebec.2
Buccaneering, however, naturally degenerated into downright piracy.
These pirates and sea rovers, when prosecuted, generally escaped scot
free through the partiality of juries. Fletcher, the governor of New
York, and his council were in close communion with these gentry,
1 Burnaby, i, 748-9. 2 Kimball, n, 80.
812 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
the governor's excuse being that he wished to reclaim Tew, a notori-
ous malefactor, from the vile habit of swearing.1 When Fletcher's
successor sought to put an end to the evil he found the task almost
impossible. In 1 704 a noted pirate was hanged in Boston who struck
an answering note when he told the bystanders to beware how they
brought money into New England, to be hanged for it. It would
seem that at both Boston and New York a full third part of the
trade was "directly against law";2 and, considering that these
laws were openly condemned by members of the governor's
council, such a result was not surprising. In 1733 a newspaper,
commending the many virtues of a deceased collector of the cus-
toms, wrote: "He with much humanity took pleasure in directing
masters of vessels how they ought to avoid the breach of the
Acts of Trade".3 Rhode Island was especially an offender in
this respect. Governor Hopkins virtually defended illicit trading
as necessary to the colony.4
In conclusion the question must be faced, what part did the social
and intellectual life of the old colonial Empire play in the develop-
ment of a new national type? So far as social life was concerned, the
answer is obvious, so that whoso runs may read. The inevitable
tendency of a new country is in the direction of democracy; and even
in the most English of the old colonies the winning of the Virginia
West altered materially the character of that colony; whilst every-
where the movement towards a frontier that was continually reaching
farther and farther west meant a new advance for democratic ideals.
Moreover, the immigration of new European types involved further
removal from English ideals. As we have seen, even in New England
aristocratic influences of a sort were for a long time strong; but
these had little in common with the aristocratic system which
prevailed in England throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies. Here, then, was the persistent cause of antagonism — a social
system increasingly democratic confronted with one which still drew
its inspiration from aristocratic sources.
Turning to the intellectual life of the old Empire we recognise that
this found its main development in two directions, neither of which
was in sympathy with tendencies prevailing at the time in the mother
country. Compared with the splendid output of the British genius
American literature counted for very little in the period in question.
In two directions alone, it asserted itself. Concentration on theology
at once narrowed and deepened the field of its activities, but this
Calvinist Puritan theology was in its essence polemical and never
tired of throwing the gage of battle to Arminiamsm as represented
by the Church of England. Again, when the fires of theology began
to burn less brightly, the lawyers, to whom the torch was handed
1 New Tork Col. Docs, iv, 447. * Ibid, rv, 776.
8 Weedcn, p. 557. 4 Kimball, n, 373-7.
THE WEST INDIES 813
on, were defending for the most part a cause which was in direct
opposition to the claims of British lawyers. Everywhere, then, we
recognise that in the field of social and intellectual, no less than
in that of political and economical life, the stars in their courses
were moving in a direction hostile to the permanence of the British
connection.
Although Puritanism played some part in the foundation of the
Bermudas and the main part in the foundation of the abortive
Providence Island plantation, religion had very little to do with the
development of the West Indies. It was the wealth of these islands
that attracted settlers. Politics played indeed some part in providing
new settlers to Barbados; it became the resort of Royalists who
could not endure the state of things in England, but even these were
more inclined to interest themselves in resenting unfair taxation than
in displaying enthusiasm for the restored monarchy. At first it seemed
as though the ideal of a white community living in semi-tropical
surroundings might be realised, since in 1645 there were said to be
more than 1 1,000 proprietors. Twenty-two years later the number of
proprietors had fallen to 745, whilst there were 82,023 negro slaves.
In 1645 there were 18,300 men fit to bear arms, and in 1667 onty
8300. * At first the tobacco and cotton planters had occupied small
plots of from five to thirty acres, and had tilled them with the help
of a few white servants; the population being almost exclusively
white. But a complete revolution in the social life of the islands was
made by the cultivation of sugar, involving, as it did, capitalist pro-
duction and the use of slave labour. If ever the statement held good,
latif undid perdidere Italiam, it was in the case of these West India islands.
For a time re-emigration could cope with the difficulty. Thousands
left Barbados to settle in Antigua and the other Leeward Islands.
At a later date Barbados found settlers for Trinidad and Surinam
and afterwards Jamaica. Henceforth the interests of the islands
became inextricably joined with those of the slave trade, the Royal
African Company playing a leading part in their development. The
huge influx of negroes had undoubtedly a demoralising effect on the
character of the planters. Fear begets cruelty, and no doubt some of
the measures taken to protect the whites against the blacks were the
outcome of panic. White indentured servants were still introduced,
but their numbers were very small compared with that of the negro
slaves. The demand largely exceeded the supply. Jeaffreson wrote,
when endeavouring from London to obtain servants: "I believe, if
you will endeavour it, you may find Scotch and English that would
willingly change their climate upon the afore-mentioned terms, and
much more when they are directed to a certain place and person of
whose character they may be well informed. How many broken
traders, miserable debtors, penniless spendthrifts, discontented
1 But sec ante pp. 174, 267 and authorities there cited.
814 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
persons, travelling heads and scatter-brains would joyfully embrace
such offers".1
In nine years out of the 300 promised malefactors only sixty-one
had been shipped to the Leeward Islands. The conditions under
which servants, no less than slaves, worked, depended mainly on the
character of their masters. According to Jeaffreson " It is seldom seen
that the ingenious or industrious men fail of raising their fortunes in
any part of the Indies especially here, or where the land is not
thoroughly settled. There are now several examples of it to my
knowledge — men raised from little or nothing to vast estates. And I
can assure you our slaves live as well now as the servants did formerly.
The white servants are so respected that, if they will not be too
refractory, they may live much better than thousands of the poor
people in England during their very servitude, or at least as well".2
Unfortunately the number of these continued to diminish and more
and more the islands came under the system of large plantations
worked by vast gangs of slaves with a few white supervisors.
As time went on, and capitalist production took more and more
the place of the small freeholders, another evil assumed alarming
dimensions. In Barbados as early as 1669 the bad results of the non-
residence of many planters were dealt with. Several of the most
eminent planters fulfilled no parochial duties, their representative
owners having removed themselves to England; attorneys, agents
and overseers were left to manage their estates, whereby the country
had a far less choice of able men to act in the highest places of trust,
the burden of inferior offices thus falling more heavily on the poorer
classes. The sufferings entailed on servants and slaves by the behaviour
of an untrustworthy agent during the absence of a good proprietor
are vividly brought out in Jeaffreson's letters. "By a kind of magnetic
force", it was said in 1689, "England draws to it all that is good in
the Plantations, it is the centre to which all things tend. Nothing but
England can we relish or fancy: our hearts are here wherever our
bodies be They that are able breed up their children in England."8
In addition to absentee planters, there was a scandal of absentee
office-holders who farmed out their offices to others who excorted
exorbitant fees from the colonists. It was the custom to send children
to be educated in England, which often bred in young men in-
difference to their native colony. Codrington College, founded by the
great governor of the Leeward Islands and completed in 1721, was
a gallant attempt to cope with this evil, but scarcity of funds did not
allow of its having a very wide influence.
Much information with regard to the social life of the West Indies
is furnished by the despatches of governors to be found in the Colonial
1 A Toung Squire of the Seventeenth Century (ed. Jeaflreson, J. G.), i, 259.
* Ibid, i, 256-7.
8 Quoted by Pitman, F. W., The Development oj the British West Indies, pp. 31, 33.
JAMAICA 815
Calendar. Thus we learn that about 1673 the population of Barbados
amounted to 21,309 whites and 33,184 negroes, the number of
negroes, however, being probably understated. At this time the
number of acres possessed by each planter ranged from 200 to 1000, the
average number being 300. x Sir Peter Golleton, who had become
president of the council at the death of Lord Willoughby, noted* that it
was a troublesome task to keep eleven men in order who reckoned them-
selves equal in power and were not over well qualified for government.
Colleton urged that a man who had an interest in the island would be
more likely to be a good governor than one sent from England; the
latter might think his employment a reward for past services and that
his offence would be winked at should he break the Acts of Trade and
Navigation.2 According to the findings of the Grand Jury in 1673
there had been a daily increase in the number of Quakers in the colony
— no doubt partly caused by the profanation of the Lord's Day,
which was a crying sin in the island, and the amount of swearing
and drunkenness.3
At the close of 1668 Jamaica was in a very prosperous condition
and growing rich by privateering and the produce of the country.
In 1674 Sir Thomas Lynch reported that the island had improved
these last three years to a marvel, and the people were as contented
as English could be.4 According to a survey made in 1670, about
209,000 acres had been granted by patent to 717 families consisting
of about 15,000 persons, and there were numerous sugar and indigo
works. No island abounded in cocoa more than Jamaica, at the time
a more profitable crop than indigo, cotton or sugar. There was great
stock of cattle, so that all danger of want was past, and in a short time
they hoped to furnish the ships homeward bound.5
A friend of Lord Arlington, the Secretary of State, one John Style,
wrote to him gossiping letters of some interest. He complained of the
great number of "tippling houses", that there were not more than
ten men resident to every licensed house that sold strong liquors, and
of the wickedness of those who called themselves Christians. "Were
the most savage heathens here present they might learn cruelty and
oppression, the worst of Sodom or the Jews that crucified our Saviour
might behold themselves matched if not undone."6 Although there
was doubtless exaggeration in all this it seems clear that gambling
was a crying evil in Jamaica and the council recommended measures
for abating the mischief. A paper addressed to Lord Vaughan, when
governor in 1674, recommended that some public manly sports in-
stead of cards, dice and tables should be brought into fashion among
the young gentry; that in time of peace they should be often exercised
in arms. Penalties should be set upon swearing and upon intemperance
1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1669-74, no. noi.
2 Ibid, no, 1104. a Ibid. no. ni6. 4 Ibid. no. 1389.
6 Ibid. nos. 271, 375- fl Ibid. no. 138.
8i6 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
"so as at least it may be brought to the state it was formerly when
those that were drunk were drunk in the night". Laws should
be few and plain and the execution certain and severe; patent con-
nivance at the breach of a known law rendered the law and lawgiver
contemptible. If the law were good, it ought to be executed, if ill,
repealed.1
A most thorny question connected with the colony was the attitude
that should be taken with regard to privateering. Modyford had
encouraged in every way privateering, which he considered absolutely
necessary for the protection of the colony against Spain. According
to him "the necessity of the affairs was such, that if it were to be done
again and I assured of all the trouble which now threatens me and
worse, it could not have been avoided without the manifest ruin of this
island ". 2 However, the policy of the Home Government had changed
and the new governor, Sir Thomas Lynch, was enjoined to send
Modyford home a prisoner. Subsequently there was again a change
of policy and we find Henry Morgan, the arch-privateer and leader
of the successful expedition against Panama, in high favour at court.3
Indeed at a later date he became acting-Governor of Jamaica. The
Spaniards had been reported as giving orders to governors in America
to give commissions to privateers to act against English subjects, and
if so retaliation was obviously necessary. Still "privateering was the
sickness of Jamaica, for that and planting a country are absolutely
inconsistent".4 In 1676 the governor, Lord Vaughan, was able to
report that Jamaica was still prospering. Trade and planting had
considerably improved, and the children borninitlived and prospered,
so that the " Croyolians" [i.e. Creoles] and natives would in a few years
make a great people. Jamaica was prospering at the expense of
Barbados, as there had been a considerable emigration of the best
quality from that island. It was reckoned that there were about
5000 fighting men in Jamaica.5
A terrible hurricane in Barbados in 1675 illustrated a peril to
which these islands were exposed. "Never was seen such prodigious
ruin in three hours"; and another menace was the fear of a rising
of the negroes. The governor, Sir Jonathan Atkins, had been forced
to execute thirty-five of them, which he believed had set a period to
that trouble.6 In Jamaica rebellions of negroes were a source of still
greater anxiety and danger. It proved a difficult task to keep them
in order.7 An amazing story of the apathy and neglect of the home
authorities was told of the Leeward Islands by Sir William Staple-
ton, the ablest and most honest of English seventeenth-century
governors, when war with France was threatened in 1677-8. Reinforce-
ments for the two companies of regular troops "were sent without
, ^'r®' Pap' CoL l66?774' no- '4*5- 2 Ibid. no. 578. * Ibid. no. 1389.
I Sir Thoims Lynch, ML no. 777. • Ibid 1675-76, nos. 673, 794, 799-
8 Ibid. no. 090. 7 Ibid. no. 793.
NEGLECT OF THE ISLAND GARRISONS 817
arms, ammunition or money to subsist withal, not so much as a
sword nor the ammunition loaf to a place where is no magazine", the
French and Dutch being spectators of their naked condition. On the
other hand there were ten companies of old French soldiers well paid
and clothed in St Christopher.1 Stapleton's troops were unpaid; the
resources which should have been available for him were diverted
by the King, and he himself was the King's creditor for many years of
arrears of pay,2 yet he never lost heart, presenting always a splendid
type of quiet resolution, resource and devotion. As time went on,
even Stapleton became worn out by the situation. "I am out of
purse ", he wrote, "for shrouds for the dead, and cure of the wounded,
for minding their arms and giving them credit in merchants* store
houses."3 When he had accomplished seventeen years of hard work
he quitted his post on leave of absence, driven to England by the
home sickness that heralded the approach of death.
Considering the behaviour of the English Government it is not
astonishing to find the suspicions held by the colonists. Thus the
fovernor, Sir Jonathan Atkins, wrote from Barbados: "When the
rench were cruising in these parts, a letter written me from England
gave the people alarm that the island was to be sold to the French;
and because I spoke French, I was put down as frenchified and the
fittest man to deliver it up. It is easy to deceive these people, but very
hard to rectify it".4
Statements made by these governors must, however, be sometimes
taken with a grain of salt. This Sir Jonathan Atkins had to be recalled
for misbehaviour, though so far as his disgrace was due to his cham-
pioning the cause of the colonists against the Acts of Trade he may
not have been undeserving of sympathy. His successor, Sir R. Dutton,
after starting under apparently favourable auspices, proved himself
absolutely dishonest and was summarily dismissed. In Bermuda
disputes between the Chartered Company which was about to be
abolished led to a kind of civil war. The cry of "No Popery" was
raised by the Nonconformist ministers, the governor giving out that
people would be forced to go to church by drum and fiddle.5 When
the first rumour of the fall of the Company reached the island, the
authority of its governor was at once disclaimed and he himself
attacked by a mob headed by one of his own captains of militia. The
captain drew his sword on him, the captain's companions tripped up
his heels and the rest of the mob stamped on him leaving his leg
in a very sad condition.6
Meanwhile in Jamaica a more orderly constitutional struggle ended
in the triumph of the colonists, the attempt to apply Poynings's Act
to the island proving a failure. The return of Sir Thomas Lynch as
1 Cat. St. Pap. Col. 1677-80, no. 582. * Ibid. no. 1557.
3 Ibid. 1681-5, no. 860. * Ibid. 1677-80, no. 1334.
6 Ibid. 1681-5, nos. 1075, 1097. * Ibid. i6l3i~5, no. 1899.
GHBE I 52
8i8 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
again governor proved very successful, though a riot between the
King's sailors and the townsfolk for a time threatened trouble. The
governor's wise and conciliatory administration had changed the old
suspicious feeling against the Grown into hearty and healthy loyalty.
Sir Henry Morgan had by this time become wholly disreputable, and
was constantly drunk, abusing the Government and cursing extra-
vagantly. His dismissal was therefore a measure of necessity.1 Space
forbids to pursue the history of the West Indies from the statements
in the Calendars but again and again in their pages the same troubles
repeat themselves: the dishonesty and inefficiency of governors, the
quarrelsome temper of the people, and dread of negro risings and the
cruelty shown in their suppression. Over Jamaica especially the
storm clouds caused by privateering bulked ominous.
Considerable difference of opinion existed with regard to the
character of the population. Bryan Edwards, the patriotic historian of
the West Indies, speaks warmly on behalf of his compatriots, but an
English traveller wrote at the beginning of the nineteenth century:
"Debility pervades all ranks Barbados compared with the rest
of the West Indies may be esteemed a very healthy island But
from the meagre and sallow appearance of the native yeomanry and
citizens, their sunken eyes, relaxed countenances, and languid
motions, I felt always on beholding them that the climate was irrecon-
cileable with the constitution of their race. I am afraid also from the
mean and disingenuous behaviour of some of the inferior white in-
habitants of the town that the climate and perhaps their association
with the blacks, have not a little relaxed in them the strength and
integrity of the British moral character".2 The extraordinary be-
haviour of many of the English governors may have been in great
measure due to the influence of a tropical climate, coupled with a
total neglect of the laws of health in the matter of food and drink,
madeira along with brandy being the favourite beverage.
But great as was the danger from absenteeism it proved impossible
to remedy it. These absentees who lived in London were men of great
wealth, social position and political power. They held meetings at
which they secretly settled the affairs of the islands. Adam Smith
affirmed that "our tobacco colonies send us home no such wealthy
planters as we see frequently arrive from our sugar islands".3
McKinnen was surprised at the absence of resident planters. In one
of ^the northern and richest districts it was said that of eighty pro-
prietors not three were to be found at this time on the spot, the wealth
of the soil being transported and consumed in remote countries.4
Miss Schaw, who wrote with enthusiasm about Antigua, was quick
to recognise this evil. Children sent at an early age to England
1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1677-80, no. 1317.
2 McKinnen, A tour through the British West Indus in the years 1802, 1803, 1804
8 Wealth of Nations, bk r, chap, xi, pt r. « McKinnen, p. 108.
CONDITION OF THE SLAVES 819
formed their sentiments there, and they left it just when they were at
an age to enjoy it most and returned to their friends and country as
banished exiles, nor could any future connection cure them of the
longing they had to return to Britain. Antigua, however, suffered
less from this evil than did the other islands, St Christopher being
almost abandoned to overseers and managers.1 Miss Schaw gives a
charming description of the relations between masters and men at
their best. Colonel Martin, " the loved and revered father of Antigua ",
lived on his estates "which are cultivated to the height by a large
troop of healthy negroes, who cheerfully perform the labour im-
posed on them by a kind and beneficent master, not a harsh and un-
reasonable tyrant. Well fed, well supported, they appear the subjects
of a good prince, not the slaves of a planter. The effect of this kindness
is a daily increase of riches by the slaves born to him on his own
plantation. He told me he had not bought in a slave for upwards
of twenty years".2 Still, though Miss Schaw' s account of the West
Indian English is generally favourable, she has to admit the bad
results of the intercourse between the whites and the native women;
and the crack of the whip reminded one that relations between the
races were not always as idyllic as those on Colonel Martin's estate.
Miss Schaw laid the flattering unction to her soul that the negroes
did not feel seriously their physical punishment.
In striking contrast is the gloomy picture presented by Lady
Nugent, the wife of the Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica. Although
Lady Nugent did not come to Jamaica before 1801 there had been
no change in the condition of the island since the last half of the
previous century. It is true that she thought that the ill-treatment of
the slaves had been greatly exaggerated and that generally speaking
the slaves were extremely well used. Still the law of the land seemed
shockingly severe. Three magistrates might condemn a slave to death.
Where two slaves, one an old offender, the other a boy of sixteen, had
robbed a man of his watch, etc., the old man who arranged the theft
and received the stolen goods was condemned to hard labour, and
the boy to be hanged. The governor made every exertion to save the
life of the boy, but it seemed that it could not be done without
exercising his prerogative very far and giving offence and alarm to
the white population.3 Necessity for the slave trade was in large
measure due to the example of licentiousness set by the whites who,
in all classes, married or single, lived immoral lives with their female
slaves.4 It was melancholy to see the disregard of both religion and
morality throughout the whole island. Everyone seemed solicitous
to make money, and no one seemed to regard the mode of acquiring
it. It was extraordinary to witness the immediate effect that the
1 Andrews, E. W. and C. M., Journal of a Lady of Quality, p. 92. 2 Ibid. pp. 103-4.
3 Lady Nugtnt's Journal, 1801-15 (ed. Gundall, F.), p. 72.
* Ibid. pp. 117, 118.
52-2
820 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
climate and habit of living had upon the minds and manners of
Europeans, particularly upon the lower orders. In the upper ranks
they became indolent and inactive, regardless of everything but eating,
drinking and indulging themselves, and were almost entirely under
the dominion of their mulatto favourites. In the lower orders they
were the same, with the addition of conceit and tyranny, considering
the negroes as creatures formed merely to administer to their ease, and
to be subject to their caprice. The white servants did not regard them
as human beings or in the possession of souls.1 Lady Nugent was
"not astonished at the general ill-health of the men; for they really
eat like cormorants and drink like porpoises".2 The wealth of the
richest proprietors was enormous; one, Mr Taylor, the richest man
in the island, piqued himself upon making his nephew the richest
commoner in England.8 A Mr Mitchell boasted of paying £30,000
per annum for duties to Government.
An interesting account of Barbados is given by Dr G. Pinckard, who
went out with the expedition to the West Indies in 1805. Although
it had had to yield to other settlements in point of produce and in-
crease of population, still its trade and resources continued to be
important, its population great, and the picturesque scenery of its
surface was perhaps unrivalled. Its temperature was more equable and
its air healthier than those of the other islands. Every part came under
the influence of the trade-wind which made it the most healthy of the
islands, being treated by the other colonies as a health resort. Situated
to windward of the other islands it received the uninterrupted breeze
brought to it in all its purity immediately from a wide extent of ocean
unimpregnated by the poisonous exhalations of stagnant waters or
polluted soil. Little oppression was felt from the heat, and in the
harbour and placed in the shade the thermometer was seldom higher
than 84 and at no time exceeded 86 degrees. Yet in spite of all these
advantages Barbados had its own peculiar trouble in the shape of a
disease, a form of elephantiasis.4 Dr Pinckard especially noted that
Barbados contained a numerous class of inhabitants between the
great planters and the people of colour; of these many were descended
from the original settlers and through several generations had been
born and had constantly lived upon the island. They regarded it as
their native and only abode, and did not, like their richer neighbours,
look to England as another and a better home.5 The inhabitants
prided themselves upon the island's antiquity and assumed a con-
sequence and almost a claim to hereditary rank and privilege from
priority of establishment. This sense of distinction was strongly
manifested by the common expression "neither Gharib nor Creole
but true Barbadian". This boast was shared even by the slaves, who
1 Lady Nugenfs Journal, pp. 131-2. a Ibid. p. 108.
8 Ibid. p. 88. * Motes on the West Indies, by Pinckard, G., M.D., ir, 79-80.
5 Ibid, n, 75 seqq.
SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN BARBADOS 821
proudly arrogated a superiority above the negroes of the other
islands.
The poor whites lived in cottages remote from the great class of
merchants and planters, obtaining a scanty livelihood by cultivating
a small patch of earth and breeding up poultry or what they termed
stock for the markets. By misfortune or misconduct they were re-
duced to a state far removed from independence, often indeed but
little superior to the condition of free negroes. Yet even these be-
lieved that in the scale of creation there could be no other country,
kingdom or empire equal to their transcendent island, their own
Barbados; whence the adage: "What would poor old England do,
were Barbados to forsake her?"1 Dr Pinckard also emphasised that
the people of Barbados were much too addicted to the pleasures of
the table. "In eating they might put to the blush even the turtle
countenances of our London fat citizens."2 He further noted the in-
efficiency of slave labour. A gang of negroes employed in making
a road to the governor's house afforded a striking example of the
indolence due to climate and slavery. A mulatto overseer attended
them who had every appearance of being as much a stranger to
industry as the negroes, who seemed not to be apprehensive of the
driver or his whip except when he made it fall across them in stripes.
"In proportion to the work done by English labourers and the price
usually paid for it the labour of these slaves could not be calculated
at so much as twopence per day, for almost any two men in England
would, with the greatest ease, do as much work in a given time as
was performed by a dozen of these indolent meagre-looking beings."8
Dr Pinckard saw, on one occasion, four women, almost naked, work-
ing in a caneficld; a stout robust-looking man, apparently white, was
following them holding a whip at their backs. Asked why he did
not join in the task, the reply was, that it was not his business, that
he had only to keep the women at work and make them feel the
weight of the whip if they grew idle or relaxed from their labour.
Equally revolting was the Barbadian law under which, if an infant
was born in slavery, a mother, should she obtain her own freedom,
could not claim her child, but had to leave it, still the disposable
property of her mistress, equally liable to be sold as any other piece
of furniture in the house. "Thus", our author concludes, "are the
natural tics of our species torn asunder, and the dearest attachments
and purest affections of the heart cruelly broken down ! Babes are
separated from their parents and mothers robbed of their children
by this unnatural appropriation of human substance!"4
A noteworthy event was a visk to Codrington College. The college
was richly endowed with the generous intention of establishing a
great and useful school for the education of the youth of Barbados,
1 Pmckzircl, ii, 132-3. * Ibid, n, 97.
* Ibid, i, 256-7. « Ibid, i, 247-8.
822 LITERATURE AND SOCIAL LIFE OF OLD EMPIRE
the revenues of two large estates being appropriated to the institution.
But Codrington's intention had not been duly regarded. The profits
had been squandered and the funds disgracefully neglected or
abused. The splendid edifice planned had not been finished, and the
part that was erected had been brought into early decay. Only one
side of the intended quadrangle had yet been built, and that, to the
disgrace of those concerned, had long been left to fall into ruin. Some-
thing, however, had been done by the present manager to recover
the estates and to direct the funds into their proper channel. The
part of the building which had been erected was now undergoing a
thorough repair in the hope of saving it from utter and premature
destruction. Twelve boys only had as yet been admitted on the foun-
dation, who, instead of occupying any part of the college building,
were accommodated in the house of the master.1
A very different aspect of West Indian life is to be found in the
rollicking pages of Tom Cringle's Log, but its author had lived fifteen
years in the tropics, and, in spite of exaggerations, the book speaks
with authority. In Kingston, he affirmed, the society was as good as
could be met with in any provincial town anywhere; "and there pre-
vailed a warmth of heart and a kindliness both in the males and females
of those families to which I had the good fortune to be introduced,
that I never experienced out of Jamaica".2 The island was at the
time in the heyday of its prosperity and Kingston harbour was full of
shipping. "The result of this princely traffic, more magnificent than
that of Tyre, was a stream of gold and silver flowing into the Bank of
England, to the extent of £3,000,000 sterling annually, in return for
British manufactures; thus supplying the sinews of war to the Govern-
ment at home, and, besides the advantage of so large a mart, employ-
ing an immense amount of British tonnage and many thousand
seamen, and in numberless ways opening up new outlets to British
enterprise and capital."3
Considering their special circumstances it was natural that the
West Indies did not produce much in the way of an indigenous
literature; but Long's History of Jamaica and Bryan Edwards's History
of the West Indies are vigorous and able statements of the history from
the West Indian standpoint.
1 Pinckard, 1,356-9.
8 Scott, M., Tom Cringle's Log (Everyman's Library edn), p. 125.
3 Ibid. p. 126.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Edited by LILLIAN M. PENSON
A. GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Compiled from the Bibliographical Lists supplied by contributors)
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND GUIDES TO MATERIAL
II. DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL (PRINTED AND UNPRINTED)
B. SPECIAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES
I. EXPLORATION AND SEA POWER
1. EXPLORATION, by Dr J. A. Williamson.
2. SEA POWER, by Professor J. Holland Rose.
II. COLONIAL POLICY
1. GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION, by Professor C. M. Andrews.
2. ECONOMIC POLICY, by Professor C. M. Andrews and Professor J. F.
Rees.
3. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE, by Professor J. Ewing.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE COLONIES
1. THE CONTINENTAL COLONIES, by Professor C. M. Andrews, C.
Headlam and Professor A. P. Newton.
2. THE WEST INDIES, by Professor C. M. Andrews, C. Headlam, and
Miss L. M. Penson.
3. WEST AFRICA, by Miss E. C. Martin.
IV. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE, by C. Headlam.
2. THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, by C. T. Atkinson.
3. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783, by C. Headlam.
A. GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND GUIDES TO MATERIAL
ANDREWS, C. M. Guide to Ike Materials for American History to 1783, in the Public
Record Office of Great Britain. Vol. I, The State Papers', Vol. n, Departmental and
Miscellaneous Papers. Washington, 1912, 1914.
ANDREWS, C. M. and DAVENPORT, F. G. Guide to the Manuscript Materials for the
History of the United States to 1 783, in the Bntish Museum, in minor London Archives,
and in the Libraries of Oxford andCambndge. Washington, 1907.
These three volumes provide a valuable analysis of the documentary
materials for American and West Indian history, available in the better
known British archives.
ANDREWS, C. M. "List of the Journals and Acts of the Councils and Assemblies
of the Thirteen Original Colonies and the Floridas in America, preserved
hi the Public Record Office." Report, American Historical Association, 1908,
" List of the Commissions, Instructions, and Additional Instructions issued
to the Royal Governors and Others in America to 1784." Report, American
Historical Association, 1911, pp. 393-528.
"List of Reports and Representations of the Plantation Councils, 1660-1674,
the Lords of Trade, 1675-1696, and the Board of Trade, 1696-1782, in the
Public Record Office. " Report, American Historical Association, 1913, pp. 3 1 9-406.
BARTLETT, J. R. Bibliography of Rhode Island. Providence, 1864.
BELL, H. C., PARKER, D. W. and others. Guide to British West Indian Archive Materials,
in London and in the Islands, for the History of the United States. Washington, 1926.
CALLENDER, G. A. R. A Bibliography of Naval History. 2 pts. Historical Association
Publicns. Nos. 58 and 61. London, 1924, 1925.
CHANNING, E., HART, A. B and TURNER, F J. Guide to the Study of American History.
3rd ed. Boston, 1912.
CUNDALL, F. Biblwgraphia Jamaicensis. Kingston, 1902. Supplement published
in 1908.
Bibliography of the West Indies, exclusive of Jamaica. Kingston, 1909.
DAVENPORT, F. fe. "Materials for English Diplomatic History, 1509-1783,
Calendared in the Reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, with
References to Similar Materials in the British Museum." xvnith Report of the
Royal Commission on Historical MSS. London, 1917.
DAVIES, G. Bibliography of Bntish History . Stuart Period, 1603-1714. Oxford, 1928.
Chapter xv, by E. A. Benians, deals with "Voyages and Travels";
Chapter xvi, by the late Professor H. E. Egerton, with "Colonial History".
There is a valuable list of Bibliographies and Guides on pp. 355-7.
GAY, J. Bibliographic des ouvrages relatifs a VAfrique et a VArabie. Paiis, 1875.
GIUSEPPI, M. S. A Guide to the Manuscripts preserved in the Public Record Office, a vols.
London, 1923.
These volumes are an enlargement of Scargill-Bird's Guide to the Public
Record Office, 3rd ed. 1009, which was for many years the standard work of
reference. The material relating to colonial subjects is dealt with in the second
volume.
GRIFFIN, G. G. (Editor). Writings on American, History, 1906 (and subsequent
years to 1923). A Bibliography of Books and Articles on United States and Canadian
History during the year. New Haven, 1908.
This series was preceded by a volume in 1902 edited by E. G. Richardson
and A. E. Morse, Princeton, 1904; and one in 1903 by A. C. McLaughlin,
W. A. Slade, and E. D. Lewis, Washington, 1905.
HICHAM, C. S. S. Colonial Entry Books. Helps for the Students of History Series,
No. 45, S.P.C.K. London, 1921.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 825
JAMESON, J. F. "Guide to the Items relating to American History in the Reports
of the English Historical Manuscripts Commission." Report, American Historical
Association, 1898, pp. 61 1-700. Washington, 1899.
LARNED, J. N. The Literature of American History. . . . Boston, 1902.
MALCOLM, H. List of Documents relating to the Bahama Islands in the British Museum
and the Public Record Office. Nassau, 1910.
NEWTON, A. P. (Editor). List of Selected Books relating to the History of the British
Empire Overseas Historical Association Publicns. No. 46. Rev. ed, London,
1929-
STEVENS, B. F. "Catalogue Index of MSS in the Archives of England, France,
Holland, and Spain relating to America, 1763-83." 180 vols. In the Library
of Congress.
THOMAS, N. W. Bibliography of Anthropology and Folk Lore. 1908.
Has a useful section on West Africa.
WEEKS, S. B. Libraries and Literature ofN. Carolina in the XVIIIih Century. Washing-
ton, 1895.
Historical Review of the Colonial and State Records of JV. Carolina. Raleigh, N.C.
Index to the Colonial and State Records of North Carolina. Goldsboro', 1909-14.
II. DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL (PRINTED AND UNPRINTED)
/. OFFICIAL PAPERS PRESERVED W BRITISH REPOSITORIES
(i) PARLIAMENTARY
(a) Acts:
The Statutes of the Realm ...(1101-1713). 1 1 vols. London, 1 8 1 0-28.
The Statutes at Large. Collected by D. Pickering. (1225-1 76 1)24 vols. Cambridge,
1762-9. Continued from 1761 to 1807. Cambridge, 1763-1807.
FIRTH, C. H. and RAIT, R. S. Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum. 3 vols.
London, 1911.
(b) Debates:
ALMON, J. Parliamentary Register, a History of the Proceedings and Debates of the
House of Commons, 1774-82. 25 vols. London, 1775 sqq.
COBBETT, W. and WRIGHT, J. Parliamentary History of England, 1066-1803.
London, 1 806 sqq.
(c) Journals of the Home of Lords, and Journals of the House of Commons:
NOTE. All entries relating to colonial affairs for North America and the West
Indies from the Journals and other sources are printed in STOCK, L. F., Pro-
ceedings and Debate* of the British Parliaments respecting North America. Washington,
1924. In progress. Vol. i covers the years 1542-1688.
(d) Parliamentary Papers and Miscellaneous MSS :
The great sei ies of Accounts and Papers and Reports of Commissioners, printed
by order of one of the Houses of Parliament and required to be laid before
them, is of the greatest value fox colonial matters, but mainly after 1783.
Among those of value for the period covered by this volume are the following
reports upon West Afric an affairs :
Reports of Commissioners , 1816, vol. vn. 2; 1817, vol. vi.
Repoits of Committees appointed to investigate the affairs of the Com-
pany of Merchants trading to Africa.
Reports of Commissioners, 1830, vol. x; 1842, vol. XL
Reports upon Sierra Leone and the British Possessions in Africa, re-
spectively.
826 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Manuscripts of the House of Lords, 1693-1710. New Series. Vols. i-vra.
London, 1900-23. In progress.
This series is in continuation of that issued under the auspices of the
Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts. (V. infra, p. 837.)
(2) PRIVY COUNCIL
Acts of the Privy Council, 1542-1614. Ed. by J. R. Dasent. 32 vols. London,
1890-1907.
1613-1616. Ed. by E. G. Atkinson. 2 vols. London, 1916, 1925. In progress.
Acts of the Privy Council Colonial, 1613-1783. Ed. by W. L. Grant and J. Munro.
6 vols. London, 1908-12.
These series of printed calendars provide the texts of entries relating to colonial
affairs in the Privy Council Register. The many volumes of the original Register
are in the Public Record Office. Vol. vi of the Acts of the Privy Council Colonial
gives a selection from the bundles of miscellaneous Privy Council Papers, which
are also in the Public Record Office.
The Privy Council Register contains records of the meetings of committees
of the Council as well as those of the Council itself. Some committees, however,
preserved separate records, e.g. the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade
and Plantations of 1675-96. (F. infra, p. 828.)
The Plantation Register.
This is a series of volumes containing the texts of documents relating to the
colonies which came before the Privy Council. They are still in the Privy Council
Office, and have not been calendared.
British Royal Proclamations relating to America, 1603-1783. Ed. by C. S. Biigham.
Published as vol. xn of the Trans, of American Antiquarian Soc. Worcester,
Mass. 1911.
(3) THE EXCHEQUER
The records of the Exchequer include series relating to the Customs, and also
the Port Books (from 1565), which give hints on early commerce and explora-
tion. They include also Privy Seal and other Warrants which sometimes
indicate the issue of patents and grants, or appointments which have not been
inscribed on Patent Rolls.
(4) THE CHANCERY
Patent Rolls. These are important for grants to Chartered Companies and Pro-
prietors, Commissions to Governors, etc.
The records of the Courts of Chancery, Star Chamber and Requests are valuable
for commerce and early colonial transactions.
(5) THE ADMIRALTY
Accountant-General's Department:
Log Books, etc.; Admirals' Journals (from 1702) and Captains' Logs (from
1669).
Navy Board :
In-Letters (from 1660); Out-Letters (from 1671).
Secretary's Department:
In-Letters (from 1673), including Reports of Courts Martial (Admiral Byng,
Admiralty 1/5290. Admiral Keppel, Admiralty 1/5312. Admiral Palliser,
Admiralty 1/5313).
Out-Letters (from 1656).
Board's Minutes (from 1657).
High Court of Admiralty:
The records of the High Court of Admiralty are important, especially in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for commerce, privateering and some
colonial transactions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 827
Some papers from the Admiralty records and records of the High Court of
Admiralty are printed in:
MARSDEN, R. G. (Editor). Documents relating to the Law and Custom of the Sea.
2 vols. N.R.S. 1915-16.
PERRIN, W. G. (Editor). The Naval Miscellany. Vol. m. N.R.S. 1928.
This volume includes the Admiralty Instructions to Captain Cook for his
three voyages.
(6) THE SECRETARIES OF STATE
State Papers of Henry VIII. General Series. 1509-1547.
These papers, of which there are 230 volumes, are in the Public Record
Office. Thev. are valuable for commercial and maritime affairs. They are
summarised in Calendar of Letters and Papers (Foreign and Domestic) of the Reign
of Henry VIII. 1509-1547. 21 vols. in 33 pts. London, 1862-1910.
State Papers Domestic, 1547-1782.
In the Public Record Office. They are summarised in:
(a) Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1547-1704. 78 vols. London, 1865-
1925. In progress.
The Calendar varies greatly in value, and there are a few gaps within its
period not yet covered. For the years 1 547-80 it is little more than a catalogue.
(b) Calendar of Home Office Papen of the Reign of Geotge III. 1760-1775. 4vols.
London, 1878-99.
Extracts from State Papers, Domestic and other Sources, are printed in:
Papers relating to the Navy during the Spanish War. 1585-7. Ed. by Sir T. S.
Corbctt. N.R.S. 1898.
Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816. Ed. by Sir J. S. Corbett. N.R.S. 1905.
State Papers relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada. Ed. by Sir J. K.
Laughton. 2 vols. N.R.S. 1894
State Papers Foreign, 1547-1782.
In the Public Record Office. They are summarised in Calendar of State Papers,
Foreign. 1547-1588. 23 vols. London, 1861-1927. In progress.
The earlier volumes of the Calendar are inadequate.
NOTE. Treaties relating to Colonial affairs arc printed in :
DAVENPORT, F. G. European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States
and its Dependencies to 1648. Washington, 1917.
DAWS, J. C. B. Treaties and Conventions concluded between the United States
and other Powers since July 4//z, 1776. Washington, 1889.
DUMONT, J. Corps universel diplomatique 8 vols. Amsterdam, La Haye,
1726-31.
Colonial Office Papers, 1574-1878.
This gioat collection, in the Public Record Office, is the most important
British official source for the study of colonial history, since it includes the records
both of the Secretaries of State and the Board of Trade and Plantations. (V.
infra, p. 828.)
Among the many scries into which the papers are divided, the following may
be mentioned :
(a) The papers of the period 1574-1697 are grouped in one series in strict
chronological order, without distinction of colony. (C.O. i.)
(b) The papers relating to the Thirteen Colonies from 1697 are collected
in one scries, but grouped together according to the colony to which they
belong. (C.O. 5.)
($) For each colony or group of colonies, other than these, there exist a
number of scries, each starting in 1697 or later.
The main classes of documents are: "Original Correspondence", i.e.
in-letters, addressed either to the Secretary of State or to the Board of
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Trade; "Entry Books" of out-letters, instructions, etc. Enclosures in the
in-letters, i.e. "Acts" of the Colonial Legislatures, "Sessional Papers",
"Government Gazettes", "Shipping Returns".
(d) In addition, the Colonial Office Papers include some general series:
"Colonies General", "Board of Trade, Commercial", and the "Minutes
of the Board of Trade ". ( V. infra, § 7.)
The Colonial Office Papers are summarised in the following:
(a) Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1574-1714.
21 vols. London, 1862-1926.
The value of these volumes varies considerably, the later issues being
generally the better. The first volume 1574-166013 inadequate. The dates
covered by each volume are: i, 1574-1660; n, 1661-68; m, 1669-74; rv,
1675-76, and Addenda for 1574-1674 (these volumes were edited by W. N.
Sainsbury); v, 1677-80 (ed. by W. N. Sainsbury and Hon. Sir J. W. For-
tescue); vi, 1681-85; vn, 1685-88; vm, 1689-92; ix, 1693-96; x, 1696-97; xi,
1697-98 (ed. by Hon. Sir J. W. Fortescue) ; xii, 1699 and Addenda for 1621-98;
xin, 1700; xrv, 1701; xv, 1702-3; xvi, 1704-5; xvii, 1706-8; xvni, 1708-9;
xix, 1710-11; xx, 1711-12; xxi, 1712-14 (ed. by C. Headlam).
(b) Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, East Indies, China and Japan, 1513-1634.
Ed. by W. N. Sainsbury. London, 1862-92. 5 vols.
This series includes documents in the India Office and the British Museum.
It is being continued in A Calendar of the Court Minutes of the East India Company,
1635-39. Ed. by Miss E. B. Sainsbury. Oxford, 1907-25. In progress. The
series of Court Minutes is being issued by the India Office. The latest volume
published deals with the years 1664-67.
Among other printed collections from Colonial papers in the Public Record
Office mention may be made of:
Recordsofthe Council for New England. Ed. by C. Deane. Cambridge, Mass. 1867.
(7) THE BOARDS OF TRADE AND PLANTATIONS
Council for Foreign Plantations, 1660-4.
Minutes and correspondence are in the Colonial Office papers at the Public
Record Office, and are calendared in the Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series.
(V. supra, §6.)
The minutes of the contemporary Committee of the Privy Council for Trade
and Plantations are also in the Public Record Office, but are included in the
Privy Council Register.
Councils for Foreign Plantations, 1670-2, and 1672-4.
Minutes are in the Library of Congress, Washington. The heads of pro-
ceedings have been printed in ANDREWS, C. M., British Committees, Councils, and
Commissions for Trade and Plantations, 1622-1675. Appendix, pp. 133-51. Cf.
BIEBER, R., "British Plantation Councils of 1670-1672". E.H.R. vol. XL
January 1925. '
Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, 1675-96.
Minutes and correspondence are in the Colonial Office papers at the Public
Record Office, included in the same series as those of the succeeding council
and are calendared in the Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series. *
The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 1696-1782.
Journal and correspondence in the Public Record Office.
The records of the years 1696-1704 are calendared in the Calendar of State
Papers, Colonial Series. Starting with the year 1704, the Journal is printed in full
in Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations. London, 1920. In pro-
gress. Five volumes have been issued, covering the years to 1728.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 829
(8) THE TREASURY
(a) General Treasury Records:
The following series are of special value for colonial affairs:
T. i . Treasury Board Papers.
Mainly in-letters. Vols. 5 1 2-9 contain matter of value for the War of American
Independence.
T. 29. Minutes.
Vols. 44-53 are valuable for the War of American Independence.
T. 38. Accounts, Departmental.
Vols. 253-69 contain matter relating to the West Indies.
T. 64. Miscellaneous, Various.
Vols. 88-90 contain the Journal of William Blathwayt, surveyor and auditor-
general of American revenues.
Vols. 101-7, 114, n 7-20 are of value for the War of American Independence.
The records of the Treasury are calendared in :
Calendar of Treasury Books, 1660-1689. 8 vols. in 15 pts. Ed. by W. A. Shaw.
London, 1904-23.
Calendar of Treasury Papers, 1557-1728. 6 vols. Ed. by H. Redington. London,
1868-89.
Calendar of Treasury Books and Papers, 1729-1745. 5 vols. Ed. by W. A. Shaw.
London, 1897-1903.
(b) African Papers :
Among the records of the Treasury are to be found the papers of the two African
companies which held the English trading forts on that coast from 1672 to
1821, the Royal Afiican Company and the Company of Merchants trading to
Africa. These papers passed into the custody of the Treasury in 182 1, and, though
they appear as Treasury papers now, they arc simply the records of the two
companies, consisting of the usual classes of company papers, minutes of com-
mittees and councils, letters (in and out), account entry books and registers of
various kinds, and miscellanea. They arc listed in the Record Office as T. 70.
(9) WAR OFFICE
W.O. I. In-Lettcrs.
These include, for the period of the War of Independence, letters to the Secre-
tary at War from officers in Amciica, the West Indies, Gibraltar and Minorca;
the correspondence of the Commander-in-Chief with the Secretary at War;
the letters from the Secretaries of State and Ticasury.
W.O. III. Out-Letters.
This scries consists in out-letters to the Commander-in-Ghief.
W.O. IV. Out-Lcttcrs.
These include a collection of "Letters to the Colonies and Places Abroad,
1730-1853", covering America, the West Indies, Minorca, Gibraltar, and the
East Indies.
W.O. XVII. Miscellanea: Monthly Returns.
This scries shows, from the year 1759, the distribution of troops in the various
colonies, etc.
W.O. XXIV. Registers: Establishments.
Royal sign manual warrants authorising establishments, including those in
the colonies.
W.O. XXVIII. Miscellanea: Head Quarter Records.
These include nine bundles of letters, etc., for field officers and others in
America for the years 1775-85.
830 BIBLIOGRAPHY
//. OFFICIAL PAPERS PRESERVED IN AMERICAN AND
COLONIAL REPOSITORIES
(By Professor G. M. ANDREWS)
The official records of the thirteen continental colonies are to be found mainly
in the various State Archives. Of particular importance are those of New Hamp-
shire (Concord), Massachusetts (Boston), Connecticut (Hartford), and South
Carolina (Columbia).
Among the official papers, of which the originals belong to American and
colonial archives, many are of interest mainly for the history of the individual
colony. Certain classes, therefore, may be instanced as of special value to the
study of general colonial development. These are:
x Acts of Colonial Legislatures.
Proceedings of Colonial Legislatures.
Official Correspondence of Governors and other Officials.
Many printed collections of these documents exist for the North American Colonies,
and some for the British West Indies. It is to be noted, however, that in many
cases the collections are formed partly of documents in the colonial archives, and
partly from originals or duplicates in the Public Record Office. Duplicates of
Acts and Proceedings of Colonial Legislatures were required to be sent to England
by an instruction of Charles II in 1680, and the English series are necessary supple-
ments to those in the colonies, which are in many cases incomplete. The correspond-
ence is also divided between English and colonial archives. The practice of keeping
copies of out-letters was not consistently followed either in England or the colonies,
and it is therefore necessary to use both the English and colonial series to obtain
the fullest material available.
The most important of the printed collections are shown below:
(i) ACTS OF COLONIAL LEGISLATURES
Acts passed in the Island of Barbadoes, 1643-1762. Carefully revised by Richard Hall
and after his death continued by his son, Richard Hall, Jr; to which is added an index
and abridgement and a list of all the laws passed since the settlement of the island9
which had become obsolete, expired, or had had their effect. London, 1 764.
A very rare volume. There are copies in the Public Record Office, the
Library of the West India Committee, and the Library of Yale University.
Acts of Assembly made and enacted in the Bermuda or Summer Islands, 1690-1713/4.
London, 1719.
Idem, continued to 1736. London, 1737.
Acts of Assembly passed in the Island of Jamaica, 1681-1737. London, 1738.
Laws of Jamaica. 5 vols. St Jago de la Vega, 1792.
Acts of Assembly passed in the Chanbee Leeward Islands, 1690-1730. London, 1734.
Idem. Montserrat, 1668-1740. London, 1740.
Idem. Nevis, 1664-1739. London, 1740.
Idem. St Christopher, 1711-1735. London, 1739.
All printed West Indian laws of this period, that bear the London imprint,
were issued in London under orders from the Board of Trade.
Laws of the Island ofSt Christopher, 171 1-1831. St Christopher, 1832.
Laws of New Hampshire. Vols. i-ra. The Province Period. Ed. by A. S. Batchellor.
Manchester, New Hampshire, 1904-15.
These volumes contain all the commissions, general instructions, additional
instructions, and many of the trade instructions issued to the governors of
the province.
The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of Massachusetts Bay. 1 9 vols.
Ed. by A. C. Goodell, A. S. Wheeler and W. G. Williamson. Boston, 1869-1922.
This work is the most important that has been issued on any of the colonial
laws. Its elaborate notes constitute almost the equivalent of a legislative
history of the province.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 831
Acts and Laws of His Majesty's Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New
England. Newport, 1745.
Rhode Island has issued no modern edition of her colonial laws.
Acts and Laws of His Majesty's Colony of Connecticut in New England. New London,
1769-79-
Regarding the various editions of the Connecticut statutes, see A. C. Bates,
Connecticut Statute Laws, A Bibliographical List of Editions. Acorn Club Publicns.
Hartford, Conn. 1900.
The Colonial Laws of New Torkfrom the Year 1664 to the Revolution. 5 vols. Albany,
A modern annotated edition, but less satisfactory than that for the Massa-
chusetts Laws.
Acts of the General Assembly of the Province of New Jersey. Burlington, 1776. Re-
printed. Somerville, 1881.
Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, 1700-1790. 12 [11] vols. Ed. by J. T. Mitchell
and S. Flanders. Harrisburg, 1896-1908.
A modern annotated edition. The first volume, covering the period from
1682 to 1700, has never been issued.
The Laws of Maryland. Revised and collected under the Authority of the Legislature by
W. Kilty. 2 vols. Annapolis, 1799-1800.
Idem. Ed. by V. Maxey. 3 vols. Baltimore, 1811.
The Statutes at Large, Being a Collection of all Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of
The Legislature in the Year 1619. n vols. Ed. by W. W. Hening. New York
and Richmond, 1809-23.
The second edition is the most complete.
State Records of North Carolina. Ed. by W. S. Saunders. Winston, 1895-1906.
Vols. XXIH-XXV contain the text of the laws of the province.
The Statutes at Large of South Carolina, i o vols. Ed. by T. Cooper and D. J. McCord.
Columbia, 1836-41.
Vols. n-iv contain the text of the laws of the provincial period.
The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia. Ed. by A. D. Chandler. Atlanta, 1904-8.
Vols. xvui-xix contain the text of the laws for the provincial period.
(2) PROCEEDINGS OF COLONIAL LEGISLATURES
Votes of the Honourable House of Assembly of the Bahama Islands. Vol. i, 1729-53;
vol. ii, 1760-65; vol in, 1766-70; vol. iv, 1770-76. Nassau, igio-n.
Ancient Journals of the House of Assembly of Bermuda, from 1691 to 1785. 3 vols.
Bermuda, 1890. Supplementary volume, London, 1906.
Journals of the House of Assembly of Jamaica. . .(1663-1826). 14 vols. Jamaica,
1811-29.
This is rare. A copy exists in the Public Record Office and another in the
British Museum.
Records of the Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay in New England, 1628-1686.
5 vols. Ed. by N. B. ShurtleiT. Boston, 1853-54.
This scries contains the records of the legislative body of Massachusetts.
Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1715-1727. 7 vols. Ed. by
W. C. Ford. Massachusetts Historical Society. Boston, 1915-25.
This work is in pi ogress. A complete file of the journal for the years 1 730-73
is in the State House, Boston.
A Collection of the Proceedings of the Great and General Court or Assembly of His Majesty1 *s
Province of the Massachusetts Bay, in New England^ containing several instructions
from the Crown to the Council and Assembly of that Province, for fixing a Salary on
the Governor and their Determination thereupon. As also the Methods taken by the Court
for supporting the several Governors since the Arrival of the Present Charter. Boston,
1729.
A very rare work.
Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Colony of New Tork, 1691-1765.
2 vols. New York, 1 764-66.
832 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania.
6vols. Philadelphia, 1752-76.
Journals of Assembly in manuscript for the three Lower Counties (Delaware)
for 1 739, 1 740, 1 74 1 , and the March sessions of 1 742 , have recently been discovered
in the archives 01 Dover. An incomplete printed journal for the year 1763, and the
entire printed journal for the years 1765 to 1770, are in private hands. No others
are known to exist.
Journals of the House of Burgesses of Colonial Virginia, 1619-1776. 12 vols. Ed. by
J. P. Kennedy and H. R. Mcllwain. Richmond, 1905-15; Legislative Journals
of the Councils of Colonial Virginia. 3 vols. Ed. by H. R. Mcllwain. Richmond,
1918-19; Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia, 1622-
1623, 1670-1676. Ed. by H. R. Mcllwain. Richmond, 1924.
Sessional papers for other colonies are contained in general collections of their
records. The following are the most important:
Province and Court Records of Maine. Vol. i. Ed. by G. T. Libby. Portland, 1928.
Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire, 1623-1800. 7 vols.
Compiled by N. Bouton. Concord, 1867-73.
These are commonly known as " Province Papers ". The minutes of Assembly
do not go beyond 1748.
Records of the Colony of New Plymouth in New England. 12 vols. Ed. by N. B. Shurtleff.
Boston, 1855-61.
Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New England, 1636-
1792. 10 vols. Ed. byj. R. Bartlett. Providence, 1856-65.
Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, 1636-1796. 15 vols. Ed. byj. H. Trumbull
and C. J. Hoadle. Hartford, 1850-90.
Documents relating to the Colonial History of New Jersey. First series, 18 vols. Ed. by
W. Whitehead, F. W. Record and W. Nelson. Newark, 1880-93.
Vols. XHI-XVIII contain the journals of the Governor and Council.
Archives of Maryland. 44 vols. Ed. by W. H. Browne, C. Hall and B. C. Steiner.
Baltimore, 1883-1926. In progress.
Colonial Records of North Carolina. 10 vols. Ed. by W. L. Saundcrs. Raleigh,
1886-90.
Contains the minutes of Council and Assembly.
South Carolina:
The State of South Carolina has not printed its records, except where very early
and very late proceedings of Assembly have appeared in the Publications of the
South Carolina Historical Commission, Columbia, 1907 and following years.
The bulk of the material for the history of this colony is in the Stale House,
Columbia, in the form of manuscript volumes and a collection of the contem-
porary printed issues, labelled on the back "Public Records of South Carolina".
The manuscript and printed volumes taken together constitute a continuous
series.
Colonial Records of the State of Georgia. 26 vols. Ed. by A. D. Candler. Atlanta,
1904-16.
Vols. vn-xvin contain the records of Council and Assembly.
Journals of Congress.
The records of meetings of Congress before 1783 are printed in:
Secret Journals of the Acts and Proceedings of Congress... (1775-1778). 4 vols. Boston,
1820-1.
Journals of the American Congress : from 1774 to 1788. 4 vols. Washington, 1823.
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789. Ed. by W. C. Ford. Washington,
1904. In progress.
(3) OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE
Correspondence of William Pitt, when Secretary of State, with Colonial Governors and
Military and Naval Commanders in America. Ed. by G. S. Kimball. 2 vols.
New York, 1906.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 833
Edward Randolph: including his letters and official papers Jrom the New England, Middle
and Southern Colonies in America with other documents relating chiefly to the vacating
of the royal charter of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1676-1703. With historical
illustrations and a memoir by R. N. Toppan. 5 vote. Prince Soc. Publicns.
Boston, 1898-99.
Idem. Vols. vi and vn. Ed. by A. T. S. Goodrick. Boston, 1909.
The Belcher Papers. In Collections of the Massachusetts Hist. Soc. 6th series.
vols. vi, VH. With prefaces by C. G. Smith. Boston, 1893-94.
Correspondence of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander
in America, 1730-1760. Ed. by G. H. Lincoln. 2 vols. New York, 1912.
The Barrington-Bernard Correspondence and Illustrative Matter, 1760-1770. Ed. by
E. Charming and A. G. Goolidge. Harvard Historical Studies. Vol. xvm.
Cambridge, Mass. 1912.
The Diary and Letters of his Excellency Thomas Hutchinson, Esq., B.A. (Harvard),
LL.D. (Oxon.), Captain General and Governor-in-Chief of his late Majesty's Province
of Massachusetts Bay in North America. By Peter Orlando Hutchinson. 2 vols.
London, 1883.
The Correspondence of the Colonial Governors of Rhode Island* 172^-177^ Ed bv
Gertrude S. Kimball. New York, 1902.
The Talcott Papers (2 vols.). The Wolcott Papers (i vol.). The PitkinPapers (i vol.).
TheLawPapers (3 vols.). The Fitch Papers (2 vols.). The Wyllys Papers (i vol.).
In Collections of the Connecticut Hist. Soc. Hartford, 1894-1925.
Documents relative to the Colonial History of New York. Ed. by E. B. O'Callaghan.
10 vols. and Index. Albany, 1853-87.
Largely made up of correspondence of the Governors with the Secretary
of State and the Board of Trade.
The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Golden. 7 vols. In Collections of the New York
Hist. Soc. 1917-23. New York, 1918-23.
Papers of Lewis Moms, Governor of the Province of New Jersey, 1738-1746. In Collec-
tions of the New Jersey Hist. Soc. Vol. ix. Newark, 1852.
Correspondence of the Governor Horatio Sharpe. Ed. by W. H. Browne. In Archives of
Maryland, vols. vi, ix, xiv. 1888, 1890, 1895.
In vol. xxi, 191 1 , pp. 569-72, may be found additional letters and addresses.
The Official Letters of Alexander Spotswood. Ed. by E. A. Brock. In Collections of
the Virginia Hist. Soc. New series, vols. i, n. Richmond, 1882, 1885.
The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie. In Collections of Virginia Hist. Soc. New
series, vols. m, iv. 2 vols. Richmond, 1883, 1884.
Many letters of the colonial governors and others may be found in the New
Hampshire Papers, the New Jersey Archive* , the Maryland Archives, the North Carolina
Records, and the Georgia Colonial Records, already listed.
The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. Ed. under the direction
of Congress by Francis Wharton. New cd. by J.B. Moore. 6 vols. Washington,
1889.
(4) MISCELLANEA
The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the
States, Territories, and Colonies now or Heretofore forming the United States of America.
Ed. by F. N. Thorpe. 7 vols. Washington, 1909.
Faulty for the Colonial Period. Omits all commissions and instructions
to the royal governors and others.
Reports on the Laws of the Colony of Connecticut by Francis Fane, K.C., Special Counsellor
to the Board of Trade. Ed. by G. M. Andrews. Acorn Club Publicns. Hartford,
Conn. 1915.
Reports by Sir John Randolph and Edward Barradall of Decisions of the General Court of
Virginia, 1728-1741. Ed. by R. T. Barton. 2 vols. Boston, 1909.
The introduction by the editor contains a section on "Government",
summarising administration in Virginia during the colonial period.
CHBEI 53
834 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Report of Cases in the Vice-Admiralty of the Province of New York and in the Court of
Admiralty of the State of New York, 1715-1788. Ed. by G. M. Hough. Yale
Hist. Publicns. MSS and Edited Texts, vol. vm. New Haven, 1925.
That part of the text which relates to the colonial period contains not the
proceedings of the vice-admiralty courts but the opinion of the judges of
vice-admiralty. Such opinions are very rarely found among the vice-admiralty
records of the colonies. .
Massachusetts Royal Commissions, 1688-1774. Ed by A. Matthews. Collections of
the Colonial Soc. of Massachusetts. Vol. n. Boston, 1913.
Contains commissions to the governors and lieutenant-governors and vice-
admiralty commissions to the governors. Supplementary to it is MATTHEW, A.,
"Notes on the Massachusetts Royal Commissions". Trans, of Colonial Soc. of
Massachusetts. Vol. xvi. Boston, 1915.
Ul. OFFICIAL PAPERS PRESERVED IN FOREIGN REPOSITORIES
(i) FRANCE
(By C. HEADLAM)
NationaJes at Paris, Ministere des Affaires fitrang&res, Ministere d.e la Guerre,
Ministere des Colonies et de la Marine, and at the Biblioth£que Nationale.
(a) The Archives du Ministere des Affaires fitrangfcres (diplomatic correspondence
and memorials) are arranged under national headings (Angleterre, Espagne,
Portugal, etc.). There is an Inventaire sommaire des archives du Department which
will be found useful.
(b) Among the Archives du Ministere de la Marine deposited in the Archives
Nationales are many despatches and instructions by the Due de Choiseul when
he was Minister of the Marine.
(s) Among the MSS Franc^ais at the Bibliotheque Nationale is the correspondence
of the Abbd Beliardi with the Due de Choiseul on Spanish and colonial affairs.
(V. an article by M. P. Muret on "Les papiers de 1'Abbe Beliardi" in Revue
d'histoire moderne, 1902, 1903.) Also a Description geographique de la
Guyane" by Bellin.
Many important diplomatic documents are printed in Flassan's Histoire de la
diplomatic ft angaise. (V. infra, p. 887.)
For the history of the French West Indies, Moreau de Saint Mary's MSS collections
at the Ministere de la Marine and Le Pers' History of San Domingo at the
Bibliothdque Nationale (No. 8992) are of great value.
Many documents relating to the Secret Diplomacy of Louis XV are printed by
Bputaric, and by the Due de Broglie, in The King's Secret. ( V. infra., pp. 885-6.)
Memoires du Due de Choiseul, 1719-1785, ed. by F. Calmettes, Paris, 1904, contains
several important letters and memoranda by the Due de Choiseul, notably that
of the year 1 765 in which Choiseul explained his policy at the end of the Seven
Years' War and his views as to the coming war with England. Choiseul
recorded his own view in other Memoires, published by Ch. Giraud in Journal
des Savants, 1881, and in Me'moires de M. le Due de Choiseul, Merits par lui-mSme.
2 vols. Paris et Chanteloupe, 1 790 ; and in his correspondence with Bcrnstorff
(Correspondance entre Bernstorff et le Due de Choiseul, 1758-1766), published at
Copenhagen, 1 87 1 . See also E. F. de Choiseul-Stainville, Memoires, 1719-1 785.
Paris, 1904.
Instructions to French Ambassadors are published in the Recueil des instructions
donnjes aux Ambassadeurs de France.. .. 20 vols. Paris, 1884-1913.
Official correspondence relating to the French Colonies is published in P. V. de
Malouet's Collection de Memoires et Correspondances Officielles sur r Administration des
Colonies, et notamment sur la Guiane Frangaise et Hollandaise. 5 vols. Paris, 1802.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 835
(2) PORTUGAL
Lisbon contains a great amount of MS material bearing upon colonisation, at
the Archive nacional da Torre do Tombo and in other libraries. For an enumera-
tion of these collections and indications of their contents see Bulletin of the Institute
of Historical Research, vol. n, pp. 4-7.
Some transcripts of papers in the Po
in Oliyeira Lima, Relagao dos manuscriptos Portugueses e estrangeiros de interresse para
o Brazil existentes no Museu Britannico de Londres. Rio de Janeiro, 1903.
(3) SPAIN
The Spanish Archives at Simancas, so far as they refer to matters relating to
England, are calendared in:
Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, 1485-1603. London, 1879-1916.
The Archives of the Indies at Seville contain a mass of largely unexplored
material, some of it bearing upon English expansion. Selected documents are
printed in the following collections :
Coleccion de documentos intditos para la histona de Espana. Ed. by A. Fernandez de
Navarrete. 112 vols. Madrid, 1842-95.
Coleccion de documentos inlditos relatives al descubrimiento, conquista y colonization de las
posesiones espanolas en America y Occeania Ed. byj. F. Pacheco, and others.
42 vols. Madrid, 1840-83.
Coleccion de documentos iniditos relatives al descubrimiento, conquista y organization de las
antiquas posesiones espanolos de ultramar. Ed. by J. F. Pacheco, and others.
2nd series, 21 vols. Madrid, 1885-1900, 1923-8.
There is a scries of transcripts of papers relating to Venezuela from the Archives
of the Indies at Seville among the MSS at the British Museum. B.M. Add. MSS
36314-36353.
The Spanish documentary material for the period 1763-1783 is preserved in the
(a) Archivo Histonco, Madrid; (b) Archive del Academia de la Historia.
Very full references to MS sources in the Spanish Archives are given by
Danvila y Collado in his elaborate Reinado de Carlos III. 6 vols. Madrid, 1892.
Original documents are published in Espcranza's Coleccion de los articulos sobre la
histona del reinado de Carlos III. Madrid, 1859.
Instructions to Ambassadors aic published by A. Morel Falio and H. Leonardon
in Recueil des Instructions donnces aux ambassadeurs de France, etc. (Espagne.)
Vol. in. Paiis, 1901.
Documents relating to the history of Peru and the Provinces of Rio de la Plata are
given in Pedro de Angeli, Relation Hut6nca, 5 vols. Buenos Ayres, 1900;
and, for the Argentine, Memoria Histdnca, by the same author. Buenos
Ayres, 1852.
(4) HOLLAND
Extracts from the Archives at the Hague are printed in:
Letters and Papers relating to the first Dutch War, 1652-1654. Ed. by S. R. Gardiner
and G. T. Atkinson. 5 vols. N.R.S. 1899-1912.
(5) VENICE
Calendars of Stale Papers, Venetian, 1202-1652. Ed. by H. Brown and A. B. Hinds.
London, 1871-1927.
Contain summaries of documents in the Venetian Archives relating to England.
53-2
836 BIBLIOGRAPHY
IV. NON-OFFICIAL PAPERS PRESERVED IN BRITISH REPOSITORIES
(i) PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Chatham MSS:
This collection, containing the correspondence of both the Elder and the Younger
Pitt, was bequeathed to the Public Record Office by the late Admiral Pringle.
There is a MS Index by Mrs S. G. Lomas.
A selection from these MSS has been published in The Chatham Correspondence.
Ed. by W. S. Taylor and J. H. Pringle. 4 vols. London, 1838-40.
Rodney MSS:
Journals and Correspondence of Admiral Rodney, 1767-1782. 26 bundles.
Bundles 9-19 are of value for the American War of Independence.
ShaftesburyMSS:
This series of 50 bundles includes the papers of the ist Earl of Shaftesbury
and those of John Locke. They are valuable especially for the settlement of the
Carolinas, and for the history of Jamaica and Barbados.
(2) BRITISH MUSEUM
MSS relating to colonisation are scattered throughout the great collection in
the Department of MSS. A note on MSS of value for the diplomacy leading up
to the Peace of Paris of 1763 is given infra, pp. 839-44. The following deserve
special notice:
Among the Lansdowne MSS the collection of State papers made by Lord
Burghley, and that of cases in maritime law by Sir Julius Caesar, are important
for commerce and international negotiations under Elizabeth.
The Harleian MSS contain a volume entitled "A Collection of Tracts and
Papers, relating chiefly to Sea-matters, Customes, etc.". This includes "Relation
of tiie taking of Gales by the Earl of Essex, 1 596 ". B.M. Harl. MS, 1 67 ; No. 1 4, f. 1 09.
The Stpwe MSS also contain material of value for expeditions of the sixteenth
century, including "A briefe and a true discourse of the late honorable voyage
into Spaine. . . " (1596) by Dr Marbecke. B.M. Stowe MS, 159, f. 353.
The Sloane and Egerton MSS contain material of particular value for the
seventeenth century. The volume Egerton 2395 is of great importance for the
West Indies for the Interregnum and Restoration periods. It contains papers of
Thomas Povey, others of which are in B.M. Add. MS 1 141 1.
Among the Additional MSS the most valuable collections are:
(a) The Newcastle Papers. Add. MSS 32686-32992 contain the correspondence of
the Duke of Newcastle, and the succeeding volumes a collection of his papers.
(b) The Hardwicke Papers. Add. MSS 35349-36278 contain the correspondence
and collections of the first four Earls of Hardwicke.
(c) Papers collected by Edward Long. Add. MSS 12402-12440, 18270-18275,
18959-18963, 21931-22639, 22676-22680. Of value for the West Indies in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
(d) Papers of the South Sea Company. Add. MSS 25494-25543 (Minutes of the
Court of Directors); 25544-25549 (Minutes of General Courts); 25550-25554
(Committee of Correspondence), and 25555-25567 (Correspondence, etc.).
(3) THE BODLEIAN LIBRARY
The Clarendon and Rawlinson MSS especially contain material of value for
the history of the West Indies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 837
(4) LIBRARY OF MAGDALENE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
The Pepys Collection:
These MSS are of the greatest value for the history of the Navy and sea power.
They are described and partly printed in:
A Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval Manuscripts in the Pepysian Library at Magdalene
College, Cambridge. Ed. by J. R. Tanner. 4 vols. N.R.S. 1903-23.
Vol. rv contains the Admiralty Journal.
Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes. Ed. byj. R. Tanner. N.R.S. 1926.
Private Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers of Samuel Pepys, 1679-1703. Ed. by
J. R. Tanner. 2 vols. London, 1926.
(5) PRIVATE COLLECTIONS
(a) The most important sources for papers in private custody are the Reports
of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts. A note on the use of
these and some other private sources for the diplomatic aspect is given infra,
PP- 839-44- A valuable analysis is given by Dr J. F. Jameson in " Guide to the
Items relating to American History in the Reports of the English Historical
Manuscripts Commission and their Appendices." Report9 American Historical
Association^ 1898, pp. 61 1-700. The following collections are of especial value
for colonial history:
Calendar of the MSS of the Marquess of Salisbury preserved at Hatfield House. 13 vols.
London, 1883-1923. (i6th century.)
Report on the MSS of his Grace the Duke of Manchester. VHIth Report, Appendix II.
London, 1 88 1 . ( 1 7 th century. )
Report on the MSS of the Earl of Eglinton. Xth Report, Appendix. London, 1885.
(i7th century.)
Report on the MSS of the Earl of Egmont. Vols. i and n, London, 1905. Vol. in,
Dublin, 1909. ( 1 7th century.)
MSS of the House of Lords. IXth Report, Appendix II (1670-8), London, 1884;
Xlth Report, Appendix II (1678-88), London, 1887; XIth Report, Appendix
VI, XIHth Report, Appendix V, XlVth Report, Appendix VI (1689-93),
London, 1889-94. For new series v. supray p. 826.
Report on the MSS of Lord Polwarth preserved at Mertoun House, Berwickshire. Vol. n.
London, 1916. (i7th and i8th centuries.)
Report on the MSS of the Duke of Portland preserved at Welbeck Abbey. Vols. in-vi
(Harley Letters and Papers). London, 1894-1901. ( 1 7th and 1 8th centuries.)
MSS of the Duke of Rutland, at Belvoir Castle. XHth Report, Appendix V, London,
1889; XlVth Report, Appendix I, London, 1894. (i7th and i8th centuries.)
MSS of the Marquess of Townshend. XIth Report, Appendix IV. London, 1887.
(i7th and i8th centuries.)
The MSS of the Earl of Dartmouth. XIth Report, Appendix, Part V. London, 1 887.
(i7th and i8th centuries.) XlVth Report, Appendix, Part X. American
Papers. London, 1895. (i8th century.)
MSS of the Right Honourable Lord Lyttelton, Hagley, Co. Worcester. Hnd Report,
Appendix, pp. 36-9. London, 1871. (i8th century.)
MSS of the Marquess of Lansdowne. Hlrd Report, Appendix, pp. 125-47.
(Shelburne MSS.) London, 1872. (i8th century.)
Shelburne MSS. Vth Report, Appendix, pp. 215-60. London, 1876. (i8th cen-
tury.) For further reference to Shelburne MSS, v. infra, pp. 842, 844.
Report re the MSS of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville. 2 vols. London, 1904, 1910. (i8th
century.)
Report on the American MSS in the Royal Institution of Great Britain. 4 vols. London,
1904-9. ( 1 8th century.)
Report on the MSS of the Marquess of Lothian. London, 1905. (i 8th century.)
Includes papers of George Grenville.
838 BIBLIOGRAPHY
MSS of the Earl of Carlisle at Castle Howard. XVth Report, Appendix V. London,
1897. (i8th century.)
The MSS of Captain Howard Vicente Knox. Various Collections. Vol. vi, pp. 81-296.
London, 1909. (i8th century.)
The MSS of Cornwallis Wykeham-Martin, Esq. Various Collections. Vol. vi, pp. 297-
434. London, 1909. (i 8th century.)
The MSS of the Right Honourable the Earl of Pembroke at Wilton House. IXth Report,
Appendix, Part I, pp. 380-4. London, 1884. (i8th century.)
MSS. ..in the Possession of Lord Brqybrooke. . .at Audley End. VHIlh Report, Ap-
pendix, pp. 287-96. (Papers of Charles, ist Marquis Cornwallis.) London,
1881. (i8th century.)
(b) Many documents from private collections of MSS valuable for the study of
sea power are printed in the publications of the Navy Records Society. Some
of these have already been mentioned, as the volumes contain also official
documents in some cases. (V. supra, p. 827.)
The following volumes of this series are of especial value for the American War
of Independence:
Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3. Ed. by D. Hannay.
N.R.S. 1895.
Journal of Rear-Admiral Bartholomew James, 1752-1828. Ed. by Sir J. K. Laughton
and J. V. I. Sulivan. N.R.S. 1896.
The Naval Miscellany. Vol. i. Ed. by Sir J. K. Laughton. N.R.S. 1902.
This volume includes "Journals of Henry Duncan, Captain, Royal Navy"
and "Extracts from the Papers of Samuel, First Viscount Hood".
Recollections of James Anthony Gardner. Ed. by Sir R. V. Hamilton and Sir J. K.
Laughton. N.R.S. 1906.
Letters and Papers of Charles Lord Barham, 1758-1813. Ed. by Sir J. K. Laughton.
Vols. i-m. N.R.S. 1907, 1910.
Signals and Instructions, 1776-1794. Ed. by Sir J. S. Corbett. N.R.S. 1908.
(c) The Windsor Archives:
Selections from the papers of George III in the Windsor Archives have recently
been published hi The Correspondence of King George III from 1760 to December 1783.
Ed. by Sir J. W. Fortescue. 6 vols. London, 1927-8.
This series is supplemented by an earlier collection still of some value:
Correspondence of George III with Lord North from 1768 to 1783. Ed. by W. B. Donne.
2 vols. London, 1867.
(d) West India Committee, London:
The Minute Books of the Committee are preserved at 14 Trinity Square, E.G. 4.
They extend from 1769 to the present day, with some gaps in the mid-nineteenth
century.
The Committee consisted in the i8th century of London merchants trading in
the West Indies, and absentee planters; it dealt mainly with commercial matters,
but also with the political interests of tie colonies. The records are full and throw
much light on economic conditions in the islands.
(e) Royal Empire Society, London:
Davis Papers. A collection of transcripts made by Darnell Davis, containing
papers relating to the West Indies, chiefly in the i7th century. Some are from
originals formerly preserved in the islands and now destroyed.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 839
NOTE ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC AND
COLONIAL RECORDS, 1509-1783
(By HAROLD TEMPERLEY)
I. Diplomatic Sources from 1509 to 1748
The records of the Colonial Office are not in themselves sufficient for the history
of colonial, still less of imperial, policy. But, while historians are fully aware of
the need of consulting other records including Foreign Office papers at the Public
Record Office, they are not equally alive to diplomatic sources available (a) in the
Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports and (b) in the British Museum Additional
Manuscripts. A most valuable report, prepared by Miss Davenport and published
as Appendix II to the Historical MSS Commission, XVIIIth Report, Cd. 8384,
covers the whole ground of diplomatic history from 1509 to 1783. It gives refer-
ences (a) to the notices and summaries dealing with this subject in the printed
volumes of the Hist. MSS Commission and (b) to a large number of manuscripts in
the British Museum. Though the sources quoted are apparently diplomatic,
colonial material becomes more and more connected with it, so that for each
succeeding century the student of colonial history will gain more by consulting it.
Miss Davenport's references to the diplomatic sources from. 1509 to 1748 are
printed on pp. 357~97 of the Hist. MSS Commission, XVIIIth Report.
It is impossible to quote these in detail. But, in order to illustrate the value
of her work, and the interconnection of diplomatic and colonial records, the portion
of her report dealing with the years 1 748-64 is quoted in full in Section II (im-
mediately following) and associated with a number of additions from other
records.
II. The Diplomacy leading up to the Peace of Paris, 1748-1763
Miss Davenport's list of materials for English Diplomatic History (Hist.
MSS Commission, XVIIIth Report, App. II, pp. 398-400, Cd. 8384) for these
years is quoted below.
1748. Letters of the Greffier Fagel to Count Bentinck, plenipotentiary at the
Congress of Aix-la-Ghapelle. Eg. MSS 1736-38. Copies of letters of Bentinck
to the Prince of Oiangc. Eg. MSS 1861.
1748. Papers dealing with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Eg. MSS 1756.
1748-57. Correspondence, chiefly diplomatic, of Robert Keith, minister pleni-
potentiary at Vienna. Add. MSS 35461-35481, 35486-35492.
1748-57. Letter-books of James Porter, ambassador to Constantinople. Add.
MSS 35496—35499.
1 749-54. Letter-books of despatches of the Earl of Albemarle during his embassy
to Paris. Add. MSS 33026-33027.
1749. 1754, I758- Full-powers to Robert Keith, minister at Vienna, later am-
bassador to Russia. Add. MSS 36271. H-J (Hardwicke papers).
1749-61. Correspondence of the Earl of Holdernesse, minister at The Hague
and secretary of state; correspondence of various ambassadors and statesmen,
including the Duke of Newcastle; many foreign news letters, xi, 7 ("Leeds,
&c. MSS"), 4 3-53-
1749-66. Copies of treaties, conventions, etc. 11,3. Bedford MSS.
1750. Papers relating to the negotiation with Spain and the treaty of Madrid,
vm, i , 284. Braybrooke MSS.
1750. Various original diplomatic documents, in Turkish. Add. MSS 12086.
. c. 1750-65. Copies of state papers, etc., relating to Portugal, n, 135-6. Lans-
downe MSS.
1751, April 8. Translation of letter in cypher from Mr Wall, Spanish ambassador
in London, to M. de Carvajal. vni, i, 284-5. Braybrooke MSS.
1752-53. Letter-books of Sir James Porter, ambassador at Constantinople,
xii, 9 ("Beaufort, etc. MSS"), 334-6. Aitken MSS.
840 BIBLIOGRAPHY
1752-57. Correspondence of Lord Tyrawley, ambassador in Portugal. Add.
MSS 23634.
i752-[8s]. Papers of Sir Joseph Yorke, plenipotentiary at The Hague. Add.
MS§ 35432— 35444.''
i 753-7 i • Correspondence of Sir Andrew Mitchell, ambassador at the court of
Frederick the Great, v, 627. Forbes MSS.
1754. Correspondence between the Earl of Albemarle, at Pans, the secretaries
of legation, and Sir Thomas Robinson, secretary of state; despatches from
Sir C. H. Williams, at Warsaw. 0,141. Lansdowne MSS.*
1755. Copies of the Russian and Hessian treaties with notes by the Duke of
Bedford, n, 2. Bedford MSS.
1755, July 30. Minute of the cabinet on subsidiary treaties. Add. MSS 35870,
27 (Hardwicke papers).
1755-6. Papers relating to difficulties between France and England. Add. MSS
1755-6. Copies of secret correspondence between the Earl of Hpldernesse and
Sir Charles Hanbury Williams, sent to St Petersburg to negotiate a treaty of
subsidy and alliance between England and Russia, in, 126-7. Lansdowne
MSS.
[1755-7.] Letters from Lord Digby to Sir Charles Hanbury Williams in 1755,
and transcripts from letters written by Sir Charles Hanbury Williams from
St Petersburg to Lord Holdernesse and others, vm, 3, 14. Ashburnham MSS.
1756. Papers relating to negotiations between England, France, and Prussia.
Add.MSS68u.
1756. Treaty projected with the Duke of Brunswick-Luneburg. Add. MSS 6866.
1756. Copies of despatches relating to German foreign affairs, in, 129. Lans-
downe MSS.*
1756. Notices relating to the memorial of M. Hop, Dutch minister in England.
Add. MSS 6813.
1756, January 16. Copy of the treaty of Westminster, and of the secret article
thereto attached, m, 132. Lansdowne MSS.*
1756, April ii. Declaration from the English plenipotentiaries to the Prussian
ministers. Add. MSS 6865.
1756, May i. Copy of treaty of Versailles, in, 132. Lansdowne MSS.
1756, May i. Copy of convention of neutrality between the Empress Queen and
France as regards the differences between England and France in America,
m, 132. Lansdowne MSS.*
1756, May 14-1757, December 15. Copies of part of the correspondence of Sir
Andrew Mitchell, envoy to Prussia, m, 127-9. Lansdowne MSS. Printed
in part in Mr Bisset's Life of Sir A. Mitchell.
1756-7. Correspondence and papers of Sir Charles Williams at Berlin. Dresden
and St Petersburg. Add. MSS 6804, 6806, 6811, 6812, 6813. 6824. 6827,
6841,6844,6864,6871. *' "
1756-7. Letters from Sir Benjamin Keene, ambassador in Spain. Add. MSS
6811-6814,6862.
1756-60. Correspondence of Sir James Porter, ambassador at Constantinople.
Add. MSS 6806-6808, 6812-6818, 6830, 6861. *
1 756-6 1 . Correspondence of the Earl of Bristol, at Turin and Madrid, vi, Q i *-6.
Leconfield MSS. ' 6 *
1756-62. Correspondence of Sir Robert Keith, at Vienna and St Petersburg. Add.
MSS 6806-6809, 68n, 6812, 6817, 6820, 6825, 6827, 6829, 6844.
1756-62. Correspondence of the Earl of Holdernesse with R. Keith, A. Mitchell,
and others. Add. MSS 6804-6806, 6808, 6811-6819, 6824, 6825, 6831,
6832, 6871.
1756-63. Letters and papers of Dodo Heinrich Knyphausen, Prussian minister
in England. Add. MSS 6804, 6807, 6816, 6817, 6821, 6847, 6851.
1756-70. Correspondence and papers of Joseph Yorke. minister at The Hague.
Add. MSS 6806-6818, 6820, 6831, 6832, 6836.
1756-70. Correspondence of David Murray, Lord Stormont, ambassador at
BIBLIOGRAPHY 841
Dresden and Vienna. Add. MSS 6804, 6806-6810, 6812, 6813, 6817, 6818,
6826—6829.
1756-70. Correspondence, memorials, etc., of Sir Andrew Mitchell, ambassador
to Prussia, etc. Add. MSS 6804-6872, 11260-11262.
1756 and later. Copies of slate papers relating to the negotiations at the chief
European courts which preceded the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, a
few relating to the war itself, the despatch of the Conde de Fuentes to Lord
Egremont, December 25, 1761, and an unimportant Spanish correspondence
after the conclusion of the peace, ni, 134-5. Lansdowne MSS.
1757. Conditions imposed by Count Colloredo, Austrian ambassador in England,
for a neutrality for Hanover, and correspondence of the same ambassador
with the Earl of Holdernesse. Add. MSS 6814, 6844.
1757-62. Diplomatic correspondence of Robert Keith, envoy extraordinary at
St Petersburg. Add. MSS 35482-35485, 35493-35495-
1758-9- Letters from Sir Harry Frankland, consul-general at Lisbon, to the Earl
of Bute. Add. MSS 5726.
1758-82 and later. A great mass of political correspondence, alphabetically
arranged and listed, vi, 236-42. Lansdowne MSS.
1759^-66. Political correspondence of Richard Phelps, under-secretary of state,
including many letters to and from ministers abroad, and instructions to
them, viii, 3, 15. Ashburnham MSS.
1759-78. Correspondence of William Pitt. Add. MSS 6807-6808, 6810, 6816-
6819,6821,6830,6831,6833.
I76o-[i783]. Drafts, to be written into cipher, of despatches from the English
Foreign Office to British ministers at foreign courts and others, with cipher
keys. Add. MSS 32253-32257.
1761. Copy of correspondence of Hans Stanley during his special mission to
France to negotiate a treaty of peace. Add. MSS 36798.
1761. Papers of Count Fuentes, Spanish ambassador in England. Add. MSS
6819, 6820.
1761, August 15. Copy of the Family Compact, m, 132. Lansdowne MSS.*
1761, Aug. i4~Sept. 1 8. Notes, by the ist Lord Hardwicke, of cabinet meetings
relating to the negotiations with France. Add. MSS 35870-35887 (Hard-
wicke papers).
1761-2. Letters from Prince Galitzin, Russian ambassador to England. Add.
MSS 6819, 6851.
1761-2. Papers relating to negotiations for peace. Add. MSS 6819, 6820.
1 76 1-3. Correspondence and papers relating to peace ; large correspondence with
Pitt, and between Lord Egremont and the French and Sardinian ministers;
and with the Duke of Bedford as plenipotentiary, vi, 316. Leconfield MSS.
1 761-3. Copies of correspondence and other papers relating to the peace of Paris.
m, 1 30-^32. Lansdowne MSS. Part of the correspondence relating to the
negotiations of 1761 is printed by Mr Thackeray, vol. i, 510-79, vol. n,
507-602.
1761-4. Papers and letters of Edward Weston, under-secretary of state for foreign
affairs, x, i "Eglinton, etc. MSS.," 221-224, 227-239, 320-380, 449-451.
Underwood MSS.
1761-7. Correspondence of George III and Prussian sovereigns. Add. MSS
6818-6821, 6864.
1761, October 16-1768. Volume containing copies of memoranda by Lord Gren-
ville, giving political information, home and foreign, n, 8. Cowper MSS.
1762. Correspondence of Count Bothmar, Danish minister in England. Add.
MSS 5726, 6820.
1762-3. Letters and papers touching the negotiations for the treaty of 1763,
including letters from the Duke of Bedford and the Earl of Egremont, and
correspondence and papers of Richard Neville Neville, vm, i, 285-7.
Braybrooke MSS.
1762-5. Papers relating to trade with Russia, collected by the Earl of Bucking-
hamshire during his embassy to St Petersburg. Private letters from the same.
842 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lothian MSS (1905)., 170-192, 222-237. An instalment of a large collection
of diplomatic papers collected by Lord Buckinghamshire and preserved among
the Lothian MSS, together with his official despatches from St Petersburg,
were published by the Royal Historical Society in 1900 and 1902. (Camden,
3rd series, vols. 2 and 3.)
1 762-5. Papers relating to Poland and Courland, with letters from Mr Wroughton,
minister at Warsaw. Lothian MSS (1905), 192-221.
1763. Letters and papers relating to the peace. 11,2. Bedford MSS.
1763, August i -November i. Copies of correspondence of Richard N. A. Neville,
secretary to the embassy at Paris, and Col. Desmaretz. Add. MSS 35882
1763-5. Letter-boot of Sir James Porter, minister at Brussels, xii, 9 ("Beaufort,
etc. MSS"), 336-342. Aitken MSS.
1763-8. Correspondence of Henry Conway, secretary of state. Add. MbS 6810,
6821,6826,6829,6833,6857. .
c. 1763-8. Copies of correspondence between the Secretaries of State, Lord Hert-
ford, at Paris, and the Duke of Bedford; between the Due de Gucrchy, in
London, and the Due de Choiseul; and between Lord Shelburne and the
Earl of Rochfort and Mr Walpole at Paris, m, 142-3. Lansdowne MSS.*
1 763-72. Extracts from the correspondence of David Murray, Viscount Stormont,
ambassador to Vienna. Add. MSS 35500, 35501 .
1764. Copies of letters and affidavits concerning the Chevalier d'Eon, and his
transactions with the French ambassador, vra, 3, 1 1. Ashburnham MSS.
1764-7. Reports, mostly by Dr Marriott, on questions of international law arising
out of the treaty of Paris, including reports on earlier treaties, in, 139. Lans-
downe MSS.
1764-1800. Correspondence of Sir William Hamilton, British envoy at Naples.
Eg. MSS 2634-2641.
(a} Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports.
It will be observed that the above list includes materials in the shape of references
to the summaries in various Reports of the Hist. MSS Commission Reports. But it
is important to note that Reports I-IX are so scanty and meagre in their descrip-
tions that their allusions to the contents of the documents are almost worthless.
The Hist. MSS Commission Reports quoted after that date as, e.g. the Wcston MSS
xi, or the Beaufort MSS xn, 9, have fuller summaries and are therefore of much
greater value.
As regards private collections Miss Davenport's list may be supplemented as
follows: The *' Lansdowne MSS", which she quotes (to which references above
are marked with an asterisk), have been called the " Shelburne MSS " in the text
(Chap. xyn). This title has been now generally adopted at the suggestion of Lord
Fitzniaurice, who wished to distinguish them from the collection of Lansdowne MSS
in the British Museum. These were studied by H. Tempei ley when they were still in
Lansdowne House, and the references in the text are references as then arranged.
The MSS have been now transferred under the name "Shelburne MSS" to the
University of Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A. There is a note as to their contents
there by C. W. Alvord in Bulletin of Institute of Historical Research, vol. i, No. 3, Feb.
1 924, PP- 77-8o.
The most important part of the collection is the Viry-Solar correspondence,
which has been made use of in the text, p. 500. This source has not been fully
used previously. It consists of an exchange of letters between the Sardinian repre-
sentatives respectively of London and Paris who were, in fact, expressing the views
of Bute and of Choiseul. The correspondence was intended to be secret and, for
that reason, the official despatches in the Public Record Office are often inten-
tionally misleading. This correspondence is summarised in the Canadian Archives
Report (Report of the Work of the Archives Branch for the year 1912, by A. G. Doughty,
Ottawa, 1913), pp. 124-52. The summaries are fairly full, but no summary is
a satisfactory substitute for a diplomatic document in toto, and in some cases dates
are incorrectly given.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 843
(b) British Museum Additional Manuscripts.
Miss Davenport's list is full and valuable for die period from 17483 with which
year it is needful to begin, as the Peace of Paris cannot be understood without
going back to that year. Many diplomatic papers, which at first sight have little
connection with the colonies, will be found to repay close examination.
The following additions to Miss Davenport's list may be made for this period.
Add. MSS 9132. Observations on the present system of foreign affairs, 1751,
endorsed by Horatio Walpole (the elder), "communicated to the Countess of
Yarmouth who laid it before His Majesty, Nov. 1 75 1 ". Add. MSS 33029, ff. 1 56-63 :
" Representation of the State of the Colonies in North America 1 754 '* ; ff. 289-309 :
"Four points to be discussed relating to America 1755".
In Add. MSS 359 1 3, ff. 65-99 there is an important paper by the Earl of Halifax
on the proceedings of the French in America dated April 1754. The papers of
Sir Benjamin Keene, 1756-7, mentioned by Miss Davenport in her report,
are a good example of the light thrown by diplomatic material upon colonial
policy. The references there given should be supplemented from the Stowe MSS
256. This gives the secret correspondence of Pilt with Keene over the proposed
cession of Gibraltar to Spain in 1757.
Add. MSS 33030, f. 401 sqq. contains a valuable report, apparently of about
1754-6, on the illicit trade of British North America with the French and Dutch
West Indies, an important subject in the diplomacy at the end of the War.
Miss Davenport gives a good many references to MSS for Pitt's peace negotia-
tions of 1 76 1 . She does not however refer to the Chatham MSS, vol. 85, in the Public
Record Office, which should be consulted. (V. supra, p. 836.)
For the Bute stage of the negotiation of 1 762-3, Miss Davenport's references may
be supplemented as follows :
(i) Commercial aspects.
Board of Trade Reports on terms of peace: 13 April 1761, Add. MSS 33030,
f. i sqq. (also in ibid. 35913, f. 73 sqq.) and under 8 June 1763, Add. MSS 35913,
f. 228 sqq.; also in Public Record Office, C.O. 325/1.
The latter report is anticipated by an undated report of Pownall (Shelburne MSS,
vol. XLIX). The Shelburne MSS also contain the original of the important report of
Frobishcr, 10 Nov. 1 766, on Indian Trade; v. also Public Record Office, C.O. 325/1.
Speech of Lord Shelburne, 1 762, on peace terms (v. text, pp. 504-5) in Shelburne
MSS, vol. GLXV.
Newfoundland Fisheries. Questions and Answers re French and British Trade
in Add. MSS 359 13, ff. 73-93-
Report on Newfoundland Fisheries in 1766 in Shelburne MSS, vol. LXV.
State of the Slave Trade. Memo and figures from 1758-71, Public Record Office,
C.O. 325/2.
(ii) Diplomatic atpccts.
There are a good many papers in Add. MSS 35839, e.g. ff. 262-3: Abstract of
Mr Lcgge's paper on Public Credit, 1 1 Feb. 1762, and a certain amount of Pitt's
correspondence in 1761. The remainder deal with the Bute period. On f. 268 we
have an exchange oflcllcrs between Frederick the Great and George III; f. 269
gives Minutes of a Cabinet of 29 March 1762 on the negotiation; ff. 272-5 detail
the highly important conversation on peace terms between the Duke of Cumber-
land and the King, i Oct. 1762.
To this we should add Add. MSS 34523, f. 361, which gives a letter of the King
to the Duke of Bedford of the 26 Oct. 1762, expressing his personal views on the
peace. There are also some important letters from Bute to the King.
There arc also some important Ictteis of Calcraft, notably one of 30 Oct. 1762
to Shelburne, in Shelburne MSS CLXVII, renumbered ccn, on the King's influence
on Lord Egremont.
III. Diplomatic Sources from 1763 to 1783
Miss Davenport's Report as before, Hist. MSS Commission, XVIIIth Report,
Cd. 8384, pp. 401-2.
844 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Note. Miss Davenport's Report was published in 1917 and some important
additions, involving colonial material, have since been made both to the Historical
MSS Commission Reports and to the Additional MSS in the British Museum.
V. NON-OFFICIAL PAPERS PRESERVED IN AMERICAN
REPOSITORIES
Original manuscript material, much of it as yet unprinted, may be found in the
Library of Congress, the New York Public Library, the Grosvenor Library at
Ann Arbor, the Huntington Library at Pasadena, the files of the North Carolina
Historical Commission, the libraries of the local historical societies from Maine
to Georgia, and the many local town and country offices.
The printed Collections and Proceedings of these historical societies contain many
papers of interest. Special mention may be made of the following series:
Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society. Worcester, Mass. 1843 sqq.
Arckaeologia Americana. 9 vols. Worcester, Mass. 1843.
Collections of the South Carolina Historical Society. Charleston, 1857-97.
Collections of the Georgia Historical Society. Savannah, 1840 sqq.
Collections of the Maine Historical Society. Portland, 1831 sqq.
Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Boston, 1792 sqq. Proceedings. . .
Boston, 1791 sqq.
Collections of the New Hampshire Historical Society. Concord, 1824-1915.
Collections of the New York Historical Society. New York, 1804 sqq.
Publications of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, 1826 sqq.
The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography. Philadelphia, 1877 sqq.
Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society. Providence, 1836 sqq.
Publications of the Virginia Historical Society. Richmond, 1874 sqq. Collections
Richmond, 1882 sqq.
The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. Richmond, 1893 sqq.
Other printed documents may be found in:
Historical Collections relating to the American Colonial Church. Ed. by W. S. Perry.
5 vols. Hartford, Conn. 1870-78.
Historical Collections of South Carolina. Ed. by B. R. Carroll. 2 vols. New York,
1836.
Among the MSS collections the following are of especial interest:
(a) Clements Library at Ann Arbor, Michigan:
Shelburne MSS (v. supra, p. 842).
(b) Huntington Library at Pasadena, California:
Abercromby Papers.
These include a volume entitled "An Examination of the Acts of Parliament
relative to the Trade of the American Colonies; also the Different Constitutions
of Government in these Colonies considered with remarks formed into a Bill
for the Amendment of the Laws of the Kingdom, in Relation to the Government
and Trade of these Colonies. By Ja. Abercromby, [22] May, 1752".
Another copy of this work exists among the Shelburne MSS.
(c) Library of Congress, Washington:
Records of the Virginia Company in the Library of Congress are printed in:
KINGSBURY, S. M. (Editor). The Records of the Virginia Company of London....
Washington, 1906. In progress.
Reference is made supra (p. 828) to the records of the Councils for Foreign
Plantations, 1670-2 and 1672-4, previously among the Phillips MSS.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 845
VI. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
(i) BRITISH
The Annual Register; or, a view of the history, politicks and literature of the year 1 758, etc.
London, rySosqq.
The Gentleman's Magazine, or, Monthly Intelligencer. London, 1731 sqq.
The British Merchant; or Commerce preserved London, 1713, 14. Reprinted in
3 vols. London, 1721; 2nd ed. London, 1743.
The Craftsman London, 1726-27. New ed. 14 vols. London, 1731-7. Con-
tinued as The Country Journal; or, the Craftsman. London, 1727-47.
The Scot's Magazine Edinburgh, 1739-1803.
A valuable collection of eighteenth-century English newspapers, made by
Charles Burney, is preserved in the Newspaper Room at the British Museum.
(2) COLONIAL
(By Professor C. M. ANDREWS)
Information regarding early colonial newspapers may be obtained from
I. THOMAS, History of Printing in America 2 vols. Worcester, Mass. 1810. C. S.
BRIGHAM, "Check List" in the Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society.
J. VAN N. INGRAM, Check List of American Eighteenth-Century Newspapers in the Library
of Congress, 1912. F. CUNDALL, "The Press and Printers of Jamaica prior to 1820 ,
in Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, new series, October 1916,
pp. 290-412, and A List of Newspapers in the Library of Tale University, Yale His-
torical Publications, Miscellany, II.
ANTIGUA (St John's) :
The Antigua Gazette. Established about 1748 and continued for six or seven
years.
BARBADOS (Bridgetown) :
The Barbadoes Gazette. Established about 1731.
The Barbadoes Mercury. Established in 1762.
GEORGIA (Savannah) :
The Georgia Gazette. Established 7 April 1763, and discontinued 7 February
1776.
JAMAICA (Kingston and St lago) :
The Weekly Jamaica Courant. Established at Kingston in 1722 and continued
until 1755. A copy or two may be found in the Public Record Office.
The Jamaica Gazette. Established at Kingston in 1745 and continued at least
to the American Revolution.
St. lago de la Vega Gazette. Established in 1755 and continued to 1820.
Kingston Journal. Established in 1756.
St. lago Intelligencer. Established in 1756.
MARYLAND (Annapolis):
The Maryland Gazette. Established in September 1727 and continued certainly
until 1731. Probably discontinued finally in 1734.
The Maryland Gazette. Established 17 January 1745, and continued until after
1820.
NEW ENGLAND (Boston) :
The Boston News-Letter. Established 20 April 1704. After various vicissitudes
and many changes of title, this oldest of colonial newspapers was brought
to an end in 1776.
The Boston Gazette, weekly. Established 21 December 1719. Under various
changes of title it was continued to 1 794.
The New England Courant, weekly. Established 7 August 1721. Lasted tiU 1726.
846 BIBLIOGRAPHY
The New England Weekly Journal. Established 30 March 1727, and incorporated
with The Boston Gazette in 1741.
The Boston Post-Boy. Established about 1734 and under various titles continued
to 1775.
NEW HAMPSHIRE (Portsmouth) :
The New Hampshire Gazette. Established 7 October 1756, and continued to the
American Revolution.
NEW YORK:
The New York Gazette. Established about 1725 and continued to 1744, when it
was succeeded by The New Tork Evening Post.
The New Tork Weekly Journal. Established 5 November 1733, by John Peter
Zenger. Discontinued in 1751.
The New Tork Weekly Post Boy. Established 4 January 1743. Title m*ny times
changed, and the paper discontinued in 1773.
The New Tork Evening Post. Established 26 November 1744. Discontinued
(probably in 1752).
The New Tork Mercury. Established 3 or 8 August 1752. Title changed in 1768
to The New Tork Gazette and Weekly Mercury, under which title it continued
to be issued to 1783.
Weyman's New Tork Gazette. Established 19 February 1759. Eventually dis-
continued in 1767.
NORTH CAROLINA( New Bern) :
The North Carolina Gazette. Established 2 May 1755. Said to have continued
about six years, but no copy is known of date later than 1759.
SOUTH CAROLINA (Charles Town) :
The South Carolina Gazette. Established 8 January 1732. Re-established 1734
and continued with occasional suspensions until 1775. There is a complete
file of this paper in the Charleston Public Library.
ST CHRISTOPHER (Basse Terre) :
The St. Christopher Gazette. Established in 1 747 and continued till after 1 775.
VIRGINIA (Williamsburg) :
The Virginia Gazette. Established in 1736 and continued with one suspension
in 1750 till 1771.
To this list of early colonial newspapers may be added the following compilation
that partakes somewhat of the character of a newspaper:
Caribbeana, containing Letters and Dissertations 9 together with Poetical Essays on
Various Subjects and Occasions, chiefly wrote by several Hands in the West Indies.
2 vols. (Usually bound in one.) London, 1741.
This work presents many valuable papers on trade, government, and
laws in general, but is chiefly concerned with the British West Indies and
with Barbados in particular.
Of some of the newspapers listed above no copies, or only a very few, arc known
to exist. Complete files of any of the papers aie very rare and arc to be found in
but few libraries. The local historical societies usually have fairly full sets of their
own newspapers, but the best general collection is that of the American Anti-
quarian Society at Worcester, Massachusetts. Occasional copies of newspapers
not known to exist elsewhere may be found among the Colonial Office Papers
in the Public Record Office.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 847
B. SPECIAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES
I. EXPLORATION AND SEA POWER
i. EXPLORATION
(A selection of works on British exploration to 1783, and on foreign discoveries
of regions which subsequently became the scenes of British expansion.)
(i) GENERAL
(a) Collections of Original Narratives:
ASTLEY, T. (Publisher). A New General Collection of Voyages and Travels. 4 vols.
London, 1745.
DE BRY, THEODOR. Voyages
Many volumes and editions under separate titles, published chiefly at
Frankfort-on-Main from 1590 to 1634, the work commenced by Theodor de
Bry and continued by Johann Theodor and Johann Israel de Bry. For a
guide to the various titles and editions see :
LINDSAY, J. L., Bail of Crawford and Balcarres. Bibliotheca Lindesiana9
Collations and Notes, No. 3. London, 1884, and:
NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY. Catalogue of the De Bry Collection of Voyages.
New York, 1904.
CHURCHILL, J. (Publisher). A Collection of Voyages and Travels. London, vols.
i-rv, 1704; vols. v and vi, 1732.
HAKLUYT, RICHARD. The Principal Navigations > Voyages , Trajfiques and Discoveries of
the English Nation. . .within the Compasse of these 1600 Teares. ist ed. i vol.
1589; 2nd ed. enlarged, 3 vols. 1598-1600; standard modern ed. from text of
1598-1600, published for the Hakiuyt Society by Messrs Maclehose, Glasgow,
12 vols. 1903-5; another modern cd. from same text but with omissions, by
Messrs Dent, London, 8 vols. 1907; reprinted, with additions, 1926-8.
PINKERTON, J. A General Collection of Voyages and Travels. 17 vols. London, 1808.
PURCHAS, SAMUEL. Hakluytus Potfhwnus, or Purc/ias his Pdgnmes. 4 vols. London,
1625; reprinted for Hakiuyt Society by Maclchose, Glasgow. 20 vols.
1905-7, with preface by the late Professor Sir W. Raleigh.
(b) Histories:
GROUSE, N. M. In Quest of the Western Ocean. London, 1928.
A general sketch of exploration across the North Atlantic and North
America, and the search for the North West Passage.
HEAWOOD, E. A History of Geographical Discovery in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries. Cambridge, 1912.
A gcnciai history of international scope.
DELAET, JAN. Novut Orbn, Amsterdam, 1633 (in Latin) ; French translation, 1640.
A general history of exploration to the date of publication. Contains some
original material.
(2) WORLD EXPLORATION TO 1550
BAXTER, J. P. A Memoir of Jacques Cartier. New York, 1906.
BEAZLEY, C. R. John and Seba\tian Cabot. London, 1898.
The Dawn of Modern Geogtaphy. 3 vols. London and Oxford, 1897, etc.
A survey of the progress of geographical science, with incidental accounts
of exploration, to 1420.
BEAZLEY, C. R. (Editor) . The Texts and Versions of John de Piano Carpini and William
de Rubruquis. Hakiuyt Society (extra series), 1903.
Prince Henry tfie Navigator. London, 1890.
BEAZLEY, G. R. and PRESTAGE, E. (Editors). The Chronicle of the Discovery and
Conquest of 'Guinea, by Gomes Eannes de Azurara. Hakiuyt Society, 1896.
848 BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIGGAR, H. P. The Voyages of the Cabots and of the Carte-Reals to North America and
Greenland, 1497-1503. Paris, 1903.
The Precursors of Jacques Cartier, I497~i534- Ottawa, 191 1.
Contains original texts and translations of documents on the voyages, and
corrects some faulty versions previously accepted.
The Voyages of Jacques Cartier. Ottawa, 1924.
Original texts, annotated.
BIRCH, W. DE G. (Editor). The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque....
Hakluyt Society, 1875.
CORDIER, H. (Editor). Cathay and the Way Thither. Ed. by Sir H. Yule, 1866.
Rev. ed. Hakluyt Society, 1913.
GUILLEMARD, F. H. H. The Life of Ferdinand Magellan and the first Circumnavigation
of the Globe, 1480-1521. London, 1891.
HARRISSE, H. The Discovery of North America. London, 1892.
A survey of geographical problems rather than a narrative. Includes an
exhaustive catalogue of early maps.
John Cabot the Discoverer of North America and Sebastian his Son. London, 1896.
Controversial, as are afl works on this subject.
JAYNE, K. G. Vasco da Gama and his Successors, 1460-1580. London, 1910.
JONES, J. W. (Editor). Divers Voyages touching the Discovery of America, collected by
Richard Hakluyt, 1582. Hakluyt Society, 1850.
LOWERY, W. Spanish Settlements within the present limits of the United States. New
York, 1911.
Deals with the period 1513-74-
MAJOR, R. H. (Editor). Select Letters of Christopher Columbus. Hakluyt Society,
1870.
Includes other documents.
MARKHAM, Sir C. R. (Editor). The Journal of Christopher Columbus. Hakluyt
Society, 1892.
The Journal is of the voyage of 1492-3, and the volume includes also
documents relating to the voyages of the Cabots.
Life of Christopher Columbus. London, 1892.
Represents the orthodox view of the career of Columbus.
(Editor). The Letters of Amerigo Vespucci. Hakluyt Society, 1894.
(Editor). Expeditions into the Valley of the Amazons, 1539, 1540, 1639. Hakluyt
Society, 1859.
(Editor) . Early Spanish Voyages to the Strait of Magellan. Hakluyt Society, 1911.
RAVENSTEIN, E. G. (Editor). A Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco da Gama, 1497-9.
Hakluyt Society, 1898.
Martin Behaim9 the Man and his Globe. London, 1908.
ROBERTSON, J. A. Magellan's Voyage round the World. Cleveland, 1906.
Pigafetta's narrative, with translation.
ROCKHILL, W. W. (Editor). The Journeys of, William of Rubruck and John ofPian de
Carpine. Hakluyt Society, 1900.
RYE, W. B. (Editor) . The Discovery and Conquest of Terra Florida. Hakluyt Society,
1851.
Narrative of the expedition of Ferdinando de Soto, with additional material.
STANLEY, LORD, of ALDERLEY (Editor). The Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama (from
Gaspar Gorrea's Lendas da India}. Hakluyt Society, 1869.
A Description of the Coasts of East Africa and Malabar (from the Book of Duarte
Barbosa). Hakluyt Society, 1865; rev. ed. by L. Dames, 1918.
The First Voyage round the World by Magellan, 1518-21. Hakluyt Society, 1874.
Pigafetta's and other accounts.
VIGNAUD, H. Histoire critique de la grande entreprise de Chnstophe Colomb. 3 vols.
Paris, 1911.
An elaborate study leading to new conclusions, some of which have been
challenged. Cf. BIGGAR, H. P., The New Columbus. Washington, 1914.
WILLIAMSON, J. A. Maritime Enterprise^ 1485-1558. Oxford, 1913.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 849
(3) ATTEMPTS TO FIND THE NORTH-EAST AND NORTH-WEST PASSAGES
(AFTER 1550)
ASHER, G. M. (Editor) . Henry Hudson the Navigator, x 607-1 3. Hakluyt Society. 1 860.
The documents on Hudson's career.
BARROW, J. (Editor). The Geography of Hudson's Bay, being the Remarks of Capt.
W. Coats in many Voyages to that locality, 1727-51; tmth extracts from the Log of
Captain Middleton on his Voyage for the Discovery of the North West Passage, 1 741-3.
Hakluyt Society, 1852.
BEKE, G. T. (Editor). A True Description of Three Voyages to the North East, by
Gerrit de Veer, 1598. Hakluyt Society, 1853; rev. ed. by K. Beynen, 1876.
The Dutch voyages to Spitsbergen and Novaya Zemlya in 1594-6.
CHRISTY, R. M. (Editor). The Voyages of Captain Luke Foxe and Captain Thomas
James. Hakluyt Society, 1893.
Includes narratives of other early North-West voyages.
COLLINSON, Sir R. (Editor). The Three Voyages of Sir Martin Frobisher. Hakluyt
Society, 1867.
The Voyages of 1576-8 from George Best's narratives in Hakluyt.
DRAGE,T. S. AnAccountof a Voyage for the Discovery of a North West Passage. London,
1748.
GOLDER, F. A. Bering's Voyages, An Account of the Efforts of the Russians to determine
the Relation of Asia and America. 2 vols. American Geographical Society,
New York, 1922-5.
An exhaustive work including contemporary maps and original texts.
JANVIER, T. A. Henry Hudson. New York, 1909.
JONES, F. The Life of Sir Martin Frobisher. London, 1878.
MARKHAM, Sir A. H. (Editor). The Voyages and Works of John Davis the Navigator.
Hakluyt Society, 1878.
MARKHAM, Sir G. R. (Editor). The Voyages of William Baffin, 1612-22. Hakluyt
Society, 1880.
The Life of John Davis iJie Navigator, 1550-1605. London, 1889.
Contains also accounts of the voyages of Thomas Cavendish, of whom there
is no separate biogiaphy.
MORGAN, E. D. and COOTE, C. H. (Editors). Early Voyages and Travels to Russia
and Persia. Hakluyt Society, 1885.
The North Eastern and Asiatic expeditions promoted by the Muscovy
Company from 1553.
RUNDALL, T. (Editor). Narratives of Voyages towards the North West, 1496-1631.
Hakluyt Society, 1849.
Still the most convenient authority for the texts of certain narratives.
DE VILLIERS, J. A. J. and GONWAY, Sir M. (Editors). Early Dutch and English
Voyages to Spitsbergen in the Seventeenth Century. Hakluyt Society, 1902.
(4) THE EXPLORATION OF ASIA (AFTER 1550)
(A limited selection is given, since the majority of English voyages and travels
in this direction comprised a very small element of new exploration.)
BURNELL, A. C. and TIELE, P. A. (Editors). The Voyage of John Huyghen Linschoten
to the East Indies. Hakluyt Society, 1884.
From the English translation of 1598.
GORNEY, B. (Editor) . The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to Bantam and the Maluco
Islands. Hakluyt Society, 1856.
The second expedition sent out by the East India Company, from the
original narrative published in 1606.
FITCH, RALPH. "The long, dangerous and memorable voyage of M. Ralph
Fitch marchant of London. . . " (by land to Ormuz, India, Siam, etc. 1583-
91). In Hakluyt Js Principal Navigations.
GHBE i 54
850 BIBLIOGRAPHY
HUNTER, Sir W. W. History of British India. Vol. i. London, 1899.
Gives a survey of early exploration by Europeans in Asia.
MARKHAM, Sir G. R. (Editor). The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster. Hakluyt Society,
1877.
Includes material on other early East Indian Voyages.
MORGAN, E. D. and COOTE, G. H. (Editors). Early Voyages and Travels to Russia
and Persia. Hakluyt Society, 1885.
Includes the journeys of Anthony Jenkinson and others in Central Asia
and Persia.
RUNDALL, T. (Editor). Memorials of the Empire of Japan. Hakluyt Society, 1850.
Includes the letters of William Adams, the first Englishman to reach Japan,
1611-17.
(5) THE EXPLORATION OF AMERICA (AFTER 1550)
(For South America, works on Guiana only are given.)
BURRAGE, H. S. (Editor). Early English and French Voyages, chiefly from Hakluyt,
1534-1608. Original Narratives of Early American History, 1906.
DAVIS, W. W. H. The Spanish Conquest of New Mexico. Doylestown, Pa. 1869.
DAWSON, S. E. The Saint Lawrence Basin and its Border-Lands, being the Story of their
Discovery, Exploration and Occupation. London, 1905.
GOSLING, W. G. The Life of Sir Humphrey Gilbert. London, 1911.
GRANT, W.L. (Editor). The Voyages of Samuel deChamplain, 1604-18. NewYork,i907.
The original narratives translated into English.
HARLOW, V. T. (Editor). Colonising Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana9 1623-
67. Hakluyt Society, 1925.
(Editor). Ralegh's Discovery of Guiana. London, 1928.
An edition of Raleigh's text, with new material from the Spanish archives.
HARRIS, Sir C. A. (Editor). A Relation of a Voyage to Guiana, by Robert Harcourt,
1613. Hakluyt Society, 1928.
HEARNE, SAMUEL. A Journey from Prince of Wales' s Fort, in Hudson9 s Bay, to the
Northern Ocean, 1769-72. Ed. by J. B. Tyrrell. Toronto, 191 1.
LESCARBOT, MARC. The New History of New France, Paris, 1618, trans, with notes
by W. L. Grant, and introduction by H. P. BIGGAR. 3 vols. Toronto, 1907.
MAJOR, R. H. (Editor). The Historie of Travaile into Virginia Britannia, by William
Strachey. Hakluyt Society, 1849.
MARGRY, PIERRE. Origines transatlantiques. Paris, 1863.
Material from French archives on pioneer voyages in the Antilles.
PARKMAN, F. Pioneers of France in the New World. Rev. cd. London, 1899.
French explorations to the death of Ghamplain.
The Jesuits in North America. Rev. ed. London, 1899.
La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West. Rev. ed. London, 1899.
SCHOMBURGK, Sir R. H. (Editor). The Discovery of the Large, Rich and Beautiful
Empire of Guiana, by Sir Walter Raleigh, 1596. Hakluyt Society, 1848.
SMITH, Captain JOHN. Works, 1608-31; modern eds. Birmingham, 1884 (ed.
E. Arber), and Glasgow, 1907.
STEBBING, W. The Life of Sir Walter Ralegh. Oxford, 1899.
For the Elizabethan voyages to the Virginia coast.
TYUBR, L. G. Narratives of Early Virginia, 1606-25. Original Narratives of Early
American History, 1907.
WINSOR, JUSTIN. Narrative and Critical History of America. 8 vols. Boston, 1884-9.
Prints much original material on exploration, with critical discussions.
From Cartier to Frontenac: Geographical Discovery in the Interior of North America,
1534-1700. Boston, 1894.
An excellent general survey.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 851
(6) THE EXPLORATION OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN (AFTER 1550)
BATTYE, J. S. Western Australia Oxford, 1924.
The first two chapters go fully into the history of the early discovery.
DE BROSSES, G. Histpire des Navigations aux Terres Australes. Pans, 1756.
CALLANDER,J. (Editor). Terra Australis Cognita. 3 vols. Edinburgh, 1766.
Narratives of voyages from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, in-
cluding some in de Brosses.
COLLINGRIDGE, G. The Discovery of Australia. Sydney, 1895.
COOK, Captain JAMES. A Journal of a Voyage round the World in His Majesty9 s Ship
Endeavour, 1768-71. London, 1771.
. A Voyage towards the South Pole and round the World, 1772-5. London, 1777.
COOK, Captain JAMES and KING, Captain J. A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776-80.
3 vols. London, 1784.
Vols. i and n by Cook, vol. HI by King.
GORBETT, Sir J. S. Drake and the Tudor Navy. 2 vols. London, 1898.
Vol. i deals with the circumnavigation.
CORNEY, B. G. (Editor). The Quest and Occupation of Tahiti. Hakluyt Society,
1913-
Deals with Spanish expeditions of 1 772-6.
DALRYMPLE, ALEXANDER. An Historical Collection of the Several Voyages and Dw-
coveries m the South Pacific Ocean. 2 vols. London, 1 790.
DAMPIER, W. A Voyage to New Holland in 1699. London, 1703.
A New Voyage round the World, yd ed. London, 1698; modern ed. by
N. M. Penzer with introduction by Sir A. Gray. London, 1927.
GIBLIN, R. W. A History of Tasmania. Vol. i. London, 1928.
Gives a full account of the early expeditions that touched the island.
HAWKESWORTH, J. An Account of the Voyages. . .performed by Commodore Byron.
London, 1773.
Chiefly on the voyage of 1764-6 to the islands of the South Pacific.
HEERES, J. E. (Editor). Abel Janszoon Taxman's Journal of his Discovery of Van
Diemen's Land and New Zealand in 1642. Amsterdam, 1898.
Includes other documents and maps.
• The Part borne by the Dutch in the Discovery ofAustralia9 1606-75. London, 1899.
KTTSON, A. Life of Captain James Cook. London, 191 1.
The best of many small lives of Cook.
MAJOR, R. H. (Editor). Early Voyages to Terra Australis. Hakluyt Society, 1859.
Documents, extracts and maps, from the sixteenth century to the lime of
Cook.
MARKHAM, Sir C. R. (Editor). The Voyages of Pedro Fernandez de Quiros. . . . (1595-
1606). 2 vols. Hakluyt Society, 1904.
MULERT, F. E. De Reis van Mr. Jacob Roggeveen ter ontdekkmg van het Zuidland, 1721-2.
The Hague, 1909.
Adds important new material to the accounts published in the eighteenth
century.
NUTTALL, ZELIA (Editor). New Light on Drake. Hakluyt Society, 1914.
Includes many hitherto unpublished documents on the voyage of cir-
cumnavigation.
TEMPLE, Sir R. C. (Editor). The World Encompassed by Sir Francis Drake. London,
1926.
With other narratives of the voyage of circumnavigation.
VAUX, W. S. W. (Editor). The World Encompassed by Sir Francis Drake. Hakluyt
Society, 1855.
The original narrative, with additional documents.
WAGNER, H. R. Sir France Drake's Voyage around the World. San Francisco, 1926.
A detailed study, with many maps.
54-2
852 BIBLIOGRAPHY
2. SEA POWER
(For documentary sources, V. supra, pp. 826-7, 837, 838)
(i) CONTEMPORARY WORKS
ANON. Observations touching trade and commerce with Hollanders. 1610.
BIGGES, W. A summarie and true discourse of Sir Francis Drake's West Indian Voyage.
London, 1589.
BOROUGH, Sir J. The Sovereignty of the British Seas, written in the year 1633. London,
1651.
BROWNING, O. (Editor). Journal of Sir G. Rooke ---- N.R.S. 1897.
BULKELEY, J. and CUMMINS, J. A Voyage to the South Seas in His Majesty's Ship the
" Wager" in the years 1740-1741 ---- London, 1927.
BURCHETT,J. Memoirs of transactions at sea. . . (1688-1697). London, 1703.
GALLENDER, G. A. R. (Editor). The Life of Sir Jofin Leake. . . (by S. Martin-
Leake). 2 vols. N.R.S. 1920.
GOLENBRANDER, H. T. (Editor). Bescheiden nit vreemde archieven omtrent de groote
Nederlandsche zjeeoorlogen 1652-1676. 's Gravenhage, 1919 sqq.
GOLLINSON, Adm. Sir R. (Editor). The Three Voyages of Sir Martin Frobisher. . ..
Hakluyt Society. London, 1867.
COOLEY, W. D. (Editor). Sir Francis Drake, his Voyage... by Thomas Maynarde.
GORBETT, Sir J. S. (Editor). Relation of the Voyage to Cadiz, 1596, by Sir R. Slyn-
gisbie. N.R.S. Naval Miscellany, vol. i, 1902.
- (Editor). Papers relating to... the Spanish War, 1585-7. N.R.S. 1898.
- (Editor). Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816. N.R.S. 1905.
DEWAR, A. G. (Editor). Voyages and Travels ... 1726. London, 1928.
DRAKE, Sir K The World Encompassed by Sir Francis Drake:. . .collected out of the
notes of Master Francis Fletcher. London, 1628. Reprinted in Arber's English
Garner, vol. y.
EVELYN, J. Navigation and Commerce, their Original and Progress ---- London, 1 674.
FALCONER, W. An universal dictionary of the Marine. . . . London, 1 769.
FIRTH, G. H. The Narrative of General Venables ____ Gamden Society. London, 1900.
GARDINER, S. R. and ATKINSON, G. T. (Editors). The First Dutch War. 5 vols. N.R.S.
1899-1912.
GENTLEMAN, T. England's Way to Win Wealth. London, 1614.
GILBERT, Sir H. A Discourse of a Discoverie for a new Passage to Cataia .... London,
GROTIUS, HUGO. Mare Liberum ---- Lugduni Batavorum, 1609. Modern transla-
tions ed. by J. B. Scott. Washington, 1916.
HOSTE, Pere P. UArt des Armies Navales ____ Lyon, 1697.
J. R. "The Trades Increase." Harleian Misc. vol. iv, pp. 202-20.
LAUGHTON, J. K. State Papers relating to the defeat of the Spanish Armada. 2 vols.
N.R.S. 1804.
LEAKE, S.M. The Hawkins Voyages. Hakluyt Society, 1878. ( V. also sub Gallcnder,
G. A. R., and Markham, G. R.)
LEDIARD, T. The Naval History of England. . .(1066-1734). London, 1735.
LENG, R. Sir Francis Drake's memorable Service done against the Spaniards in 1587. . ..
Ed. by G. Hopper. Camden Misc. vol. v, 1863.
LINSCHOTEN, J. H. VAN. The Voyage to. ..the East Indies. Hakluyt Society, 1885.
- His Discourse of voyages into ye Easte and West Indies. Translated into English
by William Philip. London, 1598.
MANWARING, G. E. (Editor). The Life and Works of Sir H. Mainwaring. N.R.S. 1920.
MARKHAM, Sir G. R. (Editor). The Voyages of Pedro Fernandez de Quiros. . . (i595-
1606). 2 vols. Hakluyt Society, 1904.
- (Editor). Life of Captain Stephen Martin. . .(by S. Martin Leake). N.R.S.
MAUDSLAY, A. P. (Editor). The True History of the Conquest of New Spain, by Bernal
Diaz del Castetto. Hakluyt Society, 1908 sqq.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 853
MUN, Sir T. A Discourse of Trade from England into the East Indies. London, 1621.
OPPENHEIM, M. (Editor). The Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson. 5 vols. N.R.S.
1902-14.
PERRIN, W. G. (Editor). The Autobiography of Phineas Pett. N.R.S. 1918.
RALEIGH, Sir W. Works 8 vols. Oxford, 1829.
The History of the World. London, 1614.
RICHMOND, Admiral Sir H. W. (Editor). Papers relating to the Loss of Minorca in
1756. N.R.S. 1913.
SAVARY DE BREVES, F. Relation des voyages. 3 vols. Paris, 1628.
SELDEN,J. Mare clausum seu de Dominio Maris. London, 1635.
SLAPTER, G. (Editor). Sir Humphrey Gylberte and his Enterprise.... Prince Soc.
Boston, 1903.
SLYNGESBIE, Sir R. A Discourse of the Navy (V. sub Tanner, J. R.)
TANNER, J. R. (Editor). Two Discourses of the Navy, 1638 and ib5Q...(6v 7
Hollond). Also A Discourse of the Navy, 1660, by Sir R. Slyngesbie. N.R.S. 1896.
TYASSENS, T. £ee-politie der Vereenigte Nederlanden. The Hague, 1670.
UBALDINO, P. A Discourse concerning the Spanish fleete mvadinge Englande in theyeare
1588 London, 1590. Reprinted, Roxburghe Club, London, 1919.
DE VILLIERS, J. A. J. (Editor). Navigation of Jacob Le Maire. Hakluyt Society,
1906.
WALTER, R. A Voyage Round the World London, 1748.
WELWOD, W. Abridgement of all Sea-Lawes. London, 1613.
WILLIAMS, Sir R. A Briefs Discourse of Wane. London, 1590.
WOOD, W. G. H. (Editor). The Logs of the Conquest of Canada. Ghamplain Society.
Toronto, 1909.
WRONG, G. M. (Editor). Louisbourg in 1745. Toronto, 1897.
• (2) MODERN WORKS
ALBION, R. G. Forests and Sea Power Harvard Economic Studies. Cambridge,
Mass. 1926.
ANDERSON, R. G. Naval Wars m the Baltic. . . 1522-1850. London, 1910.
"The Operations of the English Fleet, 1648-1652." E.H.R. vol. xxxi, July
1916.
ANSON, W. V. The Life of Admiral Lord Anson London, 1912.
ARMSTRONG, E. "Venetian Despatches on the Armada and its Results." E.H.R.
vol. xii, October 1897.
BALLHAUSEN, C. C. Die drei englisch-hollandischen Seefoiege, 1652-1654, 1664-1667,
1672-1674 Hague, 1923.
BARROW, Sir J. The Life of George, Lord Anson. London, 1839.
BEATSON, R. Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain 6 vols. London, 1804.
BLOK, P. J. Michiel de Rnyter. 1928.
BOURNE, H. R. F. English Seamen under the Tudors. 2 vols. London, 1868.
BRIDGE, Sir C. A. G. Sea-Power and other Studies. London, 1910.
BURROWS, M. The Life of Edward, Lord Hawke London, 1883.
GALLENDER, G. A. R. " Drake and his Detractors. " Mariner's Mirror, vol. vn, 1 92 1 .
"Fresh Light on Drake." Matiner's Minor , vol. ix, 1923.
The NavafSide of British History. London, 1924.
GHARNOCK, J. Biographia Navalis 6 vols. London, 1794-8.
An History of Marine Architecture. ... 3 vols. London, 1800-2.
CHEVALIER, E. Histoire de la Marine frangaise depuis les ddbuts de la Monarchie jusqu* au
traitt de pave de 1763. Paris, 1902.
GHEYNEY, E. P. "International Law under Queen Elizabeth." E.H.R. vol. xx,
October 1905.
CLARK, G. N. The Dutch Alliance and the War against French Trade9 1688-1697.
Manchester, 1923.
"War Trade and Trade War, 1701-13." Economic History Review, 1928.
"Neutral Commerce in the War of the Spanish Succession and the Treaty
of Utrecht." British Tear Book of International Law, 1928.
854 BIBLIOGRAPHY
CLARK, Sir G. S. (Baron Sydenham) and THURSFDELD, J. R. The Navy and the
Nation. . .. London, 1897.
CLOWES, Sir W. L. The Royal Navy.... 7 vols. London, 1897-1903.
COLOMB, P. H. Naval Warfare and ed. London, 1895.
Essays on Naval Defence. London, 1893.
CORBETT, Sir J. S. Drake and the Tudor Navy. 2 vols. London, 1898.
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. London, ig 1 1 .
The Successors of Drake. London, 1900.
England in the Mediterranean. . .1603-1703. 2 vols. London, 1904.
• England in the Seven Tears War 2 vols. London, 1907
DURO, F. C. Armada Espanola Vols. n, in. Madrid, 1896-7.
La Armada Invencible. 2 vols. Madrid, 1884.
EDMUNDSON, G. Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the frst half of the seventeenth century. . ..
Oxford, ign.
FIRTH, C. H. "Blake and the Battle of Santa Cruz." E.H.R. vol. xx, April 1905.
"Secretary Thurloe on the Relation of England and Holland." E.H.R.
vol. xxi, April 1906.
FORNERON, H. Histoire de Philippe II 4 vols. Paris, 1880-2.
FROUDE, J. A. The Spanish Story of the Armada. London, 1892.
English Seamen in the Sixteenth Century. London, 1895.
FULTON, T. W. The Sovereignty of the Sea Edinburgh and London, igi i.
GARDINER, S. R. "Cromwell and Mazarin in 1652." E.H.R. vol. xi, July 1896.
GRAVTERE, J. DE LA, J. P. E. Les Manns du XVme et du XVIme Siecle. 2 vols. Paris,
1879.
Les Anglais et les Hollandais dans les Mers polaires et dans la Mer des Indes. Paris,
1890.
HALE, J. R. The Story of the Great Armada. London, 1913.
~ --• - • •- - London, 1898, 1909.
the XVII century .... London,
1910.
HARRIS, F. R. The Life of Edward Mountagu, K.G., first Earl of Sandwich > 1625-72. . ..
2 vols. London, 1912.
HUME, M. A. S. The Year after the Armada, and other historical Studies. London, 1 896.
HURD, A. S. The Sea Traders. London, 1921.
JAL, A. Du Quesne et la Marine de son temps. 2 vols. Paris, 1873.
JENNER, G. "A Spanish Account of Drake's Voyages." E.H.R. vol. xvi, January
1901.
JONGE, J. C. DE. Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche %eewezen. 6 vols. Amsterdam,
1833-48.
KERVIN DE LETTENHOVE, J. M. B. C. Relations Politiques des Pays-Bos et de U Angle-
terre sous le regne de Philippe II. ... 5 vols. Brussels, 1882-6.
KIRKPATRICK, F. A. "The First Recorded English Voyage to the West Indies."
E.H.R. vol. xx, January 1905.
KTTSON, A. Captain James Cook. . . . London, 1907.
LACOUR-GAYET, G. La Marine militaire de la France sous le regne de Louis XV. 2nd
ed. Paris, 1910.
LAUGHTON, J. K. Studies in Naval History. London, 1887.
From Howard to Nelson London, 1 899.
LINDSAY, W. S. AHistoryof Merchant Shipping and Ancient Commerce. 4 vols. London,
1874-6.
LINGELBACH, W. E. The Merchant Adventurers of England: their Laws and Ordinances.
Philadelphia, 1903.
Low, C. R. History of the Indian Navy, 1613-1863. 2 vols. London, 1877.
MAHAN, Admiral A. T. Naval Strategy. . .. London and Boston, 1911.
The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. London and Cambridge,
Mass. 1890.
MARKHAM, Sir C. R. A Life of John Davis, the navigator, 1550-1605. London,
1889.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 855
MARSDEN, R. G. "The Mayflower." E.H.R. vol. xix, October 1904.
"The Early Career of Sir Martin Frobisher." E.H.R. vol. xxi, July 1906.
MCLENNAN, J. S. Lomsbourg from its Foundation to its Fall London, 1918.
MERRIMAN, R. B. Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and the New. New
York, 1925.
MULLER, S. Mare Clausum. . .. Amsterdam, 1872.
OPPENHEIM, M. History of the Administration of the Royal Navy London, 1896.
The Tudor Navy. 1902.
"The Royal Navy under Charles I." E.H.R. vol. K, January and July
1894.
"The Navy and the Commonwealth, 1649-60." E.H.R. vol. xi, January
1896.
OWEN, Sir D. Ocean Trade and Shipping. Cambridge, 1914.
PENN, C. D. The Navy under the early Stuarts. London and Portsmouth, 1913.
PENN, G. Memorials of Sir William Perm, 1644-1670. 2 vols. London, 1833.
POWLEY, E. B. The English Navy in the Revolution of 1688 Cambridge, 1928.
RICHMOND, Admiral Sir H. W. The Navy in the War of 1739-1748. 3 vols. Cam-
bridge, 1920.
ROLOFF, G. "Die Begriindung der englischen Seevorherrschaft." Preussische
Jakrbucher, Band 123. Berlin, 1906.
DE LA RONGIERE, C. B. Histoire de la Marine Frangaise. Paris, 1899. In progress.
ROUND, J. H. and OPPENHEIM, M. "The Royal Navy under Queen Elizabeth."
E.H.R. vol. ix, October 1894.
ROWLAND, A. L. Studies in English Commerce and Exploration in ike Reign of Eliza-
beth Philadelphia, 1924.
SMITH, G. C. M. "Robert Hayman and the Plantation of Newfoundland." E.H.R.
vol. xxxm, January 1916.
TANNER, J. R. "The Administration of the Navy from the Restoration to the
Revolution." E.H.R. vols. xii, xrn, xrv, January and October 1897, January
1898, January and April, 1899.
Samuel Pepys and the Royal Navy. Cambridge, 1920.
TILTON, W. F. Die Katastrophe der Spanischen Armada. . . . Freiburg, 1894.
TREVEER, A. The Sea in English Literature. . .. Liverpool and London, 1926.
TROUDE, O. Batailles navales de la France 4 vols. Paris, 1867, 1868.
TUNSTALL, W. C. B. Admiral Byng and the Loss of Minorca. London, 1928.
WADDINGTON, R. P. La Guerre de Sept Ans 3 vols. Paris, 1899-1904.
WEBER, H. La Compagnie Frangaise des Indes. Paris, 1904.
WILLIAMS, B. The Life of William Pitty Earl of Chatham 2 vols. London, 1913.
WILLIAMSON, J. A. Maritime Enterprise, 1485-1558. Oxford, 1913.
WOOD, W. C. H. The Fight for Canada London, 1905.
WRONG, G. M. The Fall of Canada Oxford, 1914.
II. COLONIAL POLICY
(Works relating to the internal development of colonies are placed
in Section III under the name of the colony concerned.)
i. GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
(i) CONTEMPORARY WORKS
BERKELEY, G. The Works of George Berkeley Ed. A. C. Fraser, 4. vols. Oxford,
1901.
A Proposal for the better supplying of Churches in our Foreign Plantations....
Pamphlet, London, 1725.
CHALMERS, G. An introduction to the history of 'the revolt of 'the American colonies. London,
1782. Never completed, Reprinted in 2 vols. Bostona 1845.
856 BIBLIOGRAPHY
CHAMBERLAYNE, E. Angliae Notitia or the Present State of England. . .. London,
Irregularly issued in many editions to 1704. Then continued byj. Chamber-
layne to 1707, when the title was changed to Magnae Notitia: or the Present
State of Great Britain, London, 1708, and continued in subsequent editions to
No. 38 in two parts, London, 1755. . ,„,*-, j ,_ „
These volumes with their continuations, the Royal Kalendar, the Court and
City Calendar and other similar calendars and almanacks, are a guide to official
England of the time. They contain also entries relating to the personnel of
colonial offices. There are fairly complete sets in the British Museum and in
the Libraryof Yale University.
POWNALL, T. The Administration of the Colonies. Ft i, London, 1764, 2nd ed. 1765;
STOKES, A. A View ojthe Constitution of the British colonies in North America and the
West Indies London, 1783. . ^ . *
Stokes was the chief justice of the province of Georgia, but, except for the
illustrative matter printed in the volume, his work has no special significance.
(2) LATER WORKS
ANDREWS, C. M. British Committees, Commissions and Councils of Trade and Plantations,
1622-1675. Johns Hopkins University Studies, xxvi, Nos. 1-3, 1908.
"The Royal Disallowance." Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society,
1914.
BASYE, A. H. The Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations. . . 1 748-1 782. Yale
Hist. Publicns. Newhaven, 1925.
BEER, G. L. (V. sub Economic Policy, infra, p. 859.)
BEEBER, R. Lords of Trade and Plantations, 1675-1696. Privately printed, 1919.
"British Plantation Councils of 1670-1672." E.H.R. vol. XL, January 1925.
This is a study based on the Journal of these Councils, formerly among the
Phillips MSS and now in the Library of Congress.
CLARKE, M. P. "The Board of Trade at Work." E.H.R. vol. xxvi, October 1911.
DICKERSON, O. M. American Colonial Government, 1696-1765. Cleveland, 1912.
History of the Board of Trade.
EGERTON, H. E. A Short History of British Colonial Policy. 5th ed. London, 1918.
GREENE, E. B. The Provincial Governor in the English Colonies in North America.
Harvard Historical Studies, VII. Cambridge, Mass. 1898.
A pioneer work in the comparative study of colonial institutions. Based on
printed materials and defective in much that concerns the British back-
ground, but nevertheless a work of great merit.
GUTTRIDGE, G. H. The Colonial Policy of William Him Ammca and the West Indies
Cambridge, 1922.
HAZELTINE, H. D. "Appeals from Colonial Courts to the King in Council, with
special reference to Rhode Island." Report of American Hist. Assoc. 1894.
HOTBLAGK, K. Chatham's Colonial Policy. London, 1917.
LABAREE, L. W. " Commissions and Instructions to Royal Governors in America
and tihe West Indies." Unprinted thesis in the Yale University Library, 1 926.
This admirable study is the first attempt that has been made to present
British governmental policy in the colonies as a whole and comparatively.
When completed and published it will deal with all the colonies for the period
to 1776.
MclLWAiN, C. H. The American Revolution: a Constitutional Interpretation. New
York, 1923.
Legalistic. Denies Parliament's right to legislate for the colonies.
PENSON, L. M. The Colonial Agents of the British West Indies. A study in colonial
administration mainly in the eighteenth century. London, 1924.
ROOT, W. T. "The Lords of Trade and Plantations." A.H.R. October 1917.
A useful preliminary study to be read in connection with Biebcr's papers.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 857
A definitive history of the personnel and policy of the Lords of Trade has yet
to be written.
RUSSELL, E. B. The Review of American Colonial Legislation by the King in Council.
Columbia University Studies, LXTV, No. 2. New York, 1915.
A careful and fairly complete study based on manuscript material in
England, handled with considerable skill.
SCHLESINGER, A. M. "Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council." Political Science
Quarterly, 1913.
TANNER, E. P. "The Colonial Agent." Political Science Quarterly, 1901.
TODD, A. Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies, and ed. London, 1894.
WASHBURNE, G. A. Imperial Control of the Administration of Justice in the Thirteen
American Colonies, 1684-1776. Studies in History, Economics and Public Law.
New York, 1923.
2. ECONOMIC POLICY
(i) CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS
ANDERSON, A. An historical and chronological deduction of the origin of Commerce. . . .
2 vols. London, 1764, Rev. ed. 4 vols. London, 1787-9.
ASHLEY, J. Memoirs and considerations concerning the trade and revenues of the British
colonies in America. 2 pts. London, 1 740-43.
Ashley was a planter and became a member of the Barbados Council in
1732. For his earlier plea for the direct export of sugar to Europe and the
pamphlet literature on the sugar question in general vide note in F. W.
Pitman's Development of the British West Indies, pp. 266-70.
BALDWIN, S. A Survey of the British Customs: containing the rates of merchandise. . . .
London, 1770.
BURKE, E. The Speeches of the Right Honourable, in the House of Commons. ... 4 vols.
London, 1816.
CAMPBELL, J. Candid and Impartial Considerations on the Nature of the Sugar Trade.
London, 1763.
Useful for the comparison between the resources of the British and French
Islands.
CARY, J. An Essay towards regulating the Trade, and Employing the Poor of this kingdom.
London, 1717.
Gary is particularly important for the discussion of the question of em-
ployment. He judged the value of the colonies by reference to the amount
of employment they stimulated in the Mother Country.
CHALMERS, G. (Editoi ) . Opinions of Eminent Lawyers on various Points of English
Jurisprudence, chiefly concerning the Colonies, Fisheries, and Commerce of Great
Britain. 2 vols. London, 1814.
CHILD, Sir J. A new Discourse of Trade. London, 1694.
This is an enlargement of Brief Observations which was published in 1668.
The writings of this Governor of the East India Company obviously exercised
considerable influence. There are a number of editions of the New Discourse.
In general Child took a liberal view on the question of trade regulation and
was critical of the prevailing notions regarding the balance of trade. But he
wished relations with the colonies to be strictly controlled.
COKE, R. A discourse of Trade London, 1670.
Coke thought that the country was annually losing large sums of money
because of the lack of men. He declares that the "trade of England, and the
fishing trade are so much diminished by how much they might have been
supplied by those men who are diverted in our American Plantations".
DAVENANT, G. The Political and Commercial Works of Charles D'Avenant. . .Collected
and revised by Sir Charles Whitworth. 5 vols. London, 1771.
Davenant was a voluminous writer on economic subjects. He is definitely
more tolerant towards ihe colonies than his older contemporary, Child.
858 BIBLIOGRAPHY
DECKER, M. An essay on the causes of the decline of the Foreign Trade 2nd ed.
Dublin, 1749.
Significant for its advocacy of greater freedom of trade. He remarks "if a
Free-Port will gain us those Trades we are naturally capable of, it will appear
to be itself the greatest Bounty".
FRANKLIN, B. The Interest of Great Britain considered with regard to her Colonies and the
acquisitions of Canada and Guadaloupe. London, 1760.
This is a reply to the arguments of those who set a high value on the West
Indian islands. Franklin insists on the importance of the development of
the continental Colonies.
GEE, J. The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain considered... . New ed. Glasgow,
There are many editions of this well-known eighteenth-century commen-
tary on trade. The first was published in London anonymously in 1729. Gee
discusses the trade with each country in separate chapters fiom the point of
view of the balance. He is a strong advocate of encouragement to the pro-
duction in the colonies of such commodities as would free Great Britain
from dependence on foreign supplies. Gee was consulted by the Board of
Trade, vide Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 1714-1718,
pp. 2io-ii, 216-17, 328, 377.
LITTLETON, E. The Groans of the Plantations. London, 1689.
Insists on the value of the sugar islands because of the demand of the
planters and their slaves for English manufactures.
MAGPHERSON, D. Annals of Commerce, Manufactures, Fisheries, and Navigation....
4 vols. London, 1805.
MAIR, J. Book-keeping methodized; or a methodical treatise of Merchant-Accompts . . .,
Edinburgh, 1739. Many later editions, 1741-73.
Has useful descriptions of the tobacco trade in Maryland and Virginia
and of the sugar trade in the West Indies. It is based largely on Anderson.
(V. supra, p. 857.)
MUN, T. England' *s Treasure by Forraign Trade. . .. London, 1664. Reprinted in
Reprints of Economic History Classics, No. i. Oxford, 1928.
rrobably written about 1630, but first published by his son in 1664.
This treatise enjoyed a great reputation as an exposition of mercan-
tilism.
PETTY, Sir W. The Petty Papers Edited from the Bowood Papers by the
Marquis of Lansdowne. 2 vols. London, 1927.
The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty Ed. by Charles H. Hull.
2 vols. Cambridge, 1899.
POSTLETHWAYT, M. Britain's Commercial Interest explained and improved. 2 vols.
London, 1757.
Particularly interesting for discussion of the Trade between the Northern
Colonies and the foreign West Indian Islands.
The Universal Dictionary of Trade. . . . London, 1 751.
Useful for such terms as "balance of trade", "naval stores", etc.
SAXBY, H. The British Customs, containing an historical and practical account of each
branch of that part of the revenue London, 1757.
SHEFFIELD, Earl of (J. B. Holroyd). Observations on the Commerce of the American
States. New ed. London, 1784.
Directed against Pitt's Bill to establish commercial relations with the United
States, the pamphlet examines the trade which had existed with the colonies.
It is well written and produces facts and figures. It ran through a number of
editions. That it had an immediate effect is undoubted.
SMITH, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 3 vols.
London, 1776.
Many editions. The edition prepared by Edwin Cannan, and first published
in 1904, is valuable because it is based on the last issued in Adam Smith's
lifetime, and is collated with the previous texts. A convenient edition is that
in the World's Classics Series, 1904, reprinted 1909, 1913.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 859
TUCKER, J. A Brief Essay on the advantages and disadvantages which respectively attend
France and Great Britain with regard to Trade, and ed. London, 1750.
Dean Tucker was a critic of the economic conceptions of his time. He here
discusses the sugar question with his usual candour.
. The True Interest of 'Britain, set forth in regard to the Colonies... Philadelphia, 17 76.
Tucker here pressed his point that the advantages supposed to arise from
the colonial system were a delusion.
WHITWORTH, Sir G. State of the Trade of Great Britain in its Imports and Exports
from 1697. London, 1776.
A convenient collection of the figures for imports and exports as summarised
for each year by the Inspector-General.
WOOD, W. A Survey of Trade. London, 1718.
There is little that is original in Wood; he restates the general mercantilist
position with respect to population, the colonies, etc.
(2) LATER WORKS
ALBION, R. G. Forests and Sea Power. The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862.
Harvard Economic Studies, vol. xxix. Cambridge, Mass. 1926.
Includes a valuable account of the Baltic supplies of naval stores and the
attempts to stimulate their production in the colonies.
ANDREWS, G. M. The Colonial Background of the American Revolution. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1924.
The discussion of the clash of mercantilist and imperial ideas in the third
essay is particularly suggestive.
" Current Lawful Money of New England." A.H.R. vol. xxrv, October 1918.
A useful introduction to the study of this subject.
"Colonial Commerce." A.H.R. vol. xx, October 1914.
"Anglo-French Commercial Rivalry 1700-1750: the Western Phase."
A.H.R. vol. xx, April, July 1915.
ASHLEY, Sir W. J. Surveys, Historic and Economic. London, 1900.
Contains two important essays on The Commercial Legislation of England and
the American Colonies, 1660-1760 and American Smuggling, 1660-1760.
BEER, G. L. The Origin of the British Colonial System 1578-1660. New York, 1908.
The Old Colonial System, 1660-1754. 2 vols. New York, 1912.
The second volume closes with the Revolution of 1688-9.
Commercial Policy of England Towards the American Colonies. New York, 1893.
British Colonial Policy, 1754-65. New York, 1907.
BELL, H. G. "British Commercial Policy in the West Indies, 1783-1793." E.H.R,
vol. xxxi, July 1916.
BIDWELL, P. W. and FALCONER, J. I. History of Agriculture in the Northern United
States, 1620-1860. Washington, 1925.
BONNASSIEUX, P. Les grandes compagmes de commerce Paris, 1892.
CALLENDER, G. S. Selections from tfie Economic History of the United States, 1765-1860,
with introductory essays. Boston, 1909.
Contains inter alia excerpts from the Report of the Board of Trade to the
House of Commons in 1731-2 and from Campbell's Considerations on the
Nature of the Sugar Trade. (V. supra, p. 857.)
CHALMERS, R. (Baron Chalmers) . A History of Currency in the British Colonies. London,
^93.
CLARK, G. N. The Dutch Alliance and the War against French Trade, 1689-1697.
University of Manchester Publicns. Historical series, XLII, 1923.
Of interest here for the discussion of the effects of the war on the working
of the Navigation Acts.
CLARK,V.S. History of Manufactures in the #m'ta/.Stofer, 1607-1860. Washington, 1916.
Chapter ix is a useful review of contemporary accounts of colonial manu-
factures, including references to the contents of the Board of Trade Reports
of 1721 and 1733 and the replies of the Colonial Governors to the Enquiry
of 1766.
86o BIBLIOGRAPHY
COBB, S. H. Story of the Palatines ---- New York, 1897.
Discusses the plan of employing German refugees from the Palatinate in
preparing naval stores on the Hudson and its failure.
CUNNINGHAM, W. The Growth of English Industry and Commerce. 2 vols. Cambridge,
1890-2.
DAHLGREN, E. W. Les relations commercials et maritimes entre la France et Us ctites
del' 'ocean pacifique. Paris, 1909.
FARRAND, M. "The Taxation of Tea, 1767-1773." -4.ff.jR. vol. m, January
1898.
A good illustration of the complexity of British Customs regulations.
FURNISS, E. S. The Position of the Labourer in a System of nationalism ---- Boston,
1920.
A critical examination of the mercantilist theories with regard to employ-
ment and the place of labour in the State generally.
GIESECKE, A. A. American Commercial Legislation befote 1789. Publication of the
University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, 1910.
Brief and statistical. Useful as a work of reference. Not otherwise important.
HANNAY, D. The Great Chartered Companies ---- London, 1926.
HARGREAVES, E. L. Restoring Currency Standards ---- London, 1926.
Refers to the problem of the over-issue of colonial paper-money.
HARRELL, I. S. Loyalism in Virginia ---- Duke University Press, Durham, N.C.
1926.
Contains some interesting illustrations of the indebtedness of the planters.
HEPBURN, A. B. A History of Currency in the United States ---- Rev. ed. New York,
HERTZ (HURST), G. B. The Old Colonial System. Manchester, 1904.
- British Imperialism in the Eighteenth Century. London, 1908.
HINKHOUSE, F. J. The Preliminaries of the American Revolution as seen in the English
Press, 1763-1775. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and
Public Law. New York, 1926.
Throws some light on the opinions of English merchants.
JOHNSON, E. R., VAN METRE, T. W. and others. History of Domestic and Foreign
Commerce of the United States. 2 vols. Washington, 1915.
Vol. i, pp. 1 12-21 contains notes on the documentary and statistical sources
for the history of commerce in the colonial period.
KEITH, T. Commercial Relations of England and Scotland, 1683-1707. ... With a
preface by W. Cunningham. Girton College Studies, No. r. Cambridge,
1910.
- "Scottish Trade with the Plantations before 1707." Scottish Hist. Rev.
October 1908.
- "The Economic Causes of the Scottish Union." E.H.R. vol. xxiv, January
Important as showing the influence of colonial trade upon the movement
for union between England and Scotland.
KNOWLES, L. The Economic Development of the British Overseas Em/tire. London,
1924.
LEVI, L. History of British Commerce. . .1763-1870. London, 1872.
LORD, E. L. Industrial Experiments in the British Colonies of North America. Johns
Hopkins University Studies, Extra vol. xvii. Baltimore, 1898.
An excellent essay on England's naval stores policy, from 1675 to 1722.
MORRISS, M. S. Colonial Trade of Maryland, 1689-1715. Johns Hopkins University
Studies, vol. xxxn, No. 3. Baltimore, 1914.
Based on material from the Public Record Office. A very useful essay.
MURRAY, A. E. A History of the Commercial and Financial Relation? between England
and Ireland from the period of the Restoration. Studies in Economics and Political
Science, London School of Economics. London, 1903.
A good piece of work, but needs elaboration along mercantilist lines, and
should be supplemented by a special investigation of commercial relations
with the colonies.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 861
PHILLIPS, H. Historical Sketches of the Paper Currency of the American Colonies. ...
Roxburgh, Mass. Two series. 1865-6.
Mainly intended for collectors, and contains a list of issues, their dates,
amounts, etc. Incidentally throws interesting light on the expedients adopted
by the different colonies.
RIPLEY, W. Z. The Financial History of Virginia, 1609-1776. Columbia College
Studies in History, etc., vol. rv. New York, 1893.
ROBERTSON, J. M. Bolingbroke and Walpole. London, 1919.
SCHLESINGER, A. M. The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution* 1763-1776.
New York, 1917. > / a //
SCOTT, W. R. The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint Stock
Companies to 1720. 3 vols. Cambridge, 1910, 1912.
A standard work, marked by extensive research, thoroughness and im-
partiality.
SCRIVENOR, H. History of the Lon Trade. ... New ed. London, 1854.
Contains statistics illustrative of England's dependence on imported iron
in the eighteenth century.
SUMNER, W. G. "The Spanish Dollar and the Colonial Shilling." A.H.R. vol. ra,
July 1898.
SUVIR\NTA, BR. The Theory of the Balance of Trade in England. Helsingfors, 1923.
A useful exposition of the subject illustrated by many quotations from
mercantilist writers.
TOPPAN, R. N. Edward Randolph. . .including his letters and official papers , 1676-
1703 7 vols. Boston, 1898-1909.
Shows the difficulties an English official had to face in attempting to have
the Laws of Tiade enforced in the Colonies.
VOLWILER, A. T. George Crogan and the Westward Movement, 1741-1782. Cleveland,
1926.
Interesting account of the activities of a prominent Indian trader and land
speculator of the colonial period.
3. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE
(i) CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES
BACON, F. Worh . . . Collected and edited by J. Speddmg, K. L. Ellis and D. D. Heath.
1 4 vols. London, 1847-74.
BERKELEY, G. Works .. .with prefaces., .by Alexander Campbell Fraser. 4 vols.
Oxford, 1871.
BLACKSTONE, Sir W. Commentaries on the Laws of England. 4 vols. Oxford, 1765-9.
BOLINGBROKE, Viscount. Works Ed. by Dr Goldsmith. 8 vols. London, 1809.
GARY, J. A Discourse concerning the Trade of Inland and Scotland. . . . London, 1696.
Brings out parallel between Ireland and New England in the English
commercial system.
DAVENANT, C. Discourse on the Plantation Trade. London, 1771. Printed in Political
and Commercial Works. . .. London, 1771. Vol. n.
HARRINGTON, J. The Oceana of James Harrington and his other Works. ... Ed. by
J. Toland. 3rd cd. London, 1747.
JUNIUS. The Letters ofjunius. Ed. by J. M. Good. London, 1814.
LOCKE, J. Of Civil Government and Toleration. Ed. with introduction by Henry
Morlcy. London, 1884.
Works i ith cd. 10 vols. London, 1812.
PATERSON, W. The WntmgA of William Paterson Ed. by S. Bannister. 2 vols.
London, i8;}8.
PETTY, Sir W. Sevetal Euay* in Political Arithmetic London, 1699.
SWIFT, J. Prose Works Ed. by Temple Scott. 12 vols. London, 1897-1908.
THOMAS, Sir D. An Historital Account of the Rise and Growth of the West-Indies
London, 1690. Published also in Harleian Miscellany, voL n, p. 340. London
1744.
862 BIBLIOGRAPHY
(2) LATER WORKS
CAMPBELL, D. The Puritan in Holland, England and America ---- London, 1892.
Marred by a pronounced anti-British bias, but contains a suggestive account
of influence of ruritanism.
CHALMERS, G. Opinions of eminent Lawyers ---- 2 vols. London, 1814.
- Political Annals of the present United Colonies, from their settlement to the Peace of
1763. Book i. London, 1780.
This book takes the history of the colonies down to 1688.
Fox BOURNE, H. R. The Life of John Locke. 2 vols. London, 1876.
FRASER, A. C. George Berkeley. Oxford, 1 88 1.
GiLLESPffi, J. E. The Influence of Oversea Expansion on England to 1700. New York
and London, 1920.
Has two chapters on English thought.
GOOCH, G. P. English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century ---- Cambridge,
1898. Newed. Cambridge, 1927.
GUTTRIDGE, G. H. The Colonial Policy of William III in America and the West Indies ....
Cambridge, 1922.
A careful study of the effect of the Revolution on colonial policy.
HALL, H. "Chatham's Colonial Policy." A.H.R. vol. v, July 1900.
HEATLEY, D. P. Studies in British History and Politics. London, 1913.
Contains a thoughtful study of an American-Independence group.
LEWIS, Sir G. C. An Essay on the Government of Dependencies ---- Ed., with an in-
troduction, by C. P. Lucas. Oxford, 1891.
Particularly valuable on legal relationship.
DE MONTMORENCY, J. E. G. " Sir William Blackstone." Journal of the Society of
Comparative Legislation. New series. No. xxxvn.
SICHEL, W. S. Bolingbroke and his times. 2 vols. London, 1901-2.
SMITH, H. F. R. Harrington and his Oceana ---- Cambridge, 1914,
A useful study on the influence of Harrington's ideas.
STEPHEN, Sir L. History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. Vol. n. London,
1876.
VAUGHAN, C. E. Studies in the History of Political Philosophy. ... 2 vols. Manchester,
WILLIAMS, B. "Chatham and the Representation of the Colonies in the Imperial
Parliament." E.H.R. vol. xxn, October 1907.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE COLONIES
i. THE CONTINENTAL COLONIES
(i) CONTEMPORARY OR NEARLY CONTEMPORARY WORKS
ADAMS, C. F. (Editor). Antmomianism in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay 1626-1638,
Including the Short Story and other Documents. Publ. of Prince Soc. Boston, Mass.
1894.
ALEXANDER, Sir W. An Encouragement to Colonies. London, 1624.
ANDROS, Sir E. The Anchor Tracts ---- 4 vols. Publ. of Prince Soc. Boston, Mass.
1868-74.
ANON. New and accurate account of the Provinces ofS. Carolina and Georgia. Pamphlet.
London, 1732.
- Reasons for raising a Fund. Printed in Brown, A. The Genesis of the United
States. Vol. i, pp. 36-42.
ARBER, E. The Story of the Pilgrim Fathers, 1606-1623 A-&', & *old by themselves,
their friends, and their enemies. London, 1897.
BACKUS, I. History of New England with particular reference to the Baptists. 2 vols*
BELCHER, J. The Belcher Papers. Ed. by C. C. Smith. 2 vols. Mass. Hist. Soc.
Gollns. series vi, vols. vi and vu. Boston, Mass. 1893-4.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 863
BESSE, J. A collection of the sufferings of the people called Quakers Vol. n. London,
1*753-
BEVERLEY,R. History of Virginia, anded. London, 1772. Reprinted Richmond.
Va., 1855.
BIARD, Father. "Relation of 1616." Reprinted in Levermore, C. H., Forerunners
and Competitors of the Pilgrims and Puritans. Brooklyn, 1912.
BRADFORD, W. History of Plymouth Plantation (ed. C. Deane). Boston, 1856.
Another edition by W. G. Ford, 2 vols. Mass. Hist. Soc. Boston, 1912.
"Governor Bradford's Letter Book," printed in Mass. Hist. Soc. Collns.
ser. i, vol. m, pp. 27-76.
BULKLEY, P. The Gospel Covenant Opened. . .. London, 1674.
[BuRKE, E.] An Account of the European Settlements in America. 2 vols. London,
1757-
BURNABY, Archdeacon A. Travels through the middle settlements in North America^
in the years 1752 and 1760. London, 1775.
BYRD, W. The Writings of Colonel William Byrd Ed. with Memoir by J. S.
Bassett. New York, 190 1.
The Westover Manuscripts: containing the History of the Dividing Line betwixt
Virginia and North Carolina. . .. Petersburg, Va. 1841.
CARLILE, G. "A briefe and summarie discourse. ..." Printed in Hakluyt, Princ.
Nav. vol. vni, pp. 134-47- Glasgow, 1904.
CHALMERS, G. An introduction to the history of the revolt of the American Colonies. . ..
London, 1782. Never completed. Reprinted, 1845, in 2 vols.
CHURCH, B. The entertaining History of King Philip's War. . .. 2nd ed. Newport,
R.I. 1772.
GOLDEN, G. The History of the Five Nations of Canada 3 vols. London, 1747.
Reprinted New York, 1902, in 2 vols.
COTTON, J. A Reply to Master Roger Williams Narragansett Club Publicns.
series i, vol. 11, pp. 1-240. Providence, 1867.
DOUGLASS, W. A Summary. . .of the British Settlements in North America. 2 vols.
London, 1755.
DRAKE, S. G. (Editor). The Old Indian Chronicle; being a collection of. . .rare tracts
written and published in the time of King Philip's War Boston, Mass. 1836.
DUNTON, J. Letters written from New England, A.D. 1686 Publ. of Prince Soc.
Boston, Mass. 1867.
EDWARDS, J. Some thoughts concerning the present revival of religion in New England.
Boston, 1742, Edinburgh, 1743.
A History of the Work of Redemption New York, 1786.
FORGE, P. (Editor). Tracts relating to the origin, settlement and progress of the Colonies
in North America. 4 vols. Washington, 1836-46.
FRANKLIN, B. The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin including his. . .correspondence.
Ed. by J. Bigelow. 10 vols. New York and London, 1887.
GARDENER, L. "Relation of the Pequot Warres," printed in Mass. Hist. Soc.
Collns. ser. m, vol. in, pp. 131-60. Cambridge, Mass. 1834.
GORGES, Sir F. A Briefe Narrative of the Original Undertakings. Reprinted in Mass.
Hist. Soc. Collns. ser. n, vol. K. Cambridge Mass. 1821.
HAKLUYT, R. A Discourse concerning Western Planting. Reprinted in Maine Hist.
Soc. Collns. ser. n, vol. n. Portland, Maine, 1877.
HART, A. B. (Editor). American History told by Contemporaries.... 4 vols. New
York, 1897-1901.
HARTWELL, H. The present State of Virginia, and the College London, 1 727.
HEWITT, A. An historical account of the nse and progress of. . .South Carolina and
Georgia. 2 vols. London, 1779.
HIGGINSON, F. New England's Plantation London, 1630. Reprinted Mass.
Hist. Soc. Collns. ser. i, vol. i. Boston, Mass. 1802.
HUBBARD, W. A General History of New England to 1680. 2nd ed. Mass. Hist. Soc.
Boston, Mass. 1848.
HUTCHINSON, T. The history of the Province of Massachusetts Bay. a vols. Boston,
1764. 2nded. London, 1765-8.
864 BIBLIOGRAPHY
HUTCHINSON,T. The Hutchinson Papers, a vols. Publ. of Prince Soc. Albany, 1865.
JONES, H. The present state of Virginia London, 1724.
KALM, PEHR. Travels into North America 2nd ed. 2 vols. London, 1772.
KNIGHT, S. The Journals of Madam Knight, and Rev. M. Buckingham. . .written in
1704 and 1710. New York, 1825.
LAWSON,J. The History of Carolina London, 1714. Raleigh, 1860.
Description and natural history.
LECHFOLD, T. "Plain Dealing: or Newes from New England." Printed in Mass.
Hist. Soc. Collns. ser. HI, vol. m, pp. 63-75. Cambridge, Mass. 1833.
A valuable account of the manners and customs of New England.
MASON, Gapt. J. A brief Discourse of the Newfoundland Edinburgh, i6ao.
• "A brief History of the Pequot War." Printed in Mass. Hist. Soc. Collns.
ser. n, vol. vni, pp. 120-53. Boston, 1826.
MATHER, G. Diary oj Cotton Mather. 2 vols. Mass. Hist. Soc. Collns. ser. vn,
vols. vn and vm. Boston, Mass. 1911-12.
Magnolia Christi Americana; or the Ecclesiastical History of New England....
London, 1702.
MATHER, I. Remarkable Providences illustrative of the earlier days of American Colonisation
. . . 1684. Reprinted London, 1856.
MEKENESS, N. D. (Editor). Travels in the American Colonies. New York, 1916.
A collection of reprints, mainly of the eighteenth century.
MILLER, J. Description of New York. New York, 1695. Reprinted 1862.
MINOT, G. R. Continuation of the History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay. . ..
2 vols. Boston, 1798-1803.
A continuation of Hutchinson Js history.
MITCHELL, J. The present state of Great Britain and North America London, 1767.
MOORE, F. A Voyage to Georgia. . .. London, 1744.
MORTON, T. New English Canaan London, 1637. Reprinted in P. Force,
Tracts. . ., vol. n, Washington, 1838.
NEAL, D. The History of the Puritans.... 4 vols. London, 1732-8. New ed.
New York, 1848.
NIGHOLL,J. An Houre Glasse of Indian News London, 1607.
OGLETHORPE, General J. Brief account of the establishment of the Colony of Georgia
London, 1897. Printed in P. Force, Tracts. . . ., vol. i, Washington, 1836.
Old South Leaflets. 7 vols. Boston, Mass., 1882.
Includes No. 21, "Eliot's Narrative" and No. 48, "Bradford's Memoirs
of Elder Brewster".
OLDMIXON, J. The British Empire in America. ... 2 vols. London, 1708. Later ed.
London, 1741-
PECKHAM, Sir G. A True Reporte of the late discoveries. . .of the Newfound Landes. . .
By Sir Humphry Gilbert. . .. London, 1583. Reprinted in Hakluyt, Princ. Nav.
vol. vm, pp. 89-131, Glasgow, 1904.
PENHALLOW, S. The History of the Wars of New England Boston, Mass. 1726.
PENN, W. Select Works London, 1771.
Letters. . . to Charles II and the Earl of Sunderland. Hist. Soc. of Pennsylvania
Memoirs. Vol. n. Philadelphia, 1826.
Correspondence between William Penn and J. Logan and others, 1700-1750
Ed. by E. Armstrong. Hist. Soc. of Pennsylvania Memoirs. Vols. DC and x.
Philadelphia, 1836-7.
PRINCE, T. A Chronological History of New England in the form of Annals. ... 2 vols.
Boston, 1736, 1754. Reprinted, ed. by E. Arber, London, 1897.
/OVJ /JT" J-VV/£SJLJLJ..ll.VsU, \*\J.» Uy J-l. 4U.UV*!., J^VSJLIVAV/IJL, i.\jy J .
PROUD, R. The History of Pennsylvania. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1797, 1798.
ROBINSON, J. The Works of John Robinson, Pastor of the Pilgrim Fathers. 3 vols.
London, 1851.
ROSIER, J. A true relation of the. . .voyage made... by Captains G. Waymouth...
London 1605. Reprinted in Gorges Soc. Publicns. Portland, 1887.
SCHAW, J. Journal of a Lady of Quality; being the narrative of a journey. . .to the West
Indies, North Carolina. ..1774 to 1776. Ed. by E. W. and G. M. Andrews.
New Haven, 1921.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 865
SEWALL, S. Diary of Samuel Sewall, 1674-1729. 3 vols. Mass. Hist. Soc. Collns.
ser. v, vols. v-vm. Boston, 1879-82.
SHEPARD, T. The Works of Thomas Shepard 3 vols. Boston, 1853.
SMITH, J. Works, 1608-1631. Ed. by Arber, E. London, 1884.
SMITH, S. The History of. . . New Jersey ...to the year 1 72 1 Burlington, 1 765.
SMITH, W. The History of the Province of New fork from the fast discovery to the year
MDCCXXXH. London, 1757. Continued to 1814. Albany, 1814.
The history was keenly criticised by Lt. Gov. Cadwallader Golden when it
first appeared. (New Tork Hut. Soc. Collns., 1868.)
SMITH, W. A brief state of the province of Pennsylvania. London, 1755.
STITH, W. The History oj the fast discovery and settlement of Virginia Williamsburg,
1747-
THOMAS, G. An Historical and Geographical Account of. . .Pensilvania; and of West-
New- Jeisey in America. London, 1698. Reprinted Cleveland, 1903.
VAUGHAN, Sir W. The Golden Grove London, 1608.
WESLEY, Rev. J. The Journal of .... Ed. by N. Curnock. 8 vols. London, 1909-16.
WHITBOURNE, Sir R. A Discourse and Liscouery of New-found-land London, 1622.
WHITE, J. The Planter's Plea 1630. Repiinted in American Colonial Tracts,
vol. n, No. 3. Rochester, 1898.
WHITEFIELD, G. Journal of a Voyage from London to Savannah in Georgia. London,
1738. Continuation of. ... London, 1739.
WILLIAMS, R. Mr. Cotton's Letter examined and answered. London, 1 644. Reprinted
in Narragansett Club Publicns. ser. i, vol. i. Providence, 1866.
Letters of Roger Williams, 1632-1682. Ed. by J. R. Bartlett. Narragansett
Club Publicns. ser. i, vol. vi. Providence, 1874.
WINTHROP, J. A Journal of the transactions and occurrences in. . .Massachusetts
Hartford, 1790. Reprinted as The History of New England from 1630 to 1649.
2 vols. Boston, 1825-6. Also 2 vols. New York, 1908.
The Winthrop Papers. Pt. v. Mass. Hist. Soc. Collns. ser. v, vol. vin. Boston.
Mass. 1889.
WiSE,J. A Vindication of the Government of New England Churches Boston, 1772.
YOUNG, A. Chronicles of the Pilgrim Fathers Boston, 1841.
A collection of contemporary narratives covering the period 1602-25.
(2) LATER WORKS
(a) General:
ADAMS, H. B. History of the United States. 9 vols. New York, 1889-91.
ANDERSON, J. S. M. Tlie History of the Church of England in the Colonies. . . . 2nd ed.
3 vols. London, 1856.
ANDREWS, C. M. The Colonial Period. New York and London, 1912.
Colonial Self-Government 1652-89 New York, 1904.
BAIRD, R. Religion in America 2nd ed. New York, 1856.
BANCROFT, G. History of the United States Revised ed. 6 vols. New York,
1885.
A work of enormous industry and of great value, being based on MS
authorities in many public and private collections, but written with anti-
British bias. The treatment of the first half of the eighteenth century is
cursory. The French translation by Comte A. de Circourt, entitled Histoire
de Faction commune de la France el de UAmbrique pour FIndipendance des Etats-Unis,
contains many previously unpublished documents. 3 vols. Paris, 1876.
BENEDICT, D. A General History of the Baptist Denomination 2 vols. Boston, 1813.
BIGGAR, H. P. The Early Tiading Companies of New France. Toronto, 1901.
BISHOP, C. F. History of Elections in the American Colonies. Columbia University
Studies, in, No. I. New York, 1893.
Based largely on readily accessible printed material, such as legislative
enactments and other similar official documents.
BISHOP, J. L. History of American Manufactures from 1608 to 1860.. . 3rd ed. 3 vols.
Philadelphia, 1868.
CHBE I 55
866 BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOND, B. W., Jr. The Quit-Rent System in the American Colonies. . . . Yale Hist.
Publicns. Miscellany xiv. New Haven, 1919.
A scholarly essay on a difficult subject. Deficient on the system as worked
out in the British colonies in the West Indies.
BOWDEN,J. History of the Society of Friends in Amenca. 2 vols. London, 1850-4.
BRIGGS, G.A. American Presbyterianism> its origin and early history New York, 1885.
BROWN, V, L. "Spanish Claims in the Newfoundland Fisheries." Report of
Canadian Hist. Assoc. 1925, pp. 64-82.
BURNS, J. F. Controversies between Royal Governors and their Assemblies in the Northern
American Colonies. Privately printed. Boston, 1923.
a pro-colonial bias. The failure of the author to present the subject c
paratively makes it difficult for the reader to grasp the underlying issues
involved. Nevertheless the work is of real value.
CHANDLER, J. E. The Colonial Architecture of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia.
3rd ed. Boston, 1900.
CHANNING, E. A History of the United States. Vols. i-rv. New York, 1905-17.
CLARKE, M. P. " Parliamentary Privilege in the American Colonies." Report,
American Historical Association, for the year 1926 (not yet printed).
This is a risumi of a longer work, now in preparation, on parliamentary
privilege in the colonies.
COLENBRANDER, H. T. Koloniale Geschiedenis. 3 vols. 's Gravenhage, 1925-6.
COBB, S. H. The Story of the Palatines. New York, 1897.
CROSS, A. L. The Anglican Episcopate and the American Colonies. Harvard Hist.
Studies, vol. ES. New York, 1902.
DOYLE, J. A. The English in America. 5 vols. London, 1882-1907.
The first four volumes deal with separate colonies down to 1714, the fifth
with all the colonies under the House of Hanover.
FAUST, A. B. The German element m the United States. ... 2 vols. Boston and New
York, 1909.
GRAHAME,J. The History of the United States. 2nd ed. 4 vols. Philadelphia, 1845.
GREENE, E. B. A Short History of the American People to 1789. New York, 1922.
Provincial America, 1690-1740. New York, 1905.
HARLOW, R. V. History of Legislative Methods in the Period before 1825. Yale Hist.
Publicns. Miscellany v, vol. v. New Haven, 1917.
Deals chiefly with the Committee system.
HAWKS, F. L. Contributions to the Ecclesiastical History of the United States 3 vols.
New York, 1836-9.
HILDRETH, R. History of the United States.. .6 vols. Revised ed. New York, 1880.
Admirably impartial.
HOGKETT, H. C. Political and Social History of the United States. Vol. I, 1492-1828.
2 vols. New York, 1925.
A risuml of essential facts, with bibliography and select authorities.
HOWARD, G. E. Preliminaries of the Revolution, 1763-1775. New York, 1905.
INSH, G. P. Scottish Colonial Schemes, 1620-1688. Glasgow, 1922.
JACOBS, H. E. A History of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States, i vol.
New York, 1893.
JAMESON, J. F. Privateering and Piracy in the Colonial Period: illustrative documents.
New York, 1923.
Dictionary of United States History, 1492-1895. Boston, 1894.
KIRKE, H. The First English Conquest of Canada. 2nd ed. London, 1908.
LEROY-BEAUIJEU, P. De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes. New ed. 2 vols.
Paris, 1902.
LODGE, H. C. Short History of the English Colonies in America. New York, 1881.
Contains information on the social life.
MARTIN, R. M. The British Colonies, their history. . .and resources. 6 vols. London
and New York, 1851-7.
Statistics of the Colonies of the British Empire London, 1839.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 867
MC&NLEY, A. E. The Suffrage Franchise in the thirteen English Colonies in America.
University of Pennsylvania Publicn. Philadelphia, 1905.
A useful publication. The subject matter, drawn entirely from printed
material, is distributed according to colonies and treated chronologically.
MCLENNAN, Senator J. S. Louisbourg, from its foundation to its fall, 1713-1758. . ..
London, 1918.
NEWMAN, A. H. A History of the Baptist Churches in the United States 6th ed.
New York, 1915.
OSGOOD, H. L. The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century. 3 vols. New York,
The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century. 4 vols. New York, 1924, 1925.
This important work, a standard authority in its field, deals with the
colonies as institutions of government and members of a growing empire.
The field is limited to the thirteen colonies and to the political and govern-
mental aspects of their history.
PARKMAN, F. A Half Century of Conflict (1700-1748). 2 vols. London, 1892.
Montcalm and Wolfe.... 2 vols. Toronto, 1901.
PERRY, W. S. History of the American Episcopal Church, 1587-1883..., 2 vols.
Boston, 1885.
PROWSE, D. W. The History of Newfoundland London, 1895.
SCUDDER, H. E. (Editor). Men and Manners in America one hundred years ago. New
York, 1876.
SEELEY, Sir J. R. The Expansion of England. London, 1883.
SMITH, W. History of the Post Office inBritishNorth America, 1639-1870. Cambridge, 1 920.
THOMAS, I. The History of Printing in America 2 vols. Worcester, Mass. 1810.
2nd ed. Albany, 1874.
TRACEY,J. The Great Awakening. Boston, 1842.
TURNER, F. J. The Frontier in American History. New York, 1921.
TYLER, L. G. England in America, 1580-1652. New York, 1904.
TYLER, M. G. A History of American Literature ( 1 607-1 765) . 2 vols. New York, 1 879.
VAN TYNE, G. H. The American Revolution, 1776-1783. . .. New York, 1905.
WILBERFORCE, S. (Bishop of Oxford, of Winchester). A History of the Protestant
Episcopal Church in America. London, 1844.
WILLIAMSON, J. A. A Short History of British Expansion. London, 1922.
WINSOR, J. .Narrative and Critical History of America. 8 vols. London, 1889.
By various writers.
The struggle in America between England and France, 1679-1 763. London, 1895.
(b) The New England Colonies:
ADAMS, B. The Emancipation of Massachusetts. Boston, 1887.
ADAMS, G. F. Three Episodes of Massachusetts History. The Settlement of Boston Bay.
The Antmomian Controversy. A Study of Church and Town Government. 2 vols.
Boston, 1892.
ADAMS, J. T. The founding of New England. . .. Boston, 1921.
Revolutionary New England, 1691-1776. Boston, 1923.
ANDREWS, G. M. The River Towns of Connecticut. Johns Hopkins University Studies.
Baltimore, 1886.
"Connecticut Intestacy Law." Tale Review9 in, 1894. Reprinted in Select
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, i, pp. 431-63. Boston, 1907.
"Connecticut and the British Government." F. Fane, Introduction to
Reports on the Laws of Connecticut. Acorn Club Publicns. No. 12, 1915.
ARNOLD, S. G. History of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. 2 vols.
New York, 1859, 1860.
BARNES, V. F. The Dominion of New England. A Study in British Colonial Policy.
Yale Hist. Publicns. New Haven, 1923.
The only satisfactory study of an important and much misunderstood early
phase in the history of British colonial policy.
BARRY, J. S. The History of Massachusetts. 3 vols. Boston, 1855-7.
55-a
868 BIBLIOGRAPHY
BAXTER, J. P. Sir Ferdinando Gorges and his Province of Maine. Publicns. of Prince Soc.
3 vols. Boston, 1890.
BEARDSIJEY, E. E. The History of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut, and ed. 2 vols.
Cambridge (Mass.), 1869.
BELKNAP,J. The History of New Hampshire, and ed. 3 vols. Philadelphia, 1813.
BLAIKIE, A. A history of Presbyterianism in New England. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1881.
BROWN, A. The First Republic in America. Boston, 1898.
BROWN, J. The Pilgrim Fathers of New England and their Puntan Successors. 4th ed.
London, 1920.
BURGESS, W. H. Jo/w Robinson9 pastor of the Pilgrim Fathers London, 1920.
BURRAGE, H. S. Beginnings of Colonial Maine 9 1602-1658. Portland, 1914.
BYINGTON, B. H. The Puritan in England and New England. Boston, 1896.
CARPENTER, E. J. Roger Williams New York, 1909.
CRAWFORD, M. C. Social Life in old New England. Boston, 1914.
DAVIS, A. M. Currency and Banking in. . .Massachusetts Bay. American Economic
Association Publicns. ser. m, vol. i, No. 4; vol. n, No. i. Saratoga, 1900, 1901.
DAVIS, O. S. John Robinson, the Pilgrim Pastor. Boston, 1903.
.DORLAND, A. G. "The Royal Disallowance in Massachusetts." Bulletin of the
Department of History and Political and Economic Science, Queen's Uni-
versity, Canada, No. 22, 1917.
DRAKE, S. G. The History and Antiquities of Boston. . . (1630-1770). Boston, 1856.
A particular History ofthe. .. War in New England. Albany, 1870.
FELT, J. B. The ecclesiastical history of New England. Vol. i. Boston, 1855.
An historical account of Massachusetts Currency. Boston, 1839.
FiSKE,J. The beginnings of New England. Boston, 1889.
New France and New England. London, 1902.
FOSTER, W. E. Town Government in Rhode Island. Johns Hopkins University Studies.
Baltimore, 1886.
FRY, W. H. New Hampshire as a Royal Province, 1741-1776. Columbia University
Studies, vol. xxrx, No. 2. New York, 1908.
Similar in plan to the contribution of Fisher and Flippin, but somewhat
less analytical.
GIPSON, L. H. Jared Ingersoll. A Study of American Iqyalism in relation to British
colonial government. Yale Hist. Publicns. Miscellany, No. 8. New Haven, 1920.
More than a biography. An admirably written essay dealing with Ingersoll
as representative of many in the colony of Connecticut who sympathised with
the British connection.
GOODWIN, J. A. The Pilgrim Republic Boston, 1888.
HAZELTINE, H. D. "Appeals from Colonial Courts to the King in Council, with
special reference to Rhode Island." Report, American Historical Association,
1894.
An early treatise on the subject, limited in its scope to appeals from Rhode
Island, of which there were many.
HILKEY, G. J. Legal Development in Colonial Massachusetts. Columbia University
Studies, vol. xxxvn, No. 2. New York, 1910.
A work of considerable merit.
HOWE, D. W. The Puntan Republic of Massachusetts Bay Indianapolis, 1899.
JAMES, B. B. Colonization of New England. Philadelphia, 1904.
KIMBALL, E. The Public Life of Joseph Dudley Harvard Historical Studies, xv.
New York, 1911.
An honest attempt to deal with a difficult New England character.
MAYO, L. S. John Wentworih, governor of New Hampshire 1767-1775. Cambridge,
Mass., 1921.
Rather personal than institutional, and inclined to overestimate Went-
worth's ability and influence.
MOORE, G. H. Prytaneum Bostomense. Notes on the History ofthe Old State House
Boston, 1886.
A valuable antiquarian essay, descriptive of the building in which the
Massachusetts council and assembly sat.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 869
OSGOOD, H. L. "New England Colonial Finance in the Seventeenth Century."
Political Science Quarterly, vol. XDC, pp. 82 sqq.
" Political Ideas of the Puritans." Political Science Quarterly, vol. vi, pp. 2 1 sqq.
PALFREY, J. G. A compendious history of New England 4 vols. Boston, 1884.
History of New England. Vols. i-rv. Boston, 1858-75.
POWIGKE, F. J. "John Robinson and the Beginning of the Pilgrim Movement."
Harvard Theological Review, July 1920.
POWNAL, C. A. W. Thomas Pownall, M.P., F.R.S., Governor of Massachusetts Bay,
Author of the Letters^ of Junius. London, 1908.
Many of the claims made, such as the authorship of the Junius Letters, have
not been substantiated.
SPENCER, H. R. Constitutional Conflict in Massachusetts, Early Eighteenth Century.
Columbus, 1905.
An early attempt to expound the constitutional problems arising in
Massachusetts in the early eighteenth century.
STEINER, B. C. The History of Education in Connecticut. Washington, 1893.
TATHAM, G. B. The Puritans in Power Cambridge, 1913.
THAYER, H. O. The Sagadahoc Colony. Portland, 1892.
TRUMBULL, B. A Complete History of Connecticut. ..to. . .1764. 2 vols. New Haven,
1818.
TRUMBULL, J. H. Origin and early progress of Indian missions in New England
Worcester, Mass. 1874.
TUTTLE, C. W. Memoir of Captain John Mason. Boston, 1887.
UPHAM, C. W. Salem Witchcraft; with an account of Salem Village 2 vols.
Boston, 1867.
USHER, R. G. The Pilgrims and their History. New York, 1918.
WEEDEN, W. B. Economic and Social History of New England, 1620-1789. 2 vols.
Boston, 1890.
WENDELL, B. Cotton Mather Cambridge, Mass., 1926.
WILLIAMSON, W. D. The History of the State of Maine.... 2 vols. Hallowell,
1832.
WINSOR, J. The Memorial History of Boston. . .1630-1880. 4 vols. Boston, 1882.
WINTHROP, R. C. Life and Letters of John Winthrop. ... 2 vols. Boston, 1864-7.
WOOD, G. A. William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, 1741-1756. A History.
Columbia University Studies. New York, 1920.
Planned in two volumes, of which only the first has appeared, carrying
the life to 1749. A useful work ably performed, but overburdened with
detail.
(c) New York and New Jersey:
FISHER, E. J. New Jersey as a Royal Province. 1738-1776. Columbia University
Studies, XLI, 1911.
A careful dissection and analysis of the institutional system of the colony
after 1 738. It is a continuation of the work of E. P. Tanner. (V. infra, p. 870.)
FISKE, J. Dutch and Quaker Colonies in America. 2 vols. London and Cambridge,
Mass. 1899.
Fox, D. R. Caleb Heathcote. . . 1692-1721. New York, 1926.
KEYS, A. M. Cadwallader Golden: a representative eighteenth century official. New York,
1906.
A sympathetic study, but based on insufficient documentary material, and
not always adequate in presenting the political and governmental issues
involved.
KAPP, F. Geschichte der Deutschen im Staate New York. New York, 1867.
LAMB, M. J. History of the City of New York 2 vols. New York, 1877.
ROBERTS, E. H. New York. The planting and growth of the Empire State. 2 vols.
Boston, 1887.
SPENCER, C. W. Phase* of Royal Government in New York, 1611-1719. Columbus,
1905-
870 BIBLIOGRAPHY
TANNER, E. P. The Province of New Jersey, 1664-1738. Columbia University
Studies, xxx, 1908.
Deals with the proprietary period.
VAN RENSSELAER, M. G. History of the City of New York in the Seventeenth Century.
2 vols. New York, 1909.
(d) Pennsylvania:
LINCOLN, C. H. The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania, 1760-1776. University
of Pennsylvania Publicns. No. i. Philadelphia, 1901.
Though treating chiefly of the period after 1763, this paper is valuable for
the earlier history of proprietary Pennsylvania as well.
ROOT, W. T. Relations of Pennsylvania with the British Government. Philadelphia, 1914.
An excellent piece of historical investigation, the scope of which is wider
than the title indicates. Based on material in the Public Record Office.
SAGHSE, J. F. German Sectarians of Pennsylvania 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1899,
1900.
SHARPLESS, I. A Quaker Experiment in Government Philadelphia, 1898.
SHEPHERD, W. R. History of Proprietary Government in Pennsylvania. Columbia
University Studies, vi, 1896.
The first of the studies of colonial governments made under Professor
Osgood's guidance. Based on materials (including the Penn Papers) in the
library of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Contains few references to
the British relationship.
SMITH, W. R. "Sectionalism in Pennsylvania during the Revolution." Political
Science Quarterly, xxrv.
Of value for the earlier period as well.
WALTON, J. Conrad Weiser and the Indian Policy of Colonial Pennsylvania. Philadelphia,
1900.
WAYLAND, J. The German element in the Shenandoah Valley. 1914.
(e) Maryland and Delaware:
ANDREWS, M. P. History of Maryland. Baltimore, 1926.
BOZMAN, J. L. History of Maryland. . . (1633-60). 2 vols. Baltimore, 1837.
BROWNE, W. H. Maryland, the History of a Palatinate. Boston, 1884.
HALL, C. C. The Lords Baltimore and the Maryland Palatinate Baltimore, 1902.
JONES, F. R. Colonization of the Middle States and Maryland. Philadelphia, 1904.
MERENESS, N. D. Maryland as a Proprietary Province. New York, 1901.
A very detailed analytical study of the institutions of the provinces. A book
of reference only.
McMAHON, J. An historical View of the Government of Maryland. . . . Baltimore, 1831.
RUSSELL, W. T. Maryland, the Land of sanctuary Baltimore, 1907.
SIOUSSAT, ST G. L. Economics and Politics in Maryland9 1720-1750, and the public
services of Daniel DuLumy the Elder. Johns Hopkins University Studies, xxi,
Nos. 6-7. Baltimore, 1903.
STEINER, B. C. History of Education in Maryland. Washington, 1894.
Rev. T. Bray. His life and. . .works. . . . Peabody Fund Publicns. No. 37. 1901.
Maryland during the English Civil Wars. 2 vols. Johns Hopkins University
Studies, xxrv, Nos. 11-12. Baltimore, 1906-7.
Life and Administration of Sir Robert Eden. Johns Hopkins University Studies,
xvi, Nos. 7-9. Baltimore, 1898.
Useful, but dry and matter of fact in treatment.
(/) Virginia:
ADAMS, H. B. The College of William and Mary. Washington, 1887.
BROV/N, A. The Genesis of the United States 2 vols. London, 1890.
Covers the period 1605-16. It quotes texts of all documents on Virginia
available for the period, for the most part in full.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 871
BRUCE, P. A. Economic History of Virginia in the seventeenth century. 2 vols. New
York, 1896.
Institutional History of Virginia in the seventeenth century 2 vols. New York,
1910.
The Social Life of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century. New York, 1907.
Excellent treatises on local conditions in Virginia based on a thorough
investigation of local manuscript material; but without adequate appreciation
of the larger aspects of the subject. Written in a somewhat rhetorical style.
BURK, J. The History of Virginia 3 vols. Petersburgh, Va. 1822.
CAMPBELL, G. History of the colony and ancient dominion of Virginia. Philadelphia,
1860.
FISKE, J. Old Virginia and her Neighbours. 2 vols. London and Cambridge, Mass.
1897.
FLIPPIN, P. S. The Royal Government in Virginia, 1624-1775. Columbia University
Studies, LXXXTV, No. i. New York, 1919.
"William Gooch, Successful Governor of Virginia." William and Mary
Quarterly, new series, v, No. 4; vi, No. i, 1925-6.
An excellent biography.
KERCHEVAL, S. A History of the Valley of Virginia 3rd ed. Woodstock, Va.
1902.
MEADE, W. Old Churches, Ministers and Families of Virginia. 2 vols. Philadelphia,
1861.
NEILL, E. D. History of the Virginia Company of London Albany, 1869.
PARGELLIS, S. M. "The Procedure of the Virginia House of Burgesses." William
and Mary Quarterly, January, April 1927.
SIOUSSAT, ST G. L. "Virginia and the English Commercial System, 1730-1733."
Report, American Historical Association, 1905. Vol. i.
WERTENBAKER, J. J. Virginia under the Stuarts, 1607-1688. Princeton and London,
1914.
WRIGHT, I. A. "Spanish Policy towards Virginia." A.H.R. vol. xxv, April
1920.
(g) North and South Carolina:
ASHE, S. A'C. History of North Carolina. Vol. i. Greensboro', 1908.
BASSETT, J. S. The Constitutional Beginnings of North Carolina, 1663-1729. Johns
Hopkins University Studies, xn, No. 3. Baltimore, 1894.
- Slavery and Servitude in the Colony of North Care "
Carolina. Johns Hopkins University
Studies, xiv, Nos. 4-5. Baltimore, 1896.
COOK, C. S. The Governor, Council and Assembly in Royal North Carolina. James
Sprunt Hist. Publicns. xii, No. i.
Based on the printed records ; amateur in treatment.
HAWKS, F. L. History of North Carolina. 3 vols. Fayctteville, N.C., 1857-8.
HAYWOOD, M. D. Governor George Burrington with an account of his official adminis-
tration in the Colony of North Carolina, 1724-1725, 1731-1735. Raleigh, 1896.
Governor William Tryon and his. administration m the Province of North Carolina,
1765-1771- Raleigh, 1903. * . .
The latter volume represents an early and courageous attempt to do justice
to an able royal governor.
McCRADY, E. The History of South Carolina under the Proprietary Government, 1670-
1719. New York, 1897.
The History of South Carolina under the Royal Government, 1719-1776. New
York, 1899.
Education in South Carolina, prior to and during the Revolution. Hist. Soc. of S.
Carolina. Charleston, 1883.
RAPER, C. L. North Carolina, A study in English colonial government. New York, 1904.
Based entirely on the North Carolina Records', slight and perfunctory in
treatment.
872 BIBLIOGRAPHY
SMITH, W. R. South Carolina as a Royal Province, 1719-1776. New York and London,
1903.
One of the best of the studies in local government produced under Pro-
fessor Osgood's auspices. Especially valuable in view of the failure of the
State of South Carolina to print its public records.
WILLIAMSON, H. The history of North Carolina. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1812.
(h) Georgia:
FnppiN,P.S. "The Royal Government of Georgia, 1752-1776." Georgia Historical
Quarterly, vni, Nos. i, 2, 4; rx, No. 3; x, No. i. 1925-6.
JONES, G. E. The history of Georgia. 2 vols. Boston, 1883.
McCAiN, G. R. The Executive in Proprietary Georgia. Atlanta, 1914.
A study of control under the Trustees, 1732-52.
McCALL, H. The History of Georgia. 2 vols. Savannah, 1811-1 6.
STEVENS, W. B. A History of Georgia 2 vols. New York, 1847-9.
WRIGHT, R. A Memoir of General James Oglethorpe London, 1867.
2. THE WEST INDIES
(i) CONTEMPORARY OR NEARLY CONTEMPORARY WORKS
ANON. (Pamphlets.) The Alarm Bell: or Considerations on the present dangerous state
of the Sugar Colonies. Pamphlet, London, 1749.
Case of the British Sugar Colonies. Pamphlet, London, 1732.
Present state of the British Sugar Colonies considered. Pamphlet, London, 1 731.
Thoughts on Trade in General and West India in particular. Pamphlet, London,
Short account of the interest and conduct of the Jamaica Planters. Pamphlet, 1 754.
The Importance of the British Plantations in America to this Kingdom. Pamphlet,
London, 1731.
Memoirs of the firsi settlement of Barbados. . .to 1742. London, 1742.
ASHLEY, J. The Sugar Trade, with the incumbrances thereon laid open. Pamphlet,
London, 1734.
Memoirs and considerations concerning the trade and revenues of the British Colonies
in America. Pamphlet, 2 pts. London, 1 740-43.
ATWOOD, T. The History of the Island of Dominica. London, 1791.
BEGKFORD, W. A Descriptive Account of the Island of Jamaica 2 vols. London,
1790.
Bossu, Capitaine. Npuveaux Voyages aux Indes Occidentales 2 vols. Paris, 1 768.
BROWNE, P. The ciiil and natural history of Jamaica. 2nd ed., 2 pts. London, 1789.
CAMPBELL, J. Candid and impartial considerations on the nature of the Sugar Trade.
Pamphlet, London, 1763.
DAVIES, J. The History of the Caribbee Islands. London, 1666.
A general account of the West India Colonies, not always accurate, but
containing some information not found elsewhere.
Du TERTRE, J. B. Histoire gtnfaale des Antilles habitdes par les Francais 4 vols.
Paris, 1667-71.
A detailed and generally accurate history, throwing much light upon the
English colonies as well as the French. The author had been in the colonies
and wrote largely from personal knowledge of events.
EDWARDS, B. The History, civil and commercial, of the British Colonies in the West
Indies. 3 vols. London, 1793-1801. 6 vols. London, 1818-9.
ExpjUEMELiN, H. O. Bucaniers of America 2 vols. London, 1684-5. New ed.
Ed. by W. S. Stallybrass, London, 1923.
FRERE, G. Short History of Barbados, to the end of 1767. London, 1768.
GAGE, T. A new survey of the West Indias 2nd ed. London, 1655. New ed. by
A. P. Newton, under title Thomas Gage. The English American. London, 1928.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 873
HARRIS, G. A. and VILLIERS, J. A. J. DE. Storm Van 9s Gravesande. The Rise of
British Guiana compiled from his Dispatches. 2 vols. Hakluyl Society, 191 1.
JEAFFRESON, J. G. A Young Squire of the Seventeenth Century. * vols. London, 1878.
LABAT, J. B. Nouveau voyage aux isles de VAmtrique 6 vols. Paris, 1 722.
LESLIE, G. A new and exact account of Jamaica Edinburgh, 1740.
LIGON, R. The True and Exact History of the Island of Barbados London, 1657.
Valuable rather as a description of the colony by an eyewitness, c. 1650,
than as a record of events.
LITTLETON, E. The Groans of the Plantations Pamphlet, London, 1689.
LONG, E. The History of Jamaica. 3 vols. London, 1774.
McKiNNEN, D. A Tour through the British West Indies, in ihe years 1802 and 1803,
giving a particular account of the Bahama Islands. London, 1804.
OLDMIXON, J. The British Empire in America 2 vols. London, 1708. Later
ed. London, 1741.
PERRIN, W. The Present State of the British and French Sugar Colonies . . . considered
Pamphlet, London, 1740.
RAYNAL, G. T. F. A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade
of Europeans in the East and West Indies. Translated from the French by
J.Justamond. 4 vols. London, 1776.
SCHAW, J. Journal of a Lady of Quality (v. supra9 p. 864.)
SLOANE, Sir HANS. A Voyage to the Islands Madera, Barbados, Nieves, St. Christophers
and Jamaica .... 2 vols. London, 1707-25.
SUCKLING, G. An historical account of the Virgin Islands. . .. London, 1780.
THOMAS, Sir D. An Historical Account of the rise and growth of the West India Colonies.
London, 1690.
(2) LATER WORKS
BREEN, R. H. Santa Lucia, Historical, Statistical, and Descriptive. London, 1844.
BRIDGES, E. W. Annals of Jamaica. 3 vols. London, 1828.
BUCHNER, J. H. The Moravians in Jamaica. London, 1854.
COKE, T. A History of the West Indies 3 vols. Liverpool, 1808-99.
GUNDALL, F. Handbook of Jamaica. London, 1 88 1 ff.
Historic Jamaica. London, 1908.
Political and Social disturbances in the West Indies. A brief account and bibliography.
Kingston, 1906.
Tlie Press and Printers of Jamaica. Worcester, Mass. 1916.
Studies in Jamaica History. London, 1900.
DALLAS, R. G. The history of the Maroons London, 1803.
DAVIS, N. D. Cavaliers and Roundheads in Barbados, 1650-2. George Town, 1887.
A detailed and accurate account of the revolt against the Commonwealth.
DAVY, J. The West Indies before and since slave emancipation London, 1854.
DESSAILES, A. et D. R. Histoire gfafrale des Antilles. 5 vols. Paris, 1847.
EDMUNDSON, G. "The Dutch 'in Western Guiana," and "The Dutch on the
Amazon." E.H.R. vol. xvi, October 1901 ; vol. xvm, October 1903; vol. xrx,
January 1904.
"The Relation of Great Britain with Guiana." Trans. ofR. Hist. Soc. 1923.
GARDNER, W.J. History of Jamaica. 2nd ed. London, 1909.
HARING, G. H. The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII century London,
1910.
Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the time of ihe Hapsburgs.
Cambridge, Mass. 1918.
HARLOW, V. T. History of Barbados, 1625-1685. Oxford, 1926,
A full and accurate work, superseding for the early period other histories
of the colony.
Christopher Codrington, 1668-1710. Oxford, 1928.
HIGHAM, G. S. S. The Development of the Leeward Islands under the Restoration.
Cambridge, 1920.
874 BIBLIOGRAPHY
HICHAM, G. S. S. "The General Assembly in the Leeward Islands." E.H.R.
vol. XLI, April, July 1926.
These articles deal with the Assembly in two periods, 1671-1711 and after
1763, and present the subject in an admirable manner.
LEFROY, Sir J. H. Memorials of the Discovery and early settlement of the Bermudas,
1511-1687. Q vols. London, 1877-9.
LUCAS, Sir G. P. A Historical Geography of the British Colonies. Vol. II. The West
Indies, and ed. rev. by G. Atchley. Oxford, 1905.
MALCOLM, H. "The Bahamas House of Assembly." Empire Review, March 1905.
NEWTON, A. P. Colonizing Activities of the English Puritans. New Haven, 1914.
For the history of the Providence Island Company.
OLIVER, V. L. History of the Island of Antigua 3 vols. London, 1894-9.
Mainly genealogical.
PENSON, L. M. The Colonial Agents of the British West Indies. London, 1924.
"The London West India Interest in the Eighteenth Century." E.H.R.
vol. xxxvi, July 1921.
PITMAN, F. W. The Development of the British West Indies, 1700-63. New Haven,
I91?-
POYER,J. The History of Barbados 9 1605-1801. London, 1808.
SCHOMBURGK, Sir R. H. History of Barbados London, 1848.
SCOTT, M. Tom Cringle's Log. 1836. Everyman's Edition. 2 vols.
SHEPHARD, G. V. An Historical Account of the Island of Saint Vincent. London, 1831.
SOUTHEY, T. Chronological History of the West Indies. 3 vols. London, 1827.
WARD, E. F. Christopher Monck, Duke of Albemarle. London, 1915.
A delightful literary essay, though treating but briefly of Albemarle's life
as Governor of Jamaica.
WATTS, A. P. Une Histoire des Colonies Anglaises aux Antilles de 1649 a 1660. Paris,
1924.
A very detailed account, strictly limited to its period, especially useful for
Jamaica.
WILLIAMSON, J. A. English Colonies in Guiana and on the Amazon, 1604-1668. Oxford,
1923.
The Caribbee Islands under the Proprietary Patents. Oxford, 1925.
WOODCOCK, H. I. A History of Tobago, Ayr, 1867.
Carnbbiana London, 1907.
3. WEST AFRICA
(For documentary sources v. supra, pp. 825, 829)
(i) CONTEMPORARY WORKS
(a) General:
BEAWES, W. Lex Mercatoria. London, 1761.
CHALMERS, G. An Estimate of the comparative strength of Great Britain. . .and of the
losses of her trade London, 1 782.
CHILD, J. A new Discourse of trade. . .. London, 1690.
DEFOE, D. An Humble Proposal to the people of England9for the increase of their Trade ....
London, 1729.
GEE, J. The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain considered London, 1 729.
SAVARY DES BRUSLONS, J. Dictionnaire tmiversel de Commerce.... 3 vols. Paris,
1723-30.
WADSTROM, G. B. An essay on colonisation particularly applied to the Western coast of
Africa 1794.
(b) West Africa:
BARBOT, J. A description of the coasts of North and South-Guinea London, 1732.
BENEZET, A. Some historical account of Guinea Philadelphia, 1771.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 875
BOSMAN, W. A new Description of the Coast of Guinea London, 1705.
DALZEL, A. The history of Dahomy from authentic memoirs London, 1793.
HARCOURT, LAMIRAL D. Afrika und seine Bewohner. . .. Hanover, 1798.
HAWKINS, J. A history of a voyage to the coast of Africa Troy, 1797.
HOUSTOUN, J. Some new and accurate observations. . .containing a true and impartial
account. . .of the coast of Guinea. . .. London, 1725.
LABAT, J. B. Nouvelle relation de I'Afrique occidentals Paris, 1728.
MATTHEWS, J. A voyage to the river Sierra-Leone London, 1788.
PARK, MUNGO. Travels in the interior districts of Africa London, 1799.
SMITH, WILLIAM. A New Voyage to Guinea. . .. London, 1744.
SNELGRAVE, W. A New Account of some parts of Guinea London, 1734.
VILLAUT, N. Relation des costes d'Afrique. . .. Paris, 1669.
(c) African Trade:
ANON. Pamphlets concerning the Royal African Company. British Museum Collection,
press marks 7i2.f.i9, 8i6.m.n, and 8223.6.4.
DAVENANT, G. Reflections upon the constitution and management of the trade to Africa.
London, 1709.
HIPPISLEY, J. Essays. I. On the Populousness of Africa. II. On the Trade at the Forts
on the Gold Coast. . . . London, 1 764.
JOBSON, R. The Golden Trade London, 1623.
ROBERTS, J. Cursory observations on the African trade London, 1778.
(2) LATER WORKS
(a) West Africa:
GLARIDGE, W. W. A History of the Gold Coast andAshanti. ... 2 vols. London, 1915.
CRUICKSHANK, B. Eighteen years on the Gold Coast of Africa. 2 vols. London, 1853.
CULTRU, P. Les origines de I'Afrique occidentale Paris, 1910.
GEORGE, G. The Rise of British West Africa London, 1903.
JOHNSTON, H. A History of the Colonisation of Africa by Alien Races. . . . London, 1913.
KELTIE, J. S. The Partition of Africa. London, 1893.
LUCAS, G. P. West Africa. (Historical Geography of the British Colonies series. ^
Oxford, 1913.
The Partition and Colonisation of Africa. Oxford, 1922.
MARTIN, E. G. The British West African Settlements, 1750-1821. London, 1928.
MEREDITH, H. An Account of the Gold Coast of Africa — London, 1812.
MOCKLER-FERRYMAN, A. F. British West Africa. London, 1893.
REEVE, H. F. The Gambia London, 1912.
(b) African Trade:
BANDINEL, J. Some account of the Trade in Slaves from Africa. . .. London, 1842.
BOWDICH, T. E. The African Committee. London, 1819.
CHEMIN DUPONT&S, P. Les Compagnies de colonisation en Afrique occidentale sous
Colbert. Paris, 1903.
CLARKSON, T. The history of the... abolition of the slave trade. 12 vols. London, 1808.
MATHIESON, W. L. British Slavery and its A bohtion, 1823-1838. London, 1926.
SCELLE, G. La Traitf negn&re aitx Indes de Castille Paris, 1906.
ZOOK, G. F. The Company of Royal Adventurers trading into Africa — Lancaster,
Pa. 1919.
(c) Periodicals:
AFRICAN SOCIETY. Journal of the African Society. London, 1901 sqq.
876 BIBLIOGRAPHY
IV. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
i. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE
(i) CONTEMPORARY SOURCES
ABINGDON, Ath Earl of (W. Bertie). Thoughts on the letters of Edm[und] Burke, Esqr
to the Sheriffs of Bristol Oxford, 1777.
ADAMS, J. The Works of John Adams With a life of the Author, notes and illustrations,
by. . .C. F. Adams. 10 vols. Boston, 1850-6.
Warren-Adams Letters. Mass. Hist. Soc. Collns. Vols. LXXII, LXXIH. Boston,
25-
ADAMS, S. The Writings of Samuel Adams. Ed. by H. A. Gushing. 4 vols. New
York, 1904-8.
The true Sentiments of America: contained in a collection of letters sent from the
House of Representatives of the Province of Massachusetts Bay to several persons of
high rank in this Kingdom. London, 1 788.
Affaires de VAngleterre et de I'Amehque. 15 vols. Antwerp, 1776.
ALMON, J. (Publisher). Biographical^ Literary and Political Anecdotes.... 3 vols.
London, 1797.
The Remembrancer 17 vols. London, 1775-84.
A Collection of the most interesting tracts lately published in England and America,
on taxing the American Colonies, etc. 6 vols. London, 1766-79.
ANDREWS, G. M. and E. W. (Editors). Journal of a Lady of Quality. . . (1774-6).
4th ed. New Haven, 1927. (v. supra, p. 864.)
BALLAGH, J. G. (Editor). The Letters of Richard Henry Lee New York, 1911.
BARHAM, Baron (G. Middleton). Letters and Papers. Ed. by Sir J. K. Laughlon.
3 vols. N.R.S.j London, 1907-11.
HARRINGTON, W. W., Viscount. The Barrmgton-Bernard Correspondence. . .1760-70.
Harvard Historical Studies. Vol. xvn. Cambridge, Mass., 1912.
Political Life of W. Wildman Viscount Barrington, compiled from original papers
by his brother (Shute Barrington, Bishop of Durham). London, 1814.
BELSHAM, W. Memoirs of the reign of George III 4 vols. London, 1795.
BERNARD, Sir F. Letters to the Rt Hon. the Earl of Hillsborough from Governor Bernard,
General Gage Boston, 1769.
Select Letters on the trade and government of America .... London, 1 774.
Conduct of the late Administration examined, relative to the American Stamp Act.
London, 1767.
BLAND, R. An Enquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies Williamsburg and
London, 1769.
BOUCHER, J. A View of the causes and consequences of the American Revolution
London, 1797.
BUCKINGHAM, Duke of (R. P. T. N. B. G. Grenville). Memoirs of the Comt and
Cabinets of George the Third 2 vols. London, 1853.
Correspondence of Thomas Grenville, 1782, in vol. i, pp. 27-64.
BURTON, M. A. (Editor). Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy , 1762 Society of
Colonial Wars in the State of Michigan. Detroit, 1913.
CHAMPION, R. Considerations on the present situation of Gieat Britain and the United
States. London, 1784 and 1787.
CHASTELLUX, F. J. DE. Voyages dans FAmerique septentrwnale, dans les annees 1 780, 1 78 1
0*1782. 2 vols. Paris, 1786. (Translated, 2 vols. London, 1787.)
CUNNINGHAM, A. Letters and diary of John Rowe, Boston Merchant, 1 759-79. Boston,
1903-
DEANE, S. Correspondence, 1774-6. Connecticut Hist. Soc. 1870.
Papers relating to the Case of Silas Deane. Publicns. of the 'Seventy-six Society.
Philadelphia, 1855.
DICKINSON, J. The Writings of.... Ed. by P. L. Ford. Philadelphia, 1895.
The late Regulations respecting the British Colonies on the Continent of America con-
sidered Philadelphia, 1766.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 877
DONIOL, H. Histoire de la pamdpatwn de la France d V Itablissement des £tats-Unis
de rAmerique, correspondancc diplomatique et documents. 5 vols. Paris, 1886-99.
DRAYTON, J. Memoirs of the American Revolution. . .as relating to the State of South
Carolina. 2 vols. Charleston, 1821.
DULANEY, D. Considerations on the propriety of imposing taxes in the British Colonies. . . .
London, 1764-5.
DURAND, J. New Materials for the History of the American Revolution. Translated from
documents in the French Archives New York, 1889.
EDDIS, W. Letters from America^ historical and descnptwe; comprising occurrences from
1769 w 1777, inclusive. London, 1792.
FRANKLIN, B. The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin. 10 vols. New York, 1887.
Autobiography and Letters Ed. J. Bigelow. 3 vols. Philadelphia, 1888.
i vol. London, 1891.
GALLOWAY, J. A candid Examination of the mutual claims of Great Britain, and the
Colonies; with a plan of accommodation on constitutional principles. New York,
1775-
The Claim of the American Loyalists. London, 1788.
Letters J torn Cicero to Catiline the Second. London, 1781.
Examination of Joseph Galloway befoie the House of Commons London, 1780.
GIBBON, E. Miscellaneous works of Edward Gibbon. ..With memoirs of his life and
writings, composed by himself; illustrated from his letters, with occasional notes and
narrative by John Lord Sheffield. 2 vols. London, 1 796.
GRAFTON, Duke of (A. H. Filzroy). Autobiography Ed. by Sir W. R. Anson.
London, 1898.
HAMILTON, A. The Works of Alexander Hamilton. Ed. by H. G. Lodge. 9 vols.
New York, 1885-6.
A full vindication of the measures of the Congress in answer to a letter under the signature
of A. W., Fanner [S. Scabury, q.v.]. New York, 1774.
The Farmer refuted New York, 1775.
HOLLIS, T. The true sentiments of America contained in a collection of letters London,
1768.
HOPKINS, S. The Rights of the Colonies examined. Providence, R.I. 1765; reprinted
London, 1766 (under title The grievances of the American Colonies candidly ex-
amined) .
HOWARD, M. A Lettet from a Gentleman at Halifax to his friend in Rhode Island. New-
port, 1765.
Reply to preceding pamphlet.
A defense of the letter from a Gentleman at Halifax Newport, 1765.
HUSKE, J Copy of a letter from John Huske to the Committee of Merchants in Boston.
London, 1764.
HUTGHINSON, P. (Editor). The Diaries and Letters of...T. Hutchinson. ... 2 vols.
London, 1883-6.
HUTGHINSON, T. Tfie History of tlie Colony of Massachusetts Bay. 2 vols. London,
1765-8. Vol. in. London, 1828.
JAY, J. (of Bedford, U.S.). On the Peace Negotiations of 1782, as illustrated by the
secret correspondence of France and England. New York, 1888.
JAY, J. (Governor of the State of New York). The Correspondence and public papers
of John Jay..., 1763-1781. Ed. by H. P. Johnston. 4 vols. New York,
1890-3.
JEFFERSON, T. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Ed. by P. L. Ford. 1 1 vols. New
York, 1893-1900.
A summary view of the rights of British America Williamsburgh, 1774.
Reprinted. . .with. . .introductions by P. L. Ford. Brooklyn, 1892.
JENYNS, S. The Objections to the Taxation of our American colonies, by the Legislature
of Great Britain., briefly considered. London, 1765.
JOHNSON, S. Taxation no Tyranny London, 1775.
KEITH, Sir W. A short discourse on the present stale of the Colonies in America with
respect to the inierew of Great Britain. London, 1728.
Two papers on the subject of taxing the British Colonies in America. London, 1767.
878 BIBLIOGRAPHY
KNOX, W. Extra-official Papers addressed to. . .Lord Rawdon and the other Members of
. . .Parliament ---- 2 vols. London, 1789.
- The Claim of the Colonies to an exemption from internal taxes. . .examined. ...
London, 1765.
- The Controversy between Great Britain and her Colonies reviewed. London, 1769.
- The Present State of the Nation, particularly with respect to its trade, finances, etc.,
etc. London, 1768.
- The justice and policy of the late [Quebec] Act,. ... London, 1774.
LAFAYETTE, Marquis DE. Memoirs and Correspondence. 3 vols. London, 1837.
LEE, W. Letters of William Lee, Sheriff. . . Commercial Agent of the Continental Congress
in France. . .1766-83. Ed. by W. C. Ford. 3 vols. Brooklyn, 1891.
MACCULLOH, H. Miscellaneous Representations relative to our Concerns in America. ...
Ed. by W. A. Shaw. London, 1905.
MACPHERSON, J. The Rights of Great Britain asserted. . . . London, 1 776.
(?) MEIN,J. Sagittarius** Letters. Boston, 1775.
MOORE, G. (Editor). The Gladwin Manuscripts ---- Lansing, 1897.
NIGHOLLS, J. Recollections and reflections. . .during the reign of George III. 2 vols.
London, 1820-22.
Ons, J. The Rights of the British Colonies asserted and proved. Boston and London,
- A Vindication of the British Colonies ---- Boston, 1765.
(?) OTIS, J. An appeal to the World ---- A reply to Governor Bernard's letters. Boston, 1 769.
PAINE, T. Common Sense; addressed to the inhabitants of America ---- apis. Phil-
adelphia, 1776.
- The Political Writings of Thomas Paine. 2 vols. Boston, 1830.
POWNALL, T. The Administration of the Colonies. 4th ed. London, 1768.
PRICE, R. Observations on the nature of Civil Liberty ---- London, 1776.
QUINCY, J. Observations on the. . .Boston Port Bill. Boston, 1774.
SEABURY, S. (A. W., Fanner). Free Thoughts on the proceedings of the Continental
Congress , . . . wherein their errors are exhibited. . . . New York, 1 774.
- A View of the controversy between Great Britain and her Colonies ____ New York,
1774.
SEWALL, J. Massachusettensis, or a series of letters. . .[on] the present troubles in t/ie
Province of the Massachusetts Bay. Boston and London, 1776.
SOULES, F. aistoire des troubles de I9 Amerique anglaise ____ 4 vols. Paris, 1787.
SPARKS, J. The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution. Being the letters
of Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, John Adams. . .and otfiers ____ 12 vols. Boston,
1829-30.
- Correspondence of the American Revolution; being letters of eminent men to George
Washington. ... 4 vols. Boston, 1853.
SXBDMAN, G. The History of the origin, progress, and termination of t/ie American War.
2 vols. London, 1 794.
Strictures upon the declaration oftfie Congress at Philadelphia ____ London, 1 776.
THAGKER, O. The Sentiments of a British American. Boston, 1764.
The Declaration of the Representatives of the United Colonies of North America. London,
The Rights of Great Britain asserted against the claims of America. London, 1776.
TOPJLADY, A. Old Fox tarr'd and feather 9d. (Reply to Wesley infra.) London, 1775.
TURGOT, A. R. J. (Euvres de Turgot et documents le concernant. Avec biographie et
notes par Gustave Schelle. 4 vols. Paris, 1913 sqq.
TUCKER, J. (Dean of Gloucester). A Letter to Edmund Burke, Esq ____ Glocester,
I775-
- The True Interest of Britain, set forth in regard to the Colonies ____ Philadelphia,
1776.
- Four Tracts ---- Glocester, 1776.
WALPOLE, H. The Last Journals of Horace Walpole. . .1771-1783. Ed. by A. F.
Stewart. 2 vols. London, 1910.
- The Letters of Horace Walpole ---- Ed. by Mrs Paget Toynbee. 16 vols. Oxford,
1903-25-
BIBLIOGRAPHY 879
WALPOLE, H. Memoirs of the Reign of King George the Third. Ed. by G. F. Russell
Barker. 4 vols. London, 1894.
Journals of the reign of King George the Third from the year 1771 to 1783 Ed.
by Dr Doran. 2 vols. London, 1859.
WASHINGTON, G. The Writings of George Washington Ed. by W. C. Ford, u
vols. New York, 1889-93.
WESLEY, J. A Calm Address to our American Colonies. London, 1775.
WHATELEY, T. Considerations on the trade and finances of the Kingdom London,
1769.
(2) LATER WORKS
ADAMS, G. F. "Battle of Bunker Hill." A.H.R., vol. i, April 1896.
• Life ofj. Adams. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1871.
ALVORD, G. W. The Mississippi Valley in British Politics, a vols. Cleveland, 1917.
ANDREWS, G. M. The Colonial Background of the American Revolution. New Haven,
"The American Revolution. An Interpretation." A.H.R. vol. xxxi, January
1926.
BECKER, G. The Spirit of '76. Washington, 1927.
The Declaration of Independence . . .. New York, 1922.
The Eve of the Revolution. . .. New Haven, 1920.
BELCHER, H. The First American Civil War, First period, 1775-8. 2 vols. London,
1911.
GARTER, G. E. Great Britain and the Illinois Country, 1763-1774, Amer. Hist. Soc.
Publns. Washington, 1910.
GIRCOURT, Gomte ADOLPHE DE. Histoire de V action commune de la France et de FAmenqw
pour Vindipendance des iStats-Unis, par George Bancroft. 3 vols. Poitiers, 1876.
Gircourt's "Conclusions Hisloriques" and documents quoted by him are
appended to his translation of Bancroft under this title. Vols. n and in.
COFFIN, V. The Province of Quebec and the early American Revolution. Wisconsin,
1894.
GONWAY, M. B. Life of Tom Paine. 2 vols. New York, 1862.
EARDLEY-WILMOT, J. Historical View of the Commission for enquiring into the losses,
services and claims of the American Loyalists,. . .with an account of the compensation
granted to them by Parliament in 1785 and 1788. London, 1815.
ENGLISH, W. H. Conquest of Hie Country Northwest of the Rwer Ohio, 1 778-83, and Life
of Gen. George Rogers Clark. 2 vols. Indianapolis, 1896.
FISHER, S. G. The Struggle for American Independence a vols. London, 1908.
The true Benjamin Franklin. Philadelphia, 1889.
FiSKE,J. The American Revolution. 2 vols. Boston, 1891.
FITZGERALD, P. Charles Townshend. London, 1866.
FLICK, A. G. Loyalism in New Tork during the American Revolution. New York, 1901.
FORTESCUE, Hon. Sir J. W. History of the British Army. 2nd ed. London, 1919 sqq.
In progress.
FROTHINGHAM, R. Life and Times of Joseph Warren. Boston, 1865.
GIPSON, L. H. Jared Ingersoll, A story of American Loyalism in relation to British colonial
government. Yale Historical Pu aliens. New Haven, 1920.
GORDON, W. The History of the rise, progress, and establishment of the Independence of
the United States 4 vols. London, 1788.
GREENE, G. W. Historical view of the American Revolution. Cambridge, Mass. 1869.
The German element in the War of American Independence. New York, 1876.
HALE, E. Franklin in France. 2 vols. Boston, 1888.
HAZELTON, J. H. The Declaration of Independence; its history. New York, 1906.
HENRY, W.W. Patrick Henry, Life, Correspondence and Speeches. 3 vols. New York, 1891.
HOLMES,A. The Annals of 'America, from... 1 492 to 1826. 2nded. 2vols. Cambridge,
Mass. 1829.
HOSMER, J. K. Samuel Adams, the Man of Town Meeting. Johns Hopkins Studies,
ser. n, vol. rv. Baltimore, 1884.
Samuel Adams. Boston, 1885.
88o BIBLIOGRAPHY
HOSMER, J. K. Life of Thomas Hutchinson Boston, 1896.
IRVING, W. The Life of George Washington. 5 vols. New York and London, 1855-9.
JAY, W. Life of J. Jay, with selections from his correspondence and miscellaneous papers.
2 vols. New York, 1833.
JOHNSON, A. Myths and Facts of the American Revolution. Toronto, 1908.
JONES, T. History of New Tork during the Revolutionary War. ... 2 vols. New York, 1879.
JUNIUS. The Letters of Jwius. 3 vols. London, 1814.
KEDDER, F. History of the Boston Massacre Albany, New York, 1870.
LODGE, H. G. The Story of the Revolution. 2 vols. New York, 1898.
MACKENZIE, A. S. The Life of Paul Jones. 2 vols. Boston, 1841.
MARSHALL/!. The Lift of George Washington. 5 vols. Philadelphia, 1804-7.
MORSE, J. T. Thomas Jefferson. Boston, 1883.
PARKMAN, F. Conspiracy ofPontiac. loth ed. 2 vols. 1885.
The Works of Francis Parkman. 12 vols. London, 1899.
PARTON,J. Life of Jefferson. Boston, 1874.
QUINGY, S. (Editor). Memoir of the Life of Josiah Quincy Jun. 3rd cd. Boston, 1877.
Reports of cases. . .in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. . . 1761-1772,
(with appendix upon the writs of assistance), by H. Gray. Boston, 1865.
ROWLAND, xL. M. Life of George Mason. ... 2 vols. New York and London, 1892.
Life of Charles Carroll ofCarollton, 1737-1832. 2 vols. New York and London,
1898.
RUSSELL, Lord JOHN. The Life and Times of Charles James Fox. 3 vols. London,
1859-66.
RYERSON, E. The Loyalists of America and their times 2 vols. Toronto, 1880.
SABINE, L. Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution. 2 vols. Boston,
1864.
ScHOULER,J. Life of Jefferson. New York, 1893.
STARK, J. U. The Loyalists of Massachusetts Boston, 1910.
STTLLE, G. J. The Lye and Times of John Dickenson. Philadelphia, 1891.
TREVELYAN, Sir G. O. The American Revolution 6 vols. London, 1905-16.
George the Third and Charles Fox. 2 vols. London, 1912-14.
Early History of Charles James Fox London, 1908.
TOWERS, G. Lafayette in the American Revolution. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1895.
TUDOR, W. The Life of James Otis of Massachusetts. Boston, 1833.
TURNER, F. J. "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley." A.H.R.,
vol. x, January 1905.
"Western State Making in the Revolutionary Era." A.H.R. vol. i, October
TYLER, M. G. Patrick Henry. American Statesmen Series. Boston, 1887.
The Literary History of the American Revolution, 1 763-1 783. (With bibliography.)
2 vols. New York, 1897.
VAN TYNE, G. H. The Loyalists in the American Revolution. New York, 1902.
The American Revolution, 1776-83. American Nation Series. New York, 1904.
The Founding of the American Republic. Vol. i. The Causes of the War of In-
dependence. Cambridge, Mass, and London, 1922.
England and America. Rivals in the American Revolution. Cambridge, 1927.
WELLS, W. V. The Life and Public Services of S. Adams 3 vols. Cambridge,
Mass. 1866.
WIRT, W. Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry. Philadelphia, 1817.
gth ed. 1845.
2. THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
(For the documentary sources v. supra, pp. 826, 829, 837-8)
(i) CONTEMPORARY WORKS
(a) Military:
ANBUREY, T. (Lt. 24th Regt.). Travels through the interior parts of America
2 vols. London, 1789.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 881
ANDREWS, J. History of the War with America, France, Spain, and Holland. . . (177*-
1783). 4vols. London, 178^-6. v //o
BARKER, Lieut. J. (4th Foot). The British in Boston, being the diary of Lieutenant
John Barker. ..(November 1774-May 1776). Cambridge, Mass. 1924.
BAXTER, J. P. (Editor). The British Invasion from the North. The campaigns of General
Carleton and Burgoyne. . .with the Journal of Lieut. W. Digby. Albany, 1887.
BIDDULPH, R. "Letters of 1779-1783." A.H.R. vol. xxrx, October 1023.
BURGOYNE, General J. A State nfthe Expedition from Canada as laid before the House
of Commons .... London, 1780.
Orderly Book.... Ed. by E. B. O'Callaghan. Albanv, N.Y. 1860.
Combattants Francois de la Guerre Americainet 1778-1783. Paris, 1907.
DRINKWATER, J. A History of the late Siege ofGibralter London, 1785.
EVELYN, Capt. W. G. Memoir and Letters of... from North America, 1774-1 776.
Ed. by G. D. Scull. Oxfor,d, 1879. >//*//
HADDEN, JAMES M. Hadden's Journal and Orderly Books Ed. by H. Rogers.
Albany, 1884.
HEATH, W. Memoirs of Major General Heath Boston, 1798.
The Heath Pabers. Mass. Hist. Soc. Collns. ser. i, vol. rv. Boston, Mass. 1878.
HOWE, Sir W. The Narrative of Lieut. -Gen. Sir William Howe London, 1780.
General Sir WiViam Howe's Orderly Book at Charlestoum, Boston, and Hajifax,
17 June 1775 to 26 May 1776. Ed. bv B. F. Stevens. London, 1890.
HUNTINGTON, E. "Letters of. . . 1774-1781." A.H.R. vol. v, July iqoo.
KEMBLE, Lieut.-Colonel S. The Kemble Pafiers. 2 vols. New York Hist. Soc.
Gollns. Nos. i6and 17. New York, 1884, 1885.
KEPPEL, G. T. (Earl of Albemarle). Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham
2 vols. London, 1852.
LAMB, R. (Sergt. gth Foot). An Original and Authentic Journal of occurrences during
the late American War Dublin, i8oq.
LEE, HENRY. Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.
New ed. Washington, 1827.
MACKENZIE, Lieut. F. (2$rd Foot). A British Fusilier in Revolutionary Boston; being
the diary of Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie (January-April 1775). Cambridge,
Mass. 1 926.
MAUDUIT, I. Three Letters to Lord Howe. London, 1781.
MONTRESOR, Captain J. The Montresor Journals. Ed. by G. D. Scull. New York
Hist. Soc. Collns. New York, 1887*.
PATTISON, Major-General J. Official Letters of Major General J. Pattison (1779-82).
New York Hist. Soc. Collns. New York, 1876.
RIEDESEL, F. A. VON. Briefs und Berichte. . . wdhrend des Nordamerikanischen Kriegs. . .
(1776-1793). Stuttgart, 1881.
RIEDESEL, Baroness VON. Letters and Journals relating to the War of the American
Revolution Translated by W. L. Stone. Albany, 1867.
ROGERS, Major R. Journals of Major Robert Rogers Ed. by F. B. Hough.
Albanv, 1883.
Ross, C. (Editor). Correspondence of Marquess Cornwallis. 3 vols. London, 1859.
RUSSELL, Capt. P. "Journal of. . . during the siege of Charleston." A.H.R. vol.
rv, April 1899.
SIMCOE, J. G. Simcoe's Military Journal New York, 1844.
SPARKS, J. Correspondence of the American Revolution. 12 vols. Boston, Mass. 1829,
1830.
STEDMAN, C. The History of the origin, progress, and termination of the American War.
2 vols. London, 1794.
STEVENS, B. F. (Editor). Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives relating to
America, 1773-1783. 25 vols. London^ 1889-98.
The Campaign in Virginia, 1781. An exact reprint of six rare pamphlets on the
Clinton-Cornwallis controversy Q vols. London, 1888.
TARLETON, Col. B. A History of the Campaigns 0/1780 andijQi London, 1787.
THACHER, J. A Military Journal during the American revolutionary War from 1775
to 1783 Boston, 1823.
56
882 BIBLIOGRAPHY
(b) Naval:
BEATSON, R. Naval and military Memoirs of 'Great Britain Vol. iv. London, 1804.
CHARNOCK,J. Biographia Navalis 6 vols. London, 1794-8.
CLARKE, J. S., JONES, S. and JONES, J. The Naval Chronicle. 40 vols. London,
1799-1818.
CLERK, J. An essay on Naval Tactics 4 vols. London, 1790-7.
GALLOWAY, J. Letters to a Nobleman on the conduct of the War in the American Colonies.
London, 1779.
[HowE.] A candid and impartial narrative of the transactions of the fleet under the command
of Lord Howe. London, 1779.
MATTHEWS, T. Twenty-One plans with explanations of different actions in the West
Indies during the late War Chester, 1784.
(2) LATER WORKS
(d) Military:
ABBOTT, W. The Crisis of the Revolution, being the story of Arnold Andre. New York,
1899.
ADAMS, C. F. Studies, Military and Diplomatic, 1775-1865. New York, 1911.
ARNOLD, I. N. The Life of Benedict Arnold. Chicago, 1880.
BALCH, T. The French in America during the War of Independence A translation
. . .of"Les Franfais en Amerique pendant la guerre de r independence des fitats-Unis."
2 vols. Philadelphia, 1891-5.
BUTLER, Col. L. Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps. Vol. i (The Royal Americans.)
London, 1913.
CALLWELL, Sir C. E. Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance London,
1905.
CARRINGTON, H. B. Battles of the American Revolution, 1775-1781 New York,
1876.
Washington the Soldier New York, 1898.
CHICHESTER, H. M. The Records and Badges of . ..the British Army 2nd ed.
London, 1900.
Contains a summary of the services of different units.
CODMAN,J. Arnold's Expedition to Quebec. 2nd ed. New York, 1902.
CURTIS, E. E. The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution. New
Haven and London, 1926.
DAWSON, H. B. Battles of the United States Vol. i. New York, 1858.
DE FONBLANQUE. Political and Military Episodes. . .from the Life and Correspondence
of. . . John Burgqyne London, 1876.
DRAPER, L. C. King's Mountain and Its Heroes Cincinnati, 1881.
DUNCAN, F. History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery Vol. i, 2nd ed. London,
1874.
EELKING, M. VON. Die Deutschen Hulfstruppen im Nordamerikanischen Befreiungs-
kriege 2 vols. Hanover, 1863.
FISHER, S. G. The Struggle for American Independence. ... 2 vols. London, 1908.
FBKE,J. The War of Independence. Boston, Mass. 1889.
FLICK, A. C. Loyalism in New York during the American Revolution. New York, 1901.
FORTESCUE, Hon. Sir J. W. A History of the British Army. Vol. m. London, 1903.
A History of the ijth Lancers. London, 1895.
FROTHINGHAM, R. History of the Siege of Boston Boston, 1849.
GREENE, F. V. General Greene. New York, 1893.
The Revolutionary War. . .of the United States. New York, 1911.
GREENE, G. W. Life ofNaihanael Greene 3 vols. Boston, 1867-71.
HATCH, L. C. The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army. Harvard
Historical Studies. Cambridge, Mass. 1904.
JOHNSON, W. Sketches of the Life and correspondence of Nathanael Greene. . . 2 vols.
Charleston, 1822.
JOHNSTON, H. P. The Campaign 0/1776.... Long Island Hist. Soc. Brooklyn.;
1878.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 883
JOHNSTON, H. P. The Battle of Harlem Heights New York. 1807.
The Torktown Campaign. New York, 1881.
The Storming of Stony Point New York, 1900.
JONES, C. H. History of the Campaign for the conquest of Canada Philadelphia
1882. '
KAPP, F. The Life of John Kalb, Major-General in the Revolutionary Army. New York,
The Life ofF. W. von Steuben. ... and ed. New York, 1859.
KEIM, DE B. R. Rochambeau Washington, 1907.
LANGWORTHY, E. Memoirs of C. Lee London, 1792.
LIVINGSTON, W. F. Israel Putnam New York, 1901.
LOSSING, B. J. Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution 2 vols. New York, 1850-2.
LOWELL, E. J. The Hessians and other German auxiliaries of Great Britain in the revolu-
tionary war. . . . New York, 1884.
LUSHINGTON, S. R. The Life and Services of General Lord Harris London, 1840.
McCRADY, E. The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783. New York,
1902.
MOORE, G. H. "Mr. Lee's Plan— March 29, 1777." The Treason of C. Lee
New York, 1860.
MURDOCK, H. The igth of April, 1775. Boston, 1923.
PERKINS, ]"• B. France in the American Revolution. New York, 1911.
Regimental Histories. The series of Historical Records of the British Army. . .compiled
by Richard Gannon (London, 1834-50) gives brief accounts of the services
of most of the regiments which were in America, in the West Indies and
Mediterranean during the war: a good many regiments have also published
fuller histories, but few of them are based to any extent on unpublished or
original sources not elsewhere accessible.
SARGENT, W. The Life and Career of Major John Andre* New York, 1871. New
ed. New York, 1902.
SMITH, J. H. Arnold's March from Cambridge to Quebec. . .. New York, 1903.
STEPHENSON, O. W. "The supply of Gunpowder in 1776." A.H.R. vol. xxx,
January 1925.
STONE, W. L. The Campaign of Lieut. Gen. J. Burgoyne Albany, 1877.
STRYKER, W. S. The Battles of Trenton and Princeton. Boston, 1898.
The Battle ofMonmouth. Princeton, 1927.
STUART- WORTLEY, V. S. (Editor). A Prime Minister and his Son London, 1925.
TARBOX, I. N. Life of Israel Putnam Boston, 1877.
TREVELYAN, Sir G. O. The American Revolution. 6 vols. New ed. London, 1905-16.
VAN TYNE, G. H. The Loyalists in the American Revolution. New York, 1902.
" Influences which determined the French Government to make the Treaty
with America." A.H.R. vol. xxi, April 1916.
WRIGHT, J. W. The Rifle in the American Revolution. A.H.R. vol. xxix, January
1924.
(V) Naval:
BARROW, T- The Life of Richard, Earl Howe London, 1838.
CASTEX, R. V. P. (Lieutenant de Vaisseau). Les Idles militaires de la Marine du
XVIII™* siecle. De Ruyter a Suffren. Paris, 1911.
CHEVALIER, E. Histoire dit la* 'Marine francaise pendant IcTGuerre" de V Independence
Americaine Paris, 1877.
CLOWES, Sir W. LAIRD. The Royal Navy Vols. m and rv. London, 1898-9.
Chapters 30 and 31 (by A. T. Mahan) and chapter 32 deal with this period.
CORBETT, Sir J. S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. London, 1911.
HALDANE-DUNCAN, R. A. H. P. (Earl of Gamperdown). Admiral Duncan....
London, 1898.
HANNAY, D. Rodney. London, 1891.
JAMES, Gapt. W. M. The British Navy in Adversity. A Study of the War of American
Independence.... London, 1926.
KEPPEL, T. The Life of Augustus, Viscount Keppel 2 vols. London, 1842.
56-2
884 BIBLIOGRAPHY
LACOUR-GAYET, G. La Marine militaire de la France sous le regne de Louis XVL
Paris, 1905.
MAHAN, Admiral A. T. Types of Naval Officers. Drawn from the History of the British
Navy London and New York, 1902.
MUNDY, G. B. The Life and Correspondence of the late Admiral Rodney. 2 vols. London,
1830.
TROUDE, O. Batailles navales de la France 4 vols. Paris, 1867, 1868.
TUCKER, J. S. Memoirs of Admiral the Right Hone the Earl of St. Vincent. 2 vols.
London, 1844.
3. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1763-1783
(i) CONTEMPORARY WORKS
ALMON, J. The History of the late Minority . . . ( 1 762-5) . London, 1 766.
The Political Register 1 1 vols. London, 1767-72.
ANDREWS, J. History of the War with America, France, Spain and Holland. . . (1775-
1783). 4 vols. London, 1785, 1786.
ANSON, G., Baron. A voyage round the world. . . (1740-4). London, 1748.
Written by Anson's chaplain, Richard Walter, and published under Anson's
direction. Contains recommendations of the Falkland Islands.
ARIBAU, B. G. Obras onginales del Conde de Floridablanca Madrid, 1899.
BECATTINI, FRANCESCO. Storia del Regno di Carlo III. di Borbone. . . . Venezia, 1 790.
BEDFORD, Duke of. Correspondence of John9 fourth Duke of Bedford. . . With an intro-
duction by Lord John Russell. 3 vols. London, 1842-6.
Correspondence and extracts from the Duke's diary, chiefly relating to
home politics and dissensions of the Whigs. Vols. n and ni cover 1 760-70.
BELL, P. A Map of the British Dominions in North America according to the Treaty in
1763.1772. (British Museum.)
BOSWELL, J. An account of Corsica. . .; and a memoir of Pascal Paoli 3rd ed.
London, 1769.
BOUTARIC, E. (V.svb Louis XV.)
BOUGAINVILLE, L. A. DE. Voyage autour du monde. . . (1766-9). Paris, 1771.
BROGLDE, Due de. The King's Secret: being the secret correspondence of Louis XV with
his diplomatic agents, from 1752 to 1774. Translated from the French ed. of
1878. 2 vols. London, 1879.
Describes the connection of the Gomte de Broglie with Louis XV's secret
diplomacy and the events and intrigues which led to the fall of Choiseul.
BURKE, E. Correspondence of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke 4 vols. London,
1844.
The Speeches of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke Dublin, 1854.
The Works of the Ri$t Honourable Edmund Burke. 12 vols. London, 1808-13.
Also 6 vols. World's Classics series. Oxford, 1906-7.
BURKE, W. Remarks upon a letter to Two Great Mm. 1759.
BYRON, JOHN, Admiral. An Account of a Voyage round the World Ed. by John
Hawkesworth. London, 1775.
GARVALHO E. MELLO, S. J. DE, Marquis de Pombal. Administration du Marquis de
Pombal. 4 vols. Amsterdam, 1787.
CAVENDISH, Sir H. Debates of the House of Commons . . . ( 1 768-7 1 ) . With Memoir by
W. Dowdeswell and Journal of the Duke of Bedford, 1766-70. 2 vols. London,
1841-3.
CHESTERFIELD, 4th Earl. (7. sub Stanhope.)
CHOISEUL, Due DE. Mtmoires de M. le Due de Choiseul, Merits par lw-m£me. 2 vols.
Paris, 1790.
CLARKE, E. D. Letters concerning the Spanish Nation. London, 1763.
From the chaplain to Lord Bristol, British Ambassador at Madrid.
DALRYMPLE, W. Lt.-Col. Travels through Spain and Portugal in 1774, with an account
of the Spanish Expedition against Algiers in 1775. London, 1777.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 885
DEANE, S. Correspondence. Connecticut Hist. Soc. Hartford, 1870.
Papers in relation to the case of Silas Deane Ed. by T. BaJch. The 'Seventy-six
Soc. Philadelphia, 1855.
Du DEFFAND, Marquise. Correspondance complete de Mme Du Deffand avec la Duchesse
de Ckoiseul, VAbbl BarthJlemy et M. Craufurt 3 vols. Paris, 1866.
fioN DE BEAUMONT, Chevalier d'. Lettres, Memoires et Mgociations The Hague,
1764.
FAVIER, J. L. Politigue de tons les Cabinets de V Europe pendant les regnes de Louis XV
et de Louis XVI. . . . 2nd ed. 3 vols. Paris, 1801.
Favier was sent to Spain by Choiseul in 1759 to report upon the resources
of that country.
FROIDEVAUX, H. "Une visite aux lies de Salut en 1763." Revue Gtographique,
T895> PP- i6i-i79-
"Une mission g6ographique et militaire a la Guyane en 1762." Armales de
Gtographie, 15 January 1892, pp. 218-31.
• "Memoires in&iits d'Adamson sur Pile de Goree et la Guyane fran^aise."
Bulletin g&ographique, historique et descriptif, No. i, ^_
A report submiLled to Ghoiseul at his request on the resources of Guiana.
GIBBON, E. The Memoirs of the life of Edward Gibbon.... Ed. by G. Birkbeck Hill.
London, 1900.
Private Letters of Edward Gibbon, 1753-1794. With an introduction by the Earl of
Sheffield. Ed. by R. E. Prothero. 2 vols. London, 1896.
GRAFTON, Duke of (Fitzroy, A. H.). Autobiography and Political Correspondence of
Augustus Henry, third Duke of Graf ton Ed. by Sir W. R. Anson, Oxford, 1 898 .
Especially important for the Corsican affair.
GRENVILLE, Rt. Hon. G. The Grenmlle Papers. ... Ed. by W. J. Smith. 4 vols.
1852-3.
Correspondence of George Grenville, and his "diary of memorable events"
during his administration. Of prime importance as evidence of Grenville's
own actions and the construction he put upon them.
HARRIS, J., ist Earl of Malmesbury. Diaries and Correspondence. . .. Vol. i. London,
1844.
Secretary and Charge d'affaires at the Embassy at Madrid, the brilliant
young diplomatist describes his interviews with Grimaldi during the Falkland
Islands' crisis, 1770, 1771.
HUMBOLDT, Baron F. H. A. VON. Gesammelte Werke. 12 vols. Stuttgart, 1889.
Travels in America.
JOHNSON, Dr S. Political Tracts. "Falkland's Islands." London, 1776.
JUNIUS. The Letters of Junius. New ed. London, 1819.
LAFAYETTE, Marquis de. Memoirs, correspondence and manuscripts of General Lafay-
ette. ... 3 vols. London, 1837.
LEBOUCHER, O. J. Histoire de la dermlre guerre entre la Grande Bretagne et les Etats-
Unis. . .la France, VEspagne et la Hollande Paris, 1787.
LINDSAY, Hon. COLIN. Narrative of the Occupation and Defence of the Island of St.
Lucie, 1779; and of the Siege of Gibraltar , 1782. Wigan, 1840.
A lively account by a British officer.
Louis XV. Conespondance secrtte sur la politique ttrangere Ed. by E. Boutaric.
Paris, 1866. (V. also sub Broglie.)
MALMESBURY, Earl of. (V. sub Harris, J.)
MITCHELL, Sir A. Memoirs and papers of Sir Andrew Mitchell Ed. by A. Bisset.
2 vols. London, 1850.
MOREAU DE SAINT-MJ&RY, M. L. E. Loix et Constitutions des Colonies Francoises de
rAmerique sous le Vent 5 vols. Paris, 1784, 1785.
Description topographique . . . et historique de la partie frangoise de I9 Isle Saint-
Domingue. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1797.
ORFORD, Earl of. (V. sub Walpole, H.)
PENROSE,B. An Account of the last Expedition to Port Egmont . . .in 1772. London, 1775.
PERNETY, A. J. Histoire d9un Voyage aux isles Malouines fait en 1763 et 1764
2 vols. Paris, 1770.
886 BIBLIOGRAPHY
ROCKINGHAM, Marquis of (Wentworth, G. W.). Memoirs Ed. by the Earl of
Albemarle. 2 vols. London, 1852.
RODNEY, Admiral. The Life and Correspondence of . . .Lord Rodney. Ed. by G. B.
Mundy. 2 vols. London, 1830.
RUSSELL, Lord JOHN. The Speech of Lord John Russell in the House of Commons,
Feb. 8, 1850, on Colonial Policy London, 1850.
ST PAUL, H., Colonel. Correspondence.... Ed. by G. G. Butler. 2 vols. London,
igii.
St Paul was Secretary of the Embassy and Ghargt d'affaires at Paris during
the long absences of the Ambassador, Lord Stormont. His diplomatic coire-
spondence is of great importance for the latter part of this period (1772-6).
STANHOPE, P. D., 4th Earl of Chesterfield. The Letters of. . .Chesterfield. ... Ed.
byj. Bradshaw. 3 vols. London, 1892.
SWINBURNE, H. Travels through Spain, in 1775 and 1776 London, 1779.
TURGOT, A. R. J., Baron de 1'Aulne. (Euvres New ed. 2 vols. Paris, 1844.
VALDES,A.J. HistoriadelalsladeCuba. . .1780. Reprinted, 3 vols. Havana, 1876.
WALPOLE, H., 4th Earl of Orford. The Letters of Horace Walpole Ed. by Mrs
Toynbee. 1 6 vols. Oxford, 1903.
Memoirs of the Reign of King George HI Ed. by Sir D. le Marchant. 4 vols.
London, 1845.
WASHINGTON, G. The Writings of George Washington Ed. by W. C. Ford.
14 vols. New York, 1889-93.
WRAXALL, Sir N. W. The historical and posthumous memoirs of Sir N. W. Wraxall,
1772-1784. Ed. by H. B. Wheatley. 5 vols. London, 1884.
Gossip of the day, frequently recording events at which the author was
present.
(2) LATER WORKS
ADOLPHUS, J. History of England from the accession of George III New ed. 7 vols.
London, 1840-5.
Laborious and impartial, but written from the Tory point of view.
ALVORD, C. W. The Mississippi Valley in British Politics 2 vols. Cleveland,
U.S.A. 1917.
ANDREWS, C. M. "Colonial Commerce." A.H.R. vol. xx, October 1914.
ARRIGHI, ARRIGO. Histoire de P. Paoli 2 vols. Paris, 1843.
BEATSON, R. Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Bntain 6 vols. London, 1804.
BISSETT, R. The History of the reign of George III 6 vols. London, 1803.
BLART, L. Les Rapports de la France et de I'Espagne apres le Pacte defamillejtuqu'd la
Jin du Mmistere du Due de Choiseul. Paris, 1915.
Deals with the economic relations of France and Spain.
BOURGET, A. Etudes sur lapolitique etrangere du Due de Choiseul. Paiis, 1907.
Based on official documents.
BOURNE, E. G. Spam in America, 1450-1580. . .. New York, 1904.
BOYER-PEYRELEAU, E. E. Les Antilles Frangaises9 particulitrement la Guadaloupe
3 vols. Paris, 1823.
BOYSON, V. F. The Falkland Islands Oxford, 1924.
Mainly descriptive, but good on early history.
BROGLIE, Due de. Histoire et Diplomatic. Paris, 1889.
BROSCH, M. Geschichte von England. Vols. vi-x. Gotha, 1893.
BROUGHAM, H., Baron Brougham and Vaux. Historical Sketches of Statesmen who
flourished in the time of George III 3 vols. London, 1839-43.
An Enquiry into the Colonial Policy of the European Powers. 2 vols. Edinburgh,
1803.
BURNEY, Admiral J. A chronological history of the discoveries in the South Sea or Pacific
Ocean. 5 vols. London, 1803-17.
CARRE, H. La France sous Louis XV, 1723-1774. Paris, 1891.
CHADWIGK, F. E., Rear-Admiral. The Relations of the United Stales and Spain
3 vols. New York, 1909-1 1.
CHEVALIER, E. Histoire de la Marine franfaise pendant la Guerre de rindependance
Americaine Paris, 1877.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 887
CLEMENT, P. Histoire du Systems Protecteur en France Paris, 1854.
GOQUELLE, P. L9 Alliance franco-hollandaise contre VAngleterre, 1735-1788 Paris,
1902.
"Le Gomte de Guerchy, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, 1763-7."
Revue des Etudes Historiques, September-October 1908, p. 432. Paris.
COUPLAND, R. The Quebec Act Oxford, 1925.
GOXE, W., Archdeacon. Memoirs of the Kings of Spam of the House of Bourbon . . .
(1700-1788). 3 vols. London, 1813.
Based on contemporary oral information and previously unpublished docu-
ments and writings, it remains a work of the first importance for the period.
DAUBIGNY, E. Choiseul et la France d'outre-mer Paris, 1892.
To be consulted for the disaster of the Kourou and Cayenne.
DONIOL, H. Histoire de la participation de la France a I'etablissement des £tats-Unis
5 vols. Paris, 1886-99.
Based on documents.
DRAKE, S. A. The Border Wars of New England New York, 1897.
FERRER DEL Rio, ANTONIO. Histoiia del reinado de Carlos III en Espana. 4 vols.
Madrid, 1856.
FISKE,J. American Revolution. 2 vols. Boston, 1891.
Moderate and impartial.
FITZMAURIGE, E. G. P., Baron. Life of William Earl ofShelburne 2nd ed. 2 vols.
London, 1912.
Based on Lansdowne House MSS. Most valuable as showing the part
played by Shelburne in diplomatic transactions.
DE FLASSAN, de R. Histoire de la diplomatic frangaise. 7 vols. Paris, 181 1.
FoRREST,SirG. The Administration of Warren #0^1^,1772-1785 Calcutta, 1892.
GAILLARDET, F. Memoir* du chevalier d'lSon. ... 3 vols. Brussels, 1837.
GARDEN, Gomte G. DE. Histoite generale des traitis de paix 15 vols. Paris,
1848-87.
GOEBEL, J. The Struggle for the Falkland Islands New Haven, 1927.
GOMES, F. L. Le Marquis de Pombal Lisbon, 1869.
GRANT, W. L. "Canada versus Guadeloupe " A.H.R. vol. xvn, July 1912.
GROUSSAG, P. Les ties Maloumes. Buenos Ayres, 1910.
GUERIN, L. Histoire maritime de la France New ed. 6 vols. Paris, 1859-63.
GUTIERREZ DE LOS Rios, G. J., Count de Fcrnan-Nuiiez. Vida de Carlos ill. . . .
2 vols. Madrid, 1898.
HALL, H. "Pitt and the Family Compact." Quarterly Review, October 1899.
"Was Pitt a Prophet?" Contemporary Review, October 1896.
"Chatham's American Policy." A.H.R. vol. v, July 1900.
HARRIS, G. The Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke with selections from his correspond-
ence. ... 3 vols. London, 1847.
Based on Hardwicke and Newcastle MSS.
HERTZ (Hurst), G. B. British Imperialism in the XVHIth Century. London, 1908.
Of value for the diplomacy of Falkland Islands incident.
HOTBLACK, K. "The Peace of Paris." Trans, of the R. Hist. Soc. 3rd ser. vol. n.
London, 1908.
Chatham's Colonial Policy London, 1917.
Treats mainly of the period before the Peace of Paris.
JESSE, J. H. Memoirs of the Life and Reign of King George the Third. 3 vols. London,
1867.
Largely a defence of George III. Many original letters quoted.
JOBEZ, A. La France sous Louis XV 6 vols. Paris, 1864-73.
KEPPEL, T. The Life of Augustus , Viscount Keppel 2 vols. London, 1842.
KOCH, C. G. DE. Histoire abregte des TraitSs de Paix 15 vols. Paris, 1817-8.
LAFUENTE, M. Historia General de Espana 30 vols. Madrid, 1850-67.
LATINO COELHO, J. M. Historia politica e militar de Portugal desde osfins do XVII
seculo aU 1814. 3 vols. Lisbon, 1874-91.
LAUVRifcRE,E. LaTragtdied'unpeuple. Histoire dupeupleacadien 2 vols. Paris, 1922.
LAVISSE, E. Histoire de France Vols. vm-x. Paris, 1910.
LOM&NIE, L. DE. Beaumarchais et son temps 2 vols. Paris, 1856.
888 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Luz SORIANO, S. J. DA. Historia do reino de Dpm Jose" I. Lisbon, 1866.
MACAULAY, T. B., Baron. Critical and Historical Essays. London, 1870.
Essay on Warren Hastings. London, 1836-54.
MAI-DONADO Y MACANAZ, J. Espanay Francia en el siglo XVIII Madrid, 1886.
MARCUS, W. Choiseul und die Katastrophe am Kovrouflusse. . .. Breslau, 1905.
MARKS, MARY A. M. England and America, 1763-1783 2 vols. London, 1907.
Useful for summaries of Parliamentary debates and operations in America.
MARTENS, G. VON, Baron. Recueil des Traites New ed. Leipzig, 1817 sqq.
MASSEY, W. N. A History of England during the reign of George the Third. 4 vols.
London, 1855-63.
MELLO MORAES, A. J. DE. Brazil historico. ist series. 4 vols. Rio de Janeiro, 1839.
MONTERO Y VIDAL, J. Historia general de las Filipinos. 3 vols. Madrid, 1887-95.
MOORE, J. W. The American Congress. . .1774-1895. London, 1895.
MORISON, M. G. "Due de Choiseul and the Invasion of England, 1768-70."
Trans, of the R. Hist. Soc. ser. n, vol. rv. 1910.
Describes documents among Chatham MSS relating to this subject.
NOAILLES, A. M. R. A., Vicomte de. Marins et soldats frangais en Amerique...
1778-83. Paris, 1903.
NORMAND.J. Le Pacts colonial. . .. Paris, 1900.
OUVEIRA MARTINS, J. P. Historia de Portugal 2 vols. Lisbon, 1894.
0 Brazil e las colonias portuguezas. Lisbon, 1880.
PAULIAT, L. Lapolitique coloniale sous I'ancien rtgime. . .. Paris, 1887.
PEZUELA, J. DE LA. Ensayo historico de la Isla de Cuba. New York, 1842.
POUGET DE SAINT ANDREA H. La Colonisation de Madagascar sous Louis XV
Paris, 1886.
RAMEAU DE SAINT P&RE, E. La France aux Colonies Paris, 1859.
RAXIS DE FLASSAN, G. DE. Histoire Generate et raisonnee de la Diplomatic Frangaise. . . .
7 vols. Paris, 1811.
Prints many documents, notably Vergennes' correspondence.
REBELLO DA SILVA, L. A. Historia de Portugal nos seculos XVII e XVIII. 5 vols.
Lisbon, 1860-71.
RENAUT, F. P. Le Pacte de Famille et VAmtrique. Lapolitique coloniale franco-espagrtole
de 1760 a 1792. Paris, 1922.
Les Provinces-Unies et la Guerre d'Amtnqut, 1775-1784. Vol. i. Paris, 1924.
RENUCCI, F. O. Stona di Corsica. 2 vols. Bastia, 1833, 1834.
ROUSSEAU, F. Regne de Charles III d'Espagne, 1759-1788. 2 vols. Paris, 1907.
Volume ii deals particularly with the relations of France and Spain.
RUVILLE, Dr A. VON. William Pttty Graf von Chatham 3 vols. Stuttgart and
Berlin, 1905. English translation. New York, 1907.
Based on Prussian archives, etc. Learned, but written with some bias
against its eponymous hero.
SCHAEFER, H. Geschichte von Portugal. 5 vols. Hamburg, 1836-54.
SCHONE, L. La politique coloniale sous Louis XV et Louis XVL Paris, 1907.
SHEPHERD, W. R. "Cession of Louisiana to Spain." Political Science Quarterly,
September 1904.
SOLTAU, R. H. TJie Duke of Choiseul Oxford, 1909.
Based on Daubigny.
STANHOPE, P. H., 5th Earl Stanhope. History of England. . .(1713-83). 7 vols.
London, 1836-54.
Vols. v and vi are useful here. They are based on contemporary information
and documents (Chevening, etc.). Laborious and reliable.
TERNAUX-COMPANS, H. Notice histonque sur la Guyane Franfaise. Paris, 1843.
THACKERAY, F. A history of the Right Hon. William Pitt 2 vols. London, 1827.
VARNHAGEN, F. A. DE. Historia geral do Brazil 2 vols. Madrid, 1854-7.
VILLIERS DU TERRAGE, M. DE, Baron. Les dernieres annees de la Louisianefrancaise
Paris, 1903.
WEDDELL, J. A Voyage towards the South Pole London, 1825.
WINSTANLEY, D. A. Lord Chatham and the Whig Opposition. Cambridge, 1912.
Deals at some length with the diplomacy relating to the Falkland Islands.
INDEX
Abercromby, Sir Robert, repulsed at
Ticonderoga, £79
Acadia, French in, 86; Charles I sells back
to the French the settlements captured
by Kirke, 132; French forts in, captured
by English force (1654), 227, 231;
returned to the French by the Treaty of
Breda (1667), 314; ceded by France at
the Treaty of Utrecht, 328, 523551 1 ; 576;
see also Nova Scotia
Acapulco, in the Philippines, 305
Ache", Comte d', French naval officer, in
India, 529-30
Act of Union with Scotland, and the
position of Scots in the colonies, 266, 287
Adams, John, 649; counsel for the soldiers
concerned in the "Boston Massacre,"
670; 684; 705; 771; 777
Adams, Samuel, 632; 666; leader of the
extreme Radicals, 670; and the Com-
mittees of Correspondence, 671 ; and the
"Boston tea
Addjson, J<
A Discourse of a
Catma, tract
Gilbert, 59;
A discourse on
674; 676
240
for a new passage to
written by Humphrey
1^05
her majesty may annoy the
King of Spain, by Humphrey Gilbert, 61 ;
70
Admiralty, relations between, and the
colonies, 415-16; 451; 514
Admiralty court, 42; 4.7; 286; 297; 411;
416; 540-1 ; juiisdiction of, extended by
Grenville, 644; and the Stamp Act, 654
Adolf Frederik, King of Sweden, 541
Africa, i ; and the slave trade, 4, 48, 437-
59; and missionary enterprise, 11, 16;
Portuguese in, 23, 30-3, 438; English
trade with, 43 seqq.; 65; 75; Anglo-
Portuguese agreement of 1654, English
to trade freely with Portuguese Africa,
230; the African Company, 440-50,
struggles with the French in, 446-58,
466; 479; 502-3; 570; export of rum to,
from the North American colonies, 597
African Company, see under Companies
Aid, ship lent by Elizabeth to Frobisher,
103
Aiguillon, Emmanuel Armand, Due de,
French Foreign Minister, 703
Aitken, James, deserter from the army,
attempt of, to fire the Portsmouth dock-
yard, 707
Aix-la-Chapelle, treaty of (i 668) ,315; treaty
of (1748), 346, 376/527; Pretender sacri-
ficed by France at (1748), 349; 548
Alabama, 546
Albany, New York, 390; the Albany Plan
of Union, 392, 630, 634-5; 476; 725
Albemarle, William, 2nd Earl of, English
ambassador at Paris, 467-9
Albemarle Sound, in Virginian coast,
Amadas and Barlow land at, 109;
colonv at, 250
Alberoni, Cardinal, 332; 339; 355
Albreda, French station on the Gambia
river, 457
Alcide* French warship, capture of, by
Boscawen, 469
Alday, James, Barbary merchant, 41 ; 42
Alexander VI, Pope, 4.6
Alexander, Sir William, 130; and the
colonisation of Nova Scotia, 153-5
Algarve, 46
Algiers, pirates of, abortive attempt of
Manscll against, 130; 135
Alleghany Mountains, 394; 641 ; 771 ; 776
Allen, Ethan, American soldier, 718
Allen's Town, Clinton at, 738
Altamaha River, English post on, 395-6
Alva, Fernando, 3rd Duke of, 30
Amadas, Captain, sent by Raleigh to
Virginia, 109
Amazon, River, 86; 87
Amazon's Company, see Company
Amboy, 729
Amboyna, massacre of, 131, acquiescence
of Stuarts in, 134; 142; 208
American Revenue Bill, 597
Amerola, Spanish captain, raid of, on
England, 124
Amherst, Jeffrey, Lord, 479; expedition of,
to Montreal, 483, 485, 532; 637-8
Amsterdam, 30; the Scrooby congregation
at, 156
An Account of New England, by Samuel
Maverick, 613
Andre", John, Major, capture of, 751
Andros, Sir Edmund, Governor of New
York (1674-80), 253; sent out by
James II to take control of the new
Dominion of New England, 260; im-
prisoned at Boston (March 1689), 260;
617
Anguilla, in the Leeward Islands, 377
Annapolis, 375; 393
Anne, Queen of England, 240; 332; grants
charter to South Sea Company, 335
Annexation, Guiana, formally annexed by
Harcourt ( 1 609) , 87 ; California, annexed
by Drake, 102; Newfoundland, annexed
byGilbert(i583), 106; Barbados annexed
by Powell (1624), 144; vagueness of
international theory as to validity of,
185-7; the rights of aborigines, 191-4
Annobon, 458
Annual Register, 453; on the capture of the
Dutch forts in Africa (1782), 457
8go
INDEX
Anson, George Anson, ist Viscount, ex-
pedition of, to the Pacific, 344, 371, 524;
victory of, in the Bay of Biscay, 376; 477;
480; 489; influence of, at the Admiralty,
524 seqq. ; and the Falkland Islands, 698;
735
Anti-Corn Law League, 14
Anticosti, whaling fleet visits, 74
Antigua, 209; introduction of sugar in-
dustry to, 209; resistance of, to Common-
wealth, 212; submits to Sir George
Ayscue, 219; squabbles between Keynell,
Puritan governor of, and the inhabitants,
233; Norwegians allowed to settle in,
237; occupied by the French (1666-7),
242; resettled, 243; returned to English
by the Treaty of Breda, 314; 376; 407;
5 w; 570; 582; 813; 818-19
Antilles, 70; 77;. failure of colonies in St
Lucia and Grenada, 87; settlement of
Warner on St Christopher, 143
Antonio, Don, claimant to throne of
Portugal, 63; 65; and the English trade
with Africa, 438
Antwerp, 2; Portuguese trade with, 30, 33;
, ,
64; taken by Parma, 119; 375; Truce of,
128, 200
Apam, Dutch fort in West Africa, captured
by Enriish (1782), 457
Appalachian Mountains, 641-2
Apsham, fishing merchants of, 74
Aquinas, Thomas, Saint, scholastic views
of, 192
Aquitaine, 23
Aranda, Pedro Abarca y Bolea, Count of,
700; 773
Arbuthnot, Marriot, Admiral, 747-8; 751
Archangel, port of the Muscovy Company
A at, 40, 41
Arcot, 485
Argall, Captain Samuel, breaks up French
settlements in North America, 86; dis-
covers direct route to Virginia, 1 14
Arguin, Dutch station in Senegal, captured
by the French, 446
Arlington, Henry Bennet, tst Earl of,
Virginia grant to (1673), 3575 promoter
of Navigation Acts, 271; and the secret
Treaty of Dover, 316; 815
Armada, Spanish, 104; Venetian ambassa-
dor at Pans, predicts defeat of, 107; 115;
120; in the Channel, 121
Armed Neutrality, 716; 750; 774; 781
Arnold, Benedict, his invasion of Canada,
A 799; 7i8; 720; 725; 748; 751-3
Arzma, 40
Ascham, Anthony, Commonwealth envoy
at Madrid, murder of, 226
Ashanti, Kingdom of, 452-3
Ashehurst, Thomas, Bristol explorer, sails
to north-west, 27
Asiento, 8; French Asiento Company, 326,
33.45 held fey Portuguese, 333; Charles II
fails to secure Asiento for the African
Company, 334; Asiento treaty with
England, 328, 336, 542; Spanish ob-
stacles in the way of the trade, 340;
English disregard for obligations of, 342 ;
suspended by Spain, 343; 345; 524-5
Assembly, Barbados, 422, 424, 427 seqq.;
Bermuda, 152; Carolina, North, 421,
429 seqq.; Carolina, South, 421, 424,
430-1; Connecticut, 163, 409, 429;
Jamaica, 245, 406-7, 410, 426 seqq.;
Leeward Islands, 407-8; Maryland,
424; Massachusetts, 161, 405, 425 seqq.,
667, 674; New York, 405, 425 seqq.;
Pennsylvania, 255, 428 seqq.; Rhode
Island, 258, 409, 424 -5 ; takes root during
the interregnum, 248; opposition of,
to local governors and the Home Govern-
ment, 377-8, 386-9; from 1660-1763,
Assumption, Isle of, see Anticosti
Atkins, Sir Jonathan, Governor of Barba-
dos, his dispute with the Crown, 291,
816-17
A treatise of the new India, with other new
found Lands and Islands, translation by
Richard Eden, of Sebastian Minister's
Cosmographia, 55
Atterbury, Francis, Bishop of Rochester,
Jacobite plot of, 349
Aubrey, William, his description of Raleigh,
108-9
Augustus III, Elector of Saxony, becomes
King of Poland, 368; 462
Australia, 1 1 ; 15; 17; William Dampier in,
517; Captain Cook in, 536
Austria, and the War of the Spanish
Succession, 325-9; and the Pragmatic
Sanction, 353, 364, 368; and the War of
the Austrian Succession, 371-6; 461-4;
469-72; and the Seven Years' War,
475 seqq.
Austrian Succession, War of, 371-6
Aviles, Pero Menendez de, Ribault's crews
fall into hands of, 56
Ayala, Balthazar, opinion of, that bar-
barian countries were not territoria
nulhus, 192; his Dejure et qfficiis bellicis
et disciplina million, 205
Ayscue, Admiral Sir George, overcomes
resistance of Royalists of Barbados, 133;
134; 218-19
Azores, 25, 35, 46; French expedition
against, 63; 65; 107; 114; 122; Sir
Richard Grenville at Flores of, 123;
wine from, exempted from the provisions
of Navigation Laws, 275, 567
Bacon, Sir Francis, sponsors colony of
Newfoundland, 90; on sea power, 126;
147; and the transportation of un-
desirables to the colonies, 604-5; and the
INDEX
891
constitution of colonial governments,
605 seqq.
Bacon, Nathaniel, his rebellion in Virginia
in 1676, 256
Badcock, and the evasion of customs in
Maryland, 280; ill-treatment of, 284
Baffin, William, 108
Baffin Land, Frobisher at, 103
Baghdad, 65
Bahamas, 293; pirate centre in, 384; re-
settlement of (1718), 384, 520; support
of the rebellious Americans, 682; 781
Bahia, 33
Bailhe, William, officer in India, 756
Balambangan, island in the Philippines,
704
Baldus, Italian jurist, 198, 203
Baltic, 31; 36; 40; importance of, to Eng-
land as a source of naval stores, 60, 224,
225, 305, 355, 358; heavy dues exacted
by Denmark, 68; treaties between
Denmark, Sweden, and the Common-
wealth concerning trade in, 135; Sweden
and Denmark claim sovereignty of, 195;
treaty of Dutch with Denmark to ex-
clude England from, 224; Dutch power
> Charles XII of Sweden vetoes
- in, 358
Calvert,
i commerce j
Baltimore, Cecilius GaTvert, 2nd Lord,
patent issued to, for the colonisation of
Maryland, 169; does not approve of the
colony's refusal to recognise the Com-
monwealth, 2 1 1 ; dispute of, with the
Commissioners of the Customs, 280
Baltimore, in Munster, 168
Bank of England, straits of, during the '45,
348
Bannister, Thomas, 389
Barbados, 4; 5; id; mistake as to date of
annexation, 87; settlement of, 131; re-
sistance of, to Commonwealth, 133, 209,
212, 216, 218-19; annexation of, by
Powell, 144; dispute as to the possession
of, 145, 171-2; 153; estimated popula-
tion of, in 1639, 174; end of proprietary
authority in, 174-5; the introduction of
the sugar industry, 210; enjoys freedom
of trade during Civil War, 210; Royalist
faction overturn Philip Bell and expel
the Puritans, 212; Francis, Lord Wil-
loughby, proclaims Charles II at, 212;
the Long Parliament forbids all trade
with, 216; reduced to submission by Sir
George Ayscue, 218-19; and the coloni-
sation of Surinam, 231; under the
Commonwealth, 233; emigration from,
to Jamaica, 236; the settlement of the
proprietary dispute at the Restoration,
241; the governorship of Willoughby,
242; home rule movement in, 243; high
death-rate in, 249; petition of, against
the Navigation Acts, 281; "Naval
officers" in, 290, 291; surveyor-general
for, 293; negro slavery in, 305; out-
stripped by Jamaica, 330, 338; 377-8;
decline of, 379; fall in the white popu-
lation of, 380, 588; social life in, 301;
government of (1666-1753), 405, 424-5,
427* 430, 43^-3; 512-14; 5*9; 570; 583;
593] 682; 813 seqq.
Barbados Gazette, 382
Barbary, 35; 41; 42; 45; Barbary pirates
prey upon trade passing through Straits
of Gibraltar, 305
Barbuda, in the Leeward Islands, 145; 177
Barfleur, naval battle of, 514
Bark Raleight ship of Sir Humphrey Gilbert,
105
Barlow, Captain, sent by Raleigh to
Virginia, 109
Barnes, Sir George, London merchant,
traded with Canaries, 35, 43
Barnetl, Curtis, commodore in the East
Indies, 526
Barnstaple, merchants of, and African
trade, 73; 516
Barras, Louis, Comte de, French naval
officer, 754
Barre", Colonel, protest of, in the House of
Commons against the Stamp Act, 646;
668; 674; 683; 705; 768-9
Barrmgton, Samuel, Admiral, 741
Barrington, William, 2nd Viscount, Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, 489; 631; 659;
7215764
Barry, Madame du, mistress of Louis XV,
702-3
Bartolus, Italian jurist, 198; 203; 541
Basse Terre (Guadeloupe), capture of, by
the English, 485
Basseterre, capital of St Christopher, 513
Bavaria and the War of the Austrian
Succession, 372-6
Bayard, Nicholas, leader of aristocratic
party in New York, 261
Bayona Islands, 124
Beachy Head, French victory off, 510,
517
Beaumarchais, Caron de, French agent in
London, 705, 707; 71*
Beaumont, Chevalier d'Eon de, 687; 705
Beausejour, French fort, capture of, 470
Beckford, William, Alderman, supporter of
the elder Pitt, 503
Bedford, John Russell, 4th Duke of,
British Plenipotentiary to France (1762) ,
497; 641; and the American colonies,
6b6 seqq. 5697-8
Bedford, Fort, 637
Bedford, privateer rendezvous, raided by
Clinton, 740
Belcher, Jonathan, Governor of Massa-
chusetts, 386; difficulty about his salary,
Belgrade, victory of Prince Eugene at, 359;
Peace of, 369-70
Beliardi, Abbe, agent of Choiseul, 688;
692
8Q2
INDEX
Bell, Philip, Governor of Bermuda, joins
Providence Company, 166; becomes
Governor of Barbados in the Warwick
interest, 175; overturned by Royalist
faction, 212
Bellasis, Lord, an opinion of, 313
Belleisle, Charles Fouquet, Due de,
French statesman, 346; 481
Belleisle, 486; capture of, by English,
489, 490; returned to France at the
Peace of Paris, 502 5534
Bellomont, Richard Coote, Earl of,
colonial governor, 574-5
Bemis Heights, Burgpyne at, 731
Benbow, John, Admiral, 519
Bengal, 474; 476; 528-9; 781
Benin, 41546; 73
Bennett, Richard, Parliamentary com-
missioner, made governor on the sub-
mission of Virginia (1652), 220
Bennington, 730
Berkeley, John, ist Earl of, one of the
eight proprietors of Carolina, 248; New
Jersey made over to him, and Sir
George Carteret, 252; sells his rights in
New Jersey to the Quakers, 253; 271
Berkeley, George, Bishop, visit of, to
Rhode Island, 404; his Bermuda project,
626-7, and the American bishopric,
803
Berkeley, Sir William, appointed Governor
of Virginia in 1640, 211; Royahst
sympathies of, 211; unable to organise
effective Royalist resistance in Virginia,
2 1 Q ; allowed to remain in the colony, 220,
250; and Carolina, 248; and the colony
at Albemarle Sound, 250; misgovern-
ment of, and recall, 256; unwillingness
of, to enforce Navigation Acts, 281-2;
Bermuda, Gates* expedition wrecked on,
83; "The Company of the Plantation of
the Somers Islands", 85; piratical ten-
dencies of colonists of, 85, 89; 138; 145;
151; Bermuda Assembly convoked, 152;
154; surviving Pequpts sold to, 165;
colonists from, join in the scheme of
Providence Company, 1 66; 174; Royalist
sympathies of, 21 1 ; repudiates Common-
wealth, 212; trade with, forbidden by
the Long Parliament, 2x6; submission or,
219; overpopulation of (c. 1657), 237; be-
comes a Crown colony, 247; high birth
rate in, 249; and the Navigation Acts,
281; 377; vegetable-growing in, 384;
view—/, ocuua uGM^$ai.t*9 i
Philadelphia, 682; 813
Bernard, Sir Francis, Governor of New
Jersey and Massachusetts, and the penal-
ties for non-observance of the Acts of
Trade, 286; 615; 631; 6625666; dissolves
the Assembly, 667
Bernstorff, Hanoverian minister of George I,
351
Berracoe, Dutch fort in West Africa, cap-
tured by English (1782), 457
Berry er, Pierre Antoine, head of the French
marine office, 481
Bethlehem, Pa., 403
Beverley, historian of Virginia, 786. 788-0
Bideford, 98; 516 ^
Bienville, Celeron de, asserts French claim
to the Ohio Valley, ;
Bilbao, decay of English trade with, 316
Bill of Rights and the position of the
chartered companies, 447
Bissagos islands, Portuguese stations on, 452
Black Death, 37
Black River, British settlement on the
Moskito Coast, 384
Blackstone, Sir William, on the acquisition
of colonies, 193; 632-3
Blair, James, Commissary for the Bishop of
London in Virginia, 399, 403, 786; and
the founding of William and Mary
College, Virginia, 790
Blake, Robert, Admiral, 133; 134; 201 ; fires
on Van Tromp and precipitates First
Dutch War, 223, 539; his blockade of
Lisbon facilitated by Spain, 226; destroys
French squadron carrying aid to Dun-
kirk, 226-7; destroys Spanish treasure
fleet at Santa Cruz, 229
Blakiston, collector of customs in Maryland,
his complaints against the colonists, 284
Bland, John, Virginia planter, complaint
of against the Navigation Acts, 281
Blavet, in Brittany, 124
Blenac, Comte de, Governor of Martinique,
Blenheim,
battle of, 300
Board of Trade and Plantations, established
in 1606, 6; 263; 269; 290; 296; 321 ; 337;
385-6; discourages the manufacture of
iron in Virginia, 394; 411; constitution
of, 413-14; 418-23; 432; and the slave
trade, 437; report of, on the African
Company, 450; 568; 573; 577 seqq.; 616
Bokhara, visited by Jenkmson in 1557, 41
Bolingbroke, Henry St John, Viscount, and
the Treaty of Utrecht, 327, 334; bribes
the Duchess of Kendal, 351, returns to
England, 365; 624-6
Bombay, acquisition of, by England, 507;
525
Bonnet, pirate chief, captured in the
Bahamas, 384
Borburata, port on Spanish Main, John
Hawkins sells negroes at, 49
Bordentown, New Jersey, 726
Borey, Thomas, Southampton merchant,
engaged in Brazil trade, 36
Boroughs, Sir John, Keeper of the Records
under Charles I, writer on the sovereignty
of the sea, 203
INDEX
893
Boscawen, Edward, Admiral, 469; his
victory at Lagos, 483; 526-7; 530; 554
Bosman, William, Dutchman on Guinea
coast, 443
Bosphorus, and the sovereignty of the sea,
535
Boston, 161; 163; trade of, 251; 252;
Anglican services permitted by Sir
Edmund Andros at, 260; Andros im-
prisoned at, 260; 261 ; customs officials at,
290, 293; vice-admiralty court at, 299;
Colbert encourages French intercourse
with, 311; colonial agent of, 434; 311;
515; 59^; protests against the restrictions
on commerce, 596, 599; reception of
Stamp Act by, 654-5; Convention of,
667; the "Massacre", 669-70; the Tea
Party, 674; 7i8seqq.; singing in, 80 1;
810-12
Boston Gazette, 671
Boston Newsletter 9 published in 1704, 399;
807
Bosworth, battle of, 22
Boucher, Jonathan, 653
Bougainville, Louis de, French commander
in Canada, 532; voyage of, to the South
Seas, 539; at the Falkland Islands, 698
Bouille, Marquis de, Governor of Mar-
tinique, captures Dominica, 712; cap-
tures St Christopher, 758
Boulogne, captured by Henry VIII, 34;
negotiations for peace with Spain
opened at (1599), 76
Boundsbrook, 727
Bouquet, Henry, Colonel, his victory over
the Indians at Bushey's Run, 638
Bourbon, Duke of, succeeds the regent
Orleans, 365; quarrels with Fleury and
falls from power, 366
Boyle, Henry, Lord Carleton, 522
Boynes, M. de, French minister of marine,
^k, Edward, General, defeat of, by
French and Red Indians, 392, 468-70;
Iford, William, succeeds Carver as
governor of the Mayflower Pilgrims, 157
Bradstreet, Colonel, 639
Brandenburg, 301; 300
Brandywine, battle of, 717, 733-4, 764
Bray, Thomas, commissary for the Bishop
of London in Maryland, 403
Brazil, English trade with, under Henry
VIII, 28; 32-4; 36; 41; 54; 66; Dutch
occupation of, 77, 142; 86; 115; 144;
English trade with, under certain re-
strictions permitted (1654}, 23°5 Jews
expelled from, 231; diversity of owner-
ship makes for freedom of trade, 305; not
included in South Sea Company's
monopoly, 335 ; Spanish designs against,
692
Breda, Treaty of, ends war with Dutch in
1667, 242; Surinam exchanged for
Dutch possessions in North America by
the terms of, 252, 508; 314; 544
Bremen, 64; acquired by Hanover, 339, 361
Breslau, 477
Brett, Peircy, and Captain Cook, 536
Brewster, William, leading member of the
Scrooby congregation, 1 56
Briar's Creek, 743
Brill, required by Elizabeth as a pledge in
return for troops, 119; kept at Treaty
of London, 128; surrendered in 1610,
129
Bristol, 23; John Cabot at, 25, 26; and
exploration in the north-west, 27, 28;
trade with the Peninsula, 33; 67; fishing
merchants of, 78; 90; John Guy, member
for, 148; importance of slave trade to,
449 5516; trade of, with North American
Colonies, 595, 597, 761
Bristol, Convention of (1574), settles all
outstanding claims between England and
Spain, 59
British Merchant, 624
British North America Act (1867), 15
Brpglie, Comte de, scheme of, for the
invasion of England, 687
Brooke, Lord, active member of council of
New England, 153; interested in the
Providence Company, 166
Brooklyn, battle of, 717, 722; Charles Fox
on, 763
Brouillan, French admiral, 515
Browmsts, failure of attempt to settle, on
shores of the St Lawrence, 74; 156
Bucarelli, Don Francisco, Governor of
Buenos Aires, 699
Buckingham, George Villiers, ist Duke of,
Lord High Admiral, 129; advocates war
with Spain, 141 ; governor of the "Com-
pany for the Plantation of Guiana", 143;
President of the Council of New England,
147
Buenos Aires, 77; 336; South Sea Com-
pany's factory at, 338; 692
Bunker's Hill, battle of, 681 ; 719
Burgoyne, John, General, 725; advance of,
from Canada, 729-31; surrender at
Saratoga, 732; 764
Burke, Edmund, the Free Port Act of, 345;
5955 637; and the Stamp Act debate,
646; and the Rockingham Whigs, 659;
and the Pitt-Grafton Ministry, 663;
denounces the taxation of the American
colonies, 668; 674; 677 seqq.; and the
French annexation of Corsica, 697;
761-3; 768-9; 775 .,
Burlamaqui, J. T., Genevese publicist,
influence of, in North America, 656-7
Burlington, occupied by Howe, 724
Burnaby, Admiral, 691
Burnaby, Andrew, the Rev., his travels in
North America, 807-1 1
Burnet, Gilbert, Bishop of Salisbury, 312;
on the bombing of Genoa, 319
894
INDEX
Burnet, William, Governor of New York
(1720), 388-9; 635; 807
Bushey*s Run, battle of, 638
Bussy, Francois de, French envoy in
London, 491
Bute, John Stuart, 3rd Earl of, and the
Seven Years' War, 480, 488seqq.; 534;
639-40; 685; retirement of, 691
Butler, Nathaniel, Governor of Bermuda,
Byllyng, Edward, Quaker, with John Fen-
wick buys Berkeley's rights in New
Jersey, 253-4
Byng, George, see Tomngton
Byng, John, Admiral, failure of, at Minorca,
472, 527; 547
Bynkershoek, Cornelius Von, on terri-
torial waters, 203, 540-2 ; and neutrality,
554; and blockade, 555
Byrd, William, of Virginia, his opinion of
the trade restrictions, 282; 791
Byrd, William (the younger), 789-90
Byron, John, Rear-Admiral, voyage of, to
the South Seas, 535; at the Falkland
Islands, 698; 740-2
Cabot, John, 2; at Bristol, 25; sails to
Labrador, 26, 27, 184, 193
Cabot, Sebastian, at Bristol, 27, 28; mem-
ber of joint stock company to discover
North-East Passage, 39; 96; 103
Cabreta, Luis, Spanish captain, warns
Philip not to trust in galleys, 117
Cadiz, 42; 1 08; 113; Drake's attack on,
12 1 ; occupation of, by Howard (1596),
124; 305; decay of English trade with,
315; attacks on, during War of Spanish
Succession, 326; 333
Calais, 3; 39; Earl of Rutland tries to save,
51; captured by Spaniards (1596), 124;
given back to France, 125
Calcutta, foundation of, 321; Black Hole
of, 476 5528
Calicut, 30; proposal that Drake should be
sent to, 65; 183
California, 4; Drake annexes, 101-2
Calvert, Charles, son of Cecilius, 2nd Lord
Baltimore, governs Maryland, 1661-75,
257
Calvert, Sir George, Secretary of State, 91 ;
maintains that Sandys' Fishing Bill is
beyond the competence of the House of
Commons, 148, 151; interested in Irish
plantations, 168; attempt to found a
colony in Newfoundland, 168; visit of,
to Virginia, 169; created Lord Baltimore,
169; submits to Church of Rome, 169;
death of, 169
Calvin, John, 161
Cambrai, Congress of (1724), 365
Camden, Charles Pratt, Earl of, jurist, 632;
652; and the taxation of the colonies,
660; 663, in favour of repealing the
Townshend duties, 668; 683; 761; Lord
President in Rockingham's second Minis-
try, 769
Camden, battle of, 747
Campbell, Archibald, Colonel, captures
Savannah, 743; 746; 756
Campeachy Bay, 330; disputes as to the
right to cut logwood in, 344
Camperdown, naval victory of Monck at
„ (*&§3)» 134
Canada, 10; n ; 14; 15; rebellion of 1837,
16; French and Portuguese in, 73; 74;
Charles I sells back to French the settle-
ments captured by Kirke, 132; 155; the
Hudson Bay Company and the French,
264; debt of Canada to the Scots, 266;
estimated by Choiseul as of less import-
ance to France than Corsica, 302; 318;
Jack Hill's expedition against, 327; 465;
capture of French Canada, 482-3, 485-6,
530-3; and the Peace of Paris, 505, 630;
11; 523; 543; qg-Qi; 640; 643; the
ebec Act, 677-8, 708-9; invasion of,
by the Americans, 709; 712; 718-20;
7*5 ? 755 J772; 775 seqq.
Canada, River of, 73; 74
Canaries, English trade with, under
Henry VIII, 33; the Castlyn family, 35,
43; the Thorne family, 36; visited by
John Hawkins in 1562, 48; 114; granted
bv Clement VI to Luis de la Cerda in
134.4, 183; Canary wines and the Navi-
gation Acts, 275
Canning, George, 13
Canso, in Nova Scotia, 525
Cap'Francois, 515
Cape Ann, Dorchester fishermen at, 159
Cape Bojador, 183
Cape Breton Island, expedition of Hore to,
in 1536, 29; 60; 66; French and Portu-
guese at, 73; proposed colony of "New
Galloway" on, 155; Scottish colonists on,
taken prisoner by the French, 155; re-
mains French at the Treaty of Utrecht,
328; and the War of the Austrian
Succession, 375-6; 391; French from
Placentia emigrate to, 393; colonial
agent for, 434; 467; 491 ; 523; 543;
assigned to government of Nova Scotia,
642
Cape Coast Castle, British fort on the^Gold
Coast, 454, 456
Cape Cod, 86; Mayflower Pilgrims land
behind, 157
Cape Fear, in Carolina, party of Barba-
dians settle at, 250
Cape Horn, Drake rounds, 100
Cape of Good Hope, 15; 66; 183; estab-
lished by Dutch as victualling station,
becomes true colony, 305-6; Johnstone's
attack on, foiled, 756
Cape Passaro, Byng destroys Spanish fleet
off, 360; 546-7
Cape Tres Puntas, 46
Cape Verde, 46; 48; 49
INDEX
895
Gap Francois, 515
Capitulations, 2
Caracas, South Sea Company's factory at,
338
Carew, George, Lord, member of the com-
mittee appointed by Charles I to consider
the reform of the government of Virginia,
Caribbean Sea, Rut visits, 29; London
trade with, 31, 33; and slave trade, 47,
48, 50; raid of Drake in, 71 ; 138; 172-3;
226; focus of international rivalry during
the Restoration period, 246; additional
frigates sent to, Tor the enforcement of
the Acts of Trade, 284
Caribs, massacre settlers on St Lucia, 87;
massacre settlers on island of Grenada,
87; Black Caribs, 642
Carleill, Christopher, stepson of Walsing-
ham, associated in colonising schemes,
59; Edward Fenton takes place of, 66;
scheme of, for colonising Newfoundland,
67; Discourse of, 68; 69; 70; 72; qo
Carleton, Sir Guy, Governor of Canada,
710^-20; 723; 725; and Burgoyne's ex-
pedition, 730; 758
Carlisle, Charles Howard, Earl of, Governor
of Jamaica, 406
Carlisle, James Hay, Earl of, patron of
Thomas Warner, 144; Lord Proprietor
of the Garibbees, 145, 153, 171-2,
209
Carlisle, Charles Howard, 2nd Earl of, con-
trol over Caribbees collapses at beginning
of Civil War, 209; his proprietary rights
over the Caribbees suspended by the Long
Parliament, 210, annulled, 219; leases
Caribbees to Lord Willoughby, 212; dies
without issue, his rights in the West
Indies passing to Lord Kinnoul, 241
Carnatic, Hyder AH in the, 715; 756
Carolina, 7; peopled mostly by re-
emigration of other colonists, 247; Sir
Robert Heath's grant from Charles I,
248; the foundation of the colony under
Charles II, 248-50; division into North
and South Carolina, 250; early govern-
ment of, 250-1 ; customs officials in, 292 ;
Anglican establishment in, 303-4; dis-
pute over boundaries of, 344; charter
of, resumed, 385 ; wars with the Indians,
385-6, 390-i; 394-5J 398-9; foreign
emigrants in, 402 ; 571 ; 589 ; 593 5 Funda-
mental Constitution of, 609; 675; 743;
literature and social life of, 784
Carolina, North, Provincial council of, 42 1 ;
Assembly of, 421, 429, 432; Speaker of,
424, 431; judicial tenure in, 43^ ; 641;
and the Stamp Act, 655; 680; loyalists
in, 721; Cornwallis in, 748; social life,
Carolina, South, Assembly of, 421, 424,
430, 435; Speaker of, 431; and the
Mutiny Act, 664; and the Declaration 01
Independence, 684; Cornwallis in, 747;
social life in, 792
Caroline, Queen, wife of George II, 350;
362; 367-8
Cartagena, visited by Hawkins, 49; con-
quest of, by Drake, 119; Blake sinks
Rupert's ships in harbour of, 133; 335;
South Sea Company's factory at, 338;
415; 516 t
Carteret, Sir George, one of the eight
proprietors of Carolina, 248; New Jersey
made over to him and Lord Berkeley,
252; sells his rights in New Jersey to the
Quakers, 254
Carteret, John, Earl of Granvilie, his view
on Anglo-French relations, 356; and the
War of the Austrian Succession, 37 1 , 373,
375; and the proprietorship of Carolina,
386, 794; death of, 501
Carrier, Jacques, French explorer, 73
Carver, John, elected governor of the
Mayflower Pilgrims, 157
Gary, John, Bristol merchant, on emigra-
tion, 565-^6
Caspian Sea, visited by Jenkinson in 1557,
41
Castleton, 730
Castlyn, Edward, London merchant, 35,
43*44
Castlyn, James, sea captain, 35
Castlyn, William, London merchant, 35
Catawba, 752
Cateau-Cambr&is, Peace of, 51; French
claim to trade with Spanish Indies
shelved. 186-7; establishment of "lines
of amity", 187
Catharine T of Russia, timely death of
(1727), 367
Catharine II of Russia, 714; and the
Armed Neutrality, 716; 773
Catherine of Braganza, Queen of Charles II,
dowrv of, 507
Catholic League, Philip counts on help
from, 120
Cavalier Parliament of 1663, Navigation
Act of, 271
Cavendish, Lord John, Chancellor of the
Exchequer, 769; resignation of, 775
Cavendish, Thomas, 199
Cayenne, Jews expelled from, settle at
Surinam, 231
Cayman, islands of, French fish for turtles
Cecil', William, Lord Burghley, 3
encourages Guinea trade, 45; and Jo]
Hawkins, 49 ; and the Naw, 51 ; entrusts
Florida design to Hawkins, 56; tem-
porising policy of, 58; interested in
North-East route, 59; enforces political
Lent, 60; 64; anxiety of, for peace, 75
Centurioni, Paolo, 28
Cerda, Luis de la, granted Canary Islands
by Clement VI, 183
Ceuta, 322
19;
896
INDEX
Ceylon, 15; Portuguese and French driven
from, by the Dutch, 306; Dutch posts in,
occupied by the English, 774
Chad's Ford, 733
Chamberlain, Joseph, 21
Champion, H.M.S., 457
Champlain, Lake, French secure control of,
39i; 546; 718; Benedict Arnold at, 725
Champlain, Samuel de, founds colony of
Qpeoec, 74; forced to surrender it to
Kirke, 154 '
Chancellor, Richard, member of Muscovy
Company, 39, 42; discovers Archangel
route, 40
Chancery, court of, 28
Ghandernagore, French stronghold on the
Hooghly,529; 701; 712; capture of, 713;
restored to France, 781
Channel Islands and the Navigation laws,
271-2
Charles I, King of England, 5; 95; barters
back Acadia and Canada, 132; defied
by Dutch in territorial waters, 132 ; Navy
side against, in Civil War, 132; 136;
Madrid adventure of, 141; 143; 145;
146; and colonial affairs, 176-7; 189;
and the sovereignty of the sea, 201-3;
execution of, 208; particular monopolies
under, 214; 239-40
Charles II, King of England, 7; 163; takes
refuge in Holland, 209; proclaimed King
in Scotland, 209; grants commission for
the Caribbees to Francis, Lord Wiliough-
by, 212; 238; his grants in Virginia to
courtiers, 257; 313; 319; attempts to
secure Asiento contract for the African
Company, 334; 446; and the Navy, 507;
Charles Edward, Prince, the Young Pre-
tender, at Derby, 348; birth of, 362; 531
Charles III, King of Spain, becomes King of
Naples and Sicily, 368-9; 480; accedes
to throne of Spain, 486; 487; 533; his
hatred of England, 686; 700 seqq.; his
offer of mediation during the American
War, 714; joins France, 714
Charles V, Emperor, 34
Charles VI, Emperor, death of,
and the Pragmatic Sanction,
his foundation of the Ostend
Charles VII, Emperor, 372-3
Charles XII, King of Sweden, 301 ; vetoes
English commerce with the Baltic, 358;
death of, 361
Charlesfort, Huguenot colony in South
Carolina, 55
Charleston in Carolina, settlement of, 250;
vice-admiralty court at, 298-9; attack of
Clinton and Parker on, 722, 743 ; capture
of, by Clinton, 747; 752; 756;
792 ; religious revival in, 793
lhateaurenaut, expedition of, tc
Chatham, naval yard at, 50
Chauvelin, Germain-Louis de, 352; 366;
hostility of, to England, 369; fall of, 369
Chebucto Bay, in Nova Scotia, 393
Cherokees, Red Indian tribe, 391
Cherry, Sir Francis, 89
Cherry Island, whale and walrus hunting
off, 89
Chesapeake Bay, Howe disembarks at, 729;
751 seqq.; 760
Chesapeake River, settlement round es-
tuary of, 80; 109; 219; additional
frigates sent to, for the enforcement of the
Acts of Trade, 284
Chester, Sir William, 44
Chesterfield, Philip Stanhope, 4th Earl of,
35 1;4?6
Chichester, Thomas, and Earl of, member
of committee appointed by Charles I to
consider the reform of the government of
Virginia, 150
Child, Sirjosiah, enumerates fifteen trades
lost by England, 3 15 ; on emigration from
England, 564-5; on New England,
578-3
China, 25; 26; 27; 41; 101; English trade
with, largely lost to the Dutch, 315
Choiseul, Etienne-Fransois, Due de, his low
estimate of the value of Canada, 302 ; the
Seven Years' War and, 461, 479;
accession of, to power, 481 ; 486 ; 489 -501 ;
531 seqq.; 686 seqq.; fall of, 702-4; 736
Christina, Queen of Sweden, and the right
of search, 557
Church, 22; 30; 37; of England, cause of
emigration, 137-8, 156; Anglican ser-
vices permitted at Boston under James II,
260; Anglicanism, in the West Indies,
381, in the North American colonies,
4°3-4> 785-787; the question of the
American bishopric, 803-4; in New
York, 804-5
Circars, Northern, cession of, to the British,
Ghateaurenaut, expeditio
Indies, 518-19
to the West
Civil War, 5 ; attitude of Navy in, 1 32 ; 1 36 ;
importance of, in imperial history, 179;
in the West Indies, 1212-19
Claiborne, William, contest between, and
Lord Baltimore's colonists in Maryland,
169
Clarendon, Edward Hyde, ist Earl of, 241 ;
patron of the Carolina scheme, 248;
favours Connecticut as a counterpoise to
Massachusetts, 251; 258; 268; promoter
of Navigation Acts* 2,30^ 3f>i j..his fall
hastens the alliance "with France, 314;
319 *
Clarke, George, Governor of New York, his
disputes with the Assembly, 388
Clarke, George Rogers, 772
Clarke, John, succeeds O'Hara as Governor
of Senegambia, 456
Clement VI, grants Canary Islands to Luis
de la Cerda (1344), 183
INDEX
897
Clifford, Thomas, Lord, member of the
cabal, 316
Clinton, Edward, ist Earl of Lincoln, Lord
Admiral under Elizabeth, supports
African voyages, 44
Clinton, George, Governor of New York,
his dispute with the Assembly, 436
Clinton, Sir Henry, General, 715; 722;
731-2; succeeds Howe, 736; 737 seqq.;
746 seqq.; 751 seqq.; 758; 760; 766
Clinton, Fort, 731
Glive, Robert, Lord, victory of, at Plassey,
529-30.
e, Captain, 308
Codrington, Christopher, ^ Governor of
Barbados, founder of Codrington College,
3815418; 513-14; 519
Codrington College, Barbados, founded
1716, 381; 814; 822
Coke, Roger, on the underpopulation of
England, 564
Colbert, commercial policy of, 207, 306-1 1,
320-1 ; and the West African trade, 441 ;
561
Colden, Lieutenant-Governor of New
York, 655
Cole, Michael, Captain, and the exporta-
tion of rice, 274
Cohgny, Admiral Gaspard de, supports
tropical expeditions, 34; and Huguenot
colonies, 54-6, 57
Colleton, Sir John, one of the eight pro-
prietors of the Carolinas, 248; 250
Colleton, Sir Peter, 815
Cologne, ally of England and France
against the Dutch (1672), 316-17
Colonial agents, 434; their attitude to the
Stamp Act, 645
Colonies, British, in North America,
4 seqq.; n; Virginia charter, 75; an-
nexation of Newfoundland by Gilbert,
1 06; transportation of criminals and
indigents to, 112, 605; valued chiefly
(under James I) as supplying naval
stores, 130; Mayflower Pilgrims and the
Plymouth settlement, 156-7; the Massa-
chusetts Bay Colony, 157-62; Connecti-
cut and Rhode Island, 162-6; settlement
of Maryland, 169-70; causes for growing
gulf between, and England after the
Restoration, 240, 604; the foundation of
Carolina, 248-9; the conquest of New
Netherland, and the foundation of New
York and New Jersey, 252-4; Pennsyl-
vania, 255-6; the policy of the later
Stuarts to the Revolution settlement,
256-63, 614; development of (1714-55),
384-404; disputes with governors and
the Crown, 386-9; foundation of
Georgia, 395-6; monetary system in,
397-8> 597-oor; colonial separatism,
389^92; trade between, and the West
Indies, 396; government of (1660-1763),
405-37; and the mercantile system,
CHBEI
trade between, and the
Vest Indies, 582-4; iron industry
ofj 394J 5?6; constitutions of, 608 seqq.;
and contributions to military expenses,
636sec[q.; Grenville and the Customs
duties in, 645 ; and the Stamp Act, 645-6;
653 seqq.; indebtedness of, to British
merchants, 653 ; and Townshend's duties,
663 seqq.; me boycott of tea, 673;
the Continental Congress, 676 seqq.;
North's bill to prohibit all trade and
intercourse with the colonies, 683;
negotiations with the French, 705 seqq.;
the War of Independence, 71 7 seqq.;
literature and social life, 784 seqq.
Colonisation, colonial enterprises of Hugue-
nots, 54-6; plan for settling English
recusants in North America, 66; reasons
urged in favour of, under Elizabeth,
68-9; Elizabethan colonies fail to attract
sufficient capital, 72; attempt to settle
Brownists on shores of the St Lawrence,
74; Virginia charter, 79; "London
colony" m Virginia, 79; French colonies
in Acadia, 86; Raleigh and the colonisa-
tion of Virginia, 109; 126; 136-8; Nova
Scotia, 153-5; the Mayflower Pilgrims,
financed by joint-stock company, settle-
ment of, at New Plymouth, 157-8; the
Mayflower compact, 158; the Massachu-
setts Bay Company, 159-60; grants to
lords proprietors become the general
rule, 1 68, 170; settlement of Surinam,
231; ill-success of emigrants sent by
Cromwell to Jamaica, 232. See also under
*he various colonies
Columbus, 2; 25; 93; 183
Colville, Lord, in Newfoundland, 535
Commissioners of the Customs, appoint
official to enforce Navigation Laws in
America, 278; dispute between, and
Lord Baltimore, 280; complaints of, to
the Treasury, 284; prepare the Naviga-
tion Act of 1696, 285 ; and the working of
the Act, 287; and the vice-admiralty
courts, 287, 296; their instructions to the
colonies, 289; and the appointment of
naval officers in the colonies, 291;
creation (1767) of an American Board of
Customs Commissioners, 293; 299; order
the seizure of all foreign ships found in
the West Indian Ports (1764), 345; 413;
414; 419; Board appointed for America
by Townshend, 664
Common Sense, by Thomas Paine, 683
Commonwealth, hostility of Europe to,
209 ; colonies refuse to recognise, 211-12;
Navigation Acts of, 213-18; submission
of colonies to, 218-20; war with the
Dutch, 222-4; the Protectorate and war
with Spain, 226-9; Treaty of, with
Portugal, 230; the colonies under the
Commonwealth and Protectorate, 231-8;
606; and the Navy, 507
57
INDEX
Company, African, founded under Charles
II to prosecute the Slave Trade, 7; slave
monopoly of, 243; seizes part of the
Guinea coast, 311, 336; attempts of
Charles II and William III to secure
Asiento contract, 334; agreement of,
with the South Sea Company to supply
slaves for the Spanish American market,
336; revision of agreement, 337; 415;
440-50; the new "Company of Mer-
chants trading to Africa", 450 seqq.; 813
Company, " the Amazons ", 1 39 ; planting,
not gold, main purpose of, 140; tobacco
grown by, 140; suppression of, by the
Spaniards, 143; 214
Company, East India, founded 1600, 4;
6; 8; 9; 12; 41; 54; 65; 75; 77; 78 ;84;
127; contests with Portuguese and Dutch,
131, 142; 214; given control of Guinea
interests (1657], 237, 438-9; the struggle
between the old and die new East India
Companies and their fusion, 264; the
occupation of St Helena, 265; quarrels
of, with Dutch, 316; suffers from com-
petition of Ostend Company, 364; 525;
547; and the export of bullion, 562-3;
and the American boycott of tea, 673
Company, Eastland, revived by Elizabeth,
39;6i;65
Company, French Asiento, 526; 334
Company, French East India, founded by
Colbert, 310; 525; 547; suopression of,
by Choiseul, 688
Company, French West India, founded by
Colbert, 310; and West Africa, 441
Company, Guinea, incorporated 1630,
237; suffers from attacks of Prince
Rupert, the Dutch and the Danes, 230;
placed under the control of the East
India Company by Cromwell, 237-8
Company, Hudson's Bay, founded in 1670,
7 > 508-9; territories taken over in 1869,
15; troubles with the French and the
Treaty of Utrecht, 264, 545; 510
Company, Kathai, 35; joint-stock com-
pany started by Martin Frobisher, 59,
01 ; 66
Company, Levant, 2; 41; founding of
(1581), 65; 75; 76; 78
Company, the Massachusetts Bay, obtains
charter, 159; emigration of ruling
members to America, 160; becomes the
civil government of the colony, 161-2;
privileges untouched by Commonwealth,
220; withdrawal of charter, 283
Company, Muscovy, privileges granted to,
by Ivan the Terrible, 40; expedition of
Jenkinson, /"•• °"11 — •• — —
memorial <
reorpnisatL ._, UJ, _„
blocked by Tartars, 65; provides capital
for Fenton's expedition, 66; jealous of
Gilbert, 66; supports CarleuPsschemefor
colonising Newfoundland, 67; 75; 78;
trading to Africa
284, 324. See also
80; develops profitable trade hi walrus
and whale products, 89
Company, Netherlands East India, 6, 127;
great size of army and navy, 304
Company, Netherlands West India, 6,
441-2; founding of, 140-1 ; 179
"Company of Adventurers trading to
Gynney and Bynney", promoted bv Sir
William St John, 139; traffic of, in slaves,
139; history of, 4; ~
"Company of Scoi
and the Indies
Darien
Company, Ostend, founded by Charles VI
in 1722, 364 ; early successes of, 364
Company, Providence, 166-7; 225; 226
Company, Somers Island, founded 1609
with Smythe as first governor, 85; incurs
hostility of Spain, 85; 89; and the
Smythe-Sandys rivalry, 140; and the
tobacco contract, 149; favourable report
of the commission of enquiry (1624) in
the affairs of, 151; directs governor to
call colonists into council, 1 52 ; surrenders
its functions to the Crown (1684), 151,
247; reconstructed under the Common-
wealth, 220
Company, South Sea, 9; founded under
the Presidency of Harley, 335; obtains
the Asiento concession and the right of
the annual ship, 336; difficulties of, with
the people of Jamaica, 337-8; factors in
South American ports, 338; its troubles
with Spanish-American officials, 340;
illicit trade of, 340-2; refuses to accept
the Convention Treaty, 343 ; loses its con-
cessions at the Peace of 1748, 344-5; 370
Company, Spanish, 36
Company, Virginia, founding of, in 1606,
75; charter of, 79; second charter, 81;
third charter, 82; encourages tobacco
growing, 84; charter extended to include
the Bermudas, 85; 89; 113; anti-Spanish
faction oust Smythe from treasurership
of, 140; failure of, to pay a dividend, 147;
committee to consider the reform of the
government of Virginia, 150; the revoca-
tion of the charter (1624), 151; final
disappearance of, circa 1632, 151; 152;
grants licence to Mayflower Pilgrims,
IS6-?; 167
Gompton, in Devon, 105
Concord, military stores at, 680, 718
Conde", victories of (1672-4), 317
Conflans, French admiral, 533
Congaree, River, 402
Connecticut, emigration from Massachu-
setts to, 162-3; favoured by Clarendon,
251; expansion of, 251; and the con-
quest of New Netherland, 252; receives
royal charter (1662) and absorbs New
Haven, 258; loses its charter (1686), 260;
charter restored in 1691, 262; 288;
customs officials in, 291, 292; 385; 392;
INDEX
899
education in, 399; 409; 429; 594; vote
by ballot in, 608, 620 ; and contributions
to military expenses, 636; 639; 641 ; 68 1 ;
literature and social life in, 784; sump-
tuary laws in, 796 ; 806
Considerations on the German War, 504
Consolato del Mare, code of maritime law,
548 seqq.
Constantinople, 2; 23; 65
Continental Congress, the, 676 seqq.; the
second, 68 r seqq.; reception of the five
Commissioners of Peace, 766; 770
"Continuous Voyage", doctrine of, 552
Contraband, 554 seqq.
Convention Parliament of 1660, Naviga-
tion Act of, 271
Conway, Henry Seymour, member of the
Rockingham ministry, 659; 662; 663;
resignation of, 666; and the Boston Tea
Party, 674; 768; Commander-in-Chief,
7^9
Cook, James, Captain, in the South Seas, 535
Coote, Sir Eyre, victory of, at Wandewash,
485; 530; 756 „ , „ J .
Coram, Thomas, and the foundation of
Georgia, 395
Cordova, Spanish admiral, 744-6; 750; 757
Cormantine, on the Gold Coast, 237;
438-9544I; 457
Cornbury, Edward, Lord, Governor of New
York, peculations of, 387; 417
Cornwallis, Governor of Nova Scotia, in-
structions sent to, as to Acts of Trade, 286
Cornwallis, Charles, ist Marquis, advances
through New Jersey, 724; at Brandywine,
733-4; in Carolina, 747~8> 751-2; m
Virginia, 753; 760; 767
Coromandel, coast of, 496
Corsica, considered by Choiseul as more
important to France than Canada, 302;
694; annexation of, by France, 697
Corunna, failure of Drake's attempt on, 123
Cosby, William, Governor of New York,
388; and the Zenger affair, 399-400;. a
"greedy proconsul", 417
Cosmographia, of Sebastian Minister, trans-
lated by Richard Eden, 55
Cotton, u; 14; grown in the West Indies
during the seventeenth century, 209;
and the Navigation Laws, 567
Council of State, colonies placed under
care of, Act of 1649, 214; appoints stand-
ing committee for trade and foreign
affairs, 215; superseded by the Lord
Protector's Council, 215; and the West
African trade, 238
Council of Trade and Navigation appointed
by Cromwell (1651)), 234; and the West
African trade, 238-9; 613
Counter-Reformation, 53
Courteen, Sir William, financial venture
of, in Barbados, 144; ousted from Bar-
bados by Carlisle, 171-2; the claims of
his descendants, 241
Cove, Cupid's, on Bay of Conception, 90
Coventry, Thomas, Lord Keeper, reports
in favour of Carlisle's claim to Barbados,
171
Coxe, William, quoted, 370
Craftsman, The, Bolingbroke's writings in,
625; colonial proposals in, 628
Craven, William, Earl of, one of the eight
Creeks, Red Indian tribe, 391
Grefeld, battle of, 479
Crespy, Peace of, 34, 35
Crisp, Sir Nicholas, and trade with Africa,
Cromwell, Oliver, 56; 134; foreign policy
0£ 135; contemplates emigrating under
the Providence Company, 166; 175; ex-
pels Parliament, 208; dislikes war with
Dutch, 222 ; becomes Lord Protector, 224;
his "Western Design", 225-6, 228-9;
foreign policy of, 222, 225-30; the con-
quest of Jamaica, 232; colonial policy
of, 233-8; 608
Crown, 2; 7; 13; 31; 45; relations of, with
colony of Virginia, 79; Secretary Calvert
maintains that the dominions in America
lie beyond the province of Parliament
(1621), 148, 151; Crown takes over the
government of Virginia, 151-2, and of
Bermuda, 247; government of colonies to
be immediately dependent upon (1625),
167; denies competence of Parliament to
consider colonial affairs, 175; and the
powers of colonial governors, with regard
to the appointment of "Naval Officers",
291 ; relations between, and the colonies
(1660-1763), 405-37, 625; 763-4
Crown Point, French station in North
America, foundation of, 363; 391; 470;
captured by volunteers from Connecti-
cut, 681, 718; 725
Cuba, 497; given back to Spain at the
Peace of Paris, 502; 779
Cuddalore, 526
Cudjoe, leader of runaway slaves in
Jamaica, 383
Culliford, William, Inspector-General of
exports and imports, 570
Culpeper, Thomas, Lord, Virginia grant
to (1673), 257; governor of Virginia,
ordered to apply Poynings's Act to
Virginia, 406
Cumberland, George, 3rd Earl of, 123;
his attempt to conquer Porto Rico, 126
Cumberland, William Augustus, Duke of,
military tactics of, 374; victory of, at
CuUoden, 375; 468; and Pitt, 475; and
the convention of Klosterzeven, 476;
Cumberland, Fort, 637
Cummings, Archibald, customs officer,
652
57-2
goo
INDEX
Curacoa, Dutch trading post in the West
Indies, facilities of, for illicit trade with
Spanish Main, 221 ; proposal of Colbert
to annex, 317; 590
Currency, 37; in the North American
colonies, 397-8; 597-8
D'Abreu, Spanish ambassador, 487
Dahomey, 453
Dale, Sir Thomas, succeeds Lord de la
Warr as Governor of Virginia, 83; takes
service under East India Company, 84,
1 10 ; Sir Edwin Sandys on, 112
Damascus, 65
Dampier, William, voyage of, to the South
Seas, 332 5344; 517-18
Danbury, 727
Daniel, Samuel, Musophilus of, 126
D'Anville, Jean-Baj>tiste, Sieur, carto-
grapher of Africa, in the reign of Louis
XV,
arby, George, Vice-Admiral, 750, 756-7
Dardanelles, and the sovereignty of the
Darby,
sea» 539
Dare, Ananias,
one of the "City of
Raleigh" colonists, 75
Darien, unsuccessful colony of Scots at,
2255265; 284; 324
Dartmouth, Gilbert's expedition sails from,
64; 105
Dartmouth, William Legge, 2nd Earl of,
Secretary for the Colonies, 718; 723
Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, 399
Dassell, Antony, London merchant, mem-
ber of Companyfor trading with Africa, 73
Davenant, Charles, opinion of, on the
value of India, 303-4; on the French
settlements on the Mississippi, 325 ; on the
mercantile system, 563; and the under-
population of England, 565 ; on colonial
law, 615; 619-20: 622
Davenport, John, Puritan minister, leader
of the Newhaven settlement, 165
Davis, John, voyage of, in search of North-
West Passage, 70; 89; 108; 116; pub-
lishes The Seaman9 s Secrets, 131; sights
Falkland Islands, 698
Dejwre belli libri tres, by Albericus Gentilis,
205
De jure belli ac pads, by Hugo Grotius,
201-6; 548
Dejwre et qfficiis bellicis et disciplina militari,
by Balthazar Ayala, 205
Dejurepraedae, 202-3
Dejusto imperio, by Seraphim de Freitas, a
Portuguese monk, a reply to Mare
Liberum, 203
Deane, Richard, Admiral, 133
Deane, Silas, Envoy to France from the
Continental Congress, 683; 705 seqq.
Decker, Matthew, 592
Declaration of Paris (1856) and neutral
hts, 549
atory Act, 66 1
Dee, Dr John, physician and astrologer,
purchases patent from Gilbert, 66; his
Brytish Monarchic, and his opinions on the
sovereignty of the sea, 198
"Deficiency" laws of Jamaica, attempt to
encourage the keeping of white servants,
380
Defoe, Daniel, 241
Delaware, Swedish settlement of, captured
by the Dutch, 251 ; captured by English
in 1664, 252; included in Perm's grant,
255; foundation of the separate colony of
Delaware (1702), 255; 392; 680; and
the Declaration of Independence, 684;
literature and social life in, 784
Delaware River, 86; 726; 734; 739
de Lede, Marquis, 546
Delight, ship of Sir Humphrey Gilbert,
1 06
Denmark, 68; treaty of, with Common-
wealth, 135,224; claims of, to sovereignty
of the sea, 195, 204, 539; treaty of, with
Dutch to exclude English from the
Sound, 224; attacks of Danes on the
Guinea Company, 237; control of, over
the Sound, a menace to English ship-
building, 305; French offer for Danish
station on Malabar coast, 310; ally of
England in the War of the Spanish
Succession, 325; the war with Sweden
and the Peace of Nystad, 361-2; Danish
stations on the Gold Coast, 452; protests
against the "Rule of the War 011756",
552J556
Deptford, Drake knighted at, 102
D'Esnambuc, joins forces with Warner at
St Christopher, 144
Destouches, French admiral, 751
Detroit, 391; 637-8; 640
Dettingen, battle of, 373
Devolution, War of, 315
Devon, 23 542; 67; 97-8
Devonshire, William Cavendish, 4th Duke
of, 474; removed from the list of Privy
Councillors, 498
Diaz, Bartholomew, rounds Cape of Good
Hope, 183
Dickinson, John, Philadelphia lawyer, his
Letters from a Farmer, 665; 679
Dickinson, Thomas, 656-7
Dieppe, 33; surrender of, to the Catholics,
.55 .
Dinwiddie, Robert, succeeds Spotswood as
Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia, 394;
467
Discourse of Trade to tfie East Indies, by
Thomas Mun, 130
Discourse of Western Planting, by Richard
Hakluyt, written to further Raleigh's
Virginia enterprise, 67; 114
Discourse of Winds, by William Dampier, 5 1 7
Discovery, hired from Muscovy Company,
sailed with colonists to Virginia (1606),
80
INDEX
901
Dissolution of the monasteries, 36; 37; 38
Dobbs, Arthur, Governor of North Caro-
lina, 794
Dominic Soto, declares that the law of
nations is equal to both Christians and
pagans, 192
Dominica, 466; 486; capture of, 489; 492;
497; 534; ports of, made free to foreign
vessels, 60 1; 642; 660; captured by
d'Estaing, 741; 758; restored at the
Peace of Versailles, 781
Dongan, Thomas, Colonel, Governor of
New York (1682-8), 253; 286
Donop, Hessian commander at Trenton,
726
Dorchester Neck, 721
Dorset, Thomas Sackville, Earl of, pen-
sioner of Spain, 111
Douglas, Admiral Sir James, 534
Dover, Dutch sink Spanish reinforcements
in Bay of, 128; Dutch and Spanish fleets
fight in harbour of, 190
Dover, secret Treaty of (1670), 316
Downing, George, promoter of Navigation
Acts, 271; 273
Downshire, Wills Hill, Marquis of (Vis-
count Hillsborough), President of Board
of Trade, 641 ; Secretary for the Colonies,
667 seqq[.
Drake, Sir Bernard, seizes Spanish and
Portuguese fishing barks off Newfound-
land, 70
Drake, Sir Francis, 4; 45; accompanies
John Hawkins, 49; 50; 51; 56; voyage
round the world, 61, 100-2; 65; 66;
sails with thirty yessels for Spanish Indies,
71; 72; upbringing and early career of,
98-100; 107; return of, 115; 116; con-
quest of Cartagena, 119; expedition to
Cadiz, 121; and the Armada, 122; un-
successful attempt on Lisbon, 123; 124;
last venture of, 126; 190; 199
Draper, Sir William, Colonel, receives the
surrender of Manila, 693
Drax, James, promoter of the Navigation
Acts, 271
Drayton, Michael, quoted, 126
Droghcda, Cromwell at, 1 33
Dubois, Cardinal, George I secures Arch-
bishopric of Cambrai for, 357
Ducket, Sir Lionel, Spanish trader, 36;
managed African voyages under Eliza-
beth, 44; backed John Hawkins's slaving
expedition, 47
Duddingston, Captain of the Gaspie, 671
Dudley, Joseph, Governor of Massachusetts,
522; 574
Dummer, Jeremiah, his Defence of the New
England Charters, 386; 389; 798
Dunbar, Colonel, Governor of Nova
Scotia, 388
Dunbar campaign of Cromwell, 133
Dunes, battle of the, leads to capture o
Dunkirk, 229
Dunkers, 403
Dunkirk, 97; 121; 122; Admiral Blake
enables Spaniards to capture, 227; ceded
to England by the Treaty of the Pyrenees,
229; visit of Louis XIV to, 319; forti-
fications of, razed, by Treaty of Utrecht,
328; 491; 691; 781
Dunmore, John, 4th Earl of, Governor of
Virginia, 68 1; 718
Dunning, John, istLord Ashburton, 768-9
Dupleix, Joseph, Governor-General of
French India, 468; 525; 548
Duquesne, Abraham de Menneville, French
admiral under Louis XIV, 3 1 8
Duquesne, Ange, Marquis, French Gover-
nor of Canada, 467
Duquesne, Fort, French fort on the Ohio
River, construction of, 394; 467; 470;
capture of, 479; renamed ftttsburg, 479
Durham, county palatine of, proprietary
colonies modelled on, 168-9
Dutch, 6; 7; 8; 63; occupation of Brazil by,
77; expeditions under Hudson, 86; lay
claim to land between Cape Cod and the
Delaware, 86; in Guiana, 86; use oil for
manufacture of soap, 89; 112-13;
Elizabeth openly supports rebellion of,
119; 120; good cargo boats of, 126; in
the East Indies, 127, 304; found the
Universal East India Company, 127;
naval victories of, over Spain, 128; peace
of 1609 with Spain, 128; attempt of
James I to tax Dutch fishermen
English seas, 130, 200; annihi
Spanish fleet in English waters (16
132; war of the Commonwealth wi
133-5; peace of 1654 with, 135; West
India Company of, 140; alliance of, with
England against Spain (1625), I42> J5^>
from Manhattan, establish trading posts
along the Connecticut River, 162; com-
petition of, with English in the West
Indies, 175; 189; disputes over the
sovereignty of the sea, 198-205, 538-43;
208; sympathy of, with English Royalists,
209; trade of, with English colonies in
America during the Civil War and after,
210-11; Navigation Acts of 1650-51
aimed primarily at, 215-18; the nature
of their colonies in America, 220-21;
the First Dutch War, 221-4, 507; terms
of peace treaty with (1654), 224; rivalry
of, with Guinea Company, 237; supply
negro slaves to West Indies, 237; the war
of 1665-7 and the Peace of Breda, 242-3,
311-14, 508; the conquest of the Dutch
possessions in North America, 281-4;
508; capture and loss of St Helena by,
265; trade of, with English colonies, 277,
281, 283; 300; 301 ; 303; their restriction
of trade, 304-6; 309-10; 315-16; war
with England and France (1672), 317-
18, 508; and the war of the Grand
Alliance, 320-2; and the War of the
n
annihilate
902
INDEX
Spanish Succession, 325-9 ; 347 ; relations
with England during the eighteenth
century, 355; in West Africa, 439, 441.
444-6; 463; and Neutral Rights, 548
seqq.; and blockade, 555 seqq.; 590;
influence of, on the ideas of the Puritans,
604; war between England and (17 ~ "
715^16, 750, 756-9; 773-4; and
Peace of 1784, 781
Dutton, Sir R., Governor of Barbados, 817
Eden, Richard, authority for Cabot's
voyages, 28; serves in Normandy with
Huguenots, 54; friend of Sebastian
Cabot, 55
Edisto, River, 402
Edward III, King of England, claims
sovereignty of English seas, 197; 555
Edward IV, King of England, recognises
Papacy's African grant to Portugal, 184
Edward VI, King of England, 38; 39; 41 ;
§o; 51; 147
Edward, Fort, Burgoyne at, 730-2
Edwards, Bryan, 818
Edwards, Jonathan, religious revivalist, 404
Edwards, Samuel, American divine, 802-3
Egg Island, in the St Lawrence, 523
Egmont, John Perceval, 2nd Earl of, at
the Admiralty, 687; 698
Egmont, Port, harbour of West Falkland,
Egremont, Charles Wyndham, 2nd Earl
of, 494-5; 640-1 m
Egypt, u; 24; 65; proposal of Leibniz
with regard to, 313; Choiseul and, 697
ElDoradOjRaleighobsessedbystoriesof, no
Elfrith, first man to carry negroes to
Virginia, 113
Elizabeth, Queen of England, 4; 31; 35;
39; 42 ; 45-7; backs Hawkins, 49; 50; and
the navy, 5 1 ; 52 ; 53 ; and Stukely's expe-
dition, 55; forbids attacks on Spaniards,
59; lack of interest in affairs outside
Europe, 61; sends Walsingham to Paris
on marriage negotiations, 65; 71 ; partner
in trading and privateering enterprises,
71; Raleigh loses favour with, 74; 75;
death of, 76; 88; subscribes to Drake's
voyage, 99; encourages Frobisher to look
for gold, 103; keeps Raleigh at home,
113; openly supports Dutch, 119; 120;
caution of (1587-8), 121; 128; 138; 156;
denies that discovery alone constitutes a
valid title to colonial possessions, 185;
protests to Henry III, 190; on neutrality
and contraband, 190; attitude of, to
maritime jurisdiction, 197-9
Elizabeth, Empress of Russia, seizes throne
in 1741, 372; 462; 471; death of, 944
Elizabeth Farnese, Queen of Spain, and
Anglo-Spanish trading; relations, 339;
344; her Italian ambitions, 364-9; loses
her husband and her power, 374
Elizabeth, sailing with Drake in 1577, 101
Elizabeth Island, named by Drake, 100
Elliot, George Augustus, Lord Heathfield,
Governor of Gibraltar, 759
Elrnina, Portuguese headquarters on the
Gold Coast, 43; 46; Frobisher a prisoner
at, 59
Elyot, Hugh, member of Bristol syndicate
for trade with the North-West, 27; 28
Emigration, 5; colonial enterprises of
Huguenots, 54-6; plan for settling
English recusants in North America, 66;
emigration of unemployed urged under
Elizabeth, 69; attempt to settle Brownists
on shores of the St Lawrence, 74;
forcible emigration of" idle and wretched
people", 112; 135-8; 605; to Virginia,
71, 79,80, 83, 112; to the West Indies,
143, 144, 167, 171-3; to Nova Scotia,
153-5; Mayflower Pilgrims, 157-8; and
Massachusetts Bay Company, 159-60;
to Maryland, 169-70; flow of, ceases at
Civil War, 179; under the indenture
system, 234-5; emigration in due pro-
portion ceases at the Restoration, 239; to
Georgia, 368, 395-6; of Foreign Protes-
tants to British colonies, 401-3; thought
to be bad for England, 564; Sir Josiah
Child on, 565; 574
Emmanuel the Fortunate. King of Portu-
gal* 53
Endeavour > Captain Cook's ship. 536
Endicott, John, sent out to prepare the
way for the Massachusetts Bay colonists,
159
England's Treaswe by Forraign Trade, by
Thomas Mun, 563
Erie, Lake, 390; 546
Erving, case concerning, in vice-admiralty
court of Massachusetts, 298
Eskimos, 27; Frobisher catches specimen
of, 103; thievish propensities of, 103
Esopus, on the Hudson, 731
Essequibo River, 87
711; captures Grenada and St Vincent,
715; on the coast of North America,
739-40; in the West Indies, 741-2; his
attack on Savannah, 743, 747
Eton, 105
Eugene, of Savoy, Prince, 301; 327; 356;
his victories over the Turks, 358; 359;
death of, 369
Evelyn, John, his opinion of the war of
1665-7, 313, of the war of 1672, 317
Excise Bill of Walpole, failure of, in 1733,
349, 368
Extra-territoriality, granted by Turks, 2
Falkland, Lucius, 2nd Lord, 91
Falkland Islands, dispute between England
and Spain as to possession of, 8; annexa-
tion of, by Byron, 535, 698; Chatham
INDEX
90S
and, 694-6; the dispute with Spain over,
FSy7compact, die first, between France
and Spain, signed in 1733, 342-4; 3695
third, of 1761, 492J the second, ,524; 534
Fane, Francis, K.G., member of the Board
Farewell, John Strong's ship, 698
M*. H.M. sioop-of-war, at the Falk-
land Islands, 699
i,W.,79i
i, Richard, Archbishop of Armagh,
i enroii* VJ«*K«*»" — — .. , •*•
second in command, disastrous voyage
of 66; Elizabeth's instructions to, on his
voyage to the East, 193 . ,_. ,
Fenwick John, Quaker, with Edward
Byllyng buys Lord Berkeley's rights in
New Jersey, 253
Ferdinand of Aragon, 25; 192
Ferdinand VI, King of Spam, policy of his
aueen, 374; 480; death of, 480
FerdinaAd, Duke of Brunswick, 478; 482-
Fefg£,. Patrick, Major, at King's
Fernandes, Francisco and Joao, natives of
die Azores, associated in the Bristol enter-
Fer>na?do2po,2ceded to Spain by Portugal,
F &, Nicholas, of Little Adding, 113;
lieutenant of SanJLys in the Virginia
dispute, 151
Ferrol, 125 _
Ferryland, Lord Baltimore at, 181
Feudal system, 22; resemblance of pro-
prietary system to, 170
***^°ft%l$ffii£&*,
Fisheries, in ,
Bristol, 29; decay of Iceland fisheries, 60;
English curing process, 60; Burghleys
encouragement of, 60; North American,
60, 397; attack on Spanish and Por-
tuguese fishermen off Newfoundland by
Bernard Drake, 70; Breton and Biscayan
fishermen off Canada, 74; Dutch com-
petition in North America, 86; 89; and
Royal Navy, 90, 130; attempt of James
to tax Dutch nshermen in hnghsh seas,
130, 200; the New England monopoly in,
147- Sandys's bill for free fishing, 148-9;
not always conducive to colonisation,
154; and the sovereignty of the sea, 198-
205, 539-43; the Treaty of Utrecht and
the Nlwfouridland fisheries, 264, 328;
Scottish, 265; herring fisheries lost to
Dutch, 316; 491-2; 495; 502; 508; 5b7»
duty on the whale fishery removed by
FitzHuj
Fitzralp
191
Flemings, 22; 25; hostility between English
and, 32-5, 63-4
Fletcher, Francis Drake's chaplain, 100
Fletcher, Benjamin, Governor of New
York, 805; 811-12
Fleury, Cardinal, supplants Bourbon as
first minister of Louis XV, 366; his
character and policy, 366; supports
England in the war of 1727, 367; 369;
371; death of, 373
Flores of the Azores, Sir Richard Grenvdle
Florida^; 55 J 66; 67; 77; Spaniards from,
attack Carolina, 250; colonial agent for,
4345 acquired by Great Britain at the
Peace of Paris in 1763, 505; 639-40; 642;
683; 705; 715; during the War of Inde-
pendence, 719, 743, 756, 770-1,781
Flonda, Blanca, Count of, Spanish states-
man, succeeds Grimaldi, 713
Flushing, required by Elizabeth as pledge,
in return for troops, 119; kept at Treaty
of London, 128
Fonseca, grant of, to the Earl of Mont-
gomery, 145
Fontenoy, French victory at, 374
Forde, Francis, captures Masulipatam, 403,
530
Formosa, 704 .
Fort Coligny, French outpost in boutn
Fort-le-Bceuf, French outpost in Ohio, 467;
637
Fort Royal, in Martinique, 512 ; 534 „ _
Fouquet, Nicholas, Colbert effects fall of,
307
Fwi*y,H.M.S.,68i
Fox, Charles James, 705; 762-3; 7WJ5
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 709; 770;
772 seqq.; resignation of, 775; «» Fox'
North coalition, 782
Fox, Henry, 498
j, envoy to France, 775,
France, 2; 6; 7; 8;ii;a3; 2£ 3l1"7* 4V-
46- 47: 51; 58; 60; fishing fleets of, 61;
supports Fhihp IPs rival for Portuguese
throne, 63; 68; peace with Spain (1598)5
7* • French in Guiana, 86 ; Richelieu and
French fleet, 115; decline of French navy
during religious wars, 117; interference
of Spain and England in, 120; becomes
leading Mediterranean Power, 132;
protests against Alexander's colony ol
ftova Scoua, 154; bar patronage off
Royahst exiles, 209; begins ™>ffiaal
maritime war against the Common-
wealth, 209; Cromwell's relations with,
226-7; treaty of, with England (1655),
229; Treaty of the Pyrenees with Spain,
22Q 218: joins the Dutch against Br-
land (1666), 242, 508; the war in
904
INDEX
West Indies, 242-3, 508; evasion of Acts
of Trade in the West Indies, 284; 300-6;
the commercial policy of Colbert, 306-1 1 ,
320-1 ; alliance of, with Dutch, 311-14;
Turenne's conquests, 315; alliance with
England against Dutch (1672), 316-18,
* - - - A 'Alliance,
the war with the Grand j
320-1, 509, 513-18; the Partition
Treaties, 322-3; the War of the Spanish
Succession, 325-9; competition with
English trade in Caribbean, 334, 345;
ike pastes defamille withSpain, 342-4, 309,
492, 524> 5345 346; SS1^; "nd^ the,
regent Orleans, 356-65; the Treaties of
Hanover and Seville, 366-7; the War of
the Polish Succession, 368-9; 369-71;
the War of the Austrian Succession,
371-6; Seven Years' War, -160-506; and
neutral rights, 549 seqq.; 685 seqq.; and
the rebellious North American colonists,
705 seqq.; recognises the independence of
the United States, 710; war with Eng-
land, 71 1 seqq.; 766-7; 770 seqq.; the
Peace of Versailles, 781. See also under
French
Franche-Comte', ceded to France by the
treaty of Nymegen, 318
Francis I of France, supports tropical
enterprises, 32; 189
Francis of Lorraine, husband of Maria
Theresa, 372
Franklin, Benjamin, his opinion of the
prospects of Georgia, 368; his "Albany
Plan of Union", 392; editor of the
Pennsylvania Gazette, 599; 468; 546; 630;
and taxation for military expenses, 637;
his attitude towards the Stamp Act,
650-1; 660; 670; and the
72-3; and the Boston
Tea Party, 674; 684; sent as agent to
France, 708-9; 711; 763; negotiation
with Shelburne and Oswald, 770 seqq.;
807
Frederick the Great, official Protestantism
of, 352; his invasion of Silesia, 371 ; and
the War of the Austrian Succession,
372-6; 462; 465; 469; 471-2; and the
Seven Years' War, 475 seqq.
Frederick William, Elector of Branden-
burg (the Great Elector), 303; alliance
of, with William III, 318
Free Port Act of 1766, 345
Free Trade, 13; 14; 18; English demand
for, with Spanish Indies, 76; 88; free
fishing bill of Sandys, 148
Freedom, Religious, 5; colonial enterprises
of the Huguenots, 54-6; plan for settling
English recusants in North America, 66;
attempt to settle Brownists on the shores
of the St Lawrence, 74; desire for, factor
in colonisation, 136-8; complete lack of,
in Massachusetts, 162, 795-6; in M
land, 170-1; in Rhode Island, 170,
religious toleration in New York, ew
Jersey, and Pennsylvania, 253-5; Gon'
necticut and Massachusetts disregard
orders from England to abandon the
religious test, 258; enforced by Andros in
Boston, 260; and the Quebec Act, 789
French in India, 306; Colbert's East India
Company, 310; recovery of Pondicherry
from the Dutch, 321; 323; capture of
Madras and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle,
376, 547-8; defeated at Wandewash,
485; loss of Pondicherry, 489; 525-6;
529-30; war with the English (1778),
713; and the Peace of Versailles, 779-81
French in North America, 73; settlement
in Acadia, 86; founding of Quebec, 74;
protest against colonisation of Nova
Scotia, 154; settlements captured by the
British, 154; given back by treaties of
Susa and St Germain-en-Laye, 155; ex-
pansion of, from Montreal and Quebec,
248; frontier rivalry with, on upper
Hudson, 259; James IFs treaty for the
maintenance of the status quo in America,
260, 542; the Treaty of Utrecht and the
French in Newfoundland and Hudson
Bay, 264, 543; fostering of French
Canada by Colbert, 310-11; Jack Hill's
expedition against Canada, 327; the
provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht, 328,
523, 545; the occupation of Niagara,
Grown Point and Ticonderoga, 363; the
war of 1 740-8 in America, and the Peace
of Aix-la-Chapelle, 375-6, 525; advance
of, along the Mississippi, 302, 325, 390,
_ j the war of 1754-6?, 39*, 394>
70 ; claims on Ohio, 465-8 ; 472 seqq. ;
i of Louisbourg, 479; loss of Quebec
and Montreal, 482-3, 530-3; the Peace
of Paris, 509; 510-1 1 ; 515-17; 522; 589-
91 5685; 691
French in West Africa, 441-2; 446-8;
capture of French forts in Senegal, 454,
479; Senegal returned to French by
Treaty of Versailles (1783), 457-8, 781;
466; 502-3; trade with the English, 579-
80; 685; 704; fighting with the Eng"
1779^
.713
Society of, buys Berkeley's and
Carteret's rights in New Jersey, 253-4;
friendship of James, Duke of York, for,
254; reasons for the unpopularity in
England of, 254; Pennsylvania, 255-6,
263; objection to the use of carnal
weapons, 390, 393; and the War of In-
dependence, 763; persecution of, in
Massachusetts, 797, 809, in Barbados,
815
Frobisher, Martin, searches for North-West
Passage, 35; served on expedition to
Guinea Coast, 43; captured by negroes,
46; 47; prisoner at Elmina, 59; interests
Lord Warwick in northern passage to the
East, 59; 65; 66; 70; 95; voyages to
discover North-West Passage, 102-4;
INDEX
905
death of, 104; 107; 116; and the Armada,
122; 123
Frobisher's Bay, 103
Fronde, the, 227
Frontenac, Louis de Buade, Comte de, in
Canada, 511
Frontenac, Fort, 479
Fry, Colonel, victory of, at Great Meadows,
394
Fuentes, Spanish ambassador in London,
487
Fuggers, German financial house, 30; 31
Fuller, Thomas, his description of
Frobisher, 104
Fundamental Orders, the constitution of
Connecticut until the charter of Charles II,
163
Fundy, Bay of, 259
Fur trade, in Virginia, 80; Dutch com-
petition in North America, 86; 88; fur
traders from Plymouth along the Con-
necticut River, 162; French, hi North
America, 465; 795
Gabarus Bay, 530
Gabriel, Frobisher's ship, 103
Gage, Thomas, author of The English
American, 227
Gage, Thomas, General, succeeds Amherst
in America, 639; closes the port of
Boston, 675; 676; 679; and Bunker's
Hill, 681, 718^19
Galiam, Italian jurist, and the sovereignty
of the seas, 541
Galloway, Joseph, 676
Gambia, 73; first English fort built in, 139;
slave trade in, 438 seqq.; rivalry with the
Dutch in, 441, 457, with the French, 446,
448> 453; the province of Senegambia,
454-8; 713
Gaspfe, H.M.S., fired by Rhode Islanders,
671
Gates, Horatio, American general, 731;
receives Burgoyne's surrender, 732;
defeat of, at Gamden, 747; 751
Gates, Sir Thomas, despatched with 500
colonists to Virginia, 82 ; wrecked, 83
Gee, Joshua, 571 ; 577-8; 592; 624
General History of Virginia, by Captain John
Smith, no
Genoa, 2 ; 25; 30; claims the sovereignty of
the Ligunan Sea, 195; 319-20
Gentilis, Albericus, Italian jurist, Regius
Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, 189;
barbarian lands not temtoria nullius, 192;
his Hispamcae Advocationis, 203; his Dejure
belli libri tres, 205
Gentleman, Tobias, pamphleteer, 130
George I, King of Great Britain, 332;
character of, and attitude of, towards
England, 350-1 ; and Dubois, 357; 625
George II, King of Great Britain, attitude
of, towards Parliament and England,
350; quarrels of, with his father, 362;
a miser, 460; his attachment to Hanover,
463* 473 y Pi" and, 473 seqq.; his death,
George III, King of Great Britain, 474
seqq.; 534; 624; 626; and the Stamp
Act, 658; 668; 679 seqq.; 764 seqq.
Georgia, colony of, founded by General
Oglethorpe, 8; 10; dispute over boun-
daries of, 344; 368; 377; 415; 431;
colonial agent for, 434; 524; 680; joins
the rebellion, 681; 743; literature and
social life in, 784
Geraldino, Spanish representative in Eng-
land, negotiations of, with Newcastle and
Walpole, 341-3
Gerard, French minister in America, 711-
12; 770-1
Germain, Lord George, and the govern-
ment of Senegambia, 456; 683; 723;
correspondence with Howe, 728-9; and
Burgoyne's expedition, 730-3; 735 seqq.;
752-3; 760
Germantown, Washington's defeat at, 734,
764
Germany, 22 ; 25; 30-2; 38-9; intervention
of Spain in Germany, 138; Germans
settle in Pennsylvania, 255, 401-3;
Germans in New York, 261, 401-3, 575;
in South Carolina, 402-3; German
stations on the Gold Coast, 452 ; War of
the Austrian Succession, 371-6; Seven
Years' War, 460-506
Gerrard, Sir Thomas, recusant, plan of, to
settle English Roman Catholics in North
America, 66
Gerrard, Sir William, Spanish trader, 36;
member of syndicate of Barbary mer-
chants, 42-4; joins syndicate to finance
John Hawkins, 49
Gibraltar, 859; Heemskerk's victory over
the Spaniards in the Bay of, 128; trade
through Straits of, preyed upon by
Barbary pirates, 305; ceded to England
by the Treaty of Utrecht, 328, 523; 322 ;
355 37i; 476; 486; capture of, by
te, 520-1; 547; siege and relief of,
„ 715, 746, ?59> 777; 743J. 779-8o
Gilbert, Adrian, brother of Humph
70
iphrey, 62 ;
Gilbert, Humphrey, annexes Newfound-
land, 4, 1 06; serves with Huguenots in
Normandy,54 ; colonising experience of, in
Ireland, 57-8; joins Muscovy Company,
57; sells patent to John Dee, and lease
to Thomas Gerrard, 66; last expedition
of, 61-2, 67, 105-7; colonisation schemes
of, 66-7; 70; 71; 78; Discourse of, 105;
death of, 107; 108; 109; 208
Gilbert, John, brother of Humphrey, 62;
70
Gillara, of Boston, explorer in the pay of
Prince Rupert, 508
Gladwyn, Captain, his defence of Fort
Detroit, 638
INDEX
Glasgow, 280; 599; .602; 761
Goa, relations of, with Portuguese Govern-
ment, 628
Godolphin, Sydney, ist Earl of, 514
Godspeed, hired, from Muscovy Company,
sailed with colonists to Virginia, 80
Godspeed to Virginia, by Robert Gray,
missionary fervour shown in, 1 10
Goertz, Count, minister of Charles XII,
succeeds in paying troops, 358; execution
of, 361
Gold, inflow of, from America, 37; trade
in, on Gold Coast, 43, and with Guinea,
47> 50; 69; Raleigh's expedition in
search of, 91, 92 ; Frobisher sent to search
for, in Canada, 103-4; Raleigh's love of,
108-10; 1 13; 191 ; the Guinea Company's
trade in, 237; 332; 438-40
Gold Coast, trade with under Edward VI,
41, 43; Gynney Company's stations on,
438-9; 441 seqq.
Golden Hind, new name given by Drake to
the Pelican, 100; 107; return of, to
Plymouth filled with gold and silver,
Gondomar, Diego, Spanish ambassador at
court of James I, and the settlement of
Virginia, 1 1 1 ; secures the suppression of
the Amazons Company, 139
Gonsalves, Jp2o, native of the Azores,
associated in the Bristol enterprises, 27;
28
Gonson, Benjamin, son of William, London
merchant, finances voyages to Guinea
and West Indies, 35
Gonson, William, London merchant,
trades with Spain and the Levant, 35
Gordon, of Lochinvar, Sir Robert, in-
terested by Sir William Alexander in
Scottish colonial schemes, 153
Gordon Riots, 767
Goree, Dutch station in Senegal, captured
by the French, 446; 450; 453-5; 458;
4795 49i; given back to France at the
Peace of Pans, 502, 685 • 704 : recaptured,
713; 781
Gorges, Sir Ferdinando, advocate of emi-
gration, 78; interested in fur trade, 88;
moving spirit in the establishment of the
Council of New England, 147, 148, 153;
161; 169; petition of, against the Massa-
chusetts magistrates, 1 76-7 ; plans armed
expedition against Massachusetts, but
fails to get adequate support from Crown,
178; 259
Gosnold, Bartholomew, fast Governor of
James Town, 80
Gower, Lord, President of the Council,
resignation of, 767; 769
Graffenried, Chnstoph, Baron de, leader
of Swiss immigration to North Carolina,
401
Grafton, Henry Fitzroy, 3rd Duke of, 499;
659; the Pitt-Grafton ministry, 663;
7, 320-2; 518
VTs Navy,
resignation of, 668; 683; 697; 766; Lord
Privy Seal, 769; resignation of, 775
Grain Coast, 43; 4
Grand Alliance, 16
Grand Mistress, ship of
51
Grandison, Oliver, ist Viscount, member
of committee appointed by Charles I to
consider the reform of the government of
Virginia, 150
Grant, James, 740-2; 746; 760
Grantham, Thomas Robinson, 2nd Baron,
Granville, John Carteret, Earl of, see
Carteret
Grasse-Tilly, Franc.ois-J.-P., Marquis de,
French admiral, in the West Indies, 750;
753-5; 757; Rodney's victory over,
Graswinckel, Dirck, kinsman of Grotius,
author of unpublished reply to Selden's
Mare Clausum, 204
Gravelines, Armada beaten off, 122
Graves, Samuel, Admiral, 719; 721; 736;
754—5
Gray, case concerning, in the vice-admiralty
court of Massachusetts, 298
Great Harry, the second, constructed for
Henry VIII, by Henry Huttoft, 36
Great Meadows, victory of Washington at,
3945 467
Greene, Nathaniel, American general,
„ ; 756
Greenland, Frobisher at, 103
Greenwich, death of Edward VI at, 39
Greenwich Hospital, tax for the support of,
415
Grenada, 377; 534; 642; capture of, by
d'Estaing, 715, 742; restored by the
Treaty of Versailles, 781
Grenville, George, his estimate of the
returns of the Plantation duty in 1753,
293; his instructions for the seizure of
all foreign ships found in the West
Indian ports, 345; 489; 495; 498; 640;
and the American customs, 642-4; and
the Stamp Act, 645-6; 658 seqq.; 663;
his pokey towards France, 691; and
Spain, 692
Grenville, Sir Richard, interested in priva-
teering, 58; in command of expedition
to America, 71; 109; 119; death of, at
Flores of the Azores, 123
Grenville, Thomas, 772-3
Gresham, Thomas, 38
Grimaldi, Marquis de, Spanish minister for
foreign affairs, 686 seqq.; and Portugal,
692
Groseillers, explorer in the pay of Prince
Rupert, 508
Grotius, Hugo, denies claim of Papacy to
grant away barbarian countries, 184;
and the rights and duties of neutrals,
189-90; and the rights of aborigines, 192;
INDEX
907
his Mare Liberum.^ 199; 206; his De jure
belli ac pacts, 199-306, 548; 540-1; 553;
and contraband, 555
Guadeloupe, 302 ; 482 ; capture of, 483 ; 485 ;
490; 491-2; restored to France at the
Peace of Paris, 502-4, 591; 513-14;
519-20; trade of, with North American
colonies, 582; 691 ; 692
Guerchy, Claude de, French ambassador
in London, 695
Guiana, Raleigh's attemot in, 74, 75;
English, Dutch and French in, 86;
Leigh's settlement in, 86, 87; tobacco
grown in, 86; Harcourt formally an-
nexes, 87; unable to attract capital, 88;
Roe in, 91; Raleigh interested in, 109-
10; Raleigh's unsuccessful expedition to,
1 13> 138; "The Company for the Planta-
tion of Guiana ", 1 45 ; 1 56 ; and the Treaty
of Utrecht, 328 ; the Kourou disaster, 689
Guichen, Luc-Urbain, Comte de, French
naval officer, 746; Rodney's actions
against, 749; 757
Guildford, Francis North, 2nd Earl of, and
the North American colonies, 668-9 5 an(i
the tea duty, 673; 674; 680; 698; 720;
fall of, 759; 764seqq.; the Fox-North
coalition, 782
Guildford, American defeat at, 752
Guinea, English trade with, under Henry
VIII, 28, 41 , under Mary and Elizabeth,
35, 44; friction with Portuguese in, 33,
47; John Hawkins and the Slave Trade
with, 47, 48, 49; deserted by English for
Caribbean, 50; 59; claimed by Spain
under terms of Bull Inter caetera, 183;
secured to Portugal by treaty of Torde-
sillas, 184; African Company seizes part
of coast of, 3 1 1 ; 438 seqo.
Guipuzcoa, intention of Louis XIV to
annex, 323
Guisnes, M. de, French ambassador in
London, 703
Gulliver's Travels, 354; and colonisation, 623
Gunter, Edmund, applies Napier's loga-
rithms to navigation, 131
Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, 189
Guy, John, promoter of colony of New-
foundland, 90, 146; 147; opposition of,
to Sandys's free fishing bill, 148
Habeas Corpus Act, suspension of, in 1720,
Haddock, Admiral, 343
Hague Tribunal and fishing rights in
territorial waters, 543
Hakluyt, Richard, 43; author of Principal
Navigations, 44; advocate of colonisa-
tion, 67; 70; urges Raleigh to persevere,
71; 75; 78; assists in drawing up the
Virginia charter, 79; 90; 96; great
influence of, 1 14; his Discourse of Western
Planting, 114; quotation from works of,
121 ; 126; 208
Halifax, George, 2nd Earl of, 634-5; 6^~ -
Halifax, Nova Scotia, vice-admiralty court
at> 299; foundation of, 393; colonial
agent of, 434; 466; 53 1
Hamburg, 2; 64; trade of, with Greenland,
315; merchants of, eager to subscribe to
the Scotland Company, 324
Hamilton, Alexander, 657
Hamilton, Andrew, counsel for Zenger, 400
Hamilton, Lord Archibald, Governor of
Jamaica, 378, 386
Hamilton, James, 3rd Marquis of, head of
the syndicate of the "Lords Proprietors
and Adventurers" of Newfoundland,
181; takes 6000 men to the assistance of
Gustavus Adolphus, 189
Hancock, John, wealthy Boston patriot and
smuggler, 666
Hanover, effects of union with, on English
Policy, 350-1, 354; the Treaty of West-
minster (1716) and, 356; the Treaty of
Hanover and, 366; acquires Verden and
Bremen, 359, 361; influence of Hano-
verian ambitions on the Second Treaty
of Vienna, 368; and the War of the
Austrian Succession, 372-3; and the
Seven Years' War, 480, 463, 470-3,
476-8; 482; 506
Hanover, Treaty of (1726), 366
Hanover Militia, Patrick Henry at the head
of, 681
Hansa, extra-territorial privileges of, 2; 22;
31; 32; friendship between Henry VIII
and, 38; privileges revoked in 1552, 38;
restored by Mary, 38; expulsion of, from
London in 1598, 39; in Russia, 40; 51;
rivalry of, with English in Iceland
^ i_ • f
fisheries, 60
Harcourt, Robert, formally annexes Guiana,
87; unable to raise capital, 88; 139;
promoter of the "Company for the
Plantation of Guiana", 143
Hardwicke, Philip Yorke, ist Earl of, and
the Seven Years' War, 477; 486; 488;
Hardy, Sir Charles, Admiral, succeeds
Keppel, 744
Hardy, Josiah, recall of, 417
Hariot, Thomas, Raleigh's mathematical
expert, 110; 113
Harman, Sir John, Admiral, 508
Harrington, James, and the government of
the colonies, 606 seqq.
Harrison, William, 107
Hartford, Connecticut, first settlement at,
163
Hartley, David, 782
Harvard, University of, 399, 796-7; 800
Haslerig, Sir Arthur, member of the
standing committee for trade and foreign
affairs, set up in 1651, 215
Hastenbeck, Cumberland driven from, 476
Hastings, Warren, 1 1 ; and the war of 1 778,
756
go8
INDEX
Hatton, Sir Christopher, sails with Drake
(1577), 100
Havana, 123; 125; 322; 333; South Sea
Company's factory at, 338; capture of,
Hawke, Admiral, Edward, Lord, victories
of, in 1 746, 376; his victory at Quiberon
Bay, 485; and Captain Cook, 536; 547;
Hawkins, John, son of William, marries
daughter of Benj. Gonson, 35; in-
augurates Guinea slave trade, 47-8;
attacked by Spaniards, 49; 51; visits
French colonists in Florida, 56; 98; 107;
and the Armada, 122; 124; 199
Hawkins, Sir Richard, shipwright expert,
117; and the Falkland Islands, 698
Hawkins, William, of Plymouth, pioneer in
Guinea trade, 33; Brazil ventures of, 33,
36; £2; 43; death of, 47
Hawkins, William, the younger, 36
Hawley, Henry, Captain, sent out to re-
establish Carlisle's claims to Barbados,
1 72 ; joins the Warwick faction, and in-
troduces representative government, 174
Hayti, 166
Head of Elk, Howe at, 729; 733
Heath, Sir Robert, Attorney-General under
Charles I, scheme of, to establish colonies
south of Virginia, 169
Heathcote, Caleb, 805
Hedges, Sir Charles, judge of the High
Court of Admiralty, authorised to erect
vice-admiralty courts in the colonies, 296
Heemskerk, Dutch admiral, victory of,
over Spaniards in Gibraltar Bay, 128
Heinsius, 322; 327
Hell Gate Channel, 725
Henrietta, island, Puritan settlement on,
166
Henrietta Maria, Queen of Charles I,
delay in paying dowry of, 155
Henry V9 King of England, statute of,
regarding reprisals, 188
Henry VII, King of England, 3; 22; 25;
gives Cabot patent, 27; and the Hanse-
atic League, 31, 32; treaties of, with
Spain and the Netherlands, 48; 52; 116;
disregards the Bull Inter caetera, 184; and
the Jhtercursus Magnus, 198; 207
Henry VIII, King of England, encourages
expeditions to the North-West, 28; 29;
and the Navy, 31; 32; grants charter to
Spanish Company, 33; 35; friendship
of, for Hanseatic League, 38; 41; 50;
52; 65; £8; 96; 1 77; 238
Henry II, King of France, supports tropical
enterprises, 34; 54
Henry III, King of France, 190
Henry IV, King- of France, assisted by
Elizabeth, against the Catholic League,
120; 124; makes peace with Spain, 125;
187; allows French soldiers to enter
service of the United Provinces, 189
Henry, eldest son of James I, interested in
Guiana, 87; comment of, on imprison-
ment of Raleigh, 1 1 3
Henry, Patrick, and the clergy of _ _0_
649; 787; and the Stamp Act, 655;
the Gasptc affair, 672; 68 1
Henry the Navigator, 24
Herbert of CherDury, Lord, 95
Herrings, see under Fisheries
Hervey, John, Lord, his sneers at the clergy,
349; his praise of Walpole, 362
Hessian troops, 683; 720; 726; and Bur-
goyne's surrender, 732
Hickman, Anthony, partner of Edward
Castlyn in the Canary trade, 35; 43; 44
High Court of Admiralty, 32; 42; 47
Hifl, John, General, 523
Hillsborough, Viscount, see Downshire,
Marquis of
Hilton, Anthony, planter on Nevis, 172
Hispamcae Advocattoms, by Albericus Gen-
tilis, 203
Hispaniola, Hawkins sells negroes in, 48;
71; 77; landing of Venables and Penn
History o/the World, Raleigh's, 113
Hobkirk's Hill, 753
Hochkirch, battle of, 478
Hodges, Cornelius, explores the interior of
Senegambia, 443
Holdernesse, Robert D'Arcy, 4th Earl of,
ip, Captain Richard, appointed
Governor of Surinam, 231
Holland, see Dutch
Holmes, Charles, Rear-Admiral, and the
capture of Quebec, 532
Holmes, Sir Robert, Admiral in charge of
expedition to Guinea Coast, 441 ; 508
Honduras, 8; 246; 382; 384; 487; 692;
7^5
Honfleur, 34
Hood, Samuel, ist Viscount, Admiral, 750;
Hooker, Richard, 619
Hooker, the Rev. Thomas, leader of the
emigration from Massachusetts to Con-
necticut, 163
Hopkins, Stephen, Governor of Rhode
Island, 812
Hotham, William, ist Baron, Admiral,
740-1
Howard, Charles, Lord of Effingham, Lord
High Admiral, tactics of, July 1588, 121 ;
defeat of the Armada, 122; 123; capture
of Cadiz, 124-5; Earl of Nottingham,
129; guilty of negligence, resigns, 129
Howard, Francis, Lord of Effingham,
Governor of Virginia (1684-9), extor-
tionate practices of, 257
Howard, Lord Thomas, in Cadiz expedi-
tion (1596), 124
Howard, Sir Thomas, expedition of, to the
Azores, 123
INDEX
909
Howard, William, Lord of Effingham, 197
Howe, Richard, ist Earl, British admiral,
736; 739-40; 759; 7%
Howe, William, 5th Viscount, American
campaign of, 721 ; capture of New York,
722-3; 724seqq.; and the Saratoga
disaster, 728-32; victory of, at Brandy-
wine, 733-45 735seqq.; 760; 763
Hubbardtown, 750
Hubner, Danish jurist, 552
Hudson, Henry, commands Dutch ex-
ploring expeditions, 86; 108
Hudson Bay, 108; and the Treaty of
Utrecht, 264; 508-9; 523; 545; 576. See
also Company, Hudson's Bay
Hudson River, Dutch at mouth of, 128;
foundation of the colony of New Am-
sterdam at, 153; 156; 165; 723
Hudson Strait, Frobisher at, io<j; 509
Hughes, Sir Edward, Admiral, in the East
Indies, 756
Huguenots, 33; 34; 35; colonial enter-
prises of, 54-0; 67; 97; assisted by
Elizabeth, 120; 189; 226-7
Humber, River, 1 19
Hume, David, 629-30; 761
Hunt, Captain of H.M.S. Tamar, at the
Falkland Islands, 699
Hunter, Robert, Governor of Jamaica, 383;
governor of New York, 386-8
Huron, Lake, 391
Hutchinson, Thomas, Lieutenant-Governor
of Massachusetts, 655; succeeds Bernard
as Governor, 670; and the Whateley
letters, 672; and the Boston Tea Party,
674; 675
Hutchinson, Mrs Ann, leader of opposition
to Boston oligarchy, expelled, 164;
796
Huttoft, Henry, Levant trader builds
second Great Harry, 36
Hyder AH, 714-155756
Iberville, Pierre le Moyne, Sieur d', Cana-
dian seaman, 516; 519; 545
Iceland, decay of, fishing trade, 60; 195
Idiaquez, secretary to Philip II of Spain,
.125
He de France, sec Mauritius
lie St Jean, Prince Edward Island, 315
Illinois County, 772
Illinois River, La Salle explores, 544
Imperial Conferences, 17; 20
Inchiquin, William, 2nd Eirl of, Governor
of Jamaica, 405
India, 4; 8; n; 12; 16; 17; 19; 65; 183;
Anglo-Portuguese agreement of 1654,
230; 303-4; Dutch strive for monopoly
in, 305-6; foundation of the French
East India Company, 310; 317; Treaty
of Ryswick and, 321; 323; 376; Plassey,
47?; .483; Wandewash, 485; 489; ac-
quisition of Bombay, 508; 525-6; 529-
30; 548; war with French in (1778), 713;
war with Hyder Ali, 715, 756; and the
Peace of Versailles (1783), 779-81. See
also under France, and Company, East
India
Indians, unfriendly to early settlers in
Virginia, 80, 81, 82, 84; of Guiana, trade
i8c— i; Perm's relations with, 29
Moskito, friendly relations of, with
Ikh, 167, 383; war with, in Carolina,
386, 390; English relations with the Six
Nations, 248, 391, 544, 638; and the war
of 1754, 392, 394; intelligent treatment
of, by the French, 465; legal position of,
I9I-4> 544-3; 6355 638; Indian reserves,
641-3; ChoiseuTs agents among, 693;
with Burgoyne, 729; 788
Industrial Revolution, 1 1 ; 12; 37
Ingersoll, Jared, Colonial agent for Con-
necticut, and the Stamp Act, 645-6
Inquisition, 33; 35
Inter caetera, Bull of Alexander VI, 183-4
Intercwrsus Magnus between Henry VII and
the Archduke-Philip (1496), 187-8; and
the sovereignty of the sea, 198, 200
International law, and claiTng to colonial
possessions under Elizabeth and James I,
185-8; and neutrality, 189-90, 548seqq.;
and the rights of aborigines, 191-4; and
the sovereignty of the sea, 195-204; 538-
43; and contraband, 554seqq.; and
blockade, 555seqq.; and the right of
search, 557 seqq.
Ireland, 5; 12; 23; colonisation undertaken
in, 56; army in, 73; 105; 113; mal-
contents in, supported by Spain, 119;
120; wreck of Catholic armada, sent to
help rebel earls in, 125; campaign of
Cromwell in, 133; growing of tobacco
forbidden in (1621), 149; attempt of
Cromwell to force emigration from, to
the West Indies, 236; and the Navigation
Laws, 279-81, 284-5, 287-8, 573; 514;
608; Swift and, 623-4; 682; and the
American War of Independence, 762,
769-70
Iroquois, Jesuit intrigues among, 510; 522;
543; acknowledge themselves subjects of
England, 544; 634
Isabella, Queen of Castile, 25; 192
Italy, 2; 22; 24; 30; 68; settlement of
Utrecht and, 359; the terms of the
Treaty of Seville (1729) with regard to,
367
Ivan the Terrible, welcomes Muscovy
Company, 40
Ivory, trade in, with African coast, 33, 43,
237; 34
Jacobites, emigration of, to colonies, 236;
348-9; 360; 362; in Barbados and New
York, 385; 510; 531
gio
INDEX
Jamaica, 56; 77; seizure of, by Venables
and Perm, 229; conditions in the early
colony, 232 ; undesirable nature of early
colonists, 236; under Charles IT, 244-6;
268; Navigation Acts not a grievance in,
282; naval officers in, 290; 293; governor
of, refuses aid to Danen settlers, 324;
Central American trade of, 330-4; 382;
689; quarrels between, and the South
Sea Company, 336-7 ; centre of the slave
trade, 354, 330; and the annual ship,
340-1 ; disputes with Home Government,
3375 37.7-8; sugar plantations in, 379
81; social conditions in, 381-3; slavery
ia, 380-3, 588; Government of 1660-
1763, 405-7, 4^0, 412* 4i6, 421, 424-9>
43*3 433, 435-6; 5075 S^-iSJ 5* 9-*°;
570; 582 ; 595; made free port, 601, 660;
682; 758; 768; 813; 815 seqq.
James I, King of England, 53; 57; 75; 87;
88; fads of, 108; 127; constant inclina-
tion of, towards Spaniards, in; timid
pedantry of, 128; toadying of, to Spain,
129; 130; i36seqci.; 154; 156; 176; and
the title to colonial domains, 185, 187;
forbids belligerent acts within home
waters, ipo, 540; claims sovereignty of
the English seas, 198-201; particular
monopolies under, 214
James II, King of England, as Duke of
York, a leading member of the African
Company, 7, 311; and the conquest of
Dutch North America, 252; makes over
New Jersey to Berkeley and Garteret,
252-3; his colonial policy, as pursued in
New York, 253; his friendship with Penn
and the Quakers, 254; his creation of the
"Dominion of New England9', 260; his
policy of religious toleration, 253, 260;
his tall and its repercussions in the
colonies, 260-3, 447, 510; supporter of
Navigation Acts, 271; 319; 320; attempt
of Louis XIV to restore, 320; and the
James iV, King of Scotland, naval policy
of, 265
j Edward,
Prince, the Old Pretender,
James]
348; _
James Fort, English station in Gambia,
446-85781
James River, 393
James Town, first settlement of, 80; 86;
89; 156
Jansenists, 355
Japan, 25; 26; Colbert and, 309; English
trade with, largely lost to die Dutch, 315
Jay,John, 771; 775-9
Jeaffreson, J. C., 813-14
Jefferson, Thomas, 652; 656-7; and the
Gaspte affair, 672; his Summary View, 679;
684; 784; 791
Jenkins, Captain, 225, 339, 342-4, 370-1
Jenkinson, Anthony, servant of M
Company, travels of, in
uscovy
Asia, 41;
interested in North-East Passage, 57;
presents memorial, with Humphrey
Gilbert, to Muscovy Company, 57
Jessop, William, secretary of Providence
Company, 226
Jesus of Lubecky warship, sold by Hansa to
Henry VIII, 31
Jesus, Society of, missionaries of, in North
America, taken prisoner by Samuel
Argall, 86; unsuccessful opposition of
members of, to religious freedom in
Maryland, 170; missions of, to North
American Indians, 303; their policy of
Indian segregation broken by Colbert,
311; their assistance of the French in
North America, 393, 403, 510; com-
mercial speculations of, 690; expulsion
of members of, from Spain, 695
Jews, of Morocco, 42; expelled from Brazil
and Cayenne, settle at Surinam, 23 1
Johannes ffornandus, exports goods from
Bristol to Lisbon, 27
John, King of England, right of search in
English waters claimed in time of, n8;
and the striking of the flag, 196
John IV, King of Portugal, leads revolt of
Portuguese against Spain, alliance of,
with Charles I, 230
Johnson, Samuel, his comparison of Wai-
pole and the elder Pitt, 346; and the
French annexation of Corsica, 697
Johnson, Sir William, and the Six Nations,
638
Johnson and Graham's Lessees v. Mclntosh,
iston, Gabriel, Governor of North
Carolina, 395 *
Johnstone, George, Commodore, Governor
of West Florida, 705; expedition of,
against Gape of Good Hope, 756
Joint-stock companies, made their appear-
ance in 1553, 25; 32; Company for
discovery of North-East Passage, 39;
Muscovy Company, first chartered joint-
1 rstock company, 41 ; 52 ; for privateering
ventures, 1 16 ; for financing the Mayflower
Pilgrims, 157; the Act of 1720 and the
colonies, 594
Jones, Paul, American privateer, 715-16
Juan Fernandez, 535
Judd, Sir Andrew, Spanish trader, 36;
grandfather of Sir Thomas Smythe, 75
Judith, Francis Drake escapes in the, 49
Julius II, Pope, confirms treaty of Torde-
sillas, 184
Justifying Memorial, by Gibbon, 715
Jutland, battle of, 119
Kalb, de, French agent in North America,
664
Kalm, Swedish traveller in North America,
647
Karikal, 485; 779-781
Kaskaskia, 640; Clarke's raid on, 772
Johnst(
INDEX
Kaunitz, Wenzel Anton, Prinz von,
Austrian Chancellor, and the Seven
Years' War, 463 seqq.
Keene, Benjamin, English ambassador, and
South Sea Company's agent at Madrid,
339; 341-35480
Keith, Sir William, proposes Stamp Act for
the Plantations, 390, 652
Kempenfelt, Richard, Rear-Admiral, 530;
744-5; 757; 759 „ .
Kendal, Duchess of, mistress of George I,
bribed by Bolingbroke, 351
Kennebec River, Fort St George founded
at mouth of, 80; 388
Kent, the, and the capture of Chanderna-
gore, 529
Kentucky, 772
Kenya, 16
Keppel, Augustus, ist Viscount, Admiral,
740-1 ; 744; First Lord of the Admiralty,
709; 779
Keynell, Christopher, Governor of Antigua,
his squabbles with the planters, 233
Khartum, 17
"The King's Chambers", 190; 540
King's Mountain, North Carolina, Fer-
guson defeated at, 748, 751
Kingston, Jamaica, 382, 520
Kinnoul, Earl of, Lord Carlisle's claims in
the West Indies pass to, 241
Kinsale Harbour, Prince Rupert's fleet
blockaded in, 133
Kipp's Bay, General Howe at, 723
Kirke, Sir David, captures French settle-
ments in Acadia and Canada, 132,
i54->>; Governor of Newfoundland, 181 ;
recalled by the Puritans, 233
Klosterzeven, Convention of, 476, swept
aside, 478
Knyphausen, Hessian commander at
Brandywine, 733; 738^9
Kolin, defeat of Frederick the Great at,
( Spanish minister, hostile to
^ ,339
Kourou, in Guiana, failure of French
settlement at, 689
Kiinersdorf, battle of, 484
La Bourdonnais, Bertrand-Fran$ois Mahe*
de, 526; captures Madras, 547-8
Labrador, expedition of John Cabot to, 26,
28; 1 08; assigned to the Government of
Newfoundland, 642
La Clue, French admiral, 530
Lafayette, Marquis, his proposal for an
invasion of Canada, 712; 751; 753
La Galissoniere, Roland, Marquis de,
Governor of Canada, 465
Lagos, naval victory of, 483; 485; 533
La Hogue, battle of, 285; 514
Lally, Thomas Arthur, Comte de, in
India, 529-30
La Luzerne, French minister in America,
771
Lamb, John, and the Stamp Act, 635
Lancashire, 14
Lancaster, James, 126; 199
Lancey, De, case of, in New York, 427
Lando, Girolamo, Venetian ambassador
in London, 108
Lane, Ralph, in charge of expedition with
Richard Grenville, to Spanish Indies, 70;
unsuccessful colony of, in Virginia, 71
Langford, Abraham, dispute as to his
appointment as naval clerk at Barbados,
291
Lapland, death of Sir Hugh Willoughby
on shores of, 40
La Quadra, Spanish minister, 342; ap-
proves the Convention Treaty, 343
La Rochelle, fiasco at, 132; 311-12
La Salle, Rene*-Robert, French explorer in
North America, 543-4
Las Casas, does not admit Papal claim to
dispose of barbarian lands, 184, 192
Laud, William, Archbishop of Canter-
bury, repressive measures of, accelerate
flow of Puritan emigration, 176-7
Laudonniere, Rene* de, 56
Lauflfeldt, French victory at, 374
Laurens, Henry, case concerning, in the
vice-admiralty court at Charleston, 298
Laurens, Henry, President of the American
Congress, 716; 771
Law, John, of Lauriston, failure of his
French companies, 357; 362-3; 622
League of Augsburg (1686), 320
Leah and Rachel, by J. Hammond, 788-9
Leake, Sir John, Admiral, 52 1
Leander, H.M.S., 457
Lee, Arthur, meets Beaumarchais in
London, 705; 708; American agent in
Spain, 709-10
Lee, Charles, American general, 738-9 m
Lee, Richard Henry, and the Gasp&c affair,
672; learning of, 790
Lee, Fort, 724
Leeward Islands, 131; 143-6; 153; 172-4;
209-12; 233; 236; 241-2; 244; 286; 314;
328; 376 seqq.; dedine of white popula-
tion in, 380, 588; barter system in, 380;
government of 1660-1763, 405, 407-9,
4*6, 433; 5io; 512-13; 520; 768; 813-
14
Legge, Henry, Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, 489; 500
Le Havre, Goligny governor of, 54; 57;
Rodney's attack, 481
Leibniz, suggests to Louis XIV that he
should conquer Egypt, 313
Leicester, Lord, supports African voyages,
58
^ , Charles, attempt of, to settle
Brownists in the estuary of the St Law-
rence, 74; leader of first English settle-
ment in Guiana, 86; death of, 87; 156
INDEX
Leigh, Sir Oliph, finances tobacco-planting
in Guiana, 86; 87
Leisler, Jacob, German in New York
colony, heads rising against Nicholson
and proclaims William III, 261; resists
the new governor and is executed, 262
Leith, burnt by the English in 1544, 34
Le Maire, Straits of, 144
Leon, Ponce de, discoverer of Florida, 55
Lepanto, battle of, 52; 117
Leslie, Colonel, and the Marathas, 713
Letter s from a Farmer, by John Dickinson,
665
Levant, 23; 24; 32; 33; 35; 36; 41 ; 65; 358
Levis, Due de, French general in Canada,
533-4
Lexington, Lord, British envoy to Madrid
, (1710,335 f , n
Lexington, battle of, 680- 1 ; 718
Leyden, the Scrooby congregation at, 156
The Libel of English Policy, 118; 197
Liberty, sloop, 566
Liegnitz, victory of Frederick the Great at,
486
Ligonier, John, ist Earl of, 489
Ligonier, Fort, 637
Ljllingston, Colonel, 515
Lima, Drake at, 101
Lincoln, Earl of, Puritan leader, interested
in the Massachusetts Bay Company, 159
Lincoln, Benjamin, American general, 743
Lincoln, Edward, ist Earl of, Lord
Admiral, 58
Lindsey, 153
"Lines of amity," 187; 188
Lion, sails on expedition to Gold Coast, 43
Lippomano, Nicolo, Venetian ambassador
^at Madrid, quoted, 122
Lisbon, 50; 53; 76; 115; supports Don
Antonio, 120
Liverpool, importance of slave trade to,
4495 5*45 trade of, with the North
American colonies, 595
Livery Companies, 28; subscribe to the
Virginia Company, 82
Livingstone, David, 16
Lock, John, commands expedition to
Guinea Coast, 43544
Lock, Michael, son of Sir William, Levant
trader, supporter of Frobisher, and of
the Kathai Company, 35; 43; one of
the founders of the Kathai Company, 59
Lock, Thomas, brother of Michael, mem-
ber of syndicate to exploit Guinea trade,
Lock, Sir William, Levant trader, 35
Locke, John, secretary to Lord Shaftesbury,
author of the Fundamental Constitutions of
Carolina, 250; his treatise on Civil
Government, 607, 617; influence of,
6i8seqq.; 656-7
Lodge, Sir Thomas, backs John Hawkins,
Logwood industry in Honduras and
Yucatan, ex-buccaneers employed in,
246; and expeditions from Jamaica, 330;
487; 781
London, 23 ; merchants of, refuse to support
Sebastian Cabot, 28; Venetians in, 32;
35; and Muscovy Company, 39; 42; and
the Guinea trade, 43; 81; 82; financiers
in, and the proprietary system in the
West Indies, 145; trade with colonies cut
off at the beginning of the Common-
wealth, 209; small band of London
merchants participate in the sugar boom,
210; and the War of American Inde-
pendence, 761, 768
London, Bishop of, ex ojfficio member of the
Board of Trade, 413
London, Treaty of, between England and
Spain, 76; importance of, 77; good for
the fish trade, 90; 91 ; 92; provisions of,
128; fails to settle question of exclusion
of Englishmen from New World, 128, 187
Long Island, Connecticut men in, 251;
becomes part of New York, 259; 722
"Lords Commissioners for Plantations in
General", Board of, created 1634, 177
Lords of Trade (1675-1700), 269; and the
interpretation of the Plantations Act of
1672, 279; steps of, for the enforcement
of the Acts of Trade, 253-4; 2^9; 406;
408; 422
Lorraine, promised to France by the
Partition Treaties, 323 ; against France in
War of Spanish Succession, 325; secured
to France by the Third Treaty of
Vienna, 369
Lough Foyle, Gilbert tries to form colony
at, 58
Louis XIV, King of France, 300-1 ; 303 ; his
relations with Colbert, 307-9; 315-16;
his prejudice against naval warfare, 318-
19; 320-1; and the Partition Treaties,
322-33; and the War of the Spanish
Succession, 325-9; 334~5; 3475 failings
of, 509
Louis XV, King of France, accession of,
353; marries daughter of Stanislaus of
Poland, 366; 367; 368; 468; 686
Louis XVI, King of France, reluctance of,
to help American colonists, 708
Louisbourg, French fortress in North
America, capture of, by the English
(i745), 375, 392, 525; handed back to
the French, 393; 415; 466; 476; capture
of (1758), 479; 5235530-I
Louisiana, 125; handed over to William
Law, 357; ceded to Spain, 685; 715
Louvain, 95
Louvois, opposition of Colbert to, 308;
relations of, with Louis XIV, 308, 319
Lutterell, Sir John, Barbary merchant, 42
Lynch, Sir Thomas, succeeds Modyford as
Governor of Jamaica, 246, 815-7
Lys, French warship, captured by Bos-
cawen, 470
INDEX
Macao, Portuguese settlement in China,
Macbride, John, Captain, at the Falkland
Islands, 899
McCulloh, Henry, and the drawing up of
the Stamp Act, 646
Machault, Fort, 394
Mackenzie, Kenneth, Captain, on the
African coast (1782), 457
Madagascar, failure of French attempt to
colonise, 690
Madeira, 25; 33; 43; wine from, exempted
from provisions of Navigation Laws, 275,
567
Madison, James, President of the United
States, 784
Madras, conquered by French and restored
at the Peace of Aix-la-Ghapelle, 376,
54H*; 526; 528-30^
„ 120; 125; 226
Madrid, Convention of (1716), 359
Madrid, Treaty of (1030), revives pro-
visions of the Treaty of London, 146;
Treaty of ( 1 670) , Spaniards acknowledge
English right to Jamaica, 246, and all the
English possessions in America, 315
Magellan, Straits of, 58, 66; Drake passes,
IOO-I
Magnolia Christi Americana, by Cotton
Mather, 800
Mah£, Fort, capture of, 713, 756; restored
to France, 781
Maine, 153; 157; 169; controlled by
Massachusetts, 259, 262; 777
Maintenon, Madame de, 323
Malabar, French offer for Danish station
on coast of, 310; 317
Malesherbes, Chretien de, French states-
man, 706
Malmesbury, James Harris, Earl of,
British ambassador at Madrid, 699-
703
Malynes, 208
Manchester and the American war, 765
Manchester School, 14; 1 6
Manhattan Island, 162; 722
Peace of Paris in 1763, 502^ 506; 535;
the dispute as to the Manila ran
Manila, 371; given back to Spain_at the
693-61
Mansell, Sir Robert, cowardly conduct of,
130
Mansfield, David Murray, 2nd Earl of
(Viscount Stormont), ambassador at
ransom,
rjuuuucAu, VVIAULOJULL Murray, ist Earl of,
his judgment in the case of the slave
Somerset!, 449; on English law in the
colonies, 615-16, 632, 660; 640; 765
Marathas, 713; 756
Marco Polo, 26; 41
Mare Claustan, by John Selden, a reply to
Grotius's Mare Liberum, 203-5, 539
Mare Liberum, 199
CHBEI
Maria Theresa, daughter of Emperor
Charles VI, her succession and the
Pragmatic Sanction, 364, 368, 372, 375;
461; 464; 471-2
Mane Antoinette, Queen of Louis XVI of
France, advocates intervention in the
American War, 708
Marie Galante, 513
Marigold, sailed with Drake in 1577, 100
Maritime Provinces, 10
Marlborough, James, 3rd Earl of, receives
pension from West Indies, 241
Marlborough, John Churchill, ist Duke of,
7; 8; 301 ; opposes sending troops to the
West Indies, 326; supporter of strong
naval policy, 326-7, 523
Maroons, descendants of Spanish slaves,
trouble with, in Jamaica, 383
Marque, Letters of, 189; 554; 558-60;
issued by the Continental Congress,
Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the U.S A., on the rights given
by discovery, 194; on the rights of
Indians, 545
Marston Moor, battle of, 228
Martin, Byam, Admiral, 760
Martin, Captain John, 112; in Virginia,
113
Martin, Colonel, of Antigua, 819
Martin, Josiah, Governor of North Caro-
lina, 722
Martin, Richard, counsel for the Virginia
Company, 140
Martinique, 406; 482; 486; capture of,
495-6, 590; given back to France, at the
Peace of Paris, 502, 508; strategic
importance of, 512-14, 534; trade of,
with North American colonies, 582;
690-3
Mary I, Queen of England, loses Calais, 3;
and the Hanseatic League, 38; grants
charter to Muscovy Company, 40 ; 44 ; 45 ;
Mary II, Queen of England, marriage of, to
William of Orange, 319
Maryland, setdement and early constitu-
tion of, 169-70; religious toleration in,
170, destroyed by Puritans during
Commonwealth, 171; civil war in,
between Puritans and Roman Catholics,
1645-6, 181, 21 1 ; repudiates the Com-
monwealth, 211-12, submits, 220; 233;
under Charles II and James II, 257;
governor appointed by the Crown, 1689-
1715, Protestant Lord Baltimore recovers
proprietorship (1715), 262 ; and the Navi-
gation Act of 1696, 289; has five naval
officers, 290, 385; 390; 392-35 3995 401 5
510; 571; iron industry in, 586-7; 589;
currency in, 598; 601 ; 636; 638; decides
to stop the exportation of tobacco, 675;
literature and social life in, 784, 787, 808
Mary Rose, wreck of, 97
58
INDEX
Mason, Captain John, second Governor of
Newfoundland, go, 161; ally of Sir
Ferdinandp Gorges, 177; 259; appointed
Vice-Admiral of New England, 178;
death of, 178
Mason, George, draws up the "Resolves of
1769", 668
Massachusetts Bay colony, foundation of
(1629), 157-61; constitution of govern-
ment of, IDO^-I ; economic conditions in,
162; 1 77; petition of Gorges against, 176;
Charles Fs government defied by
colonists of, 177-8; nor is the Parlia-
ment's authority recognised (1643), 179;
estimated population of (1640), 180;
attitude of, to Commonwealth, 213;
privileges of, untouched by Common-
wealth, 220; position of, in time of
Charles II, 251 ; and the conquest of New
Netherland, 252; disregard of order from
England to abandon religious tests, 258;
its illegal trade and the revocation of its
charter (1684), 259-60; the charter of
1691, 262; resistance of, to the Acts of
Trade, 282-3: 596; Customs officials in,
290-9, 648, 666, 671; 385-7; disputes
between the Governor and the Assembly,
388-9; 392; 397-9; the Zenger affair,
399-400; 401-4; government of (1660-
i753)» 4<>5> 42i, 425> 43<>»433; 5IQ; 523;
5945 597? vote &y ballot in, 608; and
contributions to military expenses, 636;
639; 641 ; and the Stamp Act, 655 seqq.;
resistance of, to the Mutiny Act, 002,
664; and Townshend's duties, 665;
Lord Hillsborough orders the dissolution
of the Assembly, 667; the Whateley
letters, 672-3; North's revision of the
Constitution, 674, repealed, 765; the
"Suffolk Resolves", 677; the Provincial
Congress, 679, 68p seqq.; 718 seqq.; 777;
literature and social life of, 784, 795 seqq. ;
810-12
Masserano, Prince de, Spanish minister,
695; 700-2
Masulipatam, capture of, 483, 530, 713; 779
Mather, Cotton, 798-802
Maudave, Comte de, his attempt to
colonise Madagascar, 690
Mauduit, Israel, pamphlet of, 504
Maupeou, Rene* de, Chancellor of France,
and the fall of Choiseul, 702-3
Maurepas, Jean Fr6d6ric Phelypeaux,
Comte de, French statesman, 706;
opposes intervention in the American
War, 708; 736
Maurice of Saxony, victorious campaigns
of (i 744-7), 374
Mauritius, 489; 525
Maverick, Samuel, urges reduction of the
number of colonial governments, 613
Mayfower, 88; 148; site of New Plymouth
"ranted to Pilgrims, 153
'-•-- " -,4*158
Mazalcjuiver, 779
Mazarin, Cardinal, letter of Colbert to,
207; policy of, towards Commonwealth,
227, 238; and Colbert, 307
Medford, New Jersey, rum distillery at, 396
Medici, Catharine de', 63
Medina Sidonia, in command of Spanish
Armada, 121, 122
Mediterranean, i ; 2; 8; 23; 24; 30; 32; 52 ;
115; 1 20; Richelieu maintains French
fleet in, 115, 132; Commonwealth main-
tains English squadron in, 133; Admira.
Haddock's cruise in 1738-9, 343; 515;
520; 52 1, 534; 694; 697
Medousa, Lake, 777
Mein, Patrick, surveyor-general of America,
293
Mendoza, Bernadino de, Spanish ambas-
sador, warns Philip II of Gilbert's hostile
intentions, 62 ; and Sir Thomas Gerrard's
scheme, 67; letters of, to Philip II in
1580, i i6;jplan of, for economic strangu-
lation of England, 120; bases Spanish
claims on right of prior discovery, 184-5;
protest of Elizabeth to, 199
Mennonites, religious sect of, members of,
settle in Pennsylvania, 255
Mercantile system, 6; 9; 14; 561 sccjq.; 686
Mercator's Atlas, first published in Flan-
ders (1595), 131
Merchant Adventurers, 2; 23; 36; 38; 562
Methodists, 403
Miami, Fort, 637
Michael, one of Frobisher's ships, 103
Michigan, Lake, 391; 546
MichiUimackinac, Fort, 637
Milford Haven, 104
Milton, John, 608; 611-12
Minden, battle of, 483
Mining, under Elizabeth, 31
Minion^ ship of Hawkins, 49
Minorca, 8; 9; 322; ceded to England by
the Treaty of Utrecht, 328; 355; 523;
captured by the French, 472, 476, 527;
4795 486; 492; 521; 546; 694; 743;
745-6; capture of, 757; ceded to Spain
Miquelon, 495; 543; 688; captured by
Admiral Montague, 712; ceded to
France (1783), 781
Mirabeau, Victor Riquetti, Marquis de,
and the treatment of their colonies by the
English, 650
Missionary enterprise, n; 16; 24; 46;
Jesuit, at Mount Desert, 86; interest in
missionary enterprise displayed by Eliza-
bethans, no; a pretext for disregarding
rights of aborigines, 192-3; of Jesuits in
North America, 303; not permitted
among negroes in West Indies, 383; 403;
467
Mississippi, River, French trace it to the sea,
302; the French settlement of Louisiana
at mouth of, 3 25 ; 390-3 ; La Salle explores ,
INDEX
915
543-4, 546; 635; 694; American claims
and, 770-1, 77bseqq.
Mobile, 496
Mocenigo, Giovanni, Venetian ambassador
at Paris, predicts defeat of Armada, 107
Modyford, bir Thomas, succeeds Windsor as
Governor of Jamaica in 1664,245; patron '
of buccaneers, 246; recalled, 246, 129
816
Mohawk Indians, 680
Mohawk Valley, 391
Molasses Act, of 1733, elasticity of, ji
practice, 290; 381; 584-6; 590; 596-7;
renewal of, 644
Molin, Niccolo, Venetian ambassador in
England, on state of English Navy (1607),
Mollwilz, victory of Frederick at, 372
Moluccas, Drake among, 62; 65; 6b; desire
of Colbert for, 317
Monck, George, Duke of Albemarle,
victory of, at Camperdown, 134
Mongols, 24; 41
Monhegan, 89
Monmouth Court House, battle of, 738-9
Monson, Sir William, Admiral, pensioner
of Spain, 1 1 1 ; quoted, on Elizabethan
Navy, 1 1 8; blames Drake for evacuating
Cartagena, 119; compares English slack-
ness with Dutch enterprise, 130
Montague, Sir George, Admiral, captures
Miquelon and St Pierre, 712
Montcalm, Louis, Marquis de, captures
Oswego, 472; captures Fort William
Henry, 470; his victory at Ticonderoga,
m 479; 53273
Monte Christi, 487
Montesquieu, Charles de Secpndat, Baron
de, influence of, on American political
thought, 611
Montgomery, Fort, 731
Montgomery, John, pamphlet of, 118^
Montgomery, Richard, American general,
709; 720
Montreal, 248; 483 ; capture of, 485, 533-4 ;
720
Montserrat, island of, Thomas Warner
Governor of, 145; 209; introduction of
sugar industry to, 209; neutrality of,
during Civil War, 212; under the
Commonwealth, 233; captured by the
Dutch, 242; de Ruyter at, 242; given
back to England by the Treaty of Breda,
Moon,' hired from Royal Navy for Guinea
expedition, 43
Moore, William, justice of the peace in
Pennsylvania, committed to gaol by the
Assembly for contempt, 428
Moors, expelled from Spain, 25
Moravians, 403
More, Sir Thomas, 93-5
Morgan, Daniel, American general, 752
Morgan, Henry, buccaneer leader, his sack
of Panama, 245, 8x6; 818
Morocco, 41 ; 42
Morris, Lewis, and the Zenger case, 400
Moscow, visited by Richard Chancellor, 40
Moskito Indians, in Central America,
friendly relations of English with, 167,
363; Superintendent of Moskito shore
330, English settlements on, 383-4
Motley, John Lothrop, historian, 6; 127
Mount Desert, Jesuit mission at, 86
Mouree, Dutch fort in West Africa, cap-
tured by Shirley, 457
Mousehole, burnt by Amerola, 124
Mun, Thomas, quoted, 123, 127, 130, 208;
503
Mungo Park, 453
Munster, 57; 58
Munster, ally of England and France
against the Dutch (ib72), 317
Munster, Treaty of (1648), Spain acknow-
ledges the right of the Netherlands to
navigation and commerce in the East and
West Indies, 191
Murman, coast of, death of Hugh Wil-
loughby on, 40
Murray, James, at Quebec, 533; at
.Minorca, 757
Nani, Venetian ambassador at Madrid,
quoted, 124
Nanny, chief town of the Maroons, capture
of, in 1 734, 383
JNapier, logarithms of, 131
Naples, 323
Napoleon, 13; 120; 697
Narborough, voyage of, to the South Seas,
322, 3^14
Narragansett Bay, settlement of refugees
from Massachusetts at, 164; 724
"Naval officers", officials who took the
place of the governor in all that con-
cerned the shipping clauses of the Acts of
Trade, 290-4
Naval Stores, see Navy
Navigation Laws, 6; 9; repeal of, 14; of
Henry VII, 32; of 1540, 34; of 1650-1,
134, 215-18, 233, 238, 270; of 1660, 256,
271-4, 276, 278; the Staple Act of 1663,
274-5, 29°a me Act of 1672-3 (Planta-
tion Duties), 277-8, 280; the Act of 1696,
263, 279, 285-90; of 1699, 279; the
Molasses Act of 1733, 290; resentment in
Barbados at, 243-4, 2& l » and the position
of the Scots, 279, 284, 287-8; and of the
Irish, 279-81, 284-5, 287-8; complaints
of Virginia at, 281-2; resistance of New
England to, 282-4; machinery for
carrying out, 289-99; 542; 566seqc;.;
644 seqq.; reformed by Townshend, 664;
705
Navy Board, established by Henry VIII,
34; 4113; and supply of naval stores from
the colonies, 416
Navy, Royal, 18; 19; 28; Henry VIII and,
3i; 32, 35; 38; 43; 44; 49;
58-2
916 INDEX
Tudors, 50, 515 corruption among
officials of, 5 r ; 52 ; naval stores imported
from the Baltic, 60, 61, 224, 225, 305,
355* 358> 36s> 574-5J 755 recruited from
fishermen, 90, 98; 100; recovers efficiency
in third decade of Elizabeth, 116; de-
velopment of, under Elizabeth, 117-19;
under James I, 129-31 ; under the Com-
monwealth, 134-5; 201 ; 213; 238; naval
stores for, from Massachusetts, 259,
572, 574-9; ordered to seize all foreign
ships in the Plantations (1675), 284;
used to enforce the Acts of Trade, 288-9 ;
and the capture of Louisbourg, 392 ; 451 ;
457; 468; 477; 480; 507 seqq.; and prize
money, 558—9; under the elder Pitt, 694;
703; and the American War of Inde-
pendence, 721, 735-6, 739-46, 749-52,
756 seqq., 760, 768
Nazareth, Pa., 403
Necessity, Fort, building of, and surrender
of, to the French, 467
Necker, Jacques, opposes French inter-
vention in the American War, 708; 767
Negapatam, on the Coromandel coast,
781
Nelson, Horatio, Viscount, Admiral, 173
Netherlands, 6; 7; 31 ; 32; 35; 38; 39; 48;
58; English soldiers in, 75; 112; 119;
English Dissenters in, 150; part of
Spanish, ceded to France by the Treaty
of the Pyrenees, 229; Austrian, 463. &«
also under Dutch
Neville, John, Vice-Admiral, 516
Nevis, island of, Thomas Warner, Governor
of, 145; Anthony Hilton on, 172;
Spanish occupation of (1629), X73> 209>
introduction of sugar industry to, 210;
neutrality of, during Civil War, 212;
under the Commonwealth, 233; emigra-
tion from, to Jamaica, 236; de Ruyter at,
242; 276; 407; 512; 520; 570; 615; 781
New Albion, Drake at, 102; 178
New Amsterdam, Dutch colony at the
mouth of the Hudson, foundation of,
153 ; 22 1 ; 23 1 ; illicit trading with, 25 1-2 ;
captured by Richard Nicolls, 252, 311,
508; and the Navigation Acts, 277
New Berne, North Carolina, 407
Newburg, New York, founded by German
emigrants, 401
Newcastle, Thomas, ist Duke of, and the
trade disputes in Spanish America, 341-
"• 367; and the War of the Austrian
370-1, 385; and the Seven
Years' War, 360 seqq.
New England, 4; 18; prospective source of
naval stores, 61; 131; 136; Council of,
set up under Buckingham, 147; 148; 152;
153'> settlement of Mayflower Pilgrims at
New Plymouth, 156-8; the Massachu-
setts Bay Company, 159-62; settlement
of Connecticut and Rhode Island, 162-
6; 169; establishment, during the inter-
regnum, of a confederation of the
colonies against the Indians, the Dutch
and the French, 180; estimated popu-
lation of, in 1640, 1 80; closer association
between and Newfoundland during Civil
War, 181-2; attitude of, to Common-
wealth, 2 1 2-13 ; 232 ; government during
the Commonwealth, 233; the "Do-
minion" of, 260-1; resistance of, to the
Acts of Trade, 282-4; customs officials
in, 20,2-9; 510—11; 522-5; "most pre-
judicial Plantation", 572, 574;
j 59^; social life in,
New England Courant,
currency
seqa.
published in
tion of, 67; Portuguese and Spanish
fishermen seized by Bernard Drake off,
70; Parkhurst urges fitness of, for colo-
nisation, 73; 89; Company formed, 90;
103; 105; annexation of, by Gilbert, 106;
118; 148; 153; Calvert's colony on, 168,
181; Hamilton's syndicate, and Rirke's
relations with it, 181; close association
with New England grows up in Civil
War, 181-2; Kirke recalled, island
governed by commissioners, 233; pro-
visions of the Treaty of Utrecht with
regard to, 264, 543, 576; 377; 384-5;
colonial agent for, 434; 510; 515-16;
5*9; 523; 64?
New Hampshire, royal colony of, 259;
becomes part of the "Dominion of New
England", 280; separate status restored,
262 ; dispute as to salary of governor of,
433; Assembly of, 435, 436; 522; 594;
literature and social life in, 784
New Haven, settlement and early con-
stitution of, 164-5; 253: Absorbed by
Connecticut, 250-9
New Hebrides, 535
New Holland, Captain Cook in, 536
New Jersey, 247; formerly part of Dutch
New Netherlands, captured in 1664,
251-3, 508; granted by the Duke of
York to Lord Berkeley and Sir George
Garteret, 253, who sell their rights to
the Quakers, 253-4; becomes part of the
"Dominion of New England" (1688),
260; returns to the control of its pro-
prietors, 263; 266; charter of, resumed,
385; 390; 398-9; 403; dispute as to
salary of governor of, 433 ; judicial tenure
in, 435; 639; literature and social life in,
Newlyn, burnt by Amerola, 124
New Orleans, 465; 546; 685
New Plymouth, site granted to Mayflower
Pilgrims, 153; occupation of, 157-8; 163; '
refuses conditions of Restoration charter,
258; becomes part of the "Dominion of
New England", 260; absorbed in Massa-
chusetts, 262
INDEX
Newport, on Narragansett Bay, settlement
of fugitives from Massachusetts at, 164;
396; 596;. 718; 740; 748-9; 751-2
Newport, Sir Charles, commands expedi-
tion to Virginia, 80
New York, city of, 599; congress of dele-
gates in, condemns the Stamp Act, 656;
capture of, by Howe, 722-3; 724seqq.;
Clinton at, 739; 748; Rodney at, 749;
75 * seqq-
New York, colony of, 247; formerly part of
the Dutch New Netherlands, captured in
1664, 251-2, 508; government of, under
James, Duke of York, 253; the Revolu-
tion of 1689 in, 261; 508; the governor-
ship of Sloughter and the execution of
Leisler, 262; 267; vice-admiralty courts
in, 295, 298; disputes between governor
and Assembly of, 386-9; 390-2; the
Zenger case, 399-400; German emigra-
tion to, 401-2, 575; Government of
1660-1753, 405, 410, 416, 421, 425, 427,
429> 431* 433> 435; Sjto-ii; 515; 525;
596; currency in, 598; 639; and the
Stamp Act, 6s5seqq.; resistance of, to
the Mutiny Act, 662; suspension of the
Assembly, 664; 680; joins the rebellion,
68 1 ; and the Declaration of Independ-
ence, 68 1 ; 719; loyalists in, 763; litera-
ture and social life of, 784 seqq., 805-6, 809
New Tork Weekly Journal, published by
Peter Zenger, 399
New Zealand, 234; Captain Cook at, 536
Niagara, seized by the French in x 720, 363;
Burnet's scheme for occupying, 390; 470;
capture of, 483, 485; 637-8
Nicaragua, 166
Nicholas V, Pope, African grant of, to
Portugal, 183
Nicholson, Sir Francis, Governor of New
York for James II, rising against, 261 ;
recommends the erection of vice-ad-
miralty courts in the colonies, 287;
Governor of South Carolina, 386, 393,
395> 4*8; 798
Nicolls, Richard, Colonel, takes New
Amsterdam, 252 ; promoter of Navigation
Acts, 271
Nieuport, 122
Niger, River, 43; eighteenth century
theories as to the source of, 453
Nigeria, 17
Nippissim, Lake, 777
Noadles, Maurice, Due de, French com-
mander in the War of the Austrian
Succession, 373
Noell, Martin, adviser to the Council of
State in colonial affairs, 215; 234; 271;
332; and colonial government, 612
Nombre de Dios, Spanish treasure ship, 99
Nootka Sound, 8; Captain Cook and, 536
Norfolk, Virginia, burning of, 68 1
Normandy, sailors from, participate in New-
foundlandfishing,29,explore tropics, 34; 45
Norris, Sir John, Commodore, 516
Norris, Sir John, with Drake in unsuccessfu
attempt on Lisbon, 122
North, Lord, see Guildford
North, Roger, promoter of the Amazon
Company, 139; and of the "Company
for the Plantation of Guiana", 143
North-East Passage, Sebastian Cabot's
scheme to discover, 39; expedition of
Willoughby and Chancellor, 39-40;
Gilbert and Jenkinson fail to interest
Muscovy Company in, 57; Burghley
interested in, 59; 95; general discrediting
of, 104
Northington, Robert Henley, ist Earl of,
Lord Chancellor, 489; 659; 666
North Sea, 23; 32; 36; claims of James I
and Charles I to exact fishing tolls from
foreigners in, 130
Northumberland, John Dudley, Duke of,
revokes Hanse privileges, 38
North-West Passage, voyage of Sebastian
Cabot, 27; 28; address of Robert Thornc
the younger to Henry VIII on, 29;
Frobisher's search for, 35; 41; voyage of
John Davis in search of, 70; 95; 102;
Frobisher's voyage in search of, 102-4;
interest of Gilbert in, 105; 302; and the
Hudson's Bay Company, 508-9; attempt
of Cook to discover, 536
Norumbega, French trade in furs in, 78
Norway, 39; 195
Nova Scotia, 4; 26; colonising schemes of
Alexander and Gordon, 153; hostility of
France to, 154; Knights Baronets of
Nova Scotia, 154; colonists of, occupy
Port Royal, 154; Governor of, retains
control over custom officials, 291 ; French
settlements in, returned by the Treaty
of Breda, 314; and the Treaty of Rys-
wick, 321; and the Treaty of Utrecht,
328, 523; settlement of Halifax, 393; 415;
colonial agent for, 434; 465; deportation
of French settlers from, 470; 523; 543;
642; during the War of Independence,
719; 772; 776-8. See also Acadia
Novaia Zemlia, Sir Hugh Willoughby at,
40
Noyes, Dr Oliver, 80 1
Nugent, Lady, her description of life in
Jamaica, 819-20
Nymegen, Treaty of, 318; 320; 554
Nystad, Peace of (1721), 362
Occasional Conformity Act, 349
Oceana, of James Harrington, 606, 608;
influence of, on constitutions of Carolina
and Pennsylvania, 609-10; 612
Of National Characters, essay by David
Hume, 629
Oglethorpe, James Edward, General,
founder of Georgia, 8; 395-6
O'Hara, Charles, Colonel, first Governor
of Senegambia, 455; 457; 704
9*8
INDEX
Ohio, 393-4; French claims on, 465-8,
544; 641; 771-2
OloProvidence, island off coast of Nica-
ragua, Puritan settlement on, 166; cap-
tured by Spaniards, 167
Oldmixon, John, historian, 603; 608;
627-8
OKve Branch9 failure of, to carry supplies to
Leigh in Guiana, 86; lands settlers on
Windward Islands, 87
Olive Branch Petition, 682
Oliver, Thomas, Lieutenant-Governor of
Massachusetts Bay, and the Whateley
letters, 672
Omoa, Fort of, captured by the English, 7 1 5
Ontario, Lake, 546
Ontario, Scottish settlers in, 266
Oran, 322, 779
Ordonnances, French, of 1533, 1543 and
1681, and neutral rights, 549 seqq.
O'Reilly, Alexander, Spanish general, 700
Orinoco, River, 86; 87; Raleigh organises
expedition to, 91; 109; 126
Orissa, 780-1
Orleans, Philip, Duke of, regent for
Louis XV, 357 ; alliance of, with England,
360
Orpheus, H.M.S., and American privateers,
736
Orvilliers, Louis Guillouet, Comte d*,
French admiral, 740-1; 74!
Osborn, Henry, Vice-Admiral, 550
Ossun, Marquis de, French minister at
Madrid, 701
Ostend, 124; damage done to English
commerce by privateers from, 229-30
Oswald, Richard, his negotiations with
Franklin, 770; 772 seqq.
Oswego, English fort established at (1727),
390, 470; fall of, 472
Otis, James, Boston lawyer, his attack on
the Navigation Laws, 048; 656; 66 1 ; 666
Ouatanon, Fort, 637
Oxenham, John, comrade of Drake, 99
Oxford, 105
Oxford, Earl of, Robert Harley, and the
Treaty of Utrecht, 327; President of the
South Sea Company, 335, secures for it
the Asiento agreement, 336; 624
Pacific, n ; 99; Drake sails in, roi, 115;
trade monopoly in, 305; Captain Cook
in, 535-6
Paine, Thomas, his Common Sense, 683
Palatinate, the, 141
Palliser, Sir Hugh, Admiral, served under
Keppel, 741 ; 743
Palmerston, Henry, 3rd Viscount, 21
Panama, 99; the Darien scheme, 324; silver
from Peru taken across Isthmus of, 333;
South Sea Company's factory at, 338
Papacy, and Elizalbeth and Philip, 120; its
grants of barbarian lands to Spain and
Portugal, 183-5
Para, 143
Paravicmi, 108
Pardo, Convention of the, fails to settle the
trade dispute in Spanish America, 339
Paris, Treaty of (1763), 186; 346; 454;
485-506; 535J 543; 630
Parke, Daniel, Governor of the Leeward
Islands, 378; murder of, 409; 417; 520
Parker, Hyde, Admiral, his engagement
with the Dutch, 756-7
Parker, Sir Peter, Admiral, 722
Parker, William, attacks of, on West
Indies, 126
Parkhurst, Antony, 60; describes fitness of
Newfoundland for colonisation, 73; 89
Parliamentary Commissioners for the Plan-
tations, grant charter to Providence,
Rhode Island, 164
Parma, Duke of, captures Antwerp, 119;
and the Armada, 122
Passarowitz, Peace of (1718), 358
Paterson, William, leader of the Darien
expedition, 324, 620-2
Patino, Spanish minister, 332; 339; death
of, 369
Payne, collector of customs in Maryland,
murder of, 284
Peckham, Sir George, 62; and plan for
settling recusants in North America, 66;
68; 69; 70; 90; 208
Pelham, Henry, 460; 464
Pelican, Drake sails in, 100
Pemaquid, claimed by Massachusetts, 388
Pexnberton, Benjamin, 291
Pembroke, Philip, Earl of, and of Mont-
gomery, grant of West Indian Islands to,
145; 17*
Penang, 11
Penn, Richard, and the Olive Branch
Petition, 682
Penn, William, Quaker, takes over Byllyng's
claims in New Jersey, 254; James IFs
friendship for, 254; the grant of Pennsyl-
vania in exchange for debts owed him by
the Crown, 255; his "Frame of Govern-
ment", 255; his relations with the
Indians, and the foundation of Phila-
delphia, 255, 544; rights suspended at
accession of William III, 263; on the
creation of the vice-admiralty courts,
287; his dispute with Robert Quary, 297;
298; 385; and slavery, 401; political
beliefs of, 608; his "Holy Experiment",
610
Penn, Sir William,sea commander of expedi-
tion against Spanish Main (1655), 218-
19; sent to Tower, 229
Pennington, Sir John, admiral under
Charles I, 132
Pennoyer, William, adviser to the Council
of State, in colonial affairs, 215
Pennsylvania, 247; the proprietary grant to
William Penn in 1601, 254-5; customs
officials in, 292, 297, 299; 385; 390;
INDEX
objection of inhabitants of, to use of
"carnal weapons", 392, 636-9; 398-9;
Speaker of, 425; privilege of the Assembly,
428; 429; 596-8; inhabitants of, refuse to
use the ballot, 608; constitution of, 609-
10 ; right of Parliament to tax, 654; and
the Stamp Act, 655; and the Declaration
of Independence, 684; literature and
social life in, 784, 808-9
Pennsylvania Gazette, founded by Benjamin
Franklin, 399
Pensacola, port in Florida, 694; 709; 756
Penzance, burnt by Amerola, 124
Pepper, Wyndham's expedition seeks for,
43
Pepperell, Lieut.-General, 525
Pepys, Samuel, 300; 515
Pequots, war between Connecticut settlers
and, 165
Perambakam, 756
Perpetual Parliament, The, of George Wither,
608
Persia, visited by Anthony Jenkinson, 41 ;
65
Peter I, Czar of Russia, 301 ; 346; 354; 358
Peter III, Czar of Russia, withdraws from
Seven Years' War, 494
Peterborough, Charles Mordaunt, 3rd Earl
of, 519
Petersburg, Russia, 361
Petersburg, U.S A., 753
Pett, Phineas, designs ships, 129
Petty, Sir William, on the underpopulation
of England, 564
Peyton, Edward, Commodore in the East
Indies, 526
Philadelphia, foundation of, 255; salary of
customs collector at, 293; vice-admiralty
court at, 295; 599; 60 1 ; reception of
Stamp Act in, 653; the Continental
Congress at, 676; 724-9; occupied by
General Howe, 734; evacuated by
Clinton, 738, 766 ; described by Burnaby,
808
Philip, Archduke of Austria, his treaty with
Henry VII, the Intercwrsus Magnus, 198
Phihp II, King of Spain, 30; approves of
Muscovy Company, 40, 41; insists on
prohibition of Guinea trade, 44; 45;
refuses to permit English trade with
Spanish colonies, 48; arrests all English
property in his dominions, 50; 58; 59;
bi; becomes King of Portugal in 1580,
63, 115; allegiance abjured by United
Provinces, 64; 70; 103; 107; 112; 117;
119; and the Armada and after, 121-5;
death of, 125; compelled to strike flag by
Lord William Howard, 197
Philip III, Kinq of Spain, 85; 125; and
the Treaty of London, 128; 172; 187
Philip IV, King of Spain, 226; refuses to
allow liberty of worship to Englishmen,
227
Philip V, King of Spain, 325-7; 356; 365
Philippe le Bel, King of France, 120
Philippines, Spanish trade restrictions in,
305; 704
Phillip, William, Major-General, served
with Burgoyne, 730
Phipps, Sir William, of Boston, captures
Port Royal in Acadia, 51 1 ; 514
Picardy, Parma's victories in, 125
Pierce, John, site of New Plymouth granted
to> r5?» 157
Pigot, Sir Robert, 739-40
Pinckard, Dr, 820-1
Pinteado, Antonio, Portuguese renegade,
sails with Wyndham to Guinea coast, 43
Kracy, 55 335 355 42; 51; against Spain,
under James 1, 88; 129; abortive attempt
of Mansell against pirates of Algiers, 1 30;
142; and the sovereignty of the sea,
1 9576 ; the buccaneers on the Spanish
Main, 245-6, 332-7; Bahamas centre of,
; 5175811-12
tort
ff wu
637
Pitt, William, ist Earl of Chatham, 226;
263; contrasted with Walpole, 346; his
opinion of the importance of trade, 348;
370; and the Seven Years' War, 460-506,
527-8, 53O-1, 590; 634; 641 ; 658; on the
taxation of the colonies, 659; the Pitt-
Grafkon ministry, 663, 666; resignation
of, 667; return to public life, 668; and
the Boston Tea Party, 674; 680; 685 seqq.;
761-2; 764-6; death of, 767
Pitt, William, the younger, 762 ; 768-9; his
motion for Parliamentary Reform, 770;
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 775
Pittsburjr, formerly Fort Duqucsnc, 479;
.634; 638
Pizarro, 74
Placentia, in Newfoundland, 384; 393;
5*4; 519; 522
Plassey, battle of, 476; 529
Plate, River, 58; and the Asiento agree-
ment, 328
Plowden, on the sovereignty of the sea, 199
Plymouth, 28; 33; William Hawkins and,
36, 42; John Hawkins sails from, 49; 70;
Sir Ferdinando Gorges governor of, 78;
98; 100; return of Golden Hind to, 115;
and the Armada, 121-2; the departure
of the Mayflower from, 157; 516; Franco-
Spanish mot to burn, 691
Plymouth Colony, founding of, 80
Pocock, Sir George, Admiral, in India, 529
Point Comfort, 168
Pointis, Jean-Bernard, Baron de, French
seaman, 516
Polaroon, see Pulo Run
Polish Succession, War of, 351 ; 353
Pompadour, Jeanne-Antoinette, Marquise
de, 468; 471; 480; 489
Pondicherry, restored to France, by the
terms of the Treaty of Ryswick, 321;
486; capture of, 489; 525; 529-30; 7*35
restored to France, 781
920
INDEX
Pontanus, Dutchman, in employ of King
of Denmark, reply of, to Selden, 204
Pontiac, Ottawa chief, 638; 641
Poole, 516
Popham, Edward, becomes Lord High
Admiral (1649), 133
Popham, Sir Francis (Captain), 126
Popham, Sir John, advocate of emigration,
78 ; on the emigration of undesirables, 1 1 2
Population, increase of, during Tudor
period, 36; England held to DC over-
populated under Elizabeth, 69; war with
Spain provides outlet for surplus popu-
lation, 73; surplus population under
James 1, 1 1 1-12, 136, 234; England held,
after Revolution of 1688, to be under-
populated, 564
Port de Paix, 515
Porte, Sublime, and extra-territoriality, 2
Portland, 121
Portland, William, 3rd Duke of, 769; 779
Port Louis, in the le de France (Mauritius) ,
525
Port Mahon, in Minorca, 322 ; Marlborough
urges capture of, 326; 521
Portobello, great fair at, 333; South Sea
Company^ factory at, 338
Porto Rico, John Rut touches at, 28;
Grenville fortifies himself at, 71; con-
quest of, by Earl of Cumberland, 126;
228; 333; 520; pacific blockade of, 547;
779
Portolano, pilot's chart, 24
Port Royal, French colony in Acadia, 86;
captured by Scots from Nova Scotia,
154; restored by the Treaty of St Ger-
main-en-Laye (1632), 155; 333; 415;
capture of, by Phipps, 511; 522
Port Royal, in Jamaica, destruction of by
fire, 382; 512
Port Royal, in South Carolina, Scottish
settlement at, 250
Portsmouth, blockaded by French in 1545,
34; fortified by William Hawkins, 36;
Franco-Spanish plot to burn, 691;
Aitken's attempt on, 707
Portsmouth, on Narragansett Bay, settle-
ment of fugitives from Massachusetts at,
164
Portsmouth, Va., 753
Portugal, exploration of African coast, 23-
25; Bristol trade with, 27; 29; 34; 41 ; 43;
46; and the Antwerp staple, 30; English
hatred of, 32, 3^, 37; rivalry with, in
Guinea and Brazil trade, 33, 44-9; claims
monopoly of Barbary trade, 42; better
relations with, 50; 53; 56; 59; disputed
succession, 63; 65; 88; Portuguese
fishermen off Newfoundland seized by
Bernard Drake, 70; 73; 76; 90; Philip II
of Spain becomes King of, 1 15; conquest
of, by Alva, 115; source of weakness to
Philip, 120; 127; contests of English
East Indiamen with Portuguese, 131;
revolt of, from Spain, 132 ; treaty of, with
the Commonwealth, 135; Nicholas V's
African grant to; 183; Treaty of Torde-
sillas between Spain and, 184; treaty of
Edward IV with, 184; 192; patronises
Prince Rupert, 221, 230, 223; Anglo-
Portuguese agreements of 1642, and of
1654, 230; gravitation of, toward Eng-
land, 300; ally of England in the War of
the Spanish Succession, 325 ; 332 ; Asiento
contract in hands of Portuguese, 333;
Don Antonio and English trade with
Portuguese Africa, 438; 550; 628; policy
of Choiseul and Grimaldi towards, 692 ;
war with Spain, 710
Pory, John, secretary in Virginia, 113
Postage, service in North America, 399
Postlethwayt, Malachy, 571 ; 579
Potomac, River, 401
Povey, Thomas, West India merchant,
chairman of the Committee for the West
Indies (1657), 234; promoter of Naviga-
tion Acts, 271 ; and colonial government,
612-13
Powell, Captain John, in employ of
Courteen Brothers, annexes Barbados,
Powell, Henry, re-establishes Courteen
regime in Barbados, 171
Powell, John, the younger, Governor of
Barbados in the Courteen interest, 171;
expelled by Hawley , an emissary of Lord
Carlisle, 172
Pownall, Thomas, colonial governor, 631;
645-50
Poynings's Law, application of, to Virginia
and Jamaica, 406-7, 422 ; 624
Pragmatic Sanction, 353; 364; guaranteed
by the Second Treaty of Vienna, 368
Prague, victory of Frederick the Great at,
Presqu'ile, Fort, 637
Preston, Captain, and the Boston massacre,
670
Prevost, Colonel, 743
Primogeniture, promotes piracy and colonies,
98
Primrose, hired from Royal Navy, by
Wyndham for Guinea expedition, 43
Prince Frederick, voyage of, 339
Prince Royal, constructed by Phineas Pett,
129
Prince Rupert's Land, 509
Princeton, New Jersey, University of, 399;
battle of, 726
Prince William, one of the "annual ships"
to Spanish America, 340
Privateering, 33; attacks on Spaniards,
Flemings and Portuguese during French
war (1545), 355 William Hawkins and,
36, 42; 50; 65; during war with Spain,
72; slump in, under James I, 88; 101;
joint-stock companies for the financing
of, 1 16; 123 ; 126; forbidden by Treaty of
INDEX
921
London, 128; under foreign flags, 138;
the "Gynny" Company take to, 140;
142; in international law, 188-0, 554;
230; 515-17; 53i; 558-60; during the
American War of Independence, 713,
74; 77; 138-9; 147; colonial policy of,
under Charles I, 148; special committee
of, to consider the reform of the govern-
ment of Virginia, 150; 167; committees
of, set up to deal with colonial questions,
176; permanent board set up, "Lords
Commissioners for Plantations in General*'
(1634), 177; committees of, dealing with
trade and plantations in the latter half
of the seventeenth century, 268-70; and
enforcement of the Navigation Acts, 283,
296, 297; defiance of, by Jamaica, 337;
and colonial independence, 386, 389;
relations between, and the colonies
(1666-1753), 405-37, 583-4
Prize Courts, 538; 549 seqq.
Providence, island of, in the West Indies,
166-7, 225; conquered by Spain, 227;
781; 813
Providence, on Narragansett Bay, settle-
ment of fugitives from Massachusetts at,
164.; 596
Province of Avalon, 168; 169
Prussia, ally of England in the War of the
Spanish Succession, 325; enemy, in the
War of the Austrian Succession, 371-6;
461-4; 469; the Convention of West-
minster, 471 ; and the Seven Years' War,
475 seqq.; and contraband, 550
Pudsey, John, Southampton merchant,
engaged in the Brazil trade, 36
Pulo Run (Polaroon), English driven out
of, 306; restored by the Treaty of
Breda, 314
Purchas, Samuel, 126
Puritans, 4; emigration of, 136-8; 565;
colonies of, in North America, 156-60;
unsuccessful settlements of, in West
Indies, 166-7; 604; influence of their
political thought on America, 610 seqq.
Pury, John Peter, leader of Swiss immi-
grants to Carolina, 402
Purysburg, Swiss settlement in South
Carolina, 402
Pym, John, treasurer of the Providence
Company, 166; appointed to a Parlia-
mentary committee, to consider a West
India association, 179; 225
Pyrenees, Treaty of the, terms of, 229; and
the right of search, 557
Quadruple Alliance (1718), 360-1
Quary, Robert, judge of the vice-admiralty
courts in Philadelphia, 287; Surveyor-
General of America, 293 ; his controversy
with Penn, 297
Qjiebec, founded by Champlain in 1606,
74; captured by Kirke, 154; returned
by the Treaty of St Germam-en-Laye,
1555 248; 415; 479; capture of, 482-3;
expedition of Phipps against, 512; §22;
capture of ( 1 759) , 530-4; 642 ; American
assault on repulsed, 720
Quebec Act, 677-^8; 680; 708-9; 771
Querist, The, by Bishop Berkeley, 027
Quibbletown, 729
Quiberon, sea fight off, 483; 485; 533
Quincy, Josiah, Speaker of the South
Carolina Commons House of Assembly,
430
Radisson, Pierre Esprit, explorer in pay of
Prince Rupert, 508
Raleigh, Garew, brother of Sir Walter, 62
Raleigh, Sir Walter, 56; secures permission
from Queen for Gilbert's last expedition,
67 ; 70 ; sells John White licence to found
a colony in Virginia, 71 ; interest of, in
colonisation flags, 74; forfeits Queen's
favour, 74; financial difficulties of, 75;
78; 87; 91; failure of expedition to
Guiana, 92, 138; 96; summary of life
and character, 108-11; 113; 117; serves
under Howard at Cadiz, 124-5, I26;
notes improvements in shipping, 131; 208
Rail, Hessian commander at Trenton,
726
Ramea, island of, Bretons hunt walruses
on, 73; attempt of Leigh on, 74; 86
Randolph, Edward, collector of customs in
Massachusetts, 259, 275; on the Planta-
tions Act of 1 699, 279 ; largely responsible
for the annulment of the Massachusetts
Bay charter, 284; and the illegal trade
with Scotland, 285; recommends the
erection of vice-admiralty courts, 287;
288; Surveyor-General of New England,
293 ; his proposals for a more rigid control
of customs, 296; 510; 569
Raritan River, 724; 726
Rastell, John, unsuccessful voyage of, 28
Ratcliffe, John, 112
Rayneval, Gerard de, and the peace of
1783, 776, 778-9
Ready and Easy Way to establish a Free Com-
monwealth, by John Milton, 611
Redge, Rowland, Major, succeeds Warner
as Governor of St Christopher, 212; his
policy of neutrality in the Civil War, 2 1 2
Red Sea, 17565
Redruth, fishing merchants of, 74
Reformation, 3; 23; 32; 33; 37; 52
Renaissance, 22; 93
Reneger, Robert, Southampton merchant
engaged in the Brazil trade, 36
Rensselaerswyk, 251
Revenge, 117; only ship lost in war with
Spain, 118; 123
Revolution of 1688, 5; 7; effect of, in
America, 260-3, 614
INDEX
Rhode Island, settlement of fugitives from
Massachusetts on, 164; religious tolera-
tion in, 170; 796; obtains Parliamentary
charter during the Civil War, 258;
charter from Charles II (1663), 258;
illicit trade of, 259; confiscation of
charter (1687), 260; 261; restoration of
charter by William III, 262; 288;
customs officials in, 291, 20,2, 385, 666;
596; manufacture of rum in, 597; 628;
Rhodesia, 16
Ribault, Jean, Huguenot captain, founds
French colony in South Carolina, 55
Rice, direct trade in, between colonies and
Europe forbidden (1705), 274; restric-
tions gradually removed, 274, 572 ; chief
product of South Carolina, 394; 589;
593; 644
Rich, Robert, Lord, ist Earl of Warwick,
interest of, in semi-piratical ventures,
Rich,
; 140; 141
Sir Nathaniel,
interested in the
Providence Company, 166
Rich, Sir Robert, 2nd Earl of Warwick,
backs Raleigh in his Guiana expedition,
138; member of the Council of New
England, 147, 153; and the Providence
charter, 164; promoter of the Providence
Company, 106; buys up Lord Pem-
broke's West Indian claims, 174; in-
fluence of, on Cromwell's colonial policy,
176; appointed Governor-in-Chief and
Lord High Admiral of all the English
colonies in America, 179; president of
commission appointed by Parliament in
1643, to take charge of the colonies and
their trade, 214, 606; 225; bears leading
part in organising expedition to recover
Barbados, 226
Richelieu, Cardinal, stations part of French
fleet at Toulon, 115; revives French Navy,
132; and the Treaties of Susa and St
Germain-en-Laye, 155; Colbert's ad-
miration for, 307
Richmond, Charles Lennox, 3rd Duke of,
762-3 5765; 767; 7.69
Right of Search, claimed in time of King
John, 118; under Elizabeth, 118;
557seqq.; and the Armed Neutrality,
716
Rio de la Hacha, port on Spanish Main,
John Hawkins sells negroes at, 49; 98
Rio Grande, 544
Ripperda, Jan Willem, Spanish minister,
339; responsible for the first Treaty of
Vienna (1725), 365
Roanoke, Virginia, unsuccessful settlement
at, 71, 109; salary of customs collector
at> 293
Robinson, John, minister of the Scrooby
congregation, 156
Robinson, Sir Christopher, and the doc-
trine of the Continuous Voyage, 553
Rochambeau, Count of, French general in
America, 74?~9; 75 1; 754 : 75#
Rochford William, 4th Earl of, ambassador
to Spain, 691; 701-4; 706; 765
Rochefort, 476
Rockingham, Charles Watson-Wentworth,
2nd Marquess of, succeeds Grenville, 659 ;
666; 694; 762; 765seqq.; 2nd ministry
of, 769 seqq.; death of, 775
Rodney, George, Lord, Admiral, 9; his
attack on Havre, 481 ; 534; and Martin-
ique, 690 ; his victory off Cape St Vincent,
715, 746; his actions against de Guichen,
748-51, 754; his victory over de Grasse,
Rodney, H.M.S., pressing of seamen for, in
Boston, 666
Roe, Sir Thomas, makes journey to
Amazon, 91
Roebuck, Dampier's voyage in, to Australia,
Rolfe, John, husband of Pocahontas, 113
Rollo, Andrew, Lord, 534
Rooke, Sir George, Admiral, captures
Gibraltar, 520
Rossbach, victory of Frederick the Great at,
«477 ^ u -
Roucoux, French victory at, 374
Rous, Sir John, 768
Rousby, collector of customs in Maryland,
murder of, 280, 284
Rowe, Jacob, Professor at William and
Mary College, taken into custody for
contempt by the Virginia Assembly, 427
Royal Caroline, makes the last of the
"annual" voyages to Spanish America,
340*344
Royal George, second "annual" ship sent to
Spanish America under the Asiento
agreement, 338
Royal George, H.M.S., 528
Royal Prince, first "annual" ship sent to
Spanish America under the Asiento
agreement, 338
Rudyerd, Sir Benjamin, 141 ; interested in
the Providence Company, 166
Rump Parliament, the, 208
Rupert, Prince, naval campaign of, against
the Commonwealth, 133, 134, 209, 212;
his squadron driven bv Blake from
European waters, 218; his attacks on
the Guinea Company's ships, 237, 439;
supporter of Navigation Acts, 271; and
the Hudson's Bay Company, 508-9
Russia, expedition of Willoughby and
Chancellor to, 40; English trade with,
largely lost to the Dutch, 315; acquires
European position under Peter the
Great, 354; relations of, with Government
of George I, 361-2; and the Treaty of
Nystadt, 362; 367; and the Peace of
Belgrade, 369; 371; and the War of the
INDEX
923
Austrian Succession, 375; 464; 471-2;
import of iron from, 587; 773-4
Rut, John, shipmaster of Royal Navy, sails
at Henry VIII's expense to Labrador
and the Caribbean, 28, 29
Rutland, Henry, and Earl of, tries to save
Calais, 51
Ruyter, Michael de, Admiral, 1 34 ; his attack
on Barbados, 242 ; his victories of 1672-4,
317-18; in West Africa, 441; 557
Ryswick, Peace of, 300; terms of, 321 ; 409;
517; and contraband, 551
Sacramento, 692
Sagadahoc, abandonment of, 88
Sagres Castle, occupied by Drake, 121
St Augustine, Spanish station at mouth of
the Florida Channel, 77; 86; 395
St Christopher, settlement at (1623), I3I»
143) divided between English and
French, 144; Warner Governor and
Carlisle "Lord Proprietor" of, 145;
expulsion by the Spaniards of the
colonists, and their return, 146, 173; 153;
tobacco-growing on, 172; estimated
population of, in 1639, 174; introduction
of the sugar industry to, 210; neutrality
of, during Civil War, 212; under the
Commonwealth, 233; settlement of the
proprietary dispute at the Restoration,
241; conquered by the French (1665),
241, 508; restored at the peace, 242, 314;
separate governorship of Leeward Islands,
244 ; 286 ; annexation of French settlement
in, by Treaty of Utrecht, 328; 377, 407;
12-14; 519-20; 523; 570; 576; captured
de Bouille1, 757; restored at the Peace
of Versailles, 781; 819
r, boundary
of Maine and
St Groix, River,
Nova Scotia, 777
St Eustatius, 221; proposal of Colbert to
annex, 317; 513; 590; 715; Rodney's
capture of, 750; 754; recovered by de
Bouille*, 757
St Germain-en-Laye, Treaty of (1632),
between England and France, 155
St Helena, occupation of, by the East India
Company, 265; loss and reconquest in
St John, Nicholas, leader of first settlement
on St Lucia, 87
St John, Oliver, Parliamentary envoy to
the Hague, 222
St John, one of the Virgin Islands, 412
St John River (Madawaska), 777
St John, Sir William, promoter of new
Company for African trade, 139
St John's, Fort of (Quebec), 720
St John's, Port of, Newfoundland, fishing
fleets gather at, 60; Gilbert at, 105;
fortification of, 510; 516; 522
St John's River, on the Moskito Coast, 383
St Joseph, Fort, 63 ^
St Kitts, see St. Christopher
St Lawrence River, fisheries in hands of
Bretons, 60; 73; 74; 165; and the Peace
of Utrecht, 543 5777
St Louis, Fort, French station in Senegal,
446; 450; 454-6
St Louis, Port, on East Falkland, 698;
handed over to Spain and renamed Port
Soledad, 699
St Lubin, M. de, French adventurer in
India, 713
St Lucia, settlement on, destroyed by
Garibs, 87 ; French settlers on, attacked by
Lord Willoughby, 186; and international
law, 1 86; assigned to France by Treaty
of Paris (1763), 186; 377; 466; 496; 501;
given back to France at the Peace of
Paris, 502; 534; capture of, 712; 741-2;
ceded to France (1783), 781
St Martins, Dutch trading port in the West
Indies, 221
St Pierre, island of, 492 ; 543 ; 688 ; captured
by Admiral Montague, 712; ceded to
France (1783), 781
St Vincent, Cape, naval battle of (1759).
see Lagos; Rodney's victory off, 715, 740
St Vincent, in the West Indies, 377; 466;
642; capture of, by d'Estaing, 715, 742;
restored at the Peace of Versailles, 781
Salem, first settlement at, 160; Roger
Williams minister at, 163; customs
officials at, 290; custom house moved
from Boston to, 674
Salisbury, Robert Cecil, Earl of, fosters sea
trade, 77; pensioner of Spain, in; and
the Treaty of London, 128
Saltonsfall, Sir Samuel, London merchant,
interested in the Plantations, 172
Salute of the flag, 118; Dutch agree to
strike the flag in the Narrow Seas (1654),
135; edict of King John as to, 196; under
the Tudors, 197; insisted upon in the
Channel by James I, 201; and the First
Dutch War, 201, 223, 538-9; 54O-3
Samoa, 555
San Domingo, John Rut touches at, 28;
disgrace of Venables and Penn at, 228;
rendezvous for Spanish treasure fleet,
o 3335 582 5590; 690-1
San Ildefonso, Treaty of, between Spain
and Portugal, 710
San Juan de Ulua, John Hawkins attacked
by Spaniards at, 49; 51 ; 56; 98
San Lucar, 122; 125
Sandusky, Fort, 637
Sandwich, John Montagu, 4th Earl of,
First Lord of the Admiralty, 735; 739;
744; 768
Sandy Hook, 738-40; 754-55 7^3
Sandys, Sir Edwin, on Sir Thomas Dale,
112; promoter of Free Trade Bills, 113;
succeeds Smythe as Treasurer of the
Virginia Companv, 140; free fishing bill
of, 148; resists the reform of the Virginia
Company, 150-1; 156; 174
924
INDEX
Santa Cruz, Admiral, destroys French fleet
under Strozzi, 63
Santa Cruz in Morocco, visited by Alday, 42
Santa Cruz, island in the West Indies, 1 73 ;
Blake destroys Spanish treasure fleet at,
229
Sao Jorge da Mina, Portuguese head-
quarters on African coast, 65
Sarah, the case of the (1731), 298
Saratoga, English post established at
(1727), 390; surrender of General Bur-
goyne at, 710, 725, 732, 764, 770
Sardinia, seized by Spain (1717), 359;
given to Savoy, goo; and the War of the
Austrian Succession, 373-6; 464
Sartines, Antoine de, French minister of
the Navy, 707
Saunders, Sir Charles, Admiral, at Quebec,
532, 81 1
Savannah, 368; captured by Campbell,
0 743; 7475 756^
Savoy, politics of, 300, 325, 360
Say, Geoffrey de, commissioned as admiral
by Edward III, 197
Saye and Sele, Lord, active member of the
council of New England, 153; interested
in the Providence Company, 166
Scarborough, fight between Dutch and
Dunkirkers at, 201
Schaw, Miss, on life in North Carolina,
70,3-4; and the West Indies, 818-19
Schism Act, repeal of, 349
Schohare, valley of, 402
Schwenkfelders, 403
Scotland, 3; 8; 12; 34; 51; 90; 120;
emigration from, to America, 153-5; and
foreign fishermen, 198^-200; attempt of
Cromwell to force emigration from, to
the West Indies, 236; emigration from,
to Carolina, 250; the Darien scheme and
reflections upon the Scots, 265-6; Scots
accounted English by common law, 271 ;
and the Navigation Acts, 279, 284,
286-8; unsuccessful Spanish expedition
to, 361; 608; Scots and the rebellion of
the colonists, 761-2, 765
Scottish Act, of 1693, for the encourage-
ment of foreign trade, 28^
Scrooby, in Nottinghamshire, emigration
of Independent congregation from, 156
"Sea Beggars ", indulge in privateering, 63 ;
97
Sea power, i; 3; 5; 7; q; 19; 96; under
Elizabeth, 110-19; under James I, 129-
3 1 ; technical improvements in shipping,
1 29-31; and the Commonwealth, 134-5,
213-18; the Navigation Acts of 1650 and
1651, 215-18; battle of La Hogue,
effects of, 285; from 1660 to 1763, 507-37
Sea, sovereignty of the, claims to, at the
beginning of the seventeenth century,
Sears, Isaac, on the Stamp Act, 655
Sedgwick, Robert, Major, captures French
ports in Acadia (1654), 231
Selden, John, and the salute of the flag,
201 ; his Mare Clausumy 203-5
Senecas, Red Indian tribe, 638
Senegal, 73; slave trade in, ^
French capture Dutch posts in, ^w,
rivalry with the French in, 446 ; capture
of French forts in, 454, 479; the Province
of Senegambia, 454-8; Senegal given
back to the French, 457-8, 781 ; 704; 713
Senegambia, 443; province of, 454-8
Sestos, River of, English ship sunk by
Portuguese in, 47
Seven Years' War, 9; in West Africa, 453-
4; 460-506; 527-34; 543
Seville, 42; 50; 76; 120; 125; 333
Seville, Treaty of (1729), restoration of
Anglo-Spanish trade promised, 339;
Searle, Daniel, Parliamentary commissioner,
made Governor of Barbados, 219; 233
Sewall, Samuel, 406; 797-9
Shaftesbury, Antony Cooper, Earl of,
interested in the planting of Carolina, 7;
248; and the Council for Foreign
Plantations, 269; 271; his denunciations
of Rome, 312; 319
Shakespeare, William, references in works
of, to overseas enterprises, 96-7
Sharpe, Horatio, Deputy Governor of
Maryland, 468
Shelburne, William Petty, 2nd Earl of, and
the government of Senegambia, 455;
President of the Board of Trade, 640-1 ;
650; on the Stamp Act, 66 1; 662; 663;
666; resignation of, 667; 683; 694-97;
762; 767; 769-70; 772; 7745 Ministry of,
775 seqq.; resignation of, 782
Sheridan, Richard Brmsley, 762; 768-9;
775
Sherlock, Thomas, Bishop of London,
proposal of, for the creation of an
American bishopric, 404
Ship money, 201
Shirley, Thomas, Captain, 457
Shirley, Sir Antony, attacks of, on West
Indies, 126
Shirley, William, Governor of New Eng-
land, 391; 418; 525; 630
Shute, Samuel, Colonel, Governor of
Massachusetts, refused fixed salary by
the Assembly, 388; 389; 417; 798
Sicily, 323; 546
Sidney, Sir Philip, helps to finance one of
Raleigh's expeditions, 71; 108
Sierra Leone, 10; 1 1 ; visit of John Hawkins
to, 48; Fenton calls at, 66; 237; English
stations in, 438-9
Silesia, 37 15462; 476
Silva, Don Guzman de, Spanish ambassa-
dor in England, protests against Hawkins's
voyages, 49; charm of, 50
Siraj-ud-daula, Nawab of Bengal, 528
Sisargas Islands, 744-5
INDEX
925
Six Nations, French and English contend
for influence among, 248; friendly re-
lations of, with the English, 391, 544,
638; legal position of, 545
Skenesborough, 728; 730
Skeritt, Maria, 346
Slavery, 4; 10; 19; John Hawkins and
the slave trade, 47, 48; Gynney Com-
pany's traffic in slaves, 139; 153; and the
introduction of the sugar trade into the
West Indies, 210, 37Q--8o; exportation of
slaves to the West Indies under Common-
wealth, 237; slaving monopoly of African
Company, 243, 336-7; and the popu-
lation of the West Indian and North
American colonies, 267; 305; the Asiento
agreement, 328, 329, 333-45; Jamaica,
centre of slave trade, 334, 338; and the
social system of the West Indies, 380-3,
588; 401; 403; the West African slave
trade, 437-54; growth of trade during
Seven Years' War, 501 ; 570-1 ; 597; 791 ;
808; 813; 819-21
Sloughter, Henrv, Colonel, Governor of
New York for William III, 262; 417
Sluys, battle of, 119
Smith, Adam, 159; 12; 13; 19; his estimate
of Colbert, 308; and the export of
capital, 594-5; and the colonies, 649-50,
652
Smith, Captain John, ultimate success of
James Town settlement due to, 80;
autocrat of colony, 81 ; hunts for whales,
89; exploring work of, 89; author of term
"New England", 89; interest in the con-
version of natives shown in his Generall
Historic of Virginia, no; in; 113;
146
Smith, William, provost of Philadelphia
College, and the privileges of the
Assembly, 428
Smythe, Customer, father of Sir Thomas
Smythe, 75
Smythe, Sir Thomas, connected with many
of the Elizabethan overseas enterprises,
75; Governor of Levant and East India
Companies, 76; 77; treasurer of Virginia
Company, 81, 82, 83; Governor of the
Bermuda Company, 85; opposition of,
to a breach with Spain, 140; ousted from
treasurership of Virginia Company, 140;
150; 152
Society for the Promotion of the Explora-
tion of the African interior, founded 1 788,
459
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel,
request of, that intoxicating liquors be not
sold to the Red Indians, 391 ; 404; and
the promotion of Episcopalianism, 648;
801
Soissons, Congress of, 339
Solar, Bailli de, Sardinian minister in
Paris, 495
Solomon Islands, 535
Somers, Sir George, second in command to
Sir Thomas Gates, 83; 126
Somers Islands, see Bermudas
Somerset!:, the case of, slavery declared
illegal in England, 449
Sorel, Arnold driven back on, 725
South African War, 1 7
South Sea Bubble, 349; 362
Southampton, 23; trade with Guinea and
Brazil, 28; decay of, due to Portuguese,
30; its trade with the Peninsula, 33;
Henry Huttoft native of, 36; anxiety of,
that colonies should be planted in
America, 67
Southampton, Henry, 3rd Earl of, interest
of, in colonisation, 78; finances Roe's
expedition to the Amazon, 91; backs
Raleigh's Guiana expedition, 138; 140;
member of the Council of New England,
Southwell, Robert, promoter of Navigation
Laws, 271
Southwold Bay, battle of (1672), 317
Sovereign of the Seas, first English three-
decker, 129
Spain, i; 2; 8; 9; 22; 25; 29; 30; 39; 41;
English rivalry with, 32, 35, 37; charter
granted to English merchants trading
with, 33; alliance with, against France,
34; 53; 56; disturbed relations with, 58;
convention of Bristol with, 59; 61 ; 63-9;
Spanish fishermen seized by Bernard
Drake off Newfoundland, 70; war with,
72 ; makes peace with France at Vervins,
75; Treaty of London with, 76, 128; 77;
78; 88; the Spanish market for fish, and
the peace of 1604, 90; 96; 100; 105;
hostility of English to, under James I,
ii i ; 115; condition of navy of, before
Armada, 117-19; supports Irish mal-
contents, 119; the Armada, 121-2, and
after, 123-5; an<^. Peace with the Dutch,
128; decline of, in seventeenth century,
132; war between Commonwealth and,
135; relations of, with England under
James I and Charles I, 138-46; and the
Providence Company's colonies in the
West Indies, 166-7, !72-3; Alexan-
der VI's grant to, 183-4; Treaty of
Tordesillas between Portugal and (149^),
184; founds validity of title to colonial
empire upon prior discovery, 184-5;
treaty of Munster with the Netherlands
(1648), 191 : and the rights of aborigines,
192; and the sovereignty of the sea, 199;
Spanish jurists of sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, 202-5; relations with
the Commonwealth, 225-30; Treaty of
the Pyrenees> 229, 238; 312; treaties of
1 667 and 1670 with England, English pos-
sessions in America recognised by Spain,
315; 318; and the Treaty of Ryswick, 321 ;
the Partition Treaties, 322-3; the War of
the Spanish Succession, 324-9; 330-45;
926
INDEX
518-23; Anglo-Spanish war of 1718, 339,
546-7; 342-3; 354-58; the war with the
Quadruple Alliance, 359-^1, 547 ; 363-4;
the alliance with Austria, 365-7; the
Treaty of Seville, 339, 367; the Second
Treaty of Vienna, 368; the Family Com-
pact of 1733, 369; Don Carlos becomes
King of Naples and Sicily, 368-9; the
war of Captain Jenkins's Ear, 342-4,
370-1 ; accession of Ferdinand VI and
the policy of his wife, 374; the Peace of
Aix-la-Ghapelle, 376; and the Seven
Years' War, 476, 480-1, 486 seqq.; 507;
524; 534-55 and neutral rights, 549;
policy of, under Charles III, 686 seqq.;
the affair of the Falkland Islands, 698^
703; negotiations with the North Ameri-
can colonists, 709 seqq.; war with Portu-
gal, 710; war with England (1779), 715,
743; and boundaries of United States,
770-1 ; peace negotiations, 772 seqq.
Spanish Empire, 4; 31 ; English trade with,
forbidden, 48; 67; 68; attacks of Drake
and Grenville on, 73; English demand
freedom of trade with, 76, 542 ; tobacco
imported from Spanish Indies, 84;
Drake's attacks on, 99-102; in; 115;
126; trade with, and the Treaty of
London, 128; annexation of Jamaica by
Cromwell, 135, 229; Inter caetera and the
Treaty of Tordesiflas, 183-4; successive
British attacks on, 225; Cromwell's
attack on Spanish Main, 228-9; 305;
and the Partition Treaties, 322-3;
English trade with, 330-5; the Asiento
agreement with England and the " annual
ship", 336-45; South Sea Company's
factors in Spanish American ports, 338;
the obstacles put in the way of trade by
local officials, 340; 685; revolts in, 688;
Spanish claims to monopoly, 695
Spanish Succession, WIT of, 8; 9; 325-9;
518-23; 621-3
Spencer, C., and Captain Cook, 536
Spenser, William, 108
Spert, Thomas, voyage of, fails (1516), 28
Spes, Gueran de,' succeeds de Silva as
Spanish ambassador, 49; protests against
English retention of Spanish treasure, 50
Spice trade, 26; 30; 32; 562
Spotswood, Alexander, urges contributory
organised defence upon the colonists,
390; Lieutenant-Go vernor of Virginia,
393; and the manufacture of iron in
Virginia, 394; 418; 635
Spotsylvania County, Virginia, 394
Squirrel, pinnace used by Gilbert, 106
Stamp Act, 299; 600; 631; GrenvWs
introduction of, 644-5; 653 seqq.; repeal
of, 6615693; 705
Stanislaus, exiled King of Poland, Louis XV
marries daughter or, 366
Stanley, Hans, British envoy at Paris, 461 ;
49o; 4935 495; 501
Staple, merchants of the, 23
Stapleton, Sir William, Colonel, Governor
of the Leeward Islands, 244; 407-8; 418;
816-17
Staten Island, 722; 729
Steelyard, the, headquarters of London
Hansa, seized by Elizabeth, 39
Stephenson, George, 1 1
Stettin, 361
Steuben, German officer with Washington,
738
Stewart, Rear-Admiral, 559
Stillwater, Burgoyne at, 731
"Stockholm Tar Company", 574
Stono Ferry, 743
Stony Point, 746
Stormont, Viscount, see Mansfield, 2nd
Earl of
Story, American jurist, dissents from
Blackstone, 194
Stowell, William Scott, Lord, 551 ; 553
Strachey, Henrv, British envoy to Paris, 777
Strickland, Walter, Parliamentary envoy
to the Hague, 222
Strong, John, Captain, at the Falkland
Islands, 698
Strozzi, Philip, defeated by Admiral Santa
Cruz, 63
Stuart, John, superintendent of Indian
affairs, 636
Stukeley, Thomas,
tipn, 54; betrays ]
piracy of, 55,
land, 57
Suarez, Francis, on the need for inter-
national law, 205
Sudan, 16-17
Suffren, de Saint Tropez, Pierre Andre1 de,
French admiral, 751; 756
Sugar, 10; n; 19; 34; English ships bring,
from Canaries, 33; important item in
Barbary trade, 42; introduction of sugar
industry to the West Indies, 182, 210;
industry in West Indies, financed by
Dutch capitalists during Civil War, 210;
and the introduction of slave labour to
the West Indies, 210, 380; thriving
industry developed at Surinam, 231;
makes for big estates, 241 , 379-82 ; and
the Navigation Acts, 273, 277-80 ; decline
in trade in the eighteenth century, 379;
imoter of colonisa-
to Spaniards, 55;
speculates in Irish
Sullivan, American general, 734; 739-40
Sulu, island in the Philippines, 704
Sumter, Thomas, American general, 748
Superior, Lake, 546
Surat, capture of, 485
Surinam, colony founded from Barbados by
Lord Willoughby (1651), 231; Richard
Holdip appointed Governor by Parlia-
ment, 231; sugar industry in, 231;
surrenders to the Dutch in 1667, 242;
INDEX
927
ceded to the Dutch by the Treaty of
Breda in excnange for New Amsterdam,
252, 508; not included in South Sea
Company's monopoly, 335
Susa, Treaty of, 1629, between England
and France, 159
Susan Constant , ship hired from the Muscovy
. Company, sailed with colonists to
Virginia (1606), 80
Susquehanna, River, 402
Swan, ship, sailed with Drake in 1577,
100
Sweden, eagerness of, for an alliance with
the Commonwealth, 135; claims of, to
sovereignty of the sea, 195; growth in
power of, 301; Triple Alliance with
England and Holland, 315-16,- ally of
England and France against the Dutch,
317; 347; Jacobite hopes centre on, 348;
under Charles XII, 358-61; 550; 556;
575; and the iron industry, 586-7
Swift, Jonathan, 241 ; his criticisms of the
conduct of the War of the Spanish
Succession, 326-7; 522; his views on
business men, 622-3. See also Gulliver's
Travels
Swiss, immigrants in North Carolina, 401-2
Sydney, Australia, 1 1
Syria, 24
Tagus, River, Drake in, 123; 124; Prince
Rupert, 133
Tahiti, 535; 536
Tarnar, H.M.S., at the Falkland Islands,
699
Tangier, abandonment of, 320, 509; ac-
quisition of, 507
Tarlcton, Sir Banastre, at the capture of
Charleston, 747; 752
Tartars, attacks of, injure trade of Muscovy
Company, 60
Temple, Sir Richard, 301, 316
Tennessee, 772
Tcrnate, Sultan of, forms alliance with
Drake against the Portuguese, 62 ; 65
Ternay, de, French admiral, 748-9; 751
Terra australis, 101, 535
Terray, Joseph Marie, and the fall of
Choiseul, 702-3
Test Act, 349
Thatch, pirate chief, captured in the
Bahamas, 384
Thirty Years' War, 53; 132; 136; 206
Thomas, John, Bristol merchant, 27
Thomas, Sir Dalby, historian, 603; 621
Thompson, Maurice, wealthy London
merchant, interested in the Plantations,
172; adviser to the Commonwealth, in
colonial matters, 215; piomoter of Navi-
gation Acts, 271; 332
Thome, Nicholas, Bristol merchant, traded
with Canaries, 36
Thorne, Robert, engaged in Bristol enter-
prises, 28; 29; 36, 95
Thorne, Robert, the younger, engaged in
Bristol enterprises, 29; 30
Thorpe, George, interested in conversion of
the natives, no
Three Rivers, fight at, 725
Thurlow, Edward, ist Baron, 768-9
Ticonderoga, French fort in North America,
foundation of, 363 ; defeat of Abercromby
at, 479; capture of, by Amherst, 483;
captured by the rebellious colonists, 68 1,
7 18, 72 1 ; 725 ; Burgoyne's capture of, 730
Tierra del Fuego, discovered by the Dutch,
144
Ttgar, the, and the capture of Chander-
nagore, 529
Tobacco, becomes staple product of Vir-
ginia, 84; first grown by English in
Guiana, 86, 87; planted by North's men
in Amazon delta, 139; the contract of
1621, 149; the plantations under the
proprietary system in the West Indies,
172; over-production of, 209, 256; 241;
resentment at regulation of, in colonies,
256-7; and the Navigation Laws, 273,
277-81, 567; 393; 571; 589; 593; 595;
650; 79«>; 791
Tobago, grant of, to the Earl of Mont-
gomery, 145; Warwick sends out colonists
to, 22b; proposal of Colbert to annex,
317; 377; 466; 642; 754i ceded to
France (1783), 781
Toledo, Don Fadrique de, captures Nevis
and St Chiistopher, 173
Tom Cringle's lj)g> 822
Torbay, 509
Tordesillas, Treaty of, settles demarcation
of the colonial domains of Spain and
Portugal, 184; 195
Torgau, victory of Frederick the Great at,
Torrington, Arthur Herbert, Earl of
Admiral, 510; 517
Torrington, George Byng, Viscount, Ad-
miral, destroys Spanish fleet at Cape
Passaro (1718), 360, 546-7
Tortuga, island oil Hayti, Puritan settle-
ment on, 1 66; conquest of, by Spain,
227
Toulon, Richelieu transfers part of French
fleet to, 1 15; 521; 547
Toulouse, Louis-Alexandre, Comte de,
520-1
Tourville, French Admiral, 517
Towerson, William, leads three expeditions
to African coast, 43
Townshend, Charles, President of the
Board of Trade, 640; a member of the
Rockingham ministry, 659; Chancellor
of the Exchequer in the Pitt-Grafton
ministry, 663; his North American
duties, 663 seqq.; death of, 666; 696
Townshend, Thomas, a member of
Rockingham 's second ministry, 769; and
of Shelburne's ministry, 775
928
INDEX
Trade and Navigation of Great Britain Con-
sidered, by Joshua Gee, 578
Trade's Increase, East Indiaman, 127
Transportation, 15; 112; 135-8; 234-5 »
379; 605; 627; 814 m
Treasury, relations between, and colonies
in the eighteenth century, 414-15
Trecothick, Barlow, 600-1
Trelawney, Edward, Governor of Jamaica,
and the Maroons, 383
Trenton, New Jersey, Gornwallis at, 724;
battle of, 726, 759
Trincomalee, 781
Trinidad, dastardly behaviour of Spanish
governor of, 87 ; attack of Dudley on, 1 26 ;
grant of, to the Earl of Pembroke, 145;
Warwick sends out colonists to, 226; 813
Trinity House. 540
Triple Alliance, the (1668), 318
Triple Alliance, the (1717), 357
True report of the late Discoveries and possession
...of the Newfoundlands by... Sir Humphry
Gilbert, Knight, by Sir George Peckham,
68
Tryon, William, Governor, of New York,
675; 727
Tunis, Bey of, humbled by Blake, 135
Turenne, Marshal, 314; conquests of, in
Flanders and Hainault, 315
Turgot, Anne-R.-J., Baron de J'Aulne,
and the rebellion of the American
colonies, 706
Turks, 2; 23; 24; 25; 30; 41; 65; negotia-
tions of Elizabeth with, 120; the victories
of Prince Eugene over, 358; and the
Peace of Belgrade, 369-70
Turk's Island, seizure of, by the French,
691
Tuscaroras, Indian tribe, wars with, 391
United Empire Loyalists, 10
Ushant, naval engagement off, 741
Utopia, by Sir Thomas More, 94; 107
Utrecht,Treatyof (1474), 32; (1713), 7; 8;
263; and Newfoundland, 264, 543; 300;
terms of, 328-9, 523, 542, 546; 331 ; 346;
general dissatisfaction with, 359; 377;
and contraband, 549; 576
Valerius and Publicola, of James Harrington,
611
Valley Forge, Washington at, 735, 737
Van Dam, Rip, and the Zenger case, 399-
400
Van Herwick, Abraham, connected with
scheme to settle Brownists by the St
Lawrence, 74
Van Tromp, Admiral, annihilates Spanish
fleet in English waters, 132; 134; refusal
of, to lower flag in Straits of Dover pre-
cipitates First Dutch War, 201, 223,
538-9
Vancouver Island, 8
Vanderdussen, Admiral, 520
Vane, Sir Henry, Governor of Massachu-
setts Bay, supports Mrs Hutchinson, 164;
175; member of Warwick's Commission,
215; appointed president of a Council of
Trade, 215
Vardo, on coast of Norway, visited by
Chancellor, 39, 40
Vasco da Gama, 25; 93; 183
Vasquicas, Ferdinand, Spanish jurist, holds
that the sea is common to all, 202 ; 205
Vattel, Emeric de, 186; his Droit des Gens,
541 ; on neutrality, 554
Vaughan, George, agent for New Hamp-
shire, 652
Vaughan, John, 3rd Earl of Carbery,
Governor of Jamaica, his report (1676)
on the Acts of Trade, 282; 407; 815-16
Vaughan, Sir William, takes out party of
Welsh emigrants to Newfoundland, 91
Vega, Lope de, Spanish poet, praises
Drake, 102
Velasco, Don Alonso de, letter of, to
Philip II, 112
Venables, Robert, commands expedition
against Spanish Main (1655), 228-9;
sent to Tower, 229
Venango, Fort, French attack on, 394; 637
Venice, 2; 23; 30-3; her claim to sovereignty
of the Adriatic, 195; 606; and vote by
ballot, 608
Vera Cruz, 333; South Sea Company's
factory at, 338; 689
Verden, 359; secured for Hanover, 361
Vergcnnes, Charles Gravier, Comte de,
649; 704seqq.; 77oseqq.
Vernon. Sir Edward, Admiral, at Porto-
bello, 344, 371; his attack on Cartagena,
37 1; 524
Verplanck's Point, 746
Versailles, Franco-Austrian Treaty of
(1756), 472; the Peace of (1783), 85 458;
781-3
Vervins, Treaty of (1598), 75
Vespucci, Amerigo, 94
Vetch, Captain Samuel, of Boston, 522
Vice-admiralty courts, set up in the
colonies by the Act of 1696, 287; take the
place of trial by jury, 287, 295; 294;
jurisdiction of, 297-9; m Senegambia,
Victoria, Franciscus a, theologian, does not
admit papal claim to dispose of barbarian
lands, 184, 192
Victoria, Queen of England, 13
Vienna, First Treaty of (1725), alliance of
Spain and the Empire, 365; Second
Treaty of, the Pragmatic Sanction
guaranteed, 368; Third Treaty of, 369
Vigo Bay, victory over Spanish fleet in,
326
Villegaignon, Nicholas de, French colonist,
54
Vindication of the New England Churches, by
F. Wise, 806
INDEX
929
Viper, H.M.S., treatment of, by citizens of
North Carolina, 655
Virgin Islands, 377; 412
Virginia, 4; 5; 18; 56; 57; 67; Lane's
settlement in, 71; John White's settle-
ment at Roanoke, 71; 74; schemes for
colonisation of, 78; creation of Royal
Council for, 78; provisions of the Virginia
charter, 79, 015; sufferings of the
"London Colony", 79; founding of
James Town and Fort St George, 80;
new charter of, 81; third charter, 82;
tobacco-growing in, 84; expedition sent
to, under Lord de la Warr, 83; Sir
Thomas Dale, Governor of, 83 ; organisa-
tion of, 84; Sir George Yeardley,
Governor of, 84; 87; 88; 90; Raleigh
and, 109; colonists in fear of Spain, 1 1 1 ;
forcible emigration of undesirables to,
112, 605; colony of, considered a failure,
no discovery of gold, 113; 131; settle-
ments in, acknowledge Commonwealth,
133; 13%'> J39;
tract of 1621 and, 149;
colonists in, killed by Indians, 150;
> tobacco con-
1621 and, 149; a quarter of the
committee to investigate government of,
150; the charter of the company revoked,
151; first Assembly convoked (1619),
152; assumption of direct control by the
162; Royal Commission for, ceases to
function, 167; bitterness of relations
between, and Maryland, 169-70; 175-6;
royalist sympathies of, during Civil War,
1 80, 211 ; second Indian massacre, 180-
i; 185; repudiates Commonwealth, 212;
trade with, forbidden by the Common-
wealth, 2 id; submission of, to Common-
wealth, 219, 220; 233; at the Restora-
tion, 256; the depression in the tobacco
trade, 256; oligarchy, and the rebellion
of Nathaniel Bacon, 256-7; grants to
courtiers, and corruption, 257; 262 ; 267;
and the Navigation Acts, 281-2, 287;
customs officials in, 290, 293; 320; 387;
390-3; manufacture of iron in, 394, 586-
75 397-40 Jj 4°35 government of 1060-
17% 405-7, 410, 418* 421-33; 511 ; 571;
589; 598-601; 636; 641; payment of the
clergy m, 649; and the Stamp Act,
654seqq.; the "Resolves of 1769", 668;
and the Gaspie affair, 672; decides to stop
the exportation of tobacco, 675; joins the
rebellion, 68 1 , war in, 752 seqq.; Illinois
county, 772; literature and social life in,
784 seqq., 807-8; education in, 389-90
Viry, Count of, Sardinian minister in
London, 495; 497
Volga, Anthony Jenkinson goes down,
Voltaire, Francis-Marie Arouet de, on
the English Constitution, 347; on the
prosperity of England, 354
Von Kocherthal, Joshua, leader of German
emigrants to New York, 401
Wager, Sir Charles, Commodore, 520; 524
Walker, Sir Hovenden, Rear-Ad rrnral, 5 1 9,
523
Wall, Richard, Spanish Minister of Foreign
Affairs, 698
Walhs, Captain Samuel, R.N., at Tahiti,
Walpole, Horace, the elder, his anxiety for
the safety of the West Indies, 38
Walpole, Horace, the younger,
estimate of French strength, 354;
472 ; his account of the Stamp Act debate
in the House of Commons, 646; 603
Walpole, Robert, Sir, 7; his share in the
conduct of foreign affairs, 341 ; and the
Convention Treaty of 1 737, 343; and the
War of Jenkins's Ear, 343; contrasted
with the elder Pitt, 346; Chancellor of
the Exchequer, 348; the failure of his
excise bill, 349; his fear of the Jacobites,
348-50; his relations with the Crown,
351 ; his policy of alliance with France,
363; 364-6; and the War of the Polish
uccession, 368; 369; 371; fall of, 373;
of the
375; 385^624; and the taxation
colonies, 652
Walsingham, Sir Francis, favours
bold
policy against Spain, 58; supports pro-
position for an English colony across the
Atlantic, 58; 61; Drake drafts plans for
his voyage in concert with, 62; 64; pro-
poses Drake should be sent to Calicut, 65;
approves of plan for settling recusants in
North America, 67; and Southampton,
67; supports Bernard Drake's expedition
Wandewash, Goote's victory at, 405
War Office, relations between, and the
colonies, 416—17
Warburg, 486
Ward, Richard, Bristol merchant, 27
Warner, Sir Thomas, survivor from the
Amazon settlement, 143; settles on St
Christopher, 143; his policy of planting
unoccupied islands with English settlers,
1 73 ; succeeded by Rowland Redge, 212;
407
Warren, Joseph, and the "Committees of
Correspondence", 671
Warren, Sir Peter, Commodore, 525
Warwick, Ambrose Dudley, Earl of,
interested by Frobisher in North-West
Warwick, Earls of, see under Rich
Washington, Fort, 723-4
Washington, George, at Great Meadows,
394, 467; and the boycott of British
goods, 600; introduces the "Resolves of
1769" into the Virginia House of Bur-
930
INDEX
gesses, 668; appointed Commander-in-
chief, 682; 700; opposes invasion of
Canada in concert with the French, 712;
717; 720 seqq.; defeat of, at Brandywine,
733> 734J at Valley Forge, 735, 737-3;
T 7395 74^; 748; 75i; 753-45 759; 7^3; 7^4
Waterford, 28
Waterloo, 12; 13
Watson, Charles, Rear-Admiral in India,
and Clive, 529
Watt, James, n
Wedderburn, Alexander, Lord Lough-
borough, Solicitor-General, and the
Whateley letters, 672
Weekly Jamaica Courant, first published at
Kingston in 1772, 382
Weiser, Conrad, 402
Wellmgton,ArthurWellesley, istDukeof, 13
Welsers, the, German finannal house of, 30
Welwood, William, Scotch professor, author
of De Dommo mans, 203
Wentworth, Benning, Governor of New
Hampshire, his defeat of the Assembly,
436
Wentworth, General, unsuccessful expe-
dition of, against Cartagena, 371
Werden, John, promoter of Navigation
Acts, 271
Wesel, Prussian fortress of, 461
Wesley, John, 10; and the rebellion of the
colonies, 761
Westlndies,4;9; 10; 15; 19528; 32; English
privateering in, 35, 517; trade with,
35, 36; 72; 98; 105; attacks of Somers,
Shirley and Parker on, 126; Dutch in,
128, 221 ; 133; resistance of the Royalists
m> i33> 209-10, 218-19; policy of
Cromwell in, 135, 228-9, 232-8;
Netherlands West India Company, 140-
2; settlement of Warner on St Christo-
pher, 143; annexation of Barbados, 144;
the proprietary system in, 145, 171-2;
151-4; economic conditions in, con-
trasted with those in New England, 162;
the Providence Company's colonies, 167;
Carlisle finally secures Barbados, 172;
the devastation of St Christopher and
Nevis by Spain, 173; further disputes as
to proprietorship, 174; introduction of
sugar industry to, 210; under Charles II,
241-7, 508; and the Revolution of 1688,
261, 263; 265; growth in population of,
267; and the Navigation Acts, a8i-£,
289-97; 305; co-operation with the
French in, 312; 326-7; the Treaty of
Utrecht and, 328, 377, 523 ; trade of, with
Spanish America, 330-4, 337-42; de-
cine of, 345; 348; disputes between, and
the Crown, 377-8; conditions in, in the
first half of the eighteenth century, 377-
83; trade with the North American
colonies, 396-7, 575-6, 579, 583-4; 597;
government of (1660-1763), 405-37; in
war, 512-5, 518-30; 534-5; 559-60; and
home industries, 565; 570^3; 581-6;
588-91 ; 600-1 ; 630; emissaries from the
rebellious colonies in, 682; 685; 690;
d'Estaing's campaigns in, 711; Rodney
and de Guichen in, 749-50; 757-9; social
life in, 813 seqq.
West, Captain, commander of H.M.S.
Champion, 457
West, Richard, counsel of the Board of
Trade, 615-16
West Point, Benedict Arnold at, 748
"Western Design", of Oliver Cromwell,
225-6; 332
Westiake,J., 1 86; 556
Westminster, Convention of, 471-2, 475
Westminster, Treaty of (1654), and the
right of search, 557; Treaty of (1716),
agreement with the Emperor, for mutual
defence, 356
Westphalia, Peace of, influence of Grotius
upon principles of, 206; 538
Wey mouth, 516
Weymouth, lliomas Thynne, 3rd Viscount,
697; 700-1; 711; 714
Whateley, Thomas, draws up the Stamp
Act, 646; the Whateley Letters, 672
Wheler, Governor, belief of, that he was
alone in enforcing the Acts of Trade, 283 ;
first Royal Governor-in-Chief of the Lee-
ward Islands, 47-8
Wheler, Sir Francis, West Indian expedi-
tion of, 514
Whetstone, Sir William, Rear-Admiral, 5 1 9
Whitbourne, Sir Richard, and Newfound-
land, 148
White, John, promoter of unsuccessful
settlement in Virginia, 71; 75; 109; 166
White, John, the Rev., Puritan incumbent
of Holy Trinity, Dorchester, begetter of
the Massachusetts Bay colony, 159
White Sea, Muscovy Company's route
through, 40; 65
Whitefield, George, 403; 793; 802
Whitehall, Treaty of, between England and
Holland in 1689, and the rights of
neutrals, 556
Whiteplains, Washington at, 723
Whydah, British fort on coast of Dahomey,
Wiapoco, River, 86; 87; 139; 14$
Wilkes, John, 563; and the Middlesex
William II, Prince of Orange, 309; 221;
death of, 222
William III, Prince of Orange, King of
England, 134; 260; proclaimed in New
York by Leisler, 261; his settlement of
American affairs, 261-3; sets up the
Board oi Tiade, 269; becomes Stadholder,
318; marries Mary, daughter of James I,
319; promoter of the League of Augsburg
(1686), 320; 321; and the Partition
Treaties, 322-3; and the War of the
Spanish Succession, 325-6; 518
INDEX
William and Mary, College of, in Virginia,
399; 79<>
William IV, Stadholder of Netherlands,
son-in-law of George II, 375
William Henry, Fort, capture of, by Mont-
calm, 476
Williams, Roger, founder of colony of
Rhode Island, 163 ; expelled from Massa-
chusetts, 164; religious freedom in Rhode
Island due to, 1 70, 796
Williamsburg, 68 1
Williamson, Joseph, promoter of Naviga-
tion Acts, 271
Willoughby, of Parham, Francis, Lord,
leader of the Royalists in Barbados, 133,
212, 219; occupies St Lucia, iS6; his
colony at Surinam, 231; his royalist
plots and his visits to the Tower, 231 ;
surrenders his patent to Charles II, 241 ;
becomes Governor of Barbados, 241-2;
death of, 242
Willoughby, of Parham, William, Lord,
succeeds his brother Francis in 1667, 242 ;
recovers Antigua and Monlserrat from
the French, 242; 815
Willoughby, Sir Hugh, dies in Lapland,
CJQ.
Wilmott,
Windsor, Thomas, Lord, sent out by
Restoration Government as Governor of
_ amaica, 244
indward Islands, settlement on, destroyed
by Caribs, 87; 642
Wine, 32 533; 43; 65; 275
Winthrop, John, Governor, of the Massa-
chusetts Bay Company, 160
Winthrop, John, the younger, Governor of
Connecticut, procures charter from
Charles II for Connecticut, 163
Wise, F., his Vindication of New England
Churches, 806-7
Wither, George, his Perpetual Parliament, 608
Witt, John de, 301
Wolfe, James, General, and Quebec, 483,
485* 530-3 ; on the Americans, 682
Wolverston, Captain Charles, Governor of
-Barbados for the Earl of Carlisle, 171
Wood, William, 571-2; 576
Wii
Woodes Rogers, Captain, 344; in the
Bahamas, 384
Woollen trade, 37 ; 38; 41 ; 562 ; 573~4; 593
Worcester, battle of, 222
Worms, Treaty of (1743), 373
Worsley, Governor of Barbados, grant
voted to hi™ by the Assembly, 378
Wright, Captain, 513
Wright, Edward, advances science of navi-
gation, 131
Wyat, Sir Francis, first Royal Governor of
Virginia, 152
Wychtfe, John, on the rights of non-
Christian peoples, 191
Wyndham, Thomas, engaged in West
African trade, 41, 42, 43
Wynter, John, captain of the Elizabeth, 101
Wynter, George, Navy official, engaged m
African trade, 44
Wynter, Sir WiJliam, Navy official, en-
gaged in African trade, 44; backs John
Hawkins, 47
Xeres, 125
Yale, University of, 399; undergraduates
at, join the Church, 404
Yamassee Indians, wars with, in South
Carolina, 385, 390, 391
Yarmouth, Amalie, Countess of, 460; 480
Yarmouth, fight between Dutch and
Dunkirkers in the harbour of, 201
Yeardley, Sir George, succeeds Dale as
Governor of Virginia, 84; 112; convokes
first Virginia Assembly, 152
Yorke, Philip, his fear of the Jacobites,
Yorke, Sir John, engaged in West African
trade, 42, 43; uncle of Martin Frobisher,
Yorktown, surrender of Cornwallis at, 506,
760, 767
Yucatan, 246; 382; 692
Zealand, promised to England by the
secret Treaty of Dover, 316
Zenger, John Peter, trial of, for libel, 388,
Zorndorf, battle of, 478
CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY
w. LEWIS. M.A.
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Live Music
Archive
Librivox
Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland
Museum of Art
Internet
Arcade
Console Living Room
Open Library
American
Libraries
TV News
Understanding
9/11